

## **SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL**

### **WHY ETHNIC SUBALTERN-LED PARTIES CROWD OUT ARMED ORGANIZATIONS** Explaining Maoist Violence in India

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## **Online Appendix**

This appendix contains additional information on our data and results. Sections 1-3 discuss our data and measures. Section 4, and the accompanying tables address the results of the robustness tests described in Section 9.

### **1. Data on Maoist Violence**

Our key dependent variable – chronic Maoist violence -- is a count of the years in which a district experienced at least one death related to Maoist violence during the 1981-2008 period. We also use three measures related to this count: the number and the fraction of years that a district experienced at least one death associated with Maoist violence before and after the 1977-1980 elections; and a dummy variable for whether or not a district was affected by Maoist violence (yearly from 1967 to 2008).

The count of “Maoist” or “Naxal” incidents is a broad measure of Maoist activity, violent and otherwise. In the year 1971, for example, the count of Maoist incidents includes a “gherao” (a form of protest which involves surrounding a person or building) of a university vice chancellor by Naxalite students in West Bengal, the shouting of slogans when a Naxal student leader was produced in court in Kerala, the distribution of Maoist leaflets in a small town in Uttar Pradesh, an exchange of fire between the police and armed Naxals in a hilly district of Andhra Pradesh with no casualties, and the killing of a landlord by 300 armed Naxals in Orissa.

The count of “deaths” is a narrow measure of Maoist violence, which, in the examples above, would only include the single death associated with the last incident. In general, the count of deaths in any given year represents, not a single large-scale incident of violence, but the agglomeration of a number of small scale ones: a student killed in a clash between Naxalite students and others at a university, a landlord killed in one village, or a suspected “Naxalite” shot dead by the police in a third.

Note that this measure does not distinguish between acts of violence initiated by Maoists and acts of violence in which they were responding to acts of violence initiated by security forces. This is for two reasons: first, because “responding” to acts of violence initiated by security forces or other parties indicates the presence of a critical mass of Maoist recruits in the same way as initiating such acts does, and second because many incidents of violence occur and are reported as “clashes” between the Maoists and security forces so that it is not possible to distinguish between those who initiated the attack and those who responded.

These are the only data that capture systematically the history of the Maoist movement from its inception in 1967, and are more transparent, detailed and disaggregated than any available alternative. Government data are available only from 2000 onwards and then for the state rather than the district level. Other non-governmental data sources on this subject (WITS, SATP) are also compiled for the most part from national English language dailies, cover a truncated time period (usually from 2005 onwards), focus only on specific types of violence (WITS) and are usually not transparent about their coding criteria. Two important exceptions are Kapur, Gawande and Satyanath (2012) and Dasgupta, Gawande and Kapur (2014), which employ a painstakingly

collected dataset that combines information from regional newspapers with English language newspapers. However, these data refer to a truncated sample of districts and years (districts in six states for the 2001-2008 period). Mukherjee (2013) uses government provided polling-station level data. These data too are truncated: they refer to one state (Andhra Pradesh) for one year (2003).

Although these data are unique in their temporal and spatial scope, they are not without problems. They suffer from the possibility of both measurement error and bias for several reasons, and we try to take into account the nature of the error and bias, their sources, and possible solutions in our analysis. The measurement error is likely to take the form of consistently underestimating both the scale of Maoist *violence* and the scale of Maoist *activities* broadly defined. These data are likely to underestimate of Maoist *violence* for at least two reasons: (1) The *Times of India* is a national newspaper and is likely to miss small-scale acts of violence that may be more likely to be reported by regional or local newspapers. (2) By constructing district-level data, we lose information provided at a higher level of aggregation such as casualty counts at the state or national level. And they are likely to underestimate Maoist *activity* because non-violent activities (such as building a base, or recruiting support) often take place in clandestine fashion and are not reported at all at any level.

To assess this measurement error we compare the *Times of India* dataset with several alternate original sources of data that we have also collected. These include (1) District level data for all Indian districts collected using FACTIVA, an online news digest that includes a number of news sources including wire sources. (2) District-level estimates of Maoist incidents from 2000-2009 collected by the state intelligence authorities for one state –the state of Jharkhand and (3) District-

level estimates of Maoist incidents for the same period for the state of Jharkhand coded from *Prabhat Khabar*, Jharkhand's principal Hindi language newspaper. We then compare our dataset to these alternate sources of data, as well as to existing data from SATP, WITS, and the Indian government.

This is the only attempt at triangulation that we know of that obtains and compares all the available data sources on Maoist violence at the district level. These comparisons indicate the following: (1) The direction of the error is consistent – our data are a consistent underestimate compared to these other sources. (2) The magnitude of the underestimate is very large when it refers to a count of incidents or deaths in any given year. (3) The magnitude of the underestimate is considerably reduced when we simply consider a dummy variable for whether or not a district was affected by a death in any given year. This is consistent with the findings of Behrendorf et al (2014) who find that there is significantly less volatility across datasets in counts of deaths compared to incidents, and still less volatility in counts of the number of years affected by deaths than in number of deaths. (4) The magnitude of the underestimate almost disappears when we collapse counts across a number of years. For example, if we simply code whether or not a district was affected by deadly Maoist violence during a five-year period in the state of Jharkhand, for which we have data from multiple sources, the codings from our dataset, from the regional newspaper *Prabhat Khabar* and the state intelligence data are the same.

There is a strong district-level association between the count of years affected by Maoist-related deaths and the number of deaths. Figure A3 shows that these two measures of violence are strongly and positively correlated. The correlation coefficient is  $r = 0.80$ . Except for a few data points, the

number of deaths increases linearly with the number of years of violence. However, by focusing on a count of years a district is affected by deaths rather than a count of deaths across districts, or a count of incidents, or years affected by incidents, we are able to reduce much of the measurement error discussed above. There are conceptual reasons for our choice of dependent variable, of course, but it also has this second effect of reducing measurement error. Further, our results are robust to ordinal specifications of our dependent variable – based on both the number of deaths and the number of years -- which may reduce this measurement error even further.

Constructivist approaches to the study of violence suggest a second potential problem with the data for this paper – and with newspaper based data in general, which are the backbone of practically all datasets on civil war. They tell us that the alleged “facts” of violence that make it into our datasets– such as whether an act of violence occurred or not, and whether, if it occurred, it was a riot or civil war, or some other type of event, and whether it is ethnic or not – are at least partly a product of an act of framing.<sup>1</sup>

When applied to our analysis, this raises the problem not only of measurement error but of a spurious relationship. If our counts of years of violence in any given district reflect framing rather than an objective phenomenon, then, when we explain district-wise variation in chronic Maoist violence are we actually explaining not an objective phenomenon but variation in the successful framing of otherwise ambiguous acts of violence as Maoist?

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<sup>1</sup> Brass 1997, Brubaker and Laitin 1998.

XXX's fieldwork suggests that these framing effects often do occur in the Maoist case and also allows us assess both the nature of the bias introduced by framing and its limits. XXX finds that framing effects usually produce a tendency towards overestimation of "Maoist violence." For local police officials, for example, classifying otherwise ambiguous activity in a district as "Maoist" in nature can serve as a basis on which to extract resources from the state or central government for counter-insurgency operations. For perpetrators of an act of violence, the framing of an act of violence as "Maoist" can serve as a legitimizing device, justifying a killing as effective counter-insurgency (if the perpetrator is from the security forces) or as legitimate ideological warfare (if the perpetrator is a civilian) rather than as ordinary crime. Maoist organizations may well oppose the labeling of individual activities as "Maoist" if they are falsely implicated or if such a labeling justifies police repression. But overlabeling of incidents as "Maoist" in the aggregate serves their interests by amplifying their presence even where they may be weak.

But there are constraints to whether and how an act can be framed as a "Maoist" act. Some activities are sufficiently unverifiable or ambiguous to allow interested parties to claim that they occurred when they did not, or claim that they were Maoist when they were not. Others are less susceptible to framing. Consider for example the first reported act of "Naxalite" violence in 1967, in which a police inspector was killed by Santhal tribals organized by dissident CPM cadres in Naxalbari. We know that the police inspector was in fact killed because there was a body that was identified as his and claimed by his colleagues as his. And we know that the "Naxalites" were involved because the incident attracted a lot of attention and the accounts of all sides – the Naxalites, the police, the villagers, the victim's family, the media and the national government – agreed on the interpretation of the act as a "Naxalite" one. This is not to say that a Naxalite framing

is the only one that could be imposed on this incident. There can be numerous objectively correct codings, of which a Naxalite or Maoist coding is one.

We mitigate this possible bias introduced by framing effects both through our choice of dependent variable and by experimenting with alternate specifications of the dependent variable. First, our focus on deaths rather than other types of Maoist activities reduces the framing bias. Despite the incentives, it is harder for all sides – the state, Maoists and civilians – to misclassify deaths compared to non-fatal acts of violence or non-violent “incidents.”

For example, a district administrator might manufacture a Maoist incident, saying Maoist political posters were put up in an area when they were not. This framing may persist because it is hard to verify and discount: if the posters in question are not found, the administrator might simply claim that they were torn down. But in order to successfully claim that a death has occurred, the claim has to be associated with a body. Data on deaths, therefore are in this case generally more reliable than data on incidents, violent or otherwise, that do not include a death. Further, because we code a district as affected by a death only if we find a report on this death in a newspaper, and these reports are scrutinized by journalists, the affected families and the state, they are likely to be more reliable than state-provided lists of districts allegedly “affected” by deaths.

Of course, even if the count of deaths is reliable, the question arises of whether classification of a death as “Maoist-related” is an overestimate. Here again using a count of the number of years a district experiences Maoist-related deaths rather than the count of deaths mitigates some of the problem. Even if some number of deaths are mistakenly framed as Maoist-related in a district in a



given year, our variable would be accurate as long as only one is correctly categorized as Maoist related. The constructivist problem is probably more acute for other dependent variables such as counts of deaths or counts of non-fatal activity or classifications of participants as either civilian or Maoist.

## **2. Data on Subaltern Incorporation**

The data on subaltern incorporation refers to elections held for 27 state legislative assemblies between 1977-80. Table A1 lists the number of assembly elections, and the states they were held in, for each year during this interval.

We classify each party in each state in a number of ways, including whether or not it is “exclusively” subaltern led -- the classification which our key independent variable is based on - - as well as several others. We also classify parties, for example, based on whether they are “partially” subaltern led (i.e. whether subaltern leaders share leadership posts with members of dominant groups), whether a party has a “Left” ideology, whether a party is the ruling party in the state and so on. Finally, for every party that is classified as subaltern-led in some way, we disaggregate the coding for the precise ethnic category that the leadership comes from, as well as experimenting with a number of other even more finely grained disaggregations.

We identify the key leadership position(s) within a party by combining information from the party’s documents where they are available, from secondary literature on the party organization (including books and JSTOR), and from news reports of the party’s election campaign in the 1977-80 election. For large and medium sized parties, we usually had multiple sources: news articles,

secondary studies and party documents. For very small parties, the *Times of India* was often our only source, since secondary sources and party constitutions were not available.

We try both to identify the formal position of a leader, and then to verify whether this formal position also indicates de facto leadership within the party. We ascertain de facto leadership by reading news articles (and any secondary literature) for the names of the person or persons making decisions on ticket allocation, campaign strategy and government formation.

Consider for example the DMK in Tamil Nadu. Elections were held in Tamil Nadu in October 1977. The DMK is a very well studied party, and a number of secondary sources<sup>2</sup> identify Karunanidhi as its formal leader, without always identifying his formal designation. We were not able to obtain a copy of the DMK constitution for this period, but used the *Times of India* to verify that his formal position was party president. Next, we collected a sample of up to 50 articles on the DMK's election campaign in Tamil Nadu during the 1977 election campaign from the *Times of India* digital archive to confirm that Karunanidhi was in fact the leader with defacto authority to make consequential decisions. We found that while these articles mentioned some other leaders, such as K. Anbazhagan, the deputy leader of the party, they did not associate these leaders with comparable authority. So we treated Karunanidhi as the only leader.

The name of the formal leadership position at the state level varies across parties. For example, the “key” state leader of the Communist Party of India (CPI) is the “State Secretary,” while for the

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<sup>2</sup> See Washbrook in Frankel and Rao 257, as well as Barnett and Subramanian for example.

Congress Party it is the Pradesh Congress Committee President and for the DMK it is the party president. So does the name and number of positions which reflect defacto authority.

The number of leaders we code for ranged from 1-4, but, since parties in India are relatively centralized, the majority of parties were on the lower end of this scale, with 1 or 2 leaders. In the case of the DMK, there was only 1 key leader. The relatively rare case of 4 leaders included the Janata Party in Uttar Pradesh. In UP's Janata, the key leaders were Chandra Shekhar, Charan Singh, Ram Naresh Yadav and Raj Narain. This is consistent with the history of Janata from secondary sources as an amalgam of multiple parties with multiple leaders from those parties jostling for space.

Recall that our coding for the same party can vary across states. Our coding for the Janata Party leadership varied across states as did that of the Congress and some other parties which had a presence in more than one state.

Once we had the names of key leaders, we used a combination of newspaper and secondary sources to code for all the ethnic identity categories to which they belonged and for which we could get information. Karunanidhi, for example, was coded as a Vellala (caste), Hindu (religion), Tamil speaker (language), born in Thanjavur (region). Based on this fine-grained coding, we were able to identify which subaltern category or categories he belonged to: here we was coded as belonging to the Backward Caste (BC), and not belonging to the following categories: SC, ST, Muslim,

Christian, Sikh, and Buddhist. Consequently, we coded the DMK in Tamil Nadu as a subaltern-led party. Since the DMK was led only by Karunanidhi it was also an “only” subaltern-led party.

Similarly, for the rare instances of plural leadership, such as the case of the Janata Party in Uttar Pradesh, we coded for all categories for all four leaders: Charan Singh (Hindu, Jat, Hindi speaking), Ram Naresh Yadav (Hindu, BC, Hindi speaking), Raj Narain (Hindu, Bhumihar Brahmin, Hindi speaking), Chandra Shekhar (Hindu, Rajput, Hindi speaking). The only leader who falls into a subaltern-category is Yadav, whose Yadav identity places him in the backward caste category. Consequently we code Janata in Uttar Pradesh as a party with *some* subaltern leadership but not as an exclusively subaltern-led party.

We give below an example of the coding of some variables for parties for Uttar Pradesh. Since some parties run in multiple states, the identity of the leadership of the same party can differ across states, and we code for several different variables relating to leadership, we cannot provide data on all parties for all parties, short of providing our entire dataset. But this should be sufficient to provide some detail about our coding criteria.

**State: Uttar Pradesh. Date of Election: October 6 1977**

Party	Any Subaltern Leader- ship	Only Subaltern Leader- ship	Ruling Party	Left Party
Janata Party	1	0	1	0
Indian National Congress	0	0	0	0
Communist Party Of India	0	0	0	1
Communist Party Of India (Marxist)	0	0	0	1
Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha	0	0	0	0
Akhil Bhartiya Ramrajya Parishad	0	0	0	0
All India Forward Block	0	0	0	1
Muslim League	1	1	0	0
Republican Party Of India	1	1	0	0
Republican Party Of India (Khobragade)	1	1	0	0
Revolutionary Socialist Party	0	0	0	1
Shoshit Samaj Dal (Akhil Bhartiya)	1	1	0	0
Socialist Unity Centre Of India	0	0	0	1
Uttar Pradesh Kishan Mazdoor Party	1	1	0	0

Once we have classified each party in each state according to its leadership, we then construct a constituency-level measure of the votes captured by each party, separately. In addition, for every electoral constituency in every state in each election, we record information on a number of variables including the party affiliation of every candidate who contested the election (including

independent, the vote obtained by each party or independent candidate, the position obtained by each candidate, whether or not the constituency is “reserved” for Scheduled Caste, or Scheduled Tribe candidates, the number of voters and electors in the constituency and so on.

We then aggregate this constituency-level dataset to give us a district-level dataset. The electoral constituencies for India’s assembly elections are different from, but perfectly contained within, census districts. There were 3995 electoral constituencies in the elections that took place between 1977-1980, which are contained within 593 districts (using 2001 census boundaries). Constituency boundaries did not change for the entire period of analysis – the 1977-80 elections were held based on a delimitation completed in the year 1976, and these constituency boundaries remained fixed for the most part until the year 2008. Consequently, our district-wise measure of subaltern incorporation is constructed by assigning each constituency to 2001 administrative districts using the 1976 delimitation order published by the Election Commission of India and the Census of India 2001.

This district-level dataset has a number of district-level variables on subaltern incorporation based on the classifications of parties in the constituency-level dataset. These variables include the district-wise proportion of the vote obtained by exclusively subaltern-led parties. This is our key independent variable, which is described in detail in the text of the paper. But we also generate a number of additional variables, including the following: the district-wise proportion of seats won by exclusively subaltern-led parties; the district-wise proportion of the votes and seats obtained by “partially” subaltern-led parties in a district and the district-wise proportion of the votes and seats obtained by the ruling subaltern-led parties (whether exclusively or partially subaltern led). We

also disaggregate each district-wise measure describing a subaltern-led party by the precise subaltern group it represents. These fine classifications allow us to explore the precise form of subaltern-incorporation which acts as a deterrent to armed group organization.

### **3. Data on Control Variables**

The control variables included in the dataset include measures for a wide range of variables suggested by the comparative and India-specific literatures as plausible factors that may be correlated with subaltern incorporation and Maoist violence in India. All time-varying variables are measured as far as possible at the pre-treatment level and matched to 2001 district boundaries. Time invariant variables are measured in whichever year the data were available, and matched to 2001 district boundaries.

India's district boundaries have undergone changes with each census: there were 412 districts in the 1981 census, which increased to 466 in the 1991 census, and 593 in the 2001 census. The census records the precise territorial changes in each case. We match these districts to 2001 district boundaries using the census descriptions of territorial changes, in conjunction with Kumar and Somanathan (2009), which tries to facilitate the creation of district panels by describing the share of each old district into a new one in each census from 1971-2001.

***Land area*** is the log of district area measured in square kilometers from the Census of India 2001.

***Rough Terrain*** is an index measuring differences in mean elevation in a district constructed following the topographic ruggedness index developed by Riley, et al. (1999), using 0.083-degree

resolution data on elevation from the FAO's Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ v3.0) available at <http://gaez.fao.org/>

**Forest** is the log of the percentage of a district's area covered by forest in 1987-89, the earliest years for which the Forest Survey of India reports district-wise data. This measure, based on satellite imagery from 1987-89, was published by the government of India's State of Forest Report 1991. (Earlier State of the Forest Reports, published in 1987 and 1989 do not report district-wise data).

**Minerals** is a dummy variable coded 1 if a district has mineral reserves of iron ore, bauxite or coal and 0 otherwise. The data on these minerals and all others are downloaded from <http://ibm.nic.in/reserves.htm>, and supplemented by the Indian Bureau of Mines and Minerals Yearbook of India 2009 for coal and petroleum reserves, which are not reported in the earlier source. We focus on iron ore, bauxite and coal in our analysis because three minerals are the ones widely hypothesized to be associated with Maoist violence and so this is a stricter test than if we included all minerals. However, our data contain information on all mineral reserves, and using alternate codings, for all minerals broadly or some important ones (e.g. petroleum) specifically does not change the effect of subaltern incorporation. We use data on mineral reserves, rather than on production or employment in mines, because data on reserves are more obviously exogenous.

**Prior Maoist Violence** is a dummy for Maoist violence during the 1967-1976 period. It is based on the data on deaths associated with Maoist activity described earlier.



*Large land-holdings* is a dummy for districts in which individuals hold landholdings of 10 hectares or more, calculated from the Agricultural Census of India 1991. We use the 1991 census here because of the volume of missing data in the agricultural census of 1981. There is not however significant change in the size of land holdings between 1981 and 1991. An alternate measure, which calculates the percentage of land area that consists of individual-owned large landholdings, yields the same results.

*Literacy* refers to the proportion of the population of a district which was literate (i.e could read and write in any language) is from the Census of India 1981.

*Scheduled Castes* refers to the proportion of population of a district which was Scheduled Caste in 1981 is from the Census of India 1981.

*Scheduled Tribe* refers to the proportion of population of a district which was Scheduled Tribe in 1981, is from the Census of India 1981.

*Marginal workers* refers to the proportion of the population of a district which consisted of marginal workers is from the Census of India 1981, where the term marginal worker is defined as a member of the workforce who has worked for less than six months in the calendar year preceding the year of enumeration. We use this as a measure of poverty since income based measures of poverty are not available in India, and the alternative consumption based measures collected by the National Sample Survey of India (NSS) are not representative at the district level for the pre-

treatment period.<sup>3</sup> The district level estimates of poverty, used in other studies such as Borooah 2008, for example, come from a National Sample Survey conducted in the year 2001.

**British rule** is a dummy variable coded 1 if a district under British rule (i.e. ruled directly by the British) and 0 otherwise, from Iyer 2010.

**Communist base** is a dummy variable coded 1 if a district had a candidate from either the CPI or CPM in the parliamentary elections of 1967 and 0 otherwise, coded from the Election Commission of India. Since these elections preceded any act of Maoist violence (including in the first wave), we can think of it this variable as a measure of Communist presence that is comfortably pre-treatment. We treat the presence of a Communist candidate as a proxy for the organizational presence of a Communist party in the district (more precise data on the district-wise presence of party organizations, such as the presence of party offices or membership rolls for example, do not exist).

**Homicide rate 1970s** and **Riots Rate 1970s** is measured as and coded from the Crime Records Bureau data averaging over 1972-1976 (<http://ncrb.nic.in/>).

**Non-Congress vote** refers to the district-wise vote share obtained by non-Congress parties in the 1977-80 assembly elections coded using data from the Election Commission.

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<sup>3</sup> Chaudhuri and Gupta 2009.

*Left vote* refers to the district-wise vote share obtained by the CPI and CPM in the 1977-80 assembly elections coded using data from the Election Commission.

*The effective number of parties* refers to the effective number of all candidates in an election (including independents where they are any) in the 1977-80 assembly elections coded using data from the Election Commission. We also test for calculations of the effective number of parties (dropping independents, or grouping them together as a single unit). None of the measures are significant.

*SC quotas* is the proportion of constituencies in a district that were reserved for SCs in the 1977-80 elections. Since almost all Scheduled Caste winners are elected from constituencies which have quotas for SCs, this serves as a measure of the proportion of Scheduled Caste candidates elected to office from a district.

*ST quotas* is the proportion of constituencies in a district that were reserved for SCs in the 1977-80 elections. Since almost all Scheduled Tribe winners are elected from constituencies which have quotas for STs, this serves as a measure of the proportion of Scheduled Tribe candidates elected to office from a district.

*Population* is the log of the population of the district in 1981 from the Census of India 1981.

#### **4. Threats to Causal Estimation**

This section discusses the robustness of our difference-in-differences results to: (1) time trends; (2) the exclusion of individual states and entire regions of India; (3) the clustering of standard errors by state; (4) dropping outlier districts; (5) different time periods; (6) the timing of elections

### ***Robustness to Time Trends***

Our yearly results could be confounded if there are district-specific time trends correlated with subaltern incorporation and Maoist violence. For example, a high level of subaltern incorporation achieved in 1980 may place a district on an “upward trend” in subaltern incorporation in subsequent years, thus reducing chronic violence over time for reasons not strictly part of our argument. We take care of this concern by re-estimating equation (3) including time trends that allow district-specific patterns of subaltern incorporation to trend in linear and non-linear ways over time.

### ***Excluding States and Regions***

Another concern is that individual states or clusters of states may disproportionately drive our results. For example, it is possible that the state of Jharkhand, because it is a young state (created in 2000) with systematically weaker state capacity than other states, may be driving the results. Similarly, the state of Andhra Pradesh, which developed an exceptionally strong counter-insurgency program in the mid-1990s, may also have a disproportionate influence on the results. We address these concerns by exploring the sensitivity of our results to the exclusion of individual states and entire regions of India. First, we remove states, one by one, and re-estimate equation (3). We then remove, one by one, each the following regions: North East, North, West, Central, East, and South. We also remove states on India’s periphery, states affected by prior insurgencies, states in which only subaltern parties were main contenders, and “young” states created in or after

2000. Figure A2 in the Appendix shows that our results are not particularly sensitive to the exclusion of individual states or clusters of states.

### ***Clustering Standard Errors by State***

Our regression models cluster the standard errors by district, which assumes zero cross-district spatial correlation. This may be a strong assumption given that both Maoist violence and subaltern incorporation seem to be territorially concentrated. To allow for arbitrary within-state correlation, we re-estimate equations (2) and (3) using state-clustered standard errors. This is a particularly severe test. Since only 15 states have districts that experienced Maoist violence, it reduces our effective sample to 15 observations. The results, reported in Table A6, indicate that the coefficient of interest becomes smaller but remains statistically significant at the conventional levels.

### ***Excluding Outlier Districts***

We test the sensitivity of our results from equations (2) and (3) to the exclusion of districts with extreme violence. We define as outliers those observations outside an interval of four standard deviations around the mean of years of Maoist violence. This includes districts that experienced 20 years or more of Maoist violence between 1981 and 2008. Table A7 shows that the results remain qualitatively identical and precisely estimated.

### ***Sensitivity to Different Time Periods***

We also assess whether our main results are sensitive to different time periods. We look separately at the effect of subaltern incorporation on Maoist violence during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. The results reported in Table A8 indicate that the effect is significant during the 1980s but stronger

during the 1990s and 2000s. We find these results reassuring, since the present-day Maoist organizations were at a fledgling stage in the 1980s, and expanded their reach only subsequently.

### *Timing of Elections*

Finally, we address concerns regarding the timing of elections by including only the subset of districts that held elections in 1977.<sup>4</sup> Even though this reduces the sample size noticeably, the coefficient estimates reported in the Appendix Table A9 demonstrate that our results remain substantively identical and statistically significant, even after removing such observations from the sample.

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<sup>4</sup> The following states did not hold elections in 1977, and are therefore excluded from the analysis: Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Sikkim.

**TABLE A1:**  
**NUMBER OF DISTRICTS THAT EXPERIENCED THEIR FIRST YEAR OF VIOLENCE IN ANY GIVEN YEAR**

<b>Year</b>	<b>No. Districts</b>	<b>Cumulative Percent</b>
1981	17	12.41
1981	17	12.41
1982	17	24.82
1983	11	32.85
1984	6	37.23
1985	9	43.80
1986	8	49.64
1987	4	52.55
1988	3	54.74
1989	2	56.20
1990	6	60.58
1991	10	67.88
1992	3	70.07
1993	2	71.53
1994	2	72.99
1995	1	73.72
1996	3	75.91
1997	3	78.10
1998	4	81.02
1999	1	81.75
2000	3	83.94
2001	1	84.67
2002	6	89.05
2003	2	90.51
2004	2	91.97
2005	4	94.89
2006	3	97.08
2007	4	100.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>137</b>	<b>100</b>

**TABLE A2:  
ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS INCLUDED IN THE DATA**

<b>Year of Election</b>	<b>No. States</b>	<b>States</b>
1977	17	<i>Bihar, Goa Daman and Diu, Delhi, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Nagaland, Orissa, Pondicherry, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal</i>
1978	6	<i>Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Meghalaya</i>
1979	2	<i>Mizoram, Sikkim</i>
1980	2	<i>Gujarat, Manipur</i>
<b>Total</b>	<b>27</b>	

*Notes:* The states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttarakhand, created in 2000, are counted as part of Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh in the list above. Delhi and Pondicherry, which are union territories but had assembly elections, are also counted.



**TABLE A3:  
TESTS TO COMPARE THE FIT OF DIFFERENT COUNT MODELS**

<b>Poisson</b>		BIC= -1662.467	AIC= 3.03	Prefer	Over	Evidence
vs	NB	BIC= -2191.149 AIC= 2.040 LRX2= 534.971	dif= 528.683 dif= 0.991 prob= 0	NB NB NB	Poisson Poisson Poisson	Very strong p=0.000
vs	ZIP	BIC= -2116.280 AIC= 2.020 Vuong= 4.255	dif= 453.813 dif= 1.011 prob= 0	ZIP ZIP ZIP	Poisson Poisson Poisson	Very strong p=0.000
vs	<b>ZINB</b>	BIC= -2200.665 AIC= 1.855	dif= 538.199 dif= 1.176	<b>ZINB</b> <b>ZINB</b>	Poisson Poisson	Very strong
<b>NB</b>		BIC= -2191.149	AIC= 2.04	Prefer	Over	Evidence
vs	ZIP	BIC= -2116.280 AIC= 2.020	dif= -74.87 dif= 0.02	NB ZIP	ZIP NB	Very strong
vs	<b>ZINB</b>	BIC= -2200.665 AIC= 1.855 Vuong= 6.354	dif= 9.516 dif= 0.185 prob= 0	<b>ZINB</b> <b>ZINB</b> <b>ZINB</b>	NB NB NB	Strong p=0.000
<b>ZIP</b>		BIC= -2116.280	AIC= 2.02	Prefer	Over	Evidence
vs	<b>ZINB</b>	BIC= -2200.665 AIC= 1.855 LRX2= 90.674	dif= 84.386 dif= 0.165 prob= 0	<b>ZINB</b> <b>ZINB</b> <b>ZINB</b>	ZIP ZIP ZIP	Very strong p=0.000

*Notes:* These tests compare the fit of Poisson, Negative Binomial (NB), Zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP), and Zero-inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) regressions using the specification with the full set of covariates. Fit statistics include: the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the Likelihood ratio chi-square (LRX2), and the Vuong statistic.

**TABLE A4:**  
**ZINB ESTIMATES INCLUDING THE FULL SET OF COVARIATES IN THE INFLATION MODELS**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Dependent variable:</i>	<i>Number of years that a district was affected by Maoist violence between 1981 and 2008</i>							
<b>Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Estimates</b>								
Subaltern incorporation	-2.72*** (0.39)	-2.72*** (0.40)	-2.55*** (0.36)	-2.34*** (0.69)	-2.37*** (0.30)	-2.76*** (0.42)	-2.63*** (0.39)	-3.27*** (0.54)
Prior Maoist violence		-0.12 (0.24)	-0.09 (0.23)	-0.20 (0.25)	0.00 (0.23)	-0.01 (0.23)	-0.07 (0.25)	-0.09 (0.24)
Land area			0.29 (0.20)	0.37 (0.24)	0.10 (0.16)	0.24 (0.22)	0.34 (0.25)	0.54*** (0.20)
Rough terrain			0.05 (0.12)	0.01 (0.22)	0.16 (0.13)	0.08 (0.12)	0.01 (0.16)	0.02 (0.14)
Forest			-0.25 (0.21)	-0.07 (0.18)	-0.13 (0.17)	-0.26 (0.19)	-0.22 (0.21)	0.01 (0.16)
Minerals			0.80* (0.42)	0.96** (0.40)	0.60** (0.28)	0.70* (0.40)	0.83 (0.55)	0.75** (0.36)
Large land-holdings				-0.16 (0.31)				-0.58* (0.31)
Literacy				-1.54 (1.99)				-0.42 (1.32)
Scheduled castes				2.43 (2.16)				2.79 (2.27)
Scheduled tribes				-0.41 (0.83)				-3.42** (1.47)
Marginal workers				-14.53* (8.03)				-17.56** (7.79)
British rule					-0.74** (0.32)			-0.91*** (0.35)
Communist base					-0.02 (0.34)			0.13 (0.27)
Homicide rate 1970s						0.07* (0.04)		0.16** (0.07)
Riots rate 1970s						-0.01 (0.01)		-0.03** (0.01)
Non-congress vote							0.36 (0.87)	2.38** (0.98)
Left vote							-0.78 (0.93)	-1.40 (0.98)
Effective no. parties							0.03 (0.33)	-0.18 (0.25)
SC quotas							0.30 (1.02)	-1.42 (1.22)
ST quotas							-0.26 (0.48)	1.40** (0.62)
Observations	538	538	538	538	538	538	538	538

*Notes:* Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Population is used as exposure in all regressions. For brevity, the results from the inflation models are not reported, but the full set of covariates is included in all cases. \*\*\* Significant at the 1% level; \*\* significant at the 5% level; \* significant at the 10% level.

**TABLE A5:**  
**CROSS-SECTIONAL RESULTS**  
**CLUSTERING STANDARD ERRORS BY STATE AND CONTROLLING FOR CHIEF MINISTERS**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Dependent variable:</i>	<i>Number of years that a district was affected by Maoist violence between 1981 and 2008</i>									
	Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Estimates								ZIP	OLS
Subaltern incorporation	-1.77*** (0.47)	-1.78*** (0.49)	-1.67*** (0.49)	-1.35** (0.61)	-1.61*** (0.50)	-1.70** (0.70)	-1.78*** (0.41)	-1.32* (0.75)	-2.04** (0.81)	-4.22* (2.05)
Prior Maoist violence		-0.23 (0.23)	-0.22 (0.24)	-0.20 (0.26)	-0.27 (0.23)	-0.07 (0.19)	-0.15 (0.19)	-0.10 (0.20)	0.05 (0.09)	0.27 (0.58)
Land area			0.24 (0.16)	0.22 (0.19)	0.22 (0.21)	0.21 (0.16)	0.21 (0.17)	0.26 (0.24)	0.22 (0.24)	0.38 (0.48)
Rough terrain			0.03 (0.21)	0.13 (0.22)	0.00 (0.21)	0.03 (0.20)	0.07 (0.18)	0.11 (0.18)	0.08 (0.16)	0.20 (0.33)
Forest			0.04 (0.19)	0.11 (0.20)	0.06 (0.21)	0.04 (0.18)	-0.06 (0.18)	0.04 (0.22)	0.02 (0.19)	0.63 (0.59)
Minerals			0.19 (0.28)	0.02 (0.35)	0.24 (0.24)	0.25 (0.31)	0.20 (0.21)	0.47* (0.24)	0.59*** (0.16)	2.08* (1.16)
Large land-holdings				-0.61 (0.50)				-0.91** (0.42)	-0.62** (0.30)	-2.15 (1.55)
Literacy				-2.31 (1.81)				-1.92 (1.72)	-1.12 (1.61)	-4.54 (6.18)
Scheduled castes				1.09 (2.74)				3.16* (1.73)	3.41* (1.82)	8.44 (9.40)
Scheduled tribes				1.51 (1.33)				-0.05 (2.30)	-2.56* (1.51)	-7.46 (7.62)
Marginal workers				-13.16*** (3.80)				-20.76** (9.56)	-14.82*** (5.72)	-51.57* (24.82)
British rule					-0.33 (1.06)			-0.62 (1.07)	-0.99** (0.40)	-5.25 (3.55)
Communist base					0.11 (0.35)			-0.09 (0.33)	-0.11 (0.15)	-0.31 (0.65)
Homicide rate 1970s						0.14* (0.08)		0.18 (0.15)	0.19*** (0.06)	0.59* (0.32)
Riots rate 1970s						-0.01 (0.02)		-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)
Subaltern Chief Min.							-0.58 (0.56)	-0.95 (0.86)	-0.73 (0.46)	-1.95 (1.19)
Non-congress vote							1.17 (1.75)	1.26 (2.63)	1.90* (1.10)	5.36 (3.47)
Left vote							-1.78 (1.20)	-2.15 (1.87)	-2.19** (0.98)	-6.77* (3.67)
Effective no. parties							0.16 (0.30)	-0.11 (0.30)	-0.00 (0.17)	-0.17 (0.54)
SC quotas							0.37 (0.64)	-0.84 (0.53)	-1.11* (0.62)	-3.35* (1.83)
ST quotas							-0.03 (0.47)	0.71 (0.97)	1.20* (0.68)	4.07 (3.56)
Observations	588	588	588	583	567	560	573	532	532	135
Clusters	31	31	31	31	27	29	29	26	26	13

*Notes:* Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. For brevity, the results from the inflation models are not reported, but in all cases are specified as in Table 2. Population is used as exposure in the ZINB and ZIP regressions, and as a control in the OLS model. Vuong tests comparing the zero-inflated models to their plain counterparts are significant at the 1% level in all cases. \*\*\* Significant at the 1% level; \*\* significant at the 5% level; \* significant at the 10% level.

**TABLE A6:  
DIFF-IN-DIFF RESULTS CLUSTERING STANDARD ERRORS BY STATE**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	TWO-PERIOD PANEL (DURING & POST-EMERGENCY)			ANNUAL PANEL (1971–2008)		
<i>Dependent variable:</i>	<i>Mean years of Maoist violence</i>			<i>Dichotomous indicator for whether a district experienced Maoist violence</i>		
	<b>OLS with Fixed Effects</b>			<b>LPM with Fixed Effects</b>		
Subaltern incorporation x post	-0.24*** (0.07)	-0.18*** (0.05)	-0.32* (0.15)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.13* (0.07)
Geographic controls?	--	Yes	Yes	--	Yes	Yes
Other controls?	--	--	Yes	--	--	Yes
Observations	296	296	292	6,460	6,460	6,384
Clusters	15	15	14	15	15	14

*Notes:* Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. All regressions include district fixed effects and log population interacted with a post-1980 indicator. Columns (1)–(3) include the post-1980 indicator, and columns (4)–(6) include year fixed effects. Mean years of Maoist violence is calculated at the district level for two time periods (during and after the emergency) and excludes districts that remained unaffected in both periods. The dichotomous indicator of Maoist violence is a district-year variable that covers the 1971–2008 period and excludes districts that remained unaffected during those years. Subaltern incorporation x post is the interaction of the vote share received by subaltern parties during the 1977–1980 elections with the post-1980 indicator. Geographic controls include: land area, rough terrain, forest, and minerals, interacted with the post-1980 indicator. Other controls include: large holdings, literacy, scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, marginal workers, British rule, communist base, homicide rate 1970s, riots rate 1970s, non-congress vote, left vote, effective parties, SC quotas, and ST quotas, interacted with the post-1980 indicator. All control variables are measured before the 1977–1980 elections or as close to this period as the data sources permitted. See the Online Appendix for variable definitions and data sources. \*\*\* Significant at the 1% level; \*\* significant at the 5% level; \* significant at the 10% level.

**TABLE A7:  
DIFF-IN-DIFF RESULTS EXCLUDING OUTLIERS**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	TWO-PERIOD PANEL (DURING & POST-EMERGENCY)			ANNUAL PANEL (1971–2008)		
<i>Dependent variable:</i>	<i>Mean years of Maoist violence</i>			<i>Dichotomous indicator for whether a district experienced Maoist violence</i>		
	<b>OLS with Fixed Effects</b>			<b>LPM with Fixed Effects</b>		
Subaltern incorporation x post	-0.22*** (0.07)	-0.19*** (0.07)	-0.37** (0.14)	-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.13** (0.06)
Geographic controls?	--	Yes	Yes	--	Yes	Yes
Other controls?	--	--	Yes	--	--	Yes
Observations	292	292	288	6,384	6,384	6,308

*Notes:* Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are shown in parentheses. Districts that experienced 20 years or more of Maoist violence between 1981 and 2008 are excluded from the analysis. All regressions include district fixed effects and log population interacted with a post-1980 indicator. Columns (1)–(3) include the post-1980 indicator, and columns (4)–(6) include year fixed effects. Mean years of Maoist violence is calculated at the district level for two time periods (during and after the emergency) and excludes districts that remained unaffected in both periods. The dichotomous indicator of Maoist violence is a district-year variable that covers the 1971–2008 period and excludes districts that remained unaffected during those years. Subaltern incorporation x post is the interaction of the vote share received by subaltern parties during the 1977–1980 elections with the post-1980 indicator. Geographic controls include: land area, rough terrain, forest, and minerals, interacted with the post-1980 indicator. Other controls include: large holdings, literacy, scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, marginal workers, British rule, communist base, homicide rate 1970s, riots rate 1970s, non-congress vote, left vote, effective parties, SC quotas, and ST quotas, interacted with the post-1980 indicator. All control variables are measured before the 1977–1980 elections or as close to this period as the data sources permitted. See the Online Appendix for variable definitions and data sources. \*\*\* Significant at the 1% level; \*\* significant at the 5% level; \* significant at the 10% level.

**TABLE A8:  
DIFF-IN-DIFF RESULTS USING ALTERNATIVE POST-ELECTION TIME PERIODS**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
<b>Post-election period:</b>	<b>1981–1990</b>			<b>1991–2000</b>			<b>2001–2008</b>		
<b>Panel A: Two-Period Panel</b>									
<i>Mean years of Maoist violence</i>									
<i>Dependent variable:</i>									
<b>OLS Estimates with Fixed Effects</b>									
Subaltern incorporation x post	-0.26** (0.10)	-0.28*** (0.10)	-0.48*** (0.18)	-0.33*** (0.10)	-0.29*** (0.10)	-0.79*** (0.22)	-0.45*** (0.09)	-0.30*** (0.10)	-0.42** (0.19)
Geographic controls?	--	Yes	Yes	--	Yes	Yes	--	Yes	Yes
Other controls?	--	--	Yes	--	--	Yes	--	--	Yes
Observations	216	216	212	218	218	216	230	230	228
<b>Panel B: Annual Panel</b>									
<i>Dichotomous indicator for whether a district experienced Maoist violence</i>									
<i>Dependent variable:</i>									
<b>Linear Probability Models with Fixed Effects</b>									
Subaltern incorporation x post	-0.11*** (0.04)	-0.13*** (0.04)	-0.09* (0.05)	-0.23*** (0.05)	-0.23*** (0.05)	-0.27** (0.12)	-0.30*** (0.04)	-0.25*** (0.05)	-0.28*** (0.10)
Geographic controls?	--	Yes	Yes	--	Yes	Yes	--	Yes	Yes
Other controls?	--	--	Yes	--	--	Yes	--	--	Yes
Observations	2500	2500	2460	2280	2280	2260	2214	2214	2196

*Notes:* Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are shown in parentheses. All regressions include district fixed effects and log population interacted with a post-1980 indicator. Regressions in Panel A include the post-1980 indicator, and regressions in Panel B include year fixed effects. In columns (1)–(3), the post-election period is 1981–1990; in columns (4)–(6) the post-election period is 1991–2000; and in columns (7)–(9) the post-election period is 2001–2008. Mean years of Maoist violence is calculated at the district level for two time periods (during and after the emergency) and excludes districts that remained unaffected in both periods. The dichotomous indicator of Maoist violence is a district-year variable that covers the 1971–2008 period and excludes districts that remained unaffected during those years. Subaltern incorporation x post is the interaction of the vote share received by subaltern parties during the 1977–1980 elections with the post-1980 indicator. Geographic controls include: land area, rough terrain, forest, and minerals, interacted with the post-1980 indicator. Other controls include: large holdings, literacy, scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, marginal workers, British rule, communist base, homicide rate 1970s, riots rate 1970s, non-congress vote, left vote, effective parties, SC quotas, and ST quotas, interacted with the post-1980 indicator. All control variables are measured before the 1977–1980 elections or as close to this period as the data sources permitted. See the Online Appendix for variable definitions and data sources. \*\*\* Significant at the 1% level; \*\* significant at the 5% level; \* significant at the 10% level.

**TABLE A9:**  
**DIFF-IN-DIFF RESULTS WITHIN THE SAMPLE OF DISTRICTS THAT HELD ELECTIONS IN 1977**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	TWO-PERIOD PANEL (PRE- & POST-1977 ELECTION)			ANNUAL PANEL (1971–2008)		
<i>Dependent variable:</i>	<i>Mean years of Maoist violence</i>			<i>Dichotomous indicator for whether a district experienced Maoist violence</i>		
	<b>OLS with Fixed Effects</b>			<b>LPM with Fixed Effects</b>		
Subaltern incorporation x post	-0.16*** (0.06)	-0.24*** (0.06)	-0.30** (0.12)	-0.9*** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.12** (0.06)
Geographic controls?	--	Yes	Yes	--	Yes	Yes
Other controls?	--	--	Yes	--	--	Yes
Observations	232	232	230	5,054	5,054	5,016

*Notes:* Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are shown in parentheses. Only districts that held elections in 1977 are included in the sample. Therefore, the following states are excluded from the analysis: Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Sikkim. All regressions include district fixed effects and log population interacted with a post-election indicator. Columns (1)–(3) include the post-election indicator, and columns (4)–(6) include year fixed effects. Mean years of Maoist violence is calculated at the district level for two time periods (before and after the 1977 elections) and excludes districts that remained unaffected in both periods. The dichotomous indicator of Maoist violence is a district-year variable that covers the 1971–2008 period and excludes districts that remained unaffected during those years. Subaltern incorporation x post is the interaction of the vote share received by subaltern parties during the 1977–1980 elections with the post-election indicator. Geographic controls include: land area, rough terrain, forest, and minerals, interacted with the post-election indicator. Other controls include: large holdings, literacy, scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, marginal workers, British rule, communist base, homicide rate 1970s, riots rate 1970s, non-congress vote, left vote, effective parties, SC quotas, and ST quotas, interacted with the post-election indicator. All control variables are measured before the 1977–1980 elections or as close to this period as the data sources permitted. See the Online Appendix for variable definitions and data sources. \*\*\* Significant at the 1% level; \*\* significant at the 5% level; \* significant at the 10% level.


**TABLE A10:  
DIFF-IN-DIFF RESULTS INCLUDING PRE-EMERGENCY YEARS**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	TWO-PERIOD PANEL (PRE- & POST-ELECTIONS)			ANNUAL PANEL (1967–2008)		
<i>Dependent variable:</i>	<i>Mean years of Maoist violence</i>			<i>Dichotomous indicator for whether a district experienced Maoist violence</i>		
	OLS with Fixed Effects			LPM with Fixed Effects		
Subaltern incorporation x post	-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.15** (0.06)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.17*** (0.05)
Geographic controls?	--	Yes	Yes	--	Yes	Yes
Other controls?	--	--	Yes	--	--	Yes
Observations	352	352	342	7,854	7,854	7,644

*Notes:* Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are shown in parentheses. All regressions include district fixed effects and log population interacted with a post-1980 indicator. Columns (1)–(3) include the post-1980 indicator, and columns (4)–(6) include year fixed effects. Mean years of Maoist violence is calculated at the district level for two time periods (before and after the 1977–1980 elections) and excludes districts that remained unaffected in both periods. The dichotomous indicator of Maoist violence is a district-year variable that covers the 1967–2008 period and excludes districts that remained unaffected during those years. Subaltern incorporation x post is the interaction of the vote share received by subaltern parties during the 1977–1980 elections with the post-1980 indicator. Geographic controls include: land area, rough terrain, forest, and minerals, interacted with the post-1980 indicator. Other controls include: large holdings, literacy, scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, marginal workers, British rule, communist base, homicide rate 1970s, riots rate 1970s, non-congress vote, left vote, effective parties, SC quotas, and ST quotas, interacted with the post-1980 indicator. All control variables are measured before the 1977–1980 elections or as close to this period as the data sources permitted. See the Online Appendix for variable definitions and data sources. \*\*\* Significant at the 1% level; \*\* significant at the 5% level; \* significant at the 10% level.




**FIGURE A1:  
GOODNESS OF FIT FOR DIFFERENT COUNT MODELS**



*Notes:* This figure shows the residuals (calculated as the observed minus the predicted value) from Poisson, zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP), negative binomial (NB), and zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regressions of Maoist violence on subaltern incorporation, using the full set of covariates.

**FIGURE A2:  
SENSITIVITY TO THE EXCLUSION OF SPECIFIC STATES AND REGIONS**



*Notes:* This figure presents coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the parameter of interest in equation (3), excluding individual states and specific regions of India. The dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator for whether a district was affected by Maoist violence from 1971–2008. All regressions include district fixed effects, year fixed effects, and log population interacted with a post-1980 indicator. Note that since our analysis models (or drops) districts with 0 years of violence, states in which all districts experienced 0 years of violence (such as Jammu and Kashmir or Arunachal Pradesh or Manipur) are not included in our analysis in the first place. Still, we report here the results of excluding each state individually as well as groups of states, to underline the fact that the results are not driven by districts in particular states or regions.

**FIGURE A3:**  
**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN YEARS OF MAOIST VIOLENCE AND MAOIST-RELATED DEATHS (1981-2008)**

