In this book, Soloman M. Karmel, a political scientist and a lecturer at the London School of Economics, attempts to debunk the highly controversial question of China’s status as a great power. Unlike many of those writing on China’s national strength or power projection, Karmel’s analyses are objectively realistic and undramatic.

He employs academically acknowledged paradigms such as China’s military strategy, implementation and restructuring of the armed forces, and overhaul of the military-industrial complex to find its place in the spectrum of great power. In his extensive research of Chinese and foreign sources of information and statistics, Karmel sees China as neither an emerging great power nor a very stable and fully established, modern nation-state. He sees it as resembling a developing state with an uncertain future.

To strengthen his argument, Karmel argues that China’s leadership has buried the outdated concept of a People’s War strategy and replaced it with a technocratic and non-threatening one; despite the effort of modernizing its huge armed forces, the PLA is crippled by an oversized, outdated force structure; China’s military-industrial complex is still suffering from a lack of clearly defined objectives, inadequate infrastructure and mismanagement which is inconsistent with the goal of a modernized fighting force. As a result, Karmel does not see the People’s Liberation Army possessing the conventional military capability to exert global influence. At most, it could be an instrument to support Beijing’s coercive diplomacy or be directed in an attempt to resolve in its favour various outstanding territorial claims with neighbouring countries.

Yet Karmel’s sensible analysis suffers from two shortcomings. One is that he exudes overconfidence in the rise of technocratic command in dominating military strategies and downplays the role and function of the People’s War philosophy in modernizing China’s military. This strategy is by no means a skeleton in the closet as perceived by analysts and scholars. Its legacy is still prominent because it offers a strong and creditable vehicle for the Chinese Communist Party to control the gun. The subordination of the military to the political leadership is the bulwark of sustaining communist rule over China. It is the need to fight and win modern high-tech warfare which has speeded the implementation of professionalism to acquire knowledge and skills of technocratic command. Political control over the military means the Party defines national security and military strategies, not the army. Therefore, shifting towards a more technocratic command only demonstrates the quality of professionalism in deliberating military strategy rather than being a determinant of the political will in executing those strategies.

Another weakness in this book is that it does not give sufficient
attention to the deliberation of political intention on the deployment of the PLA. Deng Xiaoping repeatedly emphasized that “China is always anti-hegemonism. When China is rising to be a big power, China is still anti-hegemonism.” This is a strategic concept still adhered to by current political and military leaderships. It symbolizes the Chinese leadership’s perception and political intention that it is to China’s advantage not to seek great power status. Karmel’s rationale over China’s power status would perhaps be strengthened with these extra concerns.

Nevertheless, this is an important contribution to the study of China and the People’s Liberation Army. It is a valuable reference book and a useful teaching aid in terms of its high quality and coherence of analysis and abundantly rich sources of information.

ANDREW N. YANG


This book asks a question everyone in the China field has to answer at one time or another. The product of a 1998 conference at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at George Washington University, it incorporates eleven short, readable chapters by different authors. The chapters assume considerable background knowledge, but would be useful for framing discussion in upper division classes.

Several of the authors ask what is meant by instability. As Steven F. Jackson and Lyman Miller both point out, if it includes rapid social and cultural change under a stable political regime, then China is unstable. But the real question is whether a combination of social change and elite power struggle will cause China to undergo a rapid regime change.

Most of the chapters look at bottom-up factors, and conclude that pressure from below will not be sufficient to force regime breakdown or democratization. Bruce Dickson looks at the decline in the prestige and organizational coherence of the Chinese Communist Party, Nicholas R. Lardy at the weaknesses of the banking system, Pieter Bottelier at economic change including unemployment and potential inflation, Dorothy J. Solinger at worker unrest, Thomas P. Bernstein at peasant protest, Merle Goldman at intellectual dissent, and June Teufel Dreyer at minority dissatisfaction. The mere list of problems is enough to suggest that the system is collapsing. Yet all the authors conclude that the Party has enough resources to stay on top of its problems. It has co-opted business and intellectual elites, divided and bought off worker and peasant opposition, and provided enough economic dynamism to win broad support. Martin King Whyte concludes in a summary chapter that social change and conflict do not pose a fundamental threat to the regime.

What is insufficiently analysed is the question of how social tensions will interact with division at the top. Splits in the leadership have always
been key to political change in Communist China. Elite politics is the subject of a single chapter by David Shambaugh, who proceeds cautiously, as one has to in this murky area, and finds no overt signs of cleavage within the civilian leadership or between them and the military. But it may be fallacious to project China’s current political stability into the future. Political splits by nature are hidden until they burst into the open.

A more imaginative, although speculative, analysis might have been warranted, to consider the plausibility of scenarios for rapid change despite the current veneer of unity. Even if it is true, as Shambaugh says, that Jiang Zemin has consolidated power and Zhu Rongji is not a dangerous rival, what will happen when both these men, and Li Peng, retire from their Party and state posts in 2002–2003? Will these senior leaders try to establish themselves as a new group of Elders, armed with ongoing control of the military through the Central Military Commission, as Deng Xiaoping did? Will the 50-something generation accept the authority of Hu Jintao? Or will splits dating back to 1989 re-emerge, based on the ties that many of the ablest men of this generation had with Zhao Ziyang?

The 1980s revealed deep disagreements in the Party over a range of important issues in politics, economics and ideology. Even though the current political arrangement causes these issues to be buried, it would be surprising if they had gone away.

ANDREW J. NATHAN

China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control: A Preliminary Assessment.

By ROBERT A. MANNING, RONALD MONTAPERTO AND BRAD ROBERTS.


This monograph summarizes a series of round tables sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. National Defense University and the Institute of Defense Analyses in 1998–99. It is a close-written and reasoned primer on the difficult and often emotional issues of nuclear strategy, arms control and the strategic military aspects of U.S.–China relations.

The authors argue that the management of the U.S.–China relationship will be the major challenge facing American diplomacy over the next decade. They propose that China’s nuclear development will be at least as important to the United States, if not more so, than Russia’s. The bio-polar thinking that managed the U.S.–Russian balance is no longer appropriate. China is building up its nuclear forces as Russia and the United States are reducing theirs. In other words, once there were two scorpions in the bottle, now there are three.

Yet the study points out that China is far from being a “peer competitor” of the United States in the size, quality or capabilities of its strategic
forces. China’s nuclear modernization, the authors suggest, is driven by worries over the credibility and survivability of its ageing arsenal. They estimate that China is not about to build a \textit{force de frappe} or strive for parity with the United States. Rather, the aim is maintenance of “minimum deterrence.” But potential changes in China’s environment – South Asian nuclear developments, American ballistic and theatre missile defence efforts, Russian responses to changes in the ABM regime – could lead to unintended and undesired consequences.

Thus complacency about Chinese developments, the study concludes, is not warranted. China is the least transparent of all the nuclear states; it participates partially in the alphabet soup of arms control regimes but has not adopted an integrated policy approach to them. Indeed, all sides worry about the effectiveness of arms control. China argues that it has only benefited “the haves” while restricting “the have-nots.” The West is sceptical whether China will honour its pledges to ban nuclear and missile proliferation.

The study ends with policy suggestions. Washington needs to engage China on many fronts, taking into account possible Chinese reaction to missile defense and the new dynamics of the U.S.–China–Russia triangle, utilizing the two countries’ responsibilities as permanent members of the UN Security Council, testing the parameters of mutual restraint. The United States must understand that Taiwan is central to Chinese strategic thinking. China needs to be more transparent about its nuclear doctrine. Above all, adroit diplomacy tempered by realism is key; it may not be possible to reach agreements fully satisfactory to both sides.

Because the monograph is a skilful condensation of many complex arguments, readers not familiar with the topics addressed may feel slightly short-changed. Each chapter could be expanded into a monograph. One of the study’s strengths is its emphasis on the importance of the action-reaction dynamic, though this writer would have liked to see more on the steps China could take on its own, such as reducing the noise level about “hegemonism” and “power politics.” Like many consensus documents, the policy recommendations may seem commonsensical. But the China policy game in Washington these days is a blood sport, and common sense is needed.

JOHN FRANKENSTEIN


Recently retired from the United States Army, Colonel Wortzel served two tours in the Defense Attaché’s Office of the American Embassy in Beijing. He was the Assistant Army Attaché in 1988–90, returning to China in 1995 to serve as the Army Attaché for two more years. In compiling his dictionary, Colonel Wortzel sought to produce a reference work reflecting the legacy of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), as that
legacy is understood by the Chinese military. A basic principle for selecting entries was therefore to draw them from conversations with Chinese officers and consult military history texts published by China’s military academies and presses. Consequently, in addition to the people, events and issues influencing the rise of the PLA from its founding as the Red Army of Workers and Peasants in 1927, the dictionary provides systematic coverage of what Chinese recall as the “century of humiliation.” The dictionary covers far more than its title suggests by encompassing Chinese military history from the 1839–42 Opium War to the Taiwan Strait crises of 1995 and 1996.

The reader must recognize, however, that this is a dictionary, not an encyclopedia. Nor is it designed to be a scrupulously footnoted scholarly interpretation of China’s recent military history. Rather, with some contributions by Captain Vance Morrison, USN (Ret.), Colonel Susan Puska, USA, and David Reuther, Wortzel has produced a single volume reference work of great value to both the specialist in Chinese military affairs and non-specialists who need such an easily accessible reference. To assist the layman, Wortzel includes some very useful maps, including the Paracel and Spratly Islands, an easily readable introduction to Chinese history, and notes on the romanization of the Chinese language. The dictionary concludes with a selected but extensive bibliography citing primarily English-language sources, but including major works in Chinese.

The dictionary’s strength is its concise description of personalities and events moulding modern China’s military history, including the major campaigns and battles fought by the PLA and its predecessors. Entries can be easily located alphabetically in either the dictionary itself or using the carefully constructed index. Each entry is followed by a short list of sources.

Given the breadth and complexity of the history Wortzel covers, omissions are to be expected. Among them, this reviewer noted in particular the absence of the largest amphibious operation ever conducted by the PLA – the seizure of the Dachen islands in 1955. Similar omissions can be found in the sources cited at the end of each entry. For example, the entry for Zhang Guotao does not include his autobiography, *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921–1927* (1971); and the entry for the Sino-Indian border war does not cite Allen S. Whiting’s seminal work, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina* (1975).

The selected bibliography also has oversights. Among them, volumes 10 and 11 of *The Cambridge History of China* (1978, 1980) are very useful for the late Qing period. One would also anticipate finding two studies by Michael D. Swaine, *The Military and Political Succession in China* (1992) and *The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking* (1996 and 1998). These omissions and others do not detract from the value of this volume. They can easily be corrected in what one hopes will be a second edition.

Paul Goodwin

Scholars have long been seeking an authoritative single-volume update to A. Doak Barnett’s 1960 classic Communist China and Asia. Many treatments have emerged over the intervening decades, and the field of Chinese foreign policy has advanced significantly as a consequence. But until now nothing has quite met the tests that would signify that a worthy successor volume has been found. These include comprehensiveness, objectivity, readability, a solid bibliography, and utility to the undergraduate beginner, the budding graduate expert and the seasoned professional. Denny Roy’s volume meets these tests.

All important aspects of Beijing’s foreign relations are covered. Roy manages to reduce its history to one chapter, probably more accurately drawn than any such chapter written to date. He then inquires how Beijing views that history and thus how it approaches the outside world. The next logical topic is how China formulates and executes its foreign policy; again, the author does a solid job of summing up what is known of that process and the institutions behind it. From there, he integrates many diverse sources on China’s changing position in the world economy, the dynamics of its military policy, its role in global politics, and its approach to its Asian neighbours. All these chapters are high quality and relatively free of obvious error. He finishes by speculating on probable future developments and by relating the subject to international relations theory.

One can always quibble with any writer’s approach and interpretation, and this volume is no exception. Roy downplays internal factors and the commanding position of economic development, which have been, and remain, the most important factors driving Beijing’s relations with the outside world. And he sometimes too uncritically accepts Beijing’s point of view or advances a too-benign interpretation of its actions (to name four: a “radically leftist” Lin Biao did not “mastermind” the Chinese attack against the Soviet Union in 1969, the radically leftist Mao did; China did not “magnanimously” withdraw from India in 1962, nor did it attack Vietnam in 1979 merely to “save” Cambodia; the United States does not “wish for world domination,” its economic base is hardly “contracting” and its social problems are not “growing”; and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs early in the 1980s had full control, to say nothing of knowledge, of China’s weapons sales to the Middle East and was hardly outflanked by a supposedly largely autonomous military). These natural and inevitable errors stem from the need to summarize the existing literature, which cannot be perfect, and the author’s political orientation that is perhaps, these days, too far left of centre. But these criticisms amount to quibbles in face of the author’s achievement.

Two final items. First, Roy goes into surprising detail, such that readers may find most any sub-field of China’s foreign relations addressed through a broad range of fact and subject. Thus his discussion of Chinese–ASEAN relations is as comprehensive and authoritative as almost
anything in the relevant literature, as is his inquiry into the Taiwan question, Sino-Japanese and Sino-American relations, China’s United Nations policy, and its stance toward globalization and uni/multi-polarity. Secondly, he presents a carefully balanced and realistic evaluation of alternative future possibilities for Beijing’s relations with the outer world. He does not automatically assume that China will become a threat to its neighbours as it grows in wealth, power and status, but neither does he blandly assume it will change its nature, and thus its policy, as it matures and enters, for the first time, into detailed and (it is hoped) responsible relations with other international entities. And thirdly, he makes an initial stab at relating Chinese policy to international relations theory, an association that is too often missing in the literature. He looks at various components of two of the standard levels of analysis, systemic and state-centred (putting aside the usual third approach, the bureaucratic/institutional). It does not matter that international relations theory has long since moved beyond this rather simple dichotomy. The point is that Roy makes the case for placing theory and policy alongside each other and seeing how they fit.

In summary, this book is a must for all those interested in Chinese foreign policy.

THOMAS ROBINSON


This is significant book that does more than bring together a number of apposite and informative papers to provide a comprehensive picture of China at the turn of the century. An important theme introduced and commonly woven throughout the contributions is the production of simplified and often distorted images of China in the United States and of the United States in China, and the contrast between the stereotypes and the nuanced political, economic and social micro-level studies of scholarly endeavour. Thus the volume as a whole engages with and interrogates the environments of information, political representation and policy choice behind the headlines or soundbites, popular perceptions of the “other” and the role that scholars play in their production and interpretation. In this respect it is a self-reflexive volume of professional interest within and beyond the China field.

The volume first seeks to counter the tendencies to simplify and demonize the China that is represented in the United States. Many of the authors argue that media-manipulated images of China not only simplify but misrepresent and obscure the full picture “beyond the headlines” and contrast greatly with the mixed, complex and fast-changing society of their research. A number of the papers not only engage and investigate
the “hot topics” of the headlines but also critically examine background social, economic and political trends that cut across and confound stereotypes yet are less likely to enter media discussions. Thus historians, anthropologists, political scientists, geographers and literary translators as well as human rights activists engage in ongoing debates that surround relations between individual and society, the market and politics, local and global, and past and future.

The papers embrace a wide range of issues in some detail, including corruption, human and legal rights, governance and democratization, economic liberalization and protectionism, ethnic and regional interests, intellectual and religious freedoms, and exploitation and unemployment. The authors use both their own investigations and their reflections on the stance of scholars in these highly politicized and public fields of study. They consider anew the production of academic and media knowledge, the crucial question of scholar communication and accountability in policy and public dialogue, and their own roles as interlocutors of a foreign society and culture that is especially relevant to contemporary geopolitics. Many of the authors look behind the dualism common in interpretations of China as either a society moving towards pluralism and democracy or one remaining in the grasp of crippling forms of totalitarian control, and the ways in which such misrepresentations may distort understanding and be as much influenced by projections of American or Western views and environments as of the characteristics of those societies. In writing the “other” each is represented in the interests of the “self” and it is this, the editors argue, which may constitute the real story behind the headlines.

The book also examines stereotypes of the United States within China, particularly those held by China’s intellectuals. Many authors conclude that the United States is not alone in its misjudgements of the “other” and that juxtaposing images of the United States (and West) in China as simultaneously a desirable destination of opportunity and an antagonistic superpower with plans to control and inhibit China’s growth both limits knowledgeable understanding and generates suspicion which can reach xenophobic proportions. In turn, as some authors argue, the Western media’s treatment of China’s nationalism disproportionately emphasizes its antagonistic and intimidating character, while overlooking the unresolved search for identity expressed in current nationalist sentiments and the contested role that nationalism itself plays in generating tensions within contemporary Chinese society and in influencing dialogue within China and between China and the United States (or the West).

Many of the authors argue that the intertwined hopes and fears that China will become either a democratic and pluralistic society commercially open to global markets, investments and ideas (and thus be more like the United States) or openly totalitarian and expansionist are more influential in determining the headlines than their macro-level and micro-level research which may depict a much more nuanced and mixed picture as China reaches for its own solutions to many contemporary dilemmas.
A key conclusion of the volume is that to represent processes, events, institutions and relationships within China more accurately and avoid both ambivalence and utopian or cynical orientalism, it is necessary to engage in a self-conscious appraisal and reflect on our own assumptions and goals along with those common in our own societies. For those interested in producing or reading the stories “behind the headlines,” this book is both informative and stimulating, for students and for scholars. Above all, though, it is a self-reflexive volume, and whether or not we agree with all the arguments presented it is essential reading for those of us fully engaged in the China field.

Elisabeth Croll


1998 will always be remembered as a notable year for China specialists. Those tense 12 months were also a time of contradictions and irony. Many of the high points are recorded in the articles contained in this book, an annual anthology that has become essential reference tool for China and Asia scholars.

The People’s Republic survived the Asian financial crisis. Yet the weak links of the economy – particularly the ageing state-owned enterprises and the financial institutions – were exposed to the full. As co-authors Zhou Fang and Geng Xiao note in their chapter on the impact of the fiscal crisis, “the poor performance of the state enterprises and banks has become a barrier to an even better performance by the market-oriented sector.” It is a truism that in China, economic reform will not succeed without commensurate liberalization in the political field. Reformer Zhu Rongji became premier in March 1998 and proceeded to introduce a series of administrative reforms beginning with the streamlining of the governmental structure and the lay-off of large numbers of cadres. These initiatives are examined by Ting Wai in his chapter “Reform of the Nomenklatura in 1998.” Ting, however, cautions that “there is no reason to believe that the transition from administrative reform to virtual political reform would be smooth and automatic.”

One excuse used by Beijing for being extra cautious with reform is that it may generate instability. Certainly, social groupings that have suffered as a result of reform can make trouble for the regime. For example, the marketization of the economy and the growth of private enterprises have spawned a new class of cadre-businessmen and “red” bosses – and the disenfranchisement of workers. In her chapter “Chinese labour at the end of the 20th century,” Pun Ngai warns of the increasing militancy of workers who have lost their status as the elite of the socialist state. Pun writes: “The Chinese working class may finally awaken to its class
consciousness … when the existence of the whole class itself is under threat as it undergoes changes dictated by the market economy and capitalist production.”

Despite apparent prosperity, the Beijing leadership also faced challenges in rural areas which were seething under low grain prices and heavy taxation. The chapter on Chinese peasants by Hok-bun Ku chronicled instances of discontent in the countryside and the increasing frequency with which farmers turned to violence. Ku says farmers were no longer willing to suffer in silence. “Instead, through different channels, villagers voice their discontent and turn their dissent to action,” he writes.

Other chapters deal with legal reform, relations with the U.S., mainland-Taiwan relations, and those between Beijing and Hong Kong. These studies give rise to tantalizing thoughts on whether more interaction with the outside world may nudge the age-old mainland system towards a faster pace of change. For example, the Chinese capital experienced a brief “Beijing spring” in the six months or so before President Bill Clinton’s visit to China. And in his study on the impact of Hong Kong television on neighbouring Guangzhou, Chen Huailin looks at the possibility that Hong Kong’s vibrant culture may at least bring forth a higher degree of pluralism in the cities.

While the year 1998 was suffused with drama and suspense, it also left one with a sense of pity. A number of contributors to this anthology make it clear that problems encountered in the course of reform could only be solved by opening the door wider – and not retreating at the first sign of socio-political hiccups. There is little evidence in this book, however, to show that the administration of President Jiang Zemin would bite the bullet and proceed with thorough-going reforms.

WILLY WO LAP LAM


The China Briefing series continues with this solid contribution under new editorship. It contains nine essays on Chinese politics, an introduction by the editor and two excellent political chronologies by Nancy Hearst. Since the articles are meant to be surveys of particular topics for an informed but general audience, they are mainly based on secondary sources rather than on original research. Writing at the close of the century, the authors in this volume were asked to take a longer historical perspective than is usually the case in the series.

The book would be excellent as a supplementary textbook for an upper-division university course on Chinese politics. Articles on consumerism, demography, and gender and nationalism introduce topics infrequently found in ordinary Chinese politics textbooks, each offering interesting angles on important political phenomena. The major short-
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coming of the book’s survey-centred approach is that most of the pieces do not discuss differences of interpretation or debates in the field that might help to structure and enliven class discussion.

The essays can be roughly divided into those focusing on elite politics and those more concerned with rural or popular issues. JosephFewsmith’s article, “Historical echoes and Chinese politics,” summarizes some of the main trends in elite politics, intellectual discourse and international relations since 1995. Barry Naughton outlines economic trends in the reform period, including a particularly useful discussion of the institutional rigidities that slowed reform until the late 1990s. Cheng Li’s “Promises and pitfalls of reform” focuses on how different members of China’s post-Tiananmen intelligentsia have interpreted the meaning, strengths and weaknesses of reform. Students beginning the study of China with the impression that Chinese intellectuals are all either liberal democratic dissidents or CCP hacks will quickly have that notion dispelled by the author’s engaging discussion of vigorous critical debates and the multiple fora where they take place. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker’s piece detailing relations among China, Taiwan and the U.S. during 1995–99 is critical of the Clinton administration’s role in cross-strait relations. Finally, Bruce Cumings’s lively piece on the historical development of U.S.–China relations from 1949 to Kosovo and the Wen Ho Lee case challenges the idea of a “China threat” needing to be contained, making the case that China and the U.S. share many common interests that would make a policy of “enmeshment” more beneficial to both sides.

Turning to the less elite-centred essays, in “Power, patronage and protest,” Jonathan Unger argues that China’s rural protests stem primarily from the legacies of Maoist political institutions, focusing on the unchecked power, corruption and self-interested behaviour of village cadres who developed networks of patronage. While mention of other more benign interpretations of local politics might have been welcome here, the piece’s discussion of differing politics in rich and poor rural areas is nuanced and helpful. In “The shape of society,” Tyrene White discusses the history of family planning in the PRC and shows how the legacies of this kind of social engineering have created their own challenges to development and reform. Treating the one-child policy, population ageing, urbanization and migration, and the sex ratio imbalance in one piece is very ambitious, but White brings these issues together coherently in a way that will make readers understand the larger consequences of family planning policy. Yunxiang Yan points out that the rise of consumerism has involved not only the development of new consumption patterns but also the rise of consumer-protection movements, and argues convincingly that consumerism has the potential both to open up more political and social space and to reduce political activity. In “Gender and nationalism in China,” Susan Brownell illustrates how the trope of gender has often been invoked in the expression of Chinese nationalism, such as in the portrayal of the (female) Chinese nation being ravished by the (male) imperial powers or U.S. bombers in Kosovo. It is fascinating, though
students who have no background in gender studies may find the complex argument the most difficult to follow among the articles in this collection.

ELIZABETH J. REMICK


Marie-Claire Bergère is known for her excellent works on 20th-century China (see for example her recently translated Sun Yat-sen) and for the role she has played (with Lucien Bianco) in teaching and inspiring generations of contemporary China students in France. The third edition of her well-known handbook on China since 1949 exhibits outstanding talents both in the methodology and in the contents. It must be noted that, except for a new chapter on the “glorious decade” of the 1990s, the content of this edition has not been changed substantially, for one simple reason: the main analysis has not been contradicted by recent publications.

Berge`re is an historian in the best sense of the word. She interprets Communist China’s historical development from the perspective of a longer history which, on one hand, is millenarian (and for example exhibits contradictory continental and maritime trends), and on the other hand has decisively changed since the Opium Wars. That’s why she gives much importance to the different traditions which have reappeared recently in Chinese society. Moreover, she excels at integrating into a coherent analysis economic as well as sociological, political and external factors. In that sense, she is a continuator of the very French school of Les Annales. This methodological originality explains why, compared to others, Marie-Claire Bergère’s handbook emphasizes the major economic and social trends as opposed to chronological and biographical details. The best passages are those which relate economic and social problems with political evolution. Specialists of Communist China will read with profit her analysis of present Chinese social trends, which she sums up as “une société non instituée.”

Berge`re’s methodology explains also why, while taking into account ideology as an important factor, she concentrates mainly on the real history. This leads her to assess Mao Zedong’s political evolution before the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution in a sober but less sceptical way than most other handbooks. This also leads her to a balanced and moderately optimistic appraisal of China’s successes during the 1990s.

The organization of the book follows a chronological line: institutionalization of the revolution (1949–66); flight into utopia (1966–76); victory and crises of pragmatism (1976–89); from isolation to opening (1960–99). It nevertheless leaves room for two debates. First, did the “flight into utopia” not begin as soon as 1955 or 1958? Secondly, though
Berge`re has always been very sober in her comments on the Tiananmen event, is she not still paradoxically putting too much importance on this crisis by attributing one entire chapter to the years 1986–89? Some chapter titles can also be questioned: for example, is it possible to describe the period 1960–65 as opposing “the Party against Mao”? These points of contention do not diminish the unquestionable value of this handbook. Indeed, even when she takes the risk of personal judgements, Bergère always refers to the best sources, particularly those published in English. The bibliography is accurate and up-to-date. Based on a deep understanding of contemporary China, and on extensive readings, this very French handbook is one of the best introductions to present-day research on the People’s Republic’s history.

JEAN-LUC DOMENACH


This brief introduction to the Chinese revolution belongs to a series that aims at presenting interpretive histories of the most significant events of the 20th century. In accordance with the format of the series, the book provides a succinct overview of the Chinese revolution, followed by several topical essays, 17 biographical notices of revolutionary leaders (the only woman included is Jiang Qing), a set of 13 primary documents, a chronology and an annotated bibliography. The short topical essays deal with Mao’s thought; the reform ideology of Deng Xiaoping; Han and non-Han; the PRC’s relationships with the Soviet Union and the United States; and finally, the PRC’s relationships with Hong Kong and Taiwan. Twelve of the 13 documents relate to the half-century of the PRC; they range from Mao’s February 1957 speech on the correct handling of contradictions among the people, to Wang Ruoshui’s 1983 essay in defence of humanism. The only pre-1949 document is Mao’s 1927 report on the peasant movement in Hunan. Altogether these documents cover one fourth of the book, which seems a bit too much for an introductory survey; at least they illustrate rather well the main developments in the PRC’s history.

The book contains no egregious errors, only minor ones: such as the 7 August emergency conference dated 1928 instead of 1927 on p. 101; or Empress Dowager Cixi’s transliteration, named Cizi below the photograph facing p. 68. Even in a few words it should have been possible to define more exactly the relationships between the Chairman and Liu Shaoqi, introduced on p. 24 as the leader of Mao’s opponents. On the whole, however, though it does not amount to an interpretive history, this slim volume could be used as a reference guide in introductory courses on modern and contemporary China.

LUCIEN BIANCO

This volume addresses a crucial issue of institutional change and economic reform. The book is a timely one as the topic of China’s property rights has been clouded by confusion and contradictory reports from the field. Over the past decades, the People’s Republic has shown impressive rates of economic growth. At the same time Western scholars and professionals have wondered how this could have taken place without the rigorous formalization and specification of legal property rights as advocated by neo-classical economists and the World Bank. The economic growth was to a great extent driven by the rural industry, which also explains the book’s focus.

The volume brings together a diverse and balanced collection of studies on property rights in rural and (to a lesser extent) urban enterprises. Thought-provoking questions bind together the various contributions. How have property rights varied across regions and economic sectors? How have they changed over time? And what are the reasons for such variation and change? The solid introduction provides a clear framework to analyse the historical shifts in property rights. Walder and Oi distinguish a basic set of ownership arrangements located on a continuum from the traditional state enterprise to private business. It is then argued that institutional change in rural industry has generally followed two markedly different patterns: the “local corporatist” pattern whereby village and township enterprises are run as a business corporation by the local government, versus the “littoral” entrepreneur-centred development with little government intervention in marketing, investment and human resource management.

The studies by Gregory Ruf, Chih-jou Chen, Xiaolin Guo and James Kung demonstrate the great and often confounding diversity of property arrangements of township and village enterprises. Whereas Ruf and Kung’s contributions are illustrative of the “local corporatist” model, Chen’s study clearly shows the “littoral” pattern of family and private businesses in the coastal zone. The shareholding co-operative system is examined by Eduard Vermeer, Susan Whiting, and Nan Lin and Chih-jou Chen. They show that the ambiguous property rights structure of the shareholding co-operatives – “neither donkey nor horse” as Vermeer aptly phrased it – is partly a result of hidden and contradictory policy agendas. Vermeer and Whiting argue that the shareholding co-operative is a transitional ownership form that sprang from changes in the legal and economic environment, yet will probably not be viable in the long run. Property rights issues of urban firms are addressed in the last three chapters. Corinna Barbara Francis, and Yi-min Lin and Zhaxin Zhang focus on a little researched area: the “backyard profit centres” or “spin-off” enterprises set up since the mid-1980s by a myriad of public institutions ranging from the Ministry of Defence to Beijing University.
Because of the retrenchment of the state many of these institutions entered the market in search of profit-making activities to reinforce their strained budgets. David Wank looks into urban non-state firms in Xiamen. Both he and Francis reach the important conclusion that vaguely defined property rights have actually been conducive to China’s market reforms.

For such a comprehensive volume it is a pity that there is no contribution that offers a national view. What is the national legal and political framework of property rights, what are its constraints, how did it evolve, and in what way is it debated and negotiated? Only in Vermeer’s article is there a discussion of national policies on the shareholding co-operative system. To date, not much has been published about China’s scholarly and political debate over the separation of ownership and management in the 1980s; the recent debate over personal and real rights (a group of Chinese jurists and policy-makers argues that lease defined as a real right instead of a personal right would make it at least as secure as private ownership); and the problem of the legal holder of collective ownership (at present deliberately left undefined in law because of the potentially explosive social and political consequences). It is also a pity that little attention is paid to land rights, one of the big ownership issues in Communist China. China’s chosen path of land reform is unique in scale and ambitions among the (ex-) socialist states: a government-owned and controlled land market that prohibits private ownership and a free land market; yet, with the ideological compromise of paid lease and transfer of use rights. Guo’s contribution is the sole article in this volume that is (partially) devoted to this topic.

However, these are only minor criticisms. Through well-researched articles that draw on fieldwork and ample Chinese and Western sources, this edited volume gives a good overview of the historical shifts in property rights in mainland China’s enterprises. I enjoyed reading it and I believe it would make an excellent textbook for courses on modern China, institutional change, and the economics of states-in-transition.


This book is a balanced, lucid account of the arguments that have challenged and confounded economic historians for the past half century. Did this huge country, with a population of almost 600 million by 1950, achieve sustained economic growth and experience any structural change? How did China’s labour-abundant rural economy interact with the international economy and the domestic sectors of urban industry and handicraft? And finally, did the Chinese state facilitate or inhibit economic change?
Philip Richardson’s answers to these questions are judicious and fair. He believes that the poor quality of economic data and the vastness of the country make it impossible to reach a consensus on how rapidly China’s gross domestic product per capita grew after 1990. For agriculture, the average farm size declined, land yields rose and average living standards did not fall despite modest technological improvements in farming. An industrial spurt took place in urban centres of the coastal provinces, promoted in part by foreign and private Chinese investments, in which the bulk of industrial organizations focused on producing consumer goods and services. Foreign trade displaced some rural handicrafts but also proved to be a beneficial force, minimizing the unemployment caused by the restructuring of rural handicrafts. The Chinese state tried to promote industrialization, raise farm income and output, and build infrastructure to nurture modern economic growth, but its performance was spotty and short-lived. However the author has not been able to frame the problem in terms of why China’s leaders and people were unable to develop a modern market economy that could have produced sustained growth of GDP per capita, initiate economic structural change, and minimize some of the pathologies of modern economic development while becoming more integrated with the world economy.

Three spheres of economic life have existed throughout Chinese history as well as in other civilizations: the customary, command and market economies. China, like most nation-states, was never able to replace those three economies. Its autocratic state had always used liturgical organizations – a mixture of official and private elites and merchant wealth and volunteerism – to modulate the customary and market economies. By so doing, its leaders and people adhered to an economic path dependency based on labour-intensive farming, handicrafts and services as well as a huge, resilient customary economy, embedded in the rural order, where nearly 95 per cent of the population resided. Liturgical organizations depended on the special contractual relations developed between officials and private individuals, whose behaviour was characterized by high transaction costs, moral hazard, and irregular practices incompatible with the values and behaviour required for creating a rational, efficient and law-abiding modern market economy.

In order to develop a modern market economy, China’s political centre and society had to redesign institutions, redistribute private property rights and enforce the contracting of such rights, establish economic organizations of a private and public nature capable of reducing transaction and transformation costs, and create social and political networks for state and market agents to co-operate rather than behave as they did in the Chinese liturgical organizational mode. Just as the Qing state was unable to carry out these reforms, so were the regimes of the Republican period and the Communist Party-governed state unable to create a modern market economy.

By ignoring the relationship between the command, customary, and traditional market economies and not examining why the Chinese could not break away from their historical path dependency on liturgical
organizations, the author has missed a golden opportunity to reappraise the rich historiography describing modern China’s economic change.

Ramon H. Myers


“The central theme of this book,” Xu Gang writes in the opening sentence, “is the impact of tourism on local economic development in China.” This line underrates considerably what the author has accomplished in this detailed empirical study. Readers in the tourism studies field will appreciate an analysis of tourism as an economic force generated from a combination of specifically local development strategies and national policies of economic reform and institutional transition. The more general China studies audience, meanwhile, will find that tourism is a particularly revealing lens through which to view the local-level development consequences of fiscal decentralization and institutional change. A number of key issues pertinent to China’s transitional economy are clearly revealed through Xu’s examination of local-level tourism development: fiscal reforms and the decentralization of revenue-generating responsibilities, the resulting influence of state advocacy in local economic development practices, the concurrent rapid growth of the non-state sector, and the general lack of broad-based participation in economic decision-making on the part of those populations most directly affected by development. Thus, the strength of Xu’s study is its focus on the local (state and business) incentives for tourism development, rather than on that nebulous and difficult to pin down entity called “the tourism industry.”

The study argues that local governments pursue tourism with unrealistic optimism, and that local conditions play a large role in determining the ultimate outcome of locally-based tourism development strategies. Because of the broader forces of fiscal reform and decentralization, tourism is often viewed by local governments as a relatively low-cost strategy for jump-starting commercial development and attracting investment capital. Treated thus as a revenue generating scheme, planning efforts seek quantitative maximization (“more heads on beds”), often leading to high capital investment requirements that cannot be financed locally. When foreign sources of capital fill this need, as Xu finds in the case of Guilin, there is often a lack of articulation with the local economy (due in part to a lack of concern for “community involvement” in development planning) and a devastatingly high rate of revenue leakage. In the Suzhou case, Xu finds a stronger local economy with less need for foreign capital, along with a deeper resource base of commercial networks and expertise, resulting in significantly more local economic benefits (particularly in
terms of the participating local crafts and souvenir industries). In Beidaihe, Xu finds a thriving non-state sector that shadows the still prevalent “danwei tourism” of the old command economy, revealing the thriving dualism of China’s transitional economy.

In comparing the international and domestic dimensions of China’s tourism market, Xu finds the rapid and spontaneous development of domestic tourism to be much more beneficial to local development goals. This is significant, since from a planning perspective domestic tourism is still severely neglected in China. Xu’s study not only suggests that local governments could benefit more from tourism by focusing more directly on the domestic tourism market, but also implies that as domestic tourism in China grows, its impact on local development strategies will become increasingly significant. This, in turn, suggests an intensifying trend towards localism and regionalism in China’s political economy, as localities increasingly vie with each other to attract this newly recognized catalyst for local commercial development. Unfortunately, Xu does not deal with this latter issue in any depth, but his book provides ample evidence for such a trend.

Originally written as a doctoral dissertation in 1996 at the University of Mainz, Xu’s study is based on eleven months of interviews and field surveys. The present version is a verbatim reprinting of Xu’s dissertation. This speaks highly for the quality of Xu’s original work, though not for the editors at Curzon. Many of the dissertation’s original typographical and grammatical errors are repeated and the English at times reads with some difficulty. With a little effort, Xu’s excellent dissertation could have become an even more polished and readable book. Nevertheless, the work stands on its own as a fine contribution to understanding of the local dimensions of China’s economic transition, and of one of the most significant sectors to emerge from, as well as succinctly characterize, that transition.

TIM OAKES


The eight chapters of this book describe the changing circumstances of Guangdong agriculture as the province came under the onslaught of currency depreciation, export growth and political instability. Few new ideas emerge. The author throws himself into the optimist-pessimist dichotomy that characterizes the literature on the subject and emerges a pessimist while giving in to much of the optimist argument. Farmers who produced for the market had a difficult time in the depression of the 1930s, he argues, but at all times, they were a suffering lot, exploited through rent and tax and food shortages.
Chapters 2 and 3 deal with much-repeated arguments on Guangdong’s high population–land ratio or its high yields. It bypasses the subject of supplementary crops even though they formed possibly a quarter of the common diet. In Chapter 4, Lin concedes that foreign trade stimulated economic growth and that cash-cropping raised per-unit land income, but he also thinks that because merchants creamed off the profit while farmers suffered from trade depressions, they did not benefit when trade boomed. The reader should be aware, though, that when Lin thinks that trade increase has often been exaggerated, he looks at the import-export statistics for only Guangzhou and Shantou which, by the 20th century, accounted for most of Guangdong’s exports but only about half of its imports.

Chapter 5 provides a description of increases in the land tax, but does not show their consequences because the increases are measured in money and nowhere in the book is it said how farm prices had been rising. In Chapter 6, Lin says that landlords and tenants should not be thought of as polarized typologies, but he stresses that some tenants were exploited by unscrupulous landlords. He is right to think that no study of landlord–tenant relations is complete without a discussion of the modes of rent payment and the level of rent, but, for lack of data, he excuses himself from quantifying rent increases. Where he does quantify, fixed crop rent is pitched in the same table (6.3) against fixed cash rent, where one is measured in terms of the percentage of crop paid as rent and the other the percentage rent was of the price of land. The two being incomparable, readers are left to make up their own minds while Lin goes off on a tangent to lament that rent was too high for Guangdong. In Chapter 7, on credit and overseas remittance, Lin shows that he dislikes pawnbrokers and money lenders but looks upon overseas remittance with favour. This last, it seems, was the only factor that could have benefited Chinese farmers without cost.

In short, this is a very muddled account of the rural economy. It has brought hardly a shred of new evidence to the argument. There are good reasons for turning to the statistics of the 1920s and 1930s on the issues raised in this book, but little can be learned from them unless they are examined critically.

DAVID FAURE


This book has a somewhat high-sounding but misleading title. If you expect to read about geographic theories and methods in depth, you will
be disappointed. It is a collection of 21 short Chinese papers presented in
a conference entitled “China and the world in the 21st century,” held in
the Chinese University of Hong Kong from 13 to 15 August 1998.
Eighteen of the papers were written by geographers from China, two from
Hong Kong, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United
States. Section 1 (“The development trends of geographic science in the
21st century”) and section 2 (“Research methods and the application of
new techniques in the geographic science”) consist of four papers each,
with the emphasis of the book on section 3 (“Geographic teaching
materials and education”). Unfortunately, the title of the book does not
reflect this fact.

The book shows the typical characteristic of conference proceedings:
great variability in the quality of the papers. Some read more like
opinions and are not supported by rigorous research. In section 1, only the
second paper, “The supporting system and scientific ability construction
of China geography development in the 21st century,” by Jiazehn Zhang
and his colleagues, makes some good observations as to how the status
of geography can be improved in China. The themes of this paper are
followed in subsequent papers, particularly those in section 3.

Two of the papers in section 2 – one dealing with the supply and
demand of internet in the field of telecommunications geography, and the
other the difficulties of publishing geographic works in China – are not
appropriate at all for this section. The remaining two papers were
contributed by Western-trained Chinese geographers. The best is by
Anthony Yeh (from Hong Kong) and Xia Li (from Guangzhou),
dealing with the use of GIS and remote sensing to study spontaneous
urban development in Dongguan in the Zhujiang Delta in Guangdong
province. The other, dealing with the development of a computer-based
resource decision support system, is contributed by a Chinese geographer
in collaboration with two British researchers at the University of New-
castle. These two papers are distinguished from other Chinese papers in
their higher degree of rigour in research design and the style of presen-
tation.

In section 3, there is an interesting paper on the number and spatial
distribution of geographers of Chinese origin teaching in universities in
the United States. The striking characteristic is that their field of special-
ization is predominantly geographic techniques. It appears that the
number of ethnic Chinese geographers in the United States is increasing,
because many Chinese students who complete their Ph.D. degrees in
the United States often succeed in getting university teaching positions.
As a result, the paper is now out-of-date. The remaining 12 papers
discuss geographic education in China and Hong Kong, with 11 concern-
ing the problems of geographic education in China at the secondary
and tertiary levels. There is a degree of sameness in the ideas presented
in these papers. They all point out the difficulty of attracting students
to geography in China, and that there is a need to change the
geography curriculum to focus on the population–environment interac-
tions and in particular sustainable development to make geography more
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useful in the 21st century. They also note the need to incorporate the new techniques of Geographic Information System and Remote Sensing.

Although many of the papers are not as rigorous as one would like, they provide some insights into the trends and development of geography and geographic education in China in the 21st century. Quite clearly, China is shifting from its Soviet model of geography (which placed more emphasis on physical geography) to the Western paradigm of emphasizing population–environment interactions. It is currently in a period of transition when the older generation of geographers is gradually superseded by a new generation influenced by the West. Nevertheless, because China is still a communist country, geography is more utilitarian and less diverse in nature than its counterpart in the West.

C.P. Lo


The issue of ethnic consciousness has grown in importance more or less all over the globe, being a source of war in several countries. China has also witnessed a rise in ethnic consciousness, even among minorities whom some specialists have believed not much different from the majority Han. However, its origin and development over the PRC period has received thorough treatment only quite recently. This book takes up the topic with respect to the most populous of China’s minority nationalities, the Zhuang, covering the entire period of the PRC. There are individual chapters on culture and economics, and a conclusion arguing that the state-sponsored rise of ethnic consciousness among the Zhuang is most unlikely to lead to violent secessionist movements.

Kaup argues that the CCP in effect created the Zhuang by promoting campaigns in favour of Zhuang ethnic consciousness. She believes that, over the long term, the CCP has managed this development quite creditably, and skillfully balanced Zhuang ethnic and regional loyalties against state integration. By this she means that “the CCP took a risk in promoting the development of a largely state-created nationality,” but that it “has paid off” (p. 180). This study contributes considerably to our understanding of state–minority relations and the impact of PRC policy on the way political elites have functioned. Kaup presents a great deal of evidence to show that it was a state-sponsored initiative which initiated Zhuang consciousness as a nationality, a starting point to which local Zhuang activism could give momentum. At the same time, she acknowledges that there was something about the Zhuang which predated the CCP’s campaigns. In other words, the “creation” of the Zhuang was not something manufactured out of thin air.

I agree with Kaup that the ethnic consciousness of the Zhuang is most unlikely to lead to the kind of violent secessionist movements seen in
And I have no fault to find with the detailed argumentation in support of her argument presented in the final chapter. What I find striking is that such an argument should be presented at all. Admittedly, ethnic consciousness has been shown in apparently unlikely places to explode into violence and only foolish governments ignore the potentials of a rise in ethnic identities. But it is really only parts of the intellectual elite that has even thought of suggesting secession. The great majority of the Zhuang see their interests as best served in remaining part of the PRC.

My criticisms of this book are very minor. I was disappointed that the chapter on culture had so little on the arts or on anything but historiography, language and education. However, I acknowledge that deep but narrow scholarship is defensible against broader but shallower treatment, and what she says on those three facets is both interesting and relevant to her overall subject. There are a few minor errors. For instance, on p. 2, Kaup informs us that the Zhuang are by far the largest of China’s nationalities. Actually, as she elsewhere acknowledges, the Han are by far the largest, though the Zhuang certainly have the largest population among China’s minorities.

Overall, this book contributes greatly to our understanding of a minority which has not received nearly the treatment it deserves. The book is theoretically informed and adds to our knowledge of PRC policy towards the minorities and, more important, how policy translates into reality among a specific people. It draws extensively on the extensive Chinese-language literature on the Zhuang, as well as on English-language works. It is well written and produced. There is a clear set of arguments and they are well presented. This is a splendid book, which I strongly recommend.


This book is certainly a much needed analysis of historical and actual Miao ethnicities and the problems of cultural identity in 20th-century China. But its main ideas, drowned in a swamp of scholasticism, may seem for the lay reader a bit difficult to grasp. Today, the Miao are one of the 56 official nationalities of the PRC and a good example that the Chinese concept of “minority nationalities” cannot be equated with ethnic groups. The Miao include no less than three main ethnic groups and mutually unintelligible languages: the Qoxiong or Kuoxiong (West Hunan, North-east Guizhou), the Hmu or Kanao (South-east Guizhou) and the Hmong or Mong (Sichuan, West Guizhou, Yunnan and the
Indo-Chinese peninsula), which do not overlap each other, but were formerly all encompassed into the Miao galaxy, a historical label for some of the oldest Chinese aborigines.

Louisa Schein, whose field experience of the Miao includes the Hmong refugees from Laos in the U.S. and the Hmu and Kanao of Guizhou, assumes that they must somehow be one and the same people because they have been recognized as one and the same nationality (these three ethnic self appellations are almost reluctantly given in a note: 14, p. 299). From this dubious premise, she embarks on a reconstitution of nationality-making in the PRC, underestimating a very central point: in exchange for their rights on their ancestral land, the state granted, together with recognition, lasting privileges of local administrative autonomy, demographic tolerance, majored representation in provincial and national assemblies, and so on. The author herself enumerates these on pp. 96–97 but seems to attribute them to the revival of the nationality policy after the Cultural Revolution, and not, apparently, linked to the unification of China’s territory. All the same, the work of socio-economic classification on the scale of social evolution undertaken by Chinese ethnologists was not “simply scientific and of no social significance,” but the key concept for advocating from the beginning a non-synchronical pace to development for the nationalities. This is why, at the time of the Cultural Revolution, the nationality policy and its actors (both politicians and ethnologists) were dubbed reactionaries and suppressed. But Schein’s main concern is elsewhere, with the images projected by the State Tourist and other agencies of exotic minorities different from the Han cultural monolith. The discrete manipulation of asymmetric gender dichotomies (“the gendering of minority images”) in patterning intra-ethnic, majority–minority relations may, she remarks, contradict the PRC ideology of equality between all and local administrative autonomy for the nationalities.

This book, however, offers vivid and genuine glimpses into the behaviour of the Han visitors to a Miao village, but a full account would require an equal treatment of local Miao consciousness and feelings. They are alluded to through life stories of ethnic artists, but remain mostly theoretical. Dealing with seduction and the selling of souvenirs may not seem always a burden after all, even if, now, tourists’ picture-hunting may endanger privacy. The importance given to state intervention into the revival of religion and ritual is much exaggerated. One may worry that this dissertation about Miao culture reveals almost nothing of it, except for a sketchy and obscure summary of ritual activities through the year and a very superficial description of a Zhaolong ritual on p. 223.

Louisa Schein’s book provides an exhaustive bibliography and a tantalizing presentation of mainly American research on identity and culture in post-Mao China. It will certainly remain a reference book for the sinologists, if not for students of the Miao.

Jacques Lemoine
This book provides a comprehensive review of housing development from 1949 to 2000 in mainland China. A chapter on each of five different periods provides readers with a clear picture of housing development in urban China. The book covers not only the development process in housing, but also issues such as environmental housing design, land and real estate management, urban renewal, and housing management.

Since the book intends to study almost everything related to housing development in urban China, the focus of discussion shifts from one period to another. The authors argue that housing development is embedded within the political and economic context, from which the importance of administrative and institutional arrangements needs to be taken into special consideration. However there is no real in-depth analysis on how institutional arrangements, especially the role of work units, affect the process and the outcome of housing development, with the discussion rather piecemeal and descriptive in nature. Discussions are illustrated by case studies and supported by secondary statistics and official documents. However, although the book includes all major official documents related to housing development in urban China, its dependence on secondary case studies means it lacks substantial theoretical support to guide its study.

Although there is room for improvement in the depth of discussion, the book succeeds in identifying the major issues in studying the urban housing system in China (such as the private/public mix, the importance of the work unit, institutional arrangements and housing distribution). The changing mix between private and public sector housing reflects the changing policy and practices and, sometimes, the political struggle of the Chinese government. The book also examines the impact of various institutional arrangements on the degree of social segregation. The authors argue that the privatization process will break down the physical linkage between work place and place of residence, and they conclude that housing inequality will hence be replaced by a system of income inequality. This is an important issue which deserves more attention in future research.

On one hand, this book is informative; on the other, some chapters need to be tightened up to make them focused. For example, chapter 2, while claiming to cover the analytical framework of the entire book, is simply a general overview of the political and economic background of contemporary China. In addition, the authors recognize the significant differences in housing provision between urban and rural China, and chapter 6 provides a brief account of the situation in rural areas. However, because of the complexity of the issue, the study on rural housing is quite superficial. It is just too ambitious to cover the two systems within a single book.

As a whole, this book can be read as an introductory text for those who want to get a quick briefing on the housing system in China. But those
The public burning of opium is a frequent ritual in anti-drug campaigns in China, from the destruction of thousands of pounds of opium by Lin Zexu in 1839 to the 4,000 kilograms of heroin set on fire in Kunming in June 1992 (21 drug traffickers were executed by firing squad for good measure): “Hail to burning! Hail to kill!” were some of the slogans accompanying these campaigns. With the exception of an intermission of 20 years under the PRC, the country never succeeded in eliminating drugs, despite numerous suppression campaigns. This book attempts to explore these campaigns in their full cultural and political complexity, focusing in particular on the role of nationalism and the issue of state building.

Skipping over the 19th century, the first official campaign to eliminate opium Zhou Yongming examines took place during the late Qing (1906–11). He shows how opium appeared for the first time in the public domain, as the “rise of nationalism” created a political context in which social elites and the central government worked in synergy in a relatively successful movement which was brutally interrupted by the fall of the empire. More substantial is the author’s analysis of the important anti-drug crusade under the Guomindang, launched in the context of the New Life Movement which aimed to bring under much tighter ideological control the everyday lives of ordinary people. Jiang Jieshi personally assumed the leadership of the movement against drugs in 1935, although taxation rather than suppression was principally aimed at subtracting revenues from regional powers in order to consolidate the central government and fund military campaigns against the communists. Weak government institutions, an ambiguous policy towards opium revenue and the onset of the Sino-Japanese War conspired to undermine the campaign from the very start. The most successful attempt at drug suppression, in contrast, took a mere three years to succeed: the CCP relied on an unprecedented degree of social mobilization in order to eliminate opium from 1950 to 1952, as a dense network of police institutions, resident committees and mass organizations was used to overwhelm drug offenders, not infrequently denounced by their own family members. The illicit consumption and production of drugs reappeared with the economic reforms of the 1980s, making China a major transit point in the international heroin traffic. In contrast to the 1950s, however, government efforts have remained largely ineffective, despite the elaborate political rituals involved in the anti-drug crusade and the demonization of drug
offenders, portrayed as dangerous, harmful and unpatriotic elements to be eliminated for the sake of collective national health.

The author relies heavily on secondary sources, with the exception of limited primary material in the chapter on the Nanjing Decade and evidence of fieldwork in the last two chapters (the author’s description of several rehabilitation centres he personally visited is the most useful first-hand information provided). Despite the promise of a rich cultural analysis, the book is a fairly conventional narrative which concentrates on the personalities who dominated the various anti-drug campaigns. Although the “role of nationalism” is emphasized in the book, no effort is made to examine the shifting cultural meanings attributed to the “nation” or the multifarious forms assumed by “nationalism” in modern China. Despite these shortcomings, this is a handy and informative book on an important aspect of 20th-century China.

FRANK DIKÖTTER


The Chinese in America have had a mixed bag of commentators and have perhaps been poorly served by the lack of breadth of understanding of many of them. The romantically sinister images and text of Arnold Genthe and Will Irwin’s Old Chinatown (1913) could convince no one that they capture more than a thin sliver of reality, and more academic treatments, such as Gunter Barth’s Bitter Strength (1964), are often too limited in scope or too pedestrian in style to take the attention. The chintzy sugar-coated exoticisms of Garding Lui’s 1948 Inside Los Angeles Chinatown are hardly enlightening, nor do other writers from within the American Chinese community necessarily fare better than outsiders, either because the timing of publication was unhappy (as perhaps with Louis Chu’s excellent 1961 Eat a Bowl of Tea) or because the “inwardness” of their material was lost on those who were not already au fait with it (director Wayne Wang’s 1985 bi-lingual film Dim Sum). One wonders at the impression left by the brilliantly observed but essentially extra-cultural writings of Maxine Hong Kingston and Amy Tan in the 1970s and 1980s. It is tempting to suggest that the best account is still Mary Coolidge’s 1909 Chinese Immigration, a book which contrives a worthy scholarly overview despite the limitations of the author’s background knowledge and the perspectives of that period.

The two works under review here are very different in aim and in scope, but suffer to some extent from a want of background knowledge.
Peffer’s study is very narrow in its focus. He is interested in the Page Law of 1875, an Act passed by the United States Senate to prohibit the immigration of women for purposes of prostitution, the only restriction bill to escape nullification by the Supreme Court until the more swingeing exclusion laws of the 1880s. That the Page Law was a cover for the more general aim of excluding Chinese women altogether from immigration and thus denying any means of self-perpetuation to the Chinese community seems clear enough, and Peffer carefully rehearses the apparent logic of the arguments which informed the Act. The Californian press in the 1870s was systematically negative in its treatment of Chinese women and Peffer finds that a “thorough if not exhaustive review of the articles that San Francisco newspapers published about Chinese American women between 1874 and 1883 fails to reveal a single entry favorable to them” (p. 76); and on p. 79: “The press unanimously informed them [the San Franciscan readers] that nine out of any ten Chinese women stepping off a steamer from Hong Kong were certain to be prostitutes.” The 1880 Census enumerators had contributed to the picture by entering “prostitute?” against the names of a large number of Chinese women, whereas against Caucasian women’s names was entered “dressmaker?” Only the courts seem to have had the courage to stand up to received public opinion and to refuse to accept unsubstantiated accusations of lewdness and immorality against Chinese women. Peffer’s own stance is late 20th-century liberal on the issue, and he brings in a certain amount of evidence from Singapore, Penang and Hawaii to show that non-exclusion of wives and other respectable women worked beneficially. His weakness lies in the failure to show even one primary Chinese source for his work, so that there is only the evidence of non-Chinese (both pro- or con- but largely the latter) on which to build his interpretation of events. He is interested in showing that the Chinese did not wish to be merely sojourners and that they would have brought their womenfolk with them if permitted but even if he is correct in this, there is little he can do to demonstrate it, still less to justify the cover blurb’s claim that he “amplifies the voices of immigrant women.” The book is interesting and far from uninformative, but it will not necessarily convince.

Chen’s much wider study (he deals with the Page Law in one paragraph) draws upon both English-language and Chinese-language sources and attempts to get beneath the surface of San Francisco’s Chinese community and at the same time to show that its members were at all times very much a part of the emigrant areas of Guangdong from which they came. He presents the view that the Chinese were neither sojourners nor fully assimilated, but rather “assimilatees with Chinese characteristics,” as it were. As he is neither a Cantonese nor American-born he would seem to be in an ideally objective position to undertake this study, but at times his grasp of some aspects of Chinese culture appears to be less than strong, and his historical sense not always unfaltering. Amongst other slips he twice (pp. 14 and 129) says that the first imperial dynasty was the Qing; gives sweeping generalizations that must be quite misleading to the lay reader, such as that “people who ventured out of their
hometowns had often formed huigan” (p. 72), seems unaware (p. 19) that the spelling hong in “co-hong” comes from the Cantonese pronunciation; believes that all Hakka live in mountainous regions (p. 15); appears not to know of the island of Shameen (p. 24); is apparently unaware of a literature on the zishunü of Shunde county (p. 83); is unaware that the Chinese knew about the solar year and so wrongly attributes the 24 solar periods of the year to the lunar calendar (p. 19); says that the foundation of Clan Associations was common ancestry rather than common surname (p. 28); gets the dates of the Three Kingdoms period wrong (p. 129); and wrongly describes the Mencius quotation “The desire for both food and sex is human nature” as “a famous saying of the sage (Confucius)” (p. 222). He is eager to dispel the idea that the Chinese emigrated out of poverty, and while it is right that such a simple cause for emigration must be less that the whole story, it must be equally wrong to fail to mention the “push” factors of the Taiping Rebellion and widespread disorder and hardship in the emigrant areas. The everyday life and work of the San Francisco Chinese is little touched upon, though a few individual life histories are partially given. The role of secret societies (the notorious Tongs) is alluded to in three widely separated paragraphs, but it is nowhere explained. The treatment of the relationship between the San Francisco Chinese and their homeland is enlightening, and the description of the 1905 boycott of American goods in China and of subsequent American Chinese aid to China fits snugly with the thesis that there was in existence a “trans-Pacific community”.

Both these books have insights to offer, but not even together do they give a satisfyingly fleshed-out picture of San Francisco’s best known inhabitants.

Hugh D.R. Baker


This book, written and edited by some of Hong Kong’s leading academics, is an analysis of the May 1998 election for the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), the first such election since China’s resumption of sovereignty. Confounding pundits, turnout at the election was the highest ever in the territory’s history, with 53.3 per cent of the electorate casting their ballot. Almost all pollsters had predicted a low turnout, especially if it rained. But the record turnout was achieved despite severely inclement weather. (One chapter in the volume is devoted to examining the reasons for the turnout.)

Most of the chapters are revised papers presented at a conference held in September 1998. Previous conferences and volumes had examined the elections of 1991 and 1995, held under British sovereignty. This volume
already seems a bit dated, since the second legislative elections have already been held, and public interest is, quite naturally, focused on more recent results. Nevertheless, scholars interested in China and Hong Kong will find the discussions of interest. And it is quite likely that the materials in this book will find their way into classrooms. There is, after all, a new subfield opening up in China studies, the study of SARs, which currently consist of Hong Kong and Macau and, if China gets its way, will eventually include Taiwan.

The editors say in the preface that Hong Kong in 1998 “offers a unique opportunity for scholars to observe possible effects of contextual and institutional changes on the meaning, conduct and results of elections.” Certainly, the 1998 election was of interest not only because it provided a barometer of popular sentiment regarding Hong Kong’s various political forces but also because it was a test of the extent to which China’s policy of “one country, two systems” was being successfully implemented. As Lau Siu-kai says in the opening chapter, “Hong Kong is unique in that the electoral system for its legislature was determined not by internal political dynamics – the balance of political forces within Hong Kong, but largely by an external power,” namely China, “in a highly politically charged atmosphere.”

Other chapters include an examination of the role of the Electoral Affairs Commission, a comparison of the 1995 and 1998 election campaigns, political parties, and the role of the media. The closing chapter, aptly titled “Election without political clout,” by Kuan Hsin-chi, examines the extent to which legislative elections are relevant in executive-led Hong Kong, where the legislature’s powers are severely circumscribed. Not only is the legislature as a whole virtually powerless vis-a-vis the executive, but only a third of the 60 seats were directly elected in 1998, with 30 seats elected by functional constituencies and 10 by an election committee, in accordance with the Basic Law promulgated by China. (The 2000 election saw 24 directly elected seats and, in 2004, half the legislature will be directly elected, with the remaining half chosen by functional constituencies.) “Taken together,” Kuan writes, “the three-constituency arrangements of the electoral system fragments the people of Hong Kong into a multitude of electorates, thereby rendering even more difficult the already difficult process of the formation of the general will.”

Kuan concludes that “the 1998 election is insignificant.” However, he adds that it must be put into a long-term perspective. “The issue,” he writes, “is not whether any single election matters, but what cumulative effects successive elections will have.”

FRANK CHING


In the context of European sinology, Portugal is a strange country. It was the first to arrive in China, by sea in 1513; with the Macau handover, it
was the last to leave, in December 1999. With such tremendous experience of permanent contacts with China, Portugal might be expected to became a country full of experts on Chinese studies. The reality is, however, different. Portuguese sinology is quite weak, although in the last ten years major steps have been taken, mostly into the research of history of Macau and Sino-Portuguese relations, based on Portuguese archives and libraries.

Moisés da Silva Fernandes, not a sinologist, is one of the Portuguese scholars who is engaged in painstaking research into Portugal in China. For nearly ten years he worked on the subject using Portuguese and North American archives, as a graduate in political science from Manitoba University (Canada), and associate researcher of the Instituto de Ciências Sociais, in Lisbon. The huge volume under review is an outstanding work. It gives a day-by-day account of the events and facts which lay behind the history of Macau and of the Portuguese in China over the last 50 years. The Sinopse is exactly what it should be, a work of investigation, with thousands of chronological entries, an appendix of previously unpublished documents in Portuguese and English, and maps and photographs of both places and people.

Moisés Fernandes presents only facts and data: there is no analysis or large explanations – this is not the goal of the work – but his Sinopse is surely an indispensable tool of research for all those who study this fascinating period of the history of Sino-Portuguese relationships. It provides many new data for a more accurate and faithful study of important periods in the recent history of Macau, such as the complicated months at the end of 1966 when the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution reached Macau. All the difficult paths leading to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Portugal and China (surprisingly only in February 1979) and to the reintegration of Macau in the People’s Republic of China are extremely well documented. However, the important role played by the Portuguese moderate Maoists – in the 1970s the PCP (M-L), or Communist Party of Portugal (Marxist-Leninist) was the only officially organization enjoying access to the political power in Beijing – is hardly mentioned. More research is needed.

This Sinopse is also very useful because the documents reveal how the Portuguese were simultaneously both powerful and weak in Macau, and how often the Chinese from Beijing didn’t know what to do with the tiny Portuguese settlement in China. And finally, it shows the important role played by some Macanese leaders, like Ho Yin, or Stanley Ho.

We are now waiting for the detailed analysis of this last half century of Sino-Portuguese relations which Moisés da Silva Fernandes is currently preparing, also based on his Sinopse.

ANTÓNIO GRAÇA DE ABREU