
David M. Lampton has written the first comprehensive scholarly history and analysis of US–China relations since the Tiananmen crisis of 1989. Although Lampton now teaches at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, for most of the period covered by this volume he served as President of the National Committee on US–China Relations. The conversations he had with Chinese and American leaders and analysts during his tenure add considerable detail, insight, and colour to his analysis. They are supplemented by quite extensive research in primary and secondary documents, although far more from American sources than Chinese.

Lampton’s basic thesis is the erosion of what he calls the “grand bargain” that guided US–China relations between the Nixon visit of 1972 and the Tiananmen crisis of 1989. During that period, the two countries’ common concerns about Soviet expansion, both globally and in Asia, enabled them to set aside more contentious issues. America tolerated China’s violations of human rights, China accepted the American military presence in Asia, and both countries put the Taiwan issue on the back burner.

A series of developments in 1989 and the years thereafter caused this bargain to unravel. The collapse of the Soviet Union removed the common adversary. The Tiananmen crisis heightened American concern about human rights in China. The development of a distinctive Taiwanese identity, and the growing demands from Taipei for greater international standing, if not formal independence, made the Taiwan issue more difficult to manage. And, as the possibility of a military confrontation over Taiwan increased, China found the American alliance structure in Asia to be far less acceptable.

Lampton also points out that, since 1989, China has been far more successful than many Americans had anticipated. The communist system did not collapse as a result of the Tiananmen crisis, as some had confidently predicted. Instead, China has experienced more than a decade of sustained economic growth and military modernization. China’s trade surplus with the United States grew, and was attributed to unfair, neo-mercantilist trade practices. As a result, Sino-American trade relations with the United States became increasingly contentious throughout the 1990s. Moreover, by the end of the decade, there was growing concern in the United States about the prospect that China could become a strategic competitor, vying for power with America both globally and regionally.

Lampton doubts that China and the United States can achieve a “broadly cooperative” relationship, but he believes they have too many common strategic and economic interests to form a “conflict-ridden” relationship, either. Instead, he predicts a “mixed relationship,” as ex-
pressed metaphorically in the book’s title, with its image of two countries coexisting uneasily with different objectives and aspirations. However, he also concludes that “the future must be shaped; it is not pre-ordained.” He therefore emphasizes the importance of wise leadership by influential individuals, in both government and society, in shaping the US–China relationship.

The book begins with a short chronological overview of US–China relations between 1989 and 2000, and ends with an equally brief chapter on policy recommendations. The bulk of the work analyses the China–US relationship along several dimensions: the global (the two countries’ interactions with Russia, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and key international regimes), the bilateral (the two countries’ common and divergent interests with regard to security, economics, and human rights), the domestic (the institutions and attitudes that shape each country’s policies toward the other), and the individual (the various leaders who make decisions or influence policy).

This is an ambitious research agenda and, although this is a long book, the reader is sometimes surprised by what has been downplayed or left out. For example, the chronological section focuses primarily on the downturns in the relationship between 1989 and 1999. It gives short shrift to the one serious attempt to create a turn for the better: the twin summits of 1997–98 that produced the joint commitment by Clinton and Jiang to “build toward a constructive strategic partnership” for the 21st century. This lacuna is unfortunate, for this was precisely the period in which the leaders of the two countries attempted to define and articulate the positive strategic vision for their relationship that Lampton regards as so important.

The analytical chapters are sometimes even more selective in their coverage. For example, the discussion of bilateral security issues discusses American concerns about China’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but not Chinese concerns about America’s missile defense programs; the discussion of the international context for the relationship highlights the two countries’ interactions over Hong Kong, but not over the Korean peninsula.

Lampton’s analysis of domestic politics and individual leaders in the two countries is especially spotty. The discussion of “The stories we tell ourselves” describes broad patterns in the two countries’ perceptions of their history and the contemporary world, but does not analyse the specific ways in which American public opinion about China (or Chinese opinion about the US) has changed since 1989. The analysis of domestic political institutions tries to sketch the roles of interest groups, bureaucracies, localities, and legislatures in the two countries in the space of only 30 pages. The chapter entitled “People count” presents short case studies of the roles of people such as Jesse Helms, Wang Daohan, Maurice Greenberg, and Dai Qing in US–China relations, but does not grapple with the underlying issue of whether these individuals’ impact on the relationship has been fundamental or only marginal. Each of these topics warrants far more extensive treatment than is given here.
Finally, the concluding chapter on policy recommendations focuses almost entirely on procedural issues, rather than the substance of policy; and presents advice almost entirely to the US as to how to “productively handle” the relationship, even as Lampton acknowledges that “Chinese have equal obligations in this regard.”

To be sure, Lampton’s advice here is well-founded: the White House should formulate a coherent approach to China; it should focus on major priorities, not dissipate scarce resources on secondary objectives; those major priorities should provide a strategic vision that the US government should communicate both to the Chinese and to its own people; and American presidents should not make promises of dramatic changes in policy that they cannot keep.

But Lampton does not tell us what the most appropriate American strategic vision of China would be, or recommend how to address the substantive issues in US–China relations. And in the end it is the substance of American policy toward China – not just the process by which it is decided and articulated – that will determine the future of US–China relations.

Still, despite the somewhat disappointing policy recommendations and the sometimes cursory analysis of domestic determinants, this book remains an excellent overview of a turbulent decade in US–China relations, and belongs on the bookshelf of anyone interested in Chinese foreign policy or US relations with China.

HARRY HARDING


Mao’s Crusade is part of a growing and welcome effort to bring key events of the 1950s back into the mainstream of the study of Chinese politics. Not that the 1950s have been ignored completely, but in comparison to the massive literature on the reform period, the early decades of the PRC have received scant scholarly attention of late, particularly in the social sciences. Studies by Dali Yang (Calamity and Reform in China, 1996) and David Bachman (Bureaucracy, Economy and Leadership in China, 1991) have tried to grapple with the most disastrous policy of this decade, the Great Leap Forward (GLF), by merging insights from the social science theory with more traditional Sinology, and by doing so have introduced vigorous debates about the GLF’s causes and consequences as well as the validity of social scientific approaches in the study of Chinese politics.

But for Alfred L. Chan, the GLF had a single cause – Mao Zedong’s delusions, fantasies, wishful thinking, irrationality, ideology, and consummate tactical skill – all of which were abetted by servile, self-interested, politically incompetent colleagues and underlings. Focusing on events in 1958, Chan’s argument that Mao “single-handedly” initiated
and pushed through the GLF is simultaneously a reaffirmation of the Mao-centred approach to Chinese politics pioneered by MacFarquhar, Teiwes and Sun and others, and a direct attack on David Bachman’s argument that the GLF was largely the result of the victory of a “planning and heavy industry coalition” over a “finance coalition,” with Mao playing a secondary role. Chan bases his argument largely upon newly published accounts of party history, memoirs of top leaders (particularly Bo Yibo), political secretaries (Li Rui), compilations of Mao’s papers and a hefty dose of national and provincial newspapers (he also mentions archives, but these do not show up anywhere in the references or footnotes). Students of Chinese politics who want to know where Chinese elites were and what they did and said in 1958 will not be disappointed. Nor will students who have tried but largely failed to apply rational choice theory or other elegant social science models to understand Chinese policy processes: “slipshod,” “absurd,” “haphazard,” “impulsive” are some of the milder of Chan’s descriptions (in chapters on the ministries of agriculture and metallurgy, and agricultural and industrial policy making in Guangdong) of how multiple, confusing, unrealistic and deluded utterances, speeches and directives were casually tossed at, but frequently ignored by, bewildered officials.

While Chan’s detailed, almost blow-by-blow, account of policy implementation in 1958 is an implicit challenge to not a few social science theories, this contribution is overshadowed by significant shortcomings in methodology, conceptualization and argumentation. Chan’s second chapter on “Policy making under a dominant Mao” is far too reliant on Bo Yibo’s memoirs and Mao’s documents (approximately half of the 433 footnotes are from these sources). His argument that the primary cleavage in pre-GLF Chinese elite politics was between Mao and “the Planners” is probably more of a reflection of these sources and misapplied social scientific terminology (such as “the planner” as a distinct political identity) than reality. Most “planners” (Li Fuchun, Chen Yun, Deng Zhihui, Deng Xiaoping, Zhou Enlai) were flip-flopping politicians,” while Mao, the supposed arch enemy of the planners, was known to proffer a plan or two himself, albeit different ones than the others. But a key issue that requires more explanation is why so many of Mao’s colleagues, all of whom were accomplished revolutionaries, did not offer more resistance to Mao’s crusade? Mao’s “domination” was surely as much of a function of this as his political skill. Chan offers numerous conflicting explanations – euphoria, self-interest, delusion, utopianism, party discipline, Mao’s legitimacy, the futility of resistance, and convenience among others – but does not delve into these issues in any depth or take advantage of voluminous social science literature on these subjects. Such theoretical shallowness results in overly simplistic, quasi-totalitarian, and ultimately condoning arguments about motive and (non) action: the Politburo “had no choice but to go along” (p. 79); “all had no choice but to be compliant” (p. 280); Chen Yun had “no choice” but to swim with the tide (p. 74); the Minister of Agriculture had “little choice but to go” (p. 109); junior officials “had no choice but to toe the line” (p. 113);
opposing or sabotaging GLF policies “was clearly not an option” (p. 161). The problem here is not merely theoretical, since Chan locates other officials (in Hunan in particular) who frequently rebuffed Mao and lived to see the sun rise again. If Mao was indeed so powerful, why was there variation in individual and provincial responses to his programs? Was Mao that much more skilled (or Chinese officials that much more docile and politically unsavvy) than Hitler, who also led his country to disaster but unlike Mao was nearly killed in an assassination attempt by top officials?

Chan’s selection of ministries, provinces and the year 1958 as case studies are also problematic. To assert that Mao was dominant in the GLF – that it was his “crusade” and not one shared by most others – requires at least some proof that he was able to overcome significant resistance at that time. In choosing certain ministries or provinces as cases, Chan should probably have focused on those with potential, interest, or capacity for resistance. However, Chan describes the Ministry of Agriculture as quasi-Maoist and without “significant institutional interests to defend” (p. 148) well before the GLF; he notes that the Ministry of Metallurgy was a “fledgling” ministry, low in the hierarchy, and staffed by highly-trained but politically vulnerable people; Guangdong’s leaders “had always been radical followers of Mao” (p. 198) and had a GLF mentality in the mid-1950s. Finally, the focus on 1958 is also quite limiting. While many ideas and policies congealed in 1958, implementation was critically important to the provinces in the crisis of 1959. Oddly, Chan cites, but does not refute, a Chinese scholar who notes that 1958 was “a little interlude in the perspective of the entire GLF period” (p. 197). This periodization also makes for difficult reading because Chan is forced to repeat similar policies in four contexts.

Because this book is very dense with policy details it is not appropriate for a general readership or teaching. Its lack of systematic hypothesis testing, theory, and comparative perspective detract from its value to political scientists who are not China specialists. China specialists who are interested in policy-making and implementation in 1958 will certainly find this book interesting, but because it is a “theory-confirming” study, one would be better off buying and reading the originals.

NEIL J. DIAMANT


As China’s environmental problems began to attract international attention over the past decade, observers of China’s environment have sought to better understand the historical background of China’s current environmental degradation. As part of that effort, questions have been raised as to how the environmental legacy of the Maoist period – a product, in part, of heroic assaults on nature employing mass mobilization techniques – is
related to the environmental dilemmas of the reform era. With the publication of her readable *Mao’s War Against Nature*, Judith Shapiro has helped shed additional light on this question by providing a descriptively rich account of some of the more egregious policy mistakes of the Maoist period and the environmental disasters they wrought. Shapiro combines her reading of the existing literature in Chinese and English with interviews and accounts of site visits she made, to create an engaging narrative that should be of interest to China specialists and non-specialists alike. The book should be a hit in the classroom.

In her introduction, Shapiro points to a number of possible interpretations of the human causes of China’s environmental problems: the influences of Chinese tradition, conquest of nature themes in Marxism/Leninism, the sway of Mao’s voluntaristic philosophy and the receptiveness of Chinese social structure and political culture to it, the challenges of industrialization, and so on. Shapiro rightly notes that explaining the human factors in environmental degradation involves, “…a complex interplay of political relationships, social structures, economic and geographic conditions, cultural traditions, linguistic understandings, and historical influences.” She illustrates this complexity through a series of case studies in which familiar policies from the Maoist period are re-examined with a new sensitivity to their environmental implications. Throughout, the author is concerned about ways in which the abuses of people are related to the abuses of nature.

The body of the book is comprised of chapters organized around four themes that Shapiro takes as defining the Maoist period. The first, “political repression,” is explored with reference to the fates of two distinguished intellectuals – economist Ma Yinchu and engineer Huang Wanli – whose expert advice on population policy and the Sanmenxia dam, respectively, was ignored at the cost of an enormous legacy of problems associated with overpopulation, and with the civil engineering fiasco on the Yellow River. The second theme, “utopian urgency,” is developed in a chapter on the Great Leap Forward which gives particular attention to deforestation and famine. The indiscriminate propagation of the Dazhai model for reclaiming marginal lands is discussed in terms of the third theme, “dogmatic uniformity,” in a chapter which features an interesting presentation of failed attempts to convert wetlands at Kunming’s Dian Lake into fields for grain cultivation. Finally, the theme of “forced population relocations,” associated with the “third front” development and the rustification of educated youth policies, is linked to a variety of misguided projects that produced the enduring environmental problems associated with the location of the Panzhihua (Sichuan) steel complex, ecosystem destruction on the Sanjiang Plain in Heilongjiang, and ill-advised efforts at creating commercial rubber plantations in Xishuangbanna in Yunnan.

The four chapters of case material are situated between introductory and concluding chapters in which Shapiro raises a series of conceptual issues derived from both the Chinese cases and her readings in the contemporary environmental studies literature. Here, the author’s control
of the discussion is less firm, with as many questions asked as answered. There are several issues on which further debate might be expected. Firstly, the extent to which Mao’s war against nature is a break from centuries of Chinese practices designed to remake nature to serve human needs. Shapiro recognizes that Chinese environmental history involves the aggressive exploitation of nature, but argues that the intensity of the Maoist assault, its organizational techniques, and the human toll associated with it, set the Maoist period apart.

Secondly, whether Mao’s war against nature differs from the attacks on nature found in the early industrialization experiences of other countries, both capitalist and communist? Again, Shapiro recognizes connections and similarities, but also points to the uniqueness of the Maoist experience in its “utopian idealism” and in the ways that struggles against “class enemies” were linked to the portrayal of nature as an enemy to be struggled against.

Thirdly, how to reconcile the political repression of technical intellectuals with the fact that many in the technical community also contributed to implementing the disastrous policies of the Maoist period? Political repression of technical personnel is clearly denounced by the author; the cases of Ma Yinchu and Huang Wanli are rightly understood by Shapiro to be symptomatic of a much larger problem. At the same time, she also acknowledges the roles of “red specialists” whose expertise was employed in the grandiose, environmentally questionable projects of the political elite.

Finally, there is the issue of whether a positive environmental legacy can also be found in Maoism. Since at least some versions of contemporary progressive Western environmental thought seem to resonate with Maoist development values, how do we reconcile such “sound environmentalism” with Shapiro’s account of the Mao period? Did such environmental principles as the rejection of capitalism, the celebration of local knowledge and distrust of established experts, labour-intensive production as a substitute for energy and materials intensity, the importance of recycling and reutilization of materials, an ethic of doing more with less, etc. simply get distorted in the hands of Maoists? Or, should the Maoist experience serve to remind us that such principles should not be romanticized when applied to a large complex society as opposed to small communal units? Unfortunately, Shapiro doesn’t explore some of these intriguing implications. Nevertheless, her engaging account of this period is most welcome.

RICHARD P. SUTTMEIER


Social Sciences and Social Engineering in China is a valuable addition to the existing literature on the development of modern academic disciplines
in China; in this case, sociology. Chiang is an able, and for the most part no-nonsense, guide to the ways in which power relations within and without China – especially the United States – shaped the work of Chinese academics and the fields that they sought to create. In full command of sources, and with an eye for disciplinary and personal detail as well as historical context, he offers a nuanced account of these power relations that is both informative and illuminating.

The study’s focus is the relationship between the Rockefeller Foundation and the development of sociology in China. Rockefeller Foundation grants were responsible for the flourishing of sociology in China from the late 1920s, and it was those institutions that benefited from Rockefeller largesse that distinguished themselves in the field: Yanjing University in Beijing and Nankai University in Tianjin. One additional (and quite unlikely) beneficiary was the Marxist historian/sociologist Chen Hansheng, whose “ad hoc” institutional bases included the Society for the Study of Chinese Agrarian Economy (founded 1933), and who benefited from Rockefeller funding indirectly through the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Jiang argues that Rockefeller largesse came at a price: Foundation “hegemony” not only directed research agenda toward conservative goals of “social engineering,” but also dictated research methods. On the other hand, Chinese academic “entrepreneurs” such as Leonard Hsu at Yanjing and Franklin Ho at Nankai were able to manipulate the Foundation to their own ends, even to the extent of misrepresenting their research in order to gain access to much-needed funds. The supreme example of the ability to subvert Foundation goals was Chen Hansheng, “a historian by training, a Comintern agent by avocation, and an agrarian researcher by commitment” (p. 11). Chen’s work receives the most serious treatment in the book – possibly because, despite his deceptions concerning the foundations, he was the most committed to sociology as a socially transformative field of learning, rather than just another discipline that could be utilized for academic careerism. Chen was exemplary of an attitude toward sociology that went back to its origins in China in the early 20th century, and remained alive in the works of anarchists and Marxists. While Jiang is even-handed in his treatment of Chinese sociologists, it is difficult to escape an impression from the study that his sympathies lie with Chen who, ironically, also was to suffer at the hands of the revolution to which he had been committed.

The study offers more than the relationship between sociology and foreign foundations. Jiang has interesting histories to tell of the development of the social sciences at Yanjing and Nankai Universities, of research projects launched and of individuals involved, who were among the architects of the social sciences in pre-revolutionary China (some, such as Fei Xiaotong, were to survive the suppression of sociology from the early 1950s). At its broadest, the study is conceived in terms of a cultural encounter between the United States and China. As the author puts it, elegantly, “social science became a kind of lingua franca of the cultural frontier,” where “social science was the syntax and money the
grammar” (p. 255). Jiang has the present very much on his mind as he writes about this past phase of the cultural encounter between China and the US through the medium of the social sciences.

Readers may be cautioned against the author’s unnecessary gestures toward tradition – that social engineering was consistent with Confucian statecraft – when all the evidence in the study points to the novelty of the work; including the disdain of more “traditional” scholars at Beijing and Qinghua universities for the new academic enterprise. Moreover, while foreign hegemony over Chinese academia had regrettable consequences, it is difficult to see why the career of sociology in China provides a “sad case of how foreign education and networking, together with international patronage, erode and break up the normal patronage networks within China” (p. 241). It was this same patronage that, for better or worse, made possible the advances in Chinese sociology. Jiang writes approvingly that the “indigenization” of economics by Nankai scholars also brought “China into the database of the discipline of economics” (p. 103).

In recent years, Chinese scholars anxious to revive the social sciences have referred to the social sciences as “a force of production.” What is at issue in such statements is the relationship between the disciplines, and their context in political economy and state-building. A broader analytical framework might have served the author well in bringing to the surface the relationship of “the cultural frontier” to material transformations in Chinese society that accompanied the turn to new developmentalist goals.

ARIF DIRLIK


China was one of the most egalitarian countries when its economic reform started in 1979. However, by 1995 income inequality in China had become greater than that of most other developing countries in Asia. Khan and Riskin argue that this unfortunate trend was mainly caused by a change in development policy – from emphasizing rural development during early reform years to focusing on rapid integration with the global economy since the mid-1980s – and by China’s failure to offset the forces generating inequality unleashed by that change. Furthermore, they argue, China’s high economic growth coupled with its poor record of poverty reduction challenge economic theory, which holds that trade liberalization and increased integration with the global economy contribute both to efficiency and to equity.

The authors show that, for historical reasons, the definition of household income used by China’s State Statistical Bureau (SSB) conceals important elements of income, such as the rental value of owned housing and some urban subsidies. This book, using data of two specifically designed household surveys in 1988 and 1995, studies changes in income distribution and poverty in China according to standard international
Book Reviews

definitions of household income. This differentiates the study from those of the World Bank and others based on official data of the SSB.

The authors’ data reveal no substantial increase in the average urban/rural income gap, whereas the SSB’s estimates – which do not include declining urban subsidies and such rapidly growing rural income components as rental value of owner-occupied housing – show the gap to have risen substantially between 1988 and 1995. In fact, overall inequality increased even faster within towns than in the countryside, because housing was a major new source of urban inequality. By 1995 about three-fifths of privately owned housing assets belonged to the richest 10 per cent of the urban population, while growing unemployment – resulting from the breaking of the Mao-era “iron rice bowl” to integrate with the world economy – has increased urban poverty.

However, the great majority of the urban unemployed – about 85 per cent in 1995 – are not poor. The study finds that, despite the increase in urban poverty, most of China’s poor – almost 90 per cent in 1995 – are still in rural areas. China’s performance on poverty reduction fails mainly in the countryside. While Khan and Riskin fault China’s performance on poverty reduction, they also show that the most important countervailing force to widening inequality is the extraordinary equality of land distribution. This is the main reason that farming is the most equalizing component of income in rural China. I regard this finding as the most important contribution of the study. The social cost of land privatization is extremely high and could be disastrous for China where most of the population depends on the land to make a living.

Khan and Riskin show that farming was still the biggest source of rural household income, but its share of total rural income fell sharply, from 74 per cent in 1988 to 56 per cent in 1995. The second-largest rural income source, wages, advanced rapidly from 9 per cent of total income to 22 per cent. The single most important source of increased rural inequality was unequal access to wage income, accounting for 40 per cent of the rural Gini ratio in 1995. In relative terms, fast-growing components of rural income were unevenly distributed, while slow growing ones were evenly distributed. This was due to the faster growth of off-farm employment opportunities in the rich coastal provinces than in the poor inland ones, a result of the change in development policy.

The authors use their unique set of data to carefully measure indicators based on standard economic concepts. The data and estimates seem to support their argument. As they observe, this is a critical issue confronting one fifth of humankind. However, such a great issue cannot be successfully studied on the basis of two surveys spanning seven years. China’s regional inequality is a long-term historical phenomenon. As early as the 1950s, Mao alluded to it in his On the Ten Major Relationships (Lun shi da guanxi). China’s planners tried to solve the problem by fiscal and redistributive mechanisms such as huge state investments in industry in poor inland provinces, which concealed elements of the original disparity, but the reform process has reversed trends toward increasing equality. This long-term inter-regional inequality is the foun-
Khan and Riskin divide China’s reform into two distinct periods: agricultural reform up to the mid-1980s and the integration with the global economy after the mid-1980s. It was impossible for China to jump from a growth led by farming to a growth led by manufactured exports. In fact, there was a period of domestic consumer revolution involving massive industrial and durable goods in between. It was during this period (1984–1988) that the potential industrial advantage of coastal areas developed rapidly, and township and village enterprises flourished. This means that regional inequality resulting from differential off-farm job opportunities would still have grown, without integration with the world economy. Furthermore, trade liberalization and increased integration with the global economy may contribute to inequality in the early stage, but in the long run they might result in equity. The authors do not deal with each case on its merits.

The authors argue that fiscal decline relative to GDP and fiscal decentralization greatly reduced the capacity of China’s fiscal system to conduct regional redistribution. However, the reason behind this phenomenon is not fully discussed. The centralized fiscal system of the Mao era depended on a set of transfer relations, but the logic of the system was changed by the agricultural reform. The authors argue that the two distinct patterns of development were due to a policy change from agricultural reform to focusing on decentralization and integration of coastal areas with the global economy. In my view, agricultural reform alone made decentralization unavoidable and, thus, the regional inequality emerged.

In conclusion, their book is a valuable contribution. Certainly, the mounting income inequality and the poor record of poverty reduction are dangerous trends threatening China’s further development. The study sounds an alarm at the right time. It provides new data for the ongoing debates of transition to market economies. This book is a valuable reference for researchers and students interested in China studies, development economics, and statistics and sociology.

XIAOLIN PEI


In 1988, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) delivered over 30 DF-3/CSS-2 medium-range ballistic missiles from its active inventory to Saudi Arabia. This sale, which was arranged by the General Staff Department’s import/export corporation, is the most common image of the PLA’s involvement in business. In his book, James Mulvenon does an excellent job of discussing PLA Incorporated by showing the entire range and
history of business activities from pig farms to international arms sales, and the positive and negative consequences on the PLA.

Over the past 20 years, the PLA successively moved from sideline agricultural production to primary industries (production involving factories and mines), to service industries, to conglomerates. Mulvenon convincingly argues that many of the PLA’s activities that do not directly support the economic welfare and warfighting capabilities of the PLA have been harmful to the military and to the state. Like the PLA’s “Red versus Expert” debate in the 1950s and 1960s, the current debate concerns the appropriateness of military forces being involved in commerce versus training for warfighting.

Mulvenon sets the stage of the PLA’s current business activities by providing a detailed description of military–business relations from around the world. Historically, most militaries supplied and funded themselves by living off the land or through pillage and plunder. While defensive military forces had the luxury of raising their own food, offensive armies pillaged from the people they conquered. Over time, states have become increasingly responsible for paying and supplying their militaries, but many countries still require their military forces to produce their own food and clothing.

Mulvenon states that the PLA has been responsible for producing enough food and clothing for itself since the 1920s, and will continue to bear this burden. The PLA’s involvement in non-agricultural production evolved when the state allowed, and even encouraged, the armed forces to sell its goods and services on the open market to make up for the shortfall in the military budget and to fill gaps in civilian services. However, involvement in non-agricultural commercial activities led to the problem of corruption. The military is authorized to purchase certain commodities, including natural resources and raw materials, at government-subsidized rates, but it then sells them illegally at higher market prices. The military also uses its trucks, ships and planes to move legal and illegal goods domestically and across international borders without paying customs and taxes. This systemic problem will not be solved as long as the PLA continues to be responsible for policing itself, especially given the fact that the senior ranks of the PLA and their families are some of the main beneficiaries of this corruption.

Mulvenon does an outstanding job of tracing the relevant factors that led to the rise of the conglomerates and the reasons for Jiang Zemin’s 1998 order for the PLA to divest itself of its non-agricultural businesses. He points out in his concluding remarks, however, that it is too soon to judge the long-term impact of the divestiture on the PLA. He argues that the PLA will continue to drag its feet, especially concerning divestiture of some of the most profitable enterprises, and that corruption will continue to be an issue.

The book is well documented and authoritative, using almost 900 footnotes and valuable in-country interviews, but Mulvenon leaves an important issue unanswered. Specifically, does the PLA use the money derived from its businesses to purchase foreign weapon systems, as some
people contend, or do weapons purchases come only from State Council-appropriated funds? Mulvenon implies that the PLA does not use the funds for weapons purchases, but does use a significant portion of the money to pay for certain unit living and welfare expenses that are not covered in the military budget. Furthermore, Mulvenon says it is not clear how the PLA will make up this serious shortfall for unit expenses after divestiture.

Most books about the PLA focus on geopolitical issues and warfighting capabilities. Thus, James Mulvenon’s book fills a critical gap in the literature about the PLA’s non-warfighting capabilities. His book is must reading for anyone interested in the important issue of civil–military relations and the PLA’s involvement in the economy.

KENNETH W. ALLEN

China’s Service Sector: A New Battlefield for International Corporations.

Yadong Luo has published several books on foreign investment in China, relying on his early years as a provincial foreign investment official followed by ten years in Western academia. His writings are typically extensive, detailed, and illustrated with cases based on multinationals investing in China.

China’s Service Sector is no exception. Liu devotes a chapter each to nine service sectors: Internet, e-commerce, telecommunications, banking and finance, insurance, advertising, accounting, retailing, and tourism. Each follows a template, including background, government policies, structural analysis, and opportunities and threats. Each concludes with a single case study. The structural analysis addresses structural dimensions, structural forces, structural attributes, and structural evolutions. This highly formal organization makes navigating easy.

There is voluminous detail in each chapter, including historical reviews of key legislation and policy changes, and much descriptive and narrative materials. Brought together in this convenient volume, it would be useful in business and academia. While his orientation is descriptive and practical, Luo avoids writing a how-to, prescriptive book for doing business in China.

Luo’s material is generally current, even though the WTO process brought rapid change, especially since 1998 and particularly in insurance, retail, telecommunications, and financial services. Much of the data is more dated than it should be. The manuscript was submitted in June 2000 and updated in November 2000, but omits 1999 data available widely by then. 1999 and 2000 were watershed years for service sectors. Banking sector data, for example, is from 1998. The PBOC had published 1999 data by June 2000 in its sector yearbook. Telecom numbers are off. In 2000, 45 million, not 30 million mobile subscribers were added, and 55
million wirelines were added to bring capacity up to 160 million lines, not 100 million as Luo’s table 4.1 shows.

The structural analyses rely on reviews of current regulations and issues reported in the marketplaces. Largely current, there are still major omissions, like the telecommunications regulations for 2000, circulated in draft as early as April 2000, in near final form in June 2000 and formally promulgated on October 2000.

Dealing with nine industries, different in dynamics globally and in China, and all in dramatic flux, is ambitious. The chapter on banking and financial services illustrates this challenge. Luo lists what he calls major banks in China, omitting China Development Bank (formerly State Development Bank), but including the much smaller and less significant Export–Import Bank. He omits China Merchant’s Bank, now China’s seventh largest, and a very significant player in innovation and commercial impact. His description of insurance and securities regulation was not current as of the writing.

Luo covers financial services but does not address major changes in China’s securities sector, arguably one of the most critical areas of change in the last five years. Readers with a specific interest in a service industry will want to go far beyond this book for a clear and current picture.

The case studies come from various time periods and vary in relevance. In some, it is not clear if the author did new interviewing or relied on desk research. Much information appears without clear attribution. The book would be enhanced greatly by more thoughtful discussion of the numbers used. Many are effectively contested. Official data is only one source on the size of China’s Internet user base; other estimates from credible sources differ greatly. Official estimator CNNIC reported 22.5 million users for the end of 2000. IDC put the number at 16.9 million, and IAMAsia at 15.2 million. These significant differences need to be taken into account.

The author brings a strong perspective to his discussion, a consistent optimism about the prospects for foreign investors in China’s services, China’s future economic growth, and China’s commitment to WTO compliance. Luo’s perspective sometimes results in a promotional tone. While not a glaring fault, it impacts the way critical analysis is approached. We are told again and again that China is a country of 1.3 billion people and that it is a huge market.

Analysis throughout the book could be strengthened. In retailing, Amway is the case. Given Amway’s unique retail niche, its experience in China is not representative of mainstream retail, compared to Walmart, KFC, Carrefour, Makro, McDonald’s, 7-Eleven and others. Furthermore, Luo’s analysis misses the most salient aspects of the Amway case. The sudden ban on direct marketing in 1998 drove sales from $178 million in 1997 to $98.3 million in 1998 (when the ban was implemented) to $55.5 million in 1999, the first full year. Amway’s history in China hinges on that event. The ban is mentioned several times but never discussed or analysed in any detail. It is treated as incidental.
The telecommunications chapter begins: “Until recently, the telecom industry in China, restricted by government control, was closed to foreign investment. Now, however, the government has opened up the market, and the industry is growing rapidly” (p. 105). Actually, as of the writing of this book, there was no legal base for foreign investment in Chinese telecommunications operations. From 1992 the government restated publicly and unequivocally a long-standing, absolute ban on foreign investment in operations, at the same time inviting foreign investment in equipment manufactured.

Throughout, the reader will miss pointed discussion of the salient issues foreign investors face, that could have lent texture and richness to Luo’s narrative. Major elements in the service sector environment are left undiscovered: the incumbent players’ attitudes and activities with respect to foreign investment, internal conflict on key issues of market opening, or inter-ministerial competition for revenue and the struggle to get government out of business. They include the grey space in which many service sector investors play, ingenious adaptations accelerating domestic push toward new reforms at the sector and enterprise levels, and the interplay between central and local policies and practices. These are as much the warp and woof of China’s investment environment as the explicit policies and public pronouncements that are the focus of Luo’s discussion.

The book ends abruptly, lacking a conclusion or summary, which seems to follow the lack of analytics throughout. The book would have benefited from aggressive editing, not so much for the inevitable typographical errors and minor infelicities, but to eliminate duplication and repetition. WTO materials are repeated often. There is regular repetition not only of the magical population number “1.3 billion,” but other editorial commentaries. We read often about the enthusiasm of foreign investors, the rapid march toward a reliable judicial system and commercial laws, the importance of culture and cultural values, the importance of understanding China, and other highly general propositions.

It is challenging to write about a topic so current and dynamic and not tilt either toward the promotional or the cynical. Many recent studies do the latter. If Luo’s work can be faulted for the former, it at least consistently argues the key point: China and Chinese consumers stand to gain by accelerating the liberalization of all of China’s service industries.

KENNETH J. DEWOSKIN


This study of the origins and evolution of securities law in China is a useful addition to the literature on the development of the PRC’s legal system, especially of statutory law and with respect to securities regulation. Dr Zhu persuasively argues that China’s securities law has evolved
in a manner distinct from that of other former communist countries. In particular, the securities markets emerged to raise capital for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) without relinquishing state control, by limiting equity offerings to a minority of shares, while the majority of shares actually or effectively remained in state control. By contrast, securities markets in many East European states served to privatize SOEs. In other words, China’s equity markets (and its bond markets as well) exemplified Deng Xiaoping’s mandate to build socialism with Chinese characteristics.

Dr Zhu’s analysis of the drafting and implementation of China’s securities law provides evidence for this thesis. Among the most salient features of the PRC’s securities regulatory regime are the following: only listing applications by SOEs were approved while non-SOEs were denied access to the capital market; development of the corporate bond market was constrained to limit competition with treasury bonds; minority shareholder protections were minimized by feeble corporate governance procedures, prohibiting the issuance of preferred stock, and poor, weakly-enforced management disclosure requirements; and the securities markets were allowed to expand at a faster pace than the institutions intended to regulate them. China’s securities markets thus sacrificed efficiency to funnel capital to SOEs.

This book is most valuable for its study of the early history of securities regulation in China and the evolution of the Securities Law (effective 1 July 1999), which is traced through several drafts over its extended drafting history. A translation of the Securities Law is helpfully appended. Dr Zhu notes that regulatory responsibility was transferred and divided several times before being assigned to the China Securities Regulatory Commission.

Securities law has developed rapidly in recent years as the shortcomings of China’s regulatory regime – including political bias in the listing approval process, poor corporate governance and lack of enforcement – have come to the fore. The provincial quota system for securities offerings has been abolished and non-SOE now enjoy some access to capital markets. An infant investment fund industry has been established.

Readers therefore have to supplement Zhu’s study with more recent primary and secondary material to understand the ongoing evolution of securities law. The book would have benefited in this respect from more extensive recent research and more careful editing. The author refers to a study trip to China conducted in 1995 but does not indicate whether systematic interviews were conducted on that occasion or subsequently. Although a large proportion of the sources cited are dated 1995 or earlier, the text often creates an unfortunate impression of contemporaneity by use of the present tense with respect to outdated regulatory requirements. Some conclusions are unsubstantiated, for example the author’s esteem for CIETAC arbitration (pp. 102, 194). On the whole, however, the book should prove useful to students of the development of securities law in the PRC.

LESTER ROSS


While globalization literature tells us that financial markets run an increasingly deterritorialized world, real estate rules in Hong Kong. Land in both material and symbolic terms is the key to understanding Hong Kong, in both the past and the present. Indeed, the reversion of Hong Kong to the PRC in 1997 was the largest real estate deal in history. Allen Chun’s *Unstructuring Chinese Society: the Fictions of Colonial Practice and the Changing Realities of ‘Land’ in the New Territories of Hong Kong* thus provides a useful entry into understanding Hong Kong not as a unique space, but as a complex of issues which problematises colonialism, modernity and globalization.

Chun began his research project with modest ambitions: to conduct an ethnography of a village in Hong Kong’s New Territories. His purpose was to see how tradition thrived in a progressive society, and how this shaped the colonial struggles between British and Chinese in Hong Kong.

The book starts with an anecdote of misunderstanding. Chun went through the usual official channels to find a house for his village fieldwork. But after two weeks, “everything began to fall apart” – the apparently “vacant” house was “occupied” (pp. 6–8). This was not an isolated case: although over half of the houses looked empty to Chun, according to the villagers they were all occupied. More than simple miscommunication or suspicion of outsiders, Chun argues, this misunderstanding was an example of an epistemological disrupture characteristic of the colonial project: two different, but individually coherent, understandings of the same situation.

Whereas Geertz’s classic Balinese cockfight anecdote tells of how an outsider is finally accepted by the villagers, Chun’s story goes in the opposite direction to outline the complex boundaries between self and other that define the New Territories in Hong Kong. Chun’s fascinating research is carefully located in two contexts: Chinese studies and anthropology are critically examined to question mainstream views of rural Chinese society. Far from being a straightforward ethnography of a single-lineage village, Chun’s book uses archival sources to examine the colonial construction of tradition and modernity via the changing meaning of “land.”

When the British took over the New Territories in 1898, the lease stipulated that they would respect indigenous custom via indirect rule. But, as Chun shows, the colonial regime had to first find out just what local tradition entailed. Thus rather than discovering the definitive stable Chinese tradition, the British regime defined a particular Chinese tradition in its investigation, codification and administration of the New Territories. By using a quintessentially modern legal apparatus to codify and enforce an indigenous custom, the British ended up drastically changing indigenous custom.
Thus, Chun argues, we need to question our concepts and methodology as we question colonial rule. He suggests that we need to see how native Chinese understand their relationships to the land. The book thus examines the complex meanings of Chinese concepts of zong, jia, and qin. Chun traces these social structures through the very concrete example of land disputes – a key variable in the New Territories. For example, in southern China land rights could be divided into topsoil and subsoil rights with different parties coherently asserting ownership to each. But this did not make sense under British law, and the complexity of “land” was reduced to two dimensions and single ownership – usually to the detriment of the local elite (pp. 63–8).

My arguments with Chun are largely theoretical. Where he states that the British needed to be more “accurate” in their cultural surveys (pp. 31, 97), he seems to be slipping back into a realist epistemology, which states that there is a stable Chinese culture waiting to be discovered. Echoing many social scientists in the PRC, Chun tells us that the best way to understand land in the New Territories is to discover the meaning of the native Chinese concepts.

But I think this appeal to nativism depoliticises scholarship once again. The point is not to blame the British for getting Chinese culture wrong, but to trace out the politics of their particular institutionalization of Chinese tradition. The politics thus moves from simply being “what” Chinese tradition entails to “how” Chinese culture is institutionalized. Looking at “who” decides, “where” and “when,” affords a more thorough critique of colonialism. Likewise, rather than thinking that a Chinese regime’s view of culture would be more accurate, we can argue that it would have entailed a different constellation of discursive politics, with different winners and losers. Since most of Chun’s book argues this case, I doubt he would disagree.

To conclude, Allen Chun’s Unstructuring Chinese Society is a useful book in many areas: Chinese anthropology, postcolonial criticism, and Hong Kong studies. Except for an over-enthusiastic chapter that runs to 115 pages, it is well written, and useful for both teaching and research.

WILLIAM A. CALLAHAN


The English of this book is quaint in places, the romanization of Cantonese words and names is quirky, the placing of Chinese characters after the first occurrence only of Chinese terms is irritating, the reference to Cantonese Society in the title is presumptuous for a relatively small-scale study of three village areas, the report is out-of-date (the work having been done
apparently between 1989 and 1993), there seems no clear focus to what the authors are attempting, nor is it clear exactly how much time was spent in the field and under what conditions, so that the danger of superficiality hovers. But while all these points may have some validity, a steady and increasingly convincing rhythm of purpose and insight emerges as the book goes on. The social historian and the social anthropologist have blended their skills to produce a fresh view of life in rural (or at least semi-rural) Guangdong in the closing years of the 20th century, and the account is no less illuminating however it has come about. This book is not to be dismissed.

In essence the authors have taken a number of areas on which the literature dealing with South China is strong, and they have tried to determine in what ways received views need to be revised in the light of the history of the past century. They are particularly concerned with the revival or apparent revival of traditional custom after the liberalization and relaxation of Communist centralized control under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, but they are always careful to avoid easy generalizations, not only about the nature of that relaxation but about the tightness of control in the first 25 years of Communist rule and indeed about the laxity or otherwise of the pre-Communist era. They do not deny the -isms and political movements which have swayed and characterized Chinese society, but they have been rather successful in peering through the veil which obscures the everyday life which albeit in modified form went on throughout. This book does not deal with revolutionary heroes, nor with misunderstood landlords, nor with idealist dissidents, nor with oppressed peasants: it tries to understand the unremarkable, and the unremarkable is often a less than clear picture.

The main features dealt with are household and family structure, lineage, the organization of work, marriage and procreation, ancestor worship, religions and the supernatural. The household is an understood concept in the state’s scheme of social organization, but we are told here that it carries little meaning for the villagers of Shunde County. They have a more flexible view of the basic unit of society, and they “play the system” splitting and joining in response to perceived advantage at different times and in different circumstances, though eating together remains probably the most important indicator of a household unit. So it is with family size: while the one-child policy has not been totally ignored by the villagers, the number of children a couple has opted for has been determined as much by a shrewd weighing of the profit and loss account as it has by official dictate. Religious observances have proliferated since the lifting of restrictions on worship, and ancestor worship, Buddhism, Taoism and other religious and quasi-religious practices are all in evidence again in the villages of Guangdong. But with religion, just as much as with family size, or with the household economy, what appears to be a resuscitation of tradition is often a transformation rather than a throw-back.

Aijmer and Ho show us that continuity and discontinuity both are change. While one might have reservations about the viability in statistical terms of the conclusions which they draw, it is hard not to be convinced by the
commonsense and rationality of their work. To read this book is to gain a three-dimensional picture of a life which rings true.

HUGH D. R. BAKER


In his introduction to the new edition of Mark Arnold-Forster’s *The World at War*, Richard Overy observed that the Second World War in East Asia still remained in the shadows of historiography. It remains true that there is no single work in English fully documenting the 1937–45 Sino-Japanese War. Yet the pieces for that eventual, necessary synthesis, are slowly appearing. New work on the troubled relationship between China and Japan from the late Qing dynasty to the Japanese surrender in 1945 has started to appear in some quantity. The works dealing with the early 20th century are part of what a special issue of this journal in 1997 termed “Reappraising Republican China.” For much of the post-1949 period, it seemed to be the communist revolution that was the grand narrative that dominated studies of China; 20th century historians turned the bulk of their attention to explaining the Communist Party’s rise, and the Republican era became a poor relation, a dark and corrupt period whose study was useful mainly to explain how its unbearable circumstances led to an almost inevitable victory for Mao and his party. The death of Mao and the disintegration of his political project severely damaged that interpretation. That change in emphasis, along with the opening of new archives in Taiwan and mainland China, threw attention back to the Republic, giving scholars breathing space to deal with the period’s complexities.

One of the most important factors that prevented Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government from stabilizing itself was the increasingly troubled relationship with Japan. The Meiji reforms of the late 19th century had turned Japan into an industrial power with imperial ambitions of its own, and politicians such as Goto Shimpei and Konoe Atsumaro made it clear that it was on Chinese territory that Japan would seek its “lifeline” to protect itself from attack and encroachment by the West. The occupation of Taiwan and southern Manchuria as the spoils of war, in addition to extensive rights of extraterritoriality meant that Japan had a formidable mixture of formal and informal empire in China by the time of the 1911 revolution. Through the 1910s and 1920s, China’s relationship with Japan varied between the confrontation of the 21 Demands of 1915 and
the demonstrations on 30 May 1925 and the more co-operative diplomatic atmosphere of much of the 1920s, characterized by the relatively liberal China policies of Foreign Minister Shidehara and the conciliatory atmosphere of the Washington Treaties.

The 1930s saw a change in mood. Although Japan’s “dark valley” period, which led to Pearl Harbor and the Pacific War, has been extensively examined from the Japanese domestic and international angle, the Chinese side of the story has been slower to emerge in English. Parks Coble’s monumental Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931–1937 broke new ground in laying out the way in which Chiang Kai-shek’s government had to balance the threat of Japanese militarism with the equally pressing problems of factional infighting within his party, civil war with rival militarists, and the communist insurgency. To accompany this macro-picture, we have now begun to see work that focuses in on specific events in the rocky Sino-Japanese relationship of that period.

Donald A. Jordan has produced one such work with China’s Trial By Fire: The Shanghai War of 1932. He has taken the 33-day battle between Japanese and Chinese forces in Shanghai in January to March 1932, which has generally been termed a mere “skirmish,” and suggested that it was in fact a short but very real war, a harbinger of the battle for Shanghai and all eastern China which would break out only five years later. Jordan combines a meticulous eye for detail with a grasp of the wider picture, and in doing so, produces a convincing argument for a reassessment of the significance of the “Shanghai Incident,” along with a colourful and engaging narrative.

Jordan sets out by explaining why the Shanghai fighting deserves more attention than it has generally been given. He argues firstly that the fierceness and extent of the fighting, and the involvement of troops directed from both Chinese and Japanese capital cities as well as by the Western powers, made the Shanghai incident an event of truly international significance. He then shows that the widespread assumption in later sources that the only Chinese troops to fight in Shanghai were the 19th Route Army under their commander Cai Tingkai, and that Chiang Kai-shek tried to stop Cai from fighting so as to preserve his appeasement policy toward Japan, was a myth created by opponents of the Nanjing regime. In fact, Fifth Army troops under Chiang’s control fought alongside their 19th Army comrades, although Chiang tried to avoid provoking the Japanese further by separating himself from them in public and placing them under 19th Army command. The latter point means that interpretations of the Shanghai Incident which use it to show a craven Nanjing government trying to suppress a popular movement for resistance to Japan need to be rethought. In fact, the perception at the time that the Nationalist government had successfully contributed to standing up against the Japanese attack may have increased its prestige in 1932, and reduced, rather than increased, support for the Communist Party in urban China. Jordan also shows that, in part, the Japanese provoked the Shanghai fighting to cover up their advance into northern Manchuria in
February 1932, with which they completed the establishment of "Manchukuo.”

Jordan’s book uses an impressive combination of sources to argue his case, including documents from archives in Nanjing, Shanghai, Taipei and Tokyo, as well as Western intelligence sources, and contemporary newspapers. The awesome level of detail means that one is taken, in the space of a few pages, from the trenches dug into the streets of Shanghai – from which Chinese guerrilla fighters picked off Japanese soldiers – to the frantic negotiations in the foreign ministries of Nanjing and Tokyo. Jordan also opens up areas which further research needs to illuminate. For instance, to what extent did the Shanghai fighting impact on Chinese cities outside Shanghai? He also touches on the Subei people who collaborated with the Japanese during this period, and it would be very interesting to know how far their actions are a counterpoint to the argument that war caused people to place more, not less, importance on national identity. However, Jordan’s provocative and powerful study can be highly recommended not only for those interested in the history of East Asia, but also comparative military historians and scholars of international relations. It should be alongside other recent studies, such as Marjorie Dryburgh’s North China and Japanese Expansion, 1933–1937 and David Barrett and Larry Shyu’s edited volume Chinese Collaboration with Japan: The Limits of Accommodation, as part of the new history of what historians of Japan have called the “14 years’ war.”

The Sino-Japanese relationship did not seem inevitably to be leading towards war throughout the 1930s. In 1934, many writers marvelled at how far towards peace the two countries appeared to have come since the dark days of the Shanghai fighting. However, the increasing demands of politicians and the military in Tokyo pushed the two countries into conflict again from 1935, as the Japanese moved to create a zone in northern China effectively under their control. In late 1936, the Xi’an Incident, in which Chiang was briefly kidnapped, dramatized the arrival of a new anti-Japanese united front between the Nationalists and the Communists, but signals that a rapprochement might be possible had been on the political horizon for a year or more beforehand. Finally, of course, the clash between Japanese and Chinese troops on 7 July 1937 at the small town of Wanping, outside Beijing, spiralled into all-out war that would see China divided for the next eight years.

The story of that war is being pieced together slowly. Its main events, such as the battles of Taierzhuang and Changsha, or events such as the bombing of Chongqing or the “Three Alls” campaigns, are slowly coming to the prominence in the West that Pearl Harbor, the Battle of the Bulge or Stalingrad have had for decades. One event, however, has stood out in recent years, the Nanjing Massacre of 1937. Stimulated by the publication of Iris Chang’s bestselling The Rape of Nanking: The Hidden Holocaust of World War II, there has been a veritable stream of materials on the events in the terrible winter of 1937–38. For many years, the dynamics of the Cold War meant that China, Taiwan and Japan all had their own reasons for erasing the massacre from popular memory. The
1980s, though, saw China turn to a new nationalism that depended in part on reviving memories of Japanese wartime atrocities. Among the issues which Chinese and Japanese scholars have fiercely disputed is the number of people killed in the massacre, with the highest Chinese numbers going into hundreds of thousands, and the lowest Japanese ones “only” thousands. In this atmosphere, it is perhaps valuable that so many of the materials that have been published are primary sources, enabling readers to make up their own minds about the events. Zhang Kaiyuan has made a welcome contribution to this literature, with his edited volume of the diaries and letters of American missionaries, *Eyewitnesses to Massacre: American Missionaries Bear Witness to Japanese Atrocities in Nanjing*. Zhang explains in the preface that he has a personal stake in the subject as he was a student in Nanjing in the 1930s before being evacuated to Sichuan. He is also explicit about his purpose: he has put the documents before the public because he is concerned about what he sees as a rising number of Japanese who seek to deny the massacre and war atrocities in general, although he does point out that such Japanese are in a minority. The bulk of the book, however, is taken up with transcriptions of diaries and letters from American missionaries and educators who witnessed the mass murder and rape that took place in the conquered Chinese capital between December and January 1938. Reading these accounts, by sober figures such as Miner S. Bates, a professor at Nanjing University, or George Ashmore Field, head of the Nanjing YMCA, leaves one in no doubt that the Japanese army, for whatever reason, acted with massive barbarity. The emotion of the diarists comes through in the expressive images recorded, such as the Episcopal minister John G. Magee, who mourned the Chinese who were “shot down like the hunting of rabbits.”

The documents, which are extracted from the Yale Divinity Library archives, complement other materials recently made available on the massacre. The volume most obviously accompanies Timothy Brook’s *Documents on the Rape of Nanking* (1999). It also accompanies *The Good Man of Nanking*, John E. Woods’s translation of the diary of John Rabe, the Siemens factory manager who was prominent in saving Chinese lives during the massacre. There is room for much more, though. To build the picture further, it would be very useful to have further sets of documents from Chinese and Japanese intelligence sources, as well as intelligence and foreign affairs documents from the Western powers, some of which still had representatives in and around Nanjing during the massacre. Finally, the weaving of past history and present political interpretation are analysed in a challenging and meticulous set of essays edited by Joshua Fogel, *The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography*. These essays, which treat this emotionally searing event with empathy, but never with sentimentality, are an essential complement to any research or seminar that uses the primary materials.

These are two valuable contributions, then, to the literature on this period. But these lamps shone into dark corners also show us how much more of the history of the Sino-Japanese War needs to be written, and not just military history, but social, cultural, gender, and literary history too.
Various scholars – David Goodman, Diana Lary, Stephen Mackinnon, and Poshek Fu, among others – have started to write this history, but there are plenty of topics waiting for their chroniclers. It is an exciting time to be working in this field.

Rana Mitter


Michael David Kwan’s memoir, Things That Must Not Be Forgotten, interweaves three stories: his own, his father’s, and that of a China ravaged in the 1930s and 1940s by government corruption, economic chaos, and devastating wars – first the Japanese invasion (1937–45) and then the armed conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists after the Second World War.

The son of a Swiss mother and Chinese father – a rich, Cambridge-educated railway administrator – Kwan chronicles, with grace and agony, his coming of age in a turbulent era in modern Chinese history. Born in 1934, Kwan’s sheltered life in Beijing protected him from the approaching foreign threats and deteriorating national crisis. However, the Japanese invasion of China in 1937 soon put the Kwan family in grave peril. His father first moved them to the safer haven of Beidaihe, and later to Qingdao. But they could not escape the spreading disorder.

Kwan had an unsettling childhood. His mother left the family when he was small, and he was raised by his English stepmother whom he had difficulty accepting. His father was emotionally distant from him. Moreover, as a Eurasian, he was ridiculed and harassed by others, especially at school. In China, “half-castes,” as he painfully recalls, were commonly regarded as “the result of moral turpitude” (p. 192). A lonely child, Kwan found temporary solace only by playing with his dog or hiding in the tree house in the garden.

The elder Kwan was a patriot as well as a man of integrity. When the Japanese invaded, he protected his family with care and tenacity, while mounting a courageous, clandestine resistance against the invaders. In Qingdao he worked in a pro-Japanese government in order to aid the resistance in secret. At one time he sheltered a downed American airman in his house, which was adjacent to the home of a Japanese admiral – surely a heroic but extremely dangerous act. Ironically, the family’s greatest adversity came only after China had won the war, for the elder Kwan was falsely accused of having collaborated with the Japanese enemy. After two years of excruciating trials and imprisonment, he was finally exonerated.

Kwan’s unstable childhood and his father’s misfortune mirrored a China plagued not only by external threats but also by domestic difficulties: ineffectual Nationalist rule, political chicanery and social disorder. As the civil war raged between the Nationalists and the Commu-
nists, his father, totally disillusioned, sent the young Kwan to safety in Hong Kong in 1946.

All memoirs to some degree are self-serving, but Kwan’s narrative is marked by an unmistakable innocence and anguish. He tells his story engagingly, whether introducing family members and friends or recounting frightening times. But the book lacks contextual depth. For instance, we are told very little about his father’s career path, nor are we adequately informed about the foreign communities with whom the Kwans were closely associated. Kwan criticizes Chiang Kai-shek for his incompetent leadership, but he overstates the weaknesses of the Nationalist Party without duly considering the difficulties it faced in governing a devastated and divided nation after a ruinous foreign invasion. In general, he paints too simplistic a picture of the conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists.

The question is, just what does Kwan’s memoir intend to tell us, beyond agonizing tales of military turmoil and family struggles? Although Kwan confines his observations primarily to his own personal life, the immediacy of his experience in the face of growing adversity, most notably his subjection to racism, is precisely what makes his memoir captivating. It is the book’s small, telling details that will both move and delight its readers.

CHANG-TAI HUNG


W. Langhorne Bond was a senior executive of China National Aviation Corporation (CNAC) from 1931 until 1950. This book, which was edited for publication after Bond’s death by James Ellis, represents Bond’s first-person account of the early days of commercial aviation in China. However, this is a book for aviation enthusiasts rather than China specialists. The tales of derring-do, especially the vivid descriptions of flying over the Hump in unpressurised, unheated DC-3s, are certainly memorable. But, as the editor explicitly recognizes in a footnote, “Bond’s descriptions of Chinese historical events … may not in all cases agree with other sources of Chinese historical information” (p. 32). A book about Republican China which talks at length about T.V. Soong, Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, Mme. Sun Yat-sen, and Mme. H.H. Kung, and never identifies them as siblings or analyses the family connection, is an odd book indeed.

RALPH W. HUENEMANN
This bibliography of arguably the greatest British historian of the Portuguese and Dutch empires is ambitious in its scope. It is first and foremost a biography of Boxer's personal life (1904–2000) – including a considerable amount of material about his wife, the American journalist and author Mickey Hahn, who lived for years in Shanghai and wrote several popular books on China. It also describes the life of British expatriates in Hong Kong just prior to and during the Second World War and gives one a flavour of the trials and tribulations of British academic life during the 1950s and 1960s. Moreover, this book devotes considerable space to résumés and critiques of Boxer's prolific works.

The sub-subtitle of the book, *Soldier, Historian, Teacher, Collector, Traveller*, illustrates the many aspects and different phases to Boxer's life. We see the development of his character and intellect through shifts from a privileged childhood to a military career advanced by attendance at Sandhurst, which led to his first career as a Japanese translation officer stationed in Hong Kong and subsequent imprisonment by the Japanese. This East Asian experience and contact with Macau facilitated Boxer's post-war evolution to self-made professor of history, a notable accomplishment considering that he held no advanced degree. Boxer's posts included a brief appointment at the School of Oriental and African Studies followed by a substantial appointment as Camões Professor of Portuguese in Kings College, London. In later years, he took visiting appointments, largely in the USA at Indiana University and Yale, as well as numerous trips and receipt of awards in countries including Portugal, the Netherlands, Brazil, India, and Australia.

The portion of Boxer's biography which has most interest for general *China Quarterly* readers is the detailed sections about British attempts to thwart Japanese expansion in China, Hong Kong, Macau, and South East Asia prior to and during the Second World War. As a student of Japanese, and a government official, Boxer was involved heavily in work related to British intelligence activities in East Asia. The story of some of Boxer's travels in inland China early in the war also provide insights into how British agents were able to move about within Japanese occupied territory. His prisoner of war years in Hong Kong and Guangzhou are described in detail. Boxer's knowledge of Dutch and Portuguese, crucial to his academic career in later years, put him in a key position for liaison with the Dutch in prison camps as well as with the Portuguese in neighbouring Macau.

Perhaps it was because our interests overlapped and because I knew the man, I found this book fascinating although a bit long with digressions into areas such as Boxer's collections of books and objets d'art. There were some typographical errors and some misspellings of Chinese and Japanese proper names and phrases. Those, however, are minor and do not detract from the contribution. This book is recommended to those interested in the British, Portuguese, and Dutch Asian empires – particularly during the first
Mungello’s recent work *The Spirit and the Flesh in Shandong, 1650–1785* on the missionary history of Franciscans attracts the attention of scholars on church history for several reasons. Firstly, many who have written on the church history of China around the period of the arrival of Matteo Ricci and his companions, have focused on the imperial court’s interactions with these missionaries and with the controversies of the rites. However, works on interactions on the regional level towards these two major issues have so far remained a void. Mungello’s work is a new discovery on the regional level. He takes his readers to the countryside of Shandong and neighbouring Hebei to witness the interactions of the missionaries with local officials and country folks from 1650–1785. The book ends with the period of 1785, because during 1784–85 a great persecution was launched by Emperor Yongzheng resulting in a dramatic ending of the Catholic mission in that region.

Secondly, to work on mission history of China on the 17th and 18th centuries, one has to overcome at least two obstacles. The language skill necessary to read missionary archives is not easily acquired, and many missionary congregations are not willing to open their archives to outsiders. This is understandable because unguarded searches could dig up unpleasant issues that, if interpreted out of historical context, could cause embarrassment to the present missionary congregation. However, Mungello successfully overcomes these two major difficulties, obtaining very valuable historical sources from the Franciscan Fathers who had their mission work in that region since 1650. Thus he has painted a new picture of Christian life in the region of northern Shandong and southern Hebei during the period of 1650 to 1785, with positive as well as negative aspects of missionary endeavour.

He has documented the success and failure of mission work through discussion of the tremendous effort of European missionaries in making conversions, mission rivalries within the Catholic Church, and the sexual scandals of two priests. The incredible acts of self-sacrifice of these European missionaries, and the heroic endeavours of humble Christians in aiding and hiding them, have great similarity with the clandestine activities of underground Chinese Catholics of the same district in the 20th century, as narrated by Richard Madsen (p. 141 and n. 92). Mungello’s discussion on the underground church throws important light on our understanding of religious questions, especially Catholic problems in modern China.

In the history of the Chinese church, the underground church is not a new phenomenon. Mungello suggests that it is a product of political oppression (p. 141). He and Madsen have shown that where the under-
ground church prevails now in southern Hebei, the same underground church existed some three centuries ago, flourishing for nearly 60 years between the official ban of Christianity by Emperor Yongzheng in 1724 and the great persecution of 1784–5. Mungello explains that it flourished because the thirst for spirituality caused human ingenuity to find a way to compensate for the absence of a formal freedom of religion in China (pp. 140–1). Mungello’s explanation remains valid on today’s underground church. It seems that Chinese political leaders, past and present, are not willing to share the teaching authority with the leader of a foreign religion – the Pope of the Catholic Church. Mungello’s research findings open important questions, urging one to search more on the church–state interactions of various dynasties in China’s history.

In this historical work by Mungello, the Chinese-character glossary (pp. 173–184) is an excellent tool to guide readers to go back to the original Chinese terms. This reviewer was frustrated to find sometimes in one page there are several important terms missing in the glossary (for example on p. 135, Zhaojiahuang, Jianjialou, and huizhang).

Finally, in dealing with the translation of Chinese terms in academic writings, I suppose most scholars should abide by conventionally translated terms. Therefore I would like to know why the author used terms such as “Lord of Heaven Church” and “Lord of Heaven teaching” to stand for tianzhujiao (pp. 113, 118), instead of the conventional translations “the Catholic Church” and “Catholic teaching.”

BEATRICE LEUNG


On 31 May 1998, I visited the Huaxiang Protestant church in Fuzhou together with a group from the Chinese University of Hong Kong. We were told that this congregation has 7,000 members, with a weekly attendance of 3,500 at two Sunday services. I spoke briefly at one such service to many hundreds of people filling the large worship hall and the courtyards outside it, and spilling out into the street beyond. Ryan Dunch’s book is about the early history and development of such churches in Fuzhou, with an emphasis on the activities of their Chinese leaders. The basic point of this book is that in the late 19th and early 20th centuries Protestant Christianity grew rapidly in the Fuzhou area of Fujian province, and came to be accepted both as a source of new ideas and practices from the West and as a support for moral reform. Some of its leaders were involved in early Chinese efforts for reform and revolution. In the first two decades of the 20th century, the old Qing order disintegrated and the new “party-state” had not yet developed, so there was an opportunity to form new voluntary reform associations and welcome new ideas from abroad. In this context Christian churches, schools and hospitals flourished, with the most direct contribu-
tions to Chinese society made by the American Methodists and the Y.M.C.A. These institutions provided new paths for literacy and social mobility, including education for women. However, with the establishment of the Nationalist and Communist parties, and the translation of Lenin’s writings on “cultural imperialism” in the 1920s, Christianity came to be rejected by the new Chinese elite, with its missions seen as a form of imperialism. In 1927, Nationalist troops looted Fuzhou churches, the Y.M.C.A. and a Methodist hospital, though by that time most of their leaders were Chinese. Though there are more Christians in China now than then, Protestantism in Fuzhou has never recovered the public acceptance and influence it once had.

Professor Dunch argues that “in converting to Christianity, Chinese Protestants did not cease to define themselves as Chinese … and understood the Protestant message through the prism of Chinese cultural norms” (p. xvii). Though there were some parallels between their Christian ideas and such indigenous Chinese traditions as belief in judgment after death and divine communications through dreams, Fuzhou Christians agreed with the Chinese elite that popular religion was “base, pointless and idolatrous” (p. 6), and so they “pitted the God of Christianity against the local gods” (p. 7). Their emphasis was rather on Christian contributions to “moral education,” to “molding the Chinese people into a nationally conscious and public-spirited citizenry” (p. xviii). To this they contributed not only their ideas and schools, but also the examples of congregational assemblies and preaching, group hymn singing, and the displaying of national flags. Several church leaders were active in reform societies, the Fujian Provincial Assembly that was established in 1909, and in the new Fujian Republican government in 1911.

Fuzhou Protestants is a helpful contribution to a more precise understanding of the role of Christianity in China, and appears to be based on the best available sources for its topic. It includes good discussions of the early acceptance of Chinese Methodist pastors as equals to the missionaries and of the activities of the Y.M.C.A. Nonetheless, the focus of the book is on the activities of just a few prominent Protestant leaders, such as the three who were part of the 75 members of the 1909 Provincial Assembly. These leaders supported groups for political reform, queue cutting and opposition to opium, but there is no evidence here that they founded such groups, or that Christian hymn singing and flag display directly influenced those outside the churches. Nor is there much here about the activities and attitudes of ordinary church members. The danger in the approach of this book is that focus on a few prominent Christians risks overemphasizing their contribution to the “making of modern China” of the book title. The evidence here is that they participated in groups and movements begun by others. There is a similar problem with the discussion of traditional popular religion in this book, which neglects the moral dimension built into family and community structure and into hope for efficacious responses from the gods, as well as the moral teachings of popular religious texts, early attacks on opium smoking in spirit-writing books, etc. All of this was in place before the Christians arrived on the scene.
If this book is to be used in university teaching, these caveats should be kept in mind.

**DANIEL L. OVERMYER**


The book under review is the ninth volume of the Leuven Chinese Studies, a series published by the Leuven Institute for Sino-Mongol Studies. It presents materials of the Sixth International Symposium of the Ferdinand Verbiest Stichting, “The Christian Missions in Qing China (1644–1911): Profiles, Strategies, Inspiration,” that took place in September 1998 in Leuven, Belgium. Two important yet still little-researched aspects of Chinese mission history – the historical context of imperialism and so-called “native Christianity” – are the main points of interest. Two of the contributions in this volume discuss the first aspect, Christianity in China within a wider socio-political framework: Scott Sommers’ “Missionaries, opium and imperialism in the Western perceptions of the Japanese colonial empire in Taiwan,” and Koen De Ridder’s “The first diplomatic contacts between Belgium and China: its background and consequences for politics, trade and mission activity” (with a good bibliography). Sommers explores Taiwan’s colonial history, drawing from the missionary records of the Presbyterian Church – “the most complete and systematic English language record of foreign residents” (p. 11). He examines, among others, the missionaries’ comments on colonial Taiwan and Western perceptions of the Japanese opium control policy. De Ridder’s contribution reflects on the official Belgian diplomacy towards China. He investigates the commercial consequences of the Belgian–Chinese relationship, especially in railway engineering, and focuses on Gansu Province, which became the special target of the diplomatic games of King Leopold II. Finally the author focuses on the CICM (Scheut) missionaries in Gansu, who in his opinion were the real Belgian representatives in China.

Three papers concern the second aspect, native Chinese converts: Jessie G. Lutz’s contribution, “A profile of Chinese Protestant evangelists in the mid-nineteenth Century,” contains “a study of sixty-seven Chinese Protestant evangelists who worked between 1830 and 1870” (p. 68). The article by Jean-Paul Wiest, “Was the Christian God partial to the Hakka people?” is a study on the question why the Hakka were more responsive to Christianity than others, based on the situation in Guangdong Province between 1850 and 1900. In his study “Conversion patterns in North China. Sociological profiles of Chinese Christians, 1860–1912,” R.G. Tiedemann divides and analyses conversion motives (especially in Shan-
Two contributions are not closely related to the main topic of this volume but nevertheless contribute to our understanding of the historical context. Ann Heylen, in her paper “Missionary linguistics on Taiwan. Romanizing Taiwanese: codification and standardization of dictionaries in Southern Min (1837–1923),” gives a historical description of the Protestant missionary contributions to the vernacularization of Southern Min dialects. Karel Steenbrink shows in his article “The religious quest of the Chinese diaspora of Southeast Asia, ca. 1900–1942,” how the religious affiliation of assimilated Chinese in Indonesia changed from general acceptance of Islam to Christianity, especially in the period 1900–1942.

It is understandable that the contributions presented at the conference, dealing with such diverse topics, employ different arguments and strategies, and that they are sometimes of uneven quality regarding coherence or the use of source materials. The title of the book is, in my opinion, not very aptly chosen nor representative of all the articles contained therein. As regards the editorial aspects, the volume shows some minor deficiencies and mistakes that might have been easily avoided. Tiedemann’s article, “Christianity and Chinese ‘heterodox sects’” (mentioned on p. 106, n. 1), for example, was not published in volume 44 of the Monumenta Serica Monograph Series but in the journal Monumenta Serica, vol. 44 (1996), pp. 339–382. But these are minor details that do not diminish the value of the individual articles or the volume as a whole.

This collection can be recommended to anybody generally interested in the history of Christianity in China as well as the interdependence between religion and politics in the 19th and 20th centuries. It will be of special interest to those readers who are seeking information on the manifold facets of Christianity in Taiwan. It would be appreciated if the questions and topics addressed in the different contributions to the present volume could be further examined in the future.

ROMAN MALEK


Western fascination with the development of Christianity in China has produced a wealth of academic and anecdotal contributions since the first European missions began in the 16th century. In many ways, the history of Christianity in China became synonymous with the academic interest in China’s history per se. Thus it comes as no surprise that even a brief summary of our knowledge of Christianity in China would amount to some 1,000 pages of tightly packed information for the first volume alone.
The significance of the present handbook lies, however, only to lesser degree in the sheer quantity of information: the *Handbook of Christianity in China* can be regarded as the first systematic presentation of China’s Christian history since the tectonic “paradigm shift” first observed in the late 1960s, moving academic interest away from the figure of the missionary to the community of indigenous believers. The 24 contributors from universities in Europe, America and Asia are themselves authoritative agents of this shift, active in their field for years and well placed to renew our knowledge of Christianity in China. As a whole, the work has retained a “traditional” appearance, by following the chronological, dynastic pattern rather than focusing on themes, such as gender or class. Appearances can, however, be deceptive, and a closer scrutiny of the individual chapters reveals the extent to which the socio-historical approach has permeated an area of historical research once firmly in the grasp of missiological interests.

The self-avowed aim of the *Handbook* is not to introduce new insights but to provide existing knowledge to a readership already acquainted with the topic. Is the *Handbook*, in this sense, a “useful” publication? The editor seems to have allocated utmost importance to organizational aspects. The three separate indices of this first volume, indeed a useful feature, take up about 5 per cent of the total length, a considerable amount. The bibliographies systematically listed at the end of each sub-chapter are the product of meticulous research. This applies specifically to the lists of primary sources, which abound in detailed information on the nature and limitations of each source. The use of Chinese characters in the text – though not in the indices – saves the reader distracting expeditions into glossaries. A separate map section (or even one general historical map) would have added to the list of beneficial features. Considerable thought has gone into the organization of the chapters themselves: based on the works of renaissance authors, the oeuvre as a whole takes its inspiration from the classical drama. Consequently, the “play” is subdivided into the three – dynastic – “scenes” (Tang, Yuan and late-Ming to mid-Qing), with each individual chapter developing along a pattern of sources, actors, scenes and themes. To return to the question of structural usefulness, the answer is undoubtly in the affirmative.

No less than 800 pages of the oeuvre are set aside for the third “scene” – reducing the discussion of Tang and Yuan Christianity to mere “introits.” This substantial chapter, co-authored by 21 contributors, analyses the first peak of Western proselytization in a wide range of aspects. Contrary to its aim of reflecting shifted parameters, the chapter is surprisingly “missionary” in its composition. Chinese Christians are allocated a substantial sub-chapter, though a clear emphasis remains on the Western missionary as the representative of Christianity in China. The decades following the anti-missionary edict of 1724, for instance, are to a large extent supported by references to Dehergne’s “missionary geographies” – leaving considerable space for the results of new research.

Despite occasional inconsistencies, the *Handbook* remains a unique
source of information not only for the study of Christianity in China, but also for the history of religion in Imperial China. The exceptionally broad range of subjects discussed also makes it a valuable resource for the study of Chinese history in general. The interested public can look forward to the second volume of this true magnus opus in elated anticipation.

LARS LAAMAN


This book is an Italian work aimed at a Western audience. Precisely what genre it belongs to is not entirely clear: most of it amounts to a convenient and very useful annotated bibliography, but some of it consists of rather less impressive excursions into history-writing proper. The back cover blurb calls it an example of “groundbreaking new scholarship,” but that may be an intentional overstatement intended to promote sales rather than accurately depict reality.

The good. New Sources and Opportunities contains extensive information on a wide range of publications relevant to its topic. Such publications include books and journals in Chinese – from the PRC as well as the ROC – and in Western languages, mostly but not exclusively English. It is particularly useful for the novice researcher who may be wondering just where to begin, given the wealth of material on the history of contemporary China, the international communist movement and the Cold War currently available. There are critical sections on restricted circulation serials, official biographies of senior CCP figures published in recent years, memoirs, neibu books, PLA publications, various multi-volume collections (e.g. the Selection of Documents of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party [1921–1949] and Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts Since the Founding of the Nation), and much more. And just so they are not forgotten, New Sources and Opportunities lists many old sources too: where would we be today without the Xinhua yuebao, the FBIS, and the Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 3: The Far East?

The bad. When the author is referring his reader to an unusual source that he has not himself seen – but other people have – he does not state this openly. Here and there in New Sources and Opportunities one comes across references to books and articles that with 99.9 per cent certainty are known to the author solely through other people’s references to them. A case in point is the Collection of Important Documents Since the Third Plenum (p. 109) and Internal Reference (pp. 41–42). The author’s descriptions of these extremely rare publications is lifted almost verbatim (original imperfections included) from the present reviewer’s discussions of them in Problems of Communism more than 15 years ago and in the now defunct, but sorely missed, CCP Research Newsletter. Would it have
diminished the value of *New Source and Opportunities* if the author had inserted a declaration “Not seen. Mentioned in . . .”? On the contrary!

The ugly. What is the point of inserting in a mainly bibliographical guide “intended to offer some suggestions and guidelines for research” (p. 15), a reference to Zhou Enlai as “the author of the most vicious attack on Deng Xiaoping.” when all the evidence one is able to furnishe is a reference to an unseen copy of a destroyed original mentioned in a personal communication from an informant whose credentials are left unexplained and whose identity is concealed? (p. 143) Clearly, we have to do better than this if we are to gain respect as serious historians. Merely repeating rumours – even when, or perhaps in particular when, they concern a dead communist with blood on his hands – is not what breaking new scholarly ground is about.

A useful reference tool, but it would have benefited tremendously from some aggressive editing and a critical pre-publication peer review.

MICHAEL SCHOENHALS

*Dictionary of the Political Thought of the People’s Republic of China.* By 

Addressing a group of non-native speakers of the Chinese language, the late PRC Premier Zhou Enlai once argued that: “As you know, Chairman Mao’s thoughts, Chairman Mao’s works, were first of all written in the Han language (Hanwen) or spoken in the Han vernacular (Hanwen kouyu) . . . To really grasp his profound arguments, you have to understand the Han language (dongde Hanyu Hanwen).” But, as Mao Zedong himself had pointed out in 1942, “this mastery of language is not easy and requires painstaking effort.” Hence the indisputable need for books like the one under review here, which, in the words of its author is intended as “something like a first-aid kit” for the English-speaking foreigner coming across an “unfamiliar term or thesis” in his or her study of PRC political thought (p. xii).

Arranged alphabetically according to pinyin transcription, the *Dictionary of the Political Thought of the People’s Republic of China* covers a broad terminological terrain, from the relatively familiar *aiguo tongyi zhanxian* (“patriotic united front”) to the rather more obscure *zuobiao shuo* (“‘coordinate’ theory”). Explanations in English vary in length from two lines to six pages, the most detailed and well-researched ones usually accompanying terms and phrases from the sphere of art and literature. Cross-references abound, including, for example, links from “truthfulness, compassion, forbearance” to “Law Wheel Cultivation” and from “China’s last emperor” to the “1989 pro-democracy movement”!

Some of the explanations are clearly those of the author-compiler himself – a member of the first generation to come of age in the People’s Republic in the 1950s and possessing an academic background in language and political culture – who manages to write with particular
confidence and authority about terms that relate to the Cultural Revolution and/or Chinese intellectual debates and debacles of the 1980s and 1990s. Entries devoted to pure political thought and entries merely tracing the supposed locus classicus of a CCP slogan or fixed formulation (tifa) are, on the other hand, often simple translations into English of official prose culled from the Party’s own history books and dictionaries. Bold comparisons of phrases and discourses across the conventional divides of time and moral space are few, which is perhaps to be expected but is a minor disappointment all the same, given the author’s background. A case in point is the entry devoted to the well-known phrase mozhe shitou guo he (“cross the river by feeling the stones”) in which the reader is merely told that both Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping used it and that it means “in building socialism with Chinese characteristics, there was no reliable model to go by …” (p. 287). Here one would have liked to see the phrase (and its political implications) compared to Mao’s once equally famous “womende renwu shi guohe, danshi meiyou qiao huo meiyou chuan jiu buneng guo” (“our task is to cross the river, but without a bridge or a boat we shall not be able to”), since metaphors describing movement are central to political thought and their subtle differences indicative of far more than just speech habits. A small number of entries contain what are widely accepted but possibly false attributions, e.g. the claim (no source provided) that Mao coined the slogan “Women hold up half the sky” (p. 15).

The Dictionary of the Political Thought of the People’s Republic of China belongs in every good institutional library, and journalists and political commentators in a hurry may even want to consider acquiring their own personal copies. Needless to say, it should not be used as an authoritative source, but merely as a short cut to half-certainty and for quick reminders of this or that aspect of politics in China. That having been said, it is a very convenient tool indeed.

MICHAEL SCHOENHALS