In retrospect, 1991–1992 may well prove to be a pivotal period in the evolution of the People’s Republic of China. The reform era ushered in by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the Third Plenum of its 11th Central Committee in December 1978 had dramatically restructured the economy and the state, but in the aftermath of the events of June 1989, it appeared to falter. Partly through reactions from outside China, and partly because of resistance within (including elements within the leadership of the Party), the programme of ‘reform and openness’ seemed challenged and about to topple. The turning point was the publicity provided for Deng Xiaoping’s inspection tour of the South about six months after the event, during which he visited Guangdong and Shanghai, and which re-ignited the flame of reform.

Michael Marti analyses the leadership politics of these two years culminating in the 14th National Congress of the CCP in great detail. This is a very readable study, which argues not only that Deng Xiaoping was central to the resurrection of the reform agenda, but also that in that process Deng forged an alliance between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), provincial leaders and the central government – named by Marti as the “Grand Compromise” – whose existence remains important for an understanding of contemporary politics in the People’s Republic of China. In Marti’s account, this “Grand Compromise” was opposed to the over-liberalization that had characterized Zhao Ziyang’s leadership. It was based on three legs: the PLA supporting Deng’s revived reform agenda, which brooked no challenge to the structure of the Party-state; the provincial leaders being prepared to provide revenue to the central government in return for the maintenance of social stability; and the central government financing continued military modernization.

Marti’s general approach to the process of change in the PRC is very similar to that adopted by Susan Shirk in The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China. It clearly places the PLA and provincial leaders at the centre of the political process. However, it places even more emphasis on Deng Xiaoping’s role as an agent of change, and tends to downplay the possibility of more long term and structural factors as part of any explanation. Deng Xiaoping’s leadership had clearly been central to the launch and emergence of reform, and was equally as clearly crucial in the events of the early 1990s. All the same, a theory of change based on the notion that Deng had a strategic plan that he somehow managed to implement – despite the opposition of the ‘conservatives’ – during the late 1970s, and resurrect in the early 1990s – again against the opposition of (presumably the same) ‘conservatives’ – rests somewhat uneasily, both generally and in detail, with the most recent research on the political process in China.
It is always tempting to describe the evolution of politics in the PRC in terms of political conflict between ‘two-lines,’ not least because the CCP often presents events having winners and losers. At the same time, the processes of change may not be best explained in these terms (see Tang Tsou, “Chinese politics at the top: factionalism or informal politics? Balance-of-power politics or a game to win all?” *The China Journal*, No. 34, July 1995). In this case, the events surrounding Deng’s ascent to the leadership of the CCP during the late 1970s – in practice if not in name – are clearly not so simply understood. Teiwes has repeatedly demonstrated the dangers of such an explanatory device both generally and in the context of the succession to Mao Zedong. It is far from clear, as Marti suggests, that Hua Guofeng opposed Deng’s ascendancy during the late 1970s, understanding from the start instead that he was only ever a stop-gap measure. Solinger and others have pointed to the existence of three basic sets of ideas about China’s future development being under debate during the late 1970s.

Marti is undoubtedly correct in his portrayal of Deng Xiaoping as being fundamentally committed to China’s successful modernization, and the Chinese Communist Party’s role in state leadership to that end. He is also undoubtedly correct in his assessment that the initial reform process and the later regeneration of those processes in the 1990s owed much to Deng Xiaoping. However, Deng’s contribution lay not in the ideas but in the organization of others to achieve these goals. To make the case he wishes to argue, Marti has also to show that Deng was not used by others as much as he may seem to have manipulated the situation, and to discuss the possibilities that some of the changes that occurred during 1991–1993 might have happened anyhow, even if with other catalysts. He does neither, which are surprising omissions given Deng’s failing health for much of the period in question.

DAVID S. G. GOODMAN


Yijiang Ding, a professor of political science at Okanagan University College in Canada, analyses the changes in the intellectual discourse on democracy in China during the last decade of the 20th century. He concludes that a major change has occurred in the discussions on the relationship between state and society that is transforming the Chinese political scene. Conceptually, much of the discourse focuses on the dualism between state and society, which he views as a departure from the Leninist concept of democratic centralism, that is the Party-state, as well as from the traditional Chinese view of state and society. As a reflection of the changing Chinese realities of a growing market economy, loosening Party controls and increasing contact with the West, society is being conceptualized as differentiated from the state
and as comprising a plurality of social interests. As Ding explains, “Increasingly, democracy is understood as the control of a limited state by an independent society and the accommodation and coordination of diverse social interests through a political process predicated on the dualism of state and society” (p. 13).

Ding substantiates his argument with an analysis of a variety of intellectual, cultural and psychological discourses on democracy, public opinion surveys and examples of China’s emerging civil society and village self-government. He acknowledges that various types of corporatism exist in China because the state has indirect control over all associations. But he points out that as local associations increasingly serve the interests of their members rather than the state, they act more independently. Therefore, he asserts, an emerging civil society exists inside and outside the corporatist structure. Ding rightly observes that because of the size and complexity of the Chinese nation, no single model approach can adequately explain associational activities in China in the 1990s.

Ding also highlights the psychological independence and cultural distinctions developing between official and unofficial culture, and the growing cultural alienation of society from the state, especially among the youth, who are more and more concerned with individual and material well-being. He attributes these gaps between the official and mass culture to the decline of official ideology. As a result, he claims that these intellectual, cultural and psychological changes have led to explorations of the sensitive issue of political pluralism.

While Ding’s analysis of the intellectual discourse on state and society is acute and fairly presented, the question is whether such discourse leads China in a democratic direction? Certainly, consciousness and articulation of the separation between state and society are prerequisites for a democratic polity, and more freedom of speech exists in China today – even on political issues in academic journals – than at any other time since 1949, but these changes have not been accompanied by greater tolerance of freedom of association, particularly political association. Ding goes beyond his data in his observation that “[e]ven in the realm of politics, independent groups’ activities appear to be on the rise…” (p. 74). He cites the establishment of the China Democracy Party (CDP) at the time of President Clinton’s visit to China in June 1998, when the CDP applied to the Zhejiang provincial government for registration as a lawful organization. In mid-September 1998, less than a month before China’s planned signature of the UN Covenant on Political and Civil Rights, the CDP launched a nationwide effort to register itself in nine provinces. Ding does not add, however, that by 1999, virtually all the leaders of the CDP had been arrested. Although Ding asserts that “arguments for democracy as valuable in itself have been repeatedly made by regime leaders and senior government officials” (p. 80), he provides few quotes to substantiate this argument.

Nonetheless, Ding’s emphasis on intellectual discourse and changes in the socioeconomic and cultural infrastructure as necessary conditions for
the development of democracy are germane. As he repeatedly observes, reform ideas are often proposed by scholars first and then adopted by the government. Yet, until China builds the institutions and establishes the laws to protect freedom of association as well as freedom of speech, all the talk about political pluralism and movement toward separation of state and society will not lead to the societal control of the state that Ding describes and China’s intellectuals seek.

MERLE GOLDMAN


Investigative journalist and human rights activist, Danny Schechter, has produced a sympathetic portrait of falun gong and its enigmatic founder, Li Hongzhi, “in the hope that it will encourage more interest and support for falun gong’s right to exist and to practise its beliefs openly” (p. 1). The first part of the reader involves a report on the persecution of falun gong practitioners inside mainland China, and castigates the press for its inadequate coverage of the crackdown. The second part of the volume incorporates a wide variety of documents pertaining to falun gong (most of which are available on the internet). The volume’s main strength is that it presents disparate material in an easily accessible format; its main weakness is that it provides little, if any, critical reflection. Key questions about the history of the movement that are likely to be raised in a classroom setting, for example, regarding the reasons for the sudden dissolution of the Falun Dafa Research Society in 1995, Li’s quiet departure from China in 1996 and his continuing reticence, are not addressed by the author. However, for instructors seeking a text to persuade students that the current crackdown has resulted in human rights violations against thousands of falun gong practitioners, Schechter’s book is certainly worth considering.

Schechter was approached by falun gong practitioner and spokesperson Gail Rachlin in 1999 because she perceived him to be a “‘friendly’ and internationally-oriented media person” (p. 2). Schechter was introduced to other practitioners and interviewed Li Hongzhi (Master Li) the day after the movement was officially banned in the PRC (a summary of which appears in the volume). Shortly thereafter, Rachlin and Schechter produced a video designed to win support for falun gong’s perspective among a wider audience. The current volume, with an author’s note updated September 2001, follows on the heels of that project, but more directly emphasizes the human rights dimensions of the continuing conflict. It features numerous testimonials describing acts of repression suffered by falun gong practitioners on the Chinese mainland, excerpts of the Amnesty International report on the crackdown, and a sample of the reactions of foreign governments to these events. Statements from practi-
tioners across the globe discussing their personal experiences, an analysis of relevant media coverage in both China and abroad, and excerpts from one of Li Hongzhi’s books are also included.

Yet Schechter’s sympathies and his unfamiliarity with modern Chinese history result in a lopsided and unsatisfying account. No serious consideration is given to the case made in the Chinese media against falun gong, nor is the movement placed in a larger context of other qigong practices, either past or present. The latter shortcoming is particularly noteworthy, given the author’s stated concern with human rights: *falun gong* is by no means the only group targeted for repression in the current crackdown, yet virtually no mention is made of the other groups suffering the same fate. The chapter entitled “Third party perspectives” is too thin to provide much-needed ballast, and the brief discussion of “What does *falun gong* believe?” offers only a superficial sketch of Master Li’s ideas. The reader is left to marvel, not only at the vehemence of the official Chinese reaction, but equally at the throngs of loyal believers ready to risk their lives for such seemingly banal practices and simple beliefs. Unfortunately, neither side is particularly well-served by this account, which also fails to convey the dimensions of this ongoing tragedy.

PATRICIA M. THORNTON


In her interesting and useful book, Karin Buhmann evaluates the potential for civil rights and ‘good-governance’ reforms to improve public administration and human rights in China and Vietnam. She argues that ‘good governance’ reforms promoting transparency and accountable discretionary power, more effectively enhance human rights observance than civil rights dialogues. The book examines the pre-modern indigenous roots of administrative rule in China and Vietnam, searches for comparative East Asian human rights and then evaluates complementalities between Western ‘good governance’ and East Asian public administration.

Buhmann sidesteps the dilemmas of cultural relativism by embracing the universality and indivisibility of human rights. This assertion, which is borrowed from the Vienna Conference on Human Rights 1993, guides the analysis to the inevitable conclusion that human rights reforms in China and Vietnam are both achievable and desirable.

She next argues that ‘good governance’ promotes human rights by limiting the arbitrary use of state power. Though intuitively appealing, this proposition only holds true where states enact laws that support human rights. In other circumstances, ‘good governance’ may strengthen the central state’s capacity to interfere with basic rights. ‘Good governance’ reforms aim to improve the efficiency of state rule and say nothing about the political morality guiding the exercise of power. Civil law
dialogues, on the other hand, advocate substantive principles promoting social justice and human dignity.

Buhmann discovers ‘good governance’ analogues in pre-modern and contemporary Chinese and Vietnamese administrative practices. This is an important finding as she stresses that effective ‘good governance’ reforms must find points of entry into “indigenous roots or institutions.” Unfortunately, she presents a highly idealized account of Chinese and Vietnamese administrative thinking. Her summary gives a state-centric view of pre-modern administrative rule that undervalues precepts and practices outside neo-Confucianism, such as Buddhism, Taoism and centre–village cultural disjunctions. Contemporary accounts of administrative practices emphasize neo-Confucian bureaucratic continuities and de-emphasize the power of Marxist-Leninist legal theory to legitimize party leadership over state apparatus. As a consequence, the discussion underestimates the profound influence exerted by the communist parties in China and Vietnam in promoting and restricting administrative reforms.

A complex four-stage methodology was used to assess the ‘fit’ or compatibility between Western ‘good governance’ and ‘human rights’ practices in China and Vietnam: meta (ideals), meso (objectives), macro (standards) and micro (domestic articulation). It does not convey a developed sense of the types of receptive behaviours in these countries or institutional factors affecting the importation of ‘good governance’ systems. For example, the author struggled to distinguish human rights ideals from objectives and standards, and the lengthy sections dealing with Chinese and Vietnamese administration show little evidence of methodological analysis.

In addition to its conceptual vagueness, the methodology gives little attention to how societies validate imported ideas. The legal transplantation literature demonstrates the importance of asking why elites adopt law reforms and how imports are received by host societies. For example, administrative reforms in China and Vietnam are inextricably bound-up in the political and economic factors shaping anti-corruption reforms. Successful ‘good governance’ reform is as much shaped by ‘palace wars’ among communist party elites, the epistemological preferences of elite level law-makers and donor conditionalities, as it is by congruent ‘indigenous’ human rights values.

In the introduction, Buhmann informs us that the analysis is based on secondary sources because East Asian languages are difficult to master. She does not explain why the extensive body of English language legal translations, newspaper articles and empirical surveys dealing with East Asian legal attitudes and precepts were rarely used. As it stands, the book largely analyses other commentators’ writings.

Buhmann intended the text as a record of academic research and a guide for foreign donors designing human rights programmes in East Asia. It fails to make good the argument that ‘good governance’ reforms are a conceptually plausible means of enhancing human rights observance in China and Vietnam. Nevertheless, the text usefully synthesizes UN and
Council of Europe standards for administrative accountability, and administrative rules in pre-modern and contemporary China and Vietnam. For this reason it is recommended as a convenient reference for donors, NGOs and those researching East Asian administrative systems.

JOHN GILLESPIE

The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century.

Those who speculate on the course of future events have given much attention to the role that China’s navy might play as a future rival to American naval power in the distant reaches of the new century. Some popular attention has been given to the idea that China, a country with the world’s largest population and a rapidly growing economy and military, will soon put the next superpower navy to sea. Bernard Cole, a retired naval officer, now a dean and professor of international history at the National War College, presents quite a different picture.

Cole’s early naval assignments in the Pacific eventually led him to write a doctoral thesis, later published as Gunboats and Marines: The United States Navy in China, 1925–28 (1983). Cole’s new book, however, deals only briefly with history and concentrates on recent Chinese naval policy. As a serving officer in the US Pacific Fleet until 1995, the author had unusual opportunities to see his subject at first-hand. To this, he has added detailed and careful academic research into current Chinese policy, extensive use of the translated reports provided by the US Foreign Broadcast Information Service, interviews with Chinese officials and visits to Chinese naval installations. The bulk of his intensive research work was completed during the five years between 1995 and 2000.

Cole’s professional background and extensive experience as a naval officer allows him to range confidently over a wide spectrum of technical issues in a way that a civilian academic could not effectively do. Cole, nonetheless, expresses himself clearly and succinctly in a way that someone not closely associated with a navy can clearly understand. The result of his work is a masterly and brief 189-page survey, with the remaining 100 pages of the volume devoted to footnotes, bibliography and index.

Cole approaches his topic in sound manner, beginning first with a brief historical introduction that notes China’s long maritime past before examining the development since 1950 of a separate naval force within the People’s Liberation Army. Cole goes on to summarize Chinese maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea as well its broader maritime economic interests in terms of off-shore oil resources, energy supplies, shipping and fisheries. Here, Cole underscores China’s ever-increasing dependence on offshore resources, not only for oil, but also as
the world’s fifth largest producer of seafood and the nation that is the most dependant of all on seaborne resources.

Cole then turns to describe the bureaucratic and decision-making structure for naval issues. In this context, he shows the navy maintaining a strength of about 10 per cent of China’s total forces while China is reducing the numbers in its overall force structure in an effort to rely on an improved quality in military technology. Cole provides unusual insight into the navy’s relationships, by showing the geographical assignments of its three fleets and its bureaucratic and doctrinal relationships to the air force, coast guard and army. Pointing out that a navy’s organization is determined by the ships and aircraft that it operates, Cole then examines the technological state of its naval equipment and shows that while recent Chinese writers are aware of the value of operating within the context of the type of co-operative network that American and other Western forces are developing, Chinese naval forces are still very clearly dependant on more traditional unit operations. With this in mind, Cole examines the navy’s personnel, education and training, operation, doctrine and strategy.

Cole concludes “there is little evidence that China’s historic dependence on continental power has changed” (p. 178). While Chinese policy-makers see the need to improve and acquire new technology to maintain a credible naval force within the context of current naval standards, there is every indication that their intentions are to create and to maintain only an expanded coastal defence with the ability to deal with China’s claims to sovereignty in nearby waters, not a superpower fleet of its own.

Cole’s lucid and comprehensive analysis of current Chinese naval developments at the beginning of the 21st century is an ideal work that can be easily used as either a starting point for novices, a text for classroom teaching in naval staff colleges, or a handy reference for experts working on current naval affairs.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF


This is a competent work that challenges the claim of new institutional economics and international regime theory that effective state institutions in the host country are vital to the inflow, and indeed growth, of foreign direct investment (FDI). It argues that the large amount of FDI China has attracted so far has been facilitated more by the informal societal institutions represented by strong personal networks operating in the country than by the formal state institutions manifested by the weak legal system. The author validates her arguments with a large number of anecdotes based on over 100 interviews she conducted in China. Her findings and
conclusions appear to be persuasive. She alleges that the existing institutional theories of economic development and of international relations have “exaggerated” the role of state institutions. Our search for determinants of FDI in China should, she suggests, include not only state but, more importantly, societal institutions.

The publication of this book is significant, especially in view of what has been identified as the main reason for the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s by many Western observers. The widespread financial and economic problems experienced by East and South-East Asian countries, with the apparent exception of China, in the late 1990s, have cast doubts over the validity of the network-based model of economic development. The close and cozy relationship between the government establishment and the private business in many Asian countries, or “crony capitalism” as termed by many critics, has been singled out as a major cause of the economic disaster. Wang Hongying’s book provides an answer to the critics – informal personal networks may be mainly responsible for the economic and financial troubles, but this was not the case in China. Indeed, based on the Chinese experience and the recent recovery of those economies, the network-based model of Asian economic development is certainly far from being written off.

This book was published on the eve of China joining the World Trade Organization (WTO). In her book, Wang Hongying provides some detailed accounts of China’s efforts to comply with international norms by actively seeking membership of several international organizations, including the WTO (see chapter three). She predicts that informal personal networks in China will eventually be replaced by impersonal universalistic rules, but stops short of investigating the potential impact of China’s pending accession to the WTO on Chinese state institutions, especially the regulatory framework governing the development of FDI. Sadly, she does not go on to speculate on the possible changes in China’s policy toward such important issues as the national treatment of foreign investors, protection of intellectual property rights, and transparency of foreign economic laws and regulations.

It is perhaps important to point out that the perceived level of the effectiveness of a country’s legal system may not be statistically significant in determining FDI inflow, but one should guard against overemphasizing the role of informal personal networks in that regard. After all, what really matters in terms of determinants of FDI inflow, as indicated by the regression analyses conducted by Wang herself, are the size of the domestic market, sunken investment, and economic growth rate in the host country.

On the whole, this is a well-researched, convincingly argued and neatly structured volume. It makes an important contribution to the debate over the role of institutions in facilitating economic development. Anyone interested in contemporary Chinese economic and political development will benefit greatly from reading it.

Qi Luo
This book is the result of a conference hosted by the North American Chinese Sociologists Association in Toronto, Canada, in August 1997. It begins with an introductory chapter by Alvin Y. So, and is followed by 15 papers. The papers are divided into four parts, which deal with the roles economic institutions, gender, social networks and the overseas Chinese play in the integration of the three Chinese states.

Alvin So gives a historical account of the break up of a single Chinese state into three separate ones. The US regional polarization project in East Asia during the Cold War – whereby mainland China practised revolutionary socialism in the 1960s while export-oriented industrialization was introduced to authoritarian Taiwan and colonial Hong Kong – played a pivotal role in the disintegrative process up to 1970, which was the approximate turning point in the formation of the Chinese triangle. The 1970s marked the détente of Sino-American relations, the US withdrawal from Indochina and the beginning of the developmental problems of both socialist and capitalist models in all three Chinese states. The attempts to reform its ossified economy along the lines of its Asian capitalist neighbours, and the drive toward national reunification, prompted mainland China to begin to integrate itself with Hong Kong and Taiwan. At the same time, labour shortages and soaring land prices drove the business community of Hong Kong and Taiwan to invest in mainland China in order to bolster their competitiveness in the world economy.

According to So, the Chinese triangle has four peculiar features: rapid societal integration amid state rivalry between Britain and the PRC over Hong Kong (before 1997) and between mainland China and Taiwan; economic integration occurring rapidly in areas far away from Beijing’s control; Hong Kong and Taiwan being socioeconomic cores while having peripheral political status; and the co-existence of economic centripetal and sociopolitical centrifugal forces.

Following the introduction are four chapters on regional integration. Xiangming Chen aims in chapter two to trace and theorize the evolution of the Chinese economic triangle. Towards the end of the chapter, Chen warns of a zero-sum internal competition between mainland China on the one hand and Taiwan and Hong Kong on the other in the more sophisticated capital-intensive industries in the world economy. In chapter three, T. S. Cheung and Ambrose King examine how “Confucian entrepreneurs,” who combine profit-making interests and Confucian moral principles, conduct their business in the three Chinese states. In chapters four and five respectively, Chih-jou Jay Chen and Gina Lai use empirical data to investigate changes in local property rights arrangements in southern Fujian and the Chang (Yangtze) River delta region, and the psychological well-being of urban workers in Shanghai.

Part two, composed of three chapters by Ngai Pun, Chi-kwan Ho, and
Ray-may Hsung and Esther N. L. Chow, studies gender inequalities in the course of economic reform, restructuring or industrialization in mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan respectively.

Part three is devoted to the study of social networks. The nature of guanxi in the Chinese context as well as the role guanxi plays in social and economic exchanges are given a detailed analysis by Nan Lin in chapter nine. Ly-yun Chang argues in chapter ten that the logic of organizational behaviour is more important than personal ties in accounting for the exchange of resources between hospitals in Taiwan. Danching Ruan demonstrates in chapter 11 that family-based kin are key to establishing discussion networks on the mainland and Taiwan. However, friends in Taiwan and co-workers in the mainland play the most important non-kin role in the two Chinese societies. Hon-chu Leung attributes the success of the Hong Kong garment industry to overlapping social networks connected by intermediaries. Finally, the four chapters in part four study overseas Chinese in the US and Canada.

Undoubtedly the Chinese triangle is one of the central issues in the study of the development of contemporary China in the 1990s and beyond. This book is therefore a timely publication. Pointing out that the previous literature on Chinese national integration has seldom emphasized “the important role of social institutions in the shaping of the integrative process in the Chinese triangle” (p. 1, emphasis added), the book’s overarching aim is to examine how the four selected social institutions influence the evolution and future development of the Chinese triangle. Many chapters, though well researched individually, deviate from the main theme of the book. Instead, they study the impact of the chosen social institutions on a single Chinese state only without delving into how the institutions help shape the integration of the triangle of the three Chinese states.

Furthermore, one may ask how the study of the social institutions of gender and the Chinese diaspora is pertinent to the theme of the book? For instance, one suspects why there is a need to define and measure carefully the population of Chinese living in the US in chapter 16. In studying the chapter, which concludes that the population of the American Chinese based on objective questions is only about 45 per cent of that based on subjective questions, one might further ask what the possible implications of the gap in the population would be for the evolution of the Chinese triangle.

For future projects, the contributors to this volume may wish to consider examining the role of identity – Hong Kong people or Taiwanese versus mainland Chinese – in the formation of the triangle and in the challenges facing the economic integration.

**PAK K. LEE**


Asian economies have long pegged their exchange rates to the US dollar
and used the dollar in international transactions. The increasing importance of intra- and extra-regional trade, together with the latest financial crisis and the adoption of a single currency in Europe, raises the question of forming an international monetary union in Asia. The Japanese economy was once regarded as an important ‘miracle’ in Asian economic development and the yen was tipped to be the key currency to be ‘pegged’ to. This book investigates the desirability and feasibility of establishing a yen bloc with the ultimate objective of integrating the Asian economies and competing against the other two major international currencies, the euro and the dollar.

The volume is divided into two parts. Part one reviews the economic fundamentals of the Asian economies and includes the chapters “The rise of regionalism in Asia,” “Deepening Japan–Asia interdependence,” “Asia in search of a new exchange rate regime,” and “Revitalizing the Japanese economy.” Part two consists of four key chapters, which examine the possibility of a yen bloc in Asia from the Japanese, Asian, regional and global perspectives.

The analysis of forming a yen bloc from the Japanese viewpoint focuses on Japan’s growing share of the Asian economy. It also examines the change in attitude of the Japanese government from initially rejecting and then promoting the yen as an international currency, and its intention to build a monetary union in Asia. The Asian perspective on the yen bloc is complicated. On the one hand, countries with loose links to the dollar suffer from fluctuations in the yen–dollar regime. On the other hand, the instability of other Asian currencies compared with the yen leaves little option but to choose the yen as a regional currency. From a regional perspective, the theory of optimal currency areas is used to explore the possibility of having a yen bloc. According to the author, the major benefit of forming a monetary union is to reduce the cost and uncertainty of transactions among member countries, while the major cost will be the loss of control by individual members over their own monetary policies. On a global level, the emergence of a yen bloc will impose additional competition for the dollar after the euro. Kwan predicts that the three dominant currencies in a tripolar world will eventually establish a more stable international monetary order.

Due to the varying levels of development within Asia, unlike in the USA and Europe, it has been the private sector that has been the main driving force behind Asian economic integration. The author points out that if a yen bloc comes into being, it could further accelerate the development of an integrated Asian economy. Yet, judging from the huge differences in GDP and the dissimilar industrial compositions among NICs (newly industrializing countries), ASEAN members and Japan, a unified regional currency appears unrealistic in the foreseeable future. In fact, as the Chinese economy grows, the reasons for supporting the yen as the regional currency become less apparent. Unfortunately, this book does provide much analysis to this aspect, although it does suggest that if currencies initially de-linked with the dollar and pegged to a basket of
currencies in which more weight is given to the yen, China could join the possible yen bloc after the NICs and ASEAN economies.

Although there is no conclusion chapter, major arguments are well-documented in the first overview chapter. Clearly written and logically presented, *Yen Bloc: Toward Economic Integration in Asia* is probably one of the most comprehensive attempts at discussing the possibility of a monetary union in Asia. It could be additional reading for those studying the Asian economies, particularly business economists.

**FUNG KWAN**


The Chinese beef industry has grown phenomenally over the last two decades, with output increasing nearly 20-fold and China now being ranked as the third largest beef producer in the world after the United States and Brazil. The authors of *Beef in China* note that this Chinese ‘beef revolution’ has been scarcely documented in the literature, including Chinese language materials, and set about this task.

The book is well structured, although one wonders why the 17 different chapters are not grouped into several different parts, which could have easily been done. Chapter one provides a concise outline of the themes and contents of the book. Chapter two presents background information on growth and change in the Chinese beef industry and beef consumption patterns in the post-1978 period. It also introduces a major argument of the book: that the growth of the beef industry was really directed by the government rather than induced by an expanding market. Cattle breeds in China, both indigenous and introduced, are briefly discussed in chapter three, as are breeding centres. Chapters three to seven deal with beef production issues, introducing and analysing the economics of different types of beef production systems (unspecialized and specialized households and feedlots). Live cattle marketing is the focus of chapter eight, and then chapters nine to 11 examine the processing of cattle and cattle products.

Chapters 12 to 15 cover aspects of beef marketing downstream from the slaughtering activity, including beef distribution and marketing channels, consumer attitudes and other aspects of the beef market. Chapter 15 is dedicated to the Hong Kong market on the basis that this is perceived to be indicative of the beef markets that may soon emerge in some of the rapidly growing metropolises of eastern China, and because Hong Kong constitutes a potential gateway for beef exporters to the mainland.
China’s imports and exports of beef are addressed in Chapter 16. The authors do not perceive the prospects for beef imports to be that great in the near future, despite the now lower import tariffs on beef following China’s accession to the WTO, because of various obstacles to the penetration of mainland markets. The final chapter presents, rather briefly, some conclusions and implications of the study.

Parallels can be drawn between Beef in China and a previous book that Longworth also co-authored, China’s Pastoral Region. Both are landmark books, drawing on original and rich fieldwork data and representing exposés of the subjects that they deal with. Beef in China is based on intensive fieldwork conducted in 14 provinces and in Hong Kong over the course of four years. It includes over 400 research interviews with various stakeholders in the industry and two major consumer surveys. Although official data is sometimes used, it is treated cautiously and its contribution is not critical. The analyses in the book and the various conclusions drawn are robust. Implications for foreign businesspeople who may want to engage more in the Chinese beef industry are clearly spelt out. For those who have a broader interest in Chinese rural reform and development, the book presents the interesting thesis that the ‘beef revolution’ was more directed by government than induced by market forces, and thus it was somewhat a matter of luck that increased supply coincided with increased demand. However, this argument is only partially substantiated and it is not situated in the broader literature. We are instead told that this thesis will be further explored in the authors’ forthcoming book (Waldron, S.A, Brown, C. G. and Longworth, J. W. The Transition of China’s Rural Economy: Institutions, Issues and Insights from the Cattle and Beef Industry, due 2002).

In summary, Beef in China is an essential reference book for any businessperson or researcher with an interest in China’s beef industry. Nevertheless, those who are seeking the placement of the Chinese ‘beef revolution’ in the broader literature on rural transition and development should also watch out for the forthcoming book by the same authors.

TONY BANKS and ALLAN RAE


The papers in Taiwan’s Presidential Politics were originally presented at a workshop held soon after the election of Chen Shui-bian and appear to
have been completed toward the end of 2000. They are thus preliminary assessments of “the domestic and international implications of two key outcomes of the election: the victory of Chen and the defeat of the KMT [Kuomintang]” (p. xii). One might expect that a volume such as this would contain a series of time-limited statements of instant wisdom whose accelerated depreciation would have begun well before publication. However, this is decidedly not the case. The articles in this volume suggest important issues that arose out of the election and present them in a thought-provoking manner. Specifically, two themes emerge from the contributions to this volume.

The first is the importance of viewing this election within the context of an ongoing process rather than as a dramatic beginning of change in Taiwan. For example, Larry Diamond sees the election as part of a process of “democratic consolidation” rather than as consolidation itself, while Yun-han Chu goes so far as to suggest that the Democratic Progressive Party “may have come to power before its time.” Tracing the history of constitutional tinkering that has accompanied the transition from KMT authoritarianism, Chu argues that Chen’s presidency is hobbled by his party’s unpreparedness to rule and by a constitutional arrangement “not designed for the scenario of divided government” (p. 111). In his discussion of Japan’s relations with Taiwan, Yoshihisa Amae sees Chen’s election as the “culmination” of Taiwan’s transformation — a process which, along with international developments, is changing the island’s status from a “neglected” to an “important” partner of Japan.

A second, related theme is the limited impact of Chen’s election both at home and abroad. The editor argues that “Chen has become an isolated leader and ineffective” because of the constitutional and party issues identified by Yun-han Chu (p. 17). Looking beyond domestic politics, Bruce Dickson suggests lessons that the democratization experience in Taiwan might hold for the People’s Republic of China, and Chua Beng Huat assesses the impact on South-East Asia’s “one party quasi-democratic regimes.” While Dickson concludes that it “remains to be seen” how the lessons will be read on the mainland (p. 130), Huat sees some resonances with the Malaysian situation and none with Singapore for which “no experience of democratization anywhere in the world is relevant” (p. 152).

In a similar vein, Yu-Shan Wu examines the triangular relationship between the United States, Taiwan and the PRC, and argues that “Chen’s election really does not make a great difference. On the contrary, it shows the strength of the structure composed of domestic and international factors and their grip on realistic politicians” (p. 189). His view is seconded by Alan Wachman, who argues that the election “has had only transitory implications for the triadic relationship” (p. 254), and Qingguo Jia, who sees Chen’s options in dealing with the mainland severely limited. Finally, Tain-Jy Chen and C.Y. Cyrus Chu present a strong case for the key role of economic ties in shaping the outcome of cross-strait relations.
There is no room in a review of this length to assess each of the contributions to this volume. Suffice it to say that the analytical level of the work is uniformly high and it manages to avoid two pitfalls of edited collections: uneven quality and tenuous threads uniting the contributions.

Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the second volume under review here, *Implementation of Taiwan Relations Act [sic]: An Examination After Twenty Years*. The most valuable contributions in this volume are Ralph Clough’s general discussion of the evolution of cross-strait relations and Robert Sutter’s insightful view of the role of Congress. The rest of the volume is simply disappointing.

Five of the contributors to this volume (David Dean, Charles T. Cross, Natale H. Bellochi, James R. Lilley and David N. Laux) have served either as director of the American Institute in Taiwan or as its chairman, with David Dean having served in both positions. Since neither the nature nor the evolution of this institution created by the TRA has received much attention, one might expect such a gathering to provide much new and interesting data. With the exception of Charles T. Cross’s excellent piece, this is not at all the case. Lilley presents a discussion of the security component that meanders around the subject at hand. The contributions of the remaining former officials provide few new insights into the politics and economics of Taiwan’s relations with Washington and Beijing. They seem to be more the work of detached analysts than practitioners involved in the unique “unofficial” diplomatic process that followed the passage of the TRA.

Finally, the introduction by Hungdah Chiu is largely a chronological discussion of PRC–Taiwan–US relations since 1979 which, although written in December 2001, devotes only five of 68 pages to events after the 1996 Taiwan Strait confrontation. This is regrettable since these were some of the most important years in the evolution of the TRA. Thus, the introduction does little to give cohesion to the discussions that follow. However, it does provide the reader with an initial warning of the unevenness of the volume that follows.

**Steven M. Goldstein**

*Governing Hong Kong: Legitimacy, Communication and Political Decay.*


This book argues that the HKSAR government has encountered a crisis of performance legitimacy. Legitimacy, according to Huntington, has procedure and performance aspects. As the HKSAR’s Chief Executive is not directly elected by universal suffrage, his procedure legitimacy is relatively weak and he has to rely on performance to buttress legitimacy. Unfortunately, from July 1997 to April 2001, the performance legitimacy of the HKSAR government was plagued by mismanagement of the civil
Compounding the problem of performance legitimacy is a deterioration of governance, as many members of the public took to the streets to protest against the HKSAR government’s reform policies. Political decay or deterioration in the HKSAR can be seen in not only citizen protests but also the mobilization of patriotic or pro-Beijing groups in support of various controversial government policies, and also the expansion of police discretion in dealing with street protesters. Moreover, political decay can be seen in the labelling of government critics as the “enemies” of the post-colonial state.

According to Lo, the dynamics of political decay in the HKSAR can be attributed to the communication problems of the HKSAR government. First, the government lacked communication with the public on its policies, which were formulated and implemented chaotically without taking into consideration public opinion. Horizontally, the communication within the government was also chaotic, leading to mismanagement of various crises such as the bird flu, airport chaos and the piling scandal. The book contends that the root of political decay in the HKSAR can also be interpreted in terms of the clash of Western and Chinese civilizations. While Huntington maintains that Chinese civilization was marked by hierarchy, subordination and collectivism, he also mentions that Western civilization was characterized by individualism, flexibility and accountability. The problems of governance in the HKSAR, once its sovereignty was returned to the motherland, can be explained in terms of such a clash of civilizations. Since Hong Kong enjoyed a relatively brief period of the rule of law and Western-style freedom from the 1970s to the 1990s, such a brief period of Western civilization cannot match the powerful influence of Chinese civilization immediately after the handover. The triumph of Chinese civilization over Western civilization in the Hong Kong context means that political decay in the HKSAR is inevitable in the short run. In the long-term, political development in the HKSAR will be contingent upon the development of China.

The strength of this book is that it adopts a comprehensive approach to understand the dynamics of the governance problems of the HKSAR since the handover. It is argumentative, using the arguments of Huntington and employing the case of Hong Kong to substantiate such a clash of civilizations. The triangular relationships between communication problems, legitimacy and political decay have also been discussed in detail. Arguably, the problem of governance in the HKSAR can be explained in terms of the clash of ideology, that is, the inevitable conflict between a one-party authoritarian Leninist system of central government and a relatively free and open local HKSAR government, rather than the clash of civilizations as suggested by Lo. Nevertheless, it is a very provocative and critical work on the political development of Hong Kong, and it will be useful to all students and scholars interested in the HKSAR’s politics and government.

This is a good volume to read in order to keep track of what the Hong Kong Chinese think about key issues concerning themselves and their changing society, with analyses provided by local Hong Kong Chinese sociologists. It is part of a series based on surveys carried out in 1988, 1990, 1993, 1995, 1997 and 1999. Over 3,000 Chinese-speaking adults were selected and interviewed each time. Additional topics were added to each successive survey, making the scope broader each time. The volumes contain a detailed appendix about survey methodology.

In general, the series provides a large body of data with interesting and sometimes penetrating analyses by local experts. It aims to gather data on social attitudes and expectations, identify areas of merit for further in-depth study, and provide insights for the formulation of social policies in selected areas. To its credit, the work has not always been popular with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) government for its analysis of sociopolitical issues, including views of the public on government policy and reform. It is also a credit that one of the volume editors was recently appointed as head of the HKSAR Central Policy Unit, which should make it more likely that the data and analyses in this volume will have a direct impact on the policy-making process.

Hong Kong people are facing difficult times and this volume carries a theme of crisis and transformation, with the role of trust given special emphasis. Unfortunately, it is inconclusive about the theme, and would benefit from an overview chapter to bring together the strands across chapters. This is not a simple task, but it would provide greater integration to the volume. Nevertheless, these preliminary analyses of the 1999 data will serve as precursors of future argument and debate about what kind of society Hong Kong is becoming.

The first chapter by Victor Zheng, Law Kwok Keung and Wong Siu-lun focuses on the crisis and anxiety that characterize Hong Kong’s transition. They look at the changing socio-cultural context and whether the HKSAR government has become more interventionist. The chapter begins by showing how important education levels have become in determining people’s views, with the less educated more prone to stress social stability over free competition, and personal qualities and virtue over adaptability. Many Hong Kong people believe the business environment has worsened, with much of the blame being placed on government policies. The data indicate widespread dissatisfaction with the Tung administration’s record on intervention in educational reform, social welfare and housing. Furthermore, doubt and suspicion toward the business community continues to increase. The authors end by providing a wake-up call: “If the HKSAR government does not pay great attention to these problems and address them swiftly and effectively, its authority will be threatened” (p. 31).
In chapter two, Ho Kwok-leung notes how the abysmal performance of the Hong Kong government has affected people’s views toward the political domain, and the extent to which legitimacy has been undermined. In fact, only 12.6 per cent of respondents viewed the performance of the HKSAR government as good or very good, a view common across all sectors of the population. Yet, Ho points out that while there is less confidence in the ability of government, legitimacy is not in doubt. Trust is maintained because many believe the government still serves the collective interest of the Hong Kong people rather than only the rich, as in the past. Trust is also maintained through the perceived integrity of civil servants.

Lau Siu-kai notes, in chapter three, the anger of the population toward senior officials who do not accept collective responsibility. The data indicate a declining trust and confidence in the ruling and social elite; a falling confidence in Hong Kong’s ability to run Hong Kong; a lack of a sense of popular influence on government; and negative views toward political parties. The more educated populace have a greater sense of political efficacy, are less likely to find politics and government complex, and are more confident that politicians and political parties will pay more attention. Yet, the more educated are also more diffident about the capacity of Hong Kongers for self-government. They are also less disposed to use radical means to advance their interest. Lau ends with a word of caution: “Until and unless the government and society can work together to reduce political and social tensions and to restore public respect for social and political authorities, Hong Kong is poised to see a new period of instability follow a couple of years of post-handover political tranquility” (p. 90).

Given the shock that Hong Kongers experienced after the Asian economic crisis, it is no wonder that a chapter would be devoted to the degree of confidence in the capitalist economy. In chapter four, Lau Siu-kai reports that views have remained robust, that the free market is still an “article of faith,” and that Hong Kongers are still optimistic about recovery. Yet, globalization has brought unrelenting competition and exacerbated social inequality and social discontent. Lau stresses the implications: “More ominously, the middle class, which used to be the bedrock of stability in Hong Kong, has become increasingly alienated from capitalist society and the ethos that undergirds it. The social contract that used to bind different social classes and the government together has frayed” (p. 113).

In chapter five, Lee Ming-kwan focuses on views about social class, inequality and conflict. He examines popular views on the degree of inequality, willingness to tolerate inequality, perceived opportunities for upward mobility, the need for inequality, and support for redistribution of income. Comparative data illustrate that the views of Hong Kongers fall somewhere between those of residents of Britain and the USA. The ideology of personal effort, competitive individualism and regard for capable persons, is alive and well. Yet people recognize and accord equal importance to class and individual factors. The data also confirms a deep
tension within the working class about existing inequalities, and a concern within the middle class about democracy and political issues.

Chan Ying-keung in chapter six confirms the family-oriented character of Hong Kong people and the great extent to which the family is still the major site of privacy and intimacy. For example, over 90 per cent still consider a member of the family the most suitable person with whom to discuss personal matters. However, career plans are often discussed with co-workers. The data in this chapter are viewed as confirming the Chinese conventions of traditional culture, even though modern society has extended the inclusion of persons outside the family in the privacy sphere.

In line with Hong Kong’s crisis and rocky transformation, Wan Po-san, in chapter seven, confirms a drop in the subjective sense of well-being among the population. Wan notes that “Those who experience a satisfying and happy life are a blessed minority. They tend to have a higher income and enjoy a subjective socio-economic status” (p. 178). Most respondents did not find their present situation corresponding to their aspirations. Many have much less than before, and some feel aggrieved at not getting what they deserve. Still, most respondents perceive their present situation as “unusual and temporary.” If the economic crisis continues, it will be interesting to see if future social indicator studies confirm the resiliency of this belief.

Finally, Thomas Wong (chapter eight) winds up the volume by scouting the terrain of trust and tolerance. Referring back to past indicator studies, he notes the high level of distrust Hong Kong people have had for businessmen and politicians. He confirms the declining trust in government, and the view that business people lack a sense of social responsibility, honesty and integrity. Yet, trust in the world of work is another matter. It is there that competence and expertise matter more. With a low level of trust in interpersonal relations, the data demonstrates that trust in the world of work is perceived as essential. There is, in the words of Wong, “trust writ small” in the ethos of the Hong Kong people.

Since the publication of this volume, the HKSAR Chief Secretary Anson Chan has resigned, the Chief Executive has been re-elected without universal suffrage, unemployment has risen to new heights and the economic crisis has deepened. The probability of Hong Kong weathering the crisis over the long-term has much to do with the success of the current educational reform. For this reason, rather than merely correlating levels of education with various response patterns, future volumes could also examine the views of Hong Kongers about the success or failure so far of education to cultivate a sense of trust into the generation that is coming of age.

The volume could serve as a companion text for courses taught on Hong Kong society and culture since it provides updated information and analyses about areas of concern to the people of Hong Kong. As the database becomes more available to the community of international scholars whose interests, perspectives and modes of analysis throw further light on the subject, the series will grow in importance and visibility. This and other volumes in the series are indispensable to
gaining a fuller understanding of the complex dynamics of sociopolitical change in Hong Kong. The next volume promises to be of continuing relevance.

GERARD POSTIGLIONE


*The Making of the Chinese Industrial Workplace* opens a window on to the world of Chinese factories and the political institutions, policies, conflicts and crises that swirled in and around them from the early 20th century to the early 1960s (with tantalizing glimpses of the Cultural Revolution and the reform period). Here, managers struggle to make a profit or just to survive, shop floor bosses jockey for position, political officials endeavour to regulate and control, and workers struggle with them all. Out of this maelstrom emerge institutions and political tendencies that twist and turn but nonetheless manage to persist at least until the 1980s. In particular, Professor Frazier recounts the origins of the (in)famous Chinese work unit (*danwei*) and the welfare system associated with it, the development of the wage system (with its narrow differentials and its emphasis on seniority), the donnybrooks between “reds” and “experts,” the twists and turns in what was at some times the labour market and at others the labour allocation system, the metamorphoses of state agencies concerned with industry and labour, the machinations of shop floor “number ones” and their enemies above and below, and the reactions of workers—often defeated, resigned and acquiescent, often furious and mobilized.

It is a fascinating story told in rich detail from which emerge several clear and compelling arguments. We learn, for example, that the Chinese work unit did not spring only or even mainly from the logic of the command economy and polity. Neither was it a simple carry-over from certain practices in Republican period enterprises that have already been documented, nor an actualization of Confucian values of patriarchy or *noblesse oblige*. Rather, it grew out of the efforts and shared interests of managers, politicians and labour in guaranteeing the provision to workers of housing, food, medical care, education and other services in a context variously of crisis, hyperinflation and/or persistent scarcity. We also learn much about the ebb and flow of wage systems amidst conflict between, on the one hand, modernizing owners, managers, officials of both the Republic and the People’s Republic, younger and more technologically advanced workers who sought to rationalize and promote development by rewarding greater effort and expertise, and, on the other hand, radical politicians and their proletarian supporters on the shop floor. (Over the long haul the latter won out.)
The expansion and contraction of the industrial labour force is, Professor Frazier argues, grounded in the interaction among workers and would-be workers clamouring for jobs for themselves and their families, managers rationally hoarding labour under the rules and constraints of the command economy, and development-minded state planners and officials seeking to cut costs, achieve efficiency, regulate migration, protect agriculture, and prevent or control labour unrest. The efforts of the Communist Party to project its power into enterprises over and against that of factory and shop floor managers, and the consequences of its general success in doing so after the First Five-Year Plan, form a major theme, both for the Chinese case and also for comparative analysis with the Soviet model. One of the Party’s antagonists in these battles were shop floor supervisors, whose lineage (and sometimes whose very identity) hearkened back to the gang bosses of China’s early industrialization. *The Making of the Chinese Industrial Workplace* shows that though they lost a great deal of power (e.g. over hiring and firing and over wage setting), they nonetheless remained a potent force on the factory floor and in industrial politics generally. Finally, though this is not a book about labour protest *per se*, it documents the ongoing drumbeat of demonstrations, “surroundings,” “eat-ins,” strikes and violent attacks by workers enraged at Republican and Communist officials and policies alike.

Professor Frazier’s overarching *motif* is the significant continuities in modes of labour management over the long, disjunct period he studies. His is not the stock argument of the historian though. The continuities are not mere persistence or the function of an enduring culture. Rather, they spring from the ongoing nature of the demands of rapid industrialization and workers’ often contradictory interests thereto, amidst domestic and international crises during the Republic and the People’s Republic. Yet politics still matter: though there are significant continuities, there is a great deal of pushing and pulling by political actors who are variously advancing their interests and working out their commitments to radical change.

*The Making of the Chinese Industrial Workplace* offers finely grained historical detail and a textured argument to match. It explores an issue that is crucial to the fate of the structural reforms but which has not been examined on this scale since those reforms made archival research possible. This wonderful book whets the appetite for its sequel.

MARC BLECHER


Why does the term ‘ethnic’ sound so odd when inserted into histories of non-contemporary societies? This is one of the problems with which Mark Elliott struggles in his engaging study of the politics of difference
in Qing China. The answer is that the term ‘ethnic’ has come into general circulation only in relatively recent times, and then in the context of national societies that have had increasingly to cope with the challenge of accommodating a variety of descent groups.

For Elliott, fully aware though he is of the problems of anachronism, ethnicity is the available word to describe the politically charged consciousness of cultural difference that, he argues, was sustained through the Qing even as the cultural difference itself was vitiating. His thesis is that Qing rule rested on the two pillars of neo-Confucian legitimacy and ethnic sovereignty, the latter steadily evident through the period of his study, which concludes around the end of the 18th century. In his stress on ethnicity, he differs explicitly from Pamela Crossley, who in a series of published works has effectively differentiated ‘Manchuness’ from ethnicity, arguing that the latter term becomes appropriate only once the Manchus began to come under pressure in the 19th century.

The picture of the Manchus emerging from Elliott’s account is one of a ruling caste that maintained its cohesion domestically by marriage within the group and institutionally through, most importantly, the Eight Banner system, kept visible in the provinces by a system of garrison cities that divided Manchu colonies from Chinese residential areas. The banners were in economic and even cultural crisis in the middle of the 18th century, but rather than being allowed to collapse were reinvigorated (one could say ‘ethnically cleansed’) when Chinese bannermen were re-classified as ordinary Chinese. Elliott’s argument is that while some obvious ethnic markers of Manchuness may have faded by this time, the banners themselves became the “repository of Manchu identity.”

Theoretical framework aside, this is an absorbing and illuminating study of a group of people who enjoyed certain legal privileges but also endured particular impositions by virtue of their lineage. In short, being a Manchu in Qing China was often a nuisance. For instance, up until the middle of the 18th century, the body of any bannerman who died in the provinces had to be transported back to Beijing at great cost and inconvenience to the family concerned. During the early Qianlong years, this was even extended to the bodies of women and children, entailing extraordinary expense and trouble. Another imposition on banner families was the requirement that their daughters be presented to the palace for possible selection for palace service, an obligation some sought to evade. Moreover, marriages could not be conducted at the discretion of the family (let alone of the individuals concerned) but had to be approved from on high.

These instances show some of the means by which the court tried to maintain group solidarity among the banner people. Women visibly served as communal boundary markers, as Elliott shows by reference to dress codes that differentiated Han Chinese from Manchu women. It would be interesting to know what roles Manchu mothers played in cultural transmission within the family. In the provinces, it would seem to be primarily occupational stratification and residential segregation that kept the banner families distinct.
Elliott insists early in his book on the importance of Manchu language sources for Qing history, and with such a topic one can imagine why. The experience of reading what Manchus had to say in their own language must be akin to the experience of reading a Chinese story in the original rather than in translation. But Manchu sources seem to be as resistant as Chinese ones to many lines of inquiry. On inter-ethnic relations within China, Elliott has had to marshal a small amount of evidence carefully to make the point that ethnic difference was a salient feature of everyday life in Qing China. He is able to show a number of cases of Man–Han (or Manchu–Nikan) criminal confrontations, but given the large number of Chinese in China, it would be rather surprising if many of the crimes committed by Manchus did not involve Chinese people.

That the Manchus, so obviously in a minority wherever they were, should construct an ethnic boundary for themselves is believable; whether Han ethnicity invariably formed along the same boundary is a moot point. Surely the majority of the Chinese population at any one time rarely if ever clapped eyes on a Manchu. There were only 15 Manchu garrison towns in the provinces, as opposed to around two thousand administrative capitals. The extent to which Manchus were a part of the Chinese mental world deserves study.

This is a book argued in adversarial mode. Elliott closely defines his position and rigorously defends it, engaging in debate with a long line of historians of China to press home his point. The strength of his argument, insofar as it involves the use of the term ‘ethnic’ to define Manchu identity, relies on an understanding of ethnicity as dynamic and mutable in its forms. It is clear that this does not account for cultural change among the Manchus, which Elliott also discusses, but it does provide a theoretical antonym for ‘assimilation.’ While it remains to be seen whether ‘ethnicity’ will hereafter be naturalized as a way of thinking about the Manchus, this book is sure to provoke much discussion.

ANTONIA FINNANE


Manchuria is slowly beginning to rival Shanghai in popularity as a topic for new work in Republican Chinese history. As in Shanghai, it is clear that the most crucial questions about nationalism, war, stability and modernization all came to a head in the north-eastern provinces of China. Ronald Suleski’s book is a welcome addition to the studies on these topics, providing an innovative and well-supported argument to show that, far from being merely a desert of endless warlord battles, the early Republic (1911–1928) was a time when differing ideas of the way forward for China battled for supremacy.

The book uses Japanese and Chinese sources, drawing in particular on
newspapers published in the region. It concentrates on the career of Wang Yongjiang, the most prominent civilian official in Manchuria in the early Republic. Wang made his name through effective service to Zhang Zuolin, the region’s militarist ruler, known as the “Old Marshal.” Zhang’s desire to expand his rule from his home provinces to the rest of China meant that he was in constant need of money for his campaigns, and Wang turned out to be a financier with a Midas touch when it came to raising revenue. Wang, however, did not offer his talents unconditionally. The first half of the 1920s saw him, along with other civilian commercial and bureaucratic elite members, using funds to develop Manchuria’s infrastructure. Always in Wang’s mind was the strong Japanese imperial presence in the region, and he thought of his reforms as part of a nationalist project to prove that advances made by the imperialists could be bettered by the Chinese themselves. The projects promoted by Wang’s clique included the expansion and sponsorship of regional industry, reform of the banks (to create more accountability and prevent plundering by the military), and a large-scale immigration project to encourage more workers from north China to enter the region. Yet the outbreak of another civil war in 1924 saw most of Wang’s reforms come to grief. Zhang’s demands for ever greater amounts of revenue to fuel the war led to the region’s economic near-collapse, and Wang’s own semi-autonomous powers were whittled away under martial law. Finally, in 1926, Wang resigned and left politics forever, despite attempts by Zhang to tempt him back. Manchuria’s finances continued to get worse, and in 1928, Zhang himself fell victim to a bomb on his train planted by renegade Japanese soldiers. The “Old Marshal” left a difficult legacy for his son, Zhang Xueliang, and in 1931, a Japanese coup saw the region occupied by the Japanese.

Suleski does an excellent job of showing that Wang Yongjiang’s reforms were potentially the basis for a stable, modernized Manchuria and perhaps, by example, China as a whole. The book is particularly strong on financial and economic history, with detailed explanations of currency reforms, and descriptions of how they affected standards of living for ordinary people as well as the elites. The book also undermines any assumptions that the Chinese elites in Manchuria were merely weak and vacillating in the face of superior Japanese imperial power: Wang’s plans to encourage migration and build industry were a clear and rational counterpart to the development of the South Manchurian Railway and migration plans of the Japanese state, but were undone by the short-term goals of Zhang’s militarism. Readers who want a multi-dimensional view of the creation of identity, nationalism and empire in the region should read this book alongside Gavan McCormack’s Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China, 1911–1928 (1977) and Y. Tak Matsusaka’s The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904–1932 (2001). In its own right, Suleski’s volume is a valuable contribution to the specialist literature, and will be of interest to scholars of not just Manchuria but Republican China as a whole.

RANA MITTER

For many years the Nanking massacre of December 1937 was not well known in the Western world as various international political factors prevented recognition of the event. This has now changed. In recent years, much new documentation has been discovered and published, including John Rabe’s diary, and the documents of a group of American missionaries who remained in Nanking during the atrocity. The emergence of these documents and Iris Chang’s best selling book, *The Rape of Nanking*, has aroused international attention and discussion. In November 1997, a group of young undergraduates organized a conference at Princeton, bringing together scholars from China, Japan and Western nations to discuss “Nanking 1937” from a wide range of viewpoints. *Nanking 1937: Memory and Healing* is the result of that conference.

The book contains 11 essays and is divided into four parts. The first part examines the Nanking massacre in a global context, discussing the importance of the debate today and in history. Ian Buruma points out that since 1945 the Nanking Massacre has evolved from a historical event to a political symbol, making it difficult for historians to discuss rationally. Richard Falk provides us with an overview of the trend toward globalization that has nurtured redressing human grievances.

In the second part, four essays from China and Japan present differing views on the massacre. Higashinakano Shudo is representative of Japanese revisionists, insisting that the evidence for the massacre comes from “hearsay” rather than confirmed proof. In an analysis of the cause of the massacre, Sun Zhaiwei emphasizes “the larger number of soldiers who put down their weapons and merged into the civilian population gave the Japanese troops an excuse to search, capture and kill” (p. 45). Determining the number of victims is a complex issue and has aroused bitter controversy in the debate on the massacre. Lee En-Han deals with it extensively and clearly, and puts forward a proposal to hold an international conference, attended by all concerned and qualified scholars, to engage in rational argument and reach a general conclusion.

Part three examines the historiography of massacre, particularly how it has been remembered in Asia and in the West, and what factors have influenced that remembrance. Haruko Taya Cook takes the *Living Soldiers* as a case study and discusses the Japanese government’s censorship of the press in war times. Takashi Yoshida examines the diverse arguments from Japan, China and the United States from 1931 to 1998. The final section focuses on the future of the Nanking debate. Vera Schwarcz compares the Jewish and Chinese responses to atrocity; Onuma Yasuaki discusses the Japanese war and postwar responsibility; Daqing Yang discusses the possibilities of a common historical understanding, and presents some theoretical approaches to achieving it.
This book provides readers with detailed and accessible insights on recent scholarship related to the Nanking massacre. The editors and authors put forward two important issues, though they are not fully resolved. One is about historiography: how can the study of the massacre prevent such an inhumane atrocity and tragedy from recurring? Another related issue is about memory and healing the wounded. As Richard Falk says, “The mere passage of time often does not by itself achieve this healing. Healing requires a deliberate and visible effort” (p. 11). These young student editors have made highly respected efforts. This is one of the few books published in English to deal in-depth with this subject, and it deserves a wide reading audience, both among the scholars and common people of Japan, China and the Western world.

ZHANG KAIYUAN and LIU JIAFENG


This volume makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the crucial period of transition in Chinese education and politics, from 1905 to 1914, and adds greatly to the work of scholars such as Marianne Bastid, Paul Bailey, Mary Backus Rankin and others whose research has illumined this period. The focus on the province of Jiangsu, traditionally a leading centre of literati influence and a focal point for reformist initiatives in education, makes possible a detailed analysis of many facets of the transition, rooted in remarkably comprehensive documentary materials.

The first chapter sketches out the scene in terms of institutional development. It provides an overview of the traditional education system, including the development of academies in the southern and northern parts of the province from 1860 to 1890, and the various new types of school or college officially established, set up by local gentry or created by various groupings of merchants, mainly in Shanghai.

The second chapter provides a brilliant analysis of the establishment, composition, character and role of the Jiangsu Education Society. Detailed biographical information on the leadership of the society, including 84 members of the executive committee over a six year period, gives fascinating insights into how younger reformist intellectuals managed to push through an important series of reforms through interface with more established scholars and scholar bureaucrats, as well as the business community. The struggles at the local level, where 53 local chapters of the society were established at the sub-prefectural level in both northern and southern Jiangsu, show how education as a professional field took
shape for the first time, freeing itself from its traditional place as a subordinate sector of the imperial bureaucracy. The very establishment of an association with a national profile and the status of a legal body, constituted a serious challenge to the traditional system, and created the basis for a whole new type of administration. The fact that the Society insisted on keeping its head office in Shanghai, and the role of leading figures in the newspaper world, in commerce and in academia in Shanghai, demonstrates the importance of this coastal metropolis in providing a base for the launching of new ideas.

Chapter three depicts the development of a modern system of education through the Society’s role in leading policy development and through its many practical interventions at the local level. It was both an animator of change and mediator of local political struggles over education. Xiao-Planes devotes sections of the chapter to the Society’s role in the development of new schools; its relations with teachers and protesting students; its efforts to popularize elementary education by transforming *sishu* into modern primary schools; the struggle for a financial base for modern education; and the development of technical education and modern industry. Many fascinating comparisons are made. For example, she shows the difference between this society, with its strong democratic tendencies, and the education society of Zhili, which was under the tight control of Yuan Shikai and far more amenable to his autocratic style of rule. She also gives a detailed description of the student protests at Zhendan and at the Zhongguo gongxue, explaining why the Society supported the Zhendan storm and the development of Fudan, but had less sympathy with the radical students at Zhongguo gongxue.

The last two chapters turn to the link between education and political development. Chapter four elaborates the ways in which the Society supported the move for constitutional reform, the leading role it played in the Provincial Consultative Assembly formed in 1909 with Zhang Jian as president, and its nationwide efforts to press for a parliament. Chapter five depicts its role in the revolution of 1911 and the political developments thereafter. In a brief epilogue, Xiao-Planes comments on the failure of the throne to respond to the real forms of local autonomy which the Society had animated, and which might have led to successful reform.

This is a demanding work to read but tremendously rewarding. The flow of the main argument is clear and logical and the supporting documentation is exhaustive. There are many subtle nuances of interpretation, particularly relating education to political and social change. The author has wisely avoided broad concepts, such as civil society or the public sphere, to focus on the particularities of China’s transition from the Jiangsu perspective over this period. The strict historical methodology is refreshing and allows readers to make their own connections to a wider literature of social and educational transition. There is an extremely valuable set of annexes, providing bibliographic information on all of the key historical figures, a 28-page bibliography, glossary and index.

In the final paragraphs, it is suggested that Tocqueville’s observations
on administrative decentralization in the American context might be more applicable to understanding this phase of Chinese history than the notion of the public sphere drawn from Habermas. This is a rather tantalizing conclusion, but it simulates the reader to think back through the volume’s richly detailed analyses of elite efforts at educational, social and political reform in Jiangsu.

Ruth Hayhoe


This book demonstrates Jeffrey Cody’s affection for Henry Murphy’s use and promotion of the traditions of Chinese architecture. Murphy combined the traditional Chinese characteristics of elevation, roof form and axial symmetry with contemporary technologies in order to achieve “structural significance” and “purity of form and colour.” He achieved this during long periods spent in China where he brought together teams of American and Chinese-American architects while taking special care with clients and contractors.

His fascination with the architectural tradition of a foreign country contrasts with the neoclassical, historical trend of architecture in northern Europe and America. Murphy had travelled in Europe, most notably to Vicenza. He used these travels in a reverse process from most other famous architects who took the same roads in order to import from Italy, missing lessons from the evolution of the Italian architecture and its reassessment of its own roots. Thus, Murphy had a career that followed a mixed pattern, using both non-Italian neoclassical and Italian contextualism – in his own words, “old wine in new bottles” and “new wine in old bottles” (“old Chinese architecture in new American technology” and “new Chinese students in old Chinese architectural traditions”).

Murphy belonged to the generation located between the time of Thomas Jefferson and the present. He travelled to China when it was already regaining its independence and attempted to contribute to its cultural renewal, using technology imported from America, traditional Chinese building, and American-educated Chinese architects, who were at that time restarting the studies of their country’s architectural heritage. In many ways, Murphy was exceptional for his time – a man trying to be accepted by the intellectuals of a semi-colonial country on an equal footing, something that has yet to be achieved among American, Chinese and China/Taiwan architects.

Cody analyses the plans of the buildings developed by Murphy in China in detail: Yale in China, Hunan, in 1913; Peking Union Medical College, in 1917; Fukien Christian University, Fujian, in 1918; St. Johns University, Shanghai, in 1920; Ginling College for Girls (Shifan daxue), Nanjing, in 1920; (Yenching) Peking University, in 1920; city planning
in Guangzhou, 1921–27; the Chapel for St. Mary’s Hall, Shanghai, 1923; and the Pagoda Tower and city planning in Nanjing, 1927–30. In all of them it is possible to appreciate the references taken from the Imperial City in Beijing. In Nanjing, Murphy stated that he “was adamant that the wall survived.”

We are also introduced to neoclassical bank branches built in China for an American bank, colleges in Korea and Japan and to neo-Chinese private houses in America. The photographs of the private houses show what seem to be generous balconies, boundary walls not completely hiding the interior private space, and small openings on the elevations with aesthetic and ventilation properties.

We find that Murphy was an architect who took pleasure in building quality architecture but who was not a researcher into architectural theory. Cody emphasizes the relationship of Murphy’s work with the research done by architect Liang Sicheng (1901–1972), whom Murphy never met.

Murphy followed in the footsteps of the Italian Jesuits in terms of their attempts to study and to assimilate Chinese architecture. They shared the attention to detail when, for example, using Chinese motives in painting walls, such as the frescos depicting stone lions and lotus flower vases done during the 17th century, which can be seen in the Chapel of the Light House in Macau.

Scholars and practitioners of architecture in China must read this book with imagination, as both a novel and a case study of history being repeated during the last decade, with the construction of buildings designed by local and foreign-educated Chinese architects and engineers, private practices staffed by foreign architects, side by side with the buildings designed by large foreign practices.

ADALBERTO TENREIRO


In many areas of China, the transformation of the built environment under reform is claiming traditional buildings to create new space for industrial development. The rapidity of growth, urged by the state, characteristically imposes new order on the landscape and reorders the places built by people motivated by different chronological logics, of seasonality, ritual, and the human lifepath. As if just in time to testify on behalf of endangered traditional landscapes, Ronald Knapp has produced *China’s Old Dwellings*, which provides unprecedented coverage of the design and distinctive structural characteristics of regional housing forms. In its move beyond descriptive compilation, the book maintains an interdisciplinary and comparative approach and seeks to assess dwellings not simply as material artifacts but as “vectors for understanding broader
issues of Chinese culture.” It also incorporates research of major Chinese scholars on vernacular architecture and demonstrates Knapp’s decades of collaborative work. As Knapp points out, China’s Old Dwellings recontextualizes and extends material in one of his previous books, China’s Traditional Rural Architecture (1986), which makes China’s Old Dwellings one of two major culminating products of the author’s 30 years of fieldwork and active scholarship. The other is this book’s companion volume, China’s Living Houses: Folk Beliefs, Symbols, and Household Ornamentation (1999). Together these books distinguish Knapp’s career as a Sinologist and cultural geographer, and give us the fullest account of these subjects in the English language.

Interdisciplinary in scope, China’s Old Dwellings is also a fundamentally geographical treatment of folk architecture. The book’s two main sections, “Spaces and structures” and “Places and regions,” organize the material based on two key concepts in human geography: the abstract concept of space and the located concepts of human-modified place and place variation, at both local and regional scales. Knapp uses these concepts to analyse precisely the design and structure of dwellings, and to assess how distinctions in dwelling design reflect local conditions of human–environment relations and Chinese culture regions. Knapp’s presentation of the composition of dwelling space, for both interior and exterior spaces, introduces structural concepts used by carpenters and builders, which insightfully explain how housing takes shape and form. In each instance of introducing a particular architectural element, the text also provides the character translation and pinyin romanization. The bibliography also provides character titles, and the large-format text is widely illustrated with line drawings and photographs.

Knapp also discusses how particular dwelling types vary and have changed over time, especially in discussion of regional house types. Assessment of dwelling types in northern China ranges from common houses to courtyard dwellings, subterranean housing, and the large residential complexes of merchant families in Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Henan. The chapter on southern China includes stilt or pile dwellings, variations on the courtyard house, village watchtowers, multistorey villas, urban house forms in the lower Chang (Yangtze) River delta, and variations in Hakka housing. Housing in the western region encompasses nomadic dwellings, and housing specific to the Tibetan Plateau, Qinghai and Xinjiang. Throughout, Knapp situates discussion in the context of regional culture and economy and assesses ways that housing reflects daily life.

A prologue and epilogue frame the book. The prologue documents the remarkable efforts and difficulties faced by Chinese scholars of vernacular housing in maintaining research programmes through the second half of the 20th century. The epilogue surveys destruction of vernacular buildings and notes that under reform, while many traditional dwellings have been razed or modified beyond recognition, it is the tourism sector of the new economy that offers the most reliable support for maintaining historic buildings in China. Otherwise, Knapp explains, the rise of a
preservation movement for traditional architecture has emerged on China’s industrialized margins, in Taiwan, Hong Kong and overseas, where known costs of modernity have already made valuable the increasingly ephemeral Chinese built environment.

CAROLYN CARTIER


The name Chen Hongmou (1696–1771) rings few bells today. Yet he was probably the most influential official of his time. A tough, honest, active man, not exactly a likeable person, he was someone deeply dedicated to improving the people’s welfare. In short, a model Qing official. In this blockbuster of a book, William T. Rowe uses Chen’s life to examine the culture of the 18th-century bureaucracy, encompassing nearly all the classic problems of Chinese society, past and present.

Born in an obscure village in Guangxi, Chen was a person from the frontier: outspoken, humourless, with little interest in aesthetics, but with a high moral rectitude. He disliked wealthy dilettantes, but he greatly respected the power of markets, often arguing that officials should leave grain merchants alone; they should not fix prices, but only buy and sell grain at appropriate times. Many others have studied food supply policies; Rowe epitomizes them in the actions of one man. Integrating Chen’s voluminous official writings with modern research, he provides deeply insightful analyses of Qing economic thought in practice. This is a massive, impressive study. Everyone interested in modern China should read it.

Rowe finds in the commonplaces of Chen’s statecraft (jingshi) discourse a subtle, distinctive style of economic analysis. Qing officials believed in improving agriculture while also fostering commerce and respecting private property, reducing taxes, but keeping an active, regulatory, streamlined state. They called this approach “storing wealth among the people.” French physiocracy, not English laissez-faire, looks most like Qing thought. Voltaire and Quesnay did not get China completely wrong. The term “early modern” reappears constantly throughout Rowe’s text, indicating that late imperial China shared much with the West. It means many things: routinized procedures and a well-ordered state (p. 333), support for the profit motive (p. 201), belief in a self-regulating market (p. 184), attention to human feelings (p. 103), rising social and geographical mobility, along with awareness of poverty (p. 300), respect for public opinion, charitable activity, civility in personal behaviour, and even individualism (p. 323). Only Rowe’s careful attention to Chen’s language and practice makes these daring analogies plausible.

Chen was no radical: he confidently worked within the system he
knew. He was lucky to serve during the efflorescent early 18th century, when the Qing expanded territorially, demographically, and economically all at once. Yet he urged officials to act as moral guides to the benighted masses. His most famous programme established 700 local schools in the southwest to teach basic literacy in the Classics. In his view, anyone could become civilized, and he knew exactly what civilization meant. Chen hated philosophy, but his ideas were nevertheless complex. All of us who have read Chen’s documents have recognized his keen insight and subtle logic. Rowe focuses on three primary tensions in Chen’s thinking: the conflict between moralism and pragmatism, between centralized state and local society, and between egalitarianism and maintenance of social hierarchy. He demonstrates brilliantly how Chen navigated these classic polarities of Confucian thought through his administrative practice. But just how typical was Chen Hongmou? Although many of his proposals were commonplace, he sometimes pushed the policy envelope to utopian extremes. Completely remaking the hydraulic infrastructure of Shaanxi, collecting huge amounts of data about local agriculture, pushing for mass education: these daring acts were not those of a hidebound reactionary. Yet many of his attitudes would appal us moderns: a few of his least favourite things were popular festivals and religious practices, Muslim, Buddhist and Daoist beliefs, non-Confucian sexual and family practices, and women who walked around in the street. On the other hand, he fervently endorsed female education, community banquets that created solidarity, and detested the arrogance of the rich. Any study of one man risks becoming a hagiography, but Rowe, despite his admiration, is very sensitive to Chen’s blind spots.

Rowe does not discuss why the empire declined after Chen’s death. Something did start to go wrong with the Qing after the 1770s. In 1781 a huge relief operation scam took root in the northwest, Chen’s favourite territory; by the 1790s He Shen had infected the court with corruption, and major rebellions at the turn of the century signalled the onset of serious upheaval, just as obstreperous Western traders arrived in the south. Chen’s 19th-century admirers desperately looked back to him for answers, but the times had changed.

Chen’s age could claim remarkable achievements. As Bertolt Brecht said, “Unhappy is the land that needs heroes.” After two centuries of catastrophic upheaval, directed by would-be revolutionary heroes who destroyed more than they constructed, perhaps modern China is entering at last a new unheroic but prosperous age. China could use more incorruptible, dutiful officials like Chen Hongmou today. Couldn’t we all?

PETER C. PERDUE


There is a growing recognition of the way in which the agenda of
Western scholarship on China, particularly on 20th-century China, has been shaped or influenced by what we might identify as a Chinese agenda of political correctness. The neglect of the first 11 years of publication of the Short Story Magazine (Xiaoshuo yuebao) (1910–1921), and its dismissal as simply purveying superficial popular entertainment, is a case in point. Study of the journal had been deemed worthwhile only after editorship was assumed by influential leftist critic Mao Dun in late 1920 and an editorial direction set which responded to new May Fourth agendas. Through a meticulous examination of four years of the journal’s early life (1910–1914), chosen to cover the years immediately preceding and following the fall of the Qing dynasty, Denise Gimpel successfully challenges the orthodoxy of May Fourth discourse to reveal therein a cultural consciousness of modernity, an incipient body of critical analysis and the earliest experimentation in the writing of committed modern short fiction.

The study is divided into five parts covering the structure of the journal; a thematic breakdown of the ‘modern questions’ discussed in both fictional and editorial form; a summary of how the issues of writing and form were addressed, including some of the earliest discussions of Western literature; and a delineation of the nascent literary field in which the journal operated with reference to Bourdieu. The fifth part comprises a persuasive restatement of the central aim of the study, namely a reassessment of the place of the journal in modern Chinese literary history. Overall, this study reveals how continuity rather than rupture characterizes the relationship between the May Fourth zealots and their immediate literary predecessors.

Considerable space is given over to the ‘modern questions’ raised within the pages of the journal, which reflect acutely the preoccupations of the times: the qualities displayed by the leaders of nations, the behaviour of military men, the state of the nation, the presentation of heroic men and women, many taken from foreign sources, the changing social relations between the sexes, the nature of youth, and interest in science and scientific methods, particularly via science fiction and detective stories. Most, if not all of these issues are conventionally associated with the discourses of the May Fourth era, but it is clear that this time of transition was equally a period when the thinking readers of this extremely popular journal “reflect[ed] on a whole range of pressing questions and … consider[ed] themselves within an international context” (p. 130). This chapter comprises more than a third of the main text but is disappointingly, if self-avowedly, descriptive. Stories are both summarized and retold in an interminable fashion with only passing reference to issues of style and genre (e.g. to new drama, p. 83). For instance, a fictionalized account of events between the crucial months of November 1911 and February 1912 raises interesting issues of which the author himself was aware: “the very comments of Yun Tieqiao show him to be fully aware that he was somewhere between the realms of fiction, reporting and history writing” (p. 75), but Gimpel offers no further discussion.
Far more satisfactory is the examination of the debates on the literary form after which the journal is named. The attempts at reconciling the expectations and conventions of traditional extended fiction with those of the translated and adapted works from the West by these early commentators can be seen to lay the foundations for later May Fourth developments. Difficulty with this new notion of fiction lay in its intersecting relations with historical fact, the realm of (new) ideas and being ‘made up’ (like a fairy tale). In combination with this, the need was perceived for committed writing which addressed national or social problems (p. 165–6). A tantalizingly small number of experimental pieces of short fiction are briefly described (p. 173). Equally illuminating is the comparison of practices of editorship and selection exhibited in Xiaoshuo yuebao with those exhibited by Western contemporary journals such as the Windsor and Strand Magazines, upon which Xiaoshuo yuebao is shown clearly to have been modelled.

Finally, the study is contextualized with an examination of this nascent field of cultural production: the market and its major players. In contrast to their May Fourth counterparts, editors and contributors are revealed to have been generalists, drawn from the political and educational elite and linked via their association with the Southern Society, and who were motivated by the non-literary concerns of national renewal rather than vehement adherence to a literary manifesto.

The significance of this study is the way it successfully overturns perpetuated assumptions about the relationship between the May Fourth generation and their predecessors. Experimentation with the short story form during these years of transition laid the foundations for the developments which followed. The use of translation, the discussion of themes of nationhood and society and so on not only reveal an incipient discourse of modernity but define practice subsequently associated exclusively with the generation which followed. This specialist study is of primary interest to those in the field of modern Chinese literary history but also illuminates the area of cultural production and consumption in urban culture.

HILARY CHUNG


This welcome re-publication of Chiang Yee’s book, first published in 1938, comes with an additional informative foreword by Da Zheng, a scholar who is presently working on a cultural biography of the author.

Chiang Yee was one of a small group of talented Chinese intellectuals who studied and worked in Britain before and during the Second World War. He was born in 1903 into a moderately wealthy and cultured family
from Jiujiang in central China, which prided itself on its ancient roots and on its adherence to conservative but relatively enlightened Confucian values. Inspired by his father, from an early age he practised calligraphy and painting, and the eyes through which he appraised the people and scenes he encountered in Britain were those of the traditional Chinese painter and poet.

Chiang came to London in 1933, where his first job was teaching Chinese in the School of Oriental and African Studies under Sir Reginald Johnson. It was then that he embarked on a lifetime mission of interpreting Chinese culture to the West. Quite apart from his own exhibitions of painting and calligraphy, and his books *Chinese Calligraphy* and the *Chinese Eye*, his major achievement in this field was the series of *Silent Traveller* books, of which the London book was the second.

*The Silent Traveller in London* is written in fluent and expressive English, and is lavishly illustrated by the author with drawings and Chinese poems. As with many travel books, we learn as much about the observer as the observed. At the same time, the reader cannot help but be amused and stimulated by images of familiar scenes and people seen through the eyes of a Chinese artist. In spite of the passing of 60 years these images are still vivid.

Chiang Yee avoided contentious issues such as politics and concentrated entirely on what he saw for himself during his daily wanderings, which, based in Hampstead, extended from Kew through central London to Epping Forest. He saw poetry in rain and even in London fog and delighted in such scenes as the motion of the forest of umbrellas held aloft by rush-hour crowds. He developed a warm affection for Londoners for their good humour and public spirit, but his narrative kept returning to his native land and to his family who, in 1938 were trapped under Japanese occupation. Although on the surface the writing is light-hearted and cheerful, one can detect an undercurrent of nostalgia for a homeland, which had changed almost beyond recognition by the time he returned in 1975.

J. D. CHINNERY


Christopher Munn has written a scholarly book of 460 pages, with detailed endnotes that will be of considerable value to researchers in Hong Kong studies. The long endnotes and bibliography reveal the author as a man of great drive, energy, tenacity and intellectual commitment. Extraordinarily well-researched, the book contains great wealth of information on Hong Kong during the first four decades of British rule from the 1840s to the 1870s.

Exploring the dynamic relationship between British colonial govern-
ment and Chinese population in Hong Kong, Munn’s work is an important contribution to historical scholarship in several ways. First, it contains a useful critical review of the historiography of Hong Kong, consisting of three broad schools: an elitist, Eurocentric colonial school; an opposing Marxist, nationalist historical school based in Beijing; and a Hong Kong school that focuses on the experience of the colony’s Chinese community.

Secondly, Munn’s discussion of the colonial relationship during the early decades of British rule is far more detailed and informative than previous studies on the subject – at various points, even more detailed than the work of Reverend Carl Smith, the doyen of Hong Kong historical studies. Munn’s book is a critical exposition of the vision of “Anglo-China,” and an analysis of the contradictions between extravagant colonial rhetoric and the serious problems of governing a large, migrant Chinese population in a colony created in the historical context of war, bitterness and hostility. Central to Munn’s narrative of the colonial relationship is the administration of criminal justice. The book also contains perceptive narratives of how governors MacDonnell, Kennedy and Hennessy had achieved a kind of equilibrium between government and people, an equilibrium that had eluded their predecessors.

Thirdly, Munn critically analyses the theme of collaboration and resistance in the colonial relationship. The ambivalent relationship between colonizers and colonized is one of the three main themes of my own book published in 1993. Munn’s elaboration deals with resistance within schemes of collaboration; it shows much sophistication in analysis.

Fourthly, Munn’s thesis (regarding the centrality of the criminal justice system in the colonial relationship) questions the existing paradigm that has characterized the early decades of British rule in Hong Kong as “indirect rule,” in which the government supposedly intervened little in the lives of the colony’s Chinese population. Challenging this paradigm, Munn asserts that the colonial authorities did in fact attempt to subject the early population of Hong Kong to considerable direct rule: this interference exerted a considerable impact on people’s daily lives. To prove his point, Munn engages in lengthy discussions of the nightly curfew, the registration schemes, the annual censuses, and the intrusive regulatory laws and policing practices which brought thousands of people into direct contact with the law. So forceful is Munn’s argument, and supported by so much evidence, that historians henceforth will have to reconsider the existing paradigm regarding “indirect rule” in early British Hong Kong.

As the author of an earlier book that helps to perpetuate that paradigm, I wish to make some observations. The adjectives “direct,” “indirect,” “intrusive” and “interventionist” are all relative terms. Only by comparison with colonial rule in other parts of the world can we more precisely describe the nature of British rule in Hong Kong. No colony in the world has ever been ruled by a complete laissez-faire policy and without population censuses, registration schemes, criminal law and prosecutions. Colonial rule everywhere is intrusive and interventionist in nature, but there are differences in degree of intrusiveness. In Taiwan under Japanese
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colonial rule prior to 1945, for instance, the police penetrated every village and urban street neighbourhood; the Japanese sought to enforce an intensive policy of assimilation and an aggressive policy of political indoctrination at every level in society: teachers forbade students to speak their own native languages at school; a great deal of pressure was put on the Taiwanese even to discard their family names and replace them with Japanese names. The intensity of British colonial control in Hong Kong paled in comparison with Japanese colonialism in Taiwan. It would seem that British colonial rule in Hong Kong was much less “intrusive” and “interventionist,” and hence much less “direct,” than Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan. In short, in reconsidering the paradigm of “indirect rule” in Hong Kong, we need a point of reference in comparison.

On the whole, Munn’s writing is marked by clarity, elegance and perception. It is remarkably free of academic jargon. This is commendable these days when we frequently see scholarly work loaded with jargon, making it quite unintelligible to scholars and intelligent readers.

Christopher Munn’s book has greatly advanced our knowledge of the relations between Chinese and European colonists in Hong Kong in the 1840s–70s. This well-researched scholarly work should be made available in less expensive paperback. All those interested in the history of Hong Kong must read this splendid work.

JUNG-FANG TSAI


Many of the faults of this book may be intuited from the title. The author too often writes as if there is a singular entity called “the Chinese Character” whose cornerstone are “the Chinese Face Practices.” Though claiming that his use of a “social constructionist” approach allows him to rise above ahistorical and orientalist approaches, the author rarely does so. For example, his history of the Chinese face practices consists of ten pages that cover the Shang dynasty to the present. He concludes that the sharp reversals of 20th-century China did little to change this essentialized cultural trait. Though he argues that there could be great variety in face practices along gender, generational, class, ethnic or regional lines, he never explores these differences, instead deriving most of his data from discussions with a narrow group of highly educated Chinese immigrants in the United States.

Dr. Jia’s methods and purpose are expressly therapeutic. He hopes to remake the Chinese character by encouraging his “consultants” to reflect on face practices in the group discussion sections that he organizes and leads. The heart of the book analyses data from two such sessions, one in which the participants reflect on a newspaper story about a Shenzhen
bowling alley employee who is forced to kneel down to a cadre customer, and a second in which they examine a fictional depiction of a young rural migrant in Beijing who does not want to see her mother after a setback in her singing career. The stories themselves are interesting, as are some of his consultants’ reactions to them, though Jia’s focus on the methods he uses in conducting the sessions becomes a bit repetitive.

One of the strong points of the book is Jia’s discussion of how face practices involve the intersection of communicative actions, socially constructed emotions, moral discourses and power relations. The problem is that Jia too often imagines that this intersection amounts to a singular structure. As a consequence, he pays insufficient attention to the specific social contexts of the incidents he explores. This weakness is compounded by the fact that both Jia and his consultants reflect upon incidents in China in the 1990s from the perspectives of emigrants who rely on their memories to generalize about Chinese culture as a whole. Many details get lost or distorted in the process. For example, in a discussion of Shenzhen during the 1990s, one of Jia’s consultants describes China as a place where career choices are “arranged for you by the Party” (p. 120). The lack of attention to detail extends to linguistic matters as well. There is no glossary of Chinese characters and many of the romanizations are either non-standardized or simply wrong. Jia further uses a non-standardized form of the character mian (as in face, mianzi) to make an etymological argument without mentioning that he is using a non-standardized character.

Perhaps therapists who work with well-educated Chinese immigrants and their families will find this book useful. Despite its interesting moments, however, I cannot whole-heartedly recommend it to a wider audience.

ANDREW KIPNIS