

Appendix for “Lawmaking in American Legislatures: An Empirical Investigation”

1 Monte Carlo Study: Alternative Filibuster Assumptions

The upper panel of Table A.1 provides simulation results from a level model under three assumptions about filibusters in state legislatures: that all chambers require a 3/5 supermajority, that no chamber has a filibuster, and that the seven states with at least one chamber that has no time limit on debate and does not allow a motion to end debate require unanimity to pass legislation. The lower panel of Table A.1 provides simulation results for all lawmaking models and all filibuster assumptions using a first-difference model. Notably, the proportion of coefficients on the majority party median that are positive and statistically significant given a pivot model is lower when using a first-difference model than when using a level model. Otherwise, the simulation results from a level model do not differ materially from the results from a first-difference model.¹

| Lawmaking Model Used to Generate Data | Chamber Median | Majority Party Median | Republican Governor |
|--|-------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|
| | Level Model | | |
| Pivot Model (All are 3/5) | 1.00 | 0.00 | 0.90 |
| Pivot Model (No filibuster) | 1.00 | 0.23 | 1.00 |
| Pivot Model (Unanimity) | 1.00 | 0.10 | 1.00 |
| | First-Difference Model | | |
| Pivot Model | 1.00 | <0.01 | 1.00 |
| Pivot Model (All are 3/5) | 0.97 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Pivot Model (No filibuster) | 1.00 | <0.01 | 1.00 |
| Pivot Model (Unanimity) | 1.00 | 0.01 | 1.00 |
| Median Voter | 1.00 | 0.01 | 0.06 |
| Party (Negative Agenda Power) | 1.00 | 1.00 | <0.01 |
| Party (Positive Agenda Power) | 0.86 | 1.00 | 0.00 |
| Executive Agenda Power | 1.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 |

Table A.1: STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT CORRELATIONS FROM SIMULATION STUDY: Cell entries are the proportion of 10,000 OLS regressions of policy outcomes on elite preferences using legislative histories of length nine that produce correlation coefficients that are correctly signed and distinguishable from zero with 95% confidence. Level regressions include state fixed effects and a time trend. First-difference regressions include state fixed effects but no time trend.

¹Simulations for the 3/5 and the unanimity pivot models are run separately, meaning that the simulation is executed exactly as the other pivot models but that the ideal points are redrawn when executing simulations for each assumption. The reported proportions are stable across multiple executions of simulations with n=10,000. Therefore, this choice has no effect our conclusion.

2 Details on Interest Group Scores and Related Analysis

Center for Education Reform Scoring of Charter School Policy

From 1996 to 2008, scores were based on ten criteria. In 1996, the score for each criterion was scored from zero to one, excluding a single criterion that was scored from zero to two, yielding a maximum score of 11. From 1997 to 2008, each criterion was scored from zero to five yielding a maximum score of 50. Beginning in 2009, scores were grouped into four categories. Two of the categories contain a single criterion, one is composed of three criteria, and one is composed of two criteria. The total possible score was increased to 55. Of the original ten criteria, seven were similar to or the same as the new criteria. To create a score that is comparable across this change, we use only the similar criteria. For each state, the sum of scores for criteria that are comparable across the change is divided by the maximum total score possible based on only these criteria, creating a score that ranges from zero to one. The seven criteria are:²

1. Whether the state permits entities other than or in addition to traditional school boards to create and manage charter schools independently.
2. Whether the state permits an unlimited number of charter schools to open.
3. Whether the state permits a variety of individuals and groups both inside and outside the existing school system to apply to operate a charter school.
4. Whether the state provides automatic blanket waivers from most or all state and district education laws.
5. Whether the state permits charter schools to be independent legal entities that can own property, sue and be sued, incur debt, control budget and personnel, and contract for services.
6. Whether the state automatically provides 100% of per-pupil funding for students enrolled in charter schools.
7. Whether the state gives charter schools complete control over personnel decisions, including exemption from district collective bargaining agreements or work rules.

The CER updates scores somewhat irregularly (see Table A.4). If the as-of-date for a set of scores was in the later six months of a given year or the first six months of the following year, it was attributed to the earlier year. For example, a score as of September 1999 or as of March 2000 would both be coded as occurring in the year 1999. Scores for states that have no charter law are coded as zero for that year. Scores exist for all 50 states from 1996 to 2012, excluding 2000, 2004, and 2006.

²These descriptions are taken from *Charter School Laws Across the States: Rankings and Scorecard 2008, 10th Edition*, published by the Center for Education Reform. Each edition of the report provides a description of the methodology used.

NARAL Scoring of Abortion Policy

We have NARAL grades for all 50 states from 2000 to 2014. The 2015 report, page 84, states:³

For 17 years, [NARAL] has used a grading system to capture the cumulative burden each state imposes on access to reproductive healthcare. Points are subtracted for anti-choice measures and added for pro-choice measures. Measures that impose the greatest burdens on women are weighted most heavily.

Likewise, demerits fall most heavily on measures that are in force, rather than measures that courts have declared invalid. For each issue area..., a state receives points in return if the measure is held unconstitutional or enjoined.

...

State rankings and grades are based on a combination of factors, including enacted measures, level of legislative and regulatory activity, and a state's overall legislative and political landscape as it pertains to advancing or restricting reproductive rights.

The specific criteria NARAL considers are:⁴

1. Whether the state bans abortions either at a specific point in the pregnancy or bans certain procedures.
2. Whether the state requires waiting periods and counseling that is anti-choice prior to having an abortion.
3. Whether the state bans organizations that received state and/or federal funds from counseling or referring women for abortion services (i.e., a gag rule).
4. Whether the state funds Crisis Pregnancy Centers with taxpayer dollars or tax benefits, and whether the state has a "Choose Life" license plate with no corresponding pro-choice option.
5. Whether the state places restrictions on emergency contraception.
6. Whether the state has passed legislation codifying the protections of *Roe v. Wade*.
7. Whether the state guarantees a woman's right to fill her birth-control prescription.
8. Whether the state guarantees insurance coverage of abortion, or whether the state prohibits insurance coverage of abortion.
9. Whether the state requires health insurance plans to cover contraceptives to the same extent they cover other medication.

³Who Decides? The Status of Women's Reproductive Rights in the United States, 24th Edition, January 2015, <http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/assets/download-files/2015-who-decides.pdf>.

⁴Ibid. See the Methodology section of the report for more detailed descriptions of criteria.

10. Whether the state medical assistance program restricts access to abortion.
11. Whether the state provides increased coverage for Medicaid-covered reproductive-health-care services.
12. Whether the state has a post-viability abortion restriction without adequate life and health exceptions, and whether post-viability is defined as a specific point in the pregnancy.
13. Whether the state protects abortion clinics from interference by protesters, including specifying a buffer zone.
14. Whether public employees or public facilities are restricted from providing abortion services.
15. Whether medical professionals may refuse to provide abortion, contraception, sterilization, or related referrals and counseling.
16. Whether consent notices are required before minors may obtain an abortion.
17. Whether the state constitution protects the right to choose.
18. Whether the state has passed “Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers” laws.

From 2000 to 2003, the scores were based on 13 criteria and categories were worth 5, 10, 15, 20, or -10 points.⁵ During this period both numerical scores and letter grades were published for each state. The methodology was changed materially in 2004 including the removal of two categories, adding eight categories, and changing the point totals for some continuing categories. We therefore exclude scores before 2004 from our analysis. Numerical scores underlying letter grades have not been published since 2004. After 2004, changes have been minor including changes in criteria used or changes in points allocated for categories. Importantly, our measure of policy is the letter grade assigned to each state based on the numerical score, not the numerical score itself. Therefore, changes in methodology that do not change the letter grade assigned to a state do not affect our score.

Tables A.2 and A.3 replicate Tables 2 and 3 from the main text, replacing state fixed effects with year fixed effects to account for the possibility that changes in interest groups’ methodology create systematic variation across time that is responsible for our results. We used year fixed effects because scores are, for the most part, updated annually. To be clear, we have only used scores that we believe are comparable across time and using year fixed effects results in models that isolates variation in elite preferences and scores within years across the states, rather than variation within state across time. Therefore, the models in Tables A.2 and A.3 do not control for systematic differences across states not accounted for by modeled covariates. We do estimate models of aggregate policy liberalism using year fixed effects because this measure is not subject to concerns that changing criteria bias our results.

⁵From 2000 to 2002 a 10-point item and a five-point item were scored separately, but combined in 2004. The total possible points was unchanged over the period.

| Model | (A1) | (A2) | (A3) | (A4) |
|-----------------|-------------------|------------|-------------------|------------|
| Policy Score | A | CS | A | CS |
| Chamber Median | 5.10*** | -0.02 | 7.04*** | -0.28*** |
| (Std. Err.) | (0.27) | (0.02) | (1.15) | (0.07) |
| Majority Median | | | -1.49* | 0.19*** |
| | | | (0.87) | (0.06) |
| Rep. Gov. | 0.61 [†] | 0.06* | 0.62 [†] | 0.05* |
| | (0.43) | (0.03) | (0.42) | (0.03) |
| Year FE | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> |
| N | 258 | 406 | 258 | 406 |
| R^2 | 0.88 | 0.70 | 0.89 | 0.71 |

Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses.

* significant at $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$ in a two-sided test.

[†] significant at $p < .10$ in a one-sided test of $H_A: \beta > 0$.

Table A.2: CORRELATES OF THE LEVEL OF POLICY WITH YEAR FIXED EFFECTS

| Model | (A5) | (A6) | (A7) | (A8) |
|-----------------|------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------|
| Policy Score | A | CS | A | CS |
| Chamber Median | 0.39** | 0.02 [†] | 0.88 [†] | 0.02 |
| (Std. Err.) | (0.18) | (0.01) | (0.56) | (0.04) |
| Majority Median | | | -0.29 | 0.00 |
| | | | (0.28) | (0.02) |
| Rep. Gov. | 0.26** | 0.01 | 0.25** | 0.01 |
| | (0.13) | (0.01) | (0.12) | (0.01) |
| Year FE | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> |
| N | 190 | 337 | 190 | 337 |
| R^2 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.11 |

Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses.

* significant at $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$ in a two-sided test.

[†] significant at $p < .10$ in a one-sided test of $H_A: \beta > 0$.

Table A.3: CORRELATES OF POLICY CHANGE WITH YEAR FIXED EFFECTS

Table A.2 shows that we would not reach difference substantive conclusions about the relationship between the level of abortion policy and the level of elite preferences. Turning to the level of charter school policy, the signs on the coefficients of the chamber and majority median are opposite those observed in the main text. Considering that these models measure association within years across states, this is not surprising given the weak relationship

between charter school policy and political parties and ideology discussed in the main text.

Looking at the relationship between changes in policy and changes in elite preferences using a first-difference model in Table A.3, we see that results from Table 3 in the main text are replicated for abortion policy. The signs on the coefficient estimates in models of charter school policy are replicated, but coefficient estimates are smaller than in the models with fixed affects and, therefore, not statistically distinguishable from zero

Distribution of Within State Change

Figure A.1 describes the magnitude of policy change in abortion and charter school policies by plotting the distribution of the change in interest group scores in each period. Consistent with lawmaking theories that predict widespread gridlock (Brady and Volden 1998; Krehbiel 1998), the modal change for both policies is zero by significant margin (78% for abortion policy and 43% for charter school policy), but large changes do occur.⁶




Figure A.1: DISTRIBUTION OF CHANGE IN POLICY SCORES PER PERIOD

⁶There are also two issues related to measurement that deserve attention. First, because the measure of abortion policy is a letter grade rather than based on a numeric score, the measure of policy change for charter schools is more sensitive to smaller policy changes. Second, because many states receive the most conservative rating possible for the abortion score in the first period, further conservative moves are impossible. This truncation arguably makes it more difficult for us to find an association between elite preferences and policy.

Mapping of Interest Groups Scores to Years for Analysis

We pair Houses that ended in odd years with Houses that ended in the subsequent even years to create our unit of analysis. (By “House,” we mean the state’s lower chamber that convenes between the relevant elections.) For example, the Houses that ended in Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, and Virginia in 1999 are paired with Houses for all other states that ended in 2000 to create one time unit in our panel data. Table A.4 gives the as-of-date, coded year, and time variable for both policy measures. CER scores are missing for 2000, 2004, and 2006. Therefore, the CER measure misses the later portion of the legislative sessions in these years for states that hold elections in even-numbered years. Lastly, the members of the lower chambers in five states - Alabama, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, and North Dakota - hold four-year terms. We split these terms into two-year intervals to account for the greater possibility of replacement altering elite preferences during these longer terms and to provide greater continuity across states between calendar time and our analytical time period.

Tables A.5 and A.6 below replicate our models after recoding our time unit so that the four-year terms are coded as one time unit. Model results are robust to this change.

| CER Scores (Charter Schools) | | |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|
| As of Date | Coded Year | Coded Time Period |
| NA | 1997 | 1 |
| December 1998 | 1998 | 1 |
| April 2000 | 1999 | 2 |
| October 2001 | 2001 | 3 |
| December 2002 | 2002 | 3 |
| December 2003 | 2003 | 4 |
| February 2006 | 2005 | 5 |
| February 2008 | 2007 | 6 |
| May 2009 | 2008 | 6 |
| December 2009 | 2009 | 7 |
| November 2010 | 2010 | 7 |
| March 2012 | 2011 | 8 |
| January 2013 | 2012 | 8 |
| March 2014 | 2013 | 9 |
| March 2015 | 2014 | 9 |
| NARAL Scores (Abortion) | | |
| As of Date | Coded Year | Coded Time Period |
| 12/8/2004 | 2004 | 1 |
| 2006 (Year of Report) | 2005 | 2 |
| 10/31/2006 | 2006 | 2 |
| 10/31/2007 | 2007 | 3 |
| 10/31/2008 | 2008 | 3 |
| 10/30/2009 | 2009 | 4 |
| 10/31/2010 | 2010 | 4 |
| 11/9/2011 | 2011 | 5 |
| 11/7/2012 | 2012 | 5 |
| 11/6/2013 | 2013 | 6 |
| 11/5/2014 | 2014 | 6 |

Table A.4: Time Mapping

| Model | (A9) | (A10) | (A11) | (A12) | (A13) | (A14) |
|-----------------|------------|------------|--------------------|------------|------------|--------------------|
| Policy Score | PL | A | CS | PL | A | CS |
| Chamber Median | 0.23*** | 0.72** | 0.05** | 0.32*** | 1.96*** | 0.04 |
| (Std. Err.) | (0.03) | (0.28) | (0.02) | (0.08) | (0.69) | (0.07) |
| Majority Median | | | | -0.06 | -0.77* | 0.01 |
| | | | | (0.05) | (0.39) | (0.04) |
| Rep. Gov. | 0.06*** | 0.40** | 0.03* | 0.06*** | 0.35** | 0.03* |
| | (0.02) | (0.17) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.17) | (0.01) |
| Trend | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.005 [†] | 0.00 | -0.01 | 0.005 [†] |
| | (0.004) | (0.04) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.04) | (0.003) |
| State FE | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> |
| N | 432 | 245 | 386 | 432 | 245 | 386 |
| R^2 | 0.98 | 0.99 | 0.95 | 0.98 | 0.99 | 0.95 |

Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses.

* significant at $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$ in a two-sided test.

[†] significant at $p < .10$ in a one-sided test of $H_A: \beta > 0$.

Table A.5: CORRELATES OF THE LEVEL OF POLICY, “FOUR-YEAR” CODING

| Model | (A15) | (A16) | (A17) | (A18) |
|-----------------|------------|------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Policy Score | A | CS | A | CS |
| Chamber Median | 0.43* | 0.04** | 0.83 [†] | 0.06 [†] |
| (Std. Err.) | (0.25) | (0.02) | (0.63) | (0.04) |
| Majority Median | | | -0.24 | -0.01 |
| | | | (0.32) | (0.02) |
| Rep. Gov. | 0.49** | 0.04*** | 0.47** | 0.04** |
| | (0.19) | (0.01) | (0.19) | (0.01) |
| State FE | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> |
| N | 178 | 318 | 178 | 318 |
| R^2 | 0.28 | 0.15 | 0.28 | 0.15 |

Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses.

* significant at $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$ in a two-sided test.

[†] significant at $p < .10$ in a one-sided test of $H_A: \beta > 0$.

Table A.6: CORRELATES OF THE CHANGE IN POLICY, “FOUR-YEAR” CODING

3 Level Regressions with Lagged Policy Scores

Table A.7 replicates the results of Table 2 in the text after including the lagged value of policy scores from the prior legislative session. Despite the extremely high correlation between the lagged and present score (evident in the Figure A.2) and the inclusion of state fixed effects, we continue to find support for the claim that the preferences of the chamber median are most associated with the level of policy conservatism. While the strength of the relationship is certainly attenuated relative to Table 2 in the main text, the qualitative conclusion is unchanged.

| Model | (A19) | (A20) | (A21) | (A22) | (A23) | (A24) |
|---------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Policy Score | PL | A | CS | PL | A | CS |
| Lagged Policy Score (t-1) | 0.67*** | 0.52*** | 0.47*** | 0.67*** | 0.51*** | 0.47*** |
| (Std. Err.) | (0.05) | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.05) | (0.12) | (0.11) |
| Chamber Median | 0.12*** | 0.51** | 0.04** | 0.13** | 1.22** | 0.01 |
| | (0.02) | (0.24) | (0.02) | (0.05) | (0.57) | (0.05) |
| Majority Median | | | | -0.01 | -0.44 | 0.02 |
| | | | | (0.03) | (0.30) | (0.03) |
| Rep. Gov. | 0.05*** | 0.43*** | 0.03*** | 0.05*** | 0.39** | 0.03*** |
| | (0.01) | (0.15) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.15) | (0.01) |
| Trend | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.00 |
| | (0.002) | (0.03) | (0.002) | (0.00) | (0.03) | (0.002) |
| State FE | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> |
| N | 448 | 209 | 357 | 448 | 209 | 357 |
| R^2 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 0.97 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 0.97 |




Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses.

* significant at $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$ in a two-sided test.

† significant at $p < .10$ in a one-sided test of $H_A: \beta > 0$.

Table A.7: CORRELATES OF THE LEVEL OF POLICY WITH LAGGED POLICY SCORES

Figure A.2: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PAST AND PRESENT SCORE



4 Senate Models

Tables A.8 and A.9 replicate Tables 2 and 3 from the main text using the preferences of states' upper chambers. These models replicate key results and lead to the same substantive conclusions.⁷

| Model | (A25) | (A26) | (A27) | (A28) | (A29) | (A30) |
|-----------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Policy Score | PL | A | CS | PL | A | CS |
| Chamber Median | 0.22*** | 0.94*** | 0.01 | 0.15*** | 1.27*** | 0.05 |
| (Std. Err.) | (0.03) | (0.23) | (0.02) | (0.06) | (0.43) | (0.05) |
| Majority Median | | | | 0.05 | -0.23 | -0.03 |
| | | | | (0.04) | (0.23) | (0.03) |
| Rep. Gov. | 0.06*** | 0.38** | 0.03** | 0.06*** | 0.38** | 0.03** |
| | (0.02) | (0.16) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.16) | (0.01) |
| Trend | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01** | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01** |
| | (0.004) | (0.03) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.03) | (0.003) |
| State FE | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> |
| N | 449 | 255 | 403 | 449 | 255 | 403 |
| R^2 | 0.98 | 0.99 | 0.95 | 0.98 | 0.99 | 0.95 |

Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses.

* significant at $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$ in a two-sided test.

† significant at $p < .10$ in a one-sided test of $H_A: \beta > 0$.

Table A.8: CORRELATES OF THE LEVEL OF POLICY WITH SENATE PREFERENCES

⁷We did not replace missing ideal points with ideal points from previous years from same session for the Senate models. This adjustment for House ideal points only affected three state-years and would create little difference in these models.

| Model | (A31) | (A32) | (A33) | (A34) |
|-----------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------------|
| Policy Score | A | CS | A | CS |
| Chamber Median | 0.65** | 0.03** | 1.02** | 0.04 [†] |
| (Std. Err.) | (0.33) | (0.01) | (0.42) | (0.02) |
| Majority Median | | | -0.27* | -0.01 |
| | | | (0.16) | (0.01) |
| Rep. Gov. | 0.45** | 0.04*** | 0.44** | 0.04*** |
| | (0.18) | (0.01) | (0.18) | (0.01) |
| State FE | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> |
| N | 185 | 332 | 185 | 332 |
| R^2 | 0.31 | 0.13 | 0.32 | 0.13 |

Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses.

* significant at $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$ in a two-sided test.

[†] significant at $p < .10$ in a one-sided test of $H_A: \beta > 0$.

Table A.9: CORRELATES OF POLICY CHANGE WITH SENATE PREFERENCES

5 Robustness of Charter School Regression Models in Text

Tables A.10 and A.11 replicate the level and first-difference models including education controls. We use the Common Core of Data from the National Center for Education Statistics.⁸ *Student-Teacher Ratio* is total students per full-time-equivalent teacher for the entire state per state-year. *Spending per Student* is total education spending in the state per student per state-year in thousands of dollars. The point estimates of primary interest are not materially changed from the specifications that are reported in the text. Additionally, the education variables are not associated with charter school policy as measured by the CER score. Data for education controls are only available through 2010.

⁸See: <https://nces.ed.gov/ccd/ccddata.asp>

| Model | (A35) | (A36) |
|--------------------------------|------------|-------------------|
| Policy Score | CS | CS |
| Chamber Median | 0.05** | 0.08 |
| (Std. Err.) | (0.02) | (0.08) |
| Majority Median | | -0.02 |
| | | (0.05) |
| Rep. Gov. | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Student-Teacher Ratio | 0.01 | 0.01 [†] |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Spending per Student (\$000's) | -0.01 | -0.01 |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Trend | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| State FE | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> |
| N | 319 | 319 |
| R^2 | 0.96 | 0.96 |

Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses.

* significant at $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$ in a two-sided test.

[†] significant at $p < .10$ in a one-sided test of $H_A: \beta > 0$.

Table A.10: CORRELATES OF THE LEVEL OF POLICY WITH EDUCATION CONTROLS

| Model | (A37) | (A38) |
|--------------------------------|------------|------------|
| Policy Score | CS | CS |
| Chamber Median | 0.07** | 0.11* |
| (Std. Err.) | (0.03) | (0.06) |
| Majority Median | | -0.03 |
| | | (0.02) |
| Rep. Gov. | 0.04** | 0.04** |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Student-Teacher Ratio | 0.01† | 0.01† |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Spending per Student (\$000's) | -0.01 | -0.01 |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| State FE | <i>Yes</i> | <i>Yes</i> |
| N | 269 | 269 |
| R^2 | 0.20 | 0.20 |

Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses.

* significant at $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$ in a two-sided test.

† significant at $p < .10$ in a one-sided test of $H_A: \beta > 0$.

Table A.11: CORRELATES OF POLICY CHANGE WITH EDUCATION CONTROLS

6 First Difference with Change in Governorship

Table 3 in the text estimates a first-difference model for the changes in policy controlling for the party of the governor. As a result, the coefficient recovers whether there is effectively policy drift during a period of same-party control. To explore the robustness of this result and to look at whether *changes* in party control of the governorship are correlated with changes in policy, we can also estimate the specifications using the change in the party of the governor. So doing produces values of 1 (Democrat to Republican change), 0 (no change), and -1 (Republican to Democrat) and there are 62 cases, 312 cases, and 47 cases of each respectively.

Table A.12 reports the replication of Table 3 and shows the expected relationship. Moving from a Democrat to a Republican governor shifts abortion policy by 0.56 and it shifts charter school policy by 0.03 in a conservative fashion. To put the magnitude of the estimated relationships in perspective, the standard deviation of the observed policy change is 0.82 for abortion regulations and 0.11 for charter school policies. While the change in chamber median is not statistically distinguishable from zero on abortion policies using a two-sided test, the relationship is in the expected direction, and it is statistically distinguishable from zero using a one sided for $p = 0.10$ when controlling for the majority party median (specification 4) and at $p = 0.12$ when not (specification 3).

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|--------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|
| | AbortReg | AbortReg | ChSch | ChSch |
| Δ Chamber Median | 0.35** (0.17) | 0.60 (0.51) | 0.04** (0.02) | 0.06 [†] (0.04) |
| Δ Majority Median | | -0.15 (0.29) | | -0.01 (0.02) |
| Δ Rep. Gov. | 0.56*** (0.20) | 0.54*** (0.20) | 0.03** (0.01) | 0.03* (0.01) |
| Observations | 190 | 190 | 336 | 336 |
| R-squared | 0.28 | 0.28 | 0.13 | 0.13 |

Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses.

* significant at $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$ in a two-sided test.

[†] significant at $p < .10$ in a one-sided test of $H_A: \beta > 0$.

Table A.12: TABLE 3 RESULTS FOR FIRST-DIFFERENCING PARTY CONTROL OF GOVERNOR: Models include state fixed effects.

7 Results by Legislative Professionalism

To examine the robustness of the results we replicate Tables 2 and 3 in the text by the level of professionalism of the legislature according to the first-dimension measure of professionalism estimated by Bowen and Greene (2014) using multidimensional scaling. Using the scores

updated through 2016 (Bowen and Greene 2016), we estimate the model separately for state-year observations that are above average professionalism (i.e., scores ≥ 0) and those that are below average (i.e., scores < 0). We conduct the analysis at the state-year level to account for the changing level of professionalization over time based on the length of session and changing pay.⁹

The results for the level specifications of Table 2 in the text do not substantively vary when the observations are disaggregated by professionalism to allow the relationship to vary by whether the level of professionalism is higher than average or not. For both more professional (Table A.13) and unprofessional (Table A.14) legislatures, there is a strong, positive relationship with the ideal point of the chamber median and no relationship with the majority party median. The impact of the *Republican Governor* indicator experiences a bit more variation relative to the pooled results reported in the text, but the variation appears to be largely a consequence of the smaller sample sizes being used to identify the effects. For example, the relationship between the party of the governor and abortion regulations are no longer distinguishable from zero in models (2) and (5) when we subset by legislative professionalism, but the point estimates are similar (e.g., in specification (2) the point estimate is 0.45 for more-professional legislatures in Table A.13 and the point estimate is 0.21 for less-professional legislatures in Table A.14). There is some suggestion that perhaps the party of the governor does not matter as much in less-professional legislatures when using the overall measure of social policy liberalism in Table A.14, but it is hard to interpret why that might be the case.

The results of the pooled first-difference model in the text (Table 3) are also largely sustained when we also allow the relationship to vary by professionalism. Table A.15 reports the results for more-professional legislatures and table A.16 reports the results for less-professional legislatures. The change in the ideal point of the majority party median is never distinguishable from zero in the expected direction (in fact, it is curiously negatively correlated for abortion regulations in more professional legislatures in Table ??), and the indicator for a Republican governor is consistently positively related to policy change regardless of the level of professionalism. Moreover, the relative magnitude of the impact of having a Republican governor is roughly equivalent for more and less professionalized legislatures. As was the case in the pooled model, the change in the ideal point of the chamber median is also positively related to policy change regardless of legislative professionalism, although the results sometimes fail to obtain significance at conventional levels for professional legislatures (Table A.15).

⁹To compute a score for every year for which Bowen and Greene (2016) have data, for odd years we use the professionalism of the previous even-year.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|-----------------|-------------------|-----------------|------------------|-------------------|-----------------|------------------|
| | PolLib | AbortReg | ChSch | PolLib | AbortReg | ChSch |
| Chamber Median | 0.16*** (0.03) | 0.69 (0.63) | 0.00 (0.03) | 0.24** (0.10) | 2.87* (1.61) | 0.02 (0.09) |
| Majority Median | | | | -0.05 (0.07) | -1.39 (1.07) | -0.01 (0.05) |
| Rep. Gov. | 0.13*** (0.03) | 0.45 (0.35) | 0.04** (0.02) | 0.13*** (0.03) | 0.34 (0.33) | 0.04** (0.02) |
| Trend | -0.01** (0.01) | | | -0.01** (0.01) | | |
| Trend | | -0.03 (0.08) | | | -0.01 (0.08) | |
| Trend | | | -0.00 (0.00) | | | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Observations | 204 | 108 | 178 | 204 | 108 | 178 |
| R-squared | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.98 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.98 |

Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses.

* significant at $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$ in a two-sided test.

Table A.13: TABLE 2 RESULTS FOR “LESS” PROFESSIONAL LEGISLATURES: Models include state fixed effects

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|-----------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| | PolLib | AbortReg | ChSch | PolLib | AbortReg | ChSch |
| Chamber Median | 0.28*** (0.04) | 0.73** (0.30) | 0.08** (0.03) | 0.29** (0.14) | 1.45** (0.64) | 0.13 (0.08) |
| Majority Median | | | | -0.01 (0.07) | -0.43 (0.29) | -0.04 (0.05) |
| Rep. Gov. | -0.00 (0.03) | 0.21 (0.17) | -0.00 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.03) | 0.19 (0.17) | -0.00 (0.02) |
| Trend | 0.00 (0.01) | | | 0.00 (0.01) | | |
| Trend | | 0.02 (0.04) | | | 0.01 (0.04) | |
| Trend | | | 0.01*** (0.00) | | | 0.01*** (0.00) |
| Observations | 250 | 150 | 228 | 250 | 150 | 228 |
| R-squared | 0.98 | 1.00 | 0.95 | 0.98 | 1.00 | 0.95 |

Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses.

* significant at $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$ in a two-sided test.

Table A.14: TABLE 2 RESULTS FOR “MORE” PROFESSIONAL LEGISLATURES: Models include state fixed effects

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|----------------------|----------|--------|----------|--------|
| | AbortReg | ChSch | AbortReg | ChSch |
| Chamber Median = D, | 0.12 | 0.01 | 2.50** | 0.02 |
| | (0.30) | (0.02) | (1.18) | (0.06) |
| Majority Median = D, | | | -1.47** | -0.01 |
| | | | (0.71) | (0.04) |
| Rep. Gov. | 0.80** | 0.04** | 0.69** | 0.04** |
| | (0.31) | (0.02) | (0.31) | (0.02) |
| Observations | 71 | 135 | 71 | 135 |
| R-squared | 0.39 | 0.15 | 0.44 | 0.15 |

Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses.

* significant at $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$ in a two-sided test.

Table A.15: TABLE 3 RESULTS FOR “MORE” PROFESSIONAL LEGISLATURES: Models include state fixed effects

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|----------------------|----------|---------|----------|---------|
| | AbortReg | ChSch | AbortReg | ChSch |
| Chamber Median = D, | 0.79*** | 0.12*** | 0.56 | 0.16*** |
| | (0.22) | (0.03) | (0.53) | (0.06) |
| Majority Median = D, | | | 0.14 | -0.03 |
| | | | (0.30) | (0.03) |
| Rep. Gov. | 0.48** | 0.06*** | 0.49** | 0.06*** |
| | (0.20) | (0.02) | (0.20) | (0.02) |
| Observations | 103 | 177 | 103 | 177 |
| R-squared | 0.40 | 0.25 | 0.41 | 0.25 |

Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses.

* significant at $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$ in a two-sided test.

Table A.16: TABLE 3 RESULTS FOR “LESS” PROFESSIONAL LEGISLATURE: Models include state fixed effects