have on the minds of decision makers. All of us can think of "M Unch" and "Vietnam" as shorthand for a whole series of judgments that we rely on to work through the maze of foreign policy calculations. In the aftermath of the World Trade Center attack in September 2001, we heard reference to "Pearl H arbor." And we can now anticipate that "9-11" will take its place as a marker for a set of lessons concerning the struggle against terrorism.

As Christopher Hemmer reminds us in this useful book, analogies are relied upon by decision makers for understandable reasons. They need reference points from the past as they confront an uncertain future. But analytically, there is a problem: How much explanatory weight can one give to the role of analogies? And, as Hemmer asks, "which ones matter?" After all, there is an infinite repertoire of so-called lessons from the past. And we know, at least anecdotally, that those who make policy are likely to dress up the untidy process of decision making by evoking important-sounding "lessons of history," even when these are little more than post facto rationalizations for actions taken.

Hemmer's approach to answering these questions is twofold. First, he provides a framework for thinking about the role of analogical reasoning in the policy process. Second, he develops two case studies in depth, Carter's response to the hostage crisis in Iran and Reagan's handling of a similar crisis a few years later, the "Iran-Contra" affair.

Hemmer sees analogical reasoning as a complement, not an alternative, to realist notions of strategic reasoning. As he correctly points out, a rational strategist will have no trouble identifying why the United States should react to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iraq, for example, but will still not know precisely which of several plausible strategies is best suited to the specific situation: "[W]hile most policy makers often know what interests they want to promote, they often do not know what specific policy will further those interests, so they turn to historical analogies for crucial information concerning what policy will best advance their interests" (p. 15). That judgment requires some degree of reasoning involving "lessons of history. My own research on the Gulf crisis of 1990–91 suggests that the "Korean analogy"—be careful of exploding goals in the midst of a war—and "Lebanon"—be careful of the fragmentation of the country—were both consciously discussed by President Bush and his closest advisers. One cannot understand the American decision to stop short of overthrowing Saddam's regime without understanding the role of these lessons.

A n important contribution of Hemmer is that he does not treat decision makers as passive victims of the analogies they carry in their heads. Instead, he sees them as actively analyzing the relevance of different lessons from the past. They tend to look first at recent history; they weigh the relative international and domestic consequences of a crisis as they look for appropriate guidelines; and they look for causal similarities. By attributing to analogies a role in structuring the definition of interests, Hemmer places himself in the constructivist camp within the international relations brotherhood.

Turning to the case studies, Hemmer finds that Carter and his colleagues consciously considered a wide range of historical precedents as they struggled to find a way to end the hostage crisis. Several examples of successful negotiations competed with more muscular examples of rescue attempts. Over the months of the crisis, the debate moved from one to another, and then back to negotiations. The result was not elegant, although the hostages were eventually released, but Hemmer's case does show the extent to which policy was informed by a conscious use of analogical reasoning.

The Reagan case is different, at least in Hemmer's telling. Although there was some attempt after the embarrassing revelations of the arms for hostages dealings to dress up the policy as comparable to Nixon's opening to China, the record shows that Reagan was primarily driven by another preoccupation—not being crippled by the hostage crisis as Carter had been. His "use of history" largely focused on the domestic consequences for Carter of struggling with the hostage issue. He was determined not to let Carter's fate befall him, and so he sought a quick resolution to the crisis by offering arms in exchange for the release of the hostages. A bit more thought by the president and his inner circle might have led them to realize that they were inadvertently providing an incentive for more hostage taking, but that lesson was apparently not seen at the time.

I find the theoretical and empirical contributions of Hemmer's book to be quite impressive. He writes clearly, has done his homework on the cases, and makes a modest contribution toward constructivist thinking in foreign policy analysis. I have used the book in an advanced course on foreign policy, and students find it accessible and generally convincing. The book ends with some suggestions for further research, and it will be interesting to see where Hemmer goes next.

Based on his debut, his future work will be worth waiting for.


James A . D unn, Jr., Rutgers University, Camden

National-level policy outcomes produced by European Union–level directives and regulations are much more diverse across member states than one might expect. This is especially true for those undramatic but complex policy areas that lack the salience of high-level negotiations and treaty signings. A drienne H´eritier and her five coauthors investigate the phenomenon of differential national responses to European policymaking in two transportation policy subareas across five states. They focus on the deregulation of road haulage (trucking) and the reform of publicly owned railways in the U K, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy. This allows them to show just how widely national policy outcomes can vary and still be generally in line with EU national policies.

The authors point out that in road haulage and railroads aim at "market making" on the European level, that is, the reduction or abolition of previous national state interventions in order to allow market forces to deal with a problem. This represents an attempt to roll back the frontiers of the (interventionist) state. In principle, all stakeholders stand to benefit from the efficiency gains that can be achieved. In practice, of course, there are numerous conflicts over the distribution of costs and benefits.

The most crucial aspect of establishing a single European transport market in road haulage was the introduction of "cabotage," the authorization of nonresident trucking firms to operate in foreign domestic markets. Thus, a Dutch trucking firm can now haul goods not just between Amsterdam and Paris but also between Lyon and Marseille, under the same regulatory conditions as a French firm. Even so, national policies have been markedly different. Cabotage and EU-level policies produced more deregulatory reform in the Netherlands, but resulted in significant new social regulatory efforts in France, and increased economic interventionism in Italy.

In railway reform, the deregulatory thrust of EU-level policy directives was very cautious. It only required more
financial transparency for state subsidies and separate accounting systems for investments in rail infrastructure, as well as for subsidies for train operations. This was just the beginning of a process aimed at reducing the deeply imbedded territorial monopolies of the continent’s nationalized railroads. The end of the process in the far future might see a private German rail company operate its trains from Frankfurt into Paris on the same financial basis as French trains. Here, too, actual policy outcomes have differed widely. The U.K.’s dismemberment and privatization of British Railways into a for-profit company that owned the track and a separate group of private companies that operated the trains went far beyond EU requirements. Carried out under Prime Minister John Major, it was driven by a Thatcher-era ideology of free market capitalism, and directives from Brussels played no role in motivating it or shaping its provisions.

By contrast, French politicians and interest groups denounced “liberal” interference by Brussels and stoutly resisted modest efforts to begin the “reform” of the Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français (SNCF). They cited the ideology of “public service,” which provided for rail service to remote regions, helped balance traffic via rail, road, and air, and justified the tradition of generous wages and pensions paid to the unionized cheminots as helping to raise the standards for the rest of the working class. Ironically, these trends were in line with the unions’ overall strategy to strike and demonstrate against the public’s loss of its rail service until they got what they needed from the government. French rail policy makers and SNCF officials complied minimally with EU directives by creating a new state-owned company, Réseau Ferré de France, giving it legal responsibility for the rail infrastructure and financial responsibility for the multibillion dollar debt of the SNCF. But little has changed operationally. And as far as German trains pulling into Paris is concerned, the word still seems to be: “They shall not pass!”

Of course, no single book could cover every important aspect of transportation politics and policymaking at the European and national levels. Within its self-imposed limits, this study admirably achieves its goal of demonstrating that diversity remains alive and well in European nations’ transport policies, despite the hopes (and fears) that many have concerning EU-level policymaking.


Mary P. Callahan, University of Washington

This book is a detailed study of recent changes in security threats and defense forces in China, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea. The author argues that East Asia is in the midst of an arms race “of unprecedented scale” (p. 231). The major threats (“flashpoints”) in the region are the tensions between North and South Korea, the conflict between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China over the future of Taiwan, and the competing claims to oil and other natural resources in the South China Sea. The range and character of these threats have not changed appreciatively in recent years, but what has changed are capabilities of militaries to project power, threaten neighbors, and destabilize the region.

Culling his data from an impressive range of primary and secondary English-language sources and from a handful of interviews, Hickey shows how the five countries rethought and reequipped their defense establishments in the 1980s and 1990s, largely according to the way they perceived shifts in the balance of military, economic and political power in the region. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the United States as a nearly unrivaled hegemon, each East Asian country under review bought new weapons systems, courted new allies and redefined old alliances, and increased high-technology warfare capabilities. While Hickey notes that it “would be a gross exaggeration to claim that the smell of war is in the air,” he nonetheless argues persuasively that the region is “more insecure as it enters the new millennium” (p. 239).

The book’s title is misleading, as Hickey’s findings are less about the armies of East Asia than the regional arms race(s) and sources of instability. Because his concern throughout is that U.S. policymakers recognize both the subtle and the major shifts in defense postures in the region, this book should be considered a fundamental text for Pentagon planners as they rethink strategy toward Asia in the coming years. As such, Hickey provides a largely atheoretical narrative of what he calls “the military buildup in East Asia” (p. 1). The absence of explicit theoretical claims in the book, however, does not limit its value to scholars interested in comparative or theoretical analysis. In a sense, Hickey has done the grunt work, providing one of the very few integrated studies of defense establishments in Asia. While his framework focuses on external phenomena (such as the collapse of the Soviet Union) as the causes of changes in Asian military strategies and force structures, he also hints at the way domestic political conditions make some reforms possible and entirely rule out others. For example, in his chapter on Japan, Hickey notes that the gradual loosening of restrictions on using the military in anything but a purely defensive manner could come only with greater chronological distance from World War II. However, like many others who study the defense policies and military strategies of other nations with an eye toward generating recommendations for the United States, Hickey treats these policies largely as unified, unproblematic
nautical reactions to international and regional forces, rather than as the outcomes of often hard-fought political struggles at home. In fact, for much of this book, the militaries of these countries come across purely as tools of the state, rather than as the highly political institutions that they are. Armies are made up of multiple sets of interests that often conflict with those of other national political agents and that cause splits even within the defense forces. Homer-Dixon alludes to what surely must have been divisive political struggles in his discussions of factions within the South Korean military and the People’s Liberation Army, but provides little analysis of how and why these factions rose and fell and how they stabilized or destabilized national and regional security.

The book’s focus really is not the armies of East Asia but, rather, how the United States can take charge of security in the region. He never questions his assumption that the United States will be—if not the only major determinant in how these arms races play out. Among his policy prescriptions are calls for the United States to convene arms reduction conferences to prevent “what appears to be an unintended drift toward war” (p. 235) and to take charge of building a “genuine multilateral security forum” for East Asia (p. 235), one that is more binding than currently exists and that looks much more like a NATO arrangement. Homer-Dixon gives little sense that these initiatives could backfire on the United States or be politically unacceptable to national leaders in the region, thus contributing to long-term volatility rather than stability (think the US failure in its SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] initiative).

A side from the inevitable difficulty of any attempt at predicting outcomes of highly political processes, the major weakness in the book is the absence of any serious attempt at systematic comparative analysis. Only seven pages of the conclusion engage in explicit comparison across the cases, despite the enormously significant similarities and divergences that emerge from the country chapters. This absence is not unexpected given Homer-Dixon’s target audience, which appears to be the US defense policy community. Nonetheless, the case chapters are filled with potential comparative insights that suggest fruitful avenues of inquiry for future researchers. Some examples are as follows: All of these militaries are downsizing their numbers of personnel to some degree or another. How are they doing this? And what impact does force reduction have on the social, political, and economic landscape of countries still weathering the economic crisis? Where are these men (and they all appear to be men in these cases) going to find employment? How will the next generation of young men be educated in citizenship if conscription is eliminated, for example, in South Korea? And do those military changes in the domestic realm affect the stability of the East Asia region? A nother commonality is that all of these militaries have emphasized much greater transnational linkages among their officer corps. How has this trafficking in officers influenced defense policy? Have more frequent intraregional contacts contributed to greater understanding and communication and, hence, made the region more stable? Or have military leaders come back from junkets abroad more committed than ever to building up stronger militaries to compete with those of the nations visited?


Marian A. L. Miller, University of Akron

In *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*, Thomas Homer-Dixon continues his examination of environmental scarcity. This exploration of the links between environmental scarcity and violent conflict captures much of the related complexity. He finds that scarcities of renewable resources, such as cropland, freshwater, and forests, can contribute to civil violence. As scarcities worsen, the incidence of this kind of violence is likely to increase. Although he acknowledges that environmental scarcity “by itself is neither a necessary nor sufficient cause” (p. 7) of violence, he argues that analysts should not underestimate its importance. Some conflicts cannot be clearly understood without an examination of the role of environmental scarcity. In this work, he offers “analysts and policymakers a toolkit of concepts and generalizations that they can use to analyze, explain, and sometimes predict connections between environmental scarcity and violence around the world” (p. 73).

He reviews the debate among analysts with neo-Malthusian, economic optimist, and distributionist stances. They offer differing explanations for economic scarcity: Neo-Malthusians emphasize physical causes, such as population size and growth; economic optimists focus on market failures and inappropriate policies and institutions; and distributionists stress social structures and political behavior. He suggests that the principal contribution of the book will be to synthesize these three perspectives. Homer-Dixon focuses on renewable resources “that are both rivalrous and excludable” (p. 48). He sees them as being subject to three types of scarcity: supply-induced, demand-induced, and structural scarcities. These scarcities interact and reinforce one another, resulting in resource capture and ecological marginalization. Structural scarcity is often “sustained and reinforced by international economic relations that trap developing countries into dependence on a few raw material exports” (p. 15). Environmental scarcity may result in a number of negative social effects, such as reduced agricultural productivity, constrained economic productivity, migration, social segmentation, and disrupted institutions. The challenge, then, is for societies to use social and technical ingenuity so that they can adapt to these scarcities without undue hardship.

Homer-Dixon is indeed successful at drawing together many of the strands from the neo-Malthusian, economic optimist, and distributionist perspectives. In this multilayered work, he explores many relevant variables and synthesizes work from a number of research projects. It is a thoughtful and coherent treatment of a complex subject. Yet, there is one important variable that seems to be just barely visible in this analysis—the international system and the powerful actors that shape the system. It is important to consider these systemic issues, not only because of possible causal factors but also because of the extent to which systemic factors can constrain how individual countries adapt to resource scarcities.

Homer-Dixon focuses on the national and subnational levels, targeting how society is affected and how it responds. For example, in examining structural scarcity, he looks at the distribution of power and wealth within a society, but he does not address the distributional impact and structural scarcity resulting from the distribution of power and wealth within the international system itself. For him, its impact is limited to that of a reinforcing factor (p. 15).

He notes that the causes of environmental scarcity include “the size of the resource-consuming population, and the technologies and practices this population uses in its consumption behavior” (p. 14). Very often, factors outside of a society play a large role in determining how much cropland or water is available to support the local population. A lmost all of the cases examined in this book are developing countries. Clearly, these are not the only societies experiencing environmental scarcity. But developed states can...
generally exercise a broader array of options. In some cases, developed states avoid—or adapt to—resource scarcity not only because of social or technical ingenuity, but also because they have the economic and political power to use the resources of the developing countries. Consequently, when we look at a country’s resource-consuming population, we have to consider the extent to which that population exists outside of the country’s borders. This is a consideration not just for resource-surplus countries, but also for countries with significant resource deficits. Foreign ownership or control of land and the mandates of powerful global actors may contribute significantly to supply-induced and demand-induced scarcity. In some countries poor people go hungry, while arable land is used to provide food for livestock in distant lands, and while International Monetary Fund strictures limit government policy options.

In his examination of second-stage intervention, Homer-Dixon discusses how a society can use its indigenous resources more sensibly and provide alternative resources to people who have limited resource access. But global factors and external actors can also limit the extent to which developing countries can close the ingenuity gap. With the harmonization of intellectual property rights under the aegis of the World Trade Organization, technical and scientific information can become private property and therefore unavailable knowledge. In the process, what is being privatized includes folk knowledge and genetic information. A powerful actors continue to appropriate knowledge and resources, the ingenuity gap might be more appropriately termed the wealth gap. Attempts to patent even the centuries-old knowledge of local communities can limit community options for adapting to scarcity.

Homer-Dixon is correct in stressing that “researchers need multivariate and complex theories and hypotheses” (p. 175) to explain multivariate and highly interactive ecological-political systems. But his discussion of environmental scarcity pays scant attention to an important set of variables—the international system and its powerful state and nonstate actors. Clearly, these actors do not provide the ultimate explanation for environmental scarcity, but they are more than reinforcing factors. Consequently, a focused examination of their role in this process should be a part of this “tool kit of concepts and generalizations” (p. 73) that is being offered to analysts and policymakers.

This criticism should not obscure the contributions made by Homer-Dixon’s exploration of the links between environmental scarcity and conflict. It provides important insights into the social effects of environmental scarcity. His work in this area has led him to take a position that is congruent with the precautionary principle being encouraged in global environmental forums. He emphasizes that policymakers should focus on avoiding environmental scarcity, since they may not always be able to adapt to it. He cautions that it is unwise to assume that there will be an infinite fount of ingenuity adequate to address future scarcities.

**U.S. Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis**

By David Patrick Houghton. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 270p. $64.95 cloth, $22.95 paper.

Marc Lynch, Williams College

David Patrick Houghton’s U.S. Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis explores the power of historical analogies in foreign policy decision making, offering along the way an engaging, thought-provoking account of decision making during the Iranian hostage crisis. Posing the question “How do decision makers reason when confronted by a problem which seems almost entirely novel in character and therefore without precedent?” (p. 19), Houghton follows Khong’s analogies at War in arguing for the centrality of analogical reasoning. The seizure of the American embassy by Iranian student radicals presented a genuinely perplexing problem for decision makers on all sides, and Houghton captures their uncertainty well. Since decision makers can rely on different historical analogies, and even the same historical analogy can offer competing lessons or be subject to divergent interpretations, Houghton focuses attention upon the interpretive interplay of analogies. As the crisis unfolded, decision makers deliberated, directly and indirectly, over the most relevant and useful analogy. These analogies, according to Houghton, are not merely justifications for strategies chosen for other reasons but directly affect individual policy preferences by shaping beliefs about the nature of the problem. Houghton convincingly establishes the prevalence and power of historical analogies in shaping the response of policymakers to unfamiliar situations. His efforts to construct generalizable theoretical propositions about their relative causal weight are somewhat less successful but are consistently thought-provoking.

The strength of the book lies in the detailed reconstruction of a decision making surrounding the initial response to the embassy seizure, the weighing of competing options, and the approval of the rescue attempt. Drawing on interviews with members of the Carter administration, Houghton demonstrates the prevalence of historical analogies in discussions at all levels. American deliberations routinely appealed to a rich set of possible analogies—the Pueblo hostage crisis of 1968, the Mayaguez rescue of 1975, the Israeli Entebbe operation of 1976, and others. In the course of debating their relevance and their putative lessons, individuals often became attached to “their” analogy. While Houghton eschews judging “how reliable analogies are as a guide to the future, or whether the analogies could have been better used” (p. 39), the narrative suggests that the reliance on particular analogies clouded the judgment of the key policymakers, leading them to overstate the similarities of the situations and to underestimate crucial differences. Houghton’s method of searching out and reporting every instance he can find of the use of analogies reveals little of the relative incidence of analogical reasoning as opposed to other forms of reasoning, however. The core concept of analogical reasoning remains elusive, as a wide variety of appeals to historical lessons or theory is counted as analogical reasoning. This makes it difficult to prove or to falsify assertions about relative importance, particularly when the outcome of the “war of analogies” is consistent with the strategies that would follow from other modes of reasoning (pp. 103, 105). It also makes it difficult to establish the causal significance of analogies. Houghton recognizes that the presence of analogies in the deliberations does not alone establish their causal weight. He tries valiantly to demonstrate that the analogies were not merely rhetorical gambits (pp. 157–65) and briefly considers a range of competing hypotheses (pp. 166–201), but the indeterminacy of the analogical theory makes it difficult to render definitive conclusions. Houghton’s enthusiasm for analogies sometimes seems to lead him to misread his own evidence. For example, when the author presents the 1948–49 A ngus Ward hostage situation as a possible analogy, Gary Sick responds, “We all learned about this well after the event . . . nobody was saying ‘Aha! This is like such and such a case’” (p. 99). Nevertheless, Houghton spends several pages speculating about its possible relevance: Perhaps it is relevant, but this example raises questions about the falsifiability of the argument.

Houghton’s treatment of the Iranian side, which draws on an archive of interviews with Iranians provided by a British documentary production rather than on personal interviews,
is suggestive of the limitations as well as the strengths of the analogical research program. Chapter three makes abundantly clear that the 1953 historical experience, in which the CIA backed the Shah’s coup against the nationalist Mohammad Mossadegh, decisively shaped the expectations and strategies of many Iranians in 1979. Exploring the ramifications of this analogy for Iranians allows a deeper understanding of Iranian behavior but risks deflecting analytical attention from internal power struggles in which the embassy seizure strengthened the hand of Iranian radicals against more moderate factions that sought compromise with the United States and a more liberal state at home. The decisive weight of an event that few of the student radicals experienced personally also raises questions about Houghton’s conclusion that “American and Iranian decision makers…overwhelmingly drew upon the experiences and analogies known to them personally, reflecting the greater cognitive availability of these events” (p. 144). The dominance of the 1953 analogy suggests that cultural frames of reference, historical nationalist narratives, or prevailing discursive tropes might be more relevant than individual experience or cognitive differences. The limitations of the emphasis on individuals can also be seen in the American case, which focuses narrowly on individual decision makers and rarely considers how debates and historical analogies in the wider public sphere might have shaped beliefs.

Houghton’s presentation of the Iranian case repeatedly attempts to demonstrate that Iranian reliance on the 1953 analogy led them to misread American intentions: “Why did the student radicals ignore evidence—mostly rhetorical but apparently sincere—that the Carter administration was different [from past administrations]?” (p. 70). Houghton’s evidence contradicts his framing of the puzzle, however. He wonders why Iranians failed to appreciate Carter’s human rights discourse but then demonstrates that this human rights policy never applied to Iran (pp. 70–71). Houghton posits that the 1953 analogy led the Iranians to expect a coup that Carter would have never considered but then admits that Brzezinski, hardly a marginal player, did advocate a coup (pp. 69–70). He suggests that the paranoia of the student radicals about an American-backed coup derived from their misapplication of the 1953 analogy but then reports that “an Iranian team had been recruited by the CIA to assist the military operation in Tehran…who believed they were recruited for an anti-Khomeini operation which would serve as a prelude to a coup d’état” (p. 122), as well as a secret meeting between Bazar and Brzezinski (pp. 61–62). In this case, the search for analogical reasoning distracts attention from a quarter-century of active American support for the Shah that gave Iranians good reason to expect American counterrevolutionary action. This prioritizing of analogical reasoning can also be seen in the dismissal of the importance of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in shaping American strategies toward Iran (p. 110). Despite these problems, Houghton has written an interesting and thought-provoking book on an important subject that raises a number of compelling questions for future research.
book. The first is an assertion that the EU exerts tremendous pressure on member states to coordinate their national processes in response to EU policymaking. Exactly what these EU pressures are and how they differ from country to country is never fully fleshed out in the empirical chapters, however. The second finding is that national policy coordination has, in fact, changed in the face of these pressures. A gain, evidence for this argument deserves more careful discussion. While this is clearly true in some case studies (notably France), it was not so apparent in others (Germany). The third finding—that there are “important similarities” in the manner in which member states coordinate their national responses—and the fourth finding—that institutional divergence persists—are thoughtfully elaborated. Here, the book’s identification not only of the similarities and differences that exist but also why they exist is a particularly valuable contribution to the literature.

It is interesting to note that this book assumes the reader has a strong grasp of both domestic and European/international-level processes and policies. Thus, comparativists with little knowledge of the EU will find the discussion of administrative and institutional features across 10 countries fascinating, but may stumble when a contributor refers to the Delors White Paper, and the “communautaire vocabulary” with no further explanation. Likewise, international relations scholars familiar with developments in the EU may find it difficult to follow the detailed discussions of subcommittees within various ministries or the casual references to political spats among national officials. That the book is pitched to this level of expertise among its readership is not a criticism per se. Rather, The National Coordination of EU Policy sheds light on the growing challenge to scholarship of the EU today.

In the concluding paragraphs, Kassim points out this challenge in an all-too-brief but important discussion of the book’s theoretical implications. Scholarship on the EU, historically dominated by international relations scholars, has often assumed a certain “symmetry between the member states” in terms of their form, structure, and interest (p. 259). Moreover, both classical and liberal intergovernmentalist theorists with their “over-organized concept of the state” have failed to adequately account for the formation of national policy positions. As this book makes clear, how member states organize and coordinate their national policy responses is critical to understanding the policy responses themselves. Citing Simon Bulmer’s seminal 1983 article, Kassim reminds us that understanding how the EU functions requires not only an understanding of Brussels politics, but also a “knowledge of domestic systems…and an appreciation of the distinctiveness of national policies” (p. 259).


Karl Kaltenthaler, Rhodes College

Alice Landau explores the nexus between globalization and regionalization in the global economy in Redrawing the Global Economy. This means that she examines the ways in which national economies are being melded globally, while at the same time, those very same economies are creating regional economic blocs. Landau’s central argument is that both globalization and regionalization are leading to a growing gap in wealth between developed and developing countries and within countries as well. Not only are globalization and regionalization helping only the richer countries, or those with means in both sets of countries, but the processes are also leading to a great deal of discontent among many of those not involved in steering them. Thus, Landau paints a relatively dark picture of what globalization and regionalization mean for North-South relations and economic development prospects for low-income countries.

Landau’s treatment of globalization and regionalization covers a great deal of theoretical and empirical territory. The first portion of the book assesses the various theoretical arguments that have been forwarded as to the causes and consequences of the globalization process. She divides the scholars who have written on this topic into “optimists” and “pessimists.” The optimists are those who see globalization producing absolute economic gains for all involved. For the optimists, to stay out of the globalization process is to miss out on the opportunity to increase one’s society’s prosperity. The pessimists, on the other hand, mean the economic consequences of globalization, particularly how the process widens the income gap between rich and poor and how it ties economies together in a way that can precipitate global, rather than simply national, economic crises.

After surveying the literature, Landau sets out to explore the empirical picture of globalization and regionalization. Her intent is to describe these processes around the world. In doing so, she focuses on what globalization has done to state power, the patterns of global trade, the creation of new international organizations to manage the process, foreign direct investment, the power and operations of transnational corporations, and international financial markets.

In the chapter on what globalization has done to state power, Landau concludes that the picture is not completely clear. She asserts that states are not withering away across the world, but then again, some states have always been very weak. It is clear to her, however, that because there are so many political actors in the global economy, there is increasing confusion over policy authority in some parts of the world.

The chapter that explores how globalization has affected global trade argues that trade flows are increasingly stratified, both across countries and across sectors. Trade is increasing among the rich countries of the world, while there has been less increase in trade between low-income countries and the rest of the world. A s, within countries, some dynamic sectors have become more integrated into the global economy, while others have not, leading them to fall behind economically.

Landau’s chapter on international organizations is meant to assess whether the World Trade Organization (WTO) has fostered the inclusion of countries from across the globe into the global economy. She asserts that the WTO has had only mixed success. It has helped bring the richer countries further into the global economy, but it has failed to do much to help the developing economies. Thus, the WTO has only added to the globalization gap between rich and low-income countries.

The chapter on foreign direct investment (FDI) mirrors the chapter on global trade patterns. FDI is concentrated in the wealthiest portion of the world; low-income countries have not been major contributors or recipients of FDI. As globalization has made it easier for FDI to flow around the world, it has only increased that pattern.

The chapter on the operations of multinationals in the global economy paints a picture that is very similar to that shown in the chapters on trade and FDI: globalization is producing a bifurcated world. Transnational corporations are much more active within the developed world than they are in the developing world. Thus, the economic and political links
that transnational corporations create are much stronger and deeper between the higher-income countries.

The final empirical chapter, which deals with international capital markets, makes the argument that there are very different patterns of capital flows within the developed and developing world. The increasing flows of capital around the world have been concentrated in the developed world. The low-income countries have made strides in accessing capital, but they are still minor recipients compared to high-income countries.

Landau’s examination of regionalization, which is much briefer than that devoted to globalization, centers on patterns of regionalization and then on an assessment of whether regionalization is fostering or impeding globalization. She asserts in the two chapters on regionalization that this process is indeed on the rise, but it is not acting as an impediment to globalization. She concludes the book by essentially summarizing her findings and argument.

Redrawing the Global Economy is a solid, comprehensive treatment of the issue of globalization. The book is a wealth of information and a very good start for one exploring the process of globalization and its economic consequences. It is almost encyclopedic in its breadth of coverage of the topic of globalization.

The book does suffer from its comprehensiveness, however, because it tries to cover so much territory in terms of the aspects of the global economy, it gives a rather superficial treatment of the subject matter in some places. This is a book that is best used as an introduction to the globalization topic; it is not very well suited for those who are looking for a deep treatment of specific aspects of the globalization process.

I would recommend this book as a text for upper-level undergraduate and graduate students in courses in international political economy. The book is also useful to scholars who are not very familiar with the globalization process.


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Public diplomacy, or foreign policy rhetoric, is an increasingly important dimension of international relations. A modern media extend their global reach, they bring national foreign policy actions out of the diplomatic closet into full public view. Public relations experts market foreign policy as they do other products and services. Foreign policy marketing uses rhetoric strategically to legitimize national actions, mobilize support from allies, and counter the propaganda efforts of opponents. McEvoy-Levy’s work contributes to the growing literature of such modern international communication.

The author describes the way that rhetoric interacts with American exceptionalism. The genealogy of exceptionalism is embedded in American history, having its origins in the religious beliefs of the first European settlers. It traces its way forward through the rhetoric of President George Washington’s warning about entangling alliances, the Monroe Doctrine and its various corollaries, and the doctrine of manifest destiny. It finally arrives at the beginning of the twenty-first century with America in its hegemonic moment as sole remaining superpower. In this vision, America is the city on the hill, defending good against evil, leading the world into the new day of peace and prosperity, globalization and democracy, toward the end of history and the new world order. This messianic rhetoric provides a powerful lever to consolidate domestic support, appeal to shared values abroad, and escape unilaterally from the realist constraints of the international system.

The work’s structure is logical and straightforward. It begins with a discussion of rhetoric and public diplomacy in international relations and foreign policy. It distinguishes between transitional and routine rhetoric, and discusses how rhetoric fits into standard models of foreign policymaking. Rhetoric infuses bureaucratic politics, incrementalism, organizational process, and agenda setting. Rhetoric gives voice to group and individual psychological dynamics. The next chapter discusses the history of the idea of American exceptionalism and the country’s conception of its missionary role. In this context, rhetoric “reflects and constitutes the collective memory” (p. 43), communicates the collective national vision, and serves as an essential tool of international political mobilization.

There follows a detailed discussion of the rhetoric of several crises during the post-Cold War period. Aft er the fall of the Berlin wall, a rhetoric of America’s public diplomacy supported a policy that sought to move beyond containment, simultaneously expanding NATO and cooperative relations with the states of the former Soviet bloc, including Russia itself. In this process, the rhetorical precedent of the U.S. Civil War served as a useful metaphor for the “strategic rhetoric of reconstruction” (p. 70). This reconstruction had as its object both the larger international system and the states of the former Soviet Union.

During the Gulf War, the rhetoric of international community building again combined with references to past history. Metaphors from World War II were prominent, and Saddam Hussein morphed easily into Hitler. Vietnam became a powerful antithetaphor, a historical marker of American weakness, defeat, and decline that needed to be overcome. In this context, the rhetorical messages of the war became no-more quagmires and America-is-back.

The immediate political tasks of the post-Cold War period and the military imperatives surrounding violence continued for the Clinton administration in the Balkans. At the same time, Clintonian rhetoric placed a new emphasis on international economic affairs. The metaphor of World War I had strong appeal, especially as it recalled the catalytic role of the Balkans in starting the unintended chain reaction. Further, the chaos that followed the harsh economic provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, unrestrained mercantilist competition, and hyperinflation had all contributed to the collapse of the interwar period. Clinton’s rhetoric of reconstruction thus expanded to embrace further post-Soviet normalization and to support such initiatives as the creation of the National Economic Council and the National Service program, the North American Free Trade Association, the expansion of the World Trade Organization, and critical international economic rescue operations.

The rhetoric of American exceptionalism has framed a vision American policy throughout the post-Cold War period. The “city on a hill,” the “redeemer nation,” “renewal through self-flagellation,” and the “manifest destiny” of building international community and world order have been recurrent themes in American public diplomacy. Political leaders have used these themes strategically as they sought to build “sympathetic public ecologies,” to recreate the American nation, and to advance an international program of “soft hegemony” (pp. 446–64). Although the author does not venture into this territory, these themes also sketch a doctrinal outline of what might be called American cultural religion at the heart of American culture.

McEvoy-Levy does a good job of describing the significance of political rhetoric and identifying major rhetorical
Arms and Ethnic Conflict


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John Sislin and Frederic Pearson have written a fine book that addresses a complex and understudied issue: the role of arms in ethnic conflict. While it is abundantly clear that arms and ethnic conflict are closely intertwined, we have little systematic knowledge on the nature of the relation. What kinds of weapons—tanks versus small arms, say—play the greatest role? Whatever the weapon, how does its influence vary at different stages in the process of ethnic conflict? Are unpleasant as the thought might be, are there conditions under which armaments play a positive role in such conflicts—for example, by promoting a situation of stalemate or bringing about outside humanitarian intervention? The signal contribution of this compact volume is to shed much-needed light on these and many other questions.

This is not a book for those who prefer simple answers. Instead, the authors carefully sift through rich data sets to offer contingent, bounded arguments on the role(s) played by arms. Put differently, this is not an argument where a single independent variable goes forth and slays all others; rather, the emphasis is on how constellations of factors—arms one among them—interact under certain conditions to lead to the escalation or de-escalation of ethnic conflict. This kind of nuanced analysis allows the authors to tease out a number of important policy implications in an excellent concluding chapter.

The structure of the book reflects these ambitions. The authors begin by highlighting our lack of rigorous knowledge on the arms/ethnic-conflict nexus (Chapter 1) and then proceed to survey and assess the armaments and arms-flow data upon which they rely (Chapter 2). The latter is a model of methodological caution, carefully assessing the drawbacks of various data sources—be they United Nations’ registries, official government reports, or journalistic accounts.

It is the next three chapters, however, that comprise the book’s core. Addressing the role of arms in the onset, progression, and resolution of ethnic conflicts, each chapter is built upon a solid combination of narrative stories and broader, large-n analysis. Not only does this make for a smoother read in a stylistic sense; it also—and more importantly—increases confidence in the validity of the volume’s findings. The authors thus often use a particular narrative to uncover a possible relation—say, that influsions of heavy arms lead to greater volatility in the escalatory/de-escalatory patterns of ethnic conflict—that is then tested against the larger set of cases.

If this said, there are limitations to the analysis, with theoretical concerns most primary. Simply put, the book offers little that is new theoretically. Perhaps this is inevitable in a volume that so self-consciously and carefully emphasizes methodological and data issues. A nd to be fair, the authors themselves say up front that “[g]enerally we proceed from existing conflict theory, deriving logical expectations and then testing them to the extent possible” (Preface, p. xiv). The book therefore pulls existing theory off the shelf, as it were, and tests it. Fair enough.

Problems arise, however, when the authors uncritically accept the core assumptions on which those theories are built. Integrating a methodologically individualist view of actors with fixed properties and a rational choice theory of action, much of this work reduces ethnic conflict to the strategic machinations of opportunistic agents who carefully calculate costs and benefits. What is wrong with this? Absolutely nothing! Empirically, we have abundant evidence that such dynamics drive a good deal of ethnic conflict, with individuals opportunistically invoking ethnicity in the pursuit of political gain.

At the same time, it strains credulity to believe that ethnic agents really do know the content of their utility functions and actually have sufficient information available to engage in intelligent cost/benefit calculations—assumptions made throughout the book under review (pp. 5, 46, 88, 121, for example). If most of us have trouble doing any of this on a daily basis, why should we assume that individuals in violent and possibly life-threatening situations will do any better? This discussion matters because the authors claim to be offering policy-relevant theory and analysis (Preface, Chapter 6). Yet if these assumptions do not always hold (p. 140, n. 5, for example), how credible and reliable are the policy prescriptions?

Given these facts, the book would have been much stronger if alternative perspectives and assumptions on ethnic conflict were introduced and tested. Here, the starting point would be that such conflict is an inherently social phenomenon. What role, then, do social norms play in creating the in- and out-groups essential for the activation of ethnic identity markers? More important given the volume’s analytic goals, how does an influx of armaments disrupt, change, or destabilize this group socialization process? What is going on when, in certain cases, ethnic actors do not seek arms despite incentives and opportunities to do so?

To ask and answer such questions suggests the utility of social constructivist perspectives for exploring the arms/ethnic-conflict relation. The point of introducing and testing such arguments would be to help the authors delimit their claims. Are there certain conditions under which it does make sense to view ethnic conflict—and the role of armaments in it—as being driven by utility-maximizing, strategic agents? Equally important, are there other conditions when it does not make sense? If such a research design were pursued, the beneficial end result would not be an argument of the “either/or” type—either rational choice or social constructivism—but of the “both/and” sort. In turn, this would help Sislin and Pearson advance a more robust and complete set of policy prescriptions.

My criticisms here need to be kept in context. Arms and Ethnic Conflict is a very good book that is judicious in its use of data, cautious in its claims, and of relevance to policymakers as well as scholars. One can only hope that the volume inspires scholars of a sociological and social constructivist orientation to build upon it, developing a more complete set of hypotheses that can be fit together in integrative ways in order for us to understand more fully the role of armaments in ethnic conflict.
The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity


Howard P. Lehman, University of Utah

Since the end of the Cold War, development studies have fallen to the wayside as attention has shifted to the democratization process in Eastern Europe, the increased integration of the European Union, and the effects of economic globalization in the advanced industrialized countries. The developing world was seen as an afterthought or, in some cases, as arenas of misunderstanding, ethnic or religious conflict, structural poverty, disease, and other hardships. However, in the context of September 11, more attention now is on the developing world, perhaps not so much on economic development, but more on containing various terrorist organizations. Yet development studies still exist, and this area of study maintains an historical connection to several decades worth of academic research. Scholars persistently ask such questions as why the South is poor and politically weak compared to countries in the North. Answers generally are located in the dependency literature of unequal economic relations leading to unequal power relations. Darryl C. Thomas, in The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, asks this question but provides a somewhat different response. The economic and political inequality in the world is not necessarily due to economic ideology but to the color of skin (p. xi). The solidarity of the Third World that Thomas sees in the past is one based on race, and racial solidarity should be the means by which the poor and powerless of the Third World transform unequal power relations. Thomas refers to this relationship as global apartheid, defining it as a structure of the world system that combines political economy and racial antagonism (p. 26). He states that global apartheid refers to the continuation of white-minority dominance of political, social, legal, cultural, and economic decision-making apparatuses within the world system (p. 111) and that this form of racial capitalism has become a permanent feature in the world system.

The major focus of the book thus is a chronological review of the evolution of racial solidarity of the Third World and the nonalignment movement. An early chapter presents the case that the Third World historically has sought to resist to global apartheid. Thomas asks, to what extent has the Third World been successful in transforming the structures of global apartheid since the end of the World War II? To what extent has the pan-pigmentationalist dimension of Third World solidarity brought about changes in the global racial order? (p. 27). To answer these questions, he draws on an historical review of the nonalignment movement during the Afro-Asian coalition of the 1950s, the more extensive solidarity during the 1960s, the Cold War, and briefly the current phase of globalization. He argues that the nonaligned movement was successful in forging a dynamic alliance among its members to challenge the North-South divide (p. 80). He claims that the newly emerging nations from Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean rejected alliances and military pacts with the Great Powers. These neophytes sought to promote peace because they believed that only through international peace could their aspirations and needs be fulfilled (p. 76).

During the Cold War, Third World solidarity became fragmented as global apartheid continued its hold over the world system. Thomas points to the divisive effects of high oil prices, the growth of newly industrializing countries, and the division between some Third World countries seeking economic integration and those following economic self-reliance. By the late 1980s, he argues, the old orthodoxy of development being guided by the state was being replaced by a new orthodoxy. Increasingly, developing countries are now focusing on building a market economy, creating a hospitable environment for private capital, closing the state out of the economic arena, and opening their political system to democracy (p. 176). Since the end of the Cold War and the rise of globalization, the forces of global apartheid are increasing the gap between the North and the South as Third World states are losing control over their domestic economic and financial policies (p. 235). Third World solidarity is increasingly on the defensive, Thomas claims, as global capitalism is not being challenged. He argues that with the retreat of the Soviet bloc, the former USSR has turned its back on anti-imperialism (p. 241). Thomas concludes his study by claiming that it may take the unfolding battle throughout the developing world for racial dignity and political and economic democracy to shake the foundation of the emerging regime of global apartheid and develop a new base of solidarity that focuses on the political, economic, racial, and military dimensions of global inequality (p. 274).

This important book focuses not just on the political and economic inequalities between the North and the South, but also on the racial dimension of these inequalities. The majority of people in the North are white and the majority of the people in the South are nonwhite. Yet the book does not present a cohesive theoretical argument concerning the link between race and capitalism. For one thing, the author relies more on a descriptive account of this relationship and less on a theoretical analysis of race and class. Second, the nonalignment movement was a crucial feature of the independence movement of the 1950s and 1960s. Yet it never developed into a powerful counterforce against the superpowers. In many ways, the nonalignment movement was a misnomer since so many of its members did indeed side with one superpower or the other in military alliances. Third, the effects of the newly industrializing countries on the nonalignment movement need to be further analyzed. Were these countries an aberration within the global apartheid or were they a model of how Third World countries could establish themselves within global capitalism? Fourth, Third World solidarity seems to be presented in this study as a monolithic concept. Yet international solidarity based on race has never materialized. Instead, we have seen a rise of regional institutions in the developing world that attempt to protect the interests of member states. NAFTA, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the East African Community, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are examples of regional solidarity. Finally, the book offers very little in terms of solidarity in the post-Cold War era. In some ways, the argument falters in the discussion of racial solidarity during this period. There is an absence of significant analysis of how the recent waves of democratization, human rights, and peace making efforts fit into the argument of global apartheid. Can Third World solidarity form around these emerging democracies? In what way has globalization affected Third World solidarity? This book raises many important questions, answers some, and leaves others unaddressed.

Perfect Deterrence


Michael D. Mcginnis, Indiana University

For too long, nuclear deterrence theory has been treated as a casualty of the end of the Cold War. During the preceding period of superpower rivalry, debates over the credibility of nuclear deterrence attracted the attention of sophisticated game theorists in diverse disciplines. But with the end of the
Cold War, this research tradition virtually ground to a halt. In this important new book, two long-term contributors to this body of research revisit these issues and effectively recast these models as representations of policy dilemmas of long-standing and continuing relevance. For instance, their models of U.S. strategic doctrines of massive retaliation and flexible response prove relevant to any situation in which the parties perceive two levels of conflict to be significantly different, even if neither level involves the use of nuclear weapons.

The book begins with a brief overview of two variants of classical deterrence theory. Whereas the first, structural version embraces the high level of survivable deterrent forces needed to sustain Mutual Assured Destruction, writers in the second decision-theoretic strand treat superpower crises as Chicken games in which neither player could rationally initiate a full nuclear exchange. Standard models of both variants suffer, Zagare and Kilgour argue, from significant shortcomings, either in terms of logical consistency or empirical verisimilitude. In their view, effective deterrents must be both capable of causing harm to the target and credible in the sense of being cost-effective to carry out, should the occasion for doing actually arise.

The authors carefully work through a series of interrelated models, each focused on one particular form of deterrence. One sequence of models deals with asymmetric (or unilateral) deterrence, in which only one state is presumed to be interested in challenging the status quo. Another series deals with situations of mutual deterrence, in which both states attempt to deter the other from initiating a challenge. In all cases, simple models of complete information are used to illustrate the range of possible behaviors expected to occur under different equilibrium conditions, followed by more complex, and more realistic, models of incomplete information in which one or both players remain unsure of the credibility of the other state's deterrent threat. Part II focuses on direct deterrence, in which one state seeks to convince a second state not to initiate a change in the status quo. Part III deals with situations of extended deterrence, in which the first state extends its protection to a third state, an effort which necessarily compounds the problem of credibility. (Some models are also interpreted in terms of power transition theory.) Each chapter concludes with a "coda" recapitulating the major points covered in that chapter, and the book concludes with an overview of the argument as a whole.

Zagare and Kilgour are to be commended for their sustained effort to draw out the implications of a few variations on basic models. They present complex results clearly. Multiple equilibrium conditions are organized into categories illustrated by easily interpretable figures and distinguished by distinct labels (although by the end of the book, these labels do tend to run together). By relegating formal proofs to 70 pages of appendices, the authors maintain a clear focus in the text on the most important results. Notation is clear and consistent, making it easy to directly compare equilibrium conditions for different models. Throughout the book, each set of findings is illustrated with appropriate examples, drawn from a wide array of historical eras.

The word perfect in the book's title refers to the condition that all equilibria must be subgame perfect, meaning that no threat can be based on actions that would be irrational to carry out, even at decision nodes that the players will not reach if both play their equilibrium strategies. This refinement has become the standard formal representation of the requirement that rational deterrents cannot be backed up with noncredible threats. As the authors demonstrate, however, many possible behaviors can be consistent with this criterion, in different sets of circumstances.

One of the most intriguing specific findings concerns the conditions under which a no-first-use policy might have been, in some parameter configurations, sustainable as equilibrium (p. 238). In general, Zagare and Kilgour demonstrate that deterrence provides, at best, a fragile foundation for peace. In nearly all of the parameter configurations they investigate, any possible equilibrium supporting the status quo is associated with another closely related equilibrium in which some challenges do occur that may end in war (p. 293).

Rarely does any one formal modeler agree with all of the assumptions imposed by another modeler. In this case, I was concerned to see that in their simplest model of "generalized mutual deterrence" (pp. 70–81), two players select C or D simultaneously, after which a C player may choose to retaliate for a play of D. I understand the authors' reasons for setting it up this way, but it still strikes me as an uneasy hybrid between single-play and repeated game representations. For this and later, more complex models, the authors might have investigated the implications of requiring their equilibria to satisfy refinements beyond subgame perfection. Also, in some of the later models, a first-strike advantage might have been introduced in order to distinguish different paths to all-out war. Still, the authors justify each of their simplifications, and they hedge their conclusions accordingly. Overall, they have selected well, in the sense that their simplifications facilitate clear presentations and interpretations of their most important findings.

By focusing on their own models, the authors leave open many avenues for later elaborations upon similar themes. For example, each crisis is treated here as a separate event, even though the authors presume that a state's level of credibility may vary according to the location or the salience of that particular crisis. Thus, later researchers might incorporate these specific models of individual crises into a broader, macro-level model of rivalry. No one should expect that nuclear deterrence theory will ever regain its earlier position of prominence, but Zagare and Kilgour remind us that now, more than a decade after the end of the Cold War, important subtleties remain hidden within the logic of deterrence.