This book begins with Tony Kushner's oldest living Bolshevik lamenting the failure of one grand theory and seeking another. Marla Brettschneider presents a grand democratic theory that could be supported by activists and scholars sharing the concerns of people of color, women, gays and lesbians, young people, and others politically marginalized within the United States. Radical democratic theory is a politics of recognition and respect for a U.S. political environment of social diversity across and within communities, as all-encompassing as the Bolshevik's grand theory, but not as decisive.

Brettschneider asks important questions of and for contemporary radical democratic theory: “What does it mean to theorize democracy from the margins of society? Can we learn to listen to each other and to those historically disenfranchised?” (p. 201). The book is a call for contemporary radical democratic theorists to focus our attention on these questions, a critique of those contemporary democratic theorists who do not, and a recognition of the collective theory-building enterprise in which those who have been following a similar calling are engaged. She urges contemporary democratic theorists to understand groups and communities as dynamic entities with histories of disagreement and internal dissent.

The focus of the book is not, however, an explicit exposition of Brettschneider’s historical method for contemporary democratic theory. Such a focus would have helped the reader understand how her approach differs from scholars of the margins think, but we don’t learn what they think. We understand what scholars of the margins think, but we don’t learn what they should do. The next steps for scholars in the radical democratic theory project require the exploration of new methods for doing democratic theory at the margins and for gaining theoretical insights from those who are active at the margins.

First, radical democratic theorists need to explore the relationship of the scholar-activist to the social movements or particular groups we study. To what extent do scholar-activists have ideas similar to or different from the “poor, immigrant, slave, sick, . . . poets all, and organizers, orators, prophetic voices” (p. 1)? By virtue of being scholars, scholar-activists have an ability to move between the worlds of academia and marginalization (e.g., Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 1990). Such freedom of movement is not open to most marginalized people (despite the persistent myth of equal opportunity within majoritarian politics). Scholars of theory in activism need to innovate methodologically in order to be accurate in our accounts of theory from the margins. We cannot rely on self-understandings of being good listeners or astute observers. Scholar-activists need methods that require (at least) critical reconsideration of our initial understandings of the ideas implicit in the actions and inactions of the marginalized.

Second, scholar-activists need to think methodologically about how best to learn about democracy from those living in marginal contexts. In her mention of Sex Panic and other queer and Generation X social groups, Brettschneider suggests that their lack of freedom confines them to alternative venues and modes of political activism. What methods enable us to understand the political significance of blues bars and cross-dressing (pp. 171–172)?

Third, radical democratic theory needs a theoretical method for guiding inquiries into universal and context-specific claims and into diversity and commonalities within groups. How are we to use our appreciation of the plurality within groups in the process of evaluating Brettschneider’s specific institutional proposals and their potential impact on marginal groups and communities? How can we be certain that we are not overobserving diversity at the expense of collective action or overobserving community consensus at the risk of obfuscating minority views within the community? How does understanding a community historically help us know that at any particular point in time a particular group is not oppressively significant (and perhaps righteous) groups within a community? For radical democratic theory to offer guidance to radical democratic politics, it needs to offer methodological insights to theorists as to how to approach these problems. Theorists cannot rely only on our own unguided reasoning capacities. Radical democratic theory needs to incorporate a critical method of researching the important questions, proposing solutions, and reevaluating those proposals. While an explicit method is not necessary for doing contemporary democratic theory, it is essential for doing democratic theory with, and not just about, people at the margins of majoritarian politics.

Contemporary democratic theorists are exploring how to bring views from the margins into political life. Brettschneider suggests that if we look within communities, we will see internal political dissent sustained by and negotiated within a community that is sustained in part by some commonality. Her historical understanding of pluralism within communities offers 1) a more accurate account of those at the margins who have been excluded from majoritarian politics in the United States, 2) a methodological tool for identifying ways for including minorities in majoritarian politics, and 3) a model for a radical democratic theory and practice in which democratic association is based on social diversity and respect.
made by citizens who weigh evidence, give rea-
soned justifications of their positions, and take
seriously the positions of fellow citizens, but
also because the practice of deliberation itself
embodies important political principles like
reciprocity and publicity. Jack Crittenden’s cri-
tique of American democracy, however, identi-
fies two significant failures where deliberation
is concerned. First, the American education
system fails adequately to prepare young peo-
ple with the critical thinking skills needed for
deliberative citizenship. And, second, the
American political system fails to provide
meaningful opportunities for them to practice
democratic deliberation.

Many other theorists have registered similar
complaints, but Crittenden is highly critical of
much of the recent literature on democratic
deliberation, and particularly that of Amy
Gutmann (Democracy and Education, 1987)
and James Fishkin (Democracy and
Deliberation, 1991), for supposedly paying lip
service to deliberative democracy while favor-
ing electoral models that make only minimal
use of the deliberative capacities of citizens.
This is problematic, Crittenden argues, because
citizens who are unable to deliberate with their
fellows cannot be said to be fully autonomous:
Full autonomy requires direct participation in
government because in order to be “truly
self-ruling, the literal definition of autonomy,
autonomous persons must take part in making
decisions that are important to their lives” (p. 2).

What, then, can be done to fix American
democracy? Like John Dewey, who once imag-
ined an education in critical (or active) think-
ing to be “democracy’s midwife,” Crittenden
looks to schools to foster the deliberative ca-
pacities of citizens and lead a wave of demo-
cratic reform. The six chapters that comprise
Democracy’s Midwife formulate a plan for such
reform worth considering by anyone with an
interest in democratic deliberation and person-
al autonomy. The detail with which curricular
matters are examined also makes the book a
significant contribution to the literature on
civic education, although not the most com-
prehensive treatment of the subject.

Building upon his previous work in Beyond
Individualism: Reconstituting the Liberal Self
(1992), Crittenden defines autonomy as an
activity involving “both rationality—which
here means the ability to give reasons for one’s
choices—and self-reflectivity, which contains
the idea of having some critical distance from
the range of choices offered” (p. 38). This con-
ception has an important social element in that
it is not enough simply to evaluate options and
make choices. Rather, the practice of autonomy
also requires that one give rational public justi-
fications for one’s choices. Since this social con-
ception of autonomy makes the rationality of
an individual’s choices contingent upon “inter-
subjective validation,” it will, doubtlessly, be
rejected by many liberal thinkers. However, by
imagining an important social element for
autonomy, Crittenden is able to claim that
democracy and autonomy are both processes of
deliberative decision making, one collective (in
the public sphere) and one individual (largely in
the private sphere). The crucial difference is
that schools may legitimately teach the ele-
ments of democratic deliberation, which is
essential for democratic self-government, while
the practice of autonomy may not be required
“without overstepping liberal authority” (p. 76).
On this point, Crittenden is in agreement with
Stephen Macedo (Diversity and Distrust, 2000)
but not with Eamon Callan, who has argued
that schools should actively promote the prac-
tice of autonomy (Creating Citizens, 1997).

According to Crittenden’s educational
scheme, young people would be taught the
critical thinking skills needed to participate
fully as democratic citizens, but would not be
compelled to critically examine their own ways
of life. Although teaching deliberation could
lead some students to the practice of self-
reflection, which is at the heart of personal
autonomy, it would not necessarily do so. He
seems to think that this arrangement, which
he calls “an education for, but not in, autonomy”
(p. 106), will reassure liberal thinkers, who
might otherwise insist that autonomy per se,
rather than merely deliberation, should be
taught in schools. But his arguments are
unlikely to impress critics of liberal autonomy,
who are bound to worry that teaching deliber-
ation is a way of smuggling critical self-reflec-
tion into the curriculum. In fairness to this
position, one wonders how young citizens
could imaginatively identify with other ways
of life without implicitly questioning their own.

Crittenden acknowledges that skeptics will
reasonably doubt whether schools, desperately
mired in problems of inequality, inadequate
funding, and bureaucracy, can be called upon
to transform democratic politics. However, his
curricular proposals are, on balance, fairly
modest, and the specificity with which he pre-
sents his program is a refreshing change from
the generalities that characterize much of the
literature on civic education. He argues per-
suasively that writing across the curriculum
could be employed throughout primary and
secondary school grades as a means to the cul-
tivation of critical thinking. Schools them-
selves would be places where young citizens are
trained for deliberative participation and
places where the transformed—that is, more
deliberative—public sphere can be modeled.

In fact, students would be taught the skills and
attitudes needed for meaningful democratic
deliberation in schools that are themselves gov-
erned, at least in part, through the practice of
democratic deliberation.

Despite these positive aspects, Democracy’s
Midwife presents a pale vision of what a more
deliberative and direct democratic political sys-
tem would look like. Although Crittenden
takes other theorists to task for failing to imagi-
'nate adequate space for deliberation by ordinary
citizens, he does little better in persuading us
that meaningful opportunities for democratic
deliberation exist, or could exist, in today’s
democracies. He argues that the expanded use
of initiative politics, conjoined with local
deliberative forums, might call citizens to make
greater use of deliberation, and he cites a few
examples of initiative politics energizing local
communities (pp. 66–69). Crittenden also
suggests that educational reform might
become the engine that drives the broader
political transformation, as citizens educated in
deliberation “demand a democracy in which
they are self-governing as well as self-ruling”
(p. 77). But in the end, the book does not
make sufficiently clear why citizens who enjoy
the practice of personal autonomy in the pri-
vate sphere would come to value collective
autonomy, or why they would be willing to set
aside private pursuits to engage in more active
participation in public life.

The Tyranny of the Two-Party System.
By Lisa Jane Disch. New York: Columbia University
Press, 2002. 196p. $45.00 cloth, $19.50 paper.

— Keith E. Whittington, Princeton University

It is not often that political theorists turn their
attention to the nuts and bolts of American
politics, but this is such a case. Following the
polemical (in the nonpejorative sense) promise
of the title, this book is a critique of the current
partisan organization of American politics, its
legal and institutional underpinnings, and a
celebration of “third party” alternatives to the
political status quo. The result is an interesting
introduction to one historical strategy of third-
party politics in the United States and an
accounting of the twentieth-century rise of the
“two-party system” as an entrenched feature of
American political discourse.

Lisa Jane Disch explains that the book arose
from her own participation in an extended
campaign to establish an affiliate of the pro-
gressive New Party in Minnesota. It was origi-
nally intended to be a contribution to “reform
political science” and a “handbook” concerned
with explaining “to citizens, legislators, and
scholars” the new electoral system that was
being established in Minnesota through court order, but a 1997 U.S. Supreme Court ruling detailed that project and created a new goal of demonstrating why the two-party system is without "constitutional warrant" (pp. x, xi). Perhaps more directly, the book is concerned with recovering the possibility of third parties as "an institutionalized vehicle for organized political opposition" and the expression of dissent (p. 14).

The particular institutional reform advocated by Disch in this book and by her allies in Minnesota is the recognition of "fusion" candidates on electoral ballots. The fusion strategy would allow more than one party to nominate the same candidate for office and have that candidate be listed on more than one line of the ballot. Votes cast for a candidate on any party line would then be aggregated for determining an electoral winner. Voters could then register their support for third parties with less concern that such votes would be "wasted" or have undesired electoral consequences. The first chapter details the efforts of progressives in Minnesota in the mid-1990s to change electoral laws to allow fusion candidates. A favorable ruling by a federal circuit court prompted the reluctant state legislature to begin considering how to reform the electoral law to allow fusion candidates, but only modest reforms were adopted before the U.S. Supreme Court overruled the circuit court and accepted the state's prerogative to disallow fusion candidates.

Fusion candidates were once more common, as the second chapter describes. When political parties printed their own ballots, as was often the case in the nineteenth century, there was no obstacle to multiple parties mobilizing for a single candidate. The widespread adoption of the government-printed common, or Australian, ballot at the turn of the century regulated ballot access, however, requiring states to determine whom to list on the ballot and how. Reflecting both partisan strategic calculation and ideological commitments of party purity, most state legislatures responded by not allowing candidates to appear more than once on the ballot. Unable to ally with the major parties behind electorally viable candidates, Disch argues, third parties declined in importance.

The next two chapters trace the ideological and discursive aftermath of this institutional change. In this quite interesting intellectual history, Disch examines how political scientists over the course of the twentieth century described, explained, and rationalized the role of political parties in American politics. Although the preeminence of the two major parties was often noted in the scholarship of the early twentieth century, it was not until after World War II that political scientists began to emphasize the distinctiveness of the American two-party system and praise it as a vital and quasi-constitutional feature of American politics.

The final two chapters celebrate the possibility of labor-intensive, participatory political parties serving as channels that would, quoting Jürgen Habermas, "shutle movement opposition 'from the periphery into the center of the political system'" (p. 120). As ready vehicles for political protest, Disch argues, third parties encourage assaults on the status quo and the expression of political and social grievances. Third parties would challenge the "excess consensus" that now "threatens electoral democracy in the United States" (p. 124).

Unfortunately, the normative or empirical case for allowing fusionist candidates is never fully developed. The historical and empirical claim that antifusionist ballot regulations are a significant explanation for the relative unimportance of third parties in American politics is not supported in detail. More troubling, Disch never makes an effort to answer the criticisms of pro-fusionist reform. To her credit, she does briefly provide the arguments made against the reform by modern Minnesota legislators and against fusion by turn-of-the-century Populists. In the aftermath of the 2000 presidential elections, legislators' concerns about confusing ballots do not seem misplaced. Nor do their worries that candidates would turn the ballot into a billboard for myriad shell parties with sloganeering names seem unreasonable. On the other hand, she does little to explain why fusion candidates would be particularly insurgent or how allowing fusion candidates could be expected to add a significant new element of radicalism to American politics. In painting a picture of the two-party system and the incentives it creates, Disch portrays voters as confronted with two parties with tenuously pitched on the Downsian median, but she gives little attention to the possibility of voter "exit" by refusing to turn out for unresponsive candidates, the influence of primaries on candidate positions, and the increasing ideological polarization of the two major parties over the past two decades.

The central two chapters are the heart of The Tyranny of the Two-Party System and its most successful components. As the would-be fusionists in Minnesota discovered, the "two-party system" is both institutionally and conceptually entrenched. But as the author explains, the grip of the idea of two parties is relatively recent and has often been contested. The idealized vision of two competitive parties has often not matched the reality of electoral politics in many parts of the country, and other normative visions of multiple parties, a single dominant party, or no parties at all have found advocates over time. Disch provides both an interesting story of one reform effort and an enlightening analysis of how the status quo came to be.


— R. Richard Banks, Stanford Law School

Debate about race and adoption has focused on the practice of race matching, according to which children in need of adoption are matched only with adoptive parents of the same race as the child. Defenders of race matching contend that same-race placements promote children's best interests by imparting culture, racial identity, and coping skills. Critics fault race matching for precluding transracial adoptions and thereby contributing to the tens of thousands of unadopted black children nationwide. Although federal law now prohibits race matching by publicly funded adoption agencies, there is little doubt that the practice continues to be employed by the corps of social workers who join adoptive parent and child.

In critiquing both poles of this debate, Hawley Fogg-Davis charts a course that is not so much a compromise of existing positions as a reconfiguration of the terms of the controversy. Her analysis of race and adoption is nuanced and satisfying because it is informed by her understanding of the theoretical concerns implicated by issues of race and identity. She rejects race matching as relying on a misguided notion that children should critically absorb or passively accept their racial identity from parents who share their racial ascription, terming this view racial solidarity. Yet she also criticizes the color-blind adoption policy advocated by some critics of race matching as trivializing, if not ignoring, racial identity.

Fogg-Davis offers a view of racial identity characterized by a process she terms racial navigation. Racial navigation recognizes race as an important social identity, but one whose meanings and possibilities are not unyielding and predetermined. Rather, individual and, hence, social meanings of race are continually subject to revision through individual choice. Racial navigation bridges the divide between ignoring race (as critics of race matching do) and passively deferring to static notions of race and identity (as some defenders of race matching do) by facilitating individuals' ongoing efforts to fashion their own racial identities. In place of either color-blindness or race matching, she proposes a
Adoptive parents’ racial preferences might be morally objectionable to the extent that they cause children to remain unadopted. In that case, a same-race preference would be less morally objectionable when expressed by a black parent than by a white parent, and a white parent’s same-race preference would become less troubling if it caused no black child to remain unadopted.

On the other hand, the problem with adoptive parents’ racial preferences might not be their effect on children waiting adoption so much as their reinforcement of the cultural preference for racial homogeneity within the family. Preferences may be objectionable because they reflect a pernicious set of racial meanings about family, love, and identity. Would, then, preferences that produce mixed race families be applauded, and preferences that produce same-race families condemned?

These different evaluative criteria are only distinct and potentially in conflict. For example, black parents’ same-race preferences might both reduce the number of unadopted black children and reinforce the primacy of racial commonality within the family. Similarly, a white adoptive parent’s desire to mimic the biological family might exacerbate the problem of unadopted black children and reinforce the norm of same-race families.

Ultimately, The Ethics of Transracial Adoption is an important scholarly contribution not because it resolves dilemmas of race and adoption but because it helps to reframe the inquiries. It poses questions that should be fundamental to the race and adoption debate, yet for too long have been absent from it.


— Steven M. DeLue, Miami University, Ohio

Ellen Freeberg opens her book by stating that “equality stirs political passions” (p. 1). Contentiousness over equality arises from the fact that in the modern world, the quest for equality is linked to an aspiration to accommodate moral and cultural pluralism. But for Freeberg, leading approaches to equality unduly restrict diverse ways of life. She is concerned with autonomy-centered perspectives, which—to secure a rational grounding to equality, freedom, and justice—may invoke a form of paternalism that associates freedom with “the close pursuit of collective moral ends” (p. 4). In contrast, her Michael Oakshott–inspired agency-centered view promotes equality, freedom, and justice by describing society as composed of social rules that facilitate the pursuit of self-defined ends. This approach, by not invoking the need for each person to acquire the virtues associated with autonomy, is perceived as more open to pluralism. Before discussing her agency-centered view, I provide illustrations of her examinations of autonomy-centered views—putting to the side, due to space limitations, her excellent critique of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s “capability ethic” (p. 9).

John Rawls’s liberal theory of justice is indebted to the Kantian view of persons as autonomous individuals. As such, individuals are free to pursue self-determined ends within the context of a commitment to rationally grounded principles of justice. However, in his conception of political liberalism, Rawls worries that his autonomy-centered view may unnecessarily restrict pluralism by imposing onto individuals “a metaphysical version of positive freedom” (p. 34). Rawls seeks to overcome this constraint on pluralism by drawing a line between the public and the nonpublic. In the public setting, individuals act in keeping with a conception of themselves as autonomous citizens who predicate their lives on rational conceptions of justice. In the nonpublic realm, individuals are not required to conform to the norms of autonomy. Instead, they can make the values of private associations of civil society the bases for their lives. Freeberg points out that pluralism is threatened because the wall between the public and nonpublic is porous, and for this reason, decisions in the public setting may place unfair constraints on the activities and beliefs of people in the nonpublic realm. The public intrudes into the nonpublic realm when legal and political distinctions either make “certain identities less important” or deny a “public hearing” to certain ways of life (p. 41).

Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, in their view of deliberative democracy, advocate a conception of “autonomous speakers” who take part in the decision-making process to resolve differences over shared issues (p. 59). People exercise autonomy in their public discussions when they manifest such virtues as “civic integrity,” which signifies sincerity and critical thinking while addressing public issues, and “civic magnanimity,” which asks people to be generous to positions different from their own (p. 59). Freeberg complains that autonomously grounded discourse, in circumstances involving incompatible values, achieves agreement only when people forgo their first-order, moral values. Here, speakers undergo a transformation in which they exchange their core values for “a newly synthesized third set of
In comparing her position on distributive justice to the one held by Rawls, Freeberg supports the provision of "the resources necessary to participate in a particular practice," but says that unlike Rawls, "no broad equal opportunity principle . . . may flow from valuing agency freedom" (p. 132). But whatever the origin of her view of distributive justice, she must, as she has not done, demonstrate why her conception of distributive justice sustains a more extensive pluralism. Despite these concerns, Regarding Equality provides a philosophically rich and intellectually intriguing account that will significantly influence future discussions of equality, freedom, and moral pluralism.


In this thoughtful and thought-provoking book, Anna Galeotti offers an account of toleration that aims to make it a key part of a theory of social justice capable of dealing with the contemporary politics of identity and difference. Criticizing the limitations of both neutralist and perfectionist versions of the liberal account of toleration, she offers in their place what she calls "toleration as recognition." Such toleration goes beyond merely granting liberty to differences that are disapproved of or disliked. It promises instead the positive and public affirmation of those differences. Galeotti claims that this account can deal with genuinely problematic cases of intolerance, including— to mention the cases on which she focuses— l'affaire du foulard, same-sex marriage, and the problem of racism. She knows that some will think that toleration as recognition cannot be considered liberal, particularly since it appears to violate the liberal principles of neutrality and impartiality. But she maintains that her account is compatible with revised versions of these principles, and she further argues that it realizes the liberal values of equal citizenship and equality of respect. For her, toleration as recognition is a development or expansion of liberalism.

Galeotti begins her account by arguing that real problems of toleration today concern the relations between the dominant majority and subordinate minorities: While the majority enjoys both private and public toleration, minorities are only tolerated in private. For the former group, their habits and customs are considered normal; they can "be 'normally' present and 'quietly' visible in public space" (p. 73). Subordinate groups, by contrast, are ascribed characteristics that they have not chosen, and that are regarded as differences in the sense of deviance from the norm. It is these differences that lack public recognition. As a consequence, while the former group is able to enjoy full citizenship, the latter are excluded and marginalized. While they may possess the formal entitlements of citizenship, excluded minorities lack the capacities with which to make full use of those entitlements. Without public recognition, and hence without public respect, they are unable to develop the self-respect and self-esteem that are the necessary conditions for making full use of the rights and opportunities of citizenship.

Given this account of the problem, Galeotti argues, the solution is to grant public recognition to those excluded minorities, to affirm the positive value of their differences. The effect of such toleration is to put these differences within the "normal" or "viable" range of options in that society. As a consequence, the newly included minorities can develop self-respect and self-esteem, and hence they can flourish as citizens. It must be emphasized that there is nothing "merely" symbolic about this public recognition since, if it were granted, social standards and conventions would have to change. For instance, Muslim girls would get the right to wear the hijab in public schools, same-sex marriage would be legalized, and certain forms of racism (such as specific instances of hate speech) that threaten to undermine the fragile identities of newly included minorities would not be tolerated. Toward the end of the book, Galeotti considers other possible measures that may be implied by this commitment to public recognition, ranging from establishing affirmative action programs to granting minorities the conditions of collective self-determination. She takes care to argue that complex considerations govern each of these cases, and she vigorously denies that all such measures flow automatically from a commitment to public recognition.

This book is a valuable contribution both to the theory of liberalism and to the theory of recognition. Its central argument, that certain specific commitments to recognition follow from the best understanding of the liberal doctrine of toleration, is developed with considerable care and subtlety. Its insightful analysis of a number of specific cases enables its practical implications to be clearly seen. Given its richness, Toleration as Recognition prompts a whole range of questions. Do problems of toleration today always concern a dominant majority and repressed minorities? If the minority's identity is ascribed, does this imply that the majority's identity is not? Can issues of distribution be neatly separated from issues of recognition as Galeotti believes? What evidence is there for...
the “conjunctural causal chain” (p. 12) that she posits among public toleration, self-respect, and full citizenship?

Given the limitations of space, however, the remainder of this review will focus on just one, albeit critical, issue. Does Galston’s extension of the idea of toleration in the direction of recognition mean that in fact it has become an account of recognition, rather than an account of toleration? She is, of course, fully aware that we ordinarily understand toleration to be a matter of not interfering with behavior that we dislike or of which we disapprove (p. 1). For this reason, she is explicitly committed to justifying “a semantic extension from the negative sense of noninterference to the positive sense of acceptance and recognition” (p. 10). Tolerations as recognition is not negative since it is detached from any attitude of dislike or disapproval. Recognition is rather a matter of public respect (p. 101) and official acceptance (p. 104). Its aim is “to make all citizens positively at ease with their full-blown identities in public as well as in private” (p. 105). Nor is toleration as recognition a matter of noninterference, since it cannot be achieved merely by granting liberties. Indeed, there should be “limits to public toleration (as noninterference)” in the case of racist acts “likely to undermine the stability” of newly included minorities (p. 110). However, if Galston’s doctrine is detached from both disapproval and noninterference, and connected instead to affirmation and active intervention, it is very difficult to see in what sense it remains one of toleration. Nor it is apparent if anything would be lost if she redescribed her project simply as the defense of the liberal theory of recognition. The advantage gained would be the ability to avoid the convolutions in argument needed to try to show that this remains a doctrine of toleration.

**Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice**, By William A. Galston.
150p. $55.00 cloth, $19.00 paper.

— Evan Charney, Duke University

The goal of this book is to defend a form of liberalism that can maximally accommodate pluralism within a stable and just political order. William Galston defends such accommodation on the basis of an assumption concerning the nature of value itself: Values are qualitatively heterogeneous and incommensurable, and hence incapable of being comprehensively ranked ordered according to a single scale of value. He argues that incommensurability applies both to the rank ordering of goods and to ethical and political deliberation itself. All so-called monist theories that try to reduce morality to a single supreme value, summum bonum, or moral law or principle ignore the irreducible heterogeneity of both values and moral obligations and distort the complexity of moral phenomena. More often than not, moral and political deliberation is a matter of choosing between heterogeneous goods and heterogeneous moral claims, which themselves defy any strict lexical ordering.

On the basis of these assumptions, Galston draws some critical conclusions for liberal political theory. Value pluralism entails that the liberal state should pursue a policy of “maximum feasible accommodation” for both groups and individuals, limited by the “core requirements of individual security and civic unity” (p. 20). The state accomplishes this by upholding “expressive liberty,” a form of Berlinian negative liberty (Isaiah Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty*, 1969) that allows both individuals and groups to lead their lives “in accordance with their own understandings of what gives life meaning and purpose” (p. 62). This means that autonomy should not be construed as the core liberal value. From a value-pluralist perspective, there may be valuable forms of life that are not autonomous in the sense that they are not the product of conscious reflection and individual choice but, rather, of tradition or deference to authority or unwavering faith. Hence toleration, which Galston associates historically with “Reformation” liberalism and religious toleration in the aftermath of the Wars of Religion, rather than autonomy, which he associates with “Enlightenment” liberalism, should be seen as the central liberal value. On the basis of these assumptions, he defends allowing the Amish to withdraw their children from high school several years early to preserve their traditional way of life; exempting Christian Fundamentalists from the use of public school readers to which they object on religious grounds; and protecting “illiberal” voluntary associations in civil society from undue interference by the state.

Galston argues that civic unity and stability will result from granting people maximal expressive liberty. If persons are left free to lead their lives as they see fit, they will support the liberal order that grants them this freedom. This may strike many as an overly optimistic assumption, inasmuch as persons in liberal democracies desire not only to lead their own lives unhindered by others but to have a say in the political process as well. A liberal less sympathetic to the project of maximal accommodation might argue that securing liberal civic unity and stability requires educating citizens in core liberal civic virtues, such as toleration.

If we grant maximal accommodation to the intolerant and illiberal, including exemptions from attempts to propagate core liberal values, but cannot exclude them from active participation in political life (which a liberal democracy could never do), are we not potentially threatening the stability of the liberal state? Those alarmed at the intolerant, antiliberal political agenda of religious fundamentalists of all faiths in liberal democracies at home and abroad may wonder whether the way to increase civic unity is to grant them even more autonomy.

Yet Galston is correct to point out that the denial of requests for accommodation, particularly in the context of education, often has the effect of alienating yet further those groups that may already be disaffected with the liberal state. The result of school boards refusing to accommodate Christian Fundamentalists by exempting their children from a particular reading class to which their parents object on religious grounds may and often does result in their parents withdrawing their children from public schools altogether. Isolated from the more pluralistic public school environment, such children have even less of a possibility of learning toleration and other liberal values, and their parents will view the liberal state as hostile and unaccommodating.

Liberals committed to the acceptance and maximal toleration of value pluralism, however, may question the extent to which Galston consistently upholds his own principles. In discussing the requirement that (adult) individuals in the liberal state have a legally enforceable right of exit from communities, such as, for example, the Amish, Galston asserts: “The politics of negative liberty seeks, first and foremost, to protect their ability to leave—although not necessarily to cultivate the awareness and reflective power that may stimulate them to leave” (p. 51). It can be argued that if persons lack the necessary awareness and reflective powers, then such a right of exit is purely formal. Yet he goes on to assert: “I would add that the exit right must be more than formal. Communities cannot rightly act in ways that disempower individuals—intellectually, emotionally, or practically—from living successfully outside their bounds” (p. 104). Galston considers the example of a community that effectively seizes itself off from the surrounding liberal society and “raises its children with the result that as adults, none ever questions or rejects the group’s basic orientation” (p. 105). Of such a group, he writes, “The community has become a type of mental prison” where the parents are abusing their expressive liberty by turning their children into “automatons” and preventing them from exercising their own expressive liberties (p. 105).
But from the standpoint of moral pluralism, why should the fact that such children come, as adults, never to reject or question the group's basic orientation—due perhaps to isolation, or perhaps simply to the effective transmission of cultural norms—mean that they have become “automatons” and the community a “prison”? Is not such questioning and rejecting characteristic of precisely the kind of Enlightenment autonomy that Galston rejects as the core liberal value, insisting that lives of tradition and faith and custom can be just as valuable as autonomous ones? To talk of customary lives as those of “automatons” invokes John Stuart Mill—the champion of liberal autonomy and individuality—and his assertion that the “customary” individual “has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation” (Mill, On Liberty, 1859). For Berlin, in a passage Galston quotes with approval, “the fundamental sense of freedom is freedom from chains, from imprisonment, from enslavement, by others” (Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, p. vi). If children raised in a traditional culture of the sort Galston mentions believe—as children and adults—in its value, if it constitutes their “core identity,” and if they are leading the lives they want to be leading, in what sense are they “enslaved”? Certainly not in Berlin’s sense of the term.

Galston’s ideas concerning the nature of value pluralism as presented in Liberal Pluralism are both interesting and convincing. But he fails to adhere consistently to some of his own core principles. In fairness to the author, he is attempting in a very slim volume a very formidable task: To articulate a liberal theory that is truly receptive to the manifold ways in which humans can lead valuable forms of life while assuring the freedom of all from “chains,” enslavement, and oppression, whether at the hands of the government, groups, or other individuals.


—Elizabeth V. Spelman, Smith College

As Cynthia Halpern sees it, the project of modernity—or at least of modern political theory—is coming to terms with the meaning and value of human suffering. The transition from a religious to a secular world proceeded along a series of changing articulations of the nature, causes, and remedies for suffering. The figures whose work defines such moments are Luther, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Nietzsche. By marking her account as a genealogy, Halpern puts us on notice that she does not intend to present the transition from religious to secular understandings of suffering as a smooth, broken, logical, unitary process but, instead, as “constructed out of several opposing perspectives that neither coincide nor cohere, but rather contradict each other, but which, in their opposition and succession, contribute to the historical and philosophical emergence of new perspectives, and a new, terrible kind of knowledge” (p. 14). For the development of such knowledge, Nietzsche will in the end be her go-to guy: “I am seeking the elusive elements of a new kind of politics and a new space for an ethics of suffering and responsibility. I want to delineate something of what a Nietzschean, postmetaphysical physical response to suffering might be like” (p. 170).

However bumpy and map resistant the ride to Nietzsche, we cannot have gotten there, nor understand what it means to have gotten there, without the perspectives on suffering to which earlier thinkers draw our attention and to which Nietzsche is responding. There is first of all the perspective of the sufferer, and here “Martin Luther supplies the material of this anguish, the beating heart of the suffering body and soul, seemingly helpless and powerless in a remorseless world in the fact of an unknowable God” (p. 15). The secular world came to offer a variety of remedies for such helplessness. There is on the one hand Thomas Hobbes, taking on and indeed helping to create the perspective of “the agent and the knowers, as he reconstitutes the causes and effects of suffering and devises scientific and political remedies for it” (p. 29). But there is also Rousseau, unabashedly the moralist, celebrating the “viewpoint of the spectator and revolutionary, for whom the politics of pity for the masses as sufferers becomes a systematic indictment of history itself” (p. 29). It is Rousseau, Halpern underscores, who “is the perfect foil, the bête noir,” (p. 134), for the Nietzsche who deeply distrusts not just the morality and politics but the metaphysics and epistemology that would allow pity to play such an important role in the organization of individual and communal lives. But Luther’s God and Hobbes’s Science are also Nietzschean culprits, and we need to be reminded of these earlier views about the causes of and possible remedies for suffering in order to appreciate the full scope and force of Nietzsche’s contribution to its genealogy.

Halpern is concerned that a book on suffering and political theory may invite inappropriate hopes in her readers, and so early on she tries to make clear what her exploration will not include. By way of characterizing her work as a genealogy, she remarks that “I have not simply chosen an interesting topic, suffering, and checked with some of the usual suspects in the history of political thought in order to hear what they had to say about it” (p. 15). So be forewarned, you Plato-to-Arendt types. Halpern also emphasizes that this is not a book for those interested in explorations of particular instances of suffering—“The Holocaust. The 60 million dead in the Stalinist gulag, Hiroshima. The mountains of skulls of the Khmer Rouge. The Cultural Revolution. The endless slaughters in Rwanda and the Congo. Kosovo” (p. 5)—nor for those wondering how if at all to talk about degrees of suffering. For “I am speaking of suffering in this book in the most generic way possible” (p. 6)—the suffering necessitated by the harsh and subjugating processes by which we become and remain both individual subjects and members of communities (p. 155). She is not opposed to the ranking of suffering (and will theorize that practice, she promises, in her next book), but insists that the conceptual, moral, and political assumptions that make such ranking seem natural and necessary are themselves part of what her account scrutinizes. (My guess is that she would acknowledge but, for the moment, not be bothered by the charge that the very idea of generic suffering itself reflects a kind of universalizing that it is the point of her genealogy to cut through.)

What can readers expect, then, in this account of the centrality of suffering to the twists, turns, and torques of modern political theory? First, a semicyclopelic tour of the views of Luther, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Nietzsche (especially the latter, to whose work more than a third of the book is devoted). There are at least two reasons for this. For one thing, Halpern not unreasonably assumes that the more we know, for example, about Luther’s notion of the relation of the spiritual to the temporal worlds (pp. 39 ff.), the better we’ll get the gist of his account of suffering as an expression of God’s will; that we need to trace Hobbes’s response to Cartesian doubt (pp. 67 ff.) in order to understand the nature of the remedies for suffering he thought possible; that consulting Rousseau’s Essay on the Origin of Language (pp. 145 ff.) will enrich our grasp of his concept of pity; that going over Nietzsche’s narrative of how humans became animals “with the right to make promises” (pp. 203 ff.) will help us interpret his claims about the sources of suffering. Secondly, there also is a strong whiff-of-the-dissertation in Suffering, Politics, Power, the almost palpable presence of the vigilant adviser to whom one must, whatever else, show one’s mastery of the canonical and noncanonical texts.

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Still, there is no doubt that Halpern loves her project, and the untrammeled enthusiasm with which she makes herself part of the conversation she is narrating invites us into it as well. Her normative claims are challenging, even if put forward more as views than arguments she defends: that we are stuck in a Rousseauian time warp, all too at ease with his "normative categories and familiar typical analysis of the causes and remedies for social suffering" (p. 134); that we need to take seriously Nietzsche's claim that "the function of suffering in life is deeply mysterious and necessary in ways we cannot understand" (p. 211); that it is a form of "monumental stupidity" to think that suffering might ever be made to disappear from human life (p. 222); that coming to live with suffering requires that "[t]here is no blame. That is the hardest lesson of all to learn, and the one Nietzsche most wanted us to learn. There is no blame" (p. 270, the concluding sentences of the book). If the *explanandum* is generic suffering—that which is necessitated by the very conditions of subjectivity and sociality—the case against blame seems strong. But what will the case against blame look like when Halpern turns, in the promised sequel, to the Holocaust, Hiroshima, Rwanda? Stay tuned.

**The Iliad as Politics: The Performance of Political Thought.**

— Donald J. Matthewson, California State University Fullerton

This book makes two important arguments. First, despite the protests of Plato that poetry is mimetic and that it is three degrees removed from reality, Dean Hammer contends that the poet can and does engage in "reflective" political philosophy. Second, he argues that the *Iliad* anticipates the development of formal political institutions and thus properly belongs in the canon of Western political philosophy. He advances these arguments over two critical objections. First, critics contend that the language of the poet is instrumental and as such is used only to create a dramatic narrative, rather than used to systematically construct and develop philosophical concepts. Second, critics note that at the time Homer wrote the *Iliad*, human psychology had not reached a point that fully recognized man's ontological separation from nature—a step, according to Sheldon Wolin (*Politics and Vision*, 1960), that is a necessary condition for the development of political philosophy. Man at this time was not sufficiently self-reflective to create institutions designed for collective deliberation about common issues.

Hammer confronts these objections by introducing his concept of "political fields." Borrowing from anthropological literature as well as literary criticism, Hammer suggests that political fields is a concept that moves beyond an exclusive focus on established political structures. Rather, "fields" represent the contexts in which processes, defined as human interactions, occur. Fields can expand or contract depending on the nature of problems that are confronted. Thus, it is "the activity that defines the field" (p. 27). Hammer's concept is important because it means that political philosophy need not be confined to the formalism that we find in the canon, but it can arise from a narrative that is shaped by the "performance of politics" in various fields.

According to Hammer, publicly performed poetry allows the community to reflect collectively about problems of community life. Thus, the *Iliad* can be viewed as instructional because Homer's audience was comprised of eighth-century elites who were participating in the development of the emerging *polis*. Hammer uses archaeological evidence to show that certain public spaces in Dark Age Greek cities were provided for public forums. Through his use of secondary sources, he also demonstrates that by the eighth century, the stage of political evolution that would precede the full development of the *polis* was well under way. This evidence is important because it helps establish the point that the *Iliad* served an instructional purpose. John Alvis (*Divine Purpose and Heroic Response in Homer and Virgil, 1995*) elaborates this point in much more detail. Alvis points out that an understanding of the epic includes a realization that Homer understands that the age of heroes is past and that the foundations for a new political order must be created. It is surprising that Hammer does not cite Alvis in his otherwise extensive bibliography.

Is Homer living in a political or prepolitical society? Any conception of politics must have a clear conception of human agency. According to Wolin, prior to the sixth century, man considered himself to be an integral part of nature. Therefore, a fully developed concept of agency, a necessary condition for formal political philosophy, could not exist. One might read Homer as being overly deterministic in that the gods play such a significant role in shaping human action. Hammer uses textual support to demonstrate the opposite, namely, that the Greeks were in the process of developing fairly sophisticated notions of agency and risk. For example, he portrays Achilles as making a fairly knowledgeable statement of autonomy and returning to the community as a thoughtful human. In fact, it could be argued that part of the epic is about the establishment of an ontologically distinct man who replaces the half-man/half-god warrior. It is no accident that Homer repeats the bloodlines of the warriors as they are killed off one by one so that in the end, the universe will be populated only by gods, men, and beasts.

In addition, the behavior of Achilles during the funeral games indicates that he uses his autonomy to restore important communal functions. Hammer argues that the funeral games emphasize Homer's view of political justice. The method employed by Achilles for the distribution of the prizes is a political act meant to restore values to the community that had been lost to natural and arbitrary causes. In short, justice requires that fate often must be corrected.

Hammer's final piece of evidence for the development of political space is the meeting between Priam and Achilles. The poet uses this scene to demonstrate that the emotions of pity and esteem are necessary conditions for the development of the political. These emotions, essential for the building of human society, must replace the unrestrained passion and thoughtlessness of the warrior code.

It is curious that Hammer spends very little time on an analysis of Troy itself. After all, "sacred *Ilium*" was created as a walled city as humans moved off the slopes of Mount Ida. Metaphorically, the walls symbolize man's separation from nature. We also know from the text that Troy itself has religious, domestic, and civic venues that are essential for a well-developed polis. Although Hammer argues that Troy does not contain the institutions necessary for a fully developed polis, I believe that Homer uses the pending destruction of the city to inform us about the missing characteristics. Despite its apparent integration of the necessary spaces for collective activities, it is Priam's obsession with Eros and Hector's willingness to risk his family and city for the warrior code that demonstrate that "Troy cannot sustain itself through time. Different foundations for the city must be established. Hammer might have made the argument that Troy is missing a space for *themis*, or a "collegial space," where public claims can be expressed and adjudicated, and, more importantly, where individual acts, which are expressions of rules, can be understood by all. Although his discussion of *themis* is well developed in relationship to the Achaeans in Chapter 6, his analysis could also be extended to Troy and its fall, which according to Alvis, Homer uses as instructional.

The significance of Hammer's book is that it demonstrates that two values are necessary
conditions for the development of politics: Pity, on the one hand, allows humans to put themselves in another's shoes, and esteem, on the other, is a human attribute necessary for the creation of public space. The _Iliad_ is the first publicly articulated narrative that outlines the conditions necessary for the establishment of political institutions that were to develop in Greece over the succeeding two centuries.


― Marion Smiley, Brandeis University

Since progressive social and political theorists are generally concerned to undermine those forces in the community that restrict the free choice of oppressed groups, as well as to ensure that group members are able to express their own desires, they would seem to be in need of both negative and positive notions of liberty. But they are not now able to incorporate either notion of liberty into their writings on freedom. For, as now formulated, negative liberty—the absence of external impediments—precludes attention to the conditions of personal empowerment, and positive liberty—the ability of individuals to control their own lives—presupposes a preformed, if not transcendental, self that many contemporary social and political theorists rightly reject as unfeasible.

What, then, are progressive social and political theorists to do? Since the prevailing formulations of negative and positive liberty are now so deeply entrenched, they might want simply to forget the whole project. But, as Nancy Hirschmann shows in this extremely well argued piece of work, negative liberty in general, as distinct from Isaiah Berlin's original formulation of it, does not rule out reference to internal barriers to self-realization. Nor does positive liberty have to be associated with a preformed self. Hence, those who want to associate freedom with both the absence of external impediments and personal empowerment do not have to give up on the notions of negative and positive liberty. Instead, they have to rethink both terms, as well as the relationship between them.

Hirschmann provides us with just such a rethinking in _The Subject of Liberty_ and, in doing so, makes a very important contribution to both our theory and practice of freedom. She begins somewhat controversially (for a feminist) by placing negative liberty, rather than, say, autonomy, at the center of our attention. But she does not accept the conventional understanding of negative liberty as the absence of purely “external” constraints. Nor does she, in moving into the realm of “internal” constraints, stop with mere socialization or resort to a model of adaptive preferences. Instead, she zeroes in on the various forces in society—ideological, material and linguistic—that constrain the “subject of liberty” in the making of (relatively) free choices, that is, choices associated with an individual’s “own” desires rather than with those created for her by a system of power over which she has no control.

Hirshmann is at her best when articulating what she calls the three levels of construction: the ideological misrepresentation of reality; the material effects of such misrepresentation; and the discursive construction of social meaning, a process through which the “language and categories of knowledge available to women are structured to express men’s experiences and desires and to obscure, ignore and deny women’s experiences and desires” (p. 89). She articulates these three levels abstractly and with considerable analytic rigor at the outset. But she does not remain in the realm of abstraction. Instead, she moves on to show how all three levels of construction work together to undermine freedom in a set of concrete cases, namely, those associated with battered women, welfare recipients, and women faced with the prospect of wearing a veil.

Two sets of questions inevitably arise in this context. First of all, how, if women’s selves are necessarily constructed by the ideological, material, and discursive forces of patriarchy, can women hope to pursue their “own” desires and formulate their “own” goals outside of a patriarchal context? Since Hirschmann does not, like many other theorists of freedom, associate freedom with the making of either purely rational or morally good choices, and since she construes freedom as relative, rather than absolute, she does not have to defend contra-causal freedom. But she does have to show how individuals can be said to be the “final arbiter of their own choices” (p. 202) within an understanding of reality that not only gives a great deal of power to language but is determinist in a variety of respects.

How can she—or anyone else—manage such a feat? Three aspects of her analysis turn out to be very helpful in this context, although they do not quite get her to the point where she can talk about individuals who are the “final arbiters of their own choices.” The first is her demonstration that women’s reality, even though it is shaped by patriarchy, can never be totally subsumed by it, since women participate in it as subjects and not just as objects. The second is her reference to macro structures other than patriarchy, such as systems of race and class, that allow particular women, for example, white women of the upper classes, to change the discourses of identity within patriarchy. The third is her recognition that all macro structures are internally inconsistent to some extent and, hence, susceptible to contestation by those who are intent on subverting them.

Hirschmann succeeds admirably in showing how women can both transform particular aspects of patriarchy and achieve (relative) freedom in their lives. But what is the status of her general theory of freedom with respect to her particular analysis of patriarchy? Does her general theory of freedom rest on her particular analysis of patriarchy to the extent that it makes no sense without it? Or does it exist independently of her particular analysis of patriarchy? Is it a distinctly feminist theory of freedom or is it a theory of freedom per se that is particularly useful to understanding the disempowerment of women?

Hirschmann refers to her theory as a “feminist theory of freedom” and makes a series of very persuasive feminist arguments about the gendered nature of the prevailing formulations of negative and positive liberty. Moreover, she succeeds in showing throughout her various examinations of women’s lives that the theory of freedom that she develops is particularly important to women. But the theory of freedom that she develops, which requires individuals to participate in their own construction, does in the end seem to hold true, not because of the particular analysis of patriarchy that she provides, but because of its power as a general theory of freedom. Hence, it is, along with the larger work of which it is part, ultimately very important, not just to feminist theory but to an understanding of the theory and practice of freedom in general.


― Eduardo A. Velásquez, Washington and Lee University and Liberty Fund, Inc.

"It has been frequently remarked," reads _Federalist Papers_ No. 1, "that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or
whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.” According to the author of *Federalist* 1, the important question that calls for a demonstrable answer is not merely about Americans’ capacity to freely choose. Americans’ special calling is to vindicate the human capacity to choose their own individual and collective good on the basis of their own reflection.

Americans view attempts to define choice in terms of a human good with suspicion and anxiety. And for good reasons. These feelings are prompted by Americans’ propensity to interpret their own good as freedom, and their own freedom as choice, any choice, even choices that prove detrimental to what others might call their good. To be sure, the imperative to “free choice” does not rule out political coercion. Our choices are bound by the requirement that we do “no harm,” to use Thomas Hobbes’s reworking of the “Golden Rule.” Even so, we tend to think of these limits in terms of the body, not the soul. Americans’ understanding of freedom in principle rules out most forms of moral coercion. The interior life of an American should be “unencumbered.” Americans speak fervently about their “free conscience,” and about the requirements of “toleration.” But as partisans of older conceptions of virtue repeatedly point out, the conflation of morality and freedom imperils all goods that do not meet the demands of freedom. Communityarians, cultural conservatives, liberal partisans of “social capital” (some of them evangelists)—the list is hardly exhaustive—look back to the days of robust bowling leagues, when fraternity, community, friendship, and common purpose meant something.

The efforts of Michael Zuckert and Peter Josephson could be read as part of an ever-expanding attempt to defend the modern, liberal, Lockean experiment in self-government against the charge that it is an open-ended enterprise vindicating unencumbered choice. There are identifiable goods that Locke’s political philosophy advances and defends, we are told. How Locke’s political philosophy is able to do this while abiding by the imperative of freedom is the central question these authors raise and then grapple with. But in trying to persuade us that some version of Locke’s political philosophy is hospitable to those human yearnings and possibilities outside the orbit of modern conceptions of the self, do Zuckert and Josephson produce an understanding of Locke (and, by extension, things American) that can be vindicated on Locke’s own premises?

*Launching Liberalism* is, for the most part, a collection of essays published at various points during Zuckert’s now long and very distinguished career. Together with his *Natural Rights and the New Republicanism* (1994) and *The Natural Rights Republic* (1996), *Launching Liberalism* is arguably one of the most subtle, intelligent, and compelling accounts of Locke’s political philosophy and its bearing on the American Founding. This is not to say Zuckert has friends everywhere. He does not conceal his debt to Leo Strauss. To move in Straussian circles is to oppose Quentin Skinner and the “Cambridge school” (p. 2), that is, all those inclined toward a strictly historical and contextual reading of Locke (pp. 57–79). But Zuckert’s debt to Strauss does not amount to servility. His commitment to a version of the “Straussian” hermeneutic goes some way in providing us with a rather un-Straussian Locke (see especially pp. 297–310). Loosely stated, Strauss advances the view that Locke is Hobbes made palatable. Locke’s modernity remains, like Hobbes’s, the “joyless quest for joy” (see Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 1953). On Zuckert’s reading, “Locke assimilates, rejects, and moves beyond the Hobbesian.” And it is “this moving beyond Hobbes that allows Locke to ‘launch liberalism’” (p. 3). Strauss is certainly right so far as he goes, argues Zuckert, “but he does not bring out the most significant way in which Locke breaks with Hobbes—the modification of the doctrine of natural right that he effects” (p. 3; cf. pp. 33–44 and 82–96).

Let us return to the moral questions (and their relation to freedom) raised by the author of the first *Federalist*. According to Zuckert’s Locke, the “rights that human beings have by nature are not pure liberties as they are for Hobbes, but moral entities of the sort that imply limitations or obligations on all” (p. 4). In the spirit of the *Federalist*, freedom comes within the orbit of morality (see especially pp. 274–93). Zuckert’s Locke moves “closer to the traditional views of nature and justice that Hobbes had rejected and is thus able to join hands with more traditional thinkers like Hooker against Hobbes” (p. 4). This is not to turn Locke into, say, a Thomist (pp. 169–200). But he supposedly makes arguments that are at least friendly to Thomism. For example, Locke’s views do not amount to a rejection of natural human community. “The state of nature,” Zuckert argues, “is a consequence of the structure of the human self, and Locke makes clear in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* that the self arises on the basis of developed linguistic capacity and, therefore, in society.” The Lockean “abstract I” caricatured by communityarians as the liberal self is, according to Zuckert, “only one part of the story” (p. 7).

On Zuckert’s reading, then, Locke turns out to have a much more robust conception of the “self.” “Like Aristotle,” Zuckert writes, “Locke identified the goal of human striving, the ultimate aim of action, as happiness” (p. 11; cf. pp. 331–53). The “Lockean self is a potentially responsible being in that it can know and conform to rules” (p. 11). Locke is also friendly to Christianity (pp. 147–68). Freedom of religion can be for Locke (properly understood) “a source of great civil stability” (p. 12). Religion helps establish morality (p. 15). There are at least echoes of a teleological Locke here. But let us be clear. An important question Zuckert attends to with care and eloquence is whether Locke’s negation of Hobbes amounts to an affirmation of a distinct human end or good. Happiness is “not fully positive,” Zuckert writes; it “is defined in terms of a negation—the absence of unease” (p. 11). The most significant suggestion of Part Two of *Launching Liberalism* leads to, but does not fully explore, Locke’s “working toward a theory of pre-modern consciousness” (pp. 15, 129–200). This is an astonishing claim in the light of Zuckert’s previous books on Locke.

Peter Josephson’s *The Great Art of Government* is animated by similar sentiments about the Lockean enterprise, although he comes to his own conclusions by different means. Let us return to morality and choice. In exploring Locke’s use of consent, Josephson wonders whether Locke is able to provide answers “to the philosophers’ objections to his proposal for government according to the will of the people or the majority” (p. xi). The philosophers’ objection amounts to the familiar critique of any democratic politics, namely, that the majority does not necessarily will its own good. It merely wills. Josephson answers that for “Locke the art of liberal government must be an art of instruction; the liberal regime must teach its subjects the virtues or qualities necessary to maintain the regime. They must be disposed to consent to what is reasonable.” This means that “Locke’s liberal regime...is like other regimes in that it requires and perhaps imposes certain moral virtues on the people” (pp. xi–xii). Americans are a “people” like other peoples. The use of such words as “regime” and “people” attests to Josephson’s gaze toward antiquity. For numerous interpreters of the American republic, the commitment to freedom puts America at odds with the very notion of a regime.

I emphasize gaze. Like Zuckert, Josephson takes seriously much of what Strauss teaches about our liberal modernity, which is to say that there is a divide between “ancients and moderns.” In his reading of Locke’s law of nature (pp. 69–118), for example, Josephson revisits Strauss’s claim that “Locke removes, piece by piece, the traditional law of nature and replaces it with a new law of human
intervention” (p. 116). Locke's modernity emphasizes human artifice and convention over and above what is supposedly given to us by nature and nature's God. Although Locke “leaves behind the traditional understanding of the law of nature,” Josephson argues, he “does not leave behind nature” (p. 118). According to Josephson, there is for Locke an “understanding of natural justice, a justice that we may imitate” (p. 277). To assert the influence of nature does not dispense with the need for conventions. “What Locke proposes,” Josephson writes, “is the rule of reasonable customs, not reason” (p. 282, my emphasis).

What are we to make of Zuckert’s and Josephson’s “non-Lockean Locke,” to borrow a phrase first coined by Nathan Tarcov? The so-called Lockean project is on both authors’ terms a radically malleable project. Things Lockean are properly defined by their peculiar capacity to absorb a variety of teachings or influences, while at the same time retaining the central characteristics we tend to attribute to Lockean things. I have in mind government by the consent of the governed, the rule of law, divided government, religious liberty, an openness of a variety of different ways of life. We find in Locke’s “openness” the essence of its durability. But it is also its weakness. Devotion to the amorphous Locke undermines our capacity to determine whether a liberal regime's various and conflicting appropriations will be in the service of liberty properly understood. Does Locke provide us with the resources to identify and to defend against those intrusions that undermine the possibility of a Lockean politics and a Lockean morality? I dare say that these two books should be read as valiant attempts to reshape Locke into something that might speak to the ills that Lockeanism alone cannot inoculate against. This is Locke in the spirit of community. Locke permits this. But explaining Locke is not quite the same as explaining ourselves. Neither would explaining ourselves explain Locke. Zuckert’s and Josephson’s Locke are very much in and of Time. Could these admittedly Straussian readings of Locke unwittingly turn out to be species of the genus historicism?


— Rebecca Kingston, University of Toronto

This work contributes to a long-standing tradition that seeks to enrich the moral vocabulary of liberalism. The focus here is the neglected and, it is argued, often rhetorically obfuscated concept of honor. It is Sharon Krause’s contention not only that a study of honor can allow us to understand better some of the heroic actions of liberal democracy’s great political actors (here, all American), but also that bringing this quality to light is one important step in helping to “revitalize individual agency” and “invigorate the civic sources of liberal democracy” (p. x).

Krause goes about her project in three interrelated and interlacing ways. Her conceptual analysis of the features of honor is both supported and refined by the study of the roots of honor in the theories of Montesquieu and Tocqueville, as well as by the study of the practice of honor in the lives of such individuals as the American founders, Frederick Douglass, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and Martin Luther King, Jr. Her investigation reveals “the aristocratic inheritance” (p. 181) of liberal democracy. Honor, as part of that inheritance, retains an aristocratic quality in that it requires the muster of types of courage and ambition of which not all democratic citizens would be capable. In this sense, while honor has historically served the cause of liberal democracy through the resolute defense of liberties against encroaching power, honor also remains in fundamental tension with the claims of equality that ground these same democratic liberties. Honor thus stands in this work like the modern democratic equivalent to Machiavellian virtù, being the set of exceptional qualities which make modern foundings and refoundings possible but which cannot be sustained or cultivated in any normalized way by the regimes they serve.

The question may arise of how a concept deemed aristocratic and rooted in the practice of absolute monarchy could be relevant at all to the political life of modern liberal democracy. Krause seeks to bridge this divide by a definition of honor that is both broad and flexible, allowing it to be found in a multitude of guises. She argues that honor as a quality of character harbors three distinguishing and relatively constant features: namely, the idea that one acts out of ambition and the desire for social recognition but also out of reverence for a set of principles or a code independent of one’s will; the summoning of courage as a basis for extraordinary action; and a continued emphasis on a sense of duty to oneself (p. 29).

These three features are then shown in practice to take on differing priorities and qualities related to both the regime and the individual concerned. Thus, some actors may be more strongly motivated by ambition and others by a sense of duty, though not to the exclusion of the other features. The content of the codes invoked are open to great variation as well.

In her discussion of Montesquieu’s understanding of honor as the “principle” of the monarchical regime, Krause focuses on the resistance of the governor of Bayonne, the Viscount of Orte, who boldly dismissed the king’s command to massacre Huguenots. The motivating force of this action is considered not an intrinsic passion for justice but a desire to do great things. The parlements and other intermediary bodies of the French monarchical regime are said to have embodied honor in the same way in their defense of political liberties vis-à-vis the Crown.

Still, the hero of Liberalism with Honor remains Tocqueville, who discussed the possibility of the continued importance of old-regime honor in democratic societies. Krause uses Tocqueville well to support the counterintuitive notion that honor is relevant in democracies. She does this by downplaying Tocqueville’s civic humanist associations. She then carries his arguments one step further by reinterpreting the actions of some of America’s most honored political actors. In her brief discussions of such figures as Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and Martin Luther King, she seeks to show that honor, rather than either pure self-interest or an altruistic passion for justice, can provide readers with a better understanding of their motivations. Communitarians and civic humanists rely on a capacity for altruism which is ultimately unreliable. Liberal virtue theorists lack an account of individual agency that will allow for the possibility of great actions to defend, sustain and redefine modern democracies.

Honor, then, she claims, can provide us with a conceptual tool better suited to both the characteristics of the modern democratic individual and the needs of modern liberal democratic regimes. She is also careful to limit her claim in recognizing that honor cannot serve as a general liberal democratic principle, but as an extraordinary quality of character to which only a few can aspire and which is indeed exercised only episodically. Still, as a final, though curious, twist, Krause has honor coming in the back door as a more extensive principle by noting that honor can be manifested within such venues as voluntary associations and can be exercised relative to them and their purposes (p. 182).

The strength of Krause’s account lies in the claim that contemporary liberalism does not provide an adequate account of the motivations driving political action. There is certainly much more to be said concerning the democratic character and the varied qualities that help maintain our collective lives. She provides a creative response to the overly rigid dichotomy (albeit partly of her own interpretative license) between self-interest and obligations to
LaVaque-Manty offers a model of liberal political agency that “doesn’t turn liberals into either cowardly intellectuals or purely selfish interest-maximizers” (p. 4). His model makes the ideal of public reason the normative basis for political actions but connects this ideal to social practices and the affective lives of particular individuals. The book is important because it calls attention to the need to treat political agency and political legitimacy together, thereby addressing the gap within many versions of contemporary liberalism between moral psychology and normative theory. It is also ambitious—both in its method and in its aims—for it combines textual study of Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Kant with the formulation of an original theory of liberal agency and a case-study analysis of current environmental politics that illustrates the practical applications of the theory. It contributes to normative debates about justice and legitimacy, as well as to the literatures on collective action, social movements, and civic engagement.

LaVaque-Manty emphasizes that his theory of agency is a normative and not an explanatory theory. His purpose is not to explain what motivates political action or to identify its causes but, rather, to describe the character that actions must have in order to count as legitimate from a liberal standpoint (pp. 90–91, 126). Liberal agency may be motivated by a range of different causes, including passions and interests of various stripes, and presumably virtues, too. What makes an action count as an exercise of liberal agency—whatever its cause—is that the agent can defend it in terms of reasons that count as valid for the other persons who comprise the relevant justificatory community (pp. 5, 126). Although his emphasis is on reasons rather than causes, LaVaque-Manty means to treat the two together, and he sets out to explore how “motives and reasons, interests and principles, rhetoric and justification” coexist in actual political practices (p. 14).

This is where the real power of the book lies, for it accounts in a largely successful way for the constitutive role of affect as a moving force of political agency, without undercutting the justificatory function of reason. This theme is developed through an interpretation of emotion in Kant, which gives way to a more general investigation of the cognitive components of emotions as they figure in political agency. Unlike some other contemporary treatments of beliefs and emotions, LaVaque-Manty resists the rationalist’s urge to reduce the latter to a species of the former. At the same time, his account makes it possible to elaborate criteria for “justifiable” emotions in politics (they are “compatible with legitimate reasons”), and hence to draw a principled distinction between, for example, angry anti-immigrant rhetoric and the passionate appeals of Love Canal activist Lois Gibbs (p. 153).

In treating the issue of justification, LaVaque-Manty adopts a version of the standard of public reason prevalent in liberal theory today, but he acknowledges the ways in which “a system that claims to take arguments on their merits may fail, on a systematic basis, to really see the merit of some arguments, namely those of systematically excluded groups” (p. 162). Under conditions of hegemony, therefore, the exercise of political agency by members of marginalized groups need not always be fully compatible with public reason. Some actions that “push the envelope” in this regard may be acceptable, even if they are not altogether “legitimate” (pp. 162–63, 166).

This sensitivity to the particular constraints on political agency borne by members of marginalized groups makes puzzling his intolerance of what he calls “the Jesus model” of agency, which emphasizes the “uncompromising” pursuit of principles (p. 169). This model is demanding but straightforward: “The agent’s gotta do what the agent’s gotta do, the Right Thing, even if the heavens fall” (p. 169). LaVaque-Manty abhors the dogmatism he finds here. On his “pluralist” view, by contrast, the agent is above all committed to “the contingent public justifiability of both her principles and her engagement” (p. 170). No one likes a dogmatist, of course, but the fallibilism inherent in LaVaque-Manty’s account has its limits, too, in politics if not in philosophy, and especially for those on the losing end of hegemonic forces. Here, the uncompromising pursuit of one’s principles may be the only path to political inclusion, or justice. And as a theoretical matter, this may be the only conceivable form that political agency can take under such circumstances, for if one’s principles are invisible to the eye of public reason because of systematic exclusions, one may well appear uncompromising and dogmatic—which can be other words for “unreasonable according to the prevailing standard of public reason.” LaVaque-Manty is surely right to reject the Jesus model as the sole model of liberal political agency, but a pluralist account of agency might allow for a diversity of types and even make room for a few dogmatists, if only to protect the possibility of contestation from genuinely diverse standpoints.

His account also leaves untouched the source of the liberal citizen’s commitment to justifiability itself. What moves her to care more about justifying herself to all affected others than doing the right thing (as she believes) when these purposes conflict? LaVaque-Manty might have done more to elaborate the reasons and...
causes that sustain our attachment to the liberal form of political agency, in addition to showing how reasons and causes interact within this form of agency. But the limits of his analysis here only point to the value of the book’s larger aspiration, for they show the importance of treating the sources and the structure of political agency together, and connecting the subjects of justification and motivation within liberal theory. If Arguments and Fists does not do this perfectly, it accomplishes significantly more in this regard than previous work has done, and it calls attention to an important new direction for development in political theory.

— Engin F. Isin, York University

In this book, Nicole Loraux plays Freud with the ancient Greek polis. She could have succeeded had her argument been developed consistently. Rather, its chapters have been published in various forms over 15 years and, while addressing several interrelated issues, do not come together as a whole. Yet the attempt is well worth every page and signals a new approach to the interpretation of the Greek polis.

How does Loraux play Freud with the polis? She investigates the city as a subject rather than an object. As a subject, the city thinks and produces subjects within it who become capable of thinking about the city as an object. But there is a fundamental disagreement or disjuncture between the city as a subject that thinks or what it thinks and what its subjects think about it as an object. We are familiar with the latter. We have listened to discourses on the city as an object for centuries (p. 257). We have been told endlessly that the city is a unity of its men as citizens who are assembled and brought together by fraternity, solidarity, and brotherhood, which became the founding myth of the polis: synoecism. We have also been told that the life of the city is military because its citizens wage war and, gathering in the assembly, make decisions based on a majority vote. It is this city that has been immortalized as the polis. But there is another polis. It has been there all along: the polis of women, artisans, metics, farmers, and sailors. By listening to the discourse of citizens, we have neglected to see the other polis and its voices. Loraux renounces “the idea that we should confine ourselves to the words of the Greeks [citizens] and [submit] their discourse to the very questions that are silenced in it” (p. 55).

The other city—city as subject—is therefore the subject of Loraux in this book. How does one investigate the city as a subject? This is where historical anthropology meets Freud. She admits that considering the city as subject is controversial, but to make the city think by listening to the multiplicity of voices and respecting the multilayered instances of enunciation reveals far more subtle and significant aspects of the city than so far we have been able to garner (pp. 59, 61). Loraux is especially drawn to the metapsychological works of Freud, such as Moses and Monotheism. The key assumption is the transference between group and individual psychology and the formation of the latter through the former. If the city has a group existence that is more than the sum total of its individual citizens, Loraux wants to have access to the repressed memory and unconscious of this group existence to recover the multiplicity of its voices. Can we ascribe to the polis the unconscious (defined as the memory that one forgets) to understand what is has repressed (pp. 75–77, 264)?

What is the forgotten here that Loraux wants to have access to? Ostensibly, the beginning point of analysis is Athens in 403 B.C.E. when a bloody oligarchic dictatorship ends and the “democrats’” return to the city victorious. Renouncing vengeance, in an act of amnesia, citizens call for—if not invent—amnesty. They not only swear an oath to forget but also forbid to remember the misfortunes of the past. These misfortunes all revolve around strife and disunity. The city wants to repress the memory of faction, division, conflict, and discord. It is in this act of repression that Loraux uncovers conflict as the founding element of the political. For her, it is “as if the memory of the city were founded on the forgetting of the political as such” (p. 42) and “as if, by swearing not to recall the past, the Athenian city had once again founded its political existence on a loss of memory” (p. 44). For these reasons, Loraux will call her investigation an inquiry into the forgetting of the political (p. 51).

This inquiry then opens up a whole array of sources in tragedy, poetry, and philosophy, not as resources for their face value but for what they symbolize in terms of the repressed memory of the city that is political. As a result, brilliantly alternative readings of Hesiod, Theognis, Aeschylus, Herodotus, Thucydides, Isocrates, Socrates, Aristotle, and Plato are offered. From these readings, Loraux patiently builds a case to demonstrate how the declarations of unity, fraternity, and brotherhood hopelessly, ceaselessly, and desperately came up against the founding principles of the political: agon, strife, discord, disunity, and fragmentation. This is what makes the oath of 403 B.C.E. crucial. For when the democrats, as the previously dominated group, returned to the city victorious, they still succumbed to the myth of the city cultivated by the oligarchs. Since it was not considered noble to succumb to vengeance, forgetting the past was sanctioned as an act of nobility. But in this act of forgetting, the democrats also repressed the memory of their victory that they had won by forgetting how great a wrong they had suffered (p. 251). It was a double forgetting: forgetting victory in exchange for forgetting resentment.

Three strategies of avoidance seem to have repressed the memory of the political (pp. 254–55). The first was the substitution of the generic term “constitution” for “democracy” as the name that describes the polis. The second was the avoidance of the word democracy altogether by using such euphemisms as order, government, and harmony. The third was the fostering of a timeless history of the polis by smoothing out its vicissitudes and anchoring it in eternity: Upheavals may appear and disappear, but the essence of the polis remains unchanged as unified city. These strategies ensconced the polis as the erasure of the political, a legacy that we have inherited.

In The Divided City, what the polis reveals about itself when laid on the couch is fascinating. Whether the polis needed the couch for this revelation is a matter harder to judge.

— Simon Caney, University of New Castle upon Tyne

This book is an important treatment of a number of issues in international political theory that seeks to defend a cosmopolitan view and to criticize statist approaches. Darrel Moellendorf begins his argument in earnest in Chapter 2 where he adopts John Rawls’s theory of justice but argues, against Rawls himself, that his liberal egalitarian theory should be applied to the world level. To do so, Moellendorf both engages in a sustained critique of Rawls’s The Law of Peoples (1999) and argues that the two moral powers Rawls ascribes to persons justify universal principles of equality and human rights.

In the following chapter, Moellendorf considers a number of challenges to this cosmopolitan Rawlsianism. The first maintains that distributive justice operates only in “associations.” To this he argues, like Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge, that a global association now prevails. A second charge that Moellendorf
addresses maintains that our special duties should trump any global ones. To this he argues that persons lack special duties of justice to fellow nationals and that patriotic duties do not always trump global ones. The argument is illustrated with discussions of immigration and protectionism.

The book then turns, in Chapter 4, to issues of global distributive justice. Moellendorf considers and rejects a number of challenges to cosmopolitan conceptions of distributive justice. In line with his cosmopolitan version of Rawls’s theory, he employs a global original position and defends a global principle of fair equality of opportunity and a global difference principle. The remainder of the chapter applies this theory to the issues raised by imperialism, and it concludes by arguing that Third World debt should be canceled and that the wealthy of the world should bear the costs of global warming.

Chapter 5 explores the moral justifiability of intervention. Moellendorf examines and rejects a number of common defenses of the norm of nonintervention, persuasively arguing that none is convincing. He then outlines his own cosmopolitan account of when intervention is acceptable. On his account, intervention in another state is justified when (i) the latter’s basic structure is unjust or its domestic policy has unjust effects on others, (ii) it will work, (iii) it is the last resort, and (iv) it is proportionate (pp. 117–20).

Having provided a cosmopolitan account of intervention, Moellendorf outlines a cosmopolitan theory of national self-determination. Unlike some cosmopolitans, he allows that nations may sometimes have a right of self-government, arguing that this is necessary to provide their members with a secure cultural environment. This may moreover justify secession, and Moellendorf elaborates five conditions that must be observed if a nation is to be allowed to secede (p. 137).

The book then returns to matters of war and peace, and in Chapter 7 Moellendorf asks when, if ever, military force may be used. He rejects two extreme views, namely, the pacifist view that the waging of war should ignore moral principles and prioritize the national interest. Moellendorf is also critical of conventional just-war theory. As in the earlier chapters, he outlines a cosmopolitan position, affirming in this instance a cosmopolitan conception of “just cause.” The book concludes with a brief discussion of how institutional framework is most appropriate, given a cosmopolitan outlook.

Cosmopolitan Justice is full of well-reasoned arguments. It is thorough and meticulously argued. Furthermore, one important virtue of the book is Moellendorf’s willingness throughout to use empirical examples to illustrate his arguments. There are, nonetheless, points at which his argument is vulnerable. First, like Thomas Pogge and others, Moellendorf maintains that norms of distributive justice operate only within “associations.” This raises a number of problems: What constitutes an association is insufficiently precise, and it is not evident why Moellendorf thinks that nations do not fall into that category (p. 53). Furthermore, the claim that all associations entail special duties of justice (pp. 34, 43, 48, 49) leads to unpalatable conclusions, such as that members of a repugnant association are bound by justice to prioritize the interests of their associates. Third, the claim that distributive justice only obtains within associations is vulnerable to a number of objections. To give one example, Moellendorf argues that associations have moral significance because of their effects on people’s moral powers (pp. 32–33, 37–38). This suggests that what matters is people’s ability to exercise their moral powers; if, however, this is what matters, does it not generate duties on everyone, even if they are not part of any common association?

One might also query Moellendorf’s treatment of just war. His discussion of this is framed in terms of his earlier account of legitimate intervention. This, though, produces a rather odd conception of just cause. The whole discussion presupposes that waging war is about invading a state (pp. 104, 160), but wars of self-defense and wars to defend other states that have been attacked do not require this. In his official statement of just cause, Moellendorf seems to say that X has just cause against Y only if Y has an unjust basic structure (humanitarian intervention) or Y’s “domestic policy” is having an unfair impact on others (p. 159). But what if Y has an aggressive foreign policy? Cosmopolitans would surely recognize two additional reasons for waging war, namely, i) the right of a just state to defend itself against attack and ii) the right/duty of a state to defend another just state that has been attacked. Furthermore, these two additional principles of “just cause” would be congruent with Moellendorf’s overall cosmopolitan theory.

Finally, although it covers much ground, some of the topics are dealt with in little detail. There is, for example, little said about the cosmopolitan account of jus in bello, and the institutional discussions in Chapter 8 could have been explored more fully and also integrated with the analysis of national self-determination. These are, however, relatively minor disagreements. Cosmopolitan Justice as a whole makes a valuable contribution. It offers a compelling political ideal. It tackles matters of utmost importance, it is lucid and well argued, and it successfully integrates philosophical argument with empirical case studies.

**Book Reviews | Political Theory**


— Bradley J. Macdonald, Colorado State University

Both Marx and Engels have been interpreted in radically different ways by scholars, depending upon how one slices the deck of their work. For example, we have commentators who argue that both of these thinkers are best represented as social scientists par excellence (in this portrayal, we might hear the words of Engels at Marx’s funeral proclaiming that Marx was the “Darwin of the social sciences”). Inevitably, such an attribution is performed by arguing for the importance of such works as Marx’s “Preface” to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859) or the first volume of Capital (1867). On the other hand, we have other students of these thinkers who see their contribution to be primarily in their philosophical positions. Here, of course, such portrayals of Marx and Engels are bolstered by looking to Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844) or, maybe, The German Ideology (1845–46). Of course, we could go on from here and talk about their contribution to sociological analysis, literary criticism, and so on, and in turn perform such arguments by looking at other works within their substantial oeuvre. Yet in all of these portrayals, there is always a recognition that Marx and Engels were also fundamentally concerned with political practices and issues, that they wrote their works not only to understand social reality but also, as Marx noted famously in Theses on Feuerbach (1845), to change the world. The question, of course, is what does the admitted political dimension to the life and thought of Marx and Engels imply about their most important concepts and ideas? If one were to more resolutely situate Marx and Engels in the politics of the period, what would this do to our understanding of their work? Moreover, what would such an analysis do to all of the other attempts to perform Marx and Engels as social scientists, philosophers, and so on?

In a quite detailed and well-researched book, August Nimtz looks squarely at this...
political dimension to the life and thought of Marx and Engels. Clearly, Nimtz's intention is quite ambitious: namely, to rethink Marx and Engels’ theory in relation to their activities within working-class political struggles, and thereby to retrieve a “truer” Marx and Engels from the various “Marxologists” who have appropriated their work and legacy. I think at the very least, Nimtz has done an important service to Marx studies by taking seriously the need to contextualize the ideas of Marx and Engels within political struggles associated with the “democratic breakthrough,” that is, those working-class struggles associated with expanding democracy and liberty. What is less apparent, unfortunately, is whether he has finally gotten Marx and Engels right, or, maybe more interestingly, whether we need to see Marx and Engels solely in this harsh organizational and strategic light.

As other commentators have noted before (e.g., see Alan Gilbert, Marx’s Politics: Communists and Citizens, 1981), one can really only avoid the political dimension to Marx and Engels’ theory at the risk of misunderstanding key aspects to their thought. What Nimtz has done is to expand such inquiries through detailed analyses of the political and organizational activities of Marx and Engels and to argue forcefully for the relationship of such activities to important theoretical and strategic insights and ideas. Nimtz deftly exhumes and explicates their early journalistic work; their important initial political work in the Communist Correspondence Committee; their defining roles within the Communist League, which gave rise to their famous tract, The Manifesto for the Communist Party, 1848), and which allowed them to be directly part of the European political struggles in 1848, particularly in Germany; their “muted” political work between 1851 and 1864, where Marx increasingly devoted himself to “scientific” work to set the stage for the next revolutionary era; and their leadership in the International Workingmen’s Association (IJWA) between 1864 and 1871, an analysis which is quite interesting in dispelling what many Marx scholars see as the political quietude of Marx after 1851. Within this dense political and historical narrative, Marx and Engels are shown to be activists who were devoted consistently to the working class being the agent of their own emancipation (with no hint of elitist vanguardism); to the necessity of winning the war of bourgeois democracy to set the stage for social revolution; to promoting the importance of a political movement of the petite bourgeoisie and peasantry led by the working classes; and to seeing the importance of struggles for national self-determination (in Ireland and elsewhere). In this portrayal, Marx and Engels, irrespective of consistent attempts to paint a quite different picture (e.g., see Allan Megill, Karl Marx: The Burden of Reason [Why Marx Rejected Politics and the Market], 2002), become political actors committed to the democratic self-determination of the working classes in their struggles for socialism.

While Nimtz has successfully shown the attachment of Marx and Engels to such political principles and actions, he unfortunately feels the necessity to launch other arguments that are less successful. First, while acknowledging the need for another work to fully argue this point, he claims “that no two people contributed more to the struggle for democracy in the last century than Marx and Engels” (p. 294). For Nimtz, this really comes down to the importance of their role in the IJWA, which, he argues, was supremely instrumental in these struggles. While I am willing to wait for further clarification in a subsequent volume, I think he has taken their asserted intention to be an important part of the struggle for democracy for their actual role in such a process itself. To me, at least, this comes out clearly in how they distanced themselves from the working-class democratic struggles in England in the 1870s and 1880s, mainly due to their disdain for the influence of bourgeois and petit-bourgeois elements in that struggle. Unless one wants to argue that these struggles (which eventually led to creation of the Labour Party) were unimportant to the “democratic breakthrough,” it is very clear that Marx and Engels were not very important in the democratic struggles of the working classes in England.

Second, Nimtz has general grudges with the way in which Marx and Engels have been appropriated by academic “Marxologists,” given that the latter have divorced them increasingly from the terrain on which they were meant by their authors to operate—the real movement” (p. 302). Yet he has not adequately argued for why one should not interpret Marx and Engels both academically (as social scientists, philosophers, etc.) and politically. Indeed, his intended argument can only be confirmed if one avoids discussing certain texts, which is the case here. For example, there is no discussion of Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts and very little of The German Ideology, let alone Capital. To have looked at these texts in greater detail, I think, would have forced Nimtz to deal with why people do take Marx and Engels seriously as social scientists or philosophers, and in turn, it would have moved him to recognize that their legacy and contemporary interest, politically and theoretically, cannot be strictly related to their professed political identities and revolutionary passions. More provocatively, if one were to make Marx and Engels a living political force today, one might have to disengage from the strict political reading that Nimtz has performed so admirably, and instead to creatively enact divergent conceptual and political relays with their thought.


— Horst Mewes, University of Colorado, Boulder

Regardless of whether Heidegger thought of himself as a postphilosophical and postmetaphysical “thinker,” he indubitably belongs to the very small group of great twentieth-century philosophers. Consequently, even if his entire opus disregarded politics and political theorizing entirely, and by its silence denied its very significance to genuine human thinking, this very fact would be of interest to political thought insofar as its own historical origins once were, or still are, thought to be philosophical.

Notoriously, Heidegger’s case is of more urgent interest still, inasmuch as his profoundly stupid and deplorable personal conduct toward, and judgments about, the German Nazi regime inevitably raises disturbing questions about the relation between the man and his thinking, his actions and the truth of his thoughts. If we trust the account of his student Karl Loewith, Heidegger himself provided the answer: His politics derived from the most fundamental premises of his thought. Unlike Hannah Arendt, for instance, Christopher Rickey takes Heidegger at his word. The result is one of the few truly superb treatments of this vexing problem. Rickey has written one of the most tightly argued and persuasive briefs, as it were, for the case in favor of the unity of Heidegger as political man and primordial thinker of the “history of being.”

With much philosophical acumen and admirably sober and balanced, yet penetrative thinking, Rickey argues that Heidegger’s pursuit of the question of being, inasmuch as it issues in diagnosing modern Western civilization as the period of the most profound forgetfulness of being, is “at heart a political and ethical undertaking” (p. 2). It has, for one, prescriptions of how to overcome the horrid alienation of the contemporary world, and is thus implicitly practical. Heidegger’s calls for prephilosophical, “originate thinking,” for a disposition of Gelassenheit, for relinquishing

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the “will to power,” all amount to prescriptive admonitions much in tune with the traditionally central philosophical/practical question of how one ought to live.

Heidegger’s view of the human condition and diagnosis of modernity makes him one of the greatest opponents of liberal democracies. His particular articulation of the history of being leads to advocacy of one of the most “thoroughly radical alternatives to modern politics” (p. 10). The Heideggerian alternative is radically revolutionary and apocalyptic, and it “bespeaks of an idealism dangerously close to madness” (p. 270).

It was “monstrous in execution,” and “dangerous in principle” (p. 12). The source of this radical Heideggerian vision of the postmodern world is what Rickey develops as his central interpretive thesis. Heidegger’s entire thinking about the question of being and its self-disclosure, by Rickey’s account, issues in a fanatical kind of mystical revolutionarily politics. This politics is, in turn, the result of Heidegger’s equation of politics and religion, based on “his antinomian conception of religiosity” (p. 9).

The concept of antinomian politics as derived from Heidegger’s antinomian theology is the theoretical heart of this book. Since Heidegger himself denied having a theology, much less a religion, Rickey needs to carefully explain his own interpretation. When subsuming Heidegger’s thinking about being under the more widely used notion of religion as “the relationship between humans and the divine” (p. 3), Rickey implicitly denies the very possibility of Heidegger’s claim of having thought the pretheological and prereligious “prerequisites” of such a relationship, namely primordial Being. Heidegger’s entire enterprise of “transcending” traditional categories and concepts is by implication exposed as an exercise in futility. Rickey in effect reduces Heidegger’s entire quest for Being to religious politics, albeit in the very original version of an antimessian theologico-political politics, “the modern-day legacy” of the most radical facets of the Protestant Reformation (p. 4). Heidegger is “reduced” to joining the company of modern visionary apocalyptic revolutionaries.

As is usual in brief reviews of books of great complexity, the best part of the work under consideration gets the shortest shrift. In this case, the genuinely informative and thoughtfully considered arguments are found in Rickey’s elaboration of the relation between political religiosity and Heidegger’s thinking of the meaning of Being. Some of the most fascinating and probably most original pages in Revolutionary Saints treat of Heidegger’s transformation of the Aristotelian concept of phronesis or practical wisdom. In a very intricate reconstruction, Rickey shows how Heidegger turns the Greek notion of practical wisdom into a “revelation of being as a whole,” which unites the end of action immanent in action itself. Practical wisdom becomes a “kind of divine revelation” (p. 266). The notion of a mystic vision of being as the highest (most authentic) human practical action also entails Heidegger’s conception of human freedom. It means, accordingly, to be free for and “share in the binding revelation of being” (p. 99). Freedom means being open to the revelations of being, the “substance” of which belongs to being, not humans beings.

In another important chapter on “the divinity of work in the age of technology,” Rickey shows the relation between Heidegger’s transformed notion of practical wisdom and its relevance for the active substantiation, if you will, of the modern age dominated by technê, or technology, into his ideal polis as a “community of saints” (p. 270). Technology is allegedly transformed by rethinking poieis. From the original “making,” it is turned into meaning, “bringing forth something in its being” (p. 121). The essence of work, rather than lying in the modern notion of technology, is turned into poetry as “experiencing being as presencing” (p. 21). The authentic version of human work is poetic dwelling in the world, where the world is envisioned as the “clearing” in which being, or as it were, the divine, can reveal itself to receptive human beings.

The final step toward modern politics is explained in chapters on “the Third Reich of the spirit.” For Heidegger, the political leader becomes a “phronetic virtuoso,” beyond conventional good and evil precisely because he must be “open to the possibilities of being itself” and thus “capable of anything” (p. 254). But Rickey’s detailed treatment of Heidegger’s view of the Nazi regime leaves one to ponder one final practical question. What accounts for Heidegger’s inability to see the incredible gap between his visions and the real character and action of Hitler and his henchmen? Does the ability to engage in such visions destroy one’s practical judgment? Or is such practical blindness the precondition for such visions? Are we, finally, still confronted with some type of “psychologically” based inability of judgment?

Rickey closes his arguments by charging that Heidegger attempted to “transcend the limits of politics” by avoiding “the hard necessities of politics” (p. 273). True enough. But not recognizing the necessities of politics is one thing. Much more serious is Heidegger’s concomitant inability, by his incredible obfuscations, to illuminate the truly important freedoms and genuine possible reflective choices open to human political being.


— E. Victor Wolfenstein, University of California, Los Angeles

America’s ongoing symposium on race is hardly harmonious but, like Alcibiades in the Platonic original, black nationalism seems to be the least welcome guest at the feast. It is, indeed, all too often excluded. Then the conversation becomes relatively monotonal, at its worst sounding more like Rodney King than Martin Luther King—“Why can’t we all just get along?”

Dean Robinson’s serious engagement with black nationalism is, therefore, most welcome. His aim is to present his subject matter with a degree of historical specificity: “While black nationalists continually react to white racism across time, the sorts of ideas and types of activism they advocate typically have homologies in the broader political and intellectual landscapes of specific historical periods” (p. 3). He thus places himself outside of the black nationalist tradition, with its characteristic essentialist or race ontological claims. More: he calls the idea of such a tradition into question. Although he does not deny that one can trace out a black nationalist genealogy, he views the tradition as, in good part, an “invention”: “Traditions result when thinkers of an historical era identify thought and behavior of a recent or distant past that serves as a model for, and justification of, present behavior” (p. 79). We are reminded of Karl Marx’s famous interpretation of bourgeois revolutionaries who “anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service . . . in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honored disguise” (“The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” in R. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader (1978), p. 595). So, analogously, the latter-day black nationalists. But what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. Marx anxiously conjured up spirits of his own when he wrote the poetry of the future; and we might find as much “invention” in the analysis of traditions as in their construction.

Robinson’s analysis centers on the black nationalist upsurge of the 1960s and early 1970s. Like many others, myself included, he portrays Malcolm X as the pivotal figure in this phase of the struggle. From this center, the inquiry extends back to David Walker’s Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World (1829) and forward to the Nation of Islam.
of Minister Louis Farrakhan and the Afrocentrism of Molefi Kete Asbanti. Garveyism is given appropriate attention in the process, and Robinson brings before us a wide range of black nationalist groups and tendencies, some scarcely known and others nearly forgotten. The very multiplicity of positions taken by these contributors to the "tradition" gives weight to the claim that it takes an act of political will to bind them tightly together. Moreover, Robinson's matting of these positions to dominant contextual trends is plausible enough. He views early versions of black nationalism as "Anglo-African" (p. 15), meaning by this term to capture their mirroring relationship to the dominant Anglo-Saxon ideologies of the period. He aligns black nationalism in the more recent period with the politics of ethnic pluralism, in which groups assert their own interests within the given framework of capitalism. And beyond these convenient labels, he demonstrates considerable sensitivity to the broader historical currents, such as the postwar decolonization of Africa, that play a constitutive role in black nationalist discourse.

Still, every interpretative perspective is bought at a price. Some things are seen and others are not, depending in part upon the political values that explicitly or implicitly give direction to the analysis. Robinson's values are quite explicit. They are those of Ralph W. Ellison, who insisted that the American experience is not the private property of white people, but was rather created by the interaction of its variously hued inhabitants. From this viewpoint, black nationalism plays into "one of the oldest American political fantasies"—in Ellison's words, "banish [blacks] from the nation's bloodstream, from its social structure, and from its conscience and historical consciousness" (cited on p. 2). Hence, we are prepared for Robinson's conclusion that black nationalists play into the hands of their putative enemies and "have to this point been unable to respond effectively to the many challenges and obstacles black men and women face in their pursuit of full equality in the United States" (p. 135).

There is another way to look at the matter. One might see a mutually determining and generative dialectic between those who insist upon the Africanist side of African American identity and those who emphasize its Americanness. For example, Robinson insists upon the remembrance of these dire experiences, hence also on what has been lost and might be reclaimed. This position grounds a strong affirmation of African American peoplehood. The other side points to the many ways in which African Americans are culturally American, a claim that gains cogency when it is linked to a clear understanding of the Africanist presence in American culture itself. This, too, is our land; the issue is recognition, not inclusion. Thus, we can say, no doubt too glibly, that one party insists on difference, the other on identity—and both on freedom for all black people.

It follows that black nationalism plays a twofold cultural and political role. Directly, it transforms the experience of exclusion into one of self-definition and self-determination. This transformation is certainly difficult, and Robinson is at his best in bringing out the ways in which black nationalism can replicate the problems it is intended to solve. But it is no less vital, for all its inherent difficulties. Indirectly, the black nationalist assertion of peoplehood makes present the Africanist presence in our national identity. Think, for example, of Ellison's own Invisible Man. How would that story read without Ras the Exhorter? Hence, my ambivalence about the stance that Robinson adopts toward his chosen subject matter. On the one hand, he invites the black nationalists to the racial symposium; on the other, he treats them as unruly guests. We are reminded again of Alcibiades; but we might also remember how much life that young man brought to the discussion.


— Rosemarie Zagare, George Mason University

This book makes a fascinating argument. Noting that most historical works study either race or gender issues in isolation, Pauline Schloesser claims that the two issues must be studied in tandem. Only by probing the complicated interaction of race and gender hierarchies can we begin to understand the stubborn persistence of racism and sexism in the United States. Focusing on the revolutionary era, Schloesser closely examines the thinking of three women, Mercy Otis Warren, Abigail Adams, and Judith Sargent Murray, for their ideas about race, class, and gender. Unlike many other women at the time, these three expressed a highly articulate understanding of the American Revolution, Exceptional as they were, however, they could not or would not pursue the implications of revolutionary principles, such as equality and natural rights, to their logical conclusion. They did not advocate political rights for women nor acknowledge the full injustice of racism against blacks.

Schloesser develops a theory called "racial patriarchy" (p. 12), based on the works of Carole Pateman and Charles W. Mills, in order to explain the women's views. Early American women, she says, drew on and developed a set of ideological assumptions that heightened their status as women by emphasizing their superiority over black people and other nonwhites. "Fair sex" ideology, as she calls it, allowed white women to "protect their race and class privileges within modern patriarchy rather than risk them for a radical equality that would have eliminated racial as well as sexual differences" (p. 191). Race trumped gender, and in the end reinforced the power and privilege of white males.

As provocative as Schloesser's theory is, her analysis leaves much to be desired. Her critique of Warren, Adams, and Murray lacks a grasp of the historical context and misconstrues evidence to serve her thesis. For example, she criticizes Murray for failing to apply her understanding of universal human nature to lower-class whites and nonwhites. She condemns her for failing to portray women as "happily single, financially self-sufficient through their own efforts, or famous for their work" (p. 179). All of this, Schloesser says, reinforces Murray's own sense of racial superiority. What Schloesser does not admit, however, is that married women at that time had little or no opportunity to work outside the home. Factories did not yet exist. Although teaching at a "dame school," selling butter, or publishing a book might have brought in a little income, women were not even legally entitled to their own wages. There was no "career path" for women. Although Murray's positions do not seem radical today, they were for her time. Her advocacy of greater educational opportunities for women and her assertion of the equality of the female intellect made her far more progressive than most of her peers. Yet like male Federalists at the time, Murray was an unreconstructed elitist who mistrusted the masses, black or white. Race was less of an issue than class.

Similarly, Schloesser overstates Adams's commitment to gender equality during the Revolution in order to portray her supposed retreat to a more conservative position in her later years. As Edith Gelles's Portia (1992) has shown, Adams was never a feminist in the modern sense. Although her husband's friend, partner, and confidante, she never aspired to hold political power and ultimately deferred to his wishes, even when they conflicted with her own desires. While Adams may not have been
a Hillary Clinton, she exercised enormous influence within the limits of women's role at the time.

Finally, Schloesser condemns Warren as a racist on the basis of her repeated invocation of the word “slavery” in attacking British tyranny—even though, as she admits, Warren did criticize the institution of slavery (pp. 101–02). In order to argue her case, Schloesser misconstrues the historical use of the term. At least since the time of John Locke, Anglo-American thinkers used the word “slavery” to refer to a complete loss of political liberty, the ultimate form of degradation. While chattel slavery as practiced in the colonies represented the most extreme form of slavery, it was often said that corruption and conspiracy in government would reduce people to the condition of slaves. As Bernard Bailyn's Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (1967) demonstrated, American colonists adopted the discourse concerning slavery from such opposition writers as John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon and employed it for their own purposes in the fight against Britain. Thus, Warren's use of the term reflected her deep engagement with a long tradition of political theory, rather than an effort to establish her racial superiority. Although such language may reveal deeply ingrained assumptions about “the binary pair colonizer/colonized” (p. 101), Schloesser does not provide the kind of nuanced analysis that would convince us of her claims.

In the end, Schloesser's anachronistic reading of the past undermines her effort to construct a useful framework for understanding the roots of sexism and racism. The Fair Sex is too superficial and too formulaic to comprehend the complexities of the problem. Perhaps in the hands of a more subtle thinker her theory will bear fruit.


— Cathy M. Johnson, Williams College

Political actors invoke the term “family values” even though they rarely specify precisely what these values are or why they are connected to families. More extensive elaboration and justification of the term come from a group of authors who have tried to make the social science case for public policies designed to invigorate and maintain two-parent, heterosexual families. In her book, Karen Struening labels these authors family communitarians, and presents an alternative justification for family policy, one that recognizes and supports diverse forms of families.

Struening presents an insightful discussion of the arguments advanced by family communitarians. She summarizes their arguments cogently and presents an astute analysis of their structure, explaining how their assumptions and interpretation of empirical evidence are used to conclude that government should adopt public policies to encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families and encourage alternative family forms, including single parent and same-sex families. She explains how ideas about gender are critical to their positions, particularly the belief that gender roles follow from biological sex and the desire to maintain those gender roles in two-parent, heterosexual families. According to family communitarians, two-parent families are desirable not simply because raising children is hard work and two adults are better than one, but because children need to be raised by men and women who father and mother. Fathering and mothering are distinct activities that can be performed only by men and women, respectively. Moreover, marriage is necessary to maintain these roles, in particular to capture male resources to benefit women and children.

While Struening's discussion of gender in the arguments of family communitarians is quite strong, she does not analyze sufficiently the extent to which their arguments rest on basic economic conservatism, a point family communitarians themselves downplay. But it is clear from their positions that they prefer not to increase government intervention in the economy or distribution of wealth. Family communitarians believe that traditional two-parent families would ameliorate a host of social problems, including crime, poverty, and poor educational achievement. They want to shift the debate away from economic issues and toward the family, for if families are expected to take care of these problems, government does not have to. Traditional conservatives and libertarians may be reluctant to promote some of the proposals urged by these communitarians, in particular those that rely on government intervention in personal decisions about family structure, such as a return to fault divorce. But conservatives can unite around the basic goal of reducing the role of government in economic and social welfare policies, and family communitarians provide an additional justification for these positions, one that is politically appealing because it portrays conservative policies as concerned and compassionate.

In New Family Values, Struening strives to advance an alternative basis for family policy, one rooted in feminist and progressive values that will respect and benefit different kinds of families. Family communitarians, she argues, promote policies that constrain personal liberty and maintain rigid gender roles that disadvantage women. With the rise of companionate marriage, no common blueprint for marriage exists. Because individuals grant considerable weight to emotional intimacy in their personal relationships, they must be able to decide for themselves the nature of those relationships, she argues. Such decisions are a crucial component of self-determination and self-fulfillment, and should be grounded in an understanding of the right to privacy as the freedom of intimate association. Thus, individuals should be able to choose whom they marry and when they enter and exit marriage. If individual choice defines marriage, one might question why it should continue as a state-recognized, privileged, and dyadic relationship. Struening concludes that it should remain “as long as it works for a large number of people” (p. 178) but downplayed, with important benefits such as health care not tied to marital relationships.

Liberty and choice are powerful idioms in American politics, and may be persuasive when applied to freedom from government intrusion into personal decisions with few consequences for others. But when individuals need not just privacy to make personal decisions about families but resources from government to help support those families, liberty and choice are problematic. The question arises as to whether choice should be exercised within the extant system, or whether that system should be changed to facilitate a broader range of choices. Struening addresses this issue with respect to both single-mother families and work/family conflicts. She argues that a broad antipoverty strategy is necessary, one that focuses on the economic causes of poverty and changes in the labor market, rather than on family structure. With respect to work/family conflicts, she endorses such measures as paid family leave and child-care assistance that would make it easier for parents, both men and women, to combine work and family. She does not support public assistance that would enable single mothers to stay home with young children, arguing that women need to be in the labor force to achieve economic independence. Struening advocates public support for certain kinds of choices concerning the care of children—those involving women in the workforce—but she does not advocate public support for the choice to stay out of the workforce and care for children full time. It seems plausible that parental decisions about caring for children could be just as important to self-definition and self-fulfillment as sexuality.
Nadia Urbinati provides an insightful and extremely innovative interpretation of John Stuart Mill’s theory of democracy. According to Urbinati, Mill offers us an agonistic understanding of deliberative democracy. Strikingly, she supports this distinctly modern interpretation of Mill by attending to his views on Athenian democracy. To understand Mill’s contribution to democratic theory, one must pay attention to his views on the ancients.

For Urbinati, Mill’s theory of democracy enriches contemporary discussions of deliberative democracy in at least two ways. First, Mill avoids a common mistake made by many contemporary deliberative democrats: focusing on the formal procedures of deliberation at the expense of examining the sources of inequality within civil society, for example, the family. Second, Mill’s agonistic conception of deliberative democracy emphasizes the importance of disagreements and rhetoric to the procedures, practices, and ethos of democracy. The proper aim of democratic deliberations is not to reach consensus. Consensus would only bury disagreements among citizens, and disagreements are crucial to democratic practices because they preserve the conditions of political liberty.

One of Urbinati’s most important theoretical insights is her discussion of Mill’s conception of political liberty—what she calls “liberty from subjection.” According to Urbinati, Mill’s conception of liberty significantly improves Isaiah Berlin’s well-known distinction between “positive” and “negative” liberty. Mill’s version of liberty cannot be explained merely in terms of negative liberty (noninterference) or in terms of positive liberty (individual autonomy). Rather, liberty from subjection is best understood as a relational activity that requires the cooperation of citizens who can (and do) disagree. Mill’s conception of liberty is consistent with citizens shaping each other’s opinions and ways of life through free and open deliberation.Urbinati sees this kind of deliberation as a form of interference. For this “interference” to be consistent with political liberty, those who are in the position to be affected by decision-making processes must be able to challenge and influence the outcomes of those processes. According to Urbinati’s reading of Mill, political liberty is possible when power has been properly distributed in reciprocal ways. Mill’s conception of liberty reflects the fact that the threats to political liberty do not come solely from the state. Individuals’ own understandings can be exercises of power. In this way, Urbinati’s Mill strongly resembles Michel Foucault. However, contrary to Foucault, Mill maintained that the visibility of representative government sustains political liberty as opposed to “regulating” the behavior of citizens and representatives. The visibility of representative government, for example, the reliance on deliberative political institutions or open ballots, promotes political liberty by encouraging representatives and citizens to understand policymaking in terms of what can be publicly justified.

Urbinati’s reading of Mill, though, complicates as much as it deepens contemporary understandings of deliberative democracy. For example, in analyzing The Subjection of Women (1869), she considers Mill’s claim that gender equality would not necessarily destroy the Victorian family, because women are likely to choose to raise children instead of looking for a job. Many have found this claim inconsistent with Mill’s claim that the emancipation of women would lead to the moral development of society as a whole. She defends Mill from this charge on the grounds that this claim is merely rhetorical, as nothing but an attempt on Mill’s part to reassure his audience that his reforms are not as radical as they might seem. This interpretation of Mill’s discussion of women’s equality deepens contemporary discussions of deliberative democracy by introducing an important tension—namely, the tension between adopting effective rhetorical strategies and maintaining a democratic ethos. Her defense of Mill presupposes that it may be permissible to appeal to the public’s undemocratic sentiments in order to persuade the public to adopt certain policies.

Yet Urbinati leaves the dangers of appealing to undemocratic sentiments unexplored. This rhetorical strategy can be dangerous because it can be put to inegalitarian purposes. It is naive to believe, as Mill did, that those who exercise their capacities for higher pleasures will always have the progress of society as a fundamental aim. In general, Urbinati recognizes that he is often naïve. However, she does not address how his naïveté should give pause to those who wish to adopt his agonistic conception of deliberative democracy. Like Mill, Urbinati exaggerates the benefits of rhetoric and disagreements to democratic practice. This omission is especially worrisome because she downplays (and to some extent excuses) the less egalitarian features of Mill’s politics, for example, the use to which he puts his distinction between lower and higher pleasures in justifying inegalitarian political procedures. Her work would have benefited from a discussion of his claim in Considerations on Representative Government (1861) that a “civilized” government needs “to be a considerable degree despotic” for people who are “unfit for liberty.”

By downplaying Mill’s less egalitarian features, Urbinati gives insufficient attention to another tension in his democratic theory: how individuality can conflict with a democratic ethos. She is right that challenging the moral views that justify patriarchal family relations is certainly worthwhile and consistent with a democratic ethos. Challenging the moral views that underlie a democratic ethos, for example, a belief in the equal capacity of human beings to be self-ruling, a view that Urbinati ascribes to Mill, is less so. The degree to which his theory of democracy improves contemporary discussions of deliberative democracy might depend on whether his naïve views about the motivations and pleasures of active individuals hold true.

Urbinati has opened up a very important line of inquiry for Mill scholars. She persuasively argues that Mill’s theory of democracy was shaped by contemporary debates on Athenian democracy. Hence, his “polis of the moderns” shares many similarities with the “polis of the ancients.” Paying attention to the differences between Mill and the ancients might be one way to address the tension between a democratic ethos and effective rhetorical strategies. Mill on Democracy is a well-written, interesting, and perceptive book that should appeal to a wide audience. It is a must-read for anyone interested in Mill, contemporary democratic theory, representation, and liberty.


— Melissa Clarke, Texas A & M University

Every so often, a work comes along that is so timely that one is startled by its import and, perhaps, even wonders why such a work has not been undertaken previously. And this book by Kerry Whiteside is one such work. It is an exposition of the contributions of contemporary French ecological philosophers to the fields of environmental philosophy and political ecology. He begins by exposing the dilemmas in which the debates of English-speaking environmental philosophers (typically, ethicists) are hopelessly mired. He then contrasts this carefully throughout with the alternative approaches taken by French-speaking ecologists—valuable contributions which have been neglected too long by the English-speaking theorists.
The French employ different, less “centered” methods to describe human identity and conceptions of nature. Whiteside puts it thus: “English-speaking green theorists debate constantly about where to locate the center of environmental value. Rarely do they probe the notion of having a center itself” (p. 261). Alternatively, French green theorists understand that relying on a single center—whether for locus of value or for individual identity—is untenable because it will always lead to dualism. And this understanding is precisely their point of departure.

As one might expect, there are various versions of noncentered theoretical approach within the field of French ecological thought. With a view to this, Whiteside has provided a broad sampling of such theories, explicating their general understanding of the cofounding of the concepts of “humans” and “nature” within various contexts and the implications of various conceptualizations, and compared each example of French theory with the “anthropocentrism versus nonanthropocentrism” debate that characterizes the English-speaking field. He outlines the way that English-speaking nonanthropocentrists (aka “biocentrists”), in their insistence on the intrinsic value of nature, wind up excluding “human” from the “nature” from which they see values arising. Likewise, anthropocentrists, in insisting that all values are human creations, support a dualism between the valuing of humans and nature inasmuch as nature is not seen as valuing or, ontologically, as comprising beings that can be intrinsically valuable. He takes this general truism with respect to English-speaking environmental ethicists and contrasts it chapter by chapter with the alternative views proffered by the French theorists. French green theorists, in each case, tend rather to consider the way that the concepts of “human” and “nature” (or “culture” and “nature”) arise together or in reciprocal ways and how, consequently, what is considered to be human or natural has specific and identifiable effects within a given social or political milieu. The French theorists thus focus more on the fact that philosophical debates are always about concepts and language, rather than about definite identities that have some kind of value, role, or meaning apart from that already assigned to them within the debate.

The French theorists discussed by Whiteside primarily include Serge Moscovici, Edmund Moulinier, Denis de Rougemont, Rene Dumont, Edgar Morin, Felix Guattari, Michel Serres, and Bruno Latour, along with the anti-environmental Luc Ferry and the German Jürgen Habermas. Whiteside’s project outlines these authors’ various perspectives thematically, considering them from the points of view of the practices of “humanizing,” “systematizing” (ecology through systems theory), and “politicizing” nature. Following the trajectory of these thematic approaches, he next considers socializing, or “ecosocialism,” in which he finds the most common ground between French theorists and the English-speaking ecologists who are social ecologists. Unfortunately, he omits a discussion of ecofeminism from the purview of this discussion, inasmuch as ecofeminists, too, are concerned with the interrelation of attitude toward environment and the effects of this on groups of individuals. Finally, he treats the processes of “negotiating” and “questioning” nature—in which discussion he contrasts French theorists’ varied and flexible conceptions of “humanism” to those of English-based “liberalism.” Although the chapters are divided this way, there is a singular theme that runs throughout the work, namely, that French philosophers and political theorists have avoided (or at least explicitly attempted to avoid) dualistic thinking in all of their considerations of political ecology and considered instead the effects in the political arena of certain conceptualizations.

As a particular example of the book’s contents, consider that in Chapter 2, Whiteside outlines Serge Moscovici’s view that any current understanding of humanism can be traced through its historical evolution in the context of understanding its definition vis-à-vis “nature.” Whiteside contrasts the views of Aldo Leopold, J. Baird Callicott, and Holmes Rolston to those views of Moscovici. Subsequently, in his reflections on socializing and politicizing nature, Whiteside considers potential concrete applications of French theory in the political and social arenas—by considering whether democracy and/or socialism will more predictably arise from or contribute to a certain kind of attitude “toward” the concept of “nature” within its discourse.

Because of its care and detail, Divided Natures will sometimes be a bit lengthy for some readers. In addition, it is a bit redundant in that it continually contrasts English-speaking theories to the various French-authored ones. Once the reader has a grasp as to the tendencies of the English-language environmental theories, there is not necessarily a need to continue to reiterate them. However, the need for such a work is pressing. I have seen no other like it, and I believe that should English-speaking theorists design to read this, they will learn as much about their own theoretical tendencies as they will about those of the French. The impact this book could have on the world of English-speaking environmental theorists is difficult to overestimate. French theorists have been completely ignored in the English-speaking debates.

Ultimately, then, in undertaking to explicate their views and the critical contrast between those of the two linguistic settings, Whiteside has provided a useful tool to the English-speaking circle of environmental academics. Overall, the project is timely and absolutely invaluable for anyone who has been frustrated with the debates in the field of environmental philosophy (which is dominated by environmental ethicists with a liberal view of the individual and a preoccupation with the locus of value) and has had an inclining that there must be another way. The response to these environmental readers is that, in fact, there has been an alternative in place for the past 30 or 40 years; it has merely been neglected as a result of the domination of English-speaking theorists.

**American Politics**


— Candice J. Nelson, American University

The primary target for advocates of campaign finance reform has long been special interest money, be it money from organized interest groups or wealthy individual donors. Campaign finance reform efforts in the 1980s were aimed at restricting or eliminating political action committees, while reform efforts in the 1990s focused on soft money—unrestricted large donations to political parties. Opponents of these reform efforts argued that limits on campaign contributions were not the answer; rather, full disclosure of all campaign contributions would enable the public to see who was making contributions, and voters could decide for themselves if such contributions were made to seek undue influence.

In Voting with Dollars, Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres reject these tenets of what they call the old paradigm of campaign finance reform. They suggest that traditional approaches to campaign finance reform “draw from a century-long argument about the regulation of the economy” (p. 4), while their...
new paradigm is built upon the principles of the franchise—secret ballots and equality of each vote. Their proposal for campaign finance consists of two principal components: “Patriot dollars” and the “secret donation booth.”

The book is divided into two parts. Part I describes the basic components of the reform proposal, and how the new paradigm compares to the old paradigm of campaign finance reform. Part II attempts to envision the practical problems in implementing Patriot dollars and the secret donation booth, and discusses how this new campaign finance system would work in practice.

Of the two tenets, Ackerman and Ayres’s proposal for Patriot dollars is the more compelling. The authors suggest that each registered voter in the United States be given 50 Patriot dollars to contribute to the candidates, interest groups, and political parties of the voter’s choosing. They recognize that some voters may choose not to engage the political system in this way, and simply not spend their Patriot dollars, but they hypothesize that if every voter who voted in the 2000 elections spent his or her 50 Patriot dollars, 5 billion dollars would have been infused into the political system. The authors discuss in some detail the many democratic prospects for Patriot dollars—citizens getting involved in politics beyond voting, potentially less dependence on private contributions, opportunities for third parties to vie for contributions. What the authors gloss over, however, is a problem that has confounded campaign finance reform under the old paradigm, namely, the strong opposition among some members of Congress to public financing of congressional elections. While newly named, Patriot dollars are still public dollars, and there is little reason to believe that those who have opposed public financing of elections in the past will change their position under a new paradigm. Nevertheless, Patriot dollars are a new way to think about public funding of elections. Public funds would not automatically be given to candidates who meet qualifying criteria, as under the current system, but would have to be earned by appeals to citizens.

The concept of a secret donation booth, while appealing on its face, proves more problematic as the authors explore its functioning in practice. Ackerman and Ayres argue that what is troublesome about the linkage between money and policymaking is that lawmakers know who contributes to their campaigns, and thus may feel obliged to give their campaign contributors special consideration. The authors suggest that campaign contributions be treated the same way votes are treated, secretly. Candidates would open campaign accounts with a reconstituted Federal Election Commission, and supporters could contribute money to a candidate’s account, but the candidate would not know who had contributed to his or her account. A supporter could claim to have made a contribution, just as a supporter can claim to have voted for a candidate, but just as there is no way to confirm a vote, there would be no way to confirm a contribution. Ackerman and Ayres argue that because candidates would not know if an actual contribution had been made, they would be less responsive to the contributor.

Part II of *Voting with Dollars* spends considerable time exploring the problems with implementing a secret donation booth and keeping donations from being known. The sheer amount of time the authors devote to the workings of such a secret booth suggests how problematic it would be. However, more fundamentally, why would policymakers discount a supporter’s claim of a financial contribution? Although during a campaign a candidate may limit the voters he or she targets because of resource limitations, officeholders do not discriminate among constituents on the basis of the constituent’s claims to have voted for the candidate. We would expect the same to be true with campaign contributions. It would make more sense to listen to individuals who claim to be contributors, but actually were not, or did not contribute as much as they claimed, than to spend less time with someone who may actually be a past or potential financial supporter.

Despite these concerns, Ackerman and Ayres do an admirable job of thinking through how Patriot dollars and the secret donation booth would work in practice. In doing so, they underscore how complicated campaign finance reform, even under their new paradigm, can be. Each problem, and potential solution, raises a new problem. The book concludes with a model statute, a constructive contribution to the new paradigm.

*Voting with Dollars* may not be the antidote those concerned with the present approach to campaign finance reform are seeking, but it is a solid effort to bring new thinking to approaches that have dominated the debate for the last quarter century. Ackerman and Ayres are to be commended for trying to think through new ways of approaching campaign finance reform. Anyone interested in the financing of elections in the United States, and more generally, the relationship between money and policymaking, will find this book interesting and informative.


— V. Jerome Stephens, Thomas Paine Institute

This slim volume is an outgrowth of the book Kathleen Barber edited a few years ago,* Proportional Representation and Electoral Reform in Ohio,* 1995. In her new work, she is interested in how proportional representation (PR) can solve the problem of ensuring that those voting in areas where they are a minority (racial, gender, political, or economic) can achieve representation that reflects the diversity present in the community. Her thesis, in fact, is that until there is a greater focus on seeing that every vote counts to elect representatives of one’s choice, American democracy will be incomplete.

The present book is divided into five chapters. The first chapter provides a brief, but adequate for most purposes, history of PR and semiproportional voting. Barber includes a discussion of the development of the single transferable vote (STV) that was designed to prohibit economic majorities, the poor, from overwhelming the political and economic elite at the ballot box. She also discusses the other types of voting that are semiproportional, such as cumulative voting, where a voter can cast several votes, all for a single candidate or several candidates.

The second chapter is devoted to an analysis of the Progressive Movement to adopt PR at the national and state level, failures for the most part—Illinois was the exception—and then the shift of focus to the municipal level. It was also during this time that STV was recast as a means by which the masses could defeat the elite, an important component of STV that has led to the almost total opposition to it by entrenched party and elite interests.

In Chapter 3, Barber discusses how proportional elections work, and how these elections produce results that are more representative than those using plurality voting in both district and at-large elections. In Chapter 4, she presents an overview of the five studies of the STV system—a total of 21 municipalities adopting STV—that was in place in Ohio in five cities. These are the most extensive of any of the case studies dealing with STV, and they remain instructive today as to what STV accomplished in these cities, and why it ultimately failed to be retained. The last of these five cities to use STV was Cincinnati, and the system was repealed in 1957 because it was almost certain that a black politician

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(Theodore Berry) would become mayor, which would have made Cincinnati the first major city to have a black mayor, long before any of the other cities using plurality voting. Berry did finally become mayor in 1972 under an at-large plurality system. The history of the politics of the city, however, is a good example that probably demonstrates that Barber’s hope that the twenty-first century will be the century of proportional election systems is more than a bit optimistic.

Once STV was abandoned in 1957, Cincinnati went to the nine member, at-large system of plurality voting. The diversity that had been present under STV quickly ended, and white males controlled by the business interests were the primary beneficiaries. Both parties opposed STV in 1957, as they did later when there were two attempts to return it to Cincinnati. In 1988, a coalition of women, blacks, gays, some unions, liberals, and other community groups tried to return STV as the election system. With all the vested interests opposing the reform, the vote for return still received about 44%. Four years later, another attempt failed by about the same margin. The Charter Committee, the major player in the initial reform of 1925 that introduced STV, is still around and has one council member, a definite nonreformer, who joins the two Republicans and two Democrats, all white males, who, with the white male Mayor, determine the policies of the city. There are two black women and one black male, no white females, on the council, but their impact on policy is more symbolic than real. The abandonment of STV, then, took Cincinnati from one of the most representative of cities to one that is among the least represented in terms of power—business interests control everything from the school board to racial policies. And it is this lack of power people in the electoral system that is the major contributor to the problems facing the city today.

It is also noteworthy that the congressional districts in Cincinnati are designed to dilute African-American votes. The city is about 43% black, but this minority is split into two congressional districts, the 1st and 2nd, with the result that two of the most reactionary Republicans in Congress hold both seats.

The fifth, and last, chapter is devoted to the Voting rights Act and the right of representation, and here Barber offers us her optimistic conclusion: “The future of Proportional Representation in the United States may be different from its past. Demographic and political pressures are opening the political system to fresh ways of looking at the meaning of democracy. As the population becomes more diverse, better educated, and at the same time less participatory, citizens, lawmakers, and judges are seeking new ways to implement political values that are as old as the nation” (p. 123). She bases her conclusions on the gains that have been made in increasing majority representation since 1964, when the court ruled that each person is entitled to an equally weighted vote, to the more recent cases where the courts have accepted election systems that are based on something other than the winner-take-all scheme. The most successful of these alternative schemes has been cumulative voting that has increased representation of minorities at the city and county levels.

Barber has produced a very readable and well-researched work. A Right to Representation can be used successfully as a supplement in courses on voting behavior, parties, and American politics in general. It also provides a very useful background for those activists who are trying to achieve a fairer and more representative political system. I highly recommend it.


— Harold W. Stanley, University of Rochester

The rise of southern Republicans has been dramatic. In 1950, southern Republicans held no U.S. Senate seats and only two U.S. House seats. Fifty years later, Republicans held majorities of the South’s seats in both chambers: 64% in the Senate and 57% in the House. Strikingly, in the 1990s congressional party leaders from the South could be found readily among Republicans, rarely among Democrats. Earl Black and Merle Black scrutinize this Republican rise, its causes, and its consequences for southern politics and for the nation. Their conclusion for the parties: a competitive South entails a competitive nation.

This work is the third in a trilogy. First, the Blacks examined broad-ranging political changes in Politics and Society in the South (1987), then the region’s impact on presidential politics in The Vital South: How Presidents Are Elected (1992). The Rise of Southern Republicans concentrates on House and Senate elections and offers richly textured historical analyses going beyond voting trends and compositions of states, contests, and partisans. Racial, economic, and religious issues; group politics; demographic shifts; and personalities—such critical influences receive appropriately abundant coverage. The Blacks deliver a skillful, readable, often witty account of profound political transformation.

The longevity of the Solid South that endured into the 1950s is a tale told well. The competitiveness that replaced one-party Democratic politics did not come smoothly. In a state-by-state treatment, the Blacks discuss southern Senate Republicans—their limited, faltering rise between 1961 and 1990 and their breakthrough in the 1990s. In the House, southern Democratic incumbents were formidable opponents. Bright Republican prospects were dimmed, initially by safe-seat Democratic conservatives, later by moderates stitching together biracial coalitions. Conservative southern Democrats moderated in response to the black vote and to congressional reforms requiring solicitousness to the rest of the party. Democratic House-rules shifts following the 1974 elections put southern Democratic conservatives on notice that seniority alone would no longer lead to committee chairmanships; Democratic caucus secret ballots would decide who held such posts.

Republican development was top-down. The Solid South collapsed first in presidential politics, with more southern whites voting Republican than Democratic for president in 1964 and thereafter. But not until 1994 did Republicans, relying mainly on white votes, win a majority of the South’s House and Senate seats.

The central political cleavage in the South has been race. The federal dismantling of segregation, starting in the 1950s, raised the salience of racial issues. Masterfully, the authors map the role of race in the Republican rise. Barry Goldwater’s appeal to southern whites in 1964 just as southern blacks were gaining an effective right to vote, coupled with continued Republican inability to secure much minority support, has defined southern partisan competition: “The mobilization of blacks as committed Democrats and the Republicans’ permanent need to secure sizable white majorities lie at the heart of the two-party battle in southern politics” (pp. 22–23). Republicans prevail in predominantly white jurisdictions, and in biracial districts (defined as over 15% black), when Republicans amass sufficient white support, they win. If Democrats can add sufficient white support to their solid black support, they win. As the authors have it, conservative whites have realigned to the Republicans; moderate whites have realigned with the Democrats but have not converted to the Republicans, serving as a swing vote. Core supporters cannot be taken for granted, but the parties do battle over the southern white moderates.

But more has been involved than racial divisions. The authors track how increased population and demographic shifts stemmed
from economic growth as the region diversified from an agrarian base to a modern economy. The resulting emergence of a middle class and suburbanization reflected a greater socioeconomic complexity that outgrew one-party politics. The rise of the religious right and the gender gap also made their mark on an evolving southern party politics.

The Republican southern congressional majorities in 1994 resulted largely, the Blacks emphasize, from Reagan’s success courting southern whites in the 1980s and redistricting after the 1990 census. The white southerners’ embrace of Reagan’s presidency constituted a realignment, establishing grass roots that strengthened Republican congressional opportunities. Redistricting in the early 1990s created 12 black-majority districts in addition to the 5 that had elected black Democrats. This concentration of Democratic black voters left surrounding districts whiter and less Democratic, thus more promising for Republicans. This and population growth gave Republicans more favorable House districts. George H. W. Bush in 1988 won by 60%, or more in 53 of 116 southern House districts. After reapportionment and redistricting, he would have carried 65 of 125 districts by this margin.

Nationally, Republican gains in the previously Democratic South have created a nationalized two-party system to an extent last seen when Whigs battled Democrats in the 1830s and 1840s. Republican gains do not mean the South will revert to one-party politics, this time solidly Republican. Republican seat shares in Congress are much smaller than those once enjoyed by southern Democrats. Neither Republicans nor Democrats are a majority party among southern voters. Ironically, even in 1996 self-identified Democrats edged out Republicans by 43% to 37% among all southern voters. The Blacks think a more realistic partisan balance requires the blending of ideology and partisanship, with all Republicans and conservative independents making up the Republican core, and conservative Democrats as swing voters, not part of the Democratic core. This treatment yields a slight plurality advantage for Republicans over Democrats in 1996. The Blacks use exit polls throughout the book, limiting usage of the National Election Studies with smaller southern samples.

Those hoping for statistical pyrotechnics will not find them here. Following the spirit of Edward Tufte’s *Envisioning Information* (1990), in 10 tables and 47 graphs the Blacks give insightful, elegant displays of the partisan contexts, contesting, and coalitions over the decades, as well as the consequences of the partisan changes for congressional composition and politics.

The *Rise of Southern Republicans* concerns a major feature of post–New Deal politics in the United States and is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand recent southern partisan changes or the import of southern congressional politics for the nation.

**Voting at the Political Fault Line:**


— Priscilla L. Southwell, University of Oregon

This volume provides a comprehensive look at California’s short-lived experiment with the blanket primary, by examining the normative, legal, and behavioral consequences of an electoral rule change that allowed voters to cross party lines from each contest to the next.

The main focus of these 17 chapters is on the behavioral aspect, centering on the following questions: Did crossover voting increase with the adoption of the blanket primary? Did crossover voters affect the outcome of races in California? Does the blanket primary lead to the nomination of more moderate candidates? Were these crossover voters “sincere,” that is, did they vote for their most preferred candidate or did they vote strategically for their most preferred candidate within the opposition party due to a noncompetitive race within their own party or when their own party appeared likely to nominate a candidate with little chance of winning in the general election? Or, do crossover voters act as saboteurs and “raid” the opposition party’s primary and vote for the weakest candidates?

These questions are commonplace in any analysis of primary type, but the blanket primary provides a context in which the opportunity costs for crossover voting are lowered. However, most of these analyses conclude that crossover voting did not rise dramatically under this new electoral rule, and most crossover voters acted sincerely. The outcome of certain races appeared to have been affected but not altered by the adoption of the blanket primary. As John Sides, Jonathan Cohen, and Jack Citrin conclude: “[O]ur analysis of the 1998 elections suggests that the blanket primary leads to neither the millennium envisaged by its advocates nor the apocalypse predicted by its detractors” (p. 77).

The authors do address other aspects of the debate over the blanket primary, such as John Petrocik’s intriguing analysis of the effect of a more open nomination process on party cohesion (“Candidate Strategy, Voter Response, and Party Cohesion”). He suggests that party cohesion declines because successful crossover-elected candidates need to retain the support of programatically different “moderates.” Additional innovating analyses are provided in Christian Collet’s look at the effect on minor parties (“Openness Begets Opportunity: Minor Parties and California’s Blanket Primary”). He presents the blanket primary as an opportunity for minor parties to enhance their visibility earlier in the campaign season, but he stresses that this aspect will only be seen as advantageous to those minor parties that are pragmatic rather than ideological in nature.

Gary Segura and Nathan Woodard’s analysis centers on the possibility that the blanket primary enabled certain Latino voters to enhance the nomination chances of Latinos within the Republican Party, despite the overall strong attachment of Latinos to the Democratic Party (“Targets of Opportunity: California’s Blanket Primary and the Political Representation of Latinos”). They find that Latino voters did make a difference in several GOP primaries for the California State Assembly.

Most of these authors are careful to point out that this experiment with the blanket primary was of limited duration due to the Supreme Court decision declaring that the blanket primary violated the parties’ freedom of association (“California Democratic Primary v. Jones [2000]). Therefore, their conclusions are, by necessity, tentative. However, several authors use this limited time period as an explanation for inconclusive results. Although most of these authors did not find the impact of the blanket primary to be overwhelming, many simply concluded that the relevant actors were slow to react to these new strategic opportunities.

This argument may provide a convenient escape route, but perhaps the most revealing words come from Wendy K. Tam Cho and Brian Gaines (“Candidates, Donors, and Voters in California’s Blanket Primary Elections”). They state: “Our conclusion from this analysis, then, is that the blanket primary was a barely noticed and largely irrelevant innovation in California” (p. 189). Such conclusions are not dismal—support for the null hypothesis still contributes to our knowledge of the nomination hypothesis. The one weakness of this book is the reluctance of certain authors to accept that their hypothesized impact of the blanket primary cannot be supported by the data. As an example, the chapter on the impact of the blanket primary on the status of women ("Thinner Ranks: Women as
Candidates and the California’s Blanket Primary”) devotes considerable effort to developing the hypothesis that the weakening of the political parties, assumed to be furthered by the blanket primary, will reduce the chances of women advancing to the general election. The data from California’s blanket primary in 1998 does not support this hypothesis. These authors then turn to a variation of this hypothesis, arguing that women who run in blanket primaries need to bring in more personal wealth or resources, or have greater previous experience, although this conclusion is based on the experiences of seven women candidates in nonpartisan elections.

Overall, Voting at the Political Fault Line is a tremendously useful resource for any student of the nomination process. Its coverage is vast—from the history of California’s antiparty populism to the cases that have given the courts the opportunity to define the constitutional character of political parties and primary elections. At times, some of the authors may stretch a bit to find support for certain arguments, but the empirical depth and theoretical richness of these analyses are outstanding.


— Sarah Slavin, Buffalo State College

This edited volume seeks to maintain research agendas set by the Center for American Women in Politics (“Reshaping the Agenda: Women in State Legislatures,” 1991; “Women and American Politics: A Research Agenda for the 21st Century,” 1996). The CAWP funded the research reported by all authors in the volume save one. Subject to these parameters, the collective findings are said to provide the most comprehensive evidence available regarding the impact of women in public office (Susan Carroll, p. xviii). The volume seeks to measure the influence of women vis-à-vis men in state and local offices, factor in the significance of political context, and assess the role of identity politics in assertions of influence.

With contingencies, editor Carroll summarizes the findings as supportive of the existence of gender-related influence. Her own research highlights the existence of priorities for women state legislators: in traditional women’s and children’s and progressive women’s rights initiatives. Her research, like Debra Dobson’s, draws on CAWP’s own nationally representative sample of state legislators.

From a well-designed case study of Colorado legislators, Lyn Kathlene offers a counterperceptive: “If women define a ‘women’s issue’ as policy-relevant because they see the issue from a broader contextualized perspective that includes public action, it may not be the ‘women’s issue’ that is being rejected but rather its conceptualization” (p. 31). Is this, as Susan Beck suggests from a cross-municipal vantage point, stylistic? Janet Boles’s comparative case study of Milwaukee elected officials argues that such “gender” differences are more qualitative than quantitative. These perspectives depend on separate original research projects funded by CAWP grants through a competitive process. (The volume included nine of them.)

The Impact of Women in Public Office overall presents some weaknesses. Data were drawn from 1987 to 1992. Thus, the phenomena reported are at least a decade old. To combat datedness, authors have updated their literature reviews (some more thoroughly than others) by showing later consonant findings.

Numbers of respondents were usually small, but women have not achieved parity with men. Excepting Elaine Martin’s use of logit analysis to study feminist judges, and Kathlene’s application of cluster analysis to state legislators’ perceptions, the method of choice was cross-tabulation—not adventurous but accessible to readers, especially undergraduates.

Discussing mayors, Sue Tolleson-Rinehart suggests that representation of women’s leadership based solely on legislators would be lacking: Seven of 11 chapters focus on legislators. An eighth, by Boles, compares legislators with supervisors and school board members. Discussing foreign policy decision makers, Nancy McGlen and Meredith Sarkees caution that deleting conservative women is a mistake. Conservative women seldom appear in other discussions.

Carroll, though, takes ideology as a personal characteristic and finds conservative women to be proportionately more likely than conservative men to work for women’s rights, and less likely than liberal or moderate men or women. Feminism as a self-identification sometimes is a standard for gender-related impact; among Dodson’s subjects in the CAWP database, “non-feminist” women officeholders have the impact!

This book has definite strengths; the political context section is one. Historian Janann Sherman’s chapter on Senator Margaret Chase Smith (R-ME) is superlative at levels of both generalizations and details. It shatters many depictions across time of her as a token, and even stooge for Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson (D-TX).

The volume is dedicated to the late Diane Kincaid Blair, who would have loved Sherman’s chapter. In an earlier publication, Kincaid Blair showed that researchers for years had assumed the appointment of widows of incumbent House members to achieve the seat. (The Constitution requires that midterm House, unlike Senate, vacancies be filled by election.) She made evident the full involvement of the “widows” in their election—and hers in the research process. Sherman has, too.

For the context section, Tolleson-Rinehart interviewed five male–female pairs of mayors, each from the same city. Four of her 10 respondents were blacks (relatively rare in the volume). Edith Barrett’s chapter on black women state legislators also offers a comparison with similarly situated African American men and “nonminority” women and men, all Democrats. The gender perceptions of both Tolleson-Rinehart’s and Barrett’s sets of subjects varied.

Indeed, the placement of Barrett’s chapter in an effects-of-identity-politics section seems questionable. Her results show that black women do not engage in identity politics. She indirectly raises a familiar methodological question: how to treat race. Carroll defined it as an “individual characteristic” (p. 10) and independent variable. The increased tendency is to treat race as a result of social construction and, hence, a dependent variable, but Tolleson-Rinehart and Barrett suggest that the consequences of construction are not hegemonic.

Further, this volume suggests powerfully the wide gap between extant regressive attitudes about women as officeholders and the ability of these women to get into office and, once situated, make their presence felt. Among others, Barrett and Kathlene make a strong case along these lines.

Beck claimed for her city council members: “What is important about these [gender] differences [in perceptions of political reality] is not whether they were objectively true but that they were perceived as such” (p. 60). Again, the question of context asserts itself. Gender is a consequence of social construction.

Strengths also emerge in McGlen and Sarkees’s analyses of ethos in the Defense and State Departments, ecological context, and social demography. In context, 50% of their decision makers do not perceive themselves as occupying policy-driven positions. These authors parallel Ole Holsti and James Rosenau for replication purposes. In this sense, theirs may be the most traditional of studies, but it demonstrates the continuing value of professionalism to research. Sue Thomas and Susan Welch do the same in their (nonetheless atheoretical) 12-state survey of women legislators’ advantages.

In the context section, Thomas and Welch find that “noticeability,” measured by propor-
tions of women serving in a particular state legislature, associates with women’s priority issues. Noticeability may amount to more than proportions. That neither low nor high proportions associate with priority issues begs the question: How do we treat the concept, “women,” methodologically? Our answer makes a difference.


— Mary E. Stuckey, Georgia State University

This little book contains a wealth of material and a richness of methodology that belies its size. Unlike many scholars, Patricia Heidotting Conley takes presidential declarations of mandates seriously; she does not believe that these are random acts, or instances of rhetorical posturing, but are important instances of presidential action. Specifically, she argues that presidential mandate claims are both predictable and revealing of the electorate's sense of the legitimacy of the electoral system. She believes that “mandate claims are the result of strategic calculations based on expectations about congressional responses to the president’s initiatives and on forecasts about voter reactions in the future” (p. 6). She believes that these claims represent an important part of a dialogue among politicians, and with the public, about individual political actors, political parties, and policy.

Following from this belief is a clear focus on the importance of information; Conley finds that this dialogue is dependent upon shared information (election results) and a shared system among political actors (the president and Congress) as a way of reacting to that information. This focus determines the structure of the book. The first chapter provides an overview and justification for the study. It is followed by an analysis of how presidents process political information, examining the factors that shape their political inferences. She then examines presidential mandate claims in historical perspective, concluding with a typology of such claims. They can be popular mandates, made possible when there have been policy debates during the election and a victory based on policy preferences (1952, 1964, and 1980); bargained mandates, when policy preferences are negotiated between the president and Congress (1948 and 1992); and perhaps the most interesting cases, victories but no mandates (1960, 1976, and 1988).

The study concludes with a discussion of the implications of this work for our understanding of political representation, and reminds us that the gist of the work ties the electoral process to the congressional environment to produce (or not) presidential mandate claims. It is an example of how important it is to connect the study of one institution to the influences of the other upon it, and provides evidence that elections are not merely empty exercises so far as policymaking goes, but are integral components in the policy process.

Conley is to be applauded for taking on this neglected area and for bringing such a variety of methods to the task. Her contribution in this regard is most impressive. This is clearly a case where more is better. I would wish that she had taken the presidency literature as seriously as she does the research in elections, voter behavior, and political psychology. There is a real dearth of work on individual presidents (she tends to rely on journalistic sources) and of research on the institution (Chapter 4 represents a limited exception). Equally puzzling is the absence of work on political rhetoric or even political communication, especially since both of the study’s stated goals are explicitly rhetorical in nature (see pages 6–8).

This is not just a disciplinary quibble; the absence of this literature means that she tends to make generalizations that these disciplines find problematic. One example is the claim that it is not until 1828 that “the notion of the president as representative of the people gained currency among politicians and voters and that presidents began associating their policy agenda with the people” (p. 3). There is plenty of research in both communication and the presidency that casts doubt on such statements, and more attention to that literature would have prevented the presentations of such controversial assertions as facts.

In addition, the neglect of this literature and a reliance on aggregate data mean that Conley tends to overlook other explanations for her findings, although in fairness, it is important to note that she does devote an entire chapter to testing other, competing hypotheses. But she misses one that may be crucial: Individual presidents have specific views on the potential and limits of the office itself. Some presidents may not have argued for a mandate because of their understanding of the role of the institution, not solely because of the information processing that is the focus here. I suspect that had the case studies ranged beyond the contemporary period, she would have found evidence for this hypothesis, and indeed, this may be one reason that those case studies are restricted to the modern presidency. If that is the case, then there may be more to her argument than she realizes: Maybe mandate claims are one of the features that distinguish the modern from the premodern presidency (although the question of whether that divide is useful to presidential scholars is one that currently occupies many researchers in the subfield).

With those reservations, Presidential Mandates is a clearly written, cogent, and accessible study of an important—and hitherto-neglected—area of presidential activity. It is methodologically rich and analytically solid. It is likely to be of use to students and scholars alike in the fields of political communication, the presidency, and political processes and institutions.


— Emmett H. Buell, Jr., Denison University

This book inventories the formal means by which American presidents have expanded executive power, often at the expense of Congress. These so-called power tools include executive orders, presidential memoranda, presidential proclamations, national security directives, and presidential signing statements. Phillip J. Cooper meticulously recounts the origins and development of every device, points up problematic aspects of each, and reveals how each has proven helpful to presidents. The book teems with examples of how administrations have tested the limits of these measures; it concludes with recommendations for restrained and thoughtful uses, grounded in the Constitution or statutes. By any estimate, Cooper has made a major contribution to the literature of presidential studies.

Even in Cooper’s capable hands, however, much of this material will seem arcane to general readers. He essays each measure in a separate chapter, but—owing to the lack of hard and fast distinctions between executive orders and presidential memoranda, as well as the difference between national security directives and executive orders—it is often difficult for readers to separate these measures. Indeed, as Cooper relates, even presidents mistake memoranda for executive orders.

Executive orders are used primarily to make legally binding pronouncements on...
government officials. The president derives the authority to issue such orders from the Constitution and/or statutes. Many executive orders are issued pursuant to statutes. The precise definition of a presidential memorandum is "unclear and evolving" (p. 83), and its publication in the Federal Register or anywhere else is not required. Presidential proclamations differ from executive orders in that the former apply to the actions of persons outside government. Pardons, however, fall under the heading of proclamations and extend to persons inside government. National security directives (NSDs) have many of the same effects as executive orders, but are not defined as such and are not covered by the Federal Register Act. Most NSDs, moreover, are classified and concern national security matters, even though many have important effects on domestic affairs. Although the presidential signing statement dates back to Andrew Jackson, according to Cooper, it did not blossom until President Reagan and Attorney General Edwin Meese saw its potential as a means of circumventing unwanted provisions of bills signed into law.

The authority of presidents to issue executive orders, proclamations, and these newer pronouncements dates back to the first days of the republic. Indeed, the antecedents of this authority extend to the British notion of prerogative and to the allied concept that the sources of executive authority are not limited to the laws and constitution of the land. Overall, the author takes a wary view of prerogative, effectively taking William Howard Taft's side in his classic disagreement with Theodore Roosevelt over the nature and extent of executive power. Cooper reverses the institutions of government and the separation of powers, even while acknowledging that in some circumstances presidents must make use of one or more power tools.

Presidential scholars will likely evaluate the strengths of this book in accordance with their own interests and training. Those steeped in public administration and administrative law will doubtless find Cooper's extensive quoting of memoranda and NSDs more digestible than will scholars with different interests. Scholars principally interested in the constitutional powers of the president—enumerated and inferred—will most enjoy the chapters on executive orders, presidential proclamations, and presidential signing statements. The proclamations chapter, for example, quotes Washington fully on the Whiskey Rebellion and his historic declaration of American neutrality in 1793. It also provides the text of Jackson's denunciation of South Carolina's attempt at nullification, Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, and Gerald Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon. The same experts will find Cooper's account of how signing statements have nearly achieved the status of item vetoes informative as well. Students of executive policymaking will pick up valuable bits of information from the author's myriad examples, such as the failed Clinton initiative to combine affirmative action and "environmental justice." Those primarily concerned with presidential power in foreign policy will learn from the chapter on national security directives, although they may find the linkage of NSDs to groupthink tenuous. Unfortunately, repetition frequently detracts from readability. Some of this was unavoidable owing to Cooper's organization of information and to the degree that several measures overlap in form and function. Still, needless redundancy shows up in a section on the advantages of executive orders (pp. 68–70), in a section on the advantages of memoranda (pp. 104–5), and in extensive quoting of the same NSD in two places (pp. 151–54 and 185–87).

This book also would have profited from a more systematic and detailed discussion of whether the use of specific power tools contrary to the will of Congress has increased with the return of divided-party control of government. Cooper only touches on the subject in a brief passage pertaining to Clinton's time in office. These shortcomings notwithstanding, By Order of the President has enhanced the study of presidential power.


— Howard A. Scarrow, Stony Brook University

When the Supreme Court outlawed malapportionment of congressional districts in 1964, students of politics wondered what would be the political consequences of giving urban and suburban areas of the country their proportionate share of representation in Congress. For the authors of this volume, that question missed the point. What is equally important in translating district votes into legislative seats is not only population equality but also the shape of the districts. Thus, the student of politics must focus on the districting process and the strategic goals of those who design those shapes.

The major argument of the study is that the Supreme Court's 1964 "one man, one vote" Wesberry decision produced a major change in that process—the introduction of federal and state courts as third strategic players in the redistricting process. As the title of the volume suggests, prior to the 1960s only state legislatures and governors such as Elbridge Gerry were involved in that process, sometimes producing districts resembling salamanders. Such gerrymandered districts might remain undisturbed for decades. Following a decennial census, partisan deadlock could result in a state's simply failing to redistrict, and even if a state were given an additional congressional seat, it could simply add to the existing map an at-large district; the current gerrymandered districts would remain undisturbed. Only if a state lost representation was it forced to redistrict, facing the option of doing so or being forced by federal law to elect all its members at large. Consequently, most of the congressional redistricting action that took place prior to 1960 occurred in those states.

The Court's 1964 Wesberry decision changed this pattern. All states now had to redistrict; reversion to the existing districting map with its inevitable malapportionment was unacceptable. In the view of Gary Cox and Jonathan Katz, this change in what they label the "reversion process" was "perhaps the single most important consequence" (p. 24) of the Wesberry ruling. The result was that in the period from 1964 to 1970, 301 of the 329 nonsouthern congressional districts were redrawn, and redrawn under court supervision or, if a lawsuit had not been filed, with legislators and governors fully aware that a "one man, one vote" lawsuit by dissatisfied plaintiffs could bring about court intervention.

The political consequences of that procedural change is the focus of this study and, the authors argue, distinguish the work from previous studies of the "reapportionment revolution." More specifically, their aim is to explain how congressional Democrats benefited from this procedural change, and also how that change related to the advantages that incumbents came to enjoy over challengers.

To accomplish that objective, the authors develop a formal model of the redistricting process from which they derive hypotheses about how partisan bias (the difference between a party's share of the statewide total vote in a congressional election and its share of congressional districts won) and responsiveness (how sensitive a party's seat share is to its vote share) differ as a function of partisan control of state government and partisan control of the supervising court. They assume that each party is risk averse and has to make a strategic decision regarding how much bias and how much responsiveness it wants in an ideal district plan, and then goes about bargaining for that goal.
For example, they hypothesize that unified party control of state government will produce partisan gerrymanders yielding high levels of both partisan bias (the other party “packed” in districts) and responsiveness (their own districts safe, but not overly safe), whereas divided government will produce incumbent-protecting gerrymanders, yielding lower levels of both bias and responsiveness.

In one of the early chapters, Cox and Katz test these hypotheses by examining House elections in nonsouthern states under varying conditions (e.g., partisan, bipartisan) in the “pre-revolution” period beginning in 1946, and comparing these election results with the first House election held in the “postrevolution” period. As predicted, the bias and responsiveness scores varied according to partisan conditions. Most important, however, was the finding that the pro-Republican bias that averaged about 6% in the earlier period abruptly disappeared in the first election held under the new procedure. Some Republican leaders had speculated that their party would benefit from the elimination of malapportionment. What those leaders failed to take into account was that under the new system, the pro-Republican gerrymanders of the past would become unraveled with the massive redistricting required by Wesberry. Also, they had not foreseen the Johnson landslide victory in 1964, which converted many Republican-dominated state governments into bipartisan governments. The finding that Democrats were the beneficiaries of the elimination of malapportionment is contrary to the findings of previous studies, as is the authors’ argument explaining the disappearing marginal districts and the advantages that incumbents came to enjoy. That phenomenon, they argue, stemmed in part from the Wesberry-induced regularity of redistricting, allowing incumbents and strong challengers to stay clear of one another.

Perhaps the most surprising finding of the study, of interest to both students of politics and to students of judicial behavior, is that the partisan composition of the supervising (actual or potential) state or federal courts (e.g., “the Democratic Supreme Court”) is shown to be predictive of the kind of district plan receiving judicial approval. Here again the authors present a model of strategic behavior. Judges are assumed to care about both the “jurisprudential” consequences of their decisions (degree of population equality) and the political consequences (degree of bias and responsiveness), and the model is designed to show the relative importance of these goals in the plans that finally emerged from the judicial process during the 1960s. Similar to their model of legislator strategy, the authors predict, and then present data to confirm, that district plans with a Democratic bias tended to emanate from Democratic-controlled courts, while plans with a Republican bias tended to come from Republican-controlled courts, partisan control of state government being held constant.

Just as the Johnson landslide of 1964 produced state governments more friendly to Democrats, Democratic dominance in Washington produced courts controlled by Democratic judges. Here, then, is another explanation of why the reapportionment revolution turned out to favor Democrats. Even where state government was firmly controlled by Republicans, as in the cases of Michigan, Ohio, New Jersey, and New York, those states did not produce legislative maps heavily favoring Republicans. The reason, the authors argue, is that legislators in those states could not afford to take a chance with maps with a pro-Republican bias that depended on only approximately equal population districts (allowed in the early years), since standing in the wings were Democrat-controlled courts that might impose plans less advantageous to their party.

Elbridge Gerry’s Salamander is not an easy read. Yet the authors have done their best to make their work accessible to the “mathematically disinclined” (p. 32). They advise readers that they may skip certain well-marked paragraphs containing technical details of their model without losing the thread of the argument. They also provide numerous “qualitative” descriptions of events illuminating their argument. For example, they cite the Republican governor of Georgia persuading fellow Republicans to sue him so that friendly judges could remap a map produced by a Democratic legislature. Those features aside, what must be stressed is the wonder that nearly 40 years after Wesberry, two political scientists have produced a study with important new findings relating to the impact of the reapportionment revolution.


— Janet M. Box-Steppensmeier, Ohio State University

Robert Erikson, Michael MacKuen, and James Stimson’s long-awaited book does not disappoint. It is the first comprehensive study of U.S. macro political-system dynamics over time. Their aggregate research design generates novel findings that are fundamental to politics and political science. For example, they ask about whether shifts in mass preferences drive government policy. Importantly, they firmly plant macro political studies on a level playing field with micro studies; indeed, they build upon the findings and theories of micro-behavior scholars. They forcefully argue for the importance of aggregate studies when they state that “politics is essentially a macro phenomenon” (p. 427). The synergy they create by bringing together the two fields of micro and macro political behavior undoubtedly leads to greater understanding.

Two broad perspectives are used to examine the macro polity. First, the authors investigate how government performance affects citizen evaluations and subsequent partisan identification. That is, they study both the government’s performance and the consequences of that performance on politics for a variety of dimensions. These include how the objective economy drives various aggregate indicators of consumer sentiment, including both expectations and retrospections; how presidential approval is primarily affected by expectations, but other political factors as well; and how both economics and political approval affect party identification. This portion of the book draws heavily from the authors’ joint American Political Science Review articles on these topics, but with a new grounding in individual-level analysis and with the integration that a book-length manuscript allows.

Second, the authors discuss how electorates and politicians interact. In this part of the book, the relationship of government policy and the electorate’s preferences are studied. They find that policy activity is affected by the national mood. As national policy responds, the national mood subsides. The discussion of policy mood is one of the most persuasive and profound parts of the book. Skeptics will wonder how one can even talk about a public response to policies that are passed, given that the public’s knowledge of actual government policies is very low. However, skeptics will be won over to the macro perspective here as the authors clearly show that the direction of desired policy is more than direct summation. Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson take the reader through micro and macro steps here, for example, when discussing why there is a long lag between mood and policy. They note how long policies take for an effect to be felt and how few people in the public are actually affected by policies. They are aware of the need to make a connection between policy and the public response. Elections are the motivator for political actors to respond to the national mood. A future extension to include a discussion of interest groups and elite discourse may further strengthen the discussion of policy and laws.
Throughout the book, the authors get a lot of leverage on unarguably important questions via their aggregate perspective and the use of longitudinal data from 1952 to 1996. In the final part, they bring all of their extensive work on presidential approval, partisanship, elections, economics, and government policymaking together in a system model. Specifically, a deterministic simulation is built. The authors emphasize the complexity of the system’s behavior on the basis of the simulation results. Further substantive lessons remain to be drawn out from the simulation. However, the reader is left feeling as though the punchline from the system’s model is not fully delivered.

A major theme and one of the reasons that this is such an important book is that the macro-political system produces a more sophisticated and intelligent response than expected on the basis of previous microbehavior research. The unique aggregate focus does not invalidate microlevel research but adds to our understanding of the whole process. The project emphasizes that the perspectives of micro and macro are, and should be, very different. At the microlevel, scholars study typical individual behavior. At the macrolevel, one studies electorates. An important and recurrent finding of the aggregate is the regular, orderly movement of the series studied.

The book is also important and exciting because the authors not only eloquently defend the study of macro politics but champion such studies as well. They straightforwardly address skeptics of aggregate studies by pointing out that the key to the macro–micro discrepancy is that the aggregate accentuates the orderly. They discuss how random political behavior of citizens cancels out and how those who act the same produce no variance, leaving the aggregate “signal” to be generated almost solely from those who are orderly in their behavior. I am confident that the point will lead to more theorizing by scholars about the public will and other macro political entities. The building of rock-solid linkages between micro- and macrolevel research, however, is left incomplete.

The performance and policy parts of the book are surprisingly disconnected. Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson state that “the two subsystems do not come together except as they present competing sets of variables to drive election outcomes” (p. 438). The election connection is clearly important, but readers may be left wanting more here. Furthermore, their two central variables, mood and macropartisanship, are shown to be unrelated. Two immediate possibilities seem worth pursuing. First, building on the work in Chapter 5 where they broke down macropartisanship by race, region, age, and gender, the authors could pursue analysis in this framework. I would suggest that a further breakdown of macropartisanship is needed, the level of political sophistication, followed with an analysis by level of political sophistication. When breaking down not only partisanship by level of political sophistication but other series as well, potential relationships might be uncovered.

Failure to use the most discriminating time series methods available for determining the memory of the series may be driving the failure to find a relationship between macropartisanship and mood, as well as some other results. Macropartisanship is characterized as having permanent memory. I am convinced that a unit change in macropartisanship is more important than the larger changes found in equilibrating time series as the authors state. However, I am skeptical that the changes are permanent. The authors tell us that macropartisanship “carries all its perturbations into the future,” and that “macropartisanship responds to every perturbation by permanently altering its level. The economic recovery under FDR, for example, should still leverage Democratic partisanship and affect the outcome in elections yet to come” (p. 421). Other scholars have published work making alternative arguments about the memory of some of the series the authors have studied, and so characterization of macropartisanship as having permanent memory is not without criticism more generally. These substantive conclusions are driven by their methodological conclusions, which were derived using knife-edged methods for characterizing the series. With the inclusion of the possibility of not just stationary or nonstationary (e.g., rapid decay or no decay) but also slow decay, a more accurate characterization of the series could be found. The characterization of the series affects not only conclusions about the impact of macropartisanship but also its causal relationship with other series.

Two pathbreaking contributions will linger with readers for a long time: first, the authors’ work on drawing critical linkages among important macro processes that are typically studied in isolation, and second, the synergy the authors create by bringing together the two fields of micro and macro political behavior. Their extensive work accomplishes so much by shifting the perspective of political scientists. The Macro Polity will undoubtedly affect the research agenda of many scholars for years to come. It will be an early entry on any list of “The Classics” in political science.


— Thomas Clay Arnold, Emporia State University

Status reports and projections regarding pollution, resource depletion, global warming, and so on increasingly convey a sense of impending large-scale, even global, crisis. Among other things, these issues vividly illustrate the promise and relevance of normative political theory. After all, better environmental practices rest on public policies that are clear about what values we ought to pursue. Innovative and provocative explorations of these values have not been lacking. The essays and discussions found in John Gillroy and Joe Bowersox’s The Moral Austerity of Environmental Decision Making happily continue that tradition. Students and scholars alike will profit from their careful study.

The book is unique in several respects, not the least of which is its organization and structure, a reflection of three years of interconnected workshops, panels, and commissioned lectures. In Part One, environmental scholars from various backgrounds address four central questions, each connected to the overall issue of sustainability: 1) Is science an appropriate substitute for moral principle in environmental policymaking? 2) Must conceptions of environmental justice include conceptions of social justice? 3) Has nature only instrumental value? 4) Would policies predicated on nature’s intrinsic value undermine democratic governance? These issues are revisited in Part Three, with the contributors now taking into account the findings of seven original case studies on sustainability featured in Part Two. The focus on specific questions, the use of case studies, and the vibrant exchanges among the contributors establish a coherence often lacking in edited proceedings.

Two of the more lively exchanges are those between Susan Buck and Robert Pahlke on science as a substitute for moral principle and Gillroy and Bob Taylor on intrinsic value. For Buck, writing from the perspective of the policy administrator, moral principle is no substitute for scientific knowledge and expertise. Working from the assumption that the legislative process “has decided the larger moral questions,” she concludes that “policy-relevant consideration of moral principles does not and should not shape bureaucratic decisions on a routine basis” (p. 26). Pahlke disagrees, citing, among other things, the inevitable gaps in

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scientific knowledge (often used, as in the case of Ronald Reagan and acid rain, to justify inaction on pressing environmental matters) and the all-too-real prospect of power overwhelming science.

Gillroy and Taylor debate the issue of intrinsic value. It is interesting to note that their debate is far more over its likely effects on a democratic policymaking process (should a concept of intrinsic value be adopted) than over what that value is or how one establishes it. According to Gillroy, basing policy on the intrinsic value of nature is central; without it we will never abandon the instrumentalism at the heart of so many of our unsustainable ways. Without directly addressing the meaning of the terms involved, or who should decide, Gillroy nonetheless urges policymakers to adopt “the integrity of functioning natural systems” (p. 73) as their policymaking principle. Taylor urges caution. By their very nature, intrinsic values trump other values, preempting public debate and bypassing democratic control of the policy process. Much like Mark Sagoff in his contribution critiquing instrumental value (pp. 62–71), Taylor prefers reexamining our rich but underutilized intellectual traditions for the moral resources sufficient to “challenge and confront . . . environmental irresponsibility” (p. 89).

Similar divisions attend the debates over the text’s central topic—sustainability. The contributors’ positions vary, a reflection of the numerous ways in which they define sustainability. Several contributors, among them Barry Rabe, John Laitos, and Robert Percival, accept the Brundtland Commission’s definition of sustainability as securing “the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (p. 195), characterizing it, in effect, as a quest for efficiency. Others find this definition manifestly unsatisfactory. Pachlke (p. 212) finds it “thoroughly ambivalent” about the well-being of the environment, in reality a definition of sustainable development. Drawing on the linguistics of John Austin (How to Do Things with Words, 1962), Bryan Norton finds the Brundtland definition guilty of a “descriptivist fallacy” (p. 59), that is, of reducing a complex concept to purely measurable terms. For Norton, sustainability is much more performative, something communities do, in this instance, the act of committing to a certain kind of “value articulation and goal setting” (p. 58). Jonathan Wiener adds to the debate, preferring instead to speak of sustainable governance.

For all their differences, the contributors share the conviction that Western environmental policymaking processes are dangerously flawed. They are ethically austere, woefully unable to engage in the inherently moral debate that is environmental policymaking; they are ill equipped to answer the question, “What is good environmental policy?” Gillroy and Boversox ground this moral austerity in two historical factors: 1) the modern belief that policy is best formulated and pursued outside the endlessly contentious sphere of moral philosophy; and 2) the dominance of a market paradigm, one which instructs policy professionals in the principle of Kaldor efficiency and little else. The hope, of course, is that by making sustainability the core concern of environmental policymakers, the market paradigm will itself be called into question and politics and morality reintegrated. Will it work? Perhaps, but not as completely as one might hope. As these essays themselves demonstrate, debates over the many meanings associated with sustainability do in fact question the market paradigm and the kinds of policies it produces. Meaningful and lasting change, however, requires something else. It requires a convincing and compelling vision of the environmental good, which these otherwise very fine essays do not, indeed cannot, given their disagreements, produce—an austerity of another sort.


— Michael Mintrom, University of Auckland

In a recent symposium on the future of political science, Rogers Smith argued that political scientists should give priority to illuminating important contemporary political issues, using appropriate scientific methods in the process. In his view, a distinctly secondary role should be accorded to the more narrow task of shoring up the science of political science. Why? “Because political science, like all science, is pursued out of human interests; because its results are inherently linked to people’s self-understandings and interests . . . and because people reasonably expect political science to address and affect questions that they see as important for their interests” (Rogers M. Smith, “Should We Make Political Science More of a Science or More about Politics?” PS: Political Science & Politics 35 [June 2002]: 201). I concur with his basic point, and I also wish to highlight a body of scholarship that illustrates the impressive contribution political scientists can make to illuminating contemporary political issues.

Since the publication of John Chubb and Terry Moe’s (1990) agenda-setting Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools, a heterogeneous group of scholars has produced research on the politics of school choice. Collectively, their work has addressed critical questions regarding education politics and policy. The work has been methodologically diverse and, very often, methodologically rigorous—contributing theoretical insights and analytical techniques that have subsequently informed the work of other political scientists with different substantive interests. The three books under review here add to this body of scholarship, making significant contributions to our knowledge of school choice and its consequences. They also add to our stock of knowledge concerning the appropriate application of social scientific research methods for addressing public policy questions. One report on the use of randomized field trials to isolate the effects of introducing school vouchers in urban settings. Another reports on carefully designed quasi-experimental research: It offers insights on parental behavior both in the presence and the absence of school choice. The third makes a primarily theoretical contribution, drawing from a vast amount of prior scholarship to underscore the linkages between the pursuit of particular values and elements of policy design. Given their relevance to contemporary policy debates, the insights contained in these books will inevitably filter through various network ties and policy communities to inform the thinking of school-choice policy entrepreneurs and policymakers.

All up, this is high-octane political science that delivers practical political and policy knowledge. The research teams associated with each book should be commended for using innovative methods to explore and illuminate an issue central to the ongoing development of American society. If this kind of political science points to the discipline’s future, then that future is looking bright indeed.

From the early 1990s, a politically savvy group of philanthropists and charitable foundations have been working to set up private school voucher programs in cities across the United States. Recognizing the opportunities that these programs offer for the study of
school vouchers and their effects, Paul Peterson worked closely with these actors to make randomized field trials integral to the design of several programs. Over the years, Peterson and other researchers—many of his own doctoral students—have published articles and book chapters analyzing these voucher programs and their effects. In *The Education Gap*, Peterson and William Howell bring those earlier findings together into a coherent whole. (Patrick Wolf and David Campbell are listed as secondary authors.) The education gap of the title refers to the oft-observed difference between white and African American student attainment on standardized tests. In their preface, the authors report that initially they did not consider that the use of vouchers to attend private schools might have differential effects across races. We are told: “One day, quite by accident, we tried to solve a data-collection puzzle by examining voucher effects separately for African Americans. The results jumped off the page” (p. xiii). This apparent anomaly, this observed difference between the educational attainment of African American students and that of other students in the randomized field trials provides the organizing principle of the book.

In the first of eight chapters, Howell and Peterson discuss the development of the public school system and the varieties of school choice in the United States. But the most significant part of this chapter is the discussion of the ways that the current system—whereby families “choose” schools on the basis of where they live, and school funding is tied to local wealth—serves to disadvantage African American children, whose household circumstances make them educationally and economically disadvantaged to begin with. The authors contend that these disadvantages provide a theoretical explanation for why “new forms of choice may be expected to have differential effects by racial group” (p. 26). In the second chapter, the authors review the random field trial methods they used to evaluate voucher programs. This chapter will be valuable reading for anyone interested in experimental design and its application in policy studies. Chapters 3 explores whether the voucher experiments served to “skim” the best students from public schools (for these cases, the answer is “no”). Chapter 4 assesses uptake of the randomly assigned vouchers, checking to see if selection biases might have crept into the experiments (again, for these cases, the answer is “no”). Chapter 5 reviews the differences between the public schools the voucher students previously attended and the private schools they entered. This chapter reveals major differences in terms of academic expectations, family involvement, and class and school size that students experience when they move to the private schools. Chapter 6 explores the test score gap, a topic I will return to shortly. Chapter 7 assesses family satisfaction with private schools, compared with public schools, finding that universally, parents appear happier when they have been able to choose their schools. The final chapter offers reflections on the likelihood that insights from the small-scale private voucher programs could be further tested through the introduction of a publicly funded comprehensive voucher program within an urban school district. Throughout, the authors are careful to qualify their claims.

According to Howell and Peterson, the private voucher programs they assessed had no overall impact on student achievement, at least as it could be measured within the relatively short, two–three-year time period of the studies. However, when the student gain scores were disaggregated by race, the results revealed statistically significant—and substantively quite significant—improvements in the performance of African American students. Importantly, this same basic pattern was observed across the independent field trials—in Dayton, New York City, and Washington, DC.

Why might the switch to private schools lead to academic gains for African American students, but not for others? Two general responses are possible. The first involves interrogating the study design. Is it possible that we are observing some artifact of the coding schemes used to generate the race variables? The second possible response is to offer a theory of race and educational outcomes in the United States. Howell and Peterson take the latter course, and bolster their argument with references to previous findings by other researchers that display similar patterns in the data. In making this argument, the authors adopt a measured tone that adds considerably to the persuasiveness of their interpretation. They also suggest that further research is needed, and argue that this should be facilitated through introduction of a permanent voucher program in a large, inner-city school district. But in the absence of such a program, there is plenty that researchers could do to further understand why African American students appear to be the only group to have made academic gains over a limited time period from using vouchers to attend private schools. Howell and Peterson have made a tremendous contribution to the study of small-scale voucher programs and their consequences. The methods and findings presented in *The Education Gap* establish a new standard of excellence in policy research and lay the ground for even more carefully calibrated future work. New studies designed especially so that race is treated as a key dimension of voucher programs to theorize, model, and manipulate are urgently needed.

In *Choosing Schools*, Mark Schneider, Paul Teske, and Melissa Marschall examine the ways parents behave when allowed to choose among public schools. As explained in Chapter 3, the study is built around an analysis of parental behavior in District 4 in Manhattan and in suburban Montclair, New Jersey, with comparisons with neighboring districts that offer limited or no public school choice. The quasi-experimental design employed here presents the strongest alternative methodology for studying policy effects when costs or other considerations prohibit the use of randomized field trials.

Schneider and his colleagues find that parents of lower socioeconomic status exhibit preferences for their children’s schools that are different from those of their more highly educated counterparts. The differences reported in Chapter 4 are intriguing. While all parents place a high value on teacher quality, low-income parents are more likely to emphasize the importance of school safety, test scores, and discipline. Higher-income parents place more emphasis on things like school values and the diversity of the student population. Given critics’ claims that school choice will fuel further racial segregation, another important finding is that racial preferences apparently play a minor role in shaping how parents choose schools. The authors acknowledge that this finding might be driven by socially acceptable responses provided by parents to the interviewers. But it might also indicate that in a multicultural environment, parents view other attributes of a school as much more important than racial composition. Significantly, in their interviews with parents, Howell and Peterson found much the same result.

How do parents act on their preferences? In Chapter 5, Schneider et al. note that choosing schools requires a certain level of skill on the part of parents. Even though low-income parents may care deeply about the schools their children attend, they do not always have access to—or the ability to access—information that would help them determine the best schools for their children. When it comes to using information about schools, the authors find that education matters a great deal. As parents’ levels of education increase, they rely more on their highly educated friends to supply them with information about schools. Less-educated parents (who in this study are often African American) are less able to tap into rich,
informal networks to gain relevant information. In Chapter 7, the authors argue that parents who are allowed to choose their schools do not always possess more knowledge about the schools they have chosen than do nonchoosing parents.

Schneider and his colleagues consider that consumer choice in schooling can have positive effects on education quality, and in Chapter 9 they support this view with time-series test score data from New York City. But they also appear sympathetic to the claim that school choice can have both positive and negative effects, allowing the children of well-educated parents to move to appropriate schools while leaving others in poorly performing schools. Actually, the authors do not find a great deal of evidence that this is the case. (Howell and Peterson find little to support the negative view, either.) Schneider et al. argue that choosers might produce positive externalities for nonchoosers. Thus, in general, parents might not know much about schools, but the mechanism of choice might produce systemwide improvements anyway, as is the case in other consumer markets. Even so, the authors’ findings suggest that government agencies could improve the likelihood that school choice will yield system-improving effects, by ensuring that high-quality information flows to all parents, leading them to make educated choices among schools for their children. Overall, this book fills a gap in our knowledge of how parents make their decisions when faced with school choice, and the outcomes and policy implications of those decisions. In terms of providing practical political knowledge, these authors offer a variety of insights that could inform not only the design of school choice programs but also any efforts to make greater use of markets for the delivery of social services.

While the close analysis of specific school choice programs is essential for knowledge generation about how such programs operate and the effects they produce, sometimes it is good to be able to stand back from the mass of details and ask: What does it all mean? In School Choice Tradeoffs, Kenneth Godwin and Frank Kemerer have done just that. This is an impressive work. Its originality lies in both the coherent synthesis of previously available, but widely dispersed, information and the effort—presented in the final chapter—to offer a design for a school choice program that would minimize the overall costs of the tradeoffs embodied within it. The book is organized along the following lines. The first two chapters provide an overview of the school choice issue and a review of the observed outcomes of current programs. Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the relationship between schooling and the normative goals of liberal democracy and schooling and the pursuit of equality. Chapter 5 reviews the tradeoffs between religious freedom and the separation of church and state. Chapters 6 and 7, respectively, discuss the economics of school choice and regulatory regimes. With respect to regulation, the key tradeoff to consider is that between accountability and autonomy. The book concludes with the authors’ own choice proposal.

School Choice Tradeoffs makes two major contributions to knowledge. First, it helps us to better locate school choice within broader traditions of discourse that inform our political and economic values. Second, it provides an excellent overview of the state of practice and debate in the school choice movement and offers a map both for interpreting and guiding future developments. As such, this book will make valuable reading for normative political theorists, policy scholars, and, of course, those with particular interests in the politics of education reform. Godwin and Kemerer do something all too rare in our discipline: They illustrate the huge intellectual and practical gains that can be achieved when normative theorists and empirically oriented researchers get over their differences and engage together in serious, problem-driven political analysis. In this case, the result is an insightful book on an important topic that also is a pleasure to read.


— John C. Green, Bliss Institute, University of Akron

Peter Kobrak has written a useful description and critique of contemporary politics in the United States. The book is a good example of reformist and liberal arguments about the failed potential of American democracy, of which E. E. Schattschneider’s The Semi sovereign People (1960) is perhaps the best example. Kobrak argues that the well-being of the American public is diminished by the twin problems of special interest power and enfeebled citizen involvement in politics. He has a special focus on the major political parties, and argues that they offer a means to address these problems. On the one hand, this book resembles Darrell West and Burdett Loomis’s The Sound of Money (1998), and on the other hand, Steven Schier’s By Invitation Only (2000). Although Cozy Politics is less focused than either, it covers a wider range of topics. It will make a good textbook, and in addition, offers some useful insights to professional students of political parties, campaign finance, and policymaking.

The book’s title comes from the commonplace accusation that government officials and special interests have too close a relationship. For Kobrak, politics is cozy “when political decisions are driven primarily by who benefits along the way rather than by the purpose of the program or the regulation” (p. 4). Cozy politics helps produce “compromised [democratic] governance,” where the political process violates the rules, the spirit—and apparently—the promise of democracy (pp. 7–8). It is not hard to find fault with these definitions (a point to which we will return momentarily), but even readers who do so will find the text that follows rewarding.

The first part of the book describes how the new economic and political conditions of the 1990s allowed for an increase in cozy politics. Chapter 1 describes the economic problems facing American citizens in the booming 1990s, and a parallel decline in citizen trust of government and involvement in politics. Chapters 2 and 3 cover the major political parties, explaining, respectively, why parties are important to democracy and how the parties have performed in recent times. The second part of the book deals with cozy politics itself. Chapter 4 covers campaign finance, a chief culprit in cozy politics. After summarizing recent developments in political money, the next two chapters review its role in producing compromised governance, including congressional (Chapter 5) and bureaucratic decision making (Chapter 6). The final section is about restoring balances in the political system. Here, Chapter 7 argues that the most effective antidote to cozy politics is greater citizen involvement, a goal that can be best achieved by “reinventing” political parties.

These chapters provide useful summaries of scholarly and journalistic literature, beginning with the economic and social inputs into the political process and ending with the policy outputs. These summaries tend toward conventional wisdom and often fail to cite the most relevant literature (for instance, Theodore J. Lowi’s The End of Liberalism (1979) is never noted in the policymaking chapters). However, they also provide numerous cogent and contemporary illustrations of the topics covered. Examples include a “future Opportunity Cost Index” of citizen well-being (pp. 34–35) and a baseball analogy for the variety of individual campaign contributors (p. 126).

In addition, the text has a lively and accessible style. It uses metaphors effectively, such as applying Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” to the quality of public discourse in campaigns.
Federalism in the Forest: National versus State Natural Resource Policy.

— Brent S. Steel, Oregon State University

In recent years many policymakers, natural resource managers, interest groups, academics, and citizens alike have called for new devolved and collaborative institutional arrangements to the management of public lands in the United States. In part, this approach to the management of public lands is rooted in many Americans’ belief that it will: 1) increase government efficiency; 2) lead to better working relationships with the private sector; and 3) be more amenable to local citizen concerns and preferences. While there is a growing body of research that examines the effectiveness of devolved natural-resource management approaches on public lands—including various ecosystem- and watershed-based management approaches—there have been few studies that examine intergovernmental differences within natural resource policy. This is especially true of studies that compare state and national government approaches to the management of such public lands as forests and rangelands. Given the federal nature of environmental and natural resource policy processes in the American system of governance, and the current movement to decentralize or devolve such policy processes, Tomas Koontz’s book is a timely and welcome addition to the literature.

Koontz compares the public forest management process at the national and state level using a case study approach. His study investigates two midwestern states (Indiana and Ohio) and two western states (Oregon and Washington). Each of these states includes both national forests (managed by the national forest service) and state forests (managed by state forestry departments). At the same time, the economic importance, type of forest, and quantity of public forested lands in each region offer an interesting and contrasting set of case study states. The focus on public forest policy is particularly intriguing because it has been characterized by fragmentation and even paralysis (e.g., the Pacific Northwest) in recent years. While the size and economic contribution of the timber industry is much larger in the Pacific Northwest when compared to the Midwest, public forestry issues have been politicized in both regions for more than a decade. Local, regional, and national interests have urged a varied and often contradictory set of public policy recommendations on natural resource agencies, such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and state forestry and natural resource agencies. “Timber crisis” solutions range from proposals to continue near-historic levels of timber cutting to those that would drastically reduce and even eliminate timber production from public lands.

In analyzing the performance of state and national forest policymaking processes, Koontz utilizes two theoretical constructs—the functional theory of federalism and bureaucratic behavior theory. Both approaches are well developed and appropriate given the focus of the study. The functional theory of federalism focuses on policy outputs from elected officials, which results in state and local governments “encouraging industrial activities that favor economic development over environmental protection” (p. 9). It is argued that state and local elected officials are more susceptible to repercussions “from capital flight if they pursue economic development” (p. 11). Conversely, “policy made by elected officials at the federal level is expected to favor environmental protection more than does policy made by elected officials at the state level” (p. 13). As Timothy Egan has commented: “Environmentalists have learned that taking their case to a larger audience may be the best strategy for preserving forests” (“Fighting for Control of America’s Hinterlands,” Journal of Forestry 89 [1991]: 26–29).

Because of the limitations of the functional theory of federalism in explaining nonelected officials’ behavior—such as agency personnel in natural resource agencies—Koontz also incorporates bureaucratic behavior theory into his study and examines such factors as citizen pressure, rules, agency official beliefs, and agency community. Special attention is paid to citizen participation and the various rules and regulations applying to public forest management, with federal forest policy much more likely to be influenced by citizen pressure to preserve forests and laws that favor environmental protection over commodity production. State natural resource managers are much more susceptible to state and local commodity interests, leading Koontz to conclude that “state agencies devoted much less effort to proactively identifying and protecting rare species that did not affect their ability to sell timber,” whereas federal officials “completed more proactive work to identify and protect rare species than did state officials” (p. 65).

The author’s analysis of public forest policy in the federal context leads him to conclude that the level of government responsible for management does make a difference. As hypothesized by Koontz and confirmed by those of us who have been directly involved in

(p. 70) and offering “global corporations” as a model for reinventing parties under the present circumstances (p. 210). The text is also characterized by wonderful turns of phrase, such as power being the “ultimate aphrodisiac” for interest groups (p. 215), and “protecting the citizens from journalism” (p. 71).

Sometimes this flashy writing gets the author into a bit of trouble, however, as in “Fully three-fifths of U.S. citizens are absent without leave from their political system” (p. 8). To which authority does a citizen apply for leave to be absent from the political system? Does such an “absence with leave” make any sense?

One of the strengths of Kobak’s argument is the recognition that the AWOL citizenry is an important reason for an increase in cozy politics. It is thus important to improve mass citizenship. Another strength of his argument is the recognition of the need for alternative sources of political power to combat cozy politics. Kobak notes that limiting the power of special interests (as in campaign finance reform) is useful, but not enough to overcome cozy politics. It is thus important to harness the countervailing power of “numbers” in the mass public. The book makes a plausible argument that “reinventing citizen-based politics” via political parties can achieve both these goals.

In this regard, Kobak offers some modest suggestions for reforming political parties. The most interesting of these proposals is legal action to require political parties to spend their soft money building stronger state and local party organizations. This idea is relevant to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (passed after this book was published) and the litigation over its constitutionality.

Cozy Politics ends with a description of reinvented political parties as a series of dialogues among citizens, activists, party leaders, and government officials (pp. 228–29). Such parties would foster a link between the public and government officials (pp. 228–29). Such parties would offer a set of public policy recommendations on natural resource agencies, and the current movement to decentralize or devolve such policy processes, Tomas Koontz’s book is a timely and welcome addition to the literature.
the public forest policy process in the Pacific Northwest, “people who favor economic development and profitable resource use would be better served with state-level authority, whereas those favoring environmental protection and citizen participation, especially from non-economic interests, would prefer federal-level control” (p. 192). Many observers of state natural resource policy processes in the West would go further and describe the situation as an “iron triangle” with a tight community of natural resource agencies and commodity interests largely determining the direction of natural resource policy. This leads me to the only significant problem with this study—the absence of any systematic analysis of the numerous and very powerful interest groups that are typically involved with public forestry issues. Interest groups have been key to the management of public forest lands at both the state and federal levels. For example, in the Pacific Northwest it was the efforts of the Portland Audubon Society and other environmental groups that led to years of political activism and litigation resulting in the 1990 Northwest Forest Plan, which shifted USDA Forest Service goals away from timber production in the Pacific Northwest to habitat protection for the northern spotted owl and the marbled murrelet (both listed under the Endangered Species Act). The formation of environmental groups has been key in helping many citizens deal with the complexities of public forest policy environmental issues. Similarly, industry and industry associations (e.g., Western Forestry and Conservation Association) have been key actors at both the federal and state levels in the Pacific Northwest to advocate the case for commodity production.

Notwithstanding this criticism, Thomas Kooontz has written a timely and important book that makes an important contribution to the literature. *Federalism in the Forest* will be of particular interest to social scientists and policymakers interested in the federal nature of natural resource policy, and to those wondering about the consequences of devolving natural resource policy to state and local levels of government.

**Thinking About Political Psychology.**


— George E. Marcus, Williams College

Political psychology is a young social science discipline. The International Society of Political Psychology was founded in 1978, the journal *Political Psychology* a year later, and the political psychology section of APSA even more recently. Yet from the outset most, if not all, political theorists in the Western tradition can be said to work as political psychologists. Explicit theories of human nature provide the foundation for politics for Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Hobbes, Rousseau, Adam Smith, David Hume, and Madison, to name just a few of the more obvious examples. Engaging this field is a challenge as it can be claimed that every variant of politics has at least some political psychological dimension.

The broad reach of the field poses quite a challenge for edited volumes. The challenge of constructing a first course in political psychology is made difficult with so many choices as to theoretical approach, method, and substantive areas of application. It is not surprising that no one has as yet written a successful textbook for the field. Edited volumes assemble chapters that, it is hoped, offer exemplary, cutting-edge research or comprehensive reviews. The annual series *Research in Micropolitics*, edited by Michael Delli Carpini, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Y. Shapiro; the forthcoming annual series *Advances in Political Psychology*, edited by Margaret Herman; a forthcoming *Handbook in Political Psychology*, edited by David Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis; and a companion volume, *Citizens and Politics: Perspectives from Political Psychology* (2001), also edited by James Kuklinski, exemplify this approach. For this volume, editor Kuklinski ably pursues a different purpose, the critical examination of political psychology as a social science discipline, with original contributions by some of the most able practitioners in the field. The 10 chapters are organized into four sections each around a different trajectory of concern.

In the opening chapter, and the sole chapter for the first section, John L. Sullivan, Wendy M. Rahn, and Thomas J. Rudolph argue that although the field has seen a variety of theoretical approaches, reflecting different concerns evident in three different eras—initially personality, followed by attitudes, and then political cognition—they can be subsumed under information processing, that is to say, how humans engage the world and respond to its many challenges. The chapter offers an excellent overview as well as thoughtful consideration of various lacunae in the field.

The next section, concerning theory and research, offers three chapters, by Arthur Lupia, Pam Conover and Donald Searing, and Jon Krosnick, each of which pushes to widen the field. Lupia argues that although rational choice theorists and political psychologists often proclaim themselves to be in different fields, rational choice theory falls well within political psychology, no matter the history of antagonism and the different styles of theorizing. He demonstrates with an empirical study on persuasion how integrating both literatures can be more productive than continuing feuding practices. Conover and Searing argue that the boundaries of political psychology, even as wide as they have been cast, may be nonetheless too narrow. Contextual effects, especially when considered from a comparative perspective, can enable political psychologists, they argue, to escape theorizing solely within a radical individualistic framework. Krosnick seeks to expand political psychology in another way. He argues that the field may have come to premature conclusions about the validity of propositions because at the outset, methods of inquiry are drawn from the dominant and conventional and are not sufficiently tailored to assess competing alternative accounts. He demonstrates that what often appears to be straightforward—the case he explores is the projection hypothesis—may not be so transparent in empirical studies. Cross-section surveys may reveal what appears to be evidence of projection (voters guesstimating where candidates, or parties, stand on the issues) but do not exclude other alternative explanations. Thus, Krosnick argues, political psychologists must be adept in a variety of empirical methods and willing to use them (e.g., surveys, panel studies, experiments, etc.) to fully explore whether any given hypothesis can be sustained when adequately matched against competing accounts.

Section 3, the psychology-politics nexus, begins with a second contribution by the team of Rahn, Sullivan, and Rudolph. In this chapter they demonstrate, by means of a review of political psychology publications in the three leading journals of political science, the growing influence of this field. They also show how political psychology has deepened our understanding by the application of psychological models to political science topics and by the use of research on politics to nourish psychological theories. Jon Krosnick provides a second chapter here to examine political psychology from yet another concern: whether political psychology is just a subfield of psychology (the happenstance inclination to apply psychological theory to political behavior, just as psychology can be applied to economic and social behavior) or something more, a psychological perspective on politics. He illustrates with examples how more of the latter will generate a political psychology, “true to its name,” that not only will illuminate our understanding of politics but also will enrich psychology. Robert Luskin ends this section with a chapter that explores how individual processes, when
properly specified, provide a basis for aggregate models. Of particular value is his exploration of the variety of ways in which models can be misspecified, perhaps the most important being ignoring the likelihood that individual models often will contain nonlinear terms.

The final section includes three chapters, by Jim Stimson, Luskin, and Michael MacKuen, which explore in substantive detail how individual and aggregate models can be linked. Stimson provides a micro model to account for the aggregate shifts in the macro model of public mood he previously developed. Luskin and MacKuen show how micro analyses can add insight into mass politics by enriching our understanding of mass political behavior, Luskin with respect to whether the apparent rationality displayed at the aggregate level is sustained at the individual level, and MacKuen arguing that while improved micro-level models may help bridge the micro–macro gap, there may be macro-level phenomena that are independent of micro-level processes.

The overall quality of the chapters is very high. But, more importantly, there is no comparable resource for encouraging a reflective and critical examination of the foundations and status of the field. Thinking about Political Psychology is an important collection for those who work in the field, and for those entering it is essential reading.


— Katherine Tate, University of California, Irvine

President Dwight D. Eisenhower once famously declared that white Americans would never comply with civil rights laws that violated their core beliefs about race and race relations. Yet in less than a generation, civil rights legislation ultimately won broad public support. The transformation of racial attitudes in America represented the most radical shift in public opinion in American history. Public opinion researchers have provided strong documentation of the liberalizing trend in racial attitudes. The political forces that lie behind the liberal trend, as well as the gaps in the public’s policy preferences and principles on race relations, however, remain deeply controversial matters.

Taeku Lee’s study of racial attitudes in the civil rights era is one proffering grand theoretical ambitions. His study represents a challenge to the conventional wisdom that has long characterized the nature of American public opinion as rootless and fickle. Drawing insights from the field of cognitive psychology, scholars have argued that ordinary citizens derive their opinions from the leadership of elite actors who, in contrast to the masses, are politically attentive and well informed. The upshot of this perspective is that the elite members of society lead and masses follow, which, as Lee rightly concludes, pushed to its extreme, mocks representative democracy.

Lee’s alternative theory of public opinion offers a different characterization of the nature of public opinion, one in which the masses take a leading role in directing the actions and opinions of the political elite. Masses lead notably during historic cycles of insurgent politics. Lee’s model is not, he claims, a “bottoms-up” alternative to the “top-down” theory of public opinion formation. Rather, it represents a rejection of the minimalist view of public opinion in which the central sources of public opinion are chiefly members of the political elite. The public sphere is conceptualized as encompassing more than elected officials and the media, but those working outside of it within the realm of a “counterpublic sphere.” Oppositional ideologies as opposed to mainstream points of view thus are included in his model as having the capacity to impact the wider public. This inclusion of minority voices is a significant modification of the conventional theory of public opinion.

In Chapter 2, Lee challenges the view that a chance set of elections in the 1960s empowered liberal Democrats in Congress, who, in turn, pushed rank-and-file Democrats to favor black civil rights. The 1964 national elections, according to some scholars, were pivotal because civil rights finally had emerged as a partisan issue. Utilizing the 1956–60 American National Election Panel Study, Lee shows that partisan affiliation prior to 1964 Democratic affiliation was closely associated with racial liberalism. The data analysis in this chapter confirms that elite actors were salient forces behind the great liberalization of American racial attitudes, but notably fewer congressional leaders than black protest leaders, since the timing of the liberalization began before the critical elections of 1964.

One of the ingenious features of Mobilizing Public Opinion is Lee’s analysis of constituency mail. Writing to officeholders has increased in popularity, yet few public opinion analysts have made use of such data. In his analysis of letters written to presidents concerning black civil rights from 1948 to 1965, Lee effectively establishes that mass opinion is neither shallow nor random. About 25% of the time, blacks who wrote letters stressed both their identities as Americans and identities as blacks; this exposes the real contradictions of American democracy, and hence, explains their demand for equal rights. Representative of this perspective is a 1962 letter by an African American: “As an American, I am ashamed that such conditions are permitted to exist in our country. As a Negro, I am ashamed of the federal government’s inability or unwillingness to take positive actions which will guarantee all Americans—regardless of race, creed, or color—the unimpeded right to enjoy the fruits of democracy” (pp. 156–57). Racially liberal whites typically made broad appeals for the principle of equality and equal rights, without personalizing as much. Southern whites, the largest source of mail among whites, were generally defensive. Nearly one-quarter of the letters from southern whites equated support for equal rights for blacks to a communist act, in defiance of popular will and states’ rights. One woman from Dallas sent John F. Kennedy the following letter: “Dear Mr. President . . . are you going to move out, after selling this country down the river . . . You should be ashamed. How can you sleep? Communist” (p. 162). Lee shows how key civil rights–movement events explain the ebb and flow of letters sent to presidents. In documenting the flow, Lee establishes the centrality of movement insurgency as a leading source of mass opinion.

Through his analysis of constituency mail, Lee makes a critical contribution to public opinion scholarship. His study exposes the fallacy of a singular approach—reliance on public opinion polls—that has generally painted the mass public as poorly informed and politically inconsistent. More valuably, in challenging conventional wisdom, Lee has in effect piled off the cap of the elite model of public opinion formation, in which actors are overwhelmingly members of a dominant group working through conventional politics. He presents an alternative model of public opinion formation that is richer and significantly more democratic. His scholarship represents a marriage of minority politics and mainstream public opinion scholarship that works to the advantage of both.


— Joanne Connor Green, Texas Christian University

Interest in the funding of American elections has increased dramatically since Herbert Alexander wrote the first book of this series in 1960. Objective, empirical studies, like those presented in this edited volume, are needed for
students of politics, academics, politicians, and others interested in the democratic process in order to effectively analyze current funding practices and their implications for effective reform. This book provides a systematic and thorough examination of the sources of campaign funding in what amounts to a compelling indictment of the current finance system. Time will only tell if the reforms enacted last year (Public Law 107–155) will prove to be the salve needed or if they will, as reform of past, fail victim to the infamous Law of Unintended Consequences (the possibility of which is explicitly examined in the last chapter of the volume).

The book clearly and consistently illustrates the controversies in financing elections by focusing on four key issues: 1) the increased role of money in elections, especially in targeted, competitive races; 2) the remarkable increase in the use of soft money, coupled with the confusing and complex transfer of money from party organization to party organization; 3) the difficulty in documenting the sources of money influencing elections (largely due to the increased use of issue advocacy and soft money and the lack of true disclosure requirements); and 4) the decreased impact of public financing in presidential electoral politics.

The organization and flow of the book is one of its strongest features as the reader is able to examine clearly and carefully the key aspects of electoral financing in the United States. Chapter 1 nicely frames the entire manuscript by demonstrating the unique characteristics of the highly competitive elections in 2000, coupled with a brief discussion of the legal regulation of campaign finance and clear evidence revealing the systematic circumvention of these regulations by parties, interest groups, and candidates. There is a very logical flow, leading the reader through the complex and multifaceted nature of financing executive, legislative, and judicial elections on the national, state, and local levels. Every chapter serves to provide empirical evidence to fulfill the promise of the concluding chapter, “Lessons for Reformers.” For example, nearly every chapter examines the complex dynamic involved in issue advocacy from a multitude of perspectives. In the conclusion, the proposals to reform issue advocacy are examined in light of the research presented in order to explore the likely impact and efficacy of each plan.

One of the most significant strengths of the book is its longitudinal nature (in both the continuity of the series itself and the specific analyses in each chapter), which serves to place the election of 2000 in the larger historical context. The depth and breadth of the analysis provides comprehensive evidence of the complex nature of the changing environment of electoral financing. A thorough examination of the sources of and competition over campaign money permeates the entire text, providing a wealth of knowledge to the reader. The volume also provides an interesting analysis of the teamwork approach to fund-raising, with an examination of victory committees and the multifaceted relationship among candidates, officials, parties, and political action committees (PACs) (for example, the use of leadership PACs to funnel money from candidate to candidate). Of special value is the inclusion of the analysis of judicial elections. That chapter frames the tension in judicial elections between the necessity to campaign, take issue positions, and raise money versus the need to appear to be neutral and nonpolitical. The remarkable increase in the need for money, well documented in the research presented, coupled with the changing character of judicial elections (noted to be at times “deazy” and “disgraceful,” p. 218), demonstrate the heightened level of competitiveness in these often understudied and increasingly significant elections.

The book would have been a bit more useful if there was a more direct examination of the financing of initiatives and referenda. While there is a brief reference to these important components of the electoral landscape on the state and local level in Chapters 2 and 8, more detail and analysis of these forms of direct democracy would nicely supplement the research presented. Additionally, there is very little reference to the role of gender and/or race and ethnicity in campaign financing. Chapter 5 briefly examines the role of gender in gubernatorial fund-raising, but there is no reference in other chapters (most notably in the chapter examining the funding of congressional elections). One last weakness of the text is the periodic inconsistent presentation of data. For example, several different values were presented regarding the amount paid in public financing for the presidential elections in 2000 ($208.3 million, p. 28, and $147.8 million, p. 89) and for the aggregate expenditures for presidential campaigns ($326 million for the nomination, p. 54, and $183 for general elections, p. 89, for a total of $509 million, rather than $607 million presented on p. 24). Additional inconsistencies for party expenditures in hard money exist between Chapters 5 and 6. I realize the difficulty in aggregating data, but inconsistency tends to confuse the reader, serving to slightly diminish the effectiveness of the presentation.

These minor criticisms notwithstanding, the contributions of Financing the 2000 Election to the academic literature are great. Most notably, the volume provides a thorough analysis of the heightened role of soft money and issue advocacy in elections in the year 2000, persuasively demonstrating the importance of regulated and enforced disclosure. The book concludes by supporting the need for a pragmatic approach to finance reform in an incremental manner and provides clear support for the main components of the McCain/Feingold approach to campaign finance, while cautioning the reader to be sensitive to the unintended consequences of these reforms. I look forward to reading the next volume in the series so that the authors can more directly examine reform legislation in light of the most recent activity. This provocative book is useful to all who want to become better informed about who funds elections in the United States and the implications of our financing system for our democratic government.


— James L. Guth, Furman University

Religion permeated almost every phase of the 2000 presidential election. George W. Bush astonished pundits by naming Jesus as his favorite political philosopher, and other Republicans rushed to establish their own bona fides. Failing to attract religious conservatives, John McCain countered by attacking those who supported Bush. Even Democratic candidates were quizzed on the political implications of their faith: Al Gore answered at length, but Bill Bradley insisted that religion was a private concern. Gore later upped the religious ante by choosing running mate Joseph Lieberman, an observant Jew whose speeches soon abounded with Biblical references. And during the fall campaign, Bush and Gore appealed to religious constituencies on various issues, campaigned in religious venues, and endorsed “faith-based” participation in federal programs.

There is obviously an important book to be written on the role of religion in this election. Piety, Politics, and Pluralism is not that book, but it does underline the potential for one. Unfortunately, Mary Segers’s volume has somewhat less coherence than the typical edited work. Originating as special conference papers, some chapters focus on the 2000 campaign, others concern religious freedom in the courts, and two deal with the postelection controversies in Florida and the courts. Despite the diversity of topics, several
individual chapters stand up well as solid scholarly contributions.

Part One addresses the role of religion in the 2000 election. In the first chapter, Segers reviews the events in Florida, discussing "what went wrong," the activities of the Bush and Gore camps during the postelection controversy, and the long-term consequences of the affair. In the next chapter, Elizabeth Hull examines the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore, assessing it as a "self-inflicted wound," with negative effects on public respect for the Court. Neither chapter addresses religious themes, and both seem out of place in this volume. They are also unduly partisan in tone and could have been written by the Gore legal team.

The rest of Part One consists of well-informed chapters on religion in the campaign. Mark Rozell argues that despite initial expectations to the contrary, the Christian Right proved to be a "king-maker" within the GOP, critical to George W. Bush's success. Segers follows with an excellent assessment of how Bush's dependence on this core GOP clientele threatened (or at least complicated) his appeal to an important "swing" constituency, Catholics. Molly Andolina and Clyde Wilcox provide a careful analysis of the religious and moral issues in the election. After reviewing the candidates' stances, they use National Election Study data to show that abortion and gay rights had significant effects on vote choice, even after partisanship is taken into account, but that vouchers and capital punishment did not. Segers wraps up this section with a positive evaluation of Lieberman's invocation of religious values, contrasting it with more questionable uses of faith by the Christian Right and the Bush campaign.

Although none of the authors could be accused of excessive sympathy with the GOP campaign, they do a solid job of recounting important campaign developments. True, there are some annoying mistakes: Elizabeth Dole, a self-described "life-long Methodist," is contrasted with a "born-again southern Baptist" (p. 58), and Dr. James Dobson, head of Focus on the Family, is peremptorily ordained, becoming "Rev." Dobson (pp. 61, 78). The more basic problem, however, is a tendency to exaggerate religious interest groups' impact on the outcome of the GOP nominating contest. McCain's defeat is repeatedly attributed to attacks by Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, and various Christian Right and pro-life organizations, which purportedly feared the Arizona senator's campaign finance reform proposals. The real story is more complicated. Evangelical Protestants did in fact favor Bush by overwhelming margins, but for reasons downplayed by the authors: They are strongly Republican in identification, ideologically conservative, and more in tune religiously with Bush. Once McCain decided to win Republican primaries with independent, Democratic, and liberal voters, his fate was sealed with Christian conservatives, including the large contingent who have little love for Falwell or Robertson.

Part Two turns to the constitutional issue of religious free exercise, focusing on Employment Division v. Smith, the famous 1990 "peyote" case, and its aftermath. Students can learn a good bit from these chapters, but specialists will find little new here. George Garvey reviews the history of free exercise and suggests a standard for constitutional review of state restrictions that is midway between the Court's position in Smith and that of Congress in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (later struck down by the Court). Bette Novit Evans summarizes her provocative argument that the preservation of religious liberty in the United States depends on two kinds of "pluralism," religious diversity and constitutional diversification of power. This optimistic assessment is questioned by Ted Jelen, who argues that in the inevitable struggles over free exercise, religious minorities are perpetually disadvantaged. Finally, Clyde Wilcox and Rachel Goldberg join Jelen in exploring public attitudes toward establishment and free exercise issues, using a survey of Washington DC residents. In a partial confirmation of Evans' thesis, they find that support for religious free exercise grows with increased religious pluralism, but not among all religious groups.

All in all, this collection might have been strengthened by some strategic deletions and additions. One or two chapters on the impact of religious influences on vote choice in the general election might have replaced those on the postelection controversies. Several of the authors have contributed to such analyses in the past; thus, the absence of a chapter on religious voting seems inexplicable. Nevertheless, newcomers to the growing literature on religion in American politics will find much useful information and argumentation in this volume.


— Jack H. Knott, University of Illinois

This book presents a description of the simple rules that policymakers use to deal with the complexity of politics and policymaking. These rules include such familiar behaviors as political slogans, party discipline, and incrementalism. The challenge for policymakers is to know when to apply a specific rule and when to avoid simple rules in favor of in-depth approaches. Political wisdom derives from accumulated experience concerning how to make sound judgments about choosing one rule over another.

The book begins with an overview of the role of simple decision rules in dealing with complex situations. Its perspective is closely associated with the writings of Charles Lindblom, Herbert Simon, James March, and Aaron Wildavsky, who studied the lack of comprehensive rationality in government decision making. The crux of Ira Sharkansky's argument is that policymaking is too complex and uncertain for cognitively limited decision makers to make effective choices. Instead they adopt simplifying rules. Sharkansky contends that these rules, which often exasperate critics interested in more thorough analysis, actually offer policymakers workable solutions to real problems.

Rather than addressing directly the question of simplicity, the next chapter (pp. 15–84) launches into a complex discussion of the policymaking process. This following chapter (pp. 85–106) discusses the complexity of organizational decision making. These two chapters together include 170 footnotes and comprise roughly half of the book. Their description of the policy process contains mostly well-worn material. It starts with a systems approach to policymaking, proceeds to John Kingdon's analysis of the agenda-setting process, and ends with the implementation literature. There are 22 sub-subheadings under the subheading of implementation alone. If the two chapters were designed to convince the reader of the complexity of the policy process, the author succeeds in achieving this goal.

Chapter 4 "is the key chapter of the book." In chronicles the various ways in which policymakers follow simple rules for making choices. The chapter describes 5 major simplifications—parties, incrementalism, slogans, coping, and doing nothing—followed by 16 other rules, including "create a crisis," "claim credit," "blame someone else" (p. 152). The detailed examples of each rule make an important contribution, and the examples of slogans are especially insightful for the political communication literature. This comprehensive set of practical rules for policymakers combines a variety of writings into a common perspective on the subject.

The final two chapters attempt to show how difficult it is for policymakers to apply these rules in the best way at the right time. Some of this material has the quality of "Look before
you leap, but he who hesitates is lost.” Over time, policymakers learn to judge which of these contradictory nostrums to apply in difficult situations. These chapters also contain material on inevitable policy trade-offs. Sharkansky provides numerous in-depth examples of these policy dilemmas. The goal seems to be to provide the reader with a wise and experienced assessment of various policy choices based on Sharkansky’s many years as a political scientist and political commentator in Israel and the United States.

Sharkansky claims that the book is stimulated by formal theory and rational choice, even though writers in these schools might not recognize their work. Any real connection to formal theory, however, remains pretty well hidden. He fails to distinguish between gaming situations in which the interdependent decisions of multiple actors affect outcomes and situations in which external forces over which the actors have no control determine outcomes. He also fails to discuss the difference between cognitive limits on understanding a complex problem and the effects of risk in dealing with uncertainty. In addition, he makes no distinction between individual rationality and collective outcomes.

This theoretical vagueness creates problems for the explanation of simplicity. For example, is the simplicity rule of constituency service a problem of coping with complexity, or is it an example of the prisoner’s dilemma? One could argue that policymakers understand the problem completely but face individual incentives that lead them to provide benefits to their constituency in order to stay elected. The result of this individual behavior, however, might lead to irrational policies for the legislature as a whole. Similarly, one could argue that simplicity derives from the need to build coalitions for the passage of legislation. Policymakers may understand fully the nature of the problem but use ambiguity, slogans, and rhetoric to entice a broader set of interests to provide support. Simplicity may be used more for advocacy and coalition building than for enhancing understanding of problems that are too complex.

Sharkansky asserts that these simple rules are “reasonable” but not “optimal.” Without specifying precisely the game’s rules or equilibrium, he cannot know whether this assertion is true in all cases. A Bayesian updating rule, for example, which empirically might appear as incremental, under some complex situations may indeed be optimal. In addition, incremental behavior is not necessarily suboptimal; it depends on the definition of incrementalism and the nature of the game. Some policymakers do use these rules in a suboptimal fashion. If they fail to understand the game or misjudge what the other players are doing, simplifying strategies will be suboptimal. Yet without more precise specification, one cannot assert which is the case.

Given that the book is about simplifying rules, one might expect an application of cognitive psychology to decision making. Indeed, there is a growing literature on the application of cognitive psychology to voting, political attitudes, and foreign policy. This theoretically rich literature, however, does not guide Sharkansky’s discussion.

The volume contains numerous examples from Israel and the United States where Sharkansky has worked and lived. Comparing Israel and the United States on these various behaviors might make sense, but Sharkansky fails to discuss the methodology of his case study approach. Usually in choosing cases, one would try to look at extremes or at representative cases. Sharkansky could have argued that the two countries differ on key variables and thus offered useful opportunities for identifying similarities and differences.

In sum, Politics and Policymaking has excellent strengths but also notable weaknesses. The strengths of the book are rich description, insightful use of examples in Israel and the United States, and the bringing together of a disparate literature on simplifications in decision making. The weaknesses are a lack of theory either in cognitive psychology or in rational choice for what causes simplification, as well as a resulting vagueness in definitions of complexity and uncertainty. In many ways, the book is a vehicle for Sharkansky to expound on his views about several policy issues, from abortion to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It also reveals his understanding of the policy process gained from years as an astute observer and participant. Consequently, the book contains several wise observations about political behavior and policy that make it worthwhile reading for politicians and political scientists.
declining oil resources that will be felt in the next 10 to 40 years.

Given the seemingly inevitable crisis in energy availability that awaits us, Smith's treatment of public opinion about this issue and how opinions about it change over time are easily accepted by this reader as vitally important topics. Students of the environment will be dismayed, but public opinion scholars will be little surprised, to learn that the public has very little knowledge about important facts concerning energy and the environment. As in other areas, the public takes cues from the media and opinion leaders to form considerations of these topics. While energy and related environmental concerns certainly have economic implications, Smith skilfully illustrates how these concerns parallel attitudes about social issues much more closely.

In unfolding the sources of public opinion about energy, the author carefully considers alternative explanations. As noted, energy opinions tend to follow social opinions, with liberals being pro-environment. Youth and educational attainment are associated with liberal, pro-environmental positions although age differences diminish over time. Smith employs John Zaller's "Receive-Accept-Sample" (RAS) model to account for this, noting that media attention to energy-related issues declined over time, and people were receiving less and less information about this topic. Without the stream of reminders coming from public debates about energy in the 1970s and early 1980s, differences among age groups start to disappear. Elsewhere, different subgroups would change in different ways as the energy issue faded from the daily news.

Public opinions about energy and the environment provide an opportunity to test two alternative explanations for contemporary attitudes about the environment. Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky offered a cultural theory that emphasizes egalitarianism and individualism to account for differences in environmental attitudes. Ronald Inglehart's postmaterialism theory emphasizes generational differences, with prewar generations favoring material values and postwar generations giving greater emphasis to postmaterial values of freedom, self-expression, and quality of life. Smith finds that neither approach provides a satisfying account of varying environmental opinion over time, and the postmaterialism interpretation is particularly weak. He argues that these theories are weak because they are static, containing no mechanism to explain rapid change or current events. When he synthesizes the Douglas and Wildavsky cultural theory with knowledge variables derived from Zaller's RAS approach, this weakness is overcome.

Egalitarian-individualistic inclinations interacting with differing levels of knowledge shaped by varying media and public discourse provide a far stronger account of over-time changes in environmentalism.

From this very careful, theoretically driven analysis, Smith is able to offer projections about our energy future, at least as it relates to the public. The public wants cheap and plentiful energy. Politicians will likely heed their wishes. Declining oil supplies, rising prices, and OPEC- or Middle East conflict-induced price spikes will upsurge the public and put pressure on politicians to find "painless" solutions for these problems. The public's response will be neither informed nor carefully reasoned, and resulting policy choices will likely be shortsighted. This state of affairs will probably forestall the hard choices that ultimately must be made, with the consequence that our continuing thirst for oil will disrupt national and international economies for years to come.

Smith has produced an important book that is must reading for both public opinion and environmental policy scholars. More broadly, Energy, the Environment, and Public Opinion offers any student of American politics and policy important insights into issue formation and diminution and opinion change.


— Timothy E. Cook, Louisiana State University

The declining trust of Americans in many of their political institutions has hit one in particular the hardest: the news media. While the public saw the press positively as a "guiding institution" in the 1970s and 1980s, recent General Social Surveys have put it dead last in the confidence accorded to its leaders.

Why should political scientists care? This concise and thought-provoking book by David Yalof, a constitutional law expert, and Kenneth Dautrich, an investigator of public opinion, gives two reasons. One is that the news media are now a political institution among the "authorities" that David Easton posited as recipients of political support (or alienation). Second is that public attitudes toward the news media may well influence Americans’ responses to the principle of freedom of the press, and to policies designed to address it. Accordingly, Yalof and Dautrich present results from two national telephone surveys, from 1997 and 1999, about citizens’ support for freedom of the press and their evaluations of specific policies toward the news media.

The background of The First Amendment and the Media in the Court of Public Opinion is the scholarship going back to the 1950s and 1960s that pointed to a discrepancy between the public’s support of civil liberties in the abstract and its willingness to restrict those liberties in concrete cases. Yalof and Dautrich raise questions with this literature’s tendency to deprecate citizens on this basis. They note that Supreme Court decisions often diverge between ringing defenses of freedoms and willingness to restrict their reach. The authors ask: Can we think of the public, too, as deliberating over the contours of freedom of the press?

Their answer is “yes.” They do find only a modest correlation (r = .30) between respondents’ abstract support for freedom of the press and their endorsement of a variety of concrete policies in its pursuit. But they suggest that this is due less to respondents being inconsistent than to their weighing freedom of expression against other legitimate considerations. For instance, in Chapter 5, the authors impressively show that the public’s support for freedom to distribute sexually explicit material varies, systematically, depending on the intrusiveness and easy availability of the medium, ranging from video stores and subscription cable television at one end to broadcast television and billboards at the other. Similarly, in Chapter 6, when asked if tabloid outlets (e.g., the National Enquirer, Hustler, or Jerry Springer) have the same freedom to publish or air what they want as establishment modalities do (e.g., the New York Times, Newsweek, or ABC News), citizens tend to agree, though less so with television than with print. Yalof and Dautrich argue that the public’s evaluation of freedom of the press is not simply more positive than commonly depicted but that “the public appears to be more sophisticated; its approach is similar to the ones the courts have used in applying free press principles” (p. 116).

Do these findings reveal an Eastonian “reservoir of goodwill” or not for the news media? This is a more open question than Yalof and Dautrich imply. One problem is that they fail to show anything more than bivariate predictions of support, making it difficult to judge how widely shared these assessments are. Their own data also contradict their argument at times, most notably by finding, as other studies do, that the public sees freedom of the press as far less salient (in an open-ended question) and also as more abused than other First Amendment liberties.

In addition, inexplicably overlooked is the most central recent work on political support—John Hibbing and Elizabeth
Theiss-Morse’s *Congress as Public Enemy* (1995)—which not only discredits the theoretical framework of Yalof and Dautrich borrow from Easton of diffuse and specific support, but also provides incisive and nuanced alternative ways to measure the complexity of attitudes toward institutions, particularly such collective political institutions as Congress and the news media. This failure becomes crucial since Yalof and Dautrich’s results may well be skewed by their question wording, which constantly cues venerated objects, such as the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the First Amendment, and freedom of speech. By beginning a list of policies with “I’m going to read you some ways that freedom of the press may be exercised” (p. 133), the authors could easily have primed their respondents to think in those terms. Similarly, by asking, “Magazines such as *Playboy* and *Hustler* should have the same freedom to publish what they want as other magazines such as *Time* and *Newsweek*” (p. 139), they force a criterion for comparison that could lead respondents to endorse the statement. Absent demonstrations through split-half samples or experiments that these question wordings did not push the results in a positive direction, Yalof and Dautrich’s claims of widespread and sophisticated support for freedom of the press in practice must be taken with a large grain of salt.

The authors’ concern with the approaches that government should and should not develop toward political information takes on unusual importance today. American politics is ever more oriented toward news and publicity. And American public policy toward the news, with the rise of the Internet and the World Wide Web, faces perhaps the biggest turning point since the Communication Act of 1934, which was to set the essential terms for the political information environment for the next half century. Yalof and Dautrich’s intriguing findings provide a valuable step in starting to bring the public into that discussion.


— Gordon Silverstein, Lewis & Clark College

While there are excellent studies of judicial behavior, and particularly of the behavior of U.S. Supreme Court justices, too often we forget that the judiciary cannot be understood in isolation from the elected branches. A full understanding of judicial behavior must grapple with the ways in which judges interact with other institutional actors, and how each branch influences or constrains the others.

We have paid attention to the process of judicial selection, nomination, and confirmation, but what happens after a justice takes the oath of office? Far too little has been written about the “president's ability to contemporaneously influence the policy-making of the justice already sitting on the Court” (p. 74). *Popular Justice* is an effort to help fill that gap.

Does presidential popularity make a difference to sitting justices? Jeff Yates makes the modest but compelling claim that we should consider presidential prestige or popularity as a supplementary explanation for judicial decision making in three broad areas. He argues that presidential prestige can make a difference in cases where the president is defending executive power, in legal challenges to the discretionary authority of executive agencies, and in cases concerning substantive policy preferences where the president has a strongly held and publicly expressed preference. Employing well-established quantitative methods, Yates argues that though presidential popularity “does not equate to political capital . . . trends in public support do make a difference” (p. 46).

If it is the case that justices pay attention to presidential popularity, strategic presidents would be wise to consider their public standing not only in dealing with Congress but also in deciding between a legal versus a legislative strategy. Yates suggests this possibility, although a full examination of executive strategy falls beyond the scope of the book. It is, nevertheless, an interesting example of the research possibilities for those willing to see the Court as part of a wider, interactive, and multi-iterated political process.

Yates next asks if the advantages enjoyed by a popular president spill over to the executive's agents. He concludes that the justices are “generally deferential toward agency action” (p. 69) and often operate “as facilitators of presidential bureaucratic power” (p. 70). This may well be true, and presidential power and prestige may be part of the explanation, but here the book might be significantly strengthened by acknowledging that although the courts and the other institutions of the national government have much in common, there are important ways in which they are different.

Why would judges tend to defer to executive agencies? Presidential popularity may make a difference, but one could well argue that this deference is actually a long-standing philosophical commitment on the part of a number of Supreme Court justices. In 1984 the Supreme Court clearly announced that where there was congressional ambiguity in statutes delegating power to executive agencies, the Court would adopt a default presumption in favor of executive discretion (*Chevron v. National Resource Defense Council*, 467 U.S. 837). Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia more fully developed this theme in a law review article in 1989 (“Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,” *Duke Law Journal* (June 1989): 511–521). Scalia wrote that Congress was on notice that any ambiguity or gap in a statute would (and should) be read as tacit delegation of discretion to executive or administrative agencies. Congress, he wrote, “now knows that the ambiguities it creates, whether intentionally or unintentionally, will be resolved, within the bounds of permissible interpretation, not by the courts but by a particular agency, whose policy biases will ordinarily be known.” Although presidential popularity may well make a difference, the existence of long-standing philosophical, ideological, and even labor-saving default assumptions by the Court need to be integrated into any study of executive-judicial relations.

The quantitative evidence presented in this book rightly reminds us that Supreme Court justices do pay attention to the world in which they live. Their own power and prestige depends upon the perceived legitimacy of their decisions. But while overruling a popular president, particularly one who has taken strong public positions on salient policy questions, can be risky, the Yates study tends to assume that this is a bit of a one-way street, with the Court and president alike focused on executive prestige. But the justices are not without resources. They have independent standing in the public eye, and there is reason to ask whether there might be situations when opposing a popular president could help rather than hurt the Court’s own prestige.

We know that the Court’s decisions opposing Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal were already on the wane when FDR proposed his ill-fated court-packaging plan in 1937, but that can hardly explain the vitriol with which his proposal was greeted by his own party. The Senate Judiciary Committee, dominated by Democrats, concluded that his proposal was “a measure which should be so emphatically rejected that its parallel will never again be presented to the free representatives of the free people of America” (*Senate Report No. 711, 75th Congress, 1st Session*, 1937). Even an extraordinarily popular president may lack prestige and clout on particular issues, a reality that would be apparent to any strategic justice.

*Popular Justice* helpfully encourages us to begin to look beyond the confines of the
courthouse in thinking about judicial behavior. Yates’s empirical instincts are sound, but future research would do well to consider the strategic impulses (and strategic advantages) held by the Court as well as the president, and to consider as well the degree to which long-standing philosophical commitments and judicial predispositions and default assumptions might make a difference. As much as we need to understand the similarities of the three branches of government, we need to keep in mind that their institutional differences and the very different incentives faced by legislators and life-tenured judges shape and constrain their interactions as well.

**COMPARATIVE POLITICS**


— Gianfranco Pasquino, University of Bologna

Much has been written on the processes of democratization and democratic consolidation. So far, however, few exceptions aside, most studies have been atheoretical descriptions of events, providing only idiosyncratic explanations. The best among these studies have produced some sets of generalizations, though of limited applicability. Utilizing a soft or flexible version of rational choice theory, Gerard Alexander has attempted to offer an elegant and parsimonious theory of democratic consolidation based on four different European cases: Spain, Weimar Germany, France, and Italy (plus a glimpse of Britain). In all four major cases, the democratic framework was challenged by the Right and ultimately collapsed. In a subsequent period, all four countries have reinstated a democratic regime that has been fully accepted by the Right.

Alexander starts his analysis by saying that in principle, right-wing forces are neither in favor nor against democracy and authoritarianism. The fruitful questions to be asked do not pin democracy against authoritarianism, but are “democracy with whom?” and “authoritarianism with whom?”. At least in these four countries, the Right has been fundamentally interested in protecting its property and in looking for safety, but Alexander claims that his hypotheses, his analysis, and his generalizations can be extended profitably to Latin American and East and Central European postcommunist political systems. Therefore, anytime a threat from the Left would materialize, the dominant question for the configuration of right-wing forces was whether that threat could be accommodated and absorbed without risks within the democratic framework, or whether it had to be dealt with by installing an authoritarian regime. To be more precise, the author suggests that, indeed, the Right would weight the costs of repression and exclusion of the Left, as well as the costs to itself, in terms of all the restrictions that inevitably an authoritarian regime would entail. Faced with a left-wing threat, the right might hedge, in some cases for an indefinite, though generally not too long, period of time. In other cases, the threat being imminent and serious, the Right has decided to defect from democracy. Finally, all the cases of democratic consolidation have been achieved following the evaluation by the Right that the Left was no longer posing any threat to its safety and property. Because the Left had become moderate or because the moderate Left could in fact control the more limited extreme Left, the Right could commit itself to democracy.

The author stresses that the basic preferences of the Right for safety and property are relatively fixed. On the contrary, the preferences for either democracy or authoritarianism are induced. They depend more on the behavior of the Left than just on the perceptions of the Right. Nevertheless, perceptions do count, but they are influenced and shaped by the statements and the declarations of the leaders of the Left, by the programs of left-wing parties, and by the behavior of the rank and file of these parties (and the inability of the leaders to curb extremist positions).

The theory is then applied to four case studies. All are presented and analyzed through an in-depth perusal of a vast secondary literature: articles, books, memoirs of the protagonists. Indeed, Alexander has definitely relied on the best products of the scholars of the different countries. Because of its importance, the case of Spain has been researched in even more depth, adding to the existing literature interviews with 17 right-wing leaders of the 1976–77 transition and a sample of 50 small-business owners. The success of the Spanish transition to democracy and of its rapid democratic consolidation has been variously explained, especially with reference to pacts and to the favorable and supportive international environment (that had, on the contrary, supported the creation of a very repressive authoritarian regime after 1939). In other cases, the emergence of an authoritarian regime and the difficulty of creating and maintaining a viable democracy have been attributed to the various national political cultures.

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— Karol Edward Soltan, University of Maryland

The main body of this book consists of four chapters, each written by one of the listed authors, all of whom are prominent scholars in “postcommunist studies” and authors of important book-length works on the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union. They each challenge the current received wisdom in accounts of democratization, using evidence from the postcommunist region.

The emergence of democracy is preceded by the failure of authoritarianism, and so Philip Roeder analyzes the sources of the failure of authoritarianism in some post-Soviet regimes and its remarkable success in others, especially in Central Asia. He finds that the fragmented communist regimes collapse into some form of democracy, while the unified regimes preserve their authoritarianism, even as it sheds its communist packaging.

M. Steven Fish considers those postcommunist regimes that first democratized, and then de-democratized (at least partially). Using the full range of postcommunist regimes as his evidence, he considers and rejects many possible explanations for such backsliding. He settles on “hyper-presidentialism” as the best explanation. The backsliders are all systems that gave unusually large powers to the chief executive. Those powers were then used to undermine, or at least to weaken, democracy.

Richard Anderson aims to explain the suddenness of the changes that he believes are the key to the transition to democracy in Russia, and elsewhere: the willingness of the members of the nomenklatura elite to begin to compete with one another for external popular support, and the willingness of the population to take sides in this competition. He finds the answer in shifts of political identity driven by changes in discourse, in the grammatical and semantic structures of the language used by the nomenklatura. Democracy emerges as the elite begins to speak a form of Russian measurably closer to that of the population at large.

Finally, Stephen Hanson is concerned with the problem of the consolidation of democracy in general, and in the postcommunist countries in particular. His chapter is largely a critique of the conceptions of consolidation found in the modernization-and-civic-culture literature, on the one hand (looking for a broad civic consensus on democracy), and the rational choice literature on the other (democracy as Nash equilibrium or as the “only game in town”). Hanson proposes a middle way between these two alternatives: A democracy is consolidated when at least the “enforcers of democratic institutions” are seriously committed to democracy.

The argument that the fragmentation of elites is of fundamental importance for democratization is explicit in Fish’s and Roeder’s chapters, but it is present in all four. This is, of course, an old familiar theme in the literature on democracy, and so a quick summary of these chapters seems a bit unfair. The authors do not simply repeat a well-known story; they give it new strength. The detailed arguments in three of these chapters (Roeder, Fish, Hanson) are smart and convincing, making them into important article-length contributions to the literature on democratization.

I do have a quarrel with Anderson, however. He poses the basic problem in a novel and interesting way: the importance of a strong, distinct, elite identity for the preservation of authoritarian patterns of rule, and of the breakdown of that distinctive identity (and the social boundary it maintains between the elite and the population) for the beginnings of democracy. His empirical evidence also shows that there were linguistic changes accompanying this transformation. But his evidence does not support his claim (which is a little hard to believe) that the linguistic change was itself causally important.

These four core chapters could have been easily published as separate articles. But what is the argument of the book as a whole? To find an answer, we must turn to George Breslauer’s brief introduction or the authors’ collectively written concluding chapter. Neither succeeds in really explaining why the volume exists.

You can approach the book in one of two ways. It is essentially an edited volume (though without editors), with the usual problems (of coherence and uneven quality) of edited volumes. But these problems are not serious: The volume contains some very interesting and valuable contributions, and it is certainly more intellectually unified than most edited volumes. I could stop here with the sort of conventional praise one gives successful edited volumes.

But one can also read the book as a missed opportunity to deliver a significant intellectual manifesto. The manifesto is directed against a broad range of theories of democratization, and this part is delivered effectively. The authors are developing an alternative to the old “preconditions” school of explaining the emergence of democracy, which saw economic development, economic equality, modernization, class structure (including a strong bourgeoisie), ethnic homogeneity, or a strong dose of Protestantism as preconditions of democracy. The experience of postcommunism fails to support most claims of that school, as the authors of this book effectively demonstrate.

This negative message is not enough to give the book unity, however, and it is not enough for an intellectual manifesto. What is, then, the positive message the authors deliver in their conclusion? They argue that we should expand the range of elements of the democratization process we consider. They claim that dispersion of political power is important for democracy. And they support an understanding of democratization, which is not deterministic, but allows for human agency. All these are undoubtedly good things, but they do not really add up to a coherent intellectual strategy or research program.

Yet, in fact, the authors contribute to, and show the fruitfulness of, a very important research program in contemporary social sciences. This program centers on two basic claims. It suggests that the best way to explain political phenomena (whole regimes, or some of their aspects) is to show the sequence of events that produced them. And to do that well, we must understand the microstructure of those events, including the role of instrumental rationality, institutions, and ideas. This is the program of both the new institutionalism that derives from rational choice and the one that appeals to the critics of rational choice. But many of the new institutionalists are misleadingly labeled. They are equally happy to consider ideas and cultures, not just institutions, because their main point is that political battles of the past have left a shared inheritance (culture, ideas, identities, institutions) that influences the political battles of the present. The key messages are that the past matters, and that its influence can be understood in a way that is both detailed and theoretical. Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy promotes this message quite effectively through its four core chapters. One can only wish that the authors had made their version of it more explicit.


— Waltraud Queiser Morales, University of Central Florida

Research on women’s issues and comparative gender roles has achieved a critical mass in
both data collection and theorizing. Progressing beyond descriptive and narrative testimonies of women’s “voices” on the one hand and cold statistics on the other, the recent literature on women and politics offers greater in-depth analysis and intriguing theoretical explanations. The two studies under review substantially advance gender research generally and in Latin and Central America specifically.

The relationship between gender and power in Latin America has deep historical roots and has inspired controversy over “natural” feminine behavior and acceptable sociopolitical roles. Women have figured prominently in the social revolutions of the twentieth century, and since the 1970s an unparalleled number have joined guerrilla movements and served as combatants in Central America's major insurgencies. Much “revolutionary” literature on gender politics tended to glorify male–female relations while ignoring persistent gender problems after guerrilla movements were transformed into governments and integrated into the traditional political party structure. In contrast, extensive and stimulating analysis of the status of women “after the revolutions” in Central America represents the single most important contribution of these two books.

Despite mixed progress in gender equality by Central American women in the postrevolutionary polities of El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, both studies conclude that the ultimate goal of substantive, in contrast to legal, gender equality and democratization remains elusive. Among the reasons, both authors emphasize two persistent and central problems: sexist notions of women’s identities, roles, and natures held by men and women; and sexist attitudes about gender (male–female) relations in general. The Central American case studies also reveal that although revolutions may significantly reorder traditional gender relations, once the societal crisis passes and the fighting ends, confusing self-perceptions and conflicting external social and cultural perceptions of gender roles quickly reemerge. This finding may readily apply to the rest of Latin America and the Third World.

Lorraine Bayard de Volo's *Mothers of Heroes and Martyrs* draws upon field research in Nicaragua during 1992–93 and extensive open-ended interviews with the most active members of the pro-Sandinista Committee of Mothers of Heroes and Martyrs of Matagalpa. Bayard de Volo also interviewed members of the mothers’ committee of Esteli and of the Mothers of the Resistance (or the mothers of the anti-Sandinista ex-Contra fighters), who later joined the Matagalpa mothers’ group. In 1998 and 1999, the author conducted follow-up interviews with about a third of the initial interviewees. Secondary data collection and archival research of more than 15 years of newspapers in Nicaragua and the United States supplement her field research.

The Nicaraguan women interviewed, as Bayard de Volo readily admits, were atypical of most poor Latin American women. Five were experts with an AK-47, and others were former guerrilla fighters, urban insurrectionists, and Sandinista collaborators; but all were mothers, and “most had prepared the destroyed body of a son or a daughter for burial” (p. xii). Despite extensive scholarly attention to the official Sandinista women's organizations, Nicaraguan maternal movements and their important and distinctive role in the gendered hegemonic struggle of the Sandinista revolutionary process have largely been ignored. Bayard de Volo’s research, therefore, fills an important void in the literature on women and politics. She argues that “images of women, particularly maternal images were mobilized by opposing forces in the battle to capture Nicaraguan hearts and minds,” and that these “mobilizing identities were both enabling and constraining to women” (p. 4). Overall she investigates several key questions: how revolution, war, and democratic transitions are gendered; why and how women organized politically as mothers; and how maternal organizations negotiated the complexities “of revolution, civil war, neoliberalism, and gendered hegemonic struggle” (p. xv).

Bayard de Volo effectively demonstrates that in revolutionary Nicaragua, the ideological battle was also fought over the nature of the maternal identity and how and who would define “female consciousness” (p. 16). In power, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) manipulated the women's movement to assure the survival of the revolution and the political advantage of the party, at the expense of women's issues and gender equality. A majority of loyal Sandinista women, many ex-guerrilla fighters and some former military commanders, supported the party's actual, in contrast to its public and official, gender policy, compromising the autonomy of the women's movement. Nevertheless, maternal collectivities demonstrated the potential for both structural and individual change, and between 1990 and 1996 the Mothers were also able to employ maternal symbolism to further women's interests and broker greater autonomy.

Another bitter lesson in gender equality was learned after the FSLN adopted an informal quota policy. In Nicaragua (as well as in El Salvador and Guatemala), women in high office and positions of power did not always advance women's interests or feminist agendas. Bayard de Volo is especially critical of former President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, who encouraged a return to conservative and traditional gender relations that restricted women's choices on sexuality and reproduction, and instituted policies during her administration that increased the "feminization of poverty.” Ironically, the author notes that the Sandinista representation of women as mothers helped Violeta Chamorro, who made effective political use of the maternal imagery, to the presidency (p. 103).

*Mother’s Heroes and Martyrs* reminds the reader that in Nicaragua, simple dichotomies have failed to explain women's motivations to organize. The Nicaraguan women that Bayard de Volo studied developed a collective identity from both expressive and instrumental motivations; women pursued both economic and symbolic stakes. The early members of the Mothers, the *Continuadoras*, joined and supported the FSLN's women's movement during and immediately after the revolution primarily to share moral resources as mothers, and they continued in the struggle to defend the revolution for which their children died. Later members, the *Interesadas*, included FSLN and Contra mothers who were drawn to the women's movement largely for material and economic reasons after the Sandinistas' electoral defeat.

Bayard de Volo concedes that the maternal identities examined in her study are “temporally and historically specific” and do not correspond to all Nicaraguan women (p. 10). Motherhood cannot be dismissed as simply natural; it entails complex images that are socially, culturally, and historically derived. The FSLN articulated the imagery of the “suffering Mother” from without and molded and imposed the dominant gender images of the revolution on Nicaraguan women. This process of constructing and resisting “maternal mobilizing identities,” she maintains, is generalizable “to state-mobilized collective action and even anti- or extra-state social movements” elsewhere in Latin America (p. 17). In the end, “mobilized mothers are a case of resistance as well as accommodation to gendered power relations” (p. 18).

Bayard de Volo anticipates future progress toward gender equality in Nicaragua through a strategy of reconciliation rather than confrontation, and as long as women's organizations maintain their relative autonomy from party and state structures. Analysis of the political climate around the Zoîlalémera case, where in Daniel Ortega's stepdaughter accused him of sexual assault since childhood, demonstrated how gendered power relations could impact national politics. FSLN party loyalists (men and women) closed ranks and protected
Ortega. The party also manipulated the quota system and electoral rules against women candidates for office. These policies indicated that “the FSLN elite never viewed the elimination of patriarchy as fundamental to its democratic agenda.” Moreover, “democracy itself,” Bayard de Volo concludes, “seems to be an endangered aspect of the FSLN agenda, in no small part because women’s emancipation is not seen as an integral aspect of democracy” (p. 248).

In After the Revolution, Ilja A. Luciak sets out to provide a balanced assessment of the revolutionary Left’s record on gender equality in the years after former guerrilla movements were transformed into political parties. This book is based on extensive field research during 1984–89 and 1992–2001 in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, as well as structured interviews with key officials in the three countries and a survey of two hundred Salvadoran ex-combatants. A central thesis is that “meaningful democratization at the national level requires internal party democracy, a unique challenge for the parties of the Left, which have recently emerged out of ‘authoritarian, hierarchical, and military organizations’” (p. xv).

Luciak’s study confirms the persistence of patriarchy in the revolutionary and postrevolutionary politics of Central America, expressed in the epigram: “Of all those who shouldered a rifle, only to the women did they give back a broom” (p. 32). Luciak basically argues that without “a fundamental rethinking of traditional gender relations” there can be no gender equality, and therefore no substantive democratization in the region (p. 225). Ultimately, he warns, quotas, although “an essential part of the struggle to increase women’s representation in the public sphere,” can easily be manipulated to “trap women in mere statistical equality” (p. 225).

Both Luciak and Bayard de Volo consider a controversial dilemma in gender politics for the Latin American political Left: la doble militancia, or “double militancy.” Can women activists be loyal to both the women’s movement and the political party at the same time? Or does this dual loyalty compromise the autonomy of the women’s movement and, ultimately, gender equality? Double militancy, a critical concern in all three Central American cases, became especially acute in Nicaragua where, ironically, the women’s movement realized greater advances after the 1990 Sandinista electoral defeat than in the previous decade immediately after the victory of the FSLN. Luciak comes to many of the same conclusions as Bayard de Volo, and he also finds that the FSLN was more self-serving than grounded in its support for women’s rights.

The core of his study, despite a comparative methodology, centers on El Salvador, the peace process, and the demobilization and integration of the FMLN (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front) into postwar politics. He also examines Nicaragua and Guatemala in order to provide a context and more comprehensive view of the Salvadoran experience. His comparisons reveal that timing and a supportive international climate were critical in the advancement of gender awareness in the region. Thus, women’s issues played a more important role in the peace process in Guatemala in 1996–97 than in El Salvador in 1992. The Guatemalan case was further complicated by the special role of indigenous women, who were some 80% of the URGN (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity) guerrilla forces.

Luciak suggests that gender equity has progressed in all three cases as a result of women’s participation in the guerrilla movements, especially in El Salvador and within the FMLN. Salvadoran women learned important lessons from “women’s subordination in the FSLN” and fought for autonomy within the party at the outset (p. 32). And despite relative success in formal gender equality, none of the three countries had passed national quota laws. Indeed, in Nicaragua and El Salvador, recent developments suggest that “the fight for gender equality is suffering a backlash” (p. 230). With the exception of Europe and North America, the revolutionary Left in Central America “looks quite good when compared with the rest of the world” in terms of formal gender equality (p. 231). And Luciak’s extensive quantitative data on rising female representation in political parties and leadership roles clearly bears this out. But formal equality “has yet to translate into substantive change” (p. 230).

His research and that of Bayard de Volo strongly support the conclusion that substantive gender equality can be achieved only by mutual cooperation between men and women, and that the mainstreaming of gender equality remains a prerequisite for substantive democracy in the region.


— Martha Merritt, University of Notre Dame

Behind its prosaic title, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State is a big, original book brimming with conceptual innovation on two much-visited topics: nationalist movements and the Soviet collapse. Mark Beissinger constructs a rigorous empirical edifice that serves to advance his first-rate theoretical reflection rather than to overwhelm it. This carefully balanced study of nationalist mobilization as a series of waves is a model for those seeking a blend of quantitative and qualitative approaches to worthy subjects.

Beissinger crosses deftly between international relations and comparative politics with his argument that the transnational influence of one wave of nationalism upon another is critical for political success or failure, when joined with the variables of preexisting structural conditions, institutional constraints, and event-specific influences. Drawing on the medium-level data set offered by the 15 Russian republics and a number of subrepublican national minorities, he develops a sophisticated set of indicators to predict the outcome both of nationalist mobilization and of the resulting political struggle. The relatively few mispredictions are treated in full and used to bolster the book’s argument that the iterative effects of nationalism require an approach sensitive to timing and historical experience (pp. 222–33, 243–52).

This study grapples with the role of individual choice driven by a complex set of influences in abnormal political periods (described as “thickened history”). The way things turned out is cast as the product of real people reacting to actual events, not some sort of predetermined pattern of nationalist initiative or regime repression. Repeatedly the reader hears the voices of political actors, as well as the more typically apolitical, as they apprehended incidents at the time of their occurrence, not the events as reconstructed in public imagination or scholarly minds. Sources range from Belorussian schoolchildren chanting “Perestroika” as they go on strike (p. 91) to the rationales provided by political elites for their decisions (e.g., Anatoliy Sobchak’s claim that Georgian political leaders expected the exhaustion of protestors to avert violence on the eve of the infamous April 9, 1989 massacre in Tbilisi (pp. 184–85). One of the most important myths—that the Soviet dissolution was inevitable, and understood as such by most participants in nationalist movements—receives a chapter-length treatment early in the volume. Beissinger’s findings concur with this reviewer’s experiences in the Baltic states during the crucial years leading to independence, a process that took participants by surprise and often ended up hurting political moderates because only nationalist extremists had predicted early victory over the seemingly impervious Soviet regime.

institutionalists might be particularly interested in the book’s nuanced consideration of constraint. As Beissinger argues, “Institutional constraints are powerful mechanisms for affecting the ways in which individuals think about their identities, for in times of normalized politics people tend to adjust their beliefs to the
boundaries of the permissible” (p. 152). When those boundaries are challenged, the process of changing beliefs about limits is described here as “emboldening”; the transformation of consciousness about which the author writes was indeed experienced by participants as an “awakening” or a “rebirth” (p. 153). Refreshingly, he is less concerned about the tired and artificial debate of primordialism vs. instrumentalism—that is, whether nationalist beliefs that emerge are best understood as preexisting or whether they are created by elite manipulation—than he is about the circumstances that make individuals more willing to risk boundary crossing. A key factor in his analysis is the role of persuasive events that demonstrate the likely rewards of action, for in essence, the regime and the nationalist mobilizers are competing for the support of the less committed, the possible fence-sitters. This process ends, as it did for the Soviet republics, if political incumbents succeed in co-opting the nationalist message.

In an especially significant treatment of repression, Beissinger weighs the options available during the Gorbachev era to impose order. He builds upon a meticulous account of episodes of protest and violence (in graph form on p. 163), during which the leaders of the Soviet Union found themselves falling short on the resources a victorious regime would use to repress nationalist expression. The failure of the Soviet state to defend itself adequately was thus rooted in a widely held conception of how order should be maintained, a case where the boundaries of the permissible did not expand for the leadership (p. 329). In contrast to the current vogue for personalizing regime choices and, in Russia, finding Mikhail Gorbachev weak-willed, Beissinger documents the reluctance of even the more order-bound members of the Politburo to exercise state repression. On the few occasions when they tried to flex regime muscle, the use of force backfired, abetted nationalist mobilization, and precipitated the breakdown of Soviet power.

The book suffers only from a reluctance to engage more fully with the wide range of literature tapped here. In particular, reference to the work of David Laitin, Elie Kedourie, and Steven Solnick (obliquely) begs greater, and sometimes more critical, comparison with the author’s own findings. Laitin’s emphasis on linguistic assimilation receives significant support, though Beissinger’s treatment of the contrast between the Belorussian and Ukrainian cases introduces important additional subtlety. Kedourie’s beautiful prose is quoted to effect, though without a treatment of his insistence that nationalism is a pathology. Beissinger challenges the notion that officials were only or mostly “stealing the state,” to quote Solnick’s excellent phrase, but could offer a more detailed picture of how his analysis contradicts solely self-interested motives for enlisting nationalism.

Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State should prove useful for graduate and sophisticated undergraduate-level courses on transnational movements, nationalism, and post-Soviet politics. The book’s carefully constructed arguments and weave of evidence make for absorbing reading and will likely stimulate fruitful discussion.


— Christian Tuschhoff, Emory University

In the tradition of second-image reversed studies, Tanja Börzel analyzes the impact of European integration on territorial institutions and federalism in Germany and Spain. In both cases, the European Union exerted considerable pressure in order to adjust separation-of-power arrangements by modifying the “say and pay” balances between central and regional governments. However, Germany and Spain responded quite differently. Börzel convincingly shows how actors combine the “logic of consequentiality” with the “logic of appropriateness” when choosing and changing their strategies. Following their cooperative federalism culture, the German regions (Länder) consistently responded to Europeanization challenges by cooperating with the central government and continuously adjusting joint decision-making and sharing arrangements. The Spanish Autonomous Communities initially pursued a strategy of confrontation by trying to build a fence around their competencies and shifting costs consistent with the culture of competitive federalism. Only after confrontation failed did they change to a cooperative strategy and adjust domestic institutions. The author finds that Europeanization resulted in facilitating cooperative federalism in both cases. While this reinforced the existing type of cooperative federalism in Germany, competitive federalism in Spain was fundamentally transformed. Europeanization exposed both EU members to the same pressure of adjustment, but the type of federalism determined its adaptability, that is, the degree of change.

Börzel explains these choices of strategy and institutional adaptation and thus makes an important contribution to the growing body of literature on the impact of institutions on choices. She develops her own “Institution Dependency Model” to move beyond explanations offered by liberal intergovernmentalist, neofunctionalist, and multilevel governance theories (Part I). Yet her model selects and combines elements from these theories into a more complex framework. The model predicts, first, that the more European institutions challenge domestic ones (degree of misfit), the greater the chances of domestic institutional change. Second, domestic institutions based on a cooperative institutional culture possess higher adaptability and are less likely to undergo significant change than competitive institutions (p. 39). Formal institutions “delimit the range of strategy options,” whereas “informal institutions [i.e., institutional culture] impact upon their ultimate strategy choice” (p. 214). These are important conditions that help in the understanding of institutional effects. Overall, I agree with Tanja Börzel’s complex picture and comparative analysis of second-image reversed effects, including a convincing causal chain of institutional change (Figure 2, p. 28).

Minor criticism cannot dilute the positive impression of States and Regions in the European Union. This is one of the very few studies that creatively combines and integrates rational choice and constructivist explanations (p. 230). The attempt enriches our understanding of how policymakers make choices. However, such increased descriptive complexity has its price. It does not always allow for the identification of the causal mechanism at work. For example, Börzel argues that the initial choice of strategy results from institutional culture, but subsequent strategy changes are determined by rational cost–benefit calculations. Yet it remains unclear why the initial choice is based on the logic of appropriateness and the subsequent choices are determined by cost–benefit calculations. A mechanism such as path dependency or trial and error might have filled the gap.

Consideration of alternative hypothetical outcomes might have further illuminated the reasons for choice. Just imagine how the autonomous communities exiting from the Spanish federation and becoming independent members of the EU could have made their initial strategy of defending their competencies a success. Börzel does not reveal why the exit option was unavailable and/or not a credible threat to support a noncooperative strategy. Nevertheless, the omission leads to an implied overestimation of the range of strategy choices available to the Spanish regions determined by formal institutions. Without such an exit option, the Spanish regions were as trapped in joint decision making as the German Länder. In addition, had the Spanish constitutional court sided with the regions instead of the central state, the outcome of institutional adjustment would have been quite different than the
adoption of cooperative federalism. Yet the reasons for the court's decision to side with the central government remain a mystery beyond the explanatory variables.

I also slightly disagree with Börzel's argument that Germany's adjustment of cooperative federalism to accommodate Europeanization effectively protected the competencies of regions. This common mistake derives from falsely equating the upper house of the German parliament, the Bundesrat, with the Länder. Constitutionally, the Bundesrat is a body of the central government. Liberal intergovernmentalists can still argue that the increased role of the Bundesrat in European affairs is evidence for their claim that European integration strengthened the central state rather than the regions. The Länder can exercise their veto rights not individually but only collectively. This distinction is not trivial because it is at the heart of William Riker's classical definition of federalism and ultimately affects the state quality of the Länder. In addition, once policy competence moves to the European level, the Länder lose the right of legislative initiative and considerable discretion of policy implementation. In short, cooperative federalism has not prevented centralization, as Heidrun Abromeit already showed in Der verkappte Einheitsstaat (1992).

There are also some minor methodological problems. For example, in the assessment of the effectiveness of institutional coordination in Spain (pp. 140–47), there is no measure for the level of conflict. Consequently, coordination might be considered effective even though common positions made it irrelevant. Or Börzel presents mostly subjective assessments by policymakers she interviewed for her statement that the Länder are not using extrastate channels to bypass the central government (pp. 77–78) and are thus refraining from competition. However, such stated subjective intentions do not amount to a pursued strategy.


—Michael Moran, University of Manchester

The great world privatization revolution brings in its wake, predictably, a boom in academic studies of privatization. These two impressive scholarly works represent a latest installment, and mark a further intellectual development in the unfolding literature. As the pace and range of the privatization revolutions gathered force throughout the 1980s, we first produced mostly single-country studies trying to comprehend what was going on; latterly, comparative studies have chiefly been about attempts to map the international contours of privatization. These two works are part of a third stage: the attempt both to subject the privatization experience to existing analytical tools and to use privatization itself as a laboratory to further test some of those analytical tools. It is a crude but, I think, fair summary of these two volumes to say that Hector Schamis is primarily interested in privatization itself, and in applying existing analytical tools to its understanding, whereas Mark Cassell is more interested in what a couple of privatization stories can tell us about some other established social theories.

Descriptively, Schamis offers a set of linked country case studies organized into discrete chapters: Chile, Britain, Mexico and Argentina (paired in a single chapter), and Hungary. Of these, Chile is given both precedence and weight: It is his first, and is by far the most detailed. The justification offered is couched in the language of comparative research design—in essence, that Chile, in part by virtue of being first in the field with an unusually radical program, is a kind of template against which to size up the others. I am not sure that this is analytically quite convincing, and in any case, the actual execution suggests someone who is simply much more at home in Latin America. At the start of his Hungarian chapter, he cites scholars who are skeptical of how far transition theory can carry across continents, and one might ask the same thing of privatization theory. At any rate, the only seriously weak chapter in the book is that on Britain, where the core of the privatization experience—the unfolding regulatory system and the unfolding clashes over the place of privatized utilities in the market economy—barely gets a look in.

But any book organized, like Re-forming the State, around a series of thick case studies of individual countries is vulnerable to sniping from single-country specialists. In fact, the analytical arguments that drive the description are highly successful. They take two loosely related forms. First, Schamis begins by summarizing a range of political economy criticisms of state enterprise, such as those derived from the work of Mancur Olson. These, in essence, see public enterprise as vulnerable to rent-seeking behavior by key interests. The policy prescription is as follows: To abolish rent-seeking opportunities, privatize. Schamis argues by contrast—and his descriptions provide highly convincing support—that liberal market alternatives are similarly vulnerable; the accounts of Chile and Hungary are particularly convincing in this respect. Privatization itself provides numerous opportunities for collusive behavior, opening up rich rent-seeking possibilities. The policy implication of this is obvious, but, for all that, important: Industries do not just privatize themselves, and protecting any liberal order from rent-seeking behavior is a matter of complex institutional design. And although Schamis does not quite say this, a pessimist might conclude from the range of very different cases here that successful institutional design is well nigh impossible. I am not sure that all this is quite such a surprising insight as Schamis wants to maintain. It looks pretty much like some familiar problems of regulatory capture that are standard in the regulation literature, and which are certainly familiar to liberal critics of state enterprise. But what is valuable is the care with which the empirical material is assembled from his thick case studies.

The second analytical driver of the book is the argument hinted at in the punning title: Privatization does not shrink the state; it reforms it, and in reforming it almost always strengthens central state control capacities. Here his slightly skimpy treatment of Britain has actually deprived him of an important piece of evidence. In the British case, the key reforms have not only involved change in the larger architecture of the state after Thatcherism—which he covers—but have also involved, via the new regulatory agencies, the creation of an increasingly active and interventionist regulatory order.

Schamis has produced an ambitious, complex book that will repay the time of anybody interested in privatization. Cassell's study is narrower in scope, but correspondingly richer in detail. It offers thick case study in the sense that good soup is thick—full of juicy morsels. How Governments Privatize is a comparative study of two agencies. The American Resolution Trust Corporation was established to sell off the assets of the thrifts that fell into the lap of government following the great savings-and-loan collapses of the 1980s. The Treuhandanstalt was established following the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to privatize the assets of the old German Democratic Republic. Although the scale of the thrift asset sell-off is certainly impressive, I am not sure it is a particularly illuminating privatization case study; it looks more like a glorified fire sale. But that, in any case, hardly matters because Cassell really wants to use the two cases to explore issues that could just as easily be explored by comparative studies of other agencies in other circumstances: issues to do with the connection between agency mission, structure,
and organization; and issues to do with the way agency behavior is shaped by the national administrative setting (in the latter case, a lot).

There is not much to be learned in this book about privatization theory, although the description of the two agencies is riveting in the detail, much of it derived from interview material. This is the sense in which the privatization experience is used as a laboratory to explore other issues. In essence, two themes emerge. One is the extent to which these agencies depart radically from models of Weberian bureaucracy: Their hierarchies are fluid and flat, their internal division of labor often chaotic, their jurisdictional boundaries often fuzzy. A second theme is the extent to which they do indeed reflect the shaping of the wider national political and bureaucratic environment. In the American case, the result is to enlace much decision making in legalism and adversarialism; in the German case, to allow a (most surprising) flexibility and entrepreneurialism. This is not quite as novel or unexpected as Cassell wants to maintain. Goal displacement, turf struggles, American legalism and adversarialism—all seem pretty second nature by now. And while this is offered as a counterpoint to a Weberian model, it would hardly come as a surprise to Weber. But what makes the book valuable is the care and detail with which the argument is documented and the vivid way the story is told. I sense that Cassell's book is done a disservice in being marketed as a study of privatization; its real value lies in the fact that it is a rare comparative study of agency politics.


— William Avilés, University of Nebraska, Kearney

**Blood and Debt** represents a profound effort to examine the origins of “weak states” in Latin America. Such states have historically failed in monopolizing control over violence, in maintaining and establishing their legitimacy, and/or effectively managing their respective fiscal or economic affairs. Miguel Centeno explores this subject by examining the applicability of bellicist theories to state development in Latin America. Bellicist theories of state development, widely applied to studies of the state in Western Europe, argue that a relationship exists between the process of war and state development. Thus, the external threats associated with international war can generate military needs, which are satisfied through some already existing administrative capacity within a state. This preexisting administrative capacity grows in response to the external threat, becoming more effective in the extraction of taxes and resources in the process. In turn, this encourages and supports the establishment of a central authority. Furthermore, the importance of conscription and the definition of an “enemy” can contribute to the development of “citizens” and a nationalist ethos. The author's central goal is to determine how effective this theory is in explaining the record of failed states in Latin America.

Focusing on the nineteenth century, a high point of war and international conflict in Latin America, Centeno analyzes cases of military conflict in South America and Mexico. He is interested in determining their impact upon state development, nationalism, and citizenship. The author's central finding is that state development in Latin America does not fit the expectations of the “bellicist model,” as Latin America's war experience has had little positive influence upon this process. The reason lies in a more sophisticated understanding of the impact that different types of war can have upon development and the societal and international context in which they take place.

Centeno makes a distinction between “limited wars” and “total wars.” He refers to total wars as conflicts that include high levels of lethality on the battlefield, the militarization of society, and an association with a moral or ideological crusade. In order to survive and be victorious in such wars, states are required to perform certain functions that potentially lay the foundation for greater state development and influence in the larger society. The wars that have traditionally been fought in Latin America have been limited wars. These conflicts have lacked the duration and mass mobilization of men and resources, as well as the loss of life, to have had the same impact upon state development as the Civil War did for the United States or the Napoleonic wars for Western Europe. Compounding the limited nature of Latin America's wars is the fact that the enemy has more often been identified as coming from within (potential slave revolts or peasant uprisings), rather than externally. This has reduced the potential contribution that war could have had upon the development of a greater sense of nationalism in the region.

Having established that wars in Latin America have been of a different type than wars fought during the period of European state development, Centeno then turns to the question of why. What was it about Latin American states, societies, or their international context that contributed to the relative lack of international conflict and total wars? The author finds that the particular conditions that defined the process of state creation on the continent precluded the type and consequences of “state-making war” (p. 20). These particular conditions included the geographical obstacles to state administration; the relative lack of a preexisting state capacity; an export-based economic strategy that prioritized international markets over domestic ones; and the resistance of dominant classes within Latin America to unite in support of more powerful centralized authorities. The last point is critical to Centeno, who concludes that elite support was central to the few cases in which war making had some type of positive affect upon state development (p. 273).

Thus, in comparing the experiences of Western Europe with Latin America and the respective developments of their states, the positive relationship between war and state capacity that has been demonstrated in the European case is lacking. What this demonstrates for Centeno is not the irrelevance of war to state development, but the importance of understanding how a region's international or domestic context can lead to different outcomes. In essence, the positive consequences of war and state development in Western Europe have had more to do with certain environmental and preexisting factors that were not present in the Latin American case. In the end, he suggests that the process of state development represents such a complex and contingent process that no “all encompassing general law” (p. 18) or “universalistic paradigms” (p. 165) can adequately predict or explain outcomes for different regional and national contexts.

Centeno does an excellent job of demonstrating the centrality of context and the contingent nature of state development. However, in demonstrating the importance of context and social conditions in restraining the likelihood and influence of war upon state development, he leaves the reader with more questions, specifically in regard to that context, or what he refers to as “starting points” (p. 264). The most important starting point for war making, according to Centeno, seems to be some level of elite unity or support from dominant classes in order to establish the conditions in which total wars can take place.

Again and again the author refers to the resistance or lack of consensus among Latin America's ruling elites in the nineteenth century that repeatedly undermined greater progress in war making and/or state development. Thus, Centeno argues that “class structures, organizational power and international constraints enveloped the Latin American states in a peaceful embrace” (p. 26); or “a society's preexisting class structure helps determine the type of coercive and extractive apparatus built by the state” (p. 27); and finally, “wars only make states” (p. 273).
Québecois achieved relatively high levels of math of Meech Lake; the 1993 federal election the unsuccessful attempt to rectify the after-
time goes on, one would expect that circum-
stances for the continuation of Canada as it now
duce its privilege” (p. 106). These findings are completely consistent with the work of state theorists that have applied economic elite analyses (e.g., see G. William Domhoff, *Who Rules America?,* 2002; George A. Gonzalez, *Corporate Power and the Environment,* 2001; Eduardo Silva, “Capitalist Coalitions, the State, and Neoliberal Economic Restructuring—Chile, 1973–88,” *World Politics* 45 [July 1993]: 526–59), or Marxist scholars who have examined democratization in Latin America (e.g., see William Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy,* 1996), or the behavior of capitalist states (e.g., Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society,* 1969). Unfortunately, the author fails to incorporate this literature in his analysis, or consider its possible contribution to an alternative explanation for the fascinating cases that are presented. One can hope that future scholars examining state development will consider this broader literature of state theory, as well as the possibility that the search for a universal paradigm might not be over.


— Peter Regenstreif, *University of Rochester*

Over the last two decades, Canada has drawn attention from scholars by appearing to be, on the one hand, a stable, well-functioning constitutional democracy and, on the other, a political system riven by an array of ethnic, religious, social, and regional tensions. As recently as seven years ago, it was threatened by a referendum in Quebec that came within a percentage point of giving a victory to the separatists and splitting the country.

This study is an excellent analysis—essentially an intensive historical review of the past 15 years—of six significant recent public events reflecting the tensions operating in the Canadian polity. Using extensive survey evidence, some of it produced by the authors themselves, combined with data from systemwide investigations carried out by others, the authors cover the 1988 federal election and the debate over the proposed free trade agreement with the United States; the failure in 1990 of the Meech Lake Accord, the attempt to bring Quebec into consensual alignment with the constitutional change that was passed in 1982; the follow-up referendum in 1992 over the Charlottetown Agreement, the unsuccessful attempt to rectify the aftermath of Meech Lake; the 1993 federal election in which two new parties, Reform and the Bloc Québécois achieved relatively high levels of success, the former in western Canada, the latter in Quebec; the historic referendum in Quebec in 1995, which the separatists narrowly lost; and the Quebec provincial election of 1998, which saw the reelection of the separatist governing Parti Québécois (PQ).

The result of the Quebec election prompts the authors to express concern about the possibility of near-term dissolution of Canada because of the promise by the PQ to hold another referendum, should conditions be positive for so doing, Harold Clarke, Allan Kornberg, and Peter Wearing frame their argument well. They devote an initial chapter to an incisive history of Canada, reviewing the key drivers of fragmentation and providing extensive references to the myriad studies discussing the issue. The evolution of Canada’s political culture, the role of federalism and the electoral system, and the performances and policies of its governments since World War II are all discussed. There is special focus on reconstruction after the war, bilingualism and biculturalism, the “stagflation” of the seventies, and, finally, the specifics of the output of the Conservative government led by Brian Mulroney from 1984 to 1993—the Free Trade Agreement, the Meech Lake Accord, the Charlottetown Agreement, and the Goods and Services Tax. Each of the six key events is then analyzed in turn through the prism of survey research, replete with the most sophisticated statistical bells and whistles, all of them appropriate to the data and material at hand.

Many provocative points are covered here. For example, the authors point out that voters expect governments to have a role in the fortunes of the economy, while they blame governments if things are going poorly, they do not reward them commensurately when the economy and their own personal fortunes are succeeding. The result is that an economy that is not performing well can defeat a government, but a government should not expect to be rewarded if the economy is doing well. Shades of the American presidential contest of 2000!

In another context, the authors put forward several interesting models to help explain the ongoing sovereignist impulse in Quebec: There is the “economic conditions” argument in which people support sovereignty depending on whether they would be “better off” or “worse off” in a sovereign Quebec. The authors demonstrate that a constitutional “settlement” would make little difference in this relationship (pp. 272–75). There is also the pure age-related hypothesis, which shows that support for sovereignty decreases with the age of respondents (r = .93). Young people are strongly sovereignist while their elders are relatively less so. As time goes on, one would expect that circumstances for the continuation of Canada as it now exists would worsen, thus the relatively pessimistic conclusion of the study (pp. 275–76) because the authors reject the “life-cycle” hypothesis, which suggests that levels of support for sovereignty will be relatively static across age cohorts but dynamic within them as they move through the electorate (p. 277).

In this connection, it should be noted that events have, at least momentarily, outrun the fears expressed at the book’s ending that Canada is “on the edge.” The authors’ concern emerging from the 1998 Quebec provincial election about the end of Canada in its present form appears to be far off. As of this date (January 2003), the PQ government is in disarray, fearful of facing an electorate that has turned to other concerns, and which, in fact, may be favoring a party other than the opposition Liberals, the Action Démocratique du Québec, a relatively recent arrival on the scene. Still, given the age-related hypothesis, there is reason for ongoing concern.

A small point of clarification: A good deal of the commentary about the Charlottetown referendum in this volume implies that the Mulroney government had some choice with regard to its being held or the conditions under which it was conducted (pp. 112–17). The authors seem to have forgotten that the date of October 26, 1992, was chosen specifically because the Quebec government had scheduled a referendum on that date, a referendum which, had it passed, would have resulted in giving Quebec new powers and, perhaps, moved the agenda of separation forward. The federal government of the day therefore felt it had little choice but to go forward with its own referendum to the people.

That aside, *A Polity on the Edge* is an important volume for students of Canadian politics, the stability of states, and mass behavior of various types. It could also serve as a useful review of the recent Canadian past for courses in Canadian politics.


— Scott Wilson, *The University of the South*

The two books under review both analyze China’s textile and shipbuilding industries, especially such firms as are located in two
leading commercial cities, Shanghai and Guangzhou. Beginning in the 1920s, Mark W. Frazier's study examines these two industries’ development through the late 1970s. Thomas G. Moore’s account of textile and shipbuilding firms covers the peri-od of the early 1970s through the late 1990s. Despite the books’ shared subject matter, the authors’ research questions, methodologies, and conclusions are quite distinct, requiring a separate analysis of each. Nevertheless, reading them conjointly provides a historical overview of the two industries’ institutional development and the causes of those changes.

Frazier develops an historical analysis of firm-level institutions to challenge existing literature on the Chinese work unit (danwei). Andrew G. Walder’s (1986) Communist Neo-Traditionalism describes the Chinese work unit as a creation of Chinese communism, primarily as a means of controlling workers through dependence on state-distributed goods, and of disseminating Chinese Communist Party policies to populations in urban state-owned enterprises. Against that work, Frazier demonstrates that many institutions associated with the danwei, such as firm-level provision of social services, compressed wage distribution, emphasis on worker seniority rather than skill development in determining pay, raising walls around factories, and labor bosses, in fact originated in the late 1930s as a consequence of Nationalist Party policies. The outcome and main thrust of these policies was to create cellular communities organized around factories.

Two shocks—hyperinflation and Japan’s 1937 invasion of China—pressed the Nationalist Party to assert control over industry and to reform firm institutions. The Nationalists compelled newly nationalized firms to distribute such goods as food and housing directly to workers in order to combat hyperinflation; decreasing the supply of money (wages) in circulation would counter competition among consumers. Too, mechanisms that limited labor movement and that distributed goods through firms allowed the Nationalist Party to control industry in the midst of invading Japanese forces. After relative calm was restored in 1945, the Nationalist Party persisted in its focus on firm-level provision and the creation of firm-level communities.

When the Chinese Communist Party seized power in 1949, it accepted many of the institutions created by the Nationalist Party. Yet the Communist Party was split by two political principles: 1) improvement of worker discipline, which required greater wage differentiation and reliance on bonuses, and 2) egalitarianism and wage control, which were often couched in “anti-economism” (to combat workers’ fixation on pay rather than socialist principles). Depending on which political orientation was in ascendance, the Communist Party would increase or decrease its commitment to expanding workers’ welfare through wages and non-wage benefits such as housing. Workers, too, were split along these lines through the Mao era. Older workers who had lesser skills enjoyed the compressed wage levels and the seniority system for promotion and pay, while younger workers sought greater weight placed on performance and skill formation. When the First Five-Year Plan was adopted in 1952, China committed itself to large-scale investment in industry, which necessitated wage controls. To limit consumption and wage growth, China relied on firm-level provision of housing and other social goods, a pattern established under the Nationalists. In the same period, the Communist Party rid China of the Nationalist-era labor bosses and substituted planned allocation of labor to state-owned enterprises. Yet enterprise officials still enjoyed a great deal of personal authority over workers due to their ability to assign workers to posts within firms and to monitor workers with individual dockers.

Frazier delivers an important and insightful contribution to the field’s understanding of the origins and development of the Chinese work unit. In particular, it will cause researchers to reconsider the rationale for the firm-level provision of resources and other control mechanisms. The main target of his critique appears to be Walder’s seminal Communist Neo-Traditionalism, which analyzes Chinese workers’ dependence on their firms in the context of other communist economies’ similar institutions. During the late 1980s and 1990s, the latter work oriented much of the research on Chinese institutions and political economy. By focusing on the historical continuities with the Nationalist era in China, Frazier advances an argument that the Chinese Communist Party did not create these institutions in their own manner or with the intent of fostering dependence but inherited them from the Nationalists. Yet the two explanations are not so distinct as they appear. In the 1930s, the Nationalist Party was deeply interested in rationalizing labor, an issue that had imbued Lenin’s thinking on the Soviet industrial workforce. In fact, China’s Nationalist Party took many cues from the Soviet Union, and so there may be little conflict between Walder’s emphasis on the communist influence over Chinese danwei institutions and Frazier’s argument on the historical continuity between firm-level institutions during the Nationalist and Communist eras.

In China in the World Economy, Moore critiques works on China’s post-1978 opening of trade and investment channels. According to the author, works such as Margaret Pearson’s (1991) Joint Ventures in the People’s Republic of China and Susan Shirk’s (1994) How China Opened Its Door, among others, explain China’s open-door policy in terms of Chinese domestic determinants and give short shrift to exogenous explanations. To demonstrate the force of such exogenous factors, the author analyzes the Chinese textile industry’s and the Chinese shipbuilding industry’s reactions to the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) and the global surplus capacity of ships, respectively in the 1980s and 1990s. He argues that such constraints, labeled “moderate economic closure,” comprised a structure conducive to reform of the shipbuilding and textile industries.

The world market’s leading importers used the MFA to hem in China by placing quotas on China’s textile export. Through the early 1980s, China continued to produce textiles for the severely limited world market without reforming its factories. In the mid-1980s, China undertook several reforms in its textile industry, including upgrading its products to increase the per product profit rate, shifting production to areas not covered by quotas or into textiles with unfilled quotas, and, perhaps most importantly, devolving authority from CHINATEX, the state-designated exporter of Chinese textiles. It is interesting to note that until 1994, China’s silk producers did not face MFA constraints, and the industry continued to produce for the world market with scant institutional reform. Only after the imposition of export constraints in 1994 did China reform its silk industry.

During the 1980s, China’s shipbuilding industry greatly improved its stature in the world marketplace. The 1980s began with an oversupply of ships on the international market. In 1982, China created the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) to navigate its industry through these difficulties. By the mid-1980s, the international oversupply of ships had become critical, and the Chinese state was forced to consider reform of its shipbuilding industry. According to the author, China devolved authority from the CSSC to shipyards, which broke the pattern of bureaucratic direction of the shipbuilding industry. With a restructured industry, China’s shipbuilding yards were able to gain contracts for repairing ships and diversified production, a move that the CSSC had previously been reluctant to undertake. In the cases of shipbuilding and textiles, moderate economic closure induced a shift from bureaucratic to market coordination of producers.

In his analysis, Moore draws from Chinese newspapers and journals and on international publications for data on world market conditions, the MFA, and developments within the
two analyzed industries. He supplemented these sources with interviews primarily conducted in Hong Kong in order to sketch the structure in which Chinese industries reformed, but he, by his own admission, has little to say about agents operating in China and their decisions. Understandably, in the period following the Tiananmen Square massacre, the author had limited access to Chinese interviewees, but his critique of the existing literature on China’s opening hinges on the international context shaping domestic actors’ decisions. Without interviewing domestic actors, it is difficult to determine that international forces rather than domestic decision making led China to reform its textile industries and shipbuilding.

Moore’s *China in the World Market* and Frazier’s *The Making of the Chinese Industrial Workplace* will make important contributions to the scholarship of China’s open-door policy and the Chinese *danwei*, respectively. Moore’s book, although limited by the author’s access to local actors, will push the burgeoning field of Chinese political economists to be more conscious of the complex way that international structure constrains domestic actors in their policymaking. Frazier’s analysis will force those who analyze Chinese firm-level institutions, a policymaking. Frazier’s analysis will force those who analyze Chinese firm-level institutions, a

### Constituting Federal Sovereignty: The European Union in Comparative Context

*By Leslie Friedman Goldstein. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. 256p. $34.95.*

— Susan Rose-Ackerman, Yale University

Federal unions face an ongoing problem of balancing central and member-state political power. Member states may resist central authority, and in the extreme, the federal union may simply split apart. *Constituting Federal Sovereignty* analyzes this problem for federal unions formed by the voluntary agreement of sovereign states. The European Union is the book’s most important contemporary example—one that is still evolving from a customs union of former combatants to a more broad-based polity with a wider mandate.

A union’s founding treaty or constitution cannot resolve all the issues that will subsequently arise. Furthermore, domestic political forces within the member states and at the federation level may shift over time. As a result, even member states that have no interest in withdrawing from the union may resist some aspects of federal policy, either formally or informally. In practice, the record of resistance is quite mixed across federalisms. Leslie Friedman Goldstein attempts to explain these differing patterns of member-state resistance and acquiescence and to draw some implications for the future of the EU.

The history of the European Community/European Union (EC/EU) motivates her inquiry, especially the widespread acquiescence of the member states in activist decisions by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In this illuminating and thoughtful book, she compares the recent experience in Europe with three other federal unions: the American republic before the Civil War, the seventeenth-century Dutch Union, and the Swiss federation after 1848. The comparative case study approach is very helpful in illuminating the debate over the nature and future of the European Union—a debate that too often ignores similar historical experiences.

Goldstein starts with a puzzle. Overt resistance by state governments was much more common in the early years of the United States republic than it has been in the European Union. As she puts it (p. 15): “[T]he nominally sovereign government of the United States of America experienced several decades of overt and occasionally even violent official defiance of its authority by the member states of the American union, while the nominally sovereign member states of the European Union virtually from the start obeyed as a legitimate authority the dictates of the judiciary of their federal union.” She documents her factual claim with tables that canvass the incidents of resistance by member states.

The first way to resolve the apparent paradox is to note that the treaties establishing the European Community awarded less power to the central authorities than did the United States Constitution and required unanimous agreement by the member states before anything could be done under the treaties. Thus, there was simply less reason for member states to object in the EU than in the United States. In this regard, a key aspect of the EC/EU is its limited budget and taxing powers. In the future, Goldstein would do well to look more closely at this aspect of EU behavior because it supports her general argument that weak central governments provoke less controversy than do strong ones.

However, another aspect of the present EU casts some doubt on the general claim that exercises of authority by the EU have been little marked by controversy. Goldstein’s legislative- and court-centered approach leads her to ignore controversial EU assertions of regulatory authority. She is correct that EU’s wide range of directives and regulations are not overtly opposed by members, and that member states support the imposition of these rules on the new candidates for membership. However, aggressive action by the European Commission acting under EC/EU legislative authority has recently provoked a backlash against the Commission and has led it to operate through a committee process that is dominated by member-state representatives. The Commission seems not to enjoy the same level of respect and deference as the ECJ.

The strongest parts of the book are Goldstein’s comparison of the ECJ with the United States Supreme Court. She points out that in the early years of the EC, with the legislative process limited to issues on which all states could agree, many controversial issues were placed before the ECJ. The ECJ was asked to interpret the treaty, and it did so in ways that generally supported a stronger and more consolidated union. These decisions produced few official objections except in France. Goldstein seeks to explain why activist judicial decisions were accepted more easily in the EC/EU than in the early decades of the American republic. The comparison suggests that some existing explanations for the influence of the ECJ do not hold up to a comparison with the United States. In contrast, several explanatory propositions do have weight (pp. 63–64): 1) A system that arises out of a colonial rebellion against a distant power will have difficulty establishing a strong central authority. In contrast, if the member states form a union of former warring powers, deference to the center is likely as a way to avoid further bloodshed. 2) Obedience to central authority will be more easily established if the rule of law is well established in the component states. 3) Consolidation will be helped if member-state officials retain status from fostering a tighter federal union. 4) An educational campaign that targets legal and judicial elites limits resistance. 5) If member-state elites are more pro-federal than the general public, the empowerment of nonaccountable, elite member-state officials limits resistance. Goldstein’s subsequent analyses of the Dutch Union and the Swiss federation are supportive of these general conclusions. This is especially so for the claim that there is an optimal level of federalization that trades off member-state consent against the effective exercise of power. Differences in the underlying respect for the rule of law also distinguish the Dutch and Swiss cases. The role of war is also more clearly articulated by the addition of these two cases.

These conclusions leave Goldstein in some doubt about the ease with which the prospective new members can be incorporated into the Union. She ends her book (p. 160) worrying about the relative weakness of the rule of law in some former Eastern Bloc states. To me this raises a new paradox. Debate over the future of
the EU is full of discussions of “subsidiarity,” meaning, in some quarters, greater devolution of authority to member states. But if the new members have less capacity to carry out policies in a law-bound way, this suggests the need for greater, not less, central authority. Greater member-state resistance would be a cost of expansion but, to me, not necessarily a reason for delay.

One also wonders what Goldstein makes of the current spate of 5–4 decisions by the United States Supreme Court, where the highest federal court is itself limiting the reach of the federal government at the behest of various state plaintiffs. Could such a pattern also develop in EU jurisprudence, or do aspects of the ECJ and its jurisdiction make such a result unlikely?

Carol Graham and Stefano Pettinato provide a thorough and illuminating examination of how economic conditions in emerging market countries affect peoples’ happiness. In particular, the authors explore how economic mobility, opportunity, and relative income levels affect life satisfaction. A central concern for them is how these variables affect attitudes toward market reform, globalization, and democracy—are people made happier by the liberalizing international political economy, and to what degree will citizens support continuing shifts toward economic openness and political participation? They argue that “relative income levels” and “subjective assessments of economic progress” (p. 1) are key to understanding these relationships, cautioning that a reliance on “rational, material self-interest” (p. 3) provides an insufficient understanding of economic behavior. Further, they propose a framework where traditional gauges of well-being, such as marital status and employment, are combined with measures of international economic integration (p. 6).

The body of the book begins with an exhaustive discussion of past work on the economic and noneconomic determinants of happiness. Readers interested in how psychologists and economists understand why some groups of people are happier than others, within and across societies, will find a valuable introduction here in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 provides an overview of conceptual issues and existing research related to economic mobility, a variable at the center of later empirical chapters. The authors examine a wide variety of mobility’s determinants, with education emerging as the most crucial, particularly for residents of less developed countries. By the end of Chapter 3 (p. 70), readers will likely find themselves more than adequately prepared for the empirical chapters to follow.

Graham and Pettinato arrive at their own puzzle in the fourth chapter by addressing three propositions utilizing survey and macroeconomic data from Latin America and Russia. The first is that the determinants of happiness are quite similar across more and less developed countries. The authors confirm their proposition, finding that more income, higher education, and a job go hand in hand with happiness. Their second proposition is that relative economic position matters more than absolute position in determining peoples’ life satisfaction. They provide several empirical cuts that back up their view, starting with a look at the effect of income on happiness in Russia. For instance, that absolute increases in income make poorer Russians happier, but wealthier Russians care more about how their position compares to that of others. The authors also show that happier people in these countries are more likely to maintain positive attitudes toward open markets and democratic governance, although these attitudes are not directly related to the relative versus absolute issue. The third proposition is that macroeconomic factors including inflation and unemployment play a role in happiness, beyond traditional demographic measures. Findings suggest that inflation and unemployment produce unhappiness, with fear of unemployment having a stronger negative effect than the rate of unemployment. The notable nonfinding in this chapter is the lack of “any discernible evidence of the general effects of market reforms on happiness” (p. 100).

Graham and Pettinato deepen their examination of relative economic level and economic mobility, using detailed data from Peru and Russia from various years between 1990 and 2000. An important category emerges here, that of the “frustrated achiever.” These people had consistent income gains but “perceived their past mobility as negative” (p. 112). Even more surprisingly, greater upward mobility often led to greater frustration. For instance, of those with income increases of 30% or more in Russia, 79% gave negative or very negative evaluations of their economic progress (p. 128). What explains this frustration? Upwardly mobile people care about how their incomes compare to others, possibly due to “international consumption standards,” an “unattainable” goal (p. 134) for all but the most economically successful in these countries. These frustrated achievers are not likely to be happy, and therein lies the dilemma—the increasing marketization and openness providing the context for their large income gains also provided the reference points leading to unhappiness with those gains. Economic liberalization is threatened if those gaining from it are unhappy with their progress. The final chapter addresses the implications of this dilemma, suggesting policies that might alleviate the frustrations of this group, along with ideas about how to “reduce the insecurity and enhance the upward mobility” of the poor and middle class (p. 145).

Graham and Pettinato have much to offer on several levels. First, Happiness and Hardship provides an accessible and thorough introduction to connections between economic conditions and happiness, while breaking new ground by focusing on emerging markets. Second, the authors present an interesting puzzle peripheral to numerous ongoing debates, including those on relative deprivation, on connections between macroeconomic performance and political legitimacy, and on the role of economic determinants of economic behavior. Third, after examining those conditions and experiences that tend to make people happy, they add their voices to the chorus of globalization scholars who suggest that improved state protection for the vulnerable is necessary for securing long-term support for open markets. Last, this work highlights some counterintuitive results of rapid economic growth, particularly that those who gain the most often perceive that they are falling behind.

On the downside, the book falls short on one of the most important goals it sets for itself, the degree to which exposure to markets and integration into the global economy makes people happier. The authors provide data on attitudes toward market reforms, but their use of income volatility and unemployment as proxies for market exposure falls short. Why not include a gauge of economic openness or state strength to get more directly at hypotheses regarding happiness and markets? There are other quibbles, but overall, this work adds up to a valuable analysis of the determinants of happiness in a small set of less developed countries—useful knowledge for students, scholars, and policymakers.

Constructivism as an approach to understanding political and social reality has grown in popularity and application in recent years, espe-

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**Book Reviews | Comparative Politics**

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— Adam L. Resnick, Western Washington University

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**Constructivism and Comparative Politics.** Edited by Daniel M. Green. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2002. 278p. $64.95 cloth, $26.95 paper.

— William L. Richter, Kansas State University

Constructivism as an approach to understanding political and social reality has grown in popularity and application in recent years, espe-
cially in the field of international relations. The eight contributions in this work seek to extend constructivist analysis to comparative politics. The contributors all share a commitment and theoretical assumptions that help to give this book a greater degree of integration than is often found in edited volumes. The essays are well written, well documented, and interesting.

The book is divided into two parts. The first four chapters focus on “Theoretical Issues and Overview,” and the last four consist of case studies. This division is somewhat misleading, however, since some of the four theoretical chapters contain case materials, and some of the case chapters provide fairly extensive theoretical discussion. Daniel Green’s introductory “Foundations and Framework” chapter (pp. 3–59) is roughly twice as long as each of the other contributions and fully one-fifth of the book. It provides a thorough review of the rationale for constructivism in IR and for its application to comparative politics. Green suggests the applicability of constructivism to the study and reinterpretation of structures and institutions, cultures, identities, and issues of global governance.

The next three chapters dovetail well with Green’s theoretical introduction, but each adds significantly to the discussion. Kurt Burch explores the development of property rights and “of sovereignty and the boundary separating politics from economics in early modern Europe” (p. 81). Rodney Bruce Hall similarly reviews the historical development of national identities in Western Europe, from the Peace of Augsburg through the creation of Westphalian territorial sovereignty, to the period of nation-states. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel Nexon deal with the interesting question of the phenomenon of globalization and its impact on comparative method: “The comparative method presumes distinct and symmetrical objects of comparison, such as cultures, civilizations, states, regions, ethnic groups, or social movements.” In these and other respects, “processes of globalization erode our ability” to make comparisons (p. 89). Jackson and Nexon suggest a few strategies for dealing with these challenges, including the comparison of social constructions and of processes, as well as looking at globalization itself as a process. As an illustrative case, they review the evolution of Polish national identities during the nineteenth century (pp. 106–109).

Of the four case study chapters, Virginia Tilley’s “The Role of the State in Ethnic Conflict: A Constructivist Reassessment” (pp. 151–74) is perhaps the most interesting and stimulating. She explores the relationships of ethnic identities, states, and the nation-state system. She notes, for instance, the bias in comparative politics that assumes “the usually tacit premise that the nation-state is the fundamental normative framework for political order, and that the territorial state demarcates the nation,” making indigenous peoples “innately nonsovereign: ‘ethnic groups’ or perhaps ‘racial formations’” (p. 153). Tilley’s focus is particularly on Latin America, but her approach is easily applicable to other parts of the world.

The remaining chapters are more specifically case studies, dealing respectively with Benin (Bruce A. Magnusson); the United States, Canada, and the European Union (Patricia M. Goff); and postwar Germany (Patrick Thaddeus Jackson). Magnusson shows how national identity in Benin is conditioned by relations with its larger West African neighbors, especially Nigeria. Goff’s discussion of culture-industry trade policies in North American (NAFTA) and global (GATT) trade negotiations illustrates how the culture industry (significantly, called the “entertainment industry” in the United States) is related to national identity issues in all three of the political entities that she considers. Jackson explores the role that the deep-seated notion of “the West” had in legitimizing postwar reconstruction in Germany. He contends that “the rhetorical commonplace of occidentalism, when incorporated into the public legitimation of policies, exercised a causal . . . impact on the course of German reconstruction, helping to shape the process at almost every step” (p. 242).

Constructivist approaches to political science force us to rethink our understanding, or social construction, of what we have thought to be political realities. The essays in this book demonstrate not only the applicability of constructivism to comparative politics, but many other benefits as well. My major criticism is that at least some of the authors do not seem to recognize the applicability of the approach to their own analytic categories, especially the political science subfields of international relations and comparative politics. Daniel Green, for instance, refers to constructivists and international relations scholars as distinctly separate groups of people, like those divided by nationality or ethnicity. Surely, these are also socially constructed categories that, we might further argue, become less adequate as the boundaries between domestic and international politics become more blurred.

The constructivist approach laid out in this book provides a foundation, not just for informing and enhancing the study of comparative politics but also for superseding traditional categories of political analysis. Constructivism and Comparative Politics will be most useful to graduate students and scholars, not just in comparative politics but in other fields as well.

Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of Communist Parties in East Central Europe, By Anna M. Grzymala-Busse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 360p. $60.00 cloth, $23.00 paper.

— Jack Bielski, Indiana University

Few would have predicted, at the time of the communist collapse in 1989, the rehabilitation of the ruling parties and their emergence as viable political contenders in the new democratic order. Yet within a few years, the former communist parties in Poland and Hungary had reinvented themselves to the point of success at the polls and legitimate rule in government. In contrast, in the neighboring Czech Republic, the successor party remained isolated and unable to convince the electorate of its reformed status. Meantime in Slovakia, the successor organization emerging from the same ruling party as in the Czech lands attained political respectability but tenuous voter support.

What explains these substantially different outcomes in the fate of the successor parties within the confines of East Central Europe? In addressing this puzzle, Anna Grzymala-Busse tackles some of the most important theoretical debates in the fields of democratic transition and party development. Her survey of party reforms in Eastern Europe contends with questions of path dependency during systemic change, institutional adoptability at the time of environmental shocks, elite agency in the face of structural constraints, and the impact of reform sequencing on political transformation. This is an impressive investigative menu, rendered even more so by a rich analytical execution that culminates in a provocative study.

Grzymala-Busse weaves effortlessly between big theoretical issues and empirical case studies. The latter consist of four main protagonists, the political parties that emerged out of the ruling communist organizations in Czechoslovakia (reconfigured as the Czech and Slovak entities), Hungary, and Poland. Much evidence, from a variety of sources and employing diverse methods, is brought to bear on the party transformations. Historical and archival records, survey data, interviews with political leaders, and election results are interwoven to define the type of political reconstruction undertaken by each party. These form the basis for assessments of the former communist parties’ performances as democratic institutions, on the criteria of organizational reform, programmatic appeals, and party-in-the-electorate and party-in-parliament effectiveness.

What explains success or failure of party resurgence? The analysis discounts the usual structural explanations emphasizing the costs
of transitions and the pain of economic reform to concentrate on the “parties’ own actions” (p. 4). The primary explanation for successful recasting of the monopolistic ruling organizations into democratic competitors is political entrepreneurship by party leaders, so that the “book focuses on the leaders’ decisions to transform the party” (p. 9). Still, the analysis reveals a tension in the author’s interpretation between the impact of elite agency and path dependency. Time and time again, political action open to the new party activists is limited, defined by resources inherited from the past, so that the political transformation of the successor parties rests primarily in “the combination of their elite portable skills and their usable past” (p. 264).

It is in fact the emphasis on past legacies and contemporary resources that ensures the explanatory power of Gryzgala-Butske’s study. The communist pasts not only are negative baggage but can also serve as important reserves for the parties’ emergence as democratic formations. Two main theoretical propositions drive the analysis. First, the combination of a “usable past” and “elite portable skills” determines the former communist parties’ performances in the post-1989 political game. The former refers to the nature of the communist period, defined by either a positive, reformist profile that can be used as a resource in the new democratic politics, or a legacy of regime divide between party and people that hinders party reformation. The latter concerns the type of skills developed during the diverse authoritarian pasts that can be transported to the new political circumstances. These variations in communist regimes, such as the nature of political rule, the form of party organization, elite recruitment, or regime-society interaction, impact significantly on the second major explanatory factor. This concerns the interconnection between the capacity to reform early during the transition and subsequent success in the democratic polity. The long-term prospects for the successor parties’ fruitful adaptation to democratic politics depend on organizational and policy reconstitution. The centralization and streamlining of the party organization and membership is necessary to enable broad electoral appeals, and assure party responsiveness to the demands of political competition. A break with past ideology and policy is essential in order to signal a new commitment to political democracy and economic recovery. But success is also dependent on strategic action: Rapid, decisive reform of the party structure and program is essential at the start of the transition to build political credibility and attain popular support.

The paradox is that in Poland and Hungary, the constraints of history emerged during the transition as political opportunities. Communist parties here attained power with little popular support, and subsequently contested that power with society. In the process, party elites developed a more regenerative style that serves well the needs of contested politics in the democratic transition. Party leaders in these countries are more pragmatic and more experienced at negotiating with society. These skills enable a push for a lean organization, effective campaigning, and persuasive action. The result is the swift transformation of the parties into democratic players that achieve extensive success. Yet in Poland, due to recent party-Solidarity rift, victories at the polls do not bring acceptance for the successor party as a coalition partner in governance. In Hungary, a more extensive reformist past translates into success in both the electoral and parliamentary arenas. In contrast, in Czechoslovakia the Left had an initially more prominent historical standing, and as a result, the ruling party became more self-reliant and enclosed. The consequence is that in the new era, the Czech successor party could evolve only into a ideologically driven, closed political formation, incapable of opening up to the exigencies of the democratic game. In Slovakia, the nationalist sentiment within the party, during and after the 1968 Prague Spring, did leave a residue of reform and adaptation that provided the successor elites with better resources and rendered the party more acceptable as a political partner for the emerging democratic parties.

The distinct pathways into democracy followed by the successor parties demonstrate clearly the import of past historical development and elite action in determining the former communists’ capacity to recast identities, organizations, and constituencies. In detailing these paths, Redeeming the Past tells us much about democratic transitions, party development, and agency-structure interactions. As such, the study bears on much larger issues than party evolution in East Europe, as it informs theories of regime change and institutional adaptability.


— Susan Eckstein, Boston University

The Cold War has ended. Revolutionary movements “as we knew them” have been relegated to the dustbins of history. And before they entirely disappeared from the public stage they were much studied. Why, then, yet another book on guerrilla movements? Karen Kampwirth shows us why in *Women and Guerrilla Movements*.

Much of what we know about the leadership and social base of guerrilla movements is male-centric. Left undocumented, almost without exception, are the women who in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Chiapas (Mexico) comprised roughly 30 percent of the combatants and important support bases for guerrilla movements in the three countries. In Nicaragua, the guerrilla movement successfully ushered in a regime change; in El Salvador the civil war ended with a negotiated settlement by which the guerrillas traded arms for electoral representation; and in Chiapas, guerrillas, together with unarmed sympathizers, pressed for greater gender equity and greater respect for the rights of women and indigenous peoples, plus a deepening of societal democratization.

Why did women in these countries become active to the point of taking up arms, and why more so than women in earlier revolutionary movements? And what impact did their involvement have? Bringing women into the analysis of revolutionary movements rests on a gendered understanding of the social context of the movements, at both the domestic and international levels. Implicitly, Kampwirth’s book suggests that women and gendered concerns can no longer be left out of any full understanding of major grassroots societal movements for greater social justice.

Kampwirth relies on secondary sources for her “big picture” portrayal of the national settings in which the guerrilla movements she studied occurred. Over a 10-year period, however, she interviewed, in an “open-ended” manner, some two hundred women in the respective countries who were activists, including combatants, in guerrilla struggles in the 1980s and early 1990s. Through the author we hear their voices, including their reasons for taking up arms. Even if other scholars have provided gendered analyses of revolutionary movements in one of her case studies, Kampwirth is unique in studying women’s involvements systematically and comparatively.

What does she find? She finds that a combination of factors are both necessary and sufficient for large numbers of women to take on a central role in guerrilla movements, some factors shared with men, others not. The necessary social conditions include a combination of long-standing political authoritarianism and post–World War II agrarian restructuring (tied to the intensification of agro-export production), and a related breakdown of the traditional family household structure and increased migration. But, most importantly,
Kampwirth traces women’s break with historical precedent to an unintended impact of changes in the Catholic Church. Against this backdrop, it is women enmeshed in organizational ties and in student as well as parish-based groups, and women who come from families with a history of political activism, that are most inclined to join guerrilla struggles. Through organizational involvements, women develop collectivist concerns, contacts, and skills.

Kampwirth highlights cross-country differences as well as similarities in women’s guerrilla involvements. Contrasts between the two Central American and Chiapas movements, on the one hand, and the Cuban revolution, the “mother” of late-twentieth-century Latin American revolutions, on the other hand, help us understand why in Cuba women played a relatively insignificant role in the armed struggle against the established order. The difference is partly historically explained. Castro’s revolution occurred in the 1950s, the other movements 20 to 40 years later. Why was the timing consequential? According to the author, because in the interim years the Catholic Church underwent organizational and theological change. Liberation theology, and liberation theology-linked base communities introduced by priests, involved women in new ways. Clergy appealed to women’s concerns, though neither in a feminist nor a militant manner. The theological “new thinking” and parish-based organizational activity, nonetheless, served to empower women, to change their mindset, and to predispose them to engage in collective action. Although women did not initiate the guerrilla movements, under the circumstances they became predisposed to partake in armed movements for radical change when they appeared on the political stage, especially as movements in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Chiapas sought mass bases. In Cuba, in contrast, the guerrillas relied, tactically, on selective focal points.

Historical timing also proved important in the most recent of the four movements Kampwirth studied, in Mexico’s impoverished, indigenous South. For one, feminist concerns were important in the Zapatista movement in a manner that they were not in the other cases. Second, Marxist-Leninism was noticeably absent as ideological discourse and inspiration. The Zapatistas focused on such women’s rights as access to health care and education, participation in community decision making, and freedom from domestic violence. Such issues were new to the global repertoire of revolutionary movements. The shift reflects the impact of women’s movements and a broadening of human rights concerns at the international level that by the 1990s included women’s rights, both for gender equity and for those based on gender differences.

Kampwirth’s analysis thus, implicitly, leaves us with a frame to better understand how movements in the post–Cold War are likely to be different in form and content than earlier movements. So long as deep inequities and injustices prevail and even deepen, as is likely, she suggests, with increased economic integration of poor countries into the world economy, movements for change can be expected, even if their social base and demands are likely to differ from and be more gendered than grassroots armed movements of times past.


— Kathleen M. Dowley, SUNY New Paltz

The disintegration of the Soviet states along the boundaries of its 15 constituent national republics stimulated renewed interest in the relationship between state policies and collective identity formation and change. While the editors of this volume note that scholarly attention to this question has quite a long pedigree, this collaboration brings something new to the table. The editors and contributors all used state-sponsored national censuses as a lens through which to observe the impact of state policies on the evolution of collective identities. The approach is multidisciplinary, as contributors hail from anthropology, demography and political science, and comparative political science, including chapters that focus on the United States Brazil, Canada, Israel, France, Rwanda and Burundi, and Uzbekistan.

The book has a three-part structure. The first is a substantial and well-written introduction to the themes of the volume and the theoretical perspective that largely (but not uniformly) informs the chapters that follow. The second part focuses on the three major modes of categorizing citizens: race (Chapter 2), ethnicity (Chapter 3), and language (Chapter 4). The final section examines three cases where recent debates over the census and the ways of counting and categorizing people have been especially acute, such as in France, Rwanda and Burundi, and Uzbekistan.

The editors argue convincingly that the census does much more than reflect or count; it can actually assist in the construction of social reality. So the decision to count (and in some instances, not to count), and the subsequent series of decisions about how to count and who to count, are all steeped in the politics of the day. In the American and Brazilian cases, for example, Melissa Nobles argues that the censuses have helped construct a racial discourse that, in turn, shapes public policy outcomes. In postslavery Brazil, the discourse is one that heralds the “mixing” of Brazil’s populations, in contrast to measurable segregation in the United States. In the United States, every census since 1790 has asked a race question, whereas in Brazil, marked by less regime continuity, censuses are not as regularly administered, and the color question is not as regularly asked. The dynamic surrounding the rationale for a color/race question has changed in both countries as well. While earlier it was largely the state making the case in collaboration with experts for particular categories of enumeration, in more recent years, it is activist members of civil society demanding reform and/or inclusion of new categories in the census, recognizing such inclusion as a vehicle for redressing past discriminatory practices.

Not all of the authors agree on the degree to which states can “construct” something from nothing, as has often been suggested for what happened in the colonial period in Africa as well as Soviet Central Asia. In the chapter on Rwanda and Burundi, Peter Uvin makes a nuanced argument about Belgian categorization of Hutu and Tutsi. These ethnic categories were not invented by the Belgian census takers. They existed prior to the arrival of the colonial elite and were part of the social fabric of what is today Rwanda and Burundi. But the colonizers added new elements, a “deeply racist and prejudicial interpretation of the origin” of differences (p. 159) and a policy of indirect rule that favored one group to the exclusion of the other. Potentially, then, these legacies hardened identities that were previously more fluid and reduced overall social mobility. But even this, he acknowledges, is a contested interpretation in Rwanda and Burundi.

In contrast, state policy in Soviet Central Asia seems more clearly to have “created” collective, even national, identities from an assortment of prenational clan and linguistic communities. In the chapter on Uzbekistan, David Abramson agrees with Rogers Brubaker (1994) that one of the central ironies of a system that privileged, in theory, socialist internationalism was that actual policies in fact “incubated” new nationalities and national differences. Inclusive and demonstrative of this effect is the Soviet census whose design reinforced the wisdom of belonging to a nationality. Both of these chapters, as well as the discussion of Brazil, finish by noting the late but important entry of external actors, particularly donors, into the census fray. The donor community now has additional
political and development reasons for seeing that national censuses “count” particular categories of interest to their development projects and goals. These will exercise increasing influence in all parts of the developing world.

The chapter on France, by Alain Blum, is particularly rich in its interpretation of a recent debate over the need to include an ethnic identity question on the French census. In response to the rise of the extreme Right and its abuse of demographic data on North African immigration to support its anti-immigration platform, French public officials are considering the need, for the first time, to identify particular ethnic groups in order to “act” to prevent discrimination against them. French censuses to date have not asked questions about race or ethnicity, distinguishing largely between French citizens and foreigners. What Blum brings to the debate and the chapter is an insider’s view of the way French social scientists have responded, “unmasking” underlying tensions and documenting the dawning recognition that “the construction and naming of statistical categories are not neutral exercises” (p. 143).

Each of the chapters is empirically rich and consistent in documenting how the states in question have historically conducted their censuses, and what have been the most salient points of debate surrounding their development over time. They vary substantively in terms of the disciplinary focus of the author, and they vary in terms of theoretical development. A concluding chapter that highlighted points of agreement and disagreement among the authors would have been helpful. The volume as whole, however, holds together quite well, better than one might have expected. As the Japanese case indicates, the grid-group theory can be used to explain differences in public policies but the goal is much more demanding. The book is not that much about pension policy per se; Lockhart’s task is to show how political culture and institutions. He could have followed his testimony a bit more in the second part of the book. The grid-group theory is not omnipotent. Lockhart is well aware of the limitations of his approach and openly discusses them.

Although my overall impression of the book is positive, I have some reservations. To begin with, the title of the book is a bit misleading. The book is not about much about pension policies but the goal is much more demanding. Lockhart’s task is to show how political culture and institutions. He could have followed his testimony a bit more in the second part of the book. The grid-group theory can be used to explain differences in public policies, not so much to analyze political culture and institutions. He could have followed his testimony a bit more in the second part of the book. The grid-group theory is not omnipotent. Lockhart is well aware of the limitations of his approach and openly discusses them.

Furthermore, the book would have been more consistent if the individual-level diagnoses of political leaders had been omitted. They are interesting but their overall contribution remains scanty. I also think that the Soviet case with its consumer price subsidies does not fully fit in with the three other case studies that are explicitly on pension policy. Perhaps a country from the social democratic welfare cluster would have been a better choice (the Swedish pension reform of the 1990s?). I would also highly encourage Lockhart to expand his analysis to more recent changes (including benefit cuts) in the German pension system.

In the beginning of his book, the author stresses the symbiotic interaction between culture and institutions. He could have followed his testimony a bit more in the second part of the book. The wonder about the robustness of the German system opened possibilities for that. In fact, Lockhart does not pay much
attention to the institutional aspects (financing, coverage, benefit calculation, institutional veto points, etc.) that may contribute to the robustness. The explanation may lie more in the institutional inertia and less in the value basis of the leading elites.

All in all, *Protecting the Elderly* is a thought-provoking book and a creative presentation on how a particular version of political culture theory can be fruitfully applied in analyzing policy making. Lockhart shows convincingly that cultural conceptions provide an important—although often neglected—variable in explaining cross-national differences in social policies.

The United States and Chile: Coming in from the Cold War, By David R. Mares and Francisco Rojas Aravena. New York: Routledge, 2001. 192p. $70.00 cloth, $17.95 paper.

— Thomas M. Leonard, University of North Florida

According to the series editors Jorge Domínguez and Rafael Fernández de Castro, *The United States and Chile* is one of 10 projected volumes on recent U.S.–Latin American relations that intends to show how the transition from authoritarian to constitutional governments in Latin America, the shift toward open market economies following the continent-wide depression of the 1980s, and the end of the Cold War led to a transformation in the relations between the United States and Latin America in the 1990s. But within the broader historical context, little has changed regarding U.S.–Chilean relations. While authors David R. Mares and Francisco Rojas Aravena describe the relationship as cooperative, in the end they leave the distinct impression that the United States remains the dominant partner in the relationship and that Chile continues to challenge that dominance at almost every turn. Within this context, the authors also are critical of the U.S. policies vis-à-vis Chile.

The conflicted relationship has many reasons, and the authors devote two-thirds of the volume establishing those factors. From the start of their relationship in the early nineteenth century, Chile viewed the United States with distrust. The latter refused to accept the former as an equal or Chile as having legitimate interests in the Southern Cone similar to those the United States had in North America. For the Chileans, United States transcontinental expansion in the mid–nineteenth century and subsequent interventions in the circumpolar region served as harbingers of U.S. intentions in South America. Equally important was the biased U.S. interference in Chilean affairs, such as the War of the Pacific and the "Baltimore Affair." According to the authors, this conflicted relationship changed in the early twentieth century when a cooperative spirit characterized U.S.–Chilean relations. It lasted until the 1970s when it again became embittered with the U.S. response to the Marxist administration of Salvadore Allende and remained strained due to the human rights violations committed during the regime of General Augusto Pinochet. Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, both nations have supported the principles of democratization and free market economies. Despite this policy symmetry, the cooperative spirit of the earlier time period did not return.

The authors explain that several issues strained U.S.–Chilean relations during the last decade of the twentieth century, most notably the continued controversy over human rights violations committed during the Pinochet administration, which included the car bomb killing of Orlando Letelier in Washington, DC, Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), like Amnesty International, and several U.S. members of Congress placed responsibility at Pinochet's doorstep and demanded justice. Thirty-six members of Congress supported Pinochet's extradition from Great Britain to Spain in 2000 to be tried for the disappearance of Spanish citizens during his administration. There seemed to be little understanding in the United States that Pinochet's alleged crimes were a Chilean domestic issue. Environmental groups also contributed to the interstate tension. When several NGOs desirous of saving thousands of hectares of environmentally sensitive forest regions in central and southern Chile found a benefactor in Douglas Tompkins, President Eduardo Frei placed insurmountable obstacles in his path. Tompkins and his supporters appeared as foreign interlopers to Chilean sovereignty. Again, U.S. interest groups failed to understand Chile's concerns.

These controversies, however, paled by comparison with trade issues, such as the "poisoned grapes" case in 1990 and the ongoing failure of Chile to gain access to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In the first instance, the Chileans charged the United States with overreacting to the discovery of a few poisoned grapes among the tens of thousands that made their way to the United States. Not only did the incident frighten U.S. consumers away from Chilean grapes, but subsequent congressional legislation that further limited Chilean imports had a serious adverse impact upon the Chilean economy. Of greater economic importance was the possibility of Chile becoming a partner in NAFTA. Although Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush have both advocated such an agreement because Chile has met all the qualifications, U.S. domestic considerations prompted the U.S. Congress to deny Clinton "fast track" negotiating authority to complete the task. The U.S. failure to understand Chilean needs has impeded fuller cooperation between the two states, and has prompted Chile to look elsewhere for economic partnerships.

Mares and Rojas Aravena have made an important contribution to the study of inter-American relations by presenting a persuasive argument regarding the issues confronting the two nations during the 1990s. But their over-reliance upon Chilean newspapers in *The United States and Chile* will prompt scholars to look elsewhere to complete the story.


— David Rayside, University of Toronto

Any cross-national comparison of the recognition accorded same-sex relationships requires formidable labor, and Yuval Merin has marshaled precisely that. This is highly complex and fast-changing terrain. And as Merin quite properly argues, the privileging of some relationships over others is the product of hundreds of state policies and private institutional practices—covering social insurance, taxation, employment benefits, inheritance, property division, family law, immigration, medical decision making, parenting, and other areas.

Merin’s central tasks are threefold. The first is to chronicle what he quite properly sees as significant shifts toward recognizing same-sex relationships across a range of countries in the liberal democratic West. The second is to point out contrasts among countries in the extent of such recognition. The third is to argue in favor of marriage rights and to advise on the legal argumentation most likely to work. As backdrop, the author provides a nuanced survey of historical changes in marriage regimes. He argues that recent developments, particularly over the last half century, have created at least some openings for activists seeking an end to the almost universal exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage.

The political system that has come closest to according full equality to same-sex couples, and which by late 2002 was still unique in allowing such couples to marry, is the Netherlands. The countries Merin identifies as next in line are the Nordic countries. His careful treatment of the legislative changes in those and other European systems points out the significant gaps that persist between the rights and obligations extended
to lesbian and gay couples and those already in place for married (heterosexual) couples. He rightly highlights an insidious pattern of excluding parental rights in Europe, although he recognizes that some such exclusions were being reconsidered as he was going to press.

Merin’s survey includes brief references to Australia and New Zealand, and more substantial treatment of Canada. These are distinctive cases in the extent to which they have extended political recognition to heterosexual cohabiting couples, with Canada having gone furthest in that direction, as well as in recognizing same-sex couples. Some of his treatment, but not all, is alert to a sea change that includes parenting rights and almost all other relational issues, placing Canada close to the Netherlands in its overall regime. In the admittedly complex Canadian case, Merin does not quite grapple with federal and provincial jurisdictions, and exaggerates the pioneering role of Quebec.

The author is back on surer ground in the even more complicated and generally discouraging American case. He talks with knowing detail about the vast differences in legal and policy change across states, localities, and employers, and the variation in pace of change from one issue to another. He pinpoints an important anomaly in a pattern of generally slow movement toward relationship recognition—namely, the number of court rulings that have favored the rights of de facto parents to adopt the biological children of their same-sex partners.

This book is somewhat less than satisfying when Merin explains differences across countries and issues. When, for example, he contemplates the unusual progress in “step-parent” adoption in the United States as compared to Europe (at least up to early 2002), he ends up prematurely discounting the explanatory power of cross-country variations in judicial leverage. He also pays too little attention to the size of the baby boom among same-sex couples in the United States, in part a function of relatively easy access to assisted reproduction there. American activist networks have also helped force parenting issues onto the legal and public agenda by their preparedness to pursue claims in court or support those already launched.

In a few different places in this large manuscript, Merin refers to factors that explain the relatively substantial progress in northern Europe on nonparenting fronts, but his attempts are partial and uneven. He mentions the power of the American religious right, although he might have made more of the truly exceptional character of U.S. religiosity. He also argues that the development in northern Europe of relatively egalitarian approaches to other historically marginalized populations paved the way for equitable approaches to sexual diversity. This is a supportable claim on gender, but not on race. Merin seems also to argue that there is more popular acceptance of sexual diversity than in the United States—part of the general view that social change precedes legal/political change—but he provides little evidence. The claim is in fact sustainable for the Netherlands, but not so much for other countries, and not at all on the question of adoption by same-sex couples. In general, there is a complex relationship between political/legal change and public acceptance that warrants fuller treatment. In a generally plausible way, he argues that movement on relationship issues as a whole requires earlier political steps to decriminalize homosexuality, still not fully effected in the United States, and to install basic nondiscrimination protections, effected in only a minority of American states and localities. Such gradualism fits most countries, although it does not quite mesh with the play of parenting claims in the United States.

As the book nears its conclusion, Merin lays out arguments for the inclusion of same-sex couples in marriage, showing that even the most advanced registered-partner systems discriminate, and asserting that “separate but equal” regimes are inherently marginalizing. In doing so, he takes up debates among sexual diversity activists about the merits of marriage as a goal. Although he may underestimate the “assimilationist” pressures associated with the quest for marriage, and the risks of widening the public’s perceptual gap between respectable same-sex couples who look most like their heterosexual counterparts and the not-respectable others, he addresses the debate with perceptive intelligence.

Equality for Same-Sex Couples has analytical limits, to be sure, and some repetitiveness, but its completion represents a major accomplishment, not least because of its comparative scope and the rapid and continuing change in most of the countries he discusses. Sexual diversity politics is at its most complex in relationship issues, and our understanding of them requires just the care that Merin brings to the task.

Legislative Politics in Latin America.
Edited by Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif.
528p. $65.00 cloth, $25.00 paper.

Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson, Texas A&M University

Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif’s edited book makes a major contribution to the comparative study of legislatures. Theories developed to explain behavior in the United States Congress are adapted to different Latin American settings by turning assumptions about the desire for reelection, the type of electoral and party system, and the constitutional powers of the president and Congress into independent variables. Case studies of the Argentine, Brazilian, Chilean, and Mexican congresses explore the effects of variance in these factors on the behavior of legislatures. While acknowledging that Latin American legislatures are not proactive policymakers like the U.S. Congress, this book shows that Latin American legislatures do “insert themselves into the policy process in a variety of ways” (Morgenstern, p. 444). The overarching purpose of the book is to explore how the interaction of institutions induces Latin American legislatures to play different types of “reactive” roles in the policy process.

Static versus progressive ambition is a central component of the analysis. All authors address the types of political career ambitions deputies have, what is rational behavior given these ambitions, and how deputies’ ambitions affect the organization of the congress, executive-legislative relations, or the policymaking role of the congress. They all assume that Latin American legislatures do matter in the policymaking process, and so it is worthwhile to rigorously study how institutions create or dampen incentives for deputies to take part in policymaking, and for the legislature to cooperate with the executive or be obstructionist.

In the body of the book, three parts each have case study chapters about the four legislatures written by 12 country experts. Part I examines executive-legislative relations and the causes of a subservient versus obstructive congress. Part II explores how parties organize the business of the legislature, and thus how parties and the nature of the party system influence deputy behavior. Part III investigates the legislature’s role in the policy process and conditions under which the legislature (or parties, state delegations, or individual deputies) exerts policy concessions from the executive.

The country study chapters alone would make Legislative Politics in Latin America important reading. Each chapter could stand alone as a journal article, as the authors test hypotheses with extensive data, often using innovative means to test hypotheses when the “conventional” data used to study the U.S. Congress are not available or would be inappropriate in their legislature. Barry Ames, for example, collected data from media sources about policy initiatives the Brazilian executive floated publicly but never proposed to the legislature, after determining that they lacked support. Nacif examined whether bills were reported out of committee in the Mexican congress as a substitute for roll-call votes.
The country study chapters explore questions ranging from how presidential cabinet formation in Brazil affects cooperation in congress, to how deputy career ambitions in Mexico create a lack of incentive for deputies to specialize and develop policy expertise (compared to incentives to professionalize and develop technical competence in the Chilean congress), to how the need to curry provincial favor in Argentina caused deputies to modify President Menem’s economic reform bills, to voting on the Labor Committee of the Chilean senate.

In the Conclusions (Ch. 14), Morgenstern, and in the Epilogue (Ch. 15), Morgenstern and Gary Cox, bring these independent stories together with a concluding chapter and then an epilogue that masterfully weave together the findings from the country chapters. Morgenstern uses the rich evidence from those chapters and additional comparative data to show how variance in reelection rates, rules of the electoral system, party systems and party unity, and the constitutional powers of the president affect legislative politics. He argues that it is inadequate to simply label Latin American legislatures as “reactive.” Morgenstern and Morgenstern and Cox break open this single category type into four types: subservient (the traditional rubber-stamp legislature); recalcitrant (the type of legislature that Juan Linz is concerned about as contributing to the “perils of presidentialism”); workable (a legislature that wants a seat at the negotiating table and bargains for concessions from the executive on policy issues); and venal (where deputies sell their votes to support executive bills in return for pork and patronage resources that help the deputy achieve future career goals).

This theme of deputy ambition, and how electoral, party, and executive institutions create cues for “rational” deputy behavior toward achieving career goals, make this book a significant contribution to legislative studies. It stands apart from other important volumes because of its focus on the legislature—rather than the executive, parties, or electoral rules. Of course, those other institutions receive much coverage here because they create the incentive structures to which deputies respond when deciding how to pursue their political career goals. But the focus is on the legislature, and the case studies show that this focus is not misplaced. While the president may be the primary initiator of successful bills, and typically enjoys an important first-mover advantage, the legislature often amends, delays, blocks, or increases the cost of projects. Thus, the executive must anticipate the legislature’s response to its policy proposals.

This study, and the new typology of legislatures it has produced, paves the way for theoretically driven case studies of other Latin American legislatures to verify, or possibly expand and refine, the theory presented here. Do other legislatures, with their own combinations of type of deputy ambition, party structure, electoral system, and constitutional powers, fit into the subservient, recalcitrant, workable, and venal categories, and under what types of institutional conditions? The four legislatures studied in this book provide theoretically interesting variance on the variables, and the multiple chapters dedicated to each case give the book valuable depth. However, four legislatures cannot cover all permutations of the key explanatory variables, or other potentially important variables. For example, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are all federal systems, and so politicians have the option of building their political career in state politics after serving in the legislature. All four countries have bicameral legislatures, and hence the career option of moving from one chamber to the other. They also all have midterm or other forms of staggered elections for the congress, president, and local government, and so incumbent presidents, even those who cannot be reelected, can influence deputies’ political futures, by offering or withholding resources to help win elections or through appointive positions. But what about deputy ambition in unitary states, with concurrent elections for local and national government, and a unicameral congress? How do these institutional differences affect the role the legislature plays in the policy process, the incentive deputies have to create a professionalized legislature, and executive-legislative relations?

Morgenstern and Nacif’s book does an excellent job of laying out a theory of how party, electoral, and executive institutions and the political career ambitions of deputies produce different modes of executive-legislative relations. In so doing they have moved forward the comparative study of legislatures. They also contribute in a rigorous, analytical, data-rich fashion to our understanding of how institutions influence democratic consolidation and the conditions under which the “perils of presidentialism” are likely to obtain.


— Josephine T. Andrews, University of California, Davis

Most work comparing legislatures across democracies does so implicitly, since the comparison is generally embedded in a broader issue, such as the utility of presidential versus parliamentary government, or the efficiency of two-party versus multiparty parliamentary systems. Work that focuses explicitly on the internal workings of the legislature has tended to examine only one legislature at a time, and comparisons to other legislatures, while implied, are usually not explored in any detail. Thus, Joel Ostrow’s explicit comparison of the internal workings of three legislatures in two emerging democracies is an important contribution to the comparative study of legislatures.

Ostrow’s study is a systematic comparison of the effect of different institutional designs on the functioning of three legislatures, the Russian Supreme Soviet, the Russian Duma, and the Estonian Riigikogu. By focusing on committees and political parties, the two most widely studied features of legislative institutions, Ostrow engages an important debate in the study of legislative institutions, whether committees or parties are more important for ensuring the stability and proper functioning of a legislature. Echoing the findings of Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins in their study of the interrelationship of committees and parties in the U.S. House of Representatives (Legislative Leviathan, 1993), Ostrow finds that legislatures function best when committees are controlled by a partisan majority, or in his own terminology, when committees and parties are “linked.” Thus, Ostrow’s careful research on legislatures in emerging democracies provides welcome empirical evidence to flesh out the formal story of legislative institutions as exemplified in much of the work on the U.S. Congress or on parliamentary systems in Europe.

The Supreme Soviet, which in many ways resembles the nonpartisan, committee structure modeled by Kenneth Shepsle in his seminal paper (“Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models,” American Journal of Political Science 23 [1979]: 27–60), was internally efficient and capable of passing a coherent and stable legislative program. However, the Supreme Soviet was short-lived because of its inability to resolve partisan conflict with the executive branch. As critics of Shepsle’s original formulation of legislative structure have noted, political parties must be brought into the model, and Ostrow’s explanation of the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet helps us understand just how important political parties are to a functioning legislature.

On the other hand, because its committees are so weak, the Russian Duma resembles a purely partisan legislature, one without the additional structure of a committee system. As Ostrow documents, the Duma is excellent at resolving partisan conflict with the executive branch, but it is highly inefficient at drafting and passing legislation. In his description of the
internal “chaos” of the Russian Duma, he seems to describe the kind of chaos anticipated by Richard McKelvey’s original presentation of cycling in a majority rule legislature that lacks any kind of institutional structure (“Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control,” *Journal of Economic Theory* 12 [1976]: 472–82).

On the basis of his analysis of Russia’s two post-Soviet legislatures, Ostrow concludes that while political parties are necessary to legislative responsibility, “it is how partisan entities are included that is important, not merely their inclusion” (p. 130). To further explore the respective roles of committees and parties, he turns to a legislature in which both committees and parties are present, but where neither operates in isolation from the other, in his terms a “linked” institutional design. In the Estonian Riigikogu, committees are controlled by a partisan majority, which coalesces as a result of the incentives to form and maintain a government that are built into a parliamentary system. Ostrow’s description of how the partisan majority coordinates the activity of the committees greatly resembles Cox and McCubbins’s description of partisan influence in the committees of the U.S. House. Thus, whether the majority is a single party or a multiparty coalition government, when a partisan majority controls committee composition and activity, the legislature is efficient and responsible.

In a strong concluding chapter, Ostrow provides some intriguing advice for emerging democracies on how to set up efficient, useful, and politically responsible legislatures. Clearly, parliamentary systems help foster majorities. However, as he notes, in most presidential systems currently in existence, “parliamentarism would require fundamental constitutional changes,” and “such changes are not necessary to create an effective legislature” (p. 242). It is possible to link parties and committees within a presidential constitutional design, and he provides several creative mechanisms, all of which could be specified within the legislature’s rules of procedure (see pp. 242–45).

In general, I was impressed with *Comparing Post-Soviet Legislatures* both for the strength of the empirical research and for the many thoughtful points it makes about the importance of legislative design for emerging democracies. However, the book would have been stronger if Ostrow had made more of his contribution to the formal debate about committees and parties. Although he is aware of at least some of the literature contributing to this debate, he never describes the arguments of its most important proponents. Instead, he dismisses the formal work without appropriate analysis or criticism, missing the opportunity to incorporate insights from this work into his analysis. The most egregious example occurs on page 198 where, in a remark referring specifically to Cox and McCubbins’s *Legislative Leviathan*, Ostrow writes: “The Russian Duma demonstrates the absurdity of the assumption that parties produce majorities which then control committees and agendas.” Obviously, Cox and McCubbins are well aware that the U.S. Congress has only two political parties and hence a guaranteed majority. As he reveals in his discussion of the Estonian Riigikogu, Ostrow understands the importance of a stable majority in controlling committee activity, and so I find it very surprising that he would misread these authors so completely. It is especially strange given that his study falls very nicely within this body of research! Theoretically, the book could have been well situated as a truly comparative testing of Cox and McCubbins’s work on the importance of a stable majority for committee decision making and legislative stability.

Although I think that Ostrow’s discussion of the role of parties and committees explains much of the variation among the three legislatures, the book would have been strengthened by a deeper discussion of alternative explanations, in particular the impact of the constitutional separation of powers on the resolution of conflict between the executive and legislative branches. For example, is it not possible that differences between how the Supreme Soviet and Duma handle conflict with the executive branch have also to do with the balance of constitutional power between these two branches and not only with the internal structure of the legislatures? Also, the reason that the Estonian Riigikogu functions as well as it does may have more to do with its parliamentary design than with the linkage between parties and committees. As Ostrow notes in Chapter 7 (pp. 216–19), committees in the Estonian parliament are weak, as is typical in parliamentary systems; in fact, they seem to have almost nothing to do with drafting and passing legislation. Therefore, the linkage between parties and committees may be unimportant as compared to the direct ties between government and legislative typical in parliamentary systems.


— Arthur A. Goldsmith, University of Massachusetts Boston

Sub-Saharan Africa stands out as the world’s poorest and least developed region. Political scientists have long argued that political factors are largely to blame, and see Africa’s economic woes growing out of distinctive government institutions and inappropriate development policies. John James Quinn’s book contributes to the literature on the political origins of Africa’s development failures.

Quinn starts with the conventional observations that in the period following independence, most African countries chose inward-oriented development strategies and that this was counterproductive for growth. Africa’s regimes were apt to overvalue their exchange rates, subsidize inefficient domestic industries, and penalize the agricultural sector where most people worked—which contributed to economic stagnation and political instability. The novel part of his argument is his explanation of why so many states went down this path, and why a few diverged and took a more outward-oriented course of export-led development. The reason has to do with state ownership of important economic sectors: Where the state owns more than half the largest exporting sector or most of the capital-intensive industries, it will opt for an inward-looking strategy that favors production for the domestic market.

Quinn offers a plausible theoretical rationale for such behavior. Decisions in state-owned firms tend to be made on political criteria rather than sound business reasons. The leading political concern in the typical African system is the production of economic rents, which leaders need to reward political allies, buy off potential opponents and line their own pockets. Economic rents evaporate under competitive conditions, and so leaders who rely on state-owned firms would logically opt for anti-competitive, inward-oriented development strategies. The empirical basis for this argument is debatable, however, because state-owned enterprise is not especially widespread in Africa compared with other regions, according to data in the World Bank study *Bureaucrats in Business* (1995).

Quinn marshals two types of evidence to test the proposition that state-owned enterprise drives policy choices in Africa. One is a simple statistical analysis of 11 countries, which shows that state ownership was indeed inversely associated with export orientation from 1973 to 1985. This evidence is not particularly compelling, due to the challenge of finding a reliable index of economic openness, so Quinn also looks in detail at four matched pairs of countries: Zambia and Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe, Zaire and Botswana, and Congo and Côte d’Ivoire. The most novel part of *The Road Oft Traveled* is these case studies, chosen to represent both a most-similar case model and a crucial-case design.
Quinn uses the cases to investigate and reject several competing accounts for inward-oriented development. He finds that the presence of a large commercial landholding class—an interest group that would normally favor exports over import substitution industrialization—is not important. The same is true of urbanization, which might have been expected to give rise to urban bias and political pressure for overvalued currencies. Ethnic heterogeneity is another factor that looks promising—highly diverse societies presumably need more rents to paper over cleavages—but which Quinn finds to have little explanatory value in accounting for inward-oriented development in Africa. Regime ideology does not count for much, either. The independent variable that seems best to fit each pair of cases is state ownership: The countries with more of it—Zambia, Nigeria, Zaire, and Congo—looked inward; the countries with less of it—Kenya, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Côte d'Ivoire—looked outward.

The book finishes with an econometric analysis of 24 African countries from 1966 to 1986. Quinn contends that, on average, the worst economic performers were the ones with majority state ownership of large industries or the chief exporting sector, which he deduces, led these countries to shun export-led development strategies. The policy implication is that African governments should privatize, which would presumably put them on an outward-looking policy track and therefore lead to faster growth (p. 150). However, the political leadership and most important interest groups in the region benefit from the status quo, making the prospects of reform unlikely (p. 179).

Subsequent events call this causal chain into question. Many African states did liberalize (though with inconsistent commitment and success) in the years following the period under analysis in this book. They sold off state-owned enterprises and reduced trade barriers. As Quinn concedes (p. 167), these economic reforms happened at approximately the same time, and one would be hard-pressed to say that one caused the other. The results, moreover, have been uneven. Privatization schemes were often a thinly veiled mode of patronage for government allies who received public assets at bargain prices, according to Roger Tangri’s (1999) *The Politics of Patronage in Africa.*

Africa’s economic liberalization of the past two decades suggests that state-owned enterprises and import substitution policies are often two sides of one coin, and that some third set of factors possibly leads governments to choose both of them. What additional factors might be important? The international financial institutions played a larger role than they are given in this book. During the 1970s, they tolerated and sometimes encouraged state ownership; during the 1980s and 1990s, they demanded that African states sell government assets and open their economies as a condition for development assistance. Another disregarded factor is democratization, which swept the region in the 1990s and put conflicting pressures on African states to end corrupt systems of patronage but also to shield local people from the ill effects of globalization.

While Quinn gives too much weight to the independent effects of state-owned firms, and thus overstates the case for privatization, he is correct that a more robust private sector would have payoffs for many African countries. A competitive business environment creates incentives for firms to use their resources for investment and production, as opposed to consumption by clientelistic networks. These would be steps forward but not a cure-all for Africa’s problems with development.


— Simon Hug, University of St. Gallen

Citizens around the world have more and more opportunities to vote directly on policy proposals. This comes about because increasing larger numbers of constitutions explicitly allow for referendums. Not surprisingly, many scholars have attempted to assess whether this “government by the people” is a valuable complement to representative government, or whether it might be detrimental. Unfortunately for constitutional framers, agreement hardly exists in the scholarly assessments. In this growing literature, Mads Qvortrup’s book stands out by its largely favorable assessment of referendums. His study broadly attempts to assess whether referendums are compatible with consensus government, and more precisely, whether referendums are democratic institutions. According to Qvortrup, institutions are democratic if they allow for equal participation of all groups and classes, for enlightened participation, and for the protection of minorities (p. 2).

Chapter 2 is devoted to assessing whether these criteria apply to referendums. First, Qvortrup finds that at least in countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a more frequent use of referendums depresses turnout, a finding paralleling those reported by other scholars. This decrease in turnout is obviously mostly harmful if the participating citizens fail to be representative of the voting population. Using data from Denmark and Switzerland, he reports that with respect to occupation and education, especially in Switzerland, some groups (higher social status, more education) are overrepresented, while others (lower social status, less education) are underrepresented. This over- and underrepresentation is slightly attenuated in elections in these two countries. Nevertheless, the author concludes that these results challenge the elitist position that referendums lead to the underrepresentation of some groups in the decision-making process. He also rejects the claim that voters in referendums are poorly informed, again on the basis of data from Denmark and Switzerland. For both countries, he reports figures suggesting that only few voters have a very poor knowledge about the issues they decided in referendums. And finally, describing a set of referendums, Qvortrup concludes that “the referendum is compatible with the ideal of minority protection, as long as we refrain from holding referendums in small divided societies” (p. 19).

Having addressed these normative criteria, Qvortrup turns to discussing A. V. Dicey’s liberal theorist, 1835–1922) view on referendums in Chapter 3. Dicey envisioned referendums mostly as a people’s veto on important constitutional issues. Thus, he proposed a very restricted use of referendums, mostly because he considered the upper house of his time to be an insufficient check on the lower house. Qvortrup cites Dicey’s proposal for a referendum act “enacting that . . . a referendum might be required by a resolution of either House, in respects of any Act e.g., affecting 1) The rights of the Crown, 2) The constitution of Parliament, 3) The Acts of Union & other large constitutional topics which might easily be enumerated” (quoted on p. 67). Such referendums obviously might act as conservative instruments. Addressing this issue in Chapter 3, Qvortrup almost inevitably engages in dangerous terrain. While recent empirical work on referendums has explicitly eschewed such normative terrain (e.g., Shaun Bowler and Todd Donovan, *Demanding Choices*, 1998, p. xiii), Qvortrup attempts to assess the possible conservative bias by studying votes having occurred in OECD countries. This qualitative assessment leads him to the conclusion that “the surveyed empirical evidence does not suggest that the referendum obstructs the system of representative government” (p. 93). Apart from the difficult normative issue, such an analysis also suffers from the fact that institutions allowing voters a final say on some policies have not only direct effects (i.e., policies that pass or are rejected in referendums) but also indirect effects (i.e., legislative proposals that are altered or not passed by Parliament).
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Thus, focusing exclusively on referendums having occurred is likely to give a biased view of the effects of this institution.

Dicey’s proposal, apart from the possible conservative bias of referendums, also raises the question whether governments would necessarily submit constitutional issues to referendums, or whether they would only do so if assured of victory. In Chapter 4, Qvortrup, using again as empirical foil the referendums having occurred in OECD countries, reports that few referendums are triggered by governments. Finally, in the last chapter, he assesses the effect of two institutions for referendums that take the triggering of referendums out of the hands of government. On the one hand, he elucidates in more detail what he calls the minority veto in Denmark and the popular referendum in Italy. The underlying question the author wishes to address is whether these institutions might allow citizens to decide on other important issues that are not necessarily dealt with in constitutions. While the Danish minority veto has only rarely been used, the Italian referendum has been used with increasing frequency, and had important political consequences in the 1990s. Thus, Qvortrup concludes that the Danish provision hardly allows the voters “a check on the majority” (p. 137), while this is the case in Italy. On this note he concludes his study with a positive assessment of referendums, which are “not a challenge to representative government” (p. 153), and states that “the device has been consistent with the normative criteria, at least in the period surveyed” (p. 158).

These rather broad-sweeping conclusions might be reasonably questioned by some scholars having come to more nuanced assessments in their studies. These scholars might emphasize the unevenness of the empirical evidence marshaled in support of the author’s arguments. For the reader, it is often hard to know why and when countries and American states that use referendums frequently (e.g., Switzerland and California) are excluded from the analysis. Some of the conclusions are also based on very few cases, and many analyses might have profited from inspiration drawn from similar comparative studies that have been carried out at the subnational level in the United States and Switzerland. For the reader, a consistent use of the various terms might also have been profitable. Qvortrup seems to use the term “referendum” both in its generic form (i.e., citizens voting on policies) and in more specific forms (e.g., required vote on constitutional issues). Relatedly, the author also introduces the notion of plebiscites (p. 90), which he defines as votes triggered by government, but seems to extend it later to votes triggered by Parliament. Similar definitional issues plague the author’s discussion of popular referendums (which may occur both on laws already in force and on bills only adopted by Parliament [p. 127]) and of initiatives (both statutory and constitutional initiatives may be direct or indirect [p. 58]). Thus, while A Comparative Study of Referendums offers interesting insights and thoughts, it does not offer the definitive answer to the question of whether referendums are valuable complements to representative democracy, or whether such institutions are detrimental.

The Reluctant Dragon: Crisis Cycles in Chinese Foreign Economic Policy

— Steve Chan, University of Colorado, Boulder

This book studies China’s foreign economic orientation in the first thirty years of the People’s Republic. The performance of the domestic economy, the policy outlook of major figures, and public pronouncements and documents with limited circulation are used to account for the regime’s changes, with an emphasis on self-reliance, import substitution, and export promotion.

In drawing attention to the discontinuities in China’s foreign economic policy, Lawrence Reardon introduces a sense of dynamism and, indeed, tension in the choice of this policy. An inward-looking orientation pursuing autarky has not been preordained by the nature of the regime or its ideology. There were among the Chinese leadership proponents of various degrees and forms of economic liberalization and openness. Naturally, the existence of divergent views makes one cautious about treating Beijing as a unitary rational actor. Rather, it points to the dynamics of coalition politics competing for policy and power. As Reardon also notes, the domestic and foreign environment presented opportunities and constraints to Chinese leaders. Economic setback, such as that from the Great Leap Forward campaign, provided the impetus for policy adjustment. Similarly, the rise and fall of Cold War tension limited or expanded the menu of choice available to Beijing. One would therefore surmise that changes in China’s foreign economic policy resulted from a combination of domestic and foreign factors.

This account seems, paradoxically, to be both overdetermined and indeterminate. It is overdetermined because the number of independent variables, additively and interactively, exceeds the policy changes that they are supposed to explain. It is indeterminate because the independent variables may be irrelevant or idiosyncratic. Thus, for instance, Western strategic embargo as a determinant of Chinese foreign economic policy loses some of its compelling force in view of the fact that countries not facing this environmental constraint such as India and Brazil, had also pursued varying forms of import substitution and autarky. The communist ideology becomes less persuasive as an explanation because, after all, a regime professing this ideology has been known to adopt alternate policies. The statements of leading cadres also do not quite help except for retrospective reconstruction, since they can be used to support a variety of policy positions (as these statements typically present bimodal injunctions, such as emphasizing both redness and expertise, self-reliance and learning from foreign experts). Indeed, the same person (such as Chen Yun) can appear to be a supporter of economic liberalization at one time but a conservative favoring central planning at another time. As a final example, although economic crises can present opportunities for change, they can also provide occasions for vested interests to become even more entrenched. An economy can continue to slide for a long time while the elites repeat and even compound earlier mistakes without undertaking any fundamental reform.

First-order explanations based on these factors do not quite satisfy, therefore, as they tend to leave unanswered questions about the “whys of whys.” When faced with similar policy environments and challenges, different elites—sometimes, the same elite—can respond differently. Economic opening presents a double-edged sword. Foreign trade and investment offer the desiderata of job creation, technology transfer, and export earnings. They also entail liabilities, such as foreign management or ownership control and dependency on foreign markets and capital, which can be used as a lever for extracting political concessions, becoming a source undermining national autonomy. Moreover, economic opening would presumably create domestic winners and losers across different regions, sectors, and elite segments by redistributing their income, status, and power. Second-order explanations would then, on the one hand, seek to explain the relative bargaining power between China and its foreign partners. Rather than facing a dichotomous choice between ideal types (e.g., import substitution versus export promotion), the actual or prospective terms of exchange are a matter of contention. How does Beijing try to unbundle the various elements of foreign commerce so that it maximizes the desirable ones while minimizing the undesirable ones? On the other hand, economic opening would presumably
entail internal bargaining so that those interest groups likely to suffer from a reallocation of resources and influence would be sufficiently compensated (or coerced) into facilitating domestic ratification. A sense of how this two-level game was played would surely enhance our understanding about Chinese decision making on foreign economic relations.

Reardon’s analysis ends with the late 1970s and, therefore, just after another round of economic reforms under Deng Xiaoping and before China’s economy expanded tremendously in the ensuing years. A natural question would be the extent to which China’s foreign economic orientation has become consolidated and the extent to which it is still fragile and therefore subject to another reversal. Another question would be whether China’s economic growth has prepared it to pursue import substitution or autarky more effectively now than before. Has its economy become more or less dependent on external commerce since Deng’s reforms? Has domestic demand in an economy of China’s continental size become the main engine of its growth? Have foreign commercial ties created sufficiently powerful domestic stakeholders to resist a return to economic isolationism? These questions become relevant in view of the attempts at linkage politics whereby the United States, for instance, tries to use economic incentives and sanctions to promote political goals (e.g., the annual debate, until recently, tying the most-favored-nation trading status to Beijing’s human rights performance). Such attempts assume that foreign commerce will become a more important driver of China’s economy, that domestic lobbies favoring foreign commerce will gain increasing influence in the policy process, and that the Chinese leaders’ relative valuation of political and economic objectives will shift to the latter. The accounts of past deliberations provided by The Reluctant Dragon are unclear about whether these expectations are warranted. The discourse of China’s leaders presented in this book is remarkably silent on the external political consequences of foreign economic relations.


— W. Rand Smith, Lake Forest College

This ambitious book successfully uses case studies to illuminate broader theoretical concerns. The case studies focus on the “resurgence of national-level social bargaining” (p. xiii) in Spain and Portugal during the past three decades. In both nations, the transition to democracy in the mid-1970s recast relations between the government and a fledgling civil society. A notable trend was the establishment of national-level negotiations among labor unions, employer organizations, and the government over labor market issues. Although social bargaining in the two nations has differed in terms of timing, continuity, and content, representatives of labor, management, and the government have successfully negotiated on such major questions as wages, labor flexibility, pension reform, dispute resolution procedures, and even the organization of collective bargaining itself.

This rise of social bargaining in Spain and Portugal is noteworthy, argues Sebastian Royo, because it does not square with a major branch of theorizing in comparative politics, namely, the theory of “neo-corporatism.” Beginning with Philippe Schmitter’s seminal article (“Still the Century of Corporatism?” Review of Politics, 36[no. 1, 1974]: 85–131), comparativists have sought to specify the conditions that foster particular patterns of state-interest group interaction, along with the economic consequences of those patterns. Focusing on the principal economic actors, Schmitter identified a trend toward a new corporatist pattern in which governments, labor unions, and employer groups engage in regular, national-level negotiations over wage levels and other labor-market issues. This trend was important, Schmitter and others subsequently argued, because neo-corporatism contributed to positive economic performance, notably wage moderation, labor peace, and steady growth. What made this form of corporatism possible was a specific institutional pattern based on encompassing, centralized unions supported by governments dominated by social democratic parties. According to the theory, such institutional configurations ensured that strong unions would produce wage restraint, while sympathetic governments would deliver generous social benefits.

Critics have long observed that neo-corporatism’s felicitous effects on national economic performance proved short-lived—essentially ending in the late 1970s—and that the pattern of regular peak-level bargaining largely collapsed in such neo-corporatist paragons as Sweden, Belgium, and Denmark. What is surprising in Spain and Portugal, Royo notes, is that corporatist-style bargaining has reemerged where neo-corporatist theory would not have predicted, namely, in nations where unions are weak and fragmented; moreover, social bargaining has flourished under conservative governments, not social democratic ones. How can this anomaly be explained?

Royo undertakes a twofold task: to trace the resurgence of social bargaining in these two nations, while using these empirical observations to critique neo-corporatist theory. The theory is faulty, he argues, because it slights the role of actor agency and organizational strategy as explanatory factors. While institutional patterns help define the possibilities and limits of what states, unions, and employers can do, ultimately the actors themselves define their own strategies on the basis of complex calculations of costs and benefits. The author concludes that the neo-corporatist framework is not so much wrong as incomplete; one needs to take account of both institutional structures and organizational choice.

For Royo, three factors explain this resurgence of social bargaining. First, the major economic actors have faced new opportunities and constraints as a result of technological innovation, European integration, “postindustrial” shifts in occupational structures, and other changes. The chief result is that in Spain (in the late 1980s and early 1990s) and Portugal (early to mid-1980s), unions grew organizationally weaker, yet governments and employers were unable to control wages in a labor-relations framework marked by fragmentation and decentralization. National social bargaining served the interests of all three parties, as unions gained in clout while governments and employers were able to entice unions to agree on wage restraint and other conditions. Second, the main unions in both countries—historically divided along partisan and regional lines—underwent a process of institutional learning and increasing autonomy from political parties that led them to reject confrontational strategies as counterproductive. Finally, new institutional structures have played a role, specifically the establishment of state-sponsored bodies (the Economic and Social Council in Spain and the Permanent Committee for Social Concertation in Portugal) that bring together labor and employer representatives in both formal and informal discussions.

The author develops this argument through a copiously documented history of social bargaining during the past three decades. The scholarship is consistently impressive, based not only on a thorough grounding in the neo-corporatist and comparative political economy literatures, but also on extensive use of the press, original sources (government documents, union reports, etc.), and personal interviews. (The author interviewed more than 50 people, including top trade union, political party, employer, and government ministry officials.) This is likely
the most complete account of the scope, content, and range of labor-market accords that have occurred in Spain and Portugal since the mid-1970s. Royo convincingly demonstrates that in the Spanish and Portuguese cases, organizational choice counts for more than institutional patterns in producing corporatist-style bargaining. (It must be said that this is a "labor-leaning" account, with much heavier focus on labor's choices and strategies, as opposed to employers and the government.) The author also establishes that this emergent variant of corporatism has contributed to improved macroeconomic performance (lower inflation, enhanced labor flexibility, higher growth), lower unemployment, and an improvement in work status for many workers (e.g., many temporary work contracts have been converted into indefinite ones).

Are Spain and Portugal harbingers of a new "liberal corporatism" (p. 237) in Western Europe, one based on a reorientation of union, employer, and government strategies in a context of monetary union and growing international competition? Royo is careful not to proclaim a "new century of corporatism," as he underlines the inherent instability of national-level agreements struck among multiple organizations having conflicting goals and facing pressures from both anxious constituents and shifting markets. But he does view this new pattern of corporatism as promising significant benefits for all three sides in an age of economic uncertainty, and thus having the potential of becoming a more generalized pattern. (Analysts have noted variants of such a pattern in such nations as Ireland, Italy, and the Netherlands.) "A New Century of Corporatism?" does not attempt to predict the future, but it provides an astute assessment of the factors that will likely shape it. In doing so, it contributes not only to our understanding of Spain and Portugal but also to major debates in comparative political economy.


— Terry Nichols Clark, University of Chicago

Jeffrey Sellers innovates repeatedly, yet makes it look easy and obvious. His style is unobtrusive and understated. Most comparative international work is by teams of experts on their own country or city, in edited books. Sellers pushes deeper to learn more. He contributes to urban politics, public policy, comparative politics, political parties, legal studies, and planning, and most of all, shows how these are not separate but interrelated parts of the same whole.

At the core of the book are analyses of three towns (and their surroundings) in the United States: Research Triangle Park, NC, New Haven, CT, and Madison, WI, as well as six similar towns in France and Germany. Sellers analyzes these towns from various perspectives and locates them via:

1. **Globalization.** The global world swamps all cities today. The author sketches this more sensitively than most urban politics studies, and adds detail. These towns are in many respects even more internationally connected than the bigger cities that get more press. Foreign students and visitors, the Internet, advanced service and high-tech jobs, and linkages to universities generate remarkable cosmopolitanism and global connectedness there. Lesson: Look not just at big cities for globalization processes; there may be more elsewhere.

2. **Postindustrial political economy.** Sellers synthesizes a wide body of analyses on high-tech, postindustrial processes that lead him to disagree with many past analyses of urban politics, who see traditional economic interests driving a local policy of "growth" in a "treadmill of production." Rather, he concludes that "local and regional economic interests in a service center, for instance, should have more reason to follow a logic of serving and maintaining consumer demands than one of producing goods. . . . These collective interests at the core of an urban political economy can furnish economic rationales for the pursuit of other aims besides economic development" (pp. 14–16). Here Sellers joins the new view of urban development that is less business-elite driven and more citizen driven; locations must compete for talented citizens who innovate. Unbridled growth is not embraced; it is often resisted. If these concerns are widely shared, they vary substantially in implementation. Sellers show why.

3. **Decentralization.** Most work on decentralization is narrowly legal or fiscal. It does not show what actually happens. Critics within a country often point to gaps between laws and "reality"; writers on France have thus concluded that decentralization made little difference (p. 394). Sellers looks deeper. National and local differences in this book emerge more sharply than in most past studies. Even though local civic groups in all countries favored ecological sensitivity and social tolerance of immigrants, policies differed substantially. The United States and France kept immigrants and disadvantaged residents more geographically segregated, and permitted more sprawl. The German towns, especially Freiberg, controlled growth and sprawl, and dispersed low-income housing in all sorts of neighborhoods. The difference was due largely to strong national parties and government staff (Weberian bureaucrats), who maintained these policy commitments despite neighborhood group protest. By contrast, so-called NIMBY movements ("not in my backyard") in the United States and France were far more successful. This counters our expectations for these places, although Madison is the most like Germany and New Haven the least. Sellers provides rich detail on these critical points, incorporating considerable past work, showing, for instance, how Robert Alford and Harry Scoble noted in the 1960s that Madison had "a pervasive moralism and a concern with aesthetic and public amenities" (p. 245). But Sellers's comparisons show how even politically correct neighborhood groups often find it appropriate for new development to keep sprawling and for the disadvantaged to live a little farther away. He frames his own findings within the history and culture of these towns, building on his own archival work and decades of past studies.

4. **Midsize cities, focus.** The hubris of big-city residents and writers blinds them to their limited generalizability, in two ways. First, smaller locations can be more extreme than bigger cities, or nations, and thus illustrate new or distinct trends more powerfully. These nine towns illustrate more about aspects of "postindustrial society" than do New York or Paris, as Sellers shows with many tables comparing these larger cities to his towns. Second, he reminds us that "applied innovation and services take place predominantly outside the largest cities" (p. 14). That is, more people live in midsized towns, many of which are suburbs. Still, these are parts of regions and involve multiple overlapping governments in key policy decisions, in ways that Sellers details, especially for land-use policy. But rather than just label it all governance or pluralism, he maps specific differences.

5. **Multiple methods, sensitive combinations.** Sellers constructs an integrated portrait from many diverse sources. His is a model to consider here, closer to Seymour Lipset than most current studies that mine one data source and consider that a virtue. Richly complementing each other in a way that seems effortless, these include census data, local government official reports, interviews, newspaper accounts, national citizen surveys like the World Values Survey, planning codes, work by dozens of past researchers on these towns, and sensitive application of results from a synthesis of several overlapping literatures (on civic participation, social movements, political parties, the welfare state, high-tech growth, globalization, etc.) For
Multiple Citizenship.

By Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 412p. $65.00 cloth, $23.00 paper.

— Zvi Gitelman, University of Michigan

This reinterpretation of Israeli political history assumes a contradiction between being a Jewish state and a Western-style democracy. Israel had “colonial beginnings” (p. 1) and has “continued colonial practices.” Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled identify three “citizenship discourses” in Israel: liberal, republican, and ethno-nationalist. The liberal mode stresses personal liberty and the worth of private property; the republican, favors the community pursuing a common good even at the expense of individual preferences; and the ethno-nationalist sees citizenship as “membership in a homogeneous descent group” (p. 6). This schema proves useful in organizing much of Israel’s political history. But the authors, who prefer the liberal citizenship discourse, ignore alternative interpretations and narratives and distort Israeli history. Their exclusive focus on Israel and failure to compare it to other countries in the real world make their treatment less persuasive than it might otherwise have been. They conclude with a surprisingly naive, simplistic prescription for simultaneously solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and most of Israel’s domestic problems.

The discussion of Israel’s colonialist practices ignores the traditional Zionist narrative of the return of a diasporic people to its historic homeland, a myth that motivated hundreds of thousands to move to Israel. The book asserts that the “massive wave of Mizrachi [Jews from Islamic lands] immigrants” was “by no means a spontaneous movement. It was initiated, orchestrated, and carried out by the State of Israel”—which is technically, partially true—though, it is noted, “relations between these Jews and the states in which they were residing were indeed becoming tense due to the Jewish-Palestinian conflict” (p. 77). “Tense” might be inadequate to describe public lynchings of Jews in Iraq and severe restrictions, arrests, and torture in Syria. Many Jews left North Africa during decolonialization and nationalization of private enterprise. Did Israel arrange the mass migration of North African Jews to France, Quebec, and elsewhere? Perhaps these were self-motivated refugees and émigrés, not pawns in the hands of manipulative Israeli colonialists. Five Arab states attacked Israel immediately upon its declaration of independence—two have made a formal peace with Israel—suggesting that they might have their own disputes with Israel, aside from the Jewish-Palestinian conflict.

The circumstances that brought a “new colonial drive” (p. 19) in 1967—closing of seaways to Israeli shipping, infiltration of murder squads into Israel from Gaza, bombardment of Israel from Syria, Jordan’s fateful joining the war on Israel—are not mentioned. What originated as a preemptive or defensive war is accommodated to the authors’ scheme as a new colonial drive. Since 1985, they say, the previously dominant republican citizenship discourse has been displaced by the ethno-nationalist one, but the liberal one may be ascendant at present. This failure to explain Ehud Barak’s triumph over Benyamin Netanyahu in 1999 and the overwhelming public support given his fruitless attempt to induce the Palestinians to make a peace with Israel, abandoning most of Israel’s “colonizing” gains.

Being Israeli contains a great deal of information, perhaps too much for the nonspecialist. It ranges widely over culture, politics, economics, the military’s role in society, gender issues, and immigration. The treatment of “Israel’s Palestinian citizens” is comprehensive, sober, and balanced. The authors point to the growing alienation of these citizens from the state, although they do not explain why as late as 1999, 28% voted for Jewish parties. The discussion of religious issues is good, although the religious point of view or theological and Jewish-legal sources of religious positions on public issues are not presented. There is an interesting discussion of women in Israeli society. The authors note the consistent failure of women’s parties in Israel but blame it on the “colonial frontier context” (p. 108). Shafir and Peled ignore the possibility that Israeli women have a different assessment of their roles and status than what the authors regard as proper. Throughout, they set up standards of practice they consider right, and judge Israel by them. They do not distinguish between “ideal” and “real” or compare Israel’s performance with other countries so that one may gauge that performance in the “real world,” and not only by the authors’ desiderata.

The rich narrative is often introduced by flat assertions originating in political preferences rather than dispassionate analysis. An example is the assertion (p. 159) that the “purpose [of Israeli ‘colonization’ after 1967], as before 1948, was to establish a permanent presence in the designated [?] areas, alter their demographic constitution, and essentially annex them to Israel.” This was very likely true of East Jerusalem. But as the authors almost immediately point out, both the government and the Israeli public saw most of the occupied areas as temporary holdings, cards to be played in negotiations. Another example is the claim that “[t]he most distinguishing characteristic of the Jewish Labor Movement in Palestine was that it was not a labor movement at all [sic]. Rather, it was a colonial movement in which the workers’ interests remained secondary to the exigencies of settlement” (p. 37).

Shafir and Peled propose for Israel an “incorporation regime” combining “universal civil, political and social rights of individuals, regardless of ascriptive affiliation, with group cultural rights for different cultural minorities” (p. 343). (No examples of such systems are cited.) Somehow, the resulting “multiple public spheres” would interact harmoniously. By “being public and engaged in contestation with other discourses . . . counterpublics militate against separatism and contribute to the cohesiveness of society, rather than undermining it.” Always? Everywhere? Once Israel withdraws from Gaza and part of the West Bank and divides sovereignty over Jerusalem—ceding the Temple Mount to Palestinian sovereignty—“citizen Palestinians would no longer be suspected of sympathy to the enemy” (p. 346). Would Palestinian-Jewish hostility and suspicion cease as soon as such arrangements were made?
Hostility to Mizrahi culture would diminish because “the main reason for the negative attitude toward Mizrahi culture was its origins in Arab and other Muslim societies” (p. 347). An alternative explanation is that Mizrahi culture was denigrated, as was Arab culture, because it was not oriented toward democracy, technology, science, and what Europeans saw as rationality.

This book is full of rich information and is well organized by an appropriate conceptual scheme. Its value is diminished by manipulative practices stemming from ideological commitment.


Burt L. Monroe, Michigan State University

Not that long ago, it was reasonable standard practice to split the world of electoral systems into three categories: plurality, proportional representation (PR), and “other.” The [West] German electoral system, at its inception a unique combination of plurality and PR concepts, was treated awkwardly as a PR variant or even more awkwardly as an outcast “other.” While many noted the German system’s apparent stability over time, our inability to shoe-horn it into one of the two familiar categories made some scholars uneasy, especially as the model began to be mimicked. My favorite example: “New Zealand, Russia, and Italy have recently adopted a bizarre hybrid of the two systems copied from Germany” (Gordon Tullock, On Voting, 1998, p. 191, italics added).

But such “mixed-member” (MM) electoral systems are now firmly entrenched on constitutional designers’ lists of what’s hot, even while they have diverged in innumerable ways from the original German model. In the 1990s, MM systems were adopted for legislative elections in a diverse set of places, including at least Albania, Armenia, Bolivia, Georgia, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mexico, New Zealand, the Philippines, Russia, South Korea, Thailand, Ukraine, Venezuela, and new regional parliaments in Scotland and Wales. That’s a full-blown phenomenon and it calls for explanation and analysis, exactly what Matthew Soberg Shugart, Martin Wattenberg, and a cast of thousands offer here.

The diversity of this country list more or less demands an edited volume. A few of the form’s inherent weaknesses are on display here, but surprisingly few. The editors have considerable experience with such volumes—in my view, Executive Decree Authority (1998), coedited by Shugart and John Carey, is a masterpiece—and it pays off here in relative coherence and pithiness.

The mixed system phenomenon raises two questions. Why have they been so widely adopted in recent years, and how do they affect the politics of the countries that adopt them? Roughly half of the book is committed to each of these questions. Shugart starts with a theory of MM reforms, and chapters on the reform experience of 10 countries (and potential reforms in the UK and Canada) follow. The second half of the book discusses the post-reform experience with MM systems in each of these 10 countries, with a concluding chapter by the editors.

Shugart’s theory of MM reforms is straightforward and compelling. He characterizes systems by their deviations from an idealized “efficient” type that provides for “the articulation of policy-based electoral majorities” (p. 28).

Systems may deviate on an “interparty” dimension by being extremely pluralitarian or, conversely, hyperrepresentative (p. 29). They may also deviate on an “intraparty” dimension by tending toward hyperpersonalistic or hypercentralized extremes. I quibble with labeling the origin of this space “efficient,” but this two-dimensional space immediately suggests the theory. Those systems that veer too far toward the extremes on one or both dimensions meet the precondition for reform, needing only a catalyst (e.g., a scandal) to get things moving. MM systems naturally lie in the middle of this space and make for reasonable equilibria of the resulting processes, whatever the details. Moreover, a simple index Shugart devises for locating electoral systems on the inter- and intraparty dimensions places pre-reform systems outside, and post-reform systems inside, an apparently stable region of the institutional space. The situation of new democracies choosing MM systems is similar: For those designing or negotiating over an entirely new system, the extremes of pure systems are less attractive than the middle ground established by the apparently successful German model. In short, mixed systems have been widely chosen because they promise “the best of both worlds.”

In the reform/design chapters, Shugart’s general assertion appears supported, and several new theoretical insights are offered to supplement it. In their discussion of Japan, Steven Reed and Michael Thies directly address the why-would-turkeys-vote-for-Christmas paradox inherent in electoral reform, noting the possibility of both outcome-contingent support [I am a winner now, but I think I will be a loser tomorrow unless I change the rules] and act-contingent support [I may lose from reform, but I will lose even more if I am seen to oppose it]. They also discuss various prior failed attempts at electoral reform, important dog-that-didn’t-bark events ignored in most reform narratives.

Richard Katz notes the importance of existing institutions where incremental reform is desirable or constitutionally necessary. In Italy, reform could be accomplished only through the deletion of words from the existing law. The result was a unique—yes, a bit bizarre—institution that reveals our previous ignorance. Institutional details that were entirely ignored as trivial in previous descriptions of the old Italian system were central determinants of the new system. We see similar phenomena in the systems of postcommunist states where electoral designers took pains to maintain as much of the predemocratic administrative apparatus, especially geographic districts, as possible.

The inferences to draw from the second half of the book are more ambiguous. The editors conclude with an upbeat assessment that MM systems do indeed provide the best of both worlds, but the case chapters suggest that the question mark in the book’s title cannot yet be erased. The visceral reaction of Tullock and others suggests a suspicion that mixed systems might provide some inconsistent PR-majoritarian mush, or even the worst of both electoral worlds. Indeed, the more or less unique mixtures chosen by each country discussed here have resulted in several intriguing unintended consequences.

For example, plurality systems (or, more generally, those with single-seat districts—SSDs) almost never conform to the cartoonish versions of the Duvergerian two-party plotline, and their effects are even more complex in MM systems. Roberto D’Alimonte notes that Italy’s SSDs have been “proportionaliﬁed,” with mutual stand-downs serving as bargaining chips for the creation of PR coalitions. René Antonio Mayorga argues that SSDs have resulted in greater fragmentation from regionalization of Bolivia’s party system. Robert Moser writes that Russia’s electoral system is now flush with independents, who win roughly half the votes and seats in the SSDs, with nationalized party consolidation years away at best. Reed and Thies report that Japanese parties have achieved better list performance where SSDs are contested—it should not take long for that interesting behavioral tidbit to draw notice elsewhere—so hundreds of no-chance candidates are now fielded where they were not before.

In other words, the two components of mixed systems interact to provide complex strategic incentives to many players, and there
is no reason to expect that the results are in all cases and on all dimensions something intermediate between the two pure types. And the devil is in the institutional and contextual details. None of the systems here mimics Germany's exactly, with some (Hungary, Italy, Russia, Thailand) bearing only a passing resemblance. Very similar systems (Venezuela, Bolivia) have had very different experiences and even the system of postunification Germany has had a different feel from that of preunification West Germany.

So, while this volume is not ultimately the final word on the subject of mixed systems, it is better than that. It is the first word, setting the agenda for the study of our new convention-busting world of mix-and-match democratic institutions. As such, and despite the price, Mixed-Member Electoral Systems will be viewed as a mandatory component of the modern electoral scholar's shelf.


— Aron G. Tannenbaum, Lander University

Elites in non-Western late-industrializing (NWLI) states such as Japan and Russia/Soviet Union know what "modern" societies in the West look like. They also know, or may be aware of, the political culture of their own premodern and largely peasant populations. Their task, if they desire modernization of their own societies, is to find some way of adapting the features of the modernized West to their own country's traditional structures. In this analytic masterpiece, Rudra Sil provides a sophisticated and nuanced comparative analysis of how elites in these two states attempted to "manage modernity" and came out with very different results.

Building on the pioneering work of Reinhardt Bendix a generation ago, Sil focuses not on the high ground of national political decision making but on the lowly factory floor where the interplay of the modern and the traditional takes place among the ordinariness of everyday life. At the center of attention is a seemingly simple question: How can managerial elites create a sufficiently high level of congruence between management and workers to produce political stability in societies undergoing the stresses of modernization? This work integrates some highly disparate academic fields: organization theory, the sociology of the workplace, Russian and Japanese area studies, and modernization theory. It is no small accomplishment.

Analytically speaking, the book divides into three main parts. First is a sophisticated and comprehensive discussion of twentieth-century organization theory, its Western origins and development, and its application to the industrial workplace. Sil analyzes both Frederick Winslow Taylor's "scientific management" school of organizational behavior and its antithesis, the "human relations" school for the hidden universalistic assumptions upon which they are based. As Sil notes, the concept of economic efficiency itself that underlies both Taylorist and human relations schools of thought may take on different meanings in modernizing societies: "The overall rise in production and the preservation of social stability tend to be regarded by political and economic elites [in NWLI countries] as no less significant than the maximization of efficiency or productivity at the individual level" (pp. 73–74). He emphasizes the importance of these other-than-efficiency values in the modernization enterprise.

The second analytic part of the book is about the peasants-cum-workers who comprise the industrial work force in the NWLI societies. Here the question is what the relevant inherited legacies (preexisting norms, practices and forms of work-related social organization) are that workers carry with them from their previous (usually agricultural or artisan) work communities onto the factory floor. Sil focuses upon the Japanese *mura* (preindustrial village communities) and upon the Russian *mir* (peasant communities) and *arreli* (urban craftsmen guilds). Both Japanese and Russian traditional work communities emphasize collective identities but in rather different fashions. In both Japan and Russia/Soviet Union, the introduction of Taylorist management theory, based on highly individualistic Western and American norms, came into sharp conflict with the more collectivist culture of the factory working class. Before World War II, tensions were high in both countries from this conflict. After the war, however, Japanese managerial elites were successful in adapting the human relations school of thought to a higher degree of congruence with Japanese worker legacy attitudes, thus contributing to Japan's postwar economic growth. Post-Stalin Soviet managerial elites were less successful in adapting human relations to their structures, however, resulting in continued labor tensions. Mikhail Gorbachev, although well-intentioned, fashioned reforms that reemphasized Taylorist norms, thus making a bad situation even worse and contributing to the Soviet collapse.

The analysis demonstrates Sil's competence in both Japanese and Russian area studies. But his analysis seems to assume that inherited legacies linger for generations after the work patterns that gave rise to them have disappeared, or at least disappeared from the view of the industrial workers themselves. That assumption needs stronger empirical verification, especially in the Russian case, where survey data were not always available. Similarly, the author assumes that managerial elites have accurate knowledge about the traditional culture of their workers, an assumption that may not be accurate at all given the large urban–rural divide in modernizing societies.

The third and, to this reviewer, most interesting analytic part of Managing "Modernity" is about the management ideologies of NWLI management elites, institution builders who stand at the crux of Western management ideologies, on one hand, and the exigencies of the traditional societies which they are trying to modernize, on the other. These elites have the historically determined task of selectively applying Western management models to their own societies. How these elites make their strategic choices goes a long way toward determining the successes and failures of the modernizing enterprise in the two countries. Sil's discussion of management theory debates in the two countries is exhaustive.

This discussion does not do justice to the complexity and sophistication of the author's analysis. Terms are defined at all times, theories are examined both logically and empirically, the relevant literature is cited appropriately, and the writing is as clear as this complex argument can allow. But therein lies a problem: The argument is so complex, and Sil's knowledge is so encyclopedic, that even an attentive reader may lose sight of the forest for the trees. To the rescue, therefore, spring a series of a dozen charts, scattered throughout the book, that sum up the argument as it presents itself up to the given point in the book. The reader would be well advised to scan the charts before reading the text in order to keep the main points clearly in mind.

It is rare that one book makes contributions to so many different and usually unrelated disciplines and fields. Russian area specialists will find new light shed on the old debate about the adaptability of traditional Russian institutions, such as the *mir*, to both Soviet and post-Soviet realities. Organization theorists will be challenged to reexamine the universalistic assumptions that Sil demonstrates are built into some of their work. And academics in general will realize that the spread of American soft power predates the current globalization process by about a century. All in all, a great deal of new light is shed upon some old and traditional questions.
In light of the overwhelming triumph of the liberals over the coup plotters in August 1991, how and why did the transformation of Russian society after 1991 fail to anchor the democratic reformers? By investigating the efforts of competing elites in the Russian Federation to forge the post-Soviet identity and to mobilize society’s collective memory, Kathleen E. Smith’s second monograph provides an answer to this crucial question.

National identity contains many complex layers, including memories of the past, reactions to the present, and expectations for the future. Of these components, memory remains the most malleable, if not the most volatile. According to Smith, “collective memory is more fluid than history. Unlike an accounting of events that exists at a remove from social life, collective memory ‘continuously negotiates between available historical records and current and political agendas’” (p. 7).

The author begins her inquiry into the political mobilization of memory with an account of how loyal communists after 1991 fought for the right to preserve their old name in the Russian Constitutional Court. During the court proceedings, the communists successfully began to redefine their own group identity and to rehabilitate their public image by rewriting their own history. She then examines how the ruling democrats adopted a “laissez-faire attitude” toward commemorations of their new regime’s founding moment. After President Boris Yeltsin’s bloody conflict with the Russian parliament in October 1993 and after parliament’s subsequent amnesty of the August 1991 coup leaders, the triumphal myth of August 1991 weakened. Other chapters trace debates over the return of trophy art captured from the Germans during World War II and celebrations of commemorative holidays. In both situations, the Communist Party renewed its efforts to capture the patriotic mantle, and the liberals downplayed their previously harsh criticism of the Soviet era.

Later chapters consider the democrats’ efforts to introduce their own ideas of appropriate versions of the national past. One chapter examines the means by which the mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov, applied his view of the Russian heritage onto the capital’s architectural landscape. By concentrating on the use of historical symbols, another chapter evaluates the confrontation between liberal reformers and nationalist-oriented communists in the 1996 presidential race. Finally, the last chapter considers Yeltsin’s post-1996 efforts to promote a usable past for the Russian Federation by attempting to build foundations for a democratic patriotism and seeking a reconciliation of historical opponents.

Smith concludes her book by claiming that “[i]mages of the past are not infinitely malleable. The Russian experience shows that politicians can neither escape the past nor mold it completely to their will” (p. 184). Inasmuch as individuals, groups, and events shape collective memories, these conflicts and negotiations over collective memory will continue into the near future. Identities and memories generally remain in flux, especially in societies experiencing major transitions.

In short, Mythmaking in the New Russia provides an excellent description and analysis of the rise and fall of the democratic forces in Russia after August 1991. As the communists successfully linked themselves with the achievements of Russia’s past (such as the Soviet victory in World War II), the electorate came to perceive the democrats as weak-willed individuals who did not represent Russia’s real interests. At the economy contracted in the 1990s, Russian public opinion identified the downturn with the democrats, Western liberalism, and the economic “shock therapy” introduced by Yeltsin’s reformers: “Unlike the communists, who had been fine-tuning new historical narratives since the demise of Soviet rule, liberals had little practice in conceptualizing a new patriotism” (p. 157). Unable and unwilling to imagine or to present it to the public, the liberals marginalized themselves and became highly unpopular.

By concentrating on the conflicts over monuments, symbols, commemorations, and historical interpretations, Smith’s highly nuanced and perceptive account recognizes the political uncertainties in the Russian Federation after 1991, after the collapse of empire and superpower status. In analyzing the struggle between the democratic and the communist visions of the past, she recognizes the importance of cumulative historical contingencies and clarifies how the communists took advantage of the fluid political environment to rehabilitate their party. By tracing the continuous negotiation of the Russian collective memory in the 1990s, she supplies us with the context in which to understand the emergence of Vladimir Putin and how he represented a politically winnable synthesis of the two conflicting visions during the 2000 presidential elections.

One of the best assessments of the Russian political situation at the end of the twentieth century, Smith’s book demonstrates the author’s talents as an insightful and shrewd analyst, able to integrate contemporary cultural history and Russian domestic politics. Without simplifying complex, often conflicting crosscurrents, she has produced a well-written, jargonless, and well-argued monograph, which all instructors of Russian and post-Soviet politics courses should seriously consider adopting.

In this book, George Tsebelis perfects the veto players theory championed in his earlier work and applies it to the full spectrum of institutional and partisan settings in which policy decisions might be made in a democracy. Here is a harmonious balance of formal theory and comparative research. While each reader will have a personal bias in favor of one or the other, any reader will find the material engaging, accessible, and encyclopedic in its breadth of coverage. Sophisticated theory building is subordinated to the overall goal of understanding politics, and the author draws on the work of scholars worldwide in order to support his conclusions. This book will be read in every core seminar in comparative politics, as well as in courses in positive political theory.

Veto players theory (VPT) enables the analyst to evaluate the likelihood and the direction of policy change on the basis of information about the institutionalized process of decision making by governing bodies. Such institutionalized processes are often described and classified in terms of constellations of formal institutional variables (e.g., the distinction between presidentialism and parliamentarism). Tsebelis, however, argues against that and in favor of taking as a point of departure something that is derivative from the formal rules and participant strategies, namely, the actual configuration of political actors who can veto policies and shape agendas. This actual configuration of relevant powers, he says, is not fully determined by the formal variables, so that different formal institutions can lead to similar veto structures, while the same set of formal institutional variables may produce veto structures substantially different. Since, theoretically, it is the veto structure that makes policy change possible and determines locations of feasible policies, stressing formal institutional variation alone cannot be expected to generate sufficient predictive ability and may not be methodologically supportable.

Veto structures in VPT do include formal rules as one of their components. Formal rules...
(though possibly also the informal norms, as in the case with the noncoitiloable parties in parliaments) dictate whose consent is required for a policy change and, crucially, the sequence in which players move, specifying prerogatives with regard to setting the legislative agenda. Other determinants of veto structures are the information about who the relevant players are (e.g., which parties participate in the government, or which peak associations are the de facto veto players) and the spatial locations of their ideal points, as well as of the status quo. Taking the actual configuration of relevant veto players as the point of departure means putting side by side players that are constitutionally defined, such as presidents and parliamentary chambers, and players whose existence and strength is endogenous to the political process, such as political parties. In a one-period model of policy choice, players of both types are treated as exogenously given. On the other hand, VPT defines the status quo endogenously, on the basis of the content of the policy change under consideration, to account for the dimensionality of the proposed legislation.

Tsibeleis offers the discipline a powerful tool. With all needed parameter values known, ‘veto players theory can make accurate predictions about policy outcomes’ (p. 284). But the basic model is not dependent on specifying all the details and, in some sense, generalizes and absorbs a variety of formal theoretical arguments made for specific institutional configurations and based on more specialized assumptions about the decision-making process. In the author’s words, “veto players theory provides the contours of the possible outcomes on the basis of minimal assumptions” (p. 285).

The ability to do so, at times, requires going for good theoretically justified approximations that nonetheless may be vulnerable to the existence of counterexamples. Where theory leads one to expect a tendency of a particular sort, a corresponding trend in the data can be reasonably hypothesized.

Moving from the basic model to more specific institutional settings, the book assesses the properties of policymaking by referenda (differentiated by the type of agenda setting). It shows that since qualified majorities and bicameralism raise the number of veto players, both lead to an increase in policy stability; that the more numerous veto players cause policy stability with respect to legislative outcomes as well as the legislative instruments; that proximity of veto players’ ideal points accounts for the durability of governments because it makes them not merely better able to formulate and execute a policy program but also to deal more effectively with exogenous shocks; and that many veto players lead to greater judicial independence and are associated with attempts to restrict bureaucracies by legislative means. The last chapter offers the application of the theory to the analysis of successive European Union institutional systems and demonstrates how policy predictions change with the institutional change, summarizing and extending the author’s extensive and influential prior contributions on the subject.

VPT’s ultimate reliance on the country-specific context, the value of specialized expertise for animating the veto players model, is generally a very attractive aspect of both the book and the theory. And at the same time, the current treatment still leaves room for modeling specific institutional and partisan configurations based on more restrictive formal assumptions. Thus, the book promises to become a seminal influence in both the comparative and the formal fields, as it generates compatible research agendas for both.

Veto Players is an excellent treatment of its subject. But it remains to be seen if the field will find ways to integrate Tsibeleis’s methodology with research questions in comparative politics that address long-term institutional and partisan development. These are, in essence, questions about the origins of veto structures—formal institutions and veto players’ preferences.” How can one extend the method to the choice of rules, formal and informal? How to incorporate the possibility that the electoral process may be policy oriented and that future veto players’ interactions in governmental bodies are already strategically processed and shape electoral outcomes (e.g., as in the electoral balancing hypothesis)? And what is the role of “absorbed” players in internal bargaining, as veto players are deciding on a policy? These are but a few tasks that the veto players theory can be expected to turn to next.


Quinten Wiktorowicz, Rhodes College

The study of Islamic activism has long been criticized for its overly descriptive orientation. To some extent, description was necessary due to a paucity of information about the myriad groups that mobilize under an “Islamic” banner. Where theory was addressed, it was typically an implicit adoption of socio-psychological functionalist accounts of mass behavior that posited a linear causal relationship between grievances, anomie, and structural strain, on the one hand, and collective action, on the other. While social scientists accumulated empirical details, there was little theoretical growth or innovation.

Carrie Rosefsky Wickham’s book challenges this status. The author adopts a social movement theory framework to explain how opposition activism emerges in authoritarian political settings. Whereas earlier approaches to the study of Islamic activism suggested that mobilization is inexorably produced by an accumulation of grievances rooted in political, economic, and cultural crises in the Muslim world, she notes that “[e]ven under the most extreme conditions of human misery and exploitation, the emergence of collective protest is not assured” (p. 7). Using the mobilization of university graduates into Islamic activism in Egypt as a case study, she argues that mobilization depends on the conscious efforts of movement members to motivate participation, generate resources, and take advantage of opportunity structures.

In emphasizing human agency, Wickham does not ignore the role of grievances as fodder for mobilization. In fact, Chapters 2 and 3 offer the richest available empirical detail about the growing frustration of the university graduate cohorts that eventually participated in Islamic activism. Under Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian regime repressed the opposition while concurrently co-opting lower- and middle-class youths (possible targets of opposition appeals) by offering free university education and guaranteeing government jobs for all graduates. The expansion of opportunities, however, eventually outran the capacity of the Egyptian patron-state to deliver entitlements under Nasser’s successors, swelling the ranks of the “lumpen intelligentsia.” Wickham provides unparalleled qualitative and quantitative details about the gap between the social mobility aspirations and actual employment of university graduates. For those seeking empirical substance about the socioeconomic background of Islamic activists, her contribution is one of the most thorough.

It is at this point in the book that Wickham’s analysis departs from the well-trodden path of deprivation arguments to explore institutional choices and dynamics of mobilization. She shows that although Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak institutionalized a limited form of political party pluralism and elections, the expansion of formal political space was utilized to manage moderate dissent and reinforce patron-client networks. Limitations on political party freedom stymied the creation of mass-party linkages and engendered political alienation among educated youths, who came to view the system as corrupt and amoral (Chapter 4).
On the periphery, Islamic activists mobilized these disaffected graduates though a “parallel Islamic sector” consisting of ostensibly nonpolitical institutions, such as private mosques, welfare societies, cultural organizations, businesses, and publishing houses (Chapter 5). The decentralized nature of this institutional network, limitations on state resources, and Islamic sympathies among government bureaucrats impeded the ability of the state to effectively curtail its growth.

Wickham’s central theoretical contribution emerges in Chapters 6 and 7, which argue that activists utilized institutions at the periphery to launch effective ideological outreach programs and persuade graduates to engage in risky forms of collective action. Research on high-risk activism tends to focus on either the social networks that draw individuals into movements or the rational calculations of utility-maximizing participants. Wickham, on the other hand, offers what can be described as an ideational approach. She argues that although selective incentives may have initially attracted individuals to low-risk Islamic activism, they do not explain the transition to riskier contention. Her explanation is that activists used the social linkages in the parallel Islamic sector to promote new political values, identities, and obligations. In particular, “Islamists challenged dominant patterns of political alienation and abstention by promoting a new ethic of civic obligation that mandated participation in the public sphere, regardless of its benefits and costs” (p. 120). The ideological appeal stressed the ephemeral nature of this life, the need to implement God’s will, irrespective of the costs, and the inevitable triumph of Islam, thus providing psychic empowerment to overcome fear and translate grievances into activism.

Although Wickham often couches this argument in the language of the framing literature, she makes a distinct theoretical contribution. Theories of framing in social movement research typically argue that mobilization occurs, in part, because movement entrepreneurs successfully frame messages that tap into the biography and worldview of potential participants (frame alignment). Wickham, however, contends that Islamic activists not only foster frame alignment but also change individual understandings about obligations and priorities. In other words, individuals are taught, persuaded, or socialized to believe in the necessity of action.

While this is certainly an important argument, the evidence seems a bit incomplete. Her central contention is that ideological outreach motivates individuals to engage in high-risk activism, but there is very little evidence of high-risk activism in the book. Perhaps this is a definitional disagreement about what constitutes “high risk,” but a number of passages in the book seem to indicate that participants did not view their behavior as extremely risky. For example, Chapter 8 provides an excellent and detailed overview of Islamist participation in professional associations, but given that the regime permitted this mobilization, how is it high risk? In fact, the author notes that “the middle-generation Islamists moved closer, in appearance and in practice, to the norms of the status quo” in what amounted to a “shift from direct confrontation with the regime to a cautious and grudging accommodation” (p. 193). Elsewhere, she observes that “Islamic Trend leaders deliberately chose to avoid a major escalation of conflict that could have led to a violent showdown with the regime” (p. 201). And in the final chapter, she notes that during the period of de-liberalization in Egypt in the 1990s, many activists “merely lapsed from action to inaction, unwilling or unable to adopt more radical tactics when legal channels of protest were closed off” (p. 210). Toward the end of the book, the reader gets the sense that ideological outreach failed, since activists seemed to back down when the risks were raised.

Regardless, Mobilizing Islam is easily one of the best books on Islamic activism. Wickham’s use of social movement theory and remarkable fieldwork produced a book that speaks to area specialists and students of contentious politics alike. Amidst the onslaught of ill-informed books on Islam in the post-September 11 period, Wickham provides a refreshing reminder that there is rigorous scholarship on Islamic activism.


— Wolfgang C. Müller, University of Vienna

This is a landmark study. It also has a remarkable history. The almost 900 large-size pages can be considered the life work of Harold Wilensky. To be sure, the book is not a reprint of the many influential chapters and articles he has produced. Rather, it draws on, synthesizes, and extends his research over the last three decades. As the author points out, the book was nearly completed when the Berkeley-Oakland firestorm destroyed most of the manuscript, related files, and the author’s library in 1991. It was reconstructed and further updated in the subsequent years. The discipline shall be grateful for this effort, in many ways heroic. The book has a tall order: to analyze the performance of the 19 richest democracies over the last 50 years or more. From the usual set of countries of the Organization for Economic Corporation and Development, the author excludes Greece, Portugal, and Spain, mainly because they are not yet rich enough to be seen as belonging to the same club as the other countries. One country—the United States—is given particular attention, as can be seen from the fact that some of the chapters are written with the aim of contrasting the U.S. experience with that of the 18 other rich countries and that most of the prescription contained in the volume aims at making the United States a better country by the author’s standards.

Rich Democracies builds on a wealth of quantitative data drawn from primary sources and the literature (resulting in 90 pages of references) and from 400 qualitative interviews with decision makers, advisors, and academics used as background information. The quantitative data in some cases extends to the mid-1990s, although mostly the endpoint is in the 1980s and sometimes in the 1970s. Typically, more recent developments are then discussed in the text. Throughout the volume, Wilensky develops a wealth of empirical measures and indicators. Data analysis typically is complex cross-tabulation (including analytical categories and countries), followed by regressions.

The book falls into three parts. The first is devoted to theory, the second to government policy, and the third to system performance. All three parts are data-rich. The main difference is that Part I is devoted to evaluating theories, while in the remaining parts, system comparison is the name of the game. In the theory part, Wilensky evaluates four theories: convergence theory, the theory of democratic corporatism, the theory of the mass society, and the theory of the postindustrial society. He finds convergence theory—that is, the idea that as rich democracies became richer they became more alike—the most convincing explanation of the historic development of the 19 countries. Yet there are remaining differences that need to be explained by other theories. His champion is the theory of democratic corporatism, or, as he would prefer, the idea that five types of political economy can be distinguished: left corporatism (e.g., Sweden), left-Catholic corporatism (e.g., Austria), Catholic corporatism (e.g., Italy), corporatism without labor (e.g., Japan), and the least corporatist countries (e.g., the United States). This typology is used throughout to explain differences in government policies and system outcomes among the 19 rich democracies. The theory of mass society figures prominently in one of the theory chapters but does not have
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS


— Manus I. Midlarsky, Rutgers University

What is just and fair in international politics? Attempts to answer this question are increasingly prominent. The present work is another addition to this literature, with special attention to the processes and outcomes of international negotiations.

This topic is currently salient, especially in light of such failures as the collapse of the Oslo peace process. And Cecilia Albin does a fine job of reviewing major theories of justice and their applicability to international negotiation. Equality, equity (as proportionality), compensatory approaches, and even Rawlsian criteria of fair selection are considered. She wisely settles on a concept of justice as “the balanced settlement of conflicting claims which calls for a degree of impartiality, a balance between different principles and interests, and compliance with freely negotiated agreements” (p. 21).

Albin's conceptualization then forms the basis of an inclusive theoretical framework (of necessity presented here in summary form) based on structure, process, and outcome. Structure includes the context (principles, location), parties, and participants, as well as the agenda. Process emphasizes the decision rules, fairness of procedures, and notions of reciprocity and fair division. Finally, the outcome is influenced by the extent of impartiality of the agreement and the parties’ willingness to later abide by its terms. This framework is applied to four cases of negotiation in disparate areas of international life: the battle against acid rain (environmental), the Uruguay Round of GATT (economic), the Israel–Palestine Liberation Organization interim talks (ethnic), and the extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (arms control). In each case, Albin gives the requisite details of structure, process, and outcome needed to estimate the extent of fit of her framework. And she finds that in all cases, the agreements reflect “justice as a balanced settlement of conflicting claims,” thereby facilitating their consummation.

So far so good. Alas, one immediately asks why three of the four agreements have thus far withstood the test of time, while in the ethnic case, a dramatic collapse has occurred. In fairness to Albin, this book must have been written almost entirely prior to the widespread realization that massive failure had occurred. Yet if a different sort of comparison had been made, perhaps some early intimations of failure could have been ferreted out.

Despite their diverse areas of applicability, all four cases are treated as virtually equivalent. Other than noting the differing substance of the agreements, no fundamental distinctions are made among the environmental, economic, arms control, and ethnic conflicts. Yet there exists at least one important difference. While the first three are susceptible to positive sum outcomes in which both sides gain, the last, ethnic conflict, frequently is subject to a different calculus based on zero sum conditions. Any gain to one side can be, and frequently is, interpreted as a loss to the other. When a circumscribed territory is at issue, no elasticity is allowed. Either side A gets the territory, or B does; there is no possibility of joint territorial gain under conditions of circumscription. Only the division of a territory or its substitution by another is available as a remedy.

This condition of circumscription stands in marked contrast in the remaining cases. Environmentally, each side can gain with no loss to the other when agreements are reached. Carbon dioxide emissions, for example, affect the environments of many countries equally; hence, their control can benefit all parties to the agreement. To be sure, there may be internal political costs in incurring the ire of large-scale carbon dioxide emitters, or manufacturers of polluting products. But these costs can be absorbed internally or even countered entirely by aggressive educational...
efforts supported by concerned governments. International economic agreements also have their internal opponents, but they can be persuaded by the benefits of increased trade. Even trade unions can be mollified by the possibilities of increased wages resulting from corporations enriched by the increase in trade. Arms control has an obvious benefit, especially when applied to the nuclear arena. The negative sum consequences of a nuclear war or even the extreme costs of nuclear arms races can be so unattractive to many protagonists that nuclear arms control agreements become mutually desirable. Only a circumscribed, territorially based conflict like that between Israel and the PLO is intractable in these terms.

Impartiality, one of Albin’s key ingredients of a just and therefore successful agreement, is far more difficult to achieve in an ethnic conflict. Long histories of international enmity typically are not salient in affecting environmental, economic, or even nuclear arms control agreements. In contrast, ethnic conflicts are far more vulnerable to the impacts of historical and mythological grievances. The ethnic conflict often penetrates to the core identities of people in ways that the remaining issue areas almost never do. Thus, Palestinian terrorism, as well as support of Hitler during World War II and of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War, certainly count against them in the Israeli view, just as Israeli military victories, occupation, and impact on refugees influence the Palestinian perspective. In other words, the weight of history is simply heavier in many ethnic conflicts. The remaining, largely ahistorical, functional areas of international life are more tractable.

David Mitrany’s early emphasis on the greater ease of international agreement in functional areas like trade and the environment could have helped clarify these differences. It is interesting that in the Israeli-Palestinian case, agreements over economic arrangements and water rights were successfully negotiated according to Albin’s principles of justice and fairness. Territorial issues (including the return of Palestinian refugees to current Israeli territory) predictably would have had a much harder row to hoe, whatever the justice and fairness of the pending agreement.

Yet in one important sense Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation breaks new ground. It is one of the few large-scale efforts to apply ethical criteria to important international phenomena and to do so empirically by using an articulated theoretical framework. Other scholars can profitably build on Albin’s work. Her conceptualization is clear, her framework is comprehensive, and the importance of international ethics is further embedded in our collective consciousness.


— William J. Long, Georgia Institute of Technology

“Don’t judge a book by its cover,” they say. In this case, it is an appropriate aphorism because the cover of this compact edited volume establishes a demanding standard. The editors assert that the book will allow us to “understand the impact of the communications revolution on international security, the world political economy, human rights, and gender relations” (back cover). Not surprisingly, it does not deliver completely on its claim. It does, however, raise several interesting questions about the role of the new information technology in world politics and it provides useful insights, partial answers, and provocative perspectives on several important issues.

Those interested in fundamental questions about the impact of information technology on the nature of international relations, state security, and global welfare will be somewhat “underwhelmed” by the equivocal but reasonable analysis of the opening three chapters. Cherie Steele and Arthur Stein reject “prophecies of revolution” forecast by some and conclude that the impact of the Internet and other information technologies on the prospects for international relations are unclear because new technologies increase the returns to both cooperative and conflictual strategies. Specifically, improvements in the speed of communications can lower the costs of trade and investment or broaden the scope, speed, and lethality of military action. Whether governments use these technologies for welfare or warfare depends primarily on the system’s underlying power relations. The authors conclude optimistically, but provisionally, that on balance, new technology is being used more to foster cooperation than conflict.

The following essay by James N. Rosenau and David Johnson also rejects technological determinism and reminds us that the impact of new information technologies (IT) on state sovereignty and globalization is best viewed as neutral. Rosenau and Johnson find that these new technologies both support system continuity by enhancing state power and contribute to change by enhancing the power and associations among other actors in a multi-centric world. They expect international relations to continue to be complex, dynamic, and tumultuous.

Frank Webster’s essay focuses on the impact of IT on global capitalism. In this realm, he argues that new technologies essentially support existing propertied classes because they are at an advantage in a knowledge economy through their dominant position in the education system. Ominously for social stability, he warns that those on the lower rungs of the economic ladder, once thought to be a source of surplus value, could be rendered virtually irrelevant in an economic system where knowledge has become the source of profit.

The chapters addressing the impact of IT on democratization and human rights are the most intriguing and original contributions in this collection. In particular, the complementary chapters by Christopher R. Kedzie and by David L. Richards offer valuable historical studies that provide empirical support for important hypotheses about the impact of information connectivity on political control. Together they find a positive correlation between information technologies and democracy and that enhanced interconnectivity indirectly increases governments’ respect for the rights of its citizens through this democratizing influence. These are exciting contributions to the debate over whether new technologies are more likely to enhance the responsiveness of governments to their people or merely reinforce governmental control and means of repression. The authors modestly and accurately note that their findings should encourage further investigation.

The book ends on a polemical note with chapters by Deborah Steinstra on the impact of information technology on gender and women’s organizing and by Ali A. Mazrui and Robert L. Ostergard, Jr., on information technology and African development. Steinstra maintains that the Internet sustains existing hegemonic world order and unequal gender relations. Women, she asserts, have used, and should continue to use, this technology to organize their nascent “counter-hegemonic” voice against the forces of inequality. Likewise, Mazrui and Ostergard warn that new information technologies may carry the risk of a new form of colonialism. Information technology may be contributing to modernization, but it also adds to dependency. True development—modernization minus dependency—may be undermined by the introduction of these technologies in the African context. These two essays may or may not prove convincing to the reader, but the editor should be commended for providing a critical perspective on technologies that are so
often viewed as a positive or indeterminate force in world politics.

Technology, Development, and Democracy offers an interesting collection of works. It provides thoughtful, if not unexpected, assessments that there is more continuity than change in fundamental dilemmas of world politics despite the proliferation of new information technology. Further, it offers focused empirical pieces that provide support for the notion of a positive relationship between new information and communication technology and democratization and protection of human rights. Finally, it provides some cautionary and critical voices warning that these technologies could exacerbate economic and gender inequality. The collection may not deliver all that its cover advertises, but it is a worthwhile read for those interested in exploring the possible impacts of new information technology on international relations.


— Jim Whitman, University of Bradford

Michael Barnett is an academic who received a fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations to spend 1993–94 as a political officer in the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. He was therefore in a position to observe the political, diplomatic, and bureaucratic machinations that took place within the United Nations as Rwanda descended into genocidal frenzy in the spring of 1994. Then and for a year thereafter, he concluded that the UN’s studied indifference to the unfolding horror had been “proper and correct” — indeed, that its conduct was the only path open to it, given the practical and political realities at the time.

This study is a painstaking reexamination of the evidence in support of that still widely held position. But the purpose here extends beyond asking whether individuals, states, or UN organs and departments can be held morally accountable for a failure to act. More fundamentally — and more disturbingly — the author “conclude[s] that the UN’s actions were guided by situated responsibilities and grounded in ethical considerations” (p. 4). The purpose of this work is therefore “to replace the secure conclusion that unethical behavior begat indifference with the discomfiting possibility that for many in New York the moral compass pointed away and not toward Rwanda” (p. 5). This is a striking assertion, yet as Barnett makes clear throughout, the moral significance of those fateful weeks and months requires an accounting that includes, but extends beyond, a careful delineation of acts and omissions. How could it have come about that “the bureaucratic arm of the world’s transcendent values” (p. 175) did nothing in the face of such an appalling crime against humanity? This is an urgent, dislocating question, similar to George Steiner’s agonized reappraisal in the aftermath of the Holocaust: Having accepted as an article of faith that the humanities humanize, what are we to make of genocide perpetrated by individuals steeped in that tradition?

To accomplish his aim, Barnett sets out to “reconstruct the moral universe at the UN” (p. xii). Its structural aspects largely comprise a brief discussion of bureaucratic dynamics, with Max Weber and Hannah Arendt as guiding lights. However, in addition, the disillusionment and dashed hopes of the vastly expanded post–Cold War peacekeeping — and in particular, the fear of failure that followed the U.S. debacle in Somalia — appear to have been so pervasive that it does not seem exaggerated to include it as part of the UN’s moral “universe” rather than as the “moral climate” of the time. Against this background, the many actors involved were able to invoke values as well as rules to justify their decisions. What ensued, argues Barnett, was not the simple “depraved indifference” that so many now assume, but something of an altogether different and more surprising character: “By withholding information from the council and denying [United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda force commander] Dallaire’s requests, the Secretariat was protecting the operation and the organization” (p. 163). National interests (essentially in the form of reluctance or refusal) are not disregarded in this account, but are presented as being formative of the disposition of the UN Secretariat: that “[because] any move might prove disastrous, [it] quietly closed its eyes” (p. 163).

However, none of this is presented as “bare facts,” but as part of an unrelenting moral interrogation. The manner in which the narrative and argumentative elements of this book are combined and made to cohere is an admirable accomplishment, as is the sense of moral indignation that propels it, controlled though it is.

In the end, Barnett “cannot definitively conclude that the Secretariat withheld information [from the Security Council]”; nevertheless, “circumstantial evidence suggests that it selectively presented information to the council, opted to avoid the language of ethnic cleansing in favor of the morally neutral language of civil war, and refrained from making the strongest case available for intervention” (p. 174). And he directly accuses the UN Secretary General of the time, Boutros Boutros-Ghali of having violated his professional responsibilities. Nor does Barnett pull his punches over the behavior of some states — notably the United States and France. But what comes through most strongly in this study is expressed succinctly in one of his concluding remarks: “The very institutions that we develop to realize our highest humanitarian ends can generate ethical principles that are disconnected from those in whose name they act” (p. 181).

If Eyewitness to a Genocide has a shortcoming, it is in that final, brief consideration of whether it is possible to build “moral institutions.” One cannot disagree that “[t]he desire to build moral institutions must include an examination of those who staff them” (p. 180). However, the more precise, far-reaching theme that this study opens up is the fundamental question of whether institutions can have moral agency. As international relations scholars begin to develop this theme, it is certain that studies of the United Nations and its performance — in Rwanda and beyond — will be central to the enterprise. This deeply felt, engaged, and engaging study not only paves the way for the furtherance of this literature; it is a first, valuable contribution.


— Don Munton, University of Northern British Columbia

In The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism, Steven Bernstein argues that the three decades since the Stockholm environment conference of 1972 have witnessed the emergence of a new “norm-complex” — “liberal environmentalism” — and that this emergence can best be explained by a “socio-evolutionary” constructivist theory. “Liberal environmentalism” (LE)
Encompasses the notion of sustainable development, as well as the polluter pays principle (PPP), market-based approaches to environmental protection, privatization of the commons, free trade, and sustained economic growth. These elements make a plausible if broad package. Sustainable development is the only one explored to any significant extent, however, and the conceptual and practical connections among these diverse elements are for the most part left rather vague.

For example, the precautionary principle may well not be incompatible with market-based approaches (as Bernstein claims), but it also seems quite compatible with a classic environmental regulatory approach. Similarly, the assumed link between the PPP and market-based instruments may seem reasonable, but polluters presumably pay either when they lack marketable permits to go on polluting or when forced to reduce emissions by regulation.

To suggest that the various elements of LE are all prevalent ideas in the current milieu is to state the obvious. To say they have prevailed and comprise a coherent, accepted norm-complex is more debatable. This book is more one of theory construction than an exposition of sustainable development or, even less, of other LE elements. Bernstein’s sophisticated treatment of theoretical issues comprises almost half the volume. His case for an alternative socioevolutionary model is strong, polished, and insightful. His critique of the epistemic communities model is thoughtful and challenging, although one might question the claim that the evolution of LE constitutes a “most-likely” case for the epistemic communities model. Surely, evidence of scientific influence is more likely to be found behind specific international environmental agreements (such as ozone depletion) than in the adoption of liberal economic principles and in the increasing use of market approaches in environmental governance.

On the other hand, if one is assessing the influence of ideas of economists, both dead and alive, then liberal environmentalism would seem a better case to tackle. Bernstein continually dichotomizes market-oriented environmental policies and old-style “command and control”—as do many others. I would suggest that the dichotomy is a false one and the terms misleading. So-called market-based approaches cannot work without certain political “commands.”

This book is an important contribution to the development of constructivist thought. Its value still depends in part on the case it makes for the emergence of what it is attempting to explain. Are the ideas Bernstein identifies “norms” in the conventional sense? Are they new? And are they now accepted?

Few readers would argue that international economic thinking has not shifted in key ways since the 1970s. Some readers may agree with Bernstein that international actors have implemented sustainable development, that these efforts coalesced into new norms by the early 1990s, and that liberal environmentalism “dominates” state practices. Others will argue that today’s ubiquitous references to sustainable development are mostly rhetorical, albeit a changed rhetoric at a new altar; that the actual norms of international environmental behavior have not shifted much; that sustainable development notions have brought no fundamental transition in environmental governance; and that traditional environmental policies are still prevalent in most states.

Sustainable development itself remains, as Bernstein notes, an ambiguous concept. Depending on one’s spin, it is as easily equated with economic growth (p. 104) as with environmental constraint. Can a concept so given to differing meanings provide a clear norm? At the end of Chapters 2 and 3, he enumerates the elements of LE. To some readers, the items there will sound less like norms than general priorities, or “to-do” notes (e.g., “cooperation to conserve the global resource base,” p. 68). There is surprisingly little discussion herein of specific norms of environmental behavior, such as the famous Principle 21 of the Stockholm declaration, a norm that goes back in international law not just to 1972 but at least to the 1930s.

Has the norm-complex shifted? While some environmentalists saw liberal economic tenets as incompatible with environmental policies in the 1970s, few governments ever fully accepted this view or allowed environmental concerns to override economic needs. Governmental policies before and after Stockholm were arguably more often aimed at ensuring that the pursuit of environmental objectives did not undermine economic growth than that economic growth did not damage the environment. Their rhetoric aside, governments have for decades made compromises to fit environmental protection into a liberal economic system with growth promotion as its top priority.

What then has changed, if not the norms? Most clearly, Western governments in the late twentieth century became more forthright in articulating the liberal economic principles underlying their policies, principles to which they had long subscribed. Bernstein himself admits that sustainable development remains problematic and that LE has not led to significant environmental action. He nevertheless maintains it is a “powerful normative underpinning” for environmental governance (p. 111).

It is not obvious where one should look for strong evidence of LE in action. Bernstein notes that areas where concerns about the common environment conflict with state sovereignty pose a particularly difficult challenge to LE, and have not proven amenable to new governance regimes. In response, it could be argued that important international environmental issues where there is no such conflict would not seem particularly numerous.

As noted, this book is focused primarily on theory development. Empirical evidence and substantiation sometimes seem sketchy. To take just one example, Bernstein claims (on the basis of one interview) that scientific studies on acid rain led Sweden to suggest the 1972 Stockholm conference. In fact, the formal Swedish proposal to the United Nations (in 1967) predated by a year the first scientific article on acid rain in Sweden. Bernstein asserts that the Kyoto Protocol is a good example of LE. In fact, while the Protocol features a number of market-like mechanisms, these are arguably not its “emphasis.” They are ancillary, cost-cutting aspects of an accord, the core of which is simple percentage emissions reductions. In other words, market approaches are more the frosting on Kyoto’s old-fashioned regulatory cake than the cake itself. The Bush administration’s rejection of Kyoto relates, to be sure, not to the frosting but to the cake.

The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism is an ambitious book, tackled with style and commitment. To his considerable credit, Steven Bernstein takes on broad and important issues and advances provocative arguments. To question his conclusion that liberal environmentalism has triumphed is not to dismiss his theoretical arguments. This is a book that many should and will want to read, both for its assessment of environmentalism internationally and for its original contribution to constructivist theory.

**Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa: Global-Local Networks of Power.** Edited by Thomas Callaghy; Ronald Kassimir, and Robert Lathan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 322p. $70.00 cloth, $25.00 paper.

— Carol Lancaster, *Georgetown University*

This collection of articles asks an important question: How do networks of global, state, and local forces intervene in African countries and influence the structures of power, authority,