encompasses the notion of sustainable development, as well as the polluter pays principle (PPP), market-based approaches to environmental protection, privatization of the commons, free trade, and sustained economic growth. These elements make a plausible if broad package. Sustainable development is the only one explored to any significant extent, however, and the conceptual and practical connections among these diverse elements are for the most part left rather vague.

For example, the precautionary principle may well not be incompatible with market-based approaches (as Bernstein claims), but it also seems quite compatible with a classic environmental regulatory approach. Similarly, the assumed link between the PPP and market-based instruments may seem reasonable, but polluters presumably pay either when they lack marketable permits to go on polluting or when forced to reduce emissions by regulation.

To suggest that the various elements of LE are all prevalent ideas in the current milieu is to state the obvious. To say they have prevailed and comprise a coherent, accepted norm-complex is more debatable. This book is more one of theory construction than an exposition of sustainable development or, even less, of other LE elements. Bernstein’s sophisticated treatment of theoretical issues comprises almost half the volume. His case for an alternative socioevolutionary model is strong, polished, and insightful. His critique of the epistemic communities model is thoughtful and challenging, although one might question the claim that the evolution of LE constitutes a “most-likely” case for the epistemic communities model. Surely, evidence of scientific influence is more likely to be found behind specific international environmental agreements (such as ozone depletion) than in the adoption of liberal economic principles and in the increasing use of market approaches in environmental governance.

On the other hand, if one is assessing the influence of ideas of economists, both dead and alive, then liberal environmentalism would seem a better case to tackle. Bernstein continually dichotomizes market-oriented environmental policies and old-style “command and control”—as do many others. I would suggest that the dichotomy is a false one and the terms misleading. So-called market-based approaches cannot work without certain political “commands.”

This book is an important contribution to the development of constructivist thought. Its value still depends in part on the case it makes for the emergence of what it is attempting to explain. Are the ideas Bernstein identifies “norms” in the conventional sense? Are they new? And are they now accepted?

Few readers would argue that international economic thinking has not shifted in key ways since the 1970s. Some readers may agree with Bernstein that international actors have implemented sustainable development, that these efforts coalesced into new norms by the early 1990s, and that liberal environmentalism “dominates” state practices. Others will argue that today’s ubiquitous references to sustainable development are mostly rhetoric, albeit a changed rhetoric at a new altar; that the actual norms of international environmental behavior have not shifted much; that sustainable development notions have brought no fundamental transition in environmental governance; and that traditional environmental policies are still prevalent in most states.

Sustainable development itself remains, as Bernstein notes, an ambiguous concept. Depending on one’s spin, it is as easily equated with economic growth (p. 104) as with environmental constraint. Can a concept so given to differing meanings provide a clear norm? At the end of Chapters 2 and 3, he enumerates the elements of LE. To some readers, the items there will sound less like norms than general priorities, or “to-do” notes (e.g., “cooperation to conserve the global resource base,” p. 68). There is surprisingly little discussion herein of specific norms of environmental behavior, such as the famous Principle 21 of the Stockholm declaration, a norm that goes back in international law not just to 1972 but at least to the 1930s.

Has the norm-complex shifted? While some environmentalists saw liberal economic tenets as incompatible with environmental policies in the 1970s, few governments ever fully accepted this view or allowed environmental concerns to override economic needs. Governmental policies before and after Stockholm were arguably more often aimed at ensuring that the pursuit of environmental objectives did not undermine economic growth than that economic growth did not damage the environment. Their rhetoric aside, governments have for decades made compromises to fit environmental protection into a liberal economic system with growth promotion as its top priority.

What then has changed, if not the norms? Most clearly, Western governments in the late twentieth century became more forthright in articulating the liberal economic principles underlying their policies, principles to which they had long subscribed. Bernstein himself admits that sustainable development remains problematic and that LE has not led to significant environmental action. He nevertheless maintains it is a “powerful normative underpinning” for environmental governance (p. 111).

It is not obvious where one should look for strong evidence of LE in action. Bernstein notes that areas where concerns about the common environment conflict with state sovereignty pose a particularly difficult challenge to LE, and have not proven amenable to new governance regimes. In response, it could be argued that important international environmental issues where there is no such conflict would not seem particularly numerous.

As noted, this book is focused primarily on theory development. Empirical evidence and substantiation sometimes seem sketchy. To take just one example, Bernstein claims (on the basis of one interview) that scientific studies on acid rain led Sweden to suggest the 1972 Stockholm conference. In fact, the formal Swedish proposal to the United Nations (in 1967) predated by a year the first scientific article on acid rain in Sweden. Bernstein asserts that the Kyoto Protocol is a good example of LE. In fact, while the Protocol features a number of market-like mechanisms, these are arguably not its “emphasis.” They are ancillary, cost-cutting aspects of an accord, the core of which is simple percentage emissions reductions. In other words, market approaches are more the frosting on Kyoto’s old-fashioned regulatory cake than the cake itself. The Bush administration’s rejection of Kyoto relates, to be sure, not to the frosting but to the cake.

The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism is an ambitious book, tackled with style and commitment. To his considerable credit, Steven Bernstein takes on broad and important issues and advances provocative arguments. To question his conclusion that liberal environmentalism has triumphed is not to dismiss his theoretical arguments. This is a book that many should and will want to read, both for its assessment of environmentalism internationally and for its original contribution to constructivist theory.


— Carol Lancaster, Georgetown University

This collection of articles asks an important question: How do networks of global, state, and local forces intervene in African countries and influence the structures of power, authority.
order, and discourse there? The question arises from much of the work on globalism that focuses on global and local actors (usually by states or international organizations) but often neglects regional and other interventions and the multiple and interacting connections among a variety of forces and actors. It is a very relevant question to apply to Africa with the weakness of many African states, which itself has created opportunities and incentives for multiple forces—multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, religious groups, militaries (including private security forces), criminal groups, and terrorist networks—to occupy political and economic space and shape the discourse in much of the region. What also makes this volume interesting is its self-conscious position at the nexus of comparative politics and international relations and often political economy as well.

Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa exhibits both the advantages and disadvantages of an effort on the part of scholars to break new ground. In asking their important questions, they confront the problems of unsettled definitions (for example, of the notion of “network” itself), the lack of a typology of “forces,” actors, and interventions, and a theory of why and how interventions occur and with what consequences. Several initial chapters attempt to define and categorize the concepts of networks, transboundary formations, and interventions, but these efforts, while a good start, do not take us very far in terms of truly new ways of conceptualizing politics in Africa.

The most interesting chapters are those that grapple with empirical material—case studies that demonstrate the varieties of forces, actors, and networks involved in interventions in Africa and their consequences. Tom Calleghy’s chapter, “Networks and Governance in Africa: Innovation in the Debt Regime,” provides new material on the role of nongovernmental organizations in shaping changes in the way governments and international organizations handle debt in Africa and elsewhere. Hans Peter Schmitz offers important insights into how international human rights groups helped move Kenya toward a more democratic political system, but in the long run, their impact was ambiguous as opposition political parties fragmented along ethnic lines and failed to gain power.

Cyril Obi examines the alliances among multinational oil companies, the government, and local leaders in the Niger Delta to exploit Nigerian petroleum reserves (with a devastating impact on the local inhabitants and their environment) and the cooperation between local Ogoni activists and human rights groups abroad to protest these problems, framing the issue effectively through the prism of minority rights. William Reno shows how certain types of foreign commercial interests—often hiring private security firms for protection of their assets—can gain through investing in activities producing a quick return (e.g., timber or mineral extraction) in Africa, even in areas involved in conflict.

As the editors conclude, transboundary relationships and formations are not new in politics in Africa or elsewhere. However, they offer a convincing case that these relationships deserve greater attention from scholars if we are to understand both political and economic conditions and change in Africa and how these conditions and changes affect, in turn, international politics. It remains to be seen whether new concepts and theories will be needed in this effort or whether the discourses and concepts of the past will serve us in this important task.


— Terrence Guay, Syracuse University

This book describes recent attempts by the European Union to develop a European common security and defense policy (ECSDP). Charles Cogan takes a chronological approach, beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall and ending in December 2000, with chapters covering one- to three-year intervals and the major events of these periods (e.g., Gulf War, Bosnian War, Madrid NATO summit). This is useful, as it illustrates the ways in which decisions and events throughout the decade shaped the interests of leaders and their countries in subsequent years.

Cogan is particularly interested in France’s role in moving the EU toward a “third option” for military action in Europe. Until the late 1990s, Europe had essentially two options for collective military action. The first was an entirely NATO operation. The second was for the European members of NATO, acting under NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force concept (a product of NATO’s 1994 Brussels summit) and through the EU or Western European Union, to borrow the alliance’s assets. This “separable but not separate” option does not completely satisfy the French, who still harbor reservations and resentment about U.S. influence in NATO. However, a third option now exists for “a purely European action, using European assets only, and with a separate and completely European chain of command” (p. 119).

Cogan focuses much of the book on France’s role in the development of ECSDP. In his view, France, despite a rapprochement with NATO during the mid-1990s, was pushed toward a third option by disagreements with NATO over enlargement and the alliance’s New Strategic Concept. At the same time, Presidents François Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac also labored to pull other EU member states into the ECSDP arrangement. Cogan is correct that the pivotal point in the decade was the Anglo-French declaration at St. Malo in December 1998. The statement that the EU needed credible and autonomous military forces and the means to decide to use them, in essence, a common defense policy, symbolized a momentous breach in Britain’s long-standing position that U.S. involvement in Europe through NATO formed the cornerstone of the continent’s security. Perhaps even more significantly, Britain’s new position represents a strikingly different view of European integration—one that is more open to the deepening of integration, at least in certain policy areas.

The author summarizes nicely the major events of the 1990s, moving across NATO meetings, EU summits, and the military actions of the decade. However, he does not delve deeply enough into the obstacles to the successful implementation of the third option or, more importantly, the implications of the third option on regional security, European integration, and transatlantic relations. The reader is left wondering whether the third option will indeed lead to the emancipation of European defense, as the book’s subtitle suggests. The EU’s movement into the defense realm during the 1990s was a remarkable achievement that only a brave few would have predicted before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Certainly, changes in the international environment and the dynamics of European integration are equally important in comprehending the evolution of ECSDP. Yet these factors will also play complementary roles in the near future in shaping the viability of the third option.

The premise of a purely European military action is that a situation requiring a military response would arise in Europe, and the United States would not be interested or willing to respond. Such a situation seems unlikely at present, especially given enhanced transatlantic cooperation on security issues in the “war against terrorism,” or for the foreseeable future. On the EU side, it is difficult to envision a serious ECSDP, given the low levels
of defense spending by member countries, inadequate decision-making procedures within the EU, and an organization that may soon expand from 15 members to 27. NATO, too, is changing. The new NATO-Russia Council provides opportunities for consultation, joint decision, and joint action. Unfortunately, Cogan only hints in the book’s epilogue at some of these issues and how they will affect a third option.

On the other hand, there is additional evidence that Cogan could have included to support the viability of a third option. The cross-border restructuring of much of Europe’s defense industry during the last five years surprised many observers, who thought that arms production would always be protected within the national domain. Much of the restructuring occurred in the months immediately preceding and following the St. Malo declaration. There is also significant public support, as shown in Eurobarometer and other opinion polls, for a common European defense policy, and the European Commission and Parliament have long sought to add this dimension to the EU’s framework. If the private sector and public opinion can come around to the idea of a third option, is it so unbelievable that European national governments are serious about ECSDP?

The Third Option does a fine job covering the important events of the 1990s, although one might object that it is a little too Francocentric (for example, Cogan does not explain why the historically neutral EU members—Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden—agreed to support ECSDP). However, the book leaves the reader wondering what will happen next. It is not clear what the author makes of the third option, and whether he thinks the Europeans will pull it off (he contends that it is “largely theoretical,” p. 120). That is disheartening given the wealth of knowledge he obviously has on the subject.


— Ronnie D. Lipschutz, University of California, Santa Cruz

Among the many debates by international relations scholars is one having to do with globalization and associated social, political, and cultural transformations. On the one hand, there are those who argue that there is little that is new, and that globalization is simply the latest phase in the international expansion of capitalism, a process that began centuries ago (e.g., see Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question, 1999). On the other hand, there are some who claim that globalization is wholly new and will lead to a total reorganization of international politics (see, e.g., Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, 1999).

Within this broader debate, there has also been considerable discussion about the efflorescence of nongovernmental organizations and social movements over the past several decades. Few deny their growing numbers or participation in various aspects of international politics, but few agree on either the causes behind their appearance or the significance of their activities. Some, including this reviewer, have called the phenomenon “global civil society.” This term has been criticized for both analytical and historical shortcomings but it has, nonetheless, found wide usage among foundations, commissions, and international organizations.

Alejandro Colás’s International Civil Society is a recent contribution to this debate, and it addresses these controversies in two ways. First, by historicizing “civil society,” and illuminating the influence of the international on the formation of national civil societies, Colás argues that what he calls “international civil society” is integral to the construction and maintenance of the international state system. Second, he makes it clear that civil society, and especially social movements, are intimately linked to the rise of capitalism and the accompanying class struggles. Each of these points diverges rather strongly from more conventional perceptions of civil society as operating in a sphere apart from the state and state system.

Civil society, according to Colás, developed along with the bourgeoisie, as the emergence of capitalist relations of production gave rise to a private social space separate from those of the family and the state. At the same time, however, civil society existed in a complex interaction with the state, marked by collective struggles for both political domination and of resistance to the state. Or as he puts it, civil society is “a domain where the class antagonisms inherent in the structural power of both state and market play themselves out, chiefly through the medium of social movements” (p. 43, my emphasis). Such social movements have, historically, been the locus of the idea of popular sovereignty, he argues, and have often been at the center of struggles for the creation of the nation-state. Finally, the role of civil society in the constitution of national states also means that social movements have been and continue to be central to the maintenance of the international state system. It is for these reasons that Colás uses the term “international civil society,” rather than “global civil society.”

In other words, claims that global civil society represents a sphere of political activity independent of either individual states or the state system are incorrect both historically and analytically, and it would certainly seem that there is no world state to which this international civil society might relate—although more on this point, anon. Finally, if the complete globalization of capitalist relations, a result of deliberate decisions by certain state authorities, has played a role in the flourishing of international civil society over the past two decades, as Colás’s argument might seem to indicate, it is difficult to see how transnational social movements could constitute a form of resistance to either state(s) or capital. On this last point, the author insists that struggle must remain within the “traditional, territorial sovereign state,” (p. 176) for it is from there that political authority continues to be exercised, even if in a form strongly modified by globalization.

What Colás, and others, overlook in their accounts of international (or global) civil society is the emergence of what Martin Shaw (Theory of the Global State, 2000) has called the “global state” or what Michel Foucault (“Governmentality,” in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, 1991) might have called “global governmentality.” While the international institutions of global rule hardly constitute an arrangement as dense or robust as that of the reified state of Europe or North America, they have begun to comprise a system of governmentality that is greater than a simple network of state-centric international regimes. Shaw argues that the global state is comprised primarily of the United States, Europe, and various other countries, increasingly integrated through economic relations while continuing to coexist as separate centers of military force, in which the United States is dominant. Foucault might have pointed out that both social welfare and security are integral elements of governmentality and the biopolitical management of people that it presupposes.

In the former case, therefore, the emergence of global civil society could be seen as central to the creation and legitimation of the global state, on the one hand, via the transfer of sovereignty from national authorities to a supranational constitutional order and, on the other, as part of a transnational class struggle between national and international capitals. The relative success of the transnational human rights movement fits rather nicely into this schematic. In the case of governmentality, states are
never fully able to provide the governmental welfare services required by populations, relying on capital and civil society for complementarity. The developing global state is especially weak in this last respect, and various campaigns to put in place global social regulations, engineered by social activists as well as corporate executives, are intended to do what international institutions cannot.

Nonetheless, with this volume Colás has made a signal contribution to the debate over international and global civil society, through historicization of the phenomenon and careful efforts to illustrate how the modern state and civil society are linked together. This is a book to which all those working on the puzzle of transnational activism and international politics will need to pay careful attention.


— Michael Shifter, *Inter-American Dialogue*

Since 1998, Colombia has been the third major recipient of U.S. security assistance in the world, the largest outside of the Middle East. What is striking, however, is that this critically important policy question has received virtually no serious and systematic attention from either political scientists or analysts of the policymaking process from other disciplines.

One of the main reasons for the unfortunate neglect also helps account for the policy’s conceptual flaws and largely disappointing, often counterproductive, results. The fact is that Colombia is immensely complex and overwhelming. The situation itself defies readily available analytical categories or widely used bureaucratic and political constructs. To illuminate the country’s multiple puzzles, it is perhaps most advisable to rely on Gabriel García Marquez’s novels of “magical realism.”

In this respect, Russell Crandall’s finely detailed and scrupulous account of the policymaking process over the last decade on such a significant foreign policy issue helps fill a major gap in the scholarly literature. Crandall draws on a variety of sources to tell a fascinating, if not altogether reassuring and upliftin, story of how a set of policy instruments are put in place global social regulations, engineered by social activists as well as corporate executives, are intended to do what international institutions cannot.

Nonetheless, with this volume Colás has made a signal contribution to the debate over international and global civil society, through historicization of the phenomenon and careful efforts to illustrate how the modern state and civil society are linked together. This is a book to which all those working on the puzzle of transnational activism and international politics will need to pay careful attention.

The author contends that because of the greater level of trust with Samper’s successor, the “narcotization” of the U.S.–Colombia relationship was less “overt” and more “implicit.” In fact, at the level of discourse, U.S. officials during the Pastrana years recognized more wide-ranging U.S. national interests and sought to develop a more balanced relationship with Colombia. Yet, underlying the $1.3 billion aid package approved in July 2000—the famous “Plan Colombia”—was the enormous political pressure to fight drugs.

Few analysts have actually examined and probed the assumption that the toughness of a politician’s position on the drug question is directly proportional to the political benefits derived. Has this simply been an article of faith for the past several decades, or is there evidence to demonstrate that this assumption is valid? Also unexplored is the important question: Why, if the drug war has manifestly failed to make a serious dent in the problem, does U.S. policy so rigidly hold to the core components of eradication, interdiction, extradition, and certification? The answer lies less in rational, cost–benefit analysis than in the realm of highly charged, symbolic politics.

It is instructive to read Driven by Drugs in light of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. Though briefly mentioned, these do not shape Crandall’s analysis. But since those attacks, many U.S. officials have justified continued U.S. involvement in Colombia in terms of the war against terrorism (three Colombian groups appear on the State Department’s list of terrorist organizations). Just as drugs supplanted the Cold War as the chief rationale for U.S. Colombia policy in the 1990s, it is worth considering whether the antiterrorist campaign could begin to overtake or compete with the drug issue in driving the policy in coming years. After reading Crandall’s study, however, one learns that it would be a serious mistake to underestimate the force and staying power of political pressures in the United States to fight drugs in major producer countries like Colombia. Also in the post–September 11 climate, with the uncertainty in the Middle East, it would be wise to consider the increasing importance of economics, and especially oil production, in affecting the dynamics of U.S. Colombia policy.

In the end, Crandall contends that a “realist” perspective is more fruitful in explaining U.S. Colombia policy than either the optic of bureaucratic politics or competing frameworks. This may be true to the extent that policymakers repeatedly invoke a concern with the U.S. national interest in defending...
their position. The real puzzle, however, is how even the most hardheaded review of national interests would yield a drug policy that resembles the one that has long been in place. The question is perhaps less whether the “realist” school has merit than, rather, “what is reality.”


— Christopher C. Joyner, Georgetown University

Transnational environmental problems obviously can impact on the relationship between neighboring states. But will that impact promote conflict or cooperation between those governments? Robert Darst explores this question as he examines how environmental problems in the former Soviet Union and five of its successor states (Russia, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) affected post–Cold War legal and economic relations with the governments of Western Europe. In this regard, he suggests a forthright yet provocative thesis, namely, that the Soviet Union’s successor states, lured by promises of “transnational subsidization,” exploited the environmental sensitivities of their West European neighbors. Furthermore, through that process, they received considerable economic support to clean up their polluting industries. To the author’s great credit, the evidence marshaled to support this thesis is compelling indeed.

There is no question that internal environmental degradation in the former Soviet Union was self-inflicted by the governmental policies of that society. It did not result from pollution produced elsewhere. The author makes a persuasive case that during the 1990s, the newly independent states exploited environmental concerns of capitalist countries, mainly the United States and Western Europe, to advance certain domestic goals, rather than to attain environmental protection or restoration. These new governments of the former Soviet Union manipulated environmental apprehensions as political levers to cajole and entreat economic aid and trade concessions from Western states.

Opportunities for “transnational subsidization” facilitated this manipulation in the years following the end of the Cold War. This process involved offers to contribute to costs and environmental protective strategies in the newly independent states, which amounted to environmental bribery for the latter to clean up their own mess. But, as Darst observes, such profiteers of transnational subsidization actually contributed to the willingness of these newly independent governments to accept higher levels of ecological risk and fostered longer life spans for their pollution-generating facilities. Emphasis fell on fixing dirty plants, not replacing them with cleaner technologies. Transnational subsidization thus raised the specter of environmental blackmail, as recipient governments could and did threaten potential donors with even greater environmental hazards if more subsidies were not forthcoming.

Three case studies comprise the bulk of the volume, and each reveals how the Soviet Union and its successor states played the transnational subsidization card with its Western neighbors. First, there is the case of the pollution of the Baltic Sea, where in 1993, a Joint Comprehensive Environmental Action Programme (JEP) was established to oversee cleanup of the region. Darst concludes that the JEP performed well and that the overall picture by the end of the 1990s is one of “impressive accomplishment” (p. 87). Western littoral states, by investing in regional environmental protection institutions to coordinate cleanup efforts with the former socialist states, were able to reduce the overall output of effluents polluting the Baltic Sea.

Second is the case of transboundary air pollution, as Darst aims to explain how the Soviet Union contributed to the inception and promotion of the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP). In a fascinating account, he examines the nuances of intra-European diplomacy that produced the LRTAP, and spotlights the role of the former Soviet Union in that process. It is true that efforts to reduce air pollution became complicated by the collapse of the command economy in the former Soviet Union. Even so, the eventual privatization of state-owned enterprises and the transition to market-based economies in the newly independent states led to significant reductions of pollutants generated by those societies, as well as the transnational effects. In short, transnational subsidization by Western governments facilitated economic and political transformation in Soviet successor states, and improved regional environmental conditions in the process.

The third case study focuses on nuclear power safety, highlighted by the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. Relying heavily on interviews and primary source materials, Darst recounts this incident in detail. He hones in on how the accident occurred, why it happened, and the decision by the government bureaucracy to resort to “spin control” in the hope of containing both internal and international criticism that was bound to follow. These efforts obviously failed. What emerged, however, was the rise of grassroots nuclear activism in the Soviet Union, which aggrivated political woes of both the government and the nuclear power industry at home. Moreover, the campaign to attract foreign subsidies for the modernization of the new states’ nuclear power industry became tied to Western governments’ insistence on the legal liability of installation operators. These conditions eventually were accepted, though only at the cost of nuclear blackmail conceded to Ukraine and Lithuania.

Academically, there is much to admire in this volume. It entails a well-written, richly documented analysis. The substance of the study is drawn from primary sources (including numerous Foreign Broadcast Information Service accounts), and its authoritative contents are bolstered by more than 150 personal interviews with scientists, statesmen, politicians, and environmental activists in Western Europe, Ukraine, Russia, and the Baltic States. Appended to the text are a 25-page bibliography and an index.

The study concludes with certain lessons for potential donor governments, among them the necessity of building on recipient states’ environmental interests, the need to coordinate efforts with other donors, and the admonition of never paying for the reduction of environmental threats that seem likely to dissipate anyway (pp. 210–19). That said, the ultimate lesson of Smokestack Diplomacy does not suggest that economic assistance from other states may be necessary for a government to manage its pollution effluents. Rather, the study spotlights the fine line between “transnational subsidization” and environmental blackmail. International aid can be an appropriate and highly effective response for helping with transnational environmental problems. But admonition is warranted: The prospects for increased aid can also be an invitation for extortion. Cooperation to clean up the environment and protect a region from threats of transnational degradation can be held for economic ransom by the polluters. In the end, recipient governments and their industrial operators must develop the capacity to act on their own behalf to control pollution and reduce environmental degradation. To permit otherwise is to invite environmental extortion, without the added benefit of resolving the transnational pollution problem. And that prospect over the long term serves no state’s best interest.
Piero Gleijeses, who has previously authored works on U.S. and Cuban policy in Latin America and Africa, has written a superb study of the intersection of U.S., Soviet, and Cuban political, diplomatic, and military strategy in Africa during the height of the Cold War. Conflicting Missions is dazzlingly researched, and substantial as the book appears, it is so beautifully crafted and thorough that it is mesmerizing. Its rigorous analysis and unfailing probing does not always provide the reader with unequivocal answers, but it does, as the author clearly desires, give shape to the multiple variables inherent in the many topics discussed. This is a book I could not put down; I believe most readers will feel similarly.

Primarily, Gleijeses, who obtained access to government archives in the former German Democratic Republic and in Havana, who has photocopies of all Cuban documents used in his research, and who has interviewed extensively in Cuba, Africa, and Washington, makes the argument that decisions regarding Cuban military activity in Africa were fashioned almost entirely independent of Moscow. Indeed, the USSR was often informed only after the fact. Accordingly, the key Africa decision makers in Havana, Fidel and Raúl Castro, and, until 1965, Ernesto (Che) Guevara, formulated Cuba’s involvement in Africa on the basis of five key components: its revolutionary ethos, its sympathy with radical movements in the non-Western world, its failed guerrilla offensive in Latin America, its determination to expand its influence in the Third World at the expense of the West, and its desire to create “two or three Vietnams” so as to dilute the pressure of the United States on Cuba and to focus U.S. attention elsewhere. As Gleijeses indicates on p. 376, “U.S. hostility spurred [Fidel] Castro to expand his vistas beyond the Western hemisphere: it would have been suicidal to respond directly to the American assault.”

Thus, as early as 1961, Cuba initiated its first foray into Africa. A significant amount of weaponry was covertly sent to the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) in support of its struggle against French colonial rule. This was followed after independence in 1962 by the dispatching of hundreds of military and medical personnel who aided Prime Minister Ahmed Ben Bella, first in helping stabilize Algeria, and then in his 1963 battle against Moroccan incursions into western Algeria. Cuba, Gleijeses states on p. 55, “kept the Soviets in the dark about a great many of their [Algerian] operations.” When Ben Bella was overthrown in 1965, Cuba all but halted its activities.

By 1964 Cuba had established embassies in Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Tanzania, and Egypt—the key points of radicalism in Africa—all with an eye to keeping track of events on the continent so as to foster or support revolutionary activities. In 1966 Cuba had hastened to bolster Amilcar Cabral’s political edifice in Guinea-Bissau in its independence struggle against Portugal. Doctors, military instructors, military equipment, and mechanics were sent to Conakry, Guinea, where Cabral was directing the war effort. By 1967 some 60 Cubans were in Guinea-Bissau, the medical personnel having set up field hospitals in the interior, while the Cuban Military Mission in Conakry reported to Cuban intelligence in Havana. According to the author (p. 213), “Cuba’s role in Guinea-Bissau, as elsewhere in Africa, was defined both by policy determined by a handful of men in Havana and by the bravery of the volunteers in the field. Just as Havana was not bowing to Soviet pressure in helping . . . so too did individual Cubans volunteer of their own free will.”

In Central Africa, Che’s 1965 fiasco in Congo-Kinshasa is abundantly documented; less well known, but fully illustrated by the author, are Cuba’s efforts in support of Congo-Brazzaville in the same year. To defend it against possible aggression from Congo-Kinshasa, to help the government form a militia to confront foreign assault, and to keep the army from threatening the rhetorically leftist regime, some 200 Cuban soldiers were dispatched to Brazzaville. Part of the military program was to aid the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), whose headquarters were in Brazzaville, in its guerrilla war in Cabinda. A handful of Cuban troops were sent into Cabinda to fight alongside the MPLA. During this period, small numbers of troops were also transferred to Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. But their efforts proved futile.

Cuba’s activities in Africa, through the period covered by the book, culminated in the extraordinarily successful campaign in Angola. The 30,000 Cubans who were in Angola from November 1975 to March 1976, fighting alongside the MPLA, helped defeat the linked efforts of the invading apartheid South African army and the covert military operation initiated by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to crush the MPLA. The millions of dollars allocated for military equipment by the United States were sent to Congo-Kinshasa’s President Joseph Mobutu for use against the MPLA, and to Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi, whose respective political organizations were slugging it out against Agostinho Neto’s MPLA for ascendancy in Angola. Success in Angola led to Cuba’s dispatching of 16,000 troops to Marxist Ethiopia in 1978 to help it repulse an invasion by Somalia. In the two decades highlighted in this study, Cuba’s expeditionary forces were active, and frequently triumphant, in all quadrants of Africa. Gleijeses analyzes this era exceedingly well, offering documentation never before made public.

Although Conflicting Missions covers these events in considerable detail, regularly referring to heretofore classified documents, the essence of the book lies in the analysis of how Cuban policy in Africa interrelated with U.S. and Soviet policy. Clearly, Fidel Castro is often shown outmaneuvering the United States in Africa. Although U.S. analysts often got it right, the decision makers, among them Kissinger, Presidents John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Gerald Ford, usually had no clue as to what was really going on inside the continent. As Gleijeses categorically states (p. 290), “Ford knew nothing about Angola.” Castro emerges from this book thorough in his planning and sound in his judgment. He knows when to go in, how to do it, and when to fold his cards and get out. His astuteness regarding how the United States and the Soviet Union will react to his policies is exquisite.

What also comes across conclusively is how little the United States understood about Cuban foreign policy in Africa. When Cubans entered Angola in force, the United States was caught completely unaware. Kissinger was utterly surprised and then jumped to the conclusion, quite incorrectly, that Cuba was acting merely at the behest of Moscow. When some of his State Department advisors suggested that the covert program he was prepared to initiate might not work and would harm the United States in the long run—particularly if the strategy failed (as it did)—Kissinger humiliated the coterie by referring to them as “missionaries,” and saw to it that the two most adamant in their views were fired. He then went on to shift responsibility for the failure of the U.S. effort from himself, where it properly belonged, to his advisors and the Congress. Decision makers in Washington were surprised again and again by Cuba’s actions. Fidel Castro, on the other hand, apparently had an inordinately astute sensitivity as to how far the United States was prepared to go in dealing with Cuban forces in Africa. When he erred he got out quickly, but he was more often than not
quite smart about what he was doing, and whether he could be successful.

The Soviet Union in Africa was usually forced to react to Cuban ventures. Unable to break with Cuba for obvious political and ideological reasons, Moscow was frequently compelled to go along with Castro's enterprises, and at times aided Cuba by shipping military equipment to the battle zones. Although in the early 1970s detente with the United States was the prime foreign policy rubric of the Soviet leadership, Castro understood the constraints on that policy when it came to Cuba. He also appreciated that success would rub off on the Soviets, and thus they sometimes willingly, commonly haltingly, went along with Castro's decisions in Africa. Fidel Castro was able to accurately take the temperature of both Washington and Moscow, but neither of the superpowers had the same skill when it came to Havana.

The meticulous approach taken by Piero Gleijeses in terms of methodology and the unearthing of data can be discerned by a close reading of the notes and bibliography sections. Both are precious in disclosing the time, effort, and painstaking research that went into producing this gem of a book. What the author has done with this information is also impressive. Whether describing events or drawing out theoretical arguments, he has given shape and context to Cuba's once formidable relationship with Africa. He has beautifully woven together history and political analysis; made astute judgments about the primary political actors; analyzed cause and affect; and bequeathed his readers a stunning tapestry of Cuba's role in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s. Conflicting Missions is uncommonly thought provoking. It is also a striking accomplishment.

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**Never Again? The United States and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide Since the Holocaust.** By Peter Ronayne. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001. 224p. $65.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.

— Howard Tolley, Jr., University of Cincinnati

Three recent works on mass killing in the twentieth century seek explanations that might reduce future carnage. Samantha Power's comprehensive case studies of the U.S. response to six genocides from 1915 to 1999 reveal consistent disregard for the systematic slaughter of Armenians, Jews, Kurds, Cambodians, Bosnian Muslims, and Tutsis. As a former Balkan war correspondent, she writes from personal experience in a style accessible to the general reader. As a scholar and executive director of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, Power conducted original interviews, obtained internal government documents, and reviewed an extraordinary wealth of secondary sources to produce a definitive account.

In a valuable work limited to U.S. policy in Cambodia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, Peter Ronayne draws similar conclusions. Presidents failed to lead a largely uninformed and disinterested public. Failure to act promptly to prevent genocide resulted in a need for considerably more expensive humanitarian relief to rescue surviving refugees. Ironically, considerable U.S. aid went to Hutu refugees, including those responsible for the mass killing of Tutsis. Both authors condemn the United States for supporting Pol Pot's exiled coalition as Cambodia's legitimate representative at the United Nations and for blocking efforts by Belgium to reinforce its peacekeepers in Rwanda when they might have averted a bloodbath. Power notes U.S. economic aid to Saddam Hussein despite clear evidence that he was using poison gas against both Iran and the Kurds in Iraq.

An idealist, Power contends that a sense of duty must accompany U.S. power. Had the United States employed its diplomatic muscle and economic clout, military intervention might not have been required to prevent mass murder. In each case history Power systematically examines the initial recognition of genocide, the response, and afterward, meticulously documenting what the president knew, when he became aware, and what he did about it. In 1994, the Clinton administration's disregard for their hard evidence prompted several midlevel foreign service officers to resign in protest. Secretary of State Warren Christopher confronted simultaneous genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda and appeared impotent. Wishful thinking, incredulity, and unavoidable inexperience in dealing with genocide reinforced Bill Clinton's preoccupation with a domestic agenda endangered by Republican prospects in the midterm elections. Not until his second term was Clinton moved by growing public demands for decisive action.

Ronayne notes how the Vietnam War and the death of U.S. peacekeepers in Somalia deterred the United States from acting either on its own or through the United Nations. Fresh from victory in the 1991 Gulf War, Colin Powell fashioned a doctrine of military restraint formalized in President Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive 25. The United States would not commit its military unless victory could be achieved at reasonable cost with a clear exit strategy. Nor would the it allow the proliferation of UN peacekeeping missions destined to fail in regions bloodied by ancient, irreconcilable feuds.

Power's minibiographies of central players are compelling. Raphael Lemkin, who invented the term "genocide," was an extraordinary advocate whose badgering of government officials produced a remarkable genocide treaty but few friends. Men of principle like U.S. Representative Frank McCloskey of Indiana lost office. In the Senate, William Proxmire became a celebrated champion, delivering 3,211 speeches advocating treaty ratification over 19 years. Substantive reservations ultimately made U.S. approval largely symbolic. After repeated calls for reinforcements that were rejected in New York and Washington, General Romeo Dallaire, the Canadian commander of UN peacekeepers in Rwanda, watched in anguish as NATO members sent troops to evacuate their own nationals. With their support he might have saved 800,000 Tutsis and Hutu moderates. A suicidal Dallaire continues to battle memories of rotting corpses piled high on his watch.

Genocide is such a potent symbol that the United States has gone to extraordinary lengths to avoid using the "G" word with ludicrous alternative formulations such as "acts tantamount to genocide." Power and Ronayne each find the treaty definition applicable to the cases of mass murder that they believe the United States had a moral and legal duty to prevent.

Dipak Gupta applies behavioral theories from psychology and economics to explain why individuals participate in collective mass murder. Individuals are motivated to join groups by a calculus of personal gain explained by economic rational choice theories as well as the psychological quest for identity. "In-groups" include the true believers, mercenaries motivated by greed, and the coerced moved by fear. "Out-groups" have conscienceless objects, free riders, and the co-opted.

Gupta's well-reasoned explanation for why groups form does not appear especially original. He offers 12 factors that lead a group into mass murder, applying the model to Rwanda's genocide, the Jonestown mass killing/suicide, and the absence of more extensive collective racial violence in the United States. The case studies do not reveal a definitive pattern, his
model has limited predictive value, and other case comparisons might have been more instructive—Rwanda and Ghana, Bosnia and Switzerland or Belgium, Paraguay and Costa Rica. His interdisciplinary methodology does not include law, and he provides the Webster's dictionary definition for genocide without reference to the UN convention. He repeatedly shifts from "I" to "we," leaving the reader uncertain when the author is advancing a personal argument or generalizing about the human condition.

From the perspective of psychology genocide is madness, to a philosopher immoral, for the lawyer illegal, and for political scientists a radical strategy to maximize power. Power and Ronayne assail U.S. inaction on moral, legal, and policy grounds. They assert a moral imperative of humanitarian intervention and predict that U.S. policymakers who provide ethical leadership could easily mobilize sufficient public support. Power recognizes, however, that the U.S. policy of nonintervention has "worked" for presidents who successfully avoided difficult foreign entanglements that might have jeopardized their standing at home.

Does a nation-state have an ethical obligation to prevent others from doing harm? In a utilitarian calculus, it seems only logical that the United States should have been willing to exert diplomatic/economic pressure and, if needed, put a few soldiers' lives at risk to prevent the Hutu slaughter of 800,000 Tutsis. Neither author, however, provides any systematic philosophical argument or authority for their unsupported assertion of a state's duty to rescue. Nor do they offer clear moral criteria about which cases justify intervention. There were 15 genocides in the twentieth century with 84 million victims (see Howard Ball, Prosecuting War Crimes: The 20th Century Experience, 1999) and additional cases of nongenocidal mass murder by Stalin and others, as well as man-made disasters such as famine in Mao Tse Tung's China. Should the body count dictate intervention? In 1972–73, Tutsis slaughtered 150,000 Hutu in Burundi, comparable to the death toll in Bosnia. The authors express laudable outrage at genocide of an ethnic group, but they never explain why extermination of a political opposition group is of less moral consequence.

Does the United States have a legal duty under the Geneva Convention to "prevent" genocide? That single term does not indicate whether unilateral humanitarian intervention is a legal duty or even allowed. Bosnia failed to persuade the International Court of Justice that a UN arms embargo illegally barred states from fulfilling their Convention obligation to prevent the Serbs' ethnic cleansing of Muslims. NATO bombing to save Kosovar Muslims was initiated without the formal Security Council approval legally required by the UN Charter. In ratifying the Convention, the United States attached a deplorable reservation denying compulsory jurisdiction to the world court, thus preserving national discretion to act or to refrain.

Has the Convention enhanced the prevention and punishment of genocide? Power's compelling evidence shows that U.S. officials were no more inclined to stop genocide after the Convention was adopted than were they before it came into force. Ronayne lauds the effort to make genocide a distinct crime punishable under international law, but he concludes that "Never Again" remains an empty slogan. David Forsythe warns against "judicial romanticism" as a response to complex political conflict (Human Rights in International Relations, 2000, p. 84).

The Nuremberg Tribunal punished crimes against humanity without using the term genocide or needing to resolve whether Nazis intended to exterminate an ethnic group. Defendants convicted of genocide in the ad hoc UN tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia were also charged and convicted for the very same acts as crimes against humanity. Perhaps genocide is being prosecuted as a hate crime justifying enhanced penalties on behalf of victims from selected groups. Several formally declared U.S. "understandings" reveal poor drafting of the Convention's compulsory jurisdiction to the world court, attached a deplorable reservation denying compulsory jurisdiction to the world court, thus preserving national discretion to act or to refrain.

The ethical, legal, and political failures have not provided as effective a rebuttal to realpolitik. The absence of any bloodbath following U.S. withdrawal illustrates the difficulty in making accurate forecasts. Multilateral intervention might constrain the influence of narrow national interest if the United States sought to lead others rather than proceeding alone.

Power and Ronayne identify a constituency supporting U.S. humanitarian intervention that includes both liberals and conservatives, Republicans and Democrats. Four distinct worldviews identified by Walter Mead ([Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World, 2001]) are evident in the unusual coalitions that supported and opposed U.S. intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo. Liberal internationalists motivated by humanitarian concerns allied with conservative internationalists concerned about NATO's reputation, security interests, and stability in Europe. Conservative isolationists wedded to a fortress-America policy joined with progressives and pacifists, profoundly suspicious of U.S. military action abroad.

Bill Schulz, a liberal internationalist, attempts to make the case for an activist U.S. policy by systematically addressing the concerns of political science realists ([In Our Own Best Interest: How Defending Human Rights Benefits Us All, 2001]). Power and Ronayne offer evidence and argument that will appeal to fellow liberal internationalists but that have not provided as effective a rebuttal to realpolitik.

What is in a word? Genocide, once the crime without a name, has now become the crime of crimes. The term is a potent symbol employed in the struggle for power. Just as foes of Israel seek to equate Zionism with racism, South African freedom fighters and feminists sought to have apartheid and rape punished as genocide. Mass murder, torture, and rape are all crimes against humanity, even without genocidal intent and whether or not the victims belong to a distinct ethnic minority. If Pol Pot's massacre of fellow Khmer is more accurately viewed as "policide," it would still be punishable as an international crime.

All three works succeed in describing horrendous crimes and U.S. policy failures but fall short in prescribing effective remedies. By examining the absence of collective madness in one case study, Gupta points the way to further comparative research that contrasts policies that have succeeded with approaches that failed. The ethical, legal, and political failures
are so well documented that the authors’ significant contribution should inspire renewed efforts to prevent mass murder.


— Marc A. Genest, University of Rhode Island

Joseph Lepgold and Miroslav Nincic present a forceful and timely critique of contemporary scholarship in international relations theory. The authors argue convincingly that far too many IR theorists have embarked down a path of intellectual triviality, having voluntarily abandoned policy-relevant research in favor of “hyperspecialized” work in increasingly arcane subfields in which methodology trumps meaning. Their fear is that scholars of IR theory, obsessed by arcane, self-referential debates within a small cadre of specialists within their particular subfield, have become akin to medieval monks huddled away in monastic obscurity.

The book begins with a candid explanation as to why IR theorists have eschewed policy-relevant debate as intellectually suspect and best left to the confines of analysts toiling away in think tanks. The myth that relevant scholarship necessarily leads to a compromise of professional standards is deconstructed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. This discussion centers on the insular and self-reinforcing nature of the majority of current research in international relations. The authors point out that professional advancement and the academic status of IR scholars depend primarily on whether their research appeals to a select few specialists in subfields that are increasingly esoteric in nature. These parochial concerns create an environment in which “the driving intellectual issues are of a technical, not substantive nature” (p. 13). In short, methodological rigor has become the enemy of substantive significance because the means have subverted the ends of research.

Lepgold and Nincic also attack the traditional arguments put forth by academics regarding the dangers of engaging in policy-relevant research. They present reasoned arguments to refute the contention that epistemological merit and integrity are endangered when academic research is subjected to a broader audience and its value is judged, at least in part, by nonacademics. This also affords them an opportunity to engage in a fascinating look at the proper relation between scholar and society. The remaining chapters are devoted to a constructive analysis of how to bridge the current theory-practice gap. In keeping with their pragmatic philosophy, the authors demonstrate how good scholarship can inform policy. Contemporary research in democratic theory and international institutions is used to demonstrate the point that policy-relevant analysis can have epistemological merit while also providing accessible insight and practical application for policymakers. In the case of democratic peace theory, Lepgold and Nincic show how scholarship influenced both the formation and subsequent implementation of the Clinton administration’s doctrine of enlargement. More importantly, they make a convincing case that the scientific value of the research was enhanced by its practical applicability to policymakers.

Finally, Lepgold and Nincic offer several concrete suggestions for “bridging the gap” (p. 178) between scholars and practitioners. This engaging discussion encompasses linkages within the field of IR, as well as between scholars and policymakers. They note that there are significant intellectual cross-benefits to be exploited with the interaction between subfields within IR, as well as between theorists and practitioners. The authors also highlight the role that case study and decision-making research can play in bridging the gap between academics and practitioners in international relations.

Beyond the Ivory Tower is an important book that merits serious attention, but it does contain a few minor shortfalls worth mentioning. The first is that Lepgold and Nincic do not offer any specific examples of research in international relations theory that fall victim to an inordinate focus on methodology. The obvious and worthy goal of the book is to provide a constructive path toward refocusing the academic toward policy-relevant research. This noble objective, however, may have led them to exclude a useful, albeit highly controversial, chapter demonstrating explicitly how substance can be subverted by exclusive attention to the sophistication of the methodological techniques employed in the work.

In addition, there are a few gaps in their overall critique of the field of international relations theory. For example, what about the place of postmodernist theories such as constructivism, and feminist theory in international relations? Surely, the authors would not argue that methodological rigor has obscured their research agenda! Yet a survey of postmodern IR theory quickly demonstrates that postmodernists are as likely to pursue policy-irrelevant research agendas as other theorists that grace the pages of the APSR, World Politics, International Organization, and the myriad other journals dealing with international relations theory. These minor problems do not pose a serious threat to the integrity of the thesis, but they do leave the reader with a yearning for a more specific critique of the subfields of IR theory.

The book represents a major contribution to the field of IR theory because it destroys the myth that scientific value and policy relevance in international relations are incompatible. This intellectually engaging and sophisticated scholarly work should be mandatory reading for scholars of international relations and added to the reading list of graduate courses in IR theory. While it is written expressly for scholars and graduate students of international relations, its central argument that policy-relevant work enhances the intrinsic intellectual value of scholarship and benefits professor and practitioner alike is important for anyone who is concerned with the proper relation between scholar and society. The authors make an eloquent and compelling plea to their colleagues to return to their roots and pursue policy relevance as a worthy academic and intellectually challenging goal of scholarship in IR theory.


— Lisa J. Carlson and Raymond Dacey, University of Idaho

The Cold War rivalry between the Americans and the Soviets generated what Michael McGinnis and John Williams deem a “mesh of compound dilemmas” or puzzles that remain open issues and require explanation. They address the following questions: How are democracies able to pursue a consistent policy over time? How did the pattern of superpower cooperation and conflict emerge, and why was this relationship stable for so
long? In short, the authors seek to explain the longevity, stability, and excesses of the Cold War rivalry. They offer a fresh perspective on international rivalry and develop a model of arms races that accounts for previous statistical findings and leads to novel predictions, which are supported empirically. The argument that supports the model is technical, and at times, the discussion is loose and suffers from imprecision, thereby making the argument difficult to follow. Despite this shortcoming, the authors’ work makes a significant contribution toward deepening our understanding of the Cold War rivalry and is essential reading for those interested in the foregoing issues.

In Chapters 1 and 2, McGinnis and Williams develop their theoretical perspective on international rivalry. To develop their framework, they use the “concepts and analytical tools of rational choice theory” (p. 1). Their argument utilizes a rational expectations (RE) framework developed from assumptions and key concepts found in various literatures, including social choice theory, standard game theory, the theory of two-level games, and agency theory. They also rely on theories of budgeting processes, particularly Graham Allison’s bureaucratic politics model, to capture the domestic foundations of international rivalry. One of the key strengths of the book is that the authors provide a good overview of many disparate literatures, and in so doing, challenge the reader to think on a deeper level regarding the interconnections among them. Another major strength of the work is the use of the RE approach as a mechanism for connecting the various concepts in these literatures.

The authors’ conceptualization of international rivalry rests on three fundamental and interrelated concepts: shared perceptions, collective action dilemmas, and the production of an information-rich environment. They argue that the “long-term stability of superpower rivalry” (p. 1) follows from the fact that each side viewed the other as the primary threat to its national security. Both states had to develop a consistent national security policy in order to defend against this threat; however, since national security is a public good, domestic actors had to devise ways to prevent complete failures of collective action (or the underprovision of national security). Soviet and American actors resolved their respective dilemmas via two different mechanisms. The Soviets restricted the number of people whose underprovision of national security. Soviet domestic actors had to devise ways to prevent on some issues, these leaders often faced profound resistance from domestic policy advocates.

The third aspect of rivalry, the production of an information-rich environment, is the key to the rest of the analysis. The authors argue that under conditions of rivalry, actors establish domestic institutions (intelligence agencies) that are used to generate efficient, unbiased information regarding the rival’s likely behavior, capabilities, and future threat potential. This view leads to the crucial assumption that Soviet and American actors made policy decisions as if they were operating on the basis of rational expectations (p. 53). Readers who are unfamiliar with RE may find the authors’ explanation on pages 51 to 61 confusing and hard to follow. The reader has to piece together the argument since the authors have a tendency to interrupt their own explanation of what RE is in order to justify why RE is a reasonable assumption. The discussion also tends to generate confusion; for example, we are given two different definitions of RE, one on page 51 and another on page 53.

McGinnis and Williams claim that if decision-making processes approximate the RE model, then “certain consequences logically follow” (p. 55). In Chapter 3, they present and employ the rational expectations arms race (REAR) model to test these consequences. The basic model and its structure are introduced in equations (1), which assert that “each state’s optimal military expenditure level is determined by the present expected values of threat and fatigue, with each evaluated according to all information available at that time” (p. 57). The “crux of the rational expectations hypothesis” is introduced in equations (2), which state that “[t]his year’s expectations are shaped by last year’s expectations” (p. 58).

Finally, the two components of the model are brought together in equations (3), which “state that each rival’s military expenditures at time t are determined by the previous year’s expectations” (p. 59).

The REAR model produces two predictions. First, the superpower’s military expenditures should not be correlated, that is, should not Granger cause one another. Second, the error terms in each military expenditure equation should be highly correlated. The second prediction is novel, counterintuitive, and “turns out to be the more powerful in distinguishing” (p. 60) the REAR model from its competitors. The authors explain, “Only a rational expectations model indicates that the contemporaneous correlations of innovations in an arms race [as measured by the error terms] should be large, since all of the important reaction occurs contemporaneously” (pp. 60–61). The key to understanding the ensuing sophisticated statistical analyses is to note that the REAR model will be “tested” indirectly via the residuals. The REAR model is never fully realized or directly tested since the key explanatory variables pertain to actors’ expectations, which are not directly measurable. The authors acknowledge this limitation as follows: “[W]e make no claim to be able to directly measure these expectation variables” (p. 57). In Chapters 4 and 5, they present the results of the statistical tests: Both of the model’s predictions were supported empirically. Given the somewhat elusive nature of the RE concept, the authors also provide a nice (albeit brief) discussion of the kinds of empirical results that would have served to falsify the model’s predictions (p. 83).

The book is beset with minor difficulties. Some, as noted, make it difficult to follow the overall argument. In a book based on “the concepts and analytical tools of rational choice theory” (p. 1), the authors need to exercise greater caution regarding the use of terms, such as “rational” and “expected value.” Specifically, acts, not outcomes, are rational (p. 50), and random variables, not equations, have expected values (p. 57). Nevertheless, the numerous strengths of the book far outweigh these difficulties. For example, the authors have melded together concepts from disparate literatures to provide interesting and compelling insights into the influences of domestic political games on the conduct of the international rivalry game that was the Cold War.


— Dennis Pirages, University of Maryland

Both of these important books advance understanding of the emerging relationships between globalization and the environment. But the authors approach this task in very different
ways. Matthew Paterson, a political scientist, applies a critical perspective to the analysis of global environmental politics. In his view, environmental deterioration is driven by the “twin dynamics of domination and accumulation, systematically produced by global power structures” (p. 160). Arthur Mol, a sociologist, is more positive about the impacts of globalization on environmental quality. While admitting that there are potentially devastating environmental consequences associated with globalization, he focuses on the ecological modernization of production and consumption and related processes of environmental reform.

Both authors are European and their books are written from a European environmental perspective. Both agree that environmental problems are embedded in the dynamics of industrial societies. Both buttress their arguments through mastery of the relevant contemporary literature, sometimes citing the same authors. But their respective arguments and conclusions are quite different. Mol is upbeat and sees a more environmentally benign world emerging almost automatically through the spread of ecological modernization. Paterson, by contrast, is more critical and sees global environmental problems to be anchored in social and political structures that are quite resistant to change.

Mol is well known for his ecological modernization theory, which refers to the “ecology-inspired and environment-induced processes of transformation and reform going on in the central institutions of modern society” (p. 59). Following somewhat in the optimistic tradition of economist Julian Simon and statistician Bjorn Lomborg, Mol swims against the prevailing environmental currents. He focuses on the dialectics of globalization and environmental reform, rather than on environmental degradation. Working within a post-Reagan-Thatcher scholarly context, Mol sees ecologically driven transformations in science and technology, the economy, the nation-state, politics, and ideologies all serving to improve environmental quality. In a manner somewhat reminiscent of the comparative politics literature of the 1960s that linked industrialization to democracy, Mol ties what could be called “postindustrialization” to positive environmental transformation.

Mol’s task in Globalization and Environmental Reform is to speculate about the impact of globalization on the diffusion of ecological modernization beyond Europe. To this end, he reviews the recent literature on globalization, explains the essence of ecological modernization theory, and then addresses both the apocalyptic and reform literature. He examines the dialectics of environmental reform in the industrial “triad,” and then in the less developed countries. He concludes that there is ample evidence that “we are moving beyond the era of a global treadmill of production that only further degrades the environment. Powerful, reflexive, countervailing powers are beginning to get a grip on the contradictory developments of environmental reform” (p. 205).

Mol makes a compelling case for looking beyond the dark side of globalization, and his book is a valuable corrective to some popular apocalyptic visions. But he also admits that ecological modernization theory has emerged in a distinctly European context, and it is unclear how it applies to other areas. Does it apply to the United States where recent signs of ecologically induced socioeconomic and political transformation are much less apparent? And what about China and India? Must they pass through industrialization and wreak global environmental havoc before they become ecologically more mature? Mol’s book clearly suggests an important future research agenda.

Paterson adopts a quite different research perspective. The task that he sets for himself in Understanding Global Environmental Politics is to think through and build upon existing critical approaches to this subject. He begins by criticizing contemporary scholarship in global environmental politics for its focus on state cooperation in resolving transnational environmental problems. He argues that these endeavors are too narrow, and that the focus on how states collaborate to solve environmental problems precludes a much-needed invest-gation of how states act as destroyers of the environment. He then describes a set of social practices that he feels systematically generate environmental problems, as well as how these practices are structured politically.

Paterson suggests that there are three primary questions that should inform the study of global environmental politics: how environmental problems originate, who they affect, and what responses should be taken to them. He begins by criticizing the weaknesses of what he refers to as the dominant realist and liberal institutionalist arguments. He finds the former wanting because of its limited focus on environmental security, and the latter lacking because of its narrow focus on international cooperation for resolving international issues. He finds that neither approach adequately addresses his first two research questions. He then moves on to summarize a literature that in his opinion yields a more explicit understanding of the origins of global environmental change. He concludes that environmental problems can best be understood through the logics of four interrelated power structures in world politics: the state system, capitalism, knowledge, and patriarchy.

Having located the origins of global environmental issues in these power hierarchies, Paterson then uses his critical theory lens to examine three British case studies that he claims demonstrate the sociopolitical origins of environmental problems. The first case focuses on the political and environmental considerations involved in the choice of timber to buttress the sea defenses in Eastbourne, England. The second deals with the environmental impact of the pervasive car culture that dominates British society, and the curious dilemma of people simultaneously seeing the automobile both as a major threat to the environment and as something that they cannot do without. The final case study focuses on the ecological consequences of the McDonald’s fast food and meat-intensive culture, and on the political resistance to this system that was manifest in a contentious British “McLibel” case.

Paterson concludes this excursion through the theoretical literature and case studies by questioning the kinds of politics that would be required to build more sustainable societies. He reasons that since global environmental change is driven by the dynamics of domination and accumulation buttressed by global political structures, the best strategy is to downsize to local green communities based on the primacy of feminist values, such as nurturing, care, and emotional labor. This is to be accomplished through continuing resistance to those who now have power in the global economy, making them legitimize their actions through democratic processes.

Thus, while Mol sees a glass that is half full, Paterson sees a glass that is half empty. For Mol, the emerging global economy is modernizing ecologically, almost as if guided by an invisible hand. There is no need for radical action to bring about a transformation of environmental politics. While nongovernmental organizations and other components of global civil society may continue their protests, their actions are simply part of an inexorable process of ecological modernization that has already substantially transformed the environment in industrialized countries, and that will likely spread to much of the rest of the planet as part of globalization processes. For Paterson, on the other hand, the feeble institutions that states have established in order to address international environmental issues do not begin to address either the social origins of environmental issues or their differential impacts on people and countries. Therefore, resistance is required.
The depth of the contrast between these two positions is illustrated by juxtaposing Mol’s five categories of environment-induced sociopolitical transformations with Paterson’s list of fundamental causes of global environmental problems. Mol sees science and technology, market dynamics, the state, the role of social movements, and political-economic ideologies as all being substantially transformed by existing environmental pressures (pp. 61–62). Ironically, Paterson identifies the present organization of knowledge and power, the nature of capitalism, the state system, and persisting patriarchy as fundamental causes of global environmental problems (pp. 42–54). Whereas Paterson laments the fact that the old wasteful paper advertising posters that once covered the walls of the Tokyo subway have been replaced by video screens that perform the same advertising function, Mol would undoubtedly celebrate this as one very small triumph for ecological modernization.

Given the obvious differences in the authors’ perspectives, are there any points of agreement that advance understanding of the impact of globalization on the environment? The most obvious agreement is that global environmental problems are embedded in what I previously have called the dominant social paradigm of industrial societies (Dennis Pirages, *The Sustainable Society*, 1977). To solve these kinds of problems requires a paradigm shift. Mol would argue that this paradigm shift is apparent in the broad-based ecological modernization that is already well under way in the industrialized world, and is very likely spreading to the periphery as a part of globalization processes. Paterson is more activist and still sees the need for resistance to the existing political, intellectual, and economic power structures that perpetuate these problems.

In summary, both books are first-rate intellectual efforts that deepen our understanding of the linkage between a changing global system and the environment. Both build their cases by frequent references to an extensive contemporary environmental politics literature. Both efforts illustrate the need for more empirical studies and data to support these provocative ideas. But even though both authors distance themselves from earlier efforts to understand global environmental problems—Paterson distancing himself from what he calls the first wave of environmental literature and Mol from what he refers to as the second wave of environmental concern—their work does have antecedents on the other side of the Reagan-Thatcher intellectual divide. The need to focus on sustainable development and to study environmental problems in a broader social, political, and economic context was a concern of environmental scholars long before the Brundtland Commission gave the concept political legitimacy in 1987.


— Daniel S. Papp, *University System of Georgia*

Technological optimists have praised the potential of the Internet and other information age technologies to reduce the economic and social gap between rich and poor within and between countries and to democratize political systems around the world. Conversely, technological pessimists have decried the dangers that the same technologies may worsen economic gaps within and between countries and concentrate political power in the hands of a few.

Siding neither with the optimists nor pessimists, Pippa Norris in *Digital Divide* presents an extensively documented, well-reasoned, carefully argued, and well-balanced analysis of the role of the Internet in three aspects of the “digital divide”: the “global divide” in access to and use of the Internet in rich as compared to poor states, the “social divide” that exists within countries regarding access to and use of the Internet, and the “democratic divide” within the wired global community between those who use the Internet for political engagement, participation, and influence and those who do not.

In her discussion of the global divide, the author details different patterns of Internet access and use that exist in rich as compared to poor countries. Not surprisingly, as pointed out elsewhere, Internet access and use is more prevalent in rich states and is likely to remain so in the near-term future. This pattern, the author remarks, is similar to that which exists in other mass media. However, the author also appropriately notes both that rapidly declining prices in information age technologies may in future years increase the level to which the Internet penetrates developing states and that price is not the sole barrier to the diffusion of the Internet and its required supporting technologies.

In her discussion of the social divide, the author explores the more “traditional” (to the extent anything scarcely more than a decade old is traditional) concept of the digital divide, different patterns of Internet access and use within countries that result from racial, gender, class, income, occupational, and other differences. Presenting the normalization and diffusion theories of technological adaptation, she rightly observes that cross-national evidence supporting one or the other theory remains scattered and inconclusive” (p. 71). Nevertheless, she leans to the normalization side of the argument, that is, the view that the current, rather narrow set of Internet users will at least in affluent societies “gradually broaden over time, like the early audiences for radio or television, until eventually it mirrors society as a whole” (p. 70).

Finally, the author examines the democratic divide, that is, the gap between those who use the Internet for political engagement, participation, and influence and those who do not. Her clear interest and emphasis is on this divide, as she devotes separate chapters to theories of digital democracy, e-governance, online parliaments, virtual parties, civic society, cyberculture, and civic engagement. These chapters invariably present extensive data on, offer valuable insights to, and provide a greater understanding of the issue at hand in each chapter. Together, they marshal support for the argument that the Internet has the potential to add to and strengthen the trend toward democratization that swept the world in the 1990s, but that the trend is far from guaranteed.

Advocating the promotion of e-Democracy, the study provides three final observations. First, regarding the global divide in Internet access and use, it points an accusing finger at economic underdevelopment, lamenting that the global divide in Internet access and use will worsen unless the gap in economic development between rich and poor states is redressed. Second, regarding the social divide within states, it observes that during the first decade of the information age, use of the Internet and other information age technologies within individual countries remains for the most part heavily stratified, especially by education, income, and occupation, while granting that government and other initiatives to redress such stratification may alter this pattern in future decades. Third, regarding the democratic divide between those who use the Internet for political engagement, participation, and influence and those who do not, the study rejects “both the utopian vision that everything will change . . . and the equally misplaced skeptical claims that nothing has changed” (p. 237). It postulates instead that digital technologies have potential to modify political behavior and processes by “altering the balance of resources among the political institutions, reducing the costs of gathering information, and communicating messages, with consequences that will mainly serve to benefit minor parties, smaller groups, and
One wishes, however, that the author has produced different results in any particular negotiation strategies and interactions would seek to redirect attention to ideational structures and outcomes, with some relationship between economic, power, or international political economy focus on the national system and on the distribution of power between and among international actors. It would have been fascinating for the author to add a chapter that postulated on how the global, social, and democratic potentials of the Internet could be maximized and the global, social, and democratic divides. For example, within the field of international affairs, there is a growing body of literature that discusses the impact of the Internet on the international system and on the distribution of power between and among international actors. It would have been fascinating had the book included a second additional chapter that postulated on how the global, social, and democratic potentials of the Internet could be maximized and the global, social, and democratic divides of the Internet minimized.

Admittedly, this would move Digital Divide away from analysis and into the world of policy prescription. This, however, would not be bad. Indeed, in our fast-changing digital world, it is becoming more necessary than ever for informed and current academic analyses to provide the underpinning for critical policy decisions. Given the excellent base provided in this book, this reviewer hopes that this may be the direction that the author chooses to go in a future effort.


— Robert Pahre, University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana

Most theoretical perspectives in the field of international political economy focus on the relationship between economic, power, or ideational structures and outcomes, with some attention to agents. In this book, John Odell seeks to redirect attention to process, in particular, negotiation in the economic relations between countries.

Odell’s central theme is that the process of negotiation affects outcomes, in that different negotiation strategies and interactions would have produced different results in any particular case. This claim is surely right. As he recognizes, the challenge is to understand or explain how process affects outcomes. Odell makes a valiant effort in this direction, but he runs up against the problems endemic to this issue, difficulties that help explain why negotiations have received less attention than they warrant in the field.

To understand negotiations, Odell develops a self-consiously eclectic theory, illustrated and/or tested by a series of paired case studies. The specifics of the theory are too rich to be summarized in any detail here, but many of his arguments center on how market conditions, internal politics, and policymaker beliefs affect negotiations.

His theory rests on an assumption of bounded rationality. As in other works sharing this assumption, bounded rationality sometimes serves as an ex post excuse for mistakes: With hindsight, it seems, we could have done better than some of these negotiators, and so their rationality must have been bounded. However, the chapter that makes the most use of this assumption, a case study of Mexican negotiations in the 1970s, avoids this trap. In that chapter, Odell carefully connects policy misjudgments to specific cognitive failures that enjoy wide support in psychology.

The theory gives extensive attention to market conditions. These have played a surprisingly small role in most qualitative research into foreign economic policy, although market conditions are studied abstractly in economics’ endogenous tariff theory. Against this background, Odell’s largely inductive theorizing about market conditions is very helpful. Future research would do well to complement his analysis with a deductive approach to the same topic.

The author usually treats market conditions as exogenous factors influencing negotiations. However, he also argues that market conditions may be endogenous, affected by international negotiations. His examples all come from monetary issues, which is suggestive: Perhaps endogeneity is far less common in nonmonetary negotiations. His theorizing in this section is less satisfying than in other areas, however, as his claims tend to be complex, highly conditional, and dependent upon the model of the economy shared by decision makers.

In his four major theory chapters, Odell generates hypotheses of two forms. One group is falsifiable, hypotheses that make an unambiguous prediction about how one variable is related to another. For example, he argues that “[w]hen two countries are on the same side of a market, their governments are more likely to use integrative tactics in their strategies toward each other than when they are on opposite sides, where we should observe more distributive tactics toward each other” (pp. 49–50, italics deleted). There are a half dozen or so similarly specific hypotheses in the book.

A second group of hypotheses are nonfalsifiable. For example, Odell argues that market conditions help determine the identities of negotiators (p. 48), and that strategic interaction between firms and governments can move the Pareto frontier either outward or inward (pp. 65–66). Such hypotheses really serve a more heuristic purpose, as checklists for research into a particular case.

Odell’s case selection rules are better suited for this second group of hypotheses than for the first. His selection strategy, a two-case method of difference, raises immediate red flags. Each pair of cases is chosen to differ in both the independent and dependent variables; from a classical hypothesis-testing standpoint, this guarantees that no hypothesis can be falsified. Even so, the case studies have some heuristic uses. The cases are nicely chosen to hold extraneous variables constant, and to present real puzzles worth explaining. Each pair also presents a challenge to existing theoretical perspectives, such as realism or liberalism.

Odell rightly argues that case studies have many advantages not found in quantitative research, but the reader must still wonder why the case selection strategy needed to be so intentionally limited. Looking at more than two cases at a time, and allowing richer variation in the independent and dependent variables, would retain the advantages of cases while nonetheless allowing for some classical hypothesis testing. Indeed, much of the methodological discussion in political science today represents efforts to have it both ways, capturing some advantages of both case methods and modest-n hypothesis testing. Given these debates, it is puzzling that the author would limit himself here.

The greatest strength, as well as the biggest challenge of Negotiating the World Economy is Odell’s effort to make predictions about bargaining, a subject that many people think is inherently indeterminate. To the extent that he provides explanations of the different outcomes in each pair of cases, he provides a riposte to those who do not study bargaining because they believe it unanalyzable to deterministic theory. Yet he never really confronts the tension between bargaining strategy as a choice and as an object of explanation. If states can truly choose, can we really explain their choices deterministically?

These questions cannot be answered with finality in any theory. Odell’s theoretical goals are more modest, and they represent a promising direction for research. The book as a whole...
gives us a strong programmatic statement of the need to study negotiations, and represents the start of a research agenda that is likely to be fruitful.


— Herbert K. Tillema, University of Missouri-Columbia

According to some popular notions regarding national political development, advance of personal liberty, and democratic institutions, economic growth and constructive nationalism ought naturally to proceed hand in hand. Alas, it is not always so in practice.

Robert Packenham, writing some years ago in Liberal America and the Third World (1973), chastised both American foreign policy doctrines and social science theory for misplaced liberal faith that “all good things go together” in the process of development. According to Packenham, scholars as well as policymakers overgeneralized the apparently uniform pattern of economic, social, and political development demonstrated within the United States and a few European countries. This criticism may yet apply to mainstream doctrines and theories of political development represented within contemporary Western journals.

Masayo Ohara’s Democratization and Expansionism invites us to examine Japan prior to World War II, as well as other societies that initiated liberal development but which devolved into reckless expansionism inconsistent with liberal premises. “Reckless expansionism,” characteristic of Japan, Italy, and Germany leading to World War II, ultimately self-destructive due in part to international consequences, is here distinguished from more prudent forms of nationalism. The unfortunate cases of Japan, Germany, and Italy are frequently neglected within recent literature on political development.

Description and analysis herein relies primarily upon observation of coalitions among social groups and institutions within a society. This reprises the theoretical framework of social dynamics that is familiar to many students of political sociology but which is frequently neglected within recent political science literature. Secondary attention is given to international conditions, particularly to conditions that may affect formation and survival of domestic social coalitions.

Liberal interpretations of modern political development according to the social dynamics perspective often assume that industrialization creates economic elites that may work together in order to restrain political elites and military interests. Ohara postulates that modernization may establish and empower a multiplicity of distinct social groups, including within the bourgeoisie, working classes, and various political elites. In some instances, specific groups may form political coalitions that defy stereotypical liberal expectations.

The case of Japan receives most attention and occupies most of the book. Central chapters detail Japanese social dynamics and public policy from the 1870s through the 1930s, including the establishment of a modern state under the Meiji (1868–1912); the development of an antimilitary coalition after World War I under the Tasho (1912–26); and the emergence of a pro-military expansionist coalition in the 1930s under the Showa (1926–1989).

Ohara argues that Japan deviated early from the stereotypical liberal model of development. The collapse of the ancien régime dominated by the Tokugawa until the 1860s followed familiar expectations within liberal development theory. However, the subsequent development program initiated by sovereign political elites after the Meiji Restoration did not depend upon the support of the landed gentry. State-supported industrial enterprises were established side by side with indigenous bourgeois enterprises. A powerful clan oligarchy representing traditional familial structures emerged. Sovereign political elites and challenging political elites competed for allegiance among various groups within the landed, the bourgeoisie, and working classes. Unstable social coalitions ensued.

An antimilitary coalition emerged after World War I but did not last long. The anti-military coalition relied upon the combined support of large enterprises, the petit bourgeois and landowners, in accordance with liberal expectations. It was displaced by a pro-military coalition in the 1930s that included collusion among the military, civilian government bureaucrats, and large business interests represented by the Zaibatsu.

Two later chapters include brief comments upon the social dynamics of development within selected other societies. Chapter 5 includes capsule descriptions, each limited to a few paragraphs, of pre–World War II Germany and Italy, which also embarked upon “reckless expansionism,” as well as of the United Kingdom, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union/Russia, which did not. Chapter 6 includes speculative observations upon the Soviet Union and China after World War II. Ohara suggests that contemporary societies of Soviet Union/Russia and China demonstrate some internal characteristics reminiscent of Germany, Italy, and Japan in the early twentieth century.

Democratization and Expansionism will appeal to most readers primarily for the interesting story that it tells about pre–World War II Japanese political development. This is not an original account based upon primary documentary sources. Nor does it constitute a rigorous test of a fully specified theory. Nevertheless, thoughtful review of Japan’s experience is timely in light of current scholarly and policy attention to democratization and political development. This review provides a useful reminder that the process of political development is not necessarily uniform or linear in accordance with popular liberal orthodoxy. In addition, Ohara’s exercise inspecting social coalitions may stimulate other social scientists in the future to employ related concepts within systematic comparisons of developing societies, past and present.


— Christian Reus-Smit, The Australian National University

The past decade has seen a wave of new literature on sovereignty. Most of this work has been done by constructivists, who have treated sovereignty as a variable, practically constituted institution of international society, the meaning and implications of which have changed from one historical context to another. In 1999, Stephen Krasner published Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, challenging the underlying assumptions of much of this constructivist scholarship. He agreed that the practice of sovereignty was constantly changing, and that there had never been a golden age of the Westphalian state. He argued, though, that it was the quest for power, rather than actors’ identities or ideas, that conditioned political elites’ attitudes toward sovereignty, and that in the international arena, such elites were concerned more with “logics of consequences” than “logics of appropriateness”: “Outcomes in the international system are determined by rules whose violation of, or adherence to, international principles or rules is based on calculations of material and ideational interests, not taken-for-granted practices derived from some overarching institutional structures or deeply embedded generative grammars” (Krasner, p. 9).

Daniel Philpott’s Revolutions in Sovereignty is a powerful counterpoint to Krasner’s realism. He sets out to explain changes in the constitutional
structure of international society: “Behind wars and commerce and investment and immigration, prior to alliances, leagues, concerts, and balances of power, beneath agreements governing trade, armaments, and the environment, is the constitution of international society” (p. 11). This foundational normative complex defines the “three faces of authority.” It specifies which are the legitimate polities, what are the rules for becoming one of these polities, and what are the rightful prerogatives of such polities. “All constitutions contain all three faces; every constitution’s depiction of them is its unique signature” (p. 15). In the modern era, the constitutional structure of international society has been defined by the principle of sovereignty, as the sovereign state now constitutes the only legitimate type of polity. A change in the constitutional structure of modern international society thus involves the rise or demise of the sovereign state as the paramount political form, changes in the rules governing the polities that can become sovereign states, or shifts in ideas about what sovereign states can legitimately do.

Where other scholars have sought to show the impact of constitutional structures on international political action (for example, Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State, 1999), Philpott focuses on the origins and development of these structures, and in the process he confronts head on the realist shibboleths of “interest” and “power.” Instead of treating these concepts as unproblematic variables—as universal motive forces driving political action across time, space, and social context—he argues that they must be given historical content if we are to understand great structural transformations: “That polities have interests, of course, says nothing about why they have interests. Their interests may be shaped by ideal or material forces, acting from within the polity, or in its international environment. Identifying these forces is . . . the charge of any explanation of revolutions in sovereignty” (p. 48). Taking up this charge, Philpott argues that it was ultimately revolutions in ideas that drove these revolutions in political authority. Ideas performed two key roles. First, they shaped actors’ identities—“mass identities across several societies—through the reasoned reflection of their holders” (p. 49). Second, they became forms of social power. Converts organized themselves politically “to translate their commitments into costs and benefits for the head of the polity, the one who sets the polity’s interest and pursues the policies that the ideas demand” (p. 49).

Philpott uses this theoretical framework to explain two “movements” in modern international history: the first comprising revolutions that have consolidated the society of sovereign states, the second involving those that have compromised it. Most of the book is concerned with the consolidating revolutions of the Peace of Westphalia and twentieth-century colonial independence. Defending the claim that Westphalia is rightly considered the origin of modern international society, he argues that the Treaties of Osnabrück and Münster “established the state as the legitimate European polity—the first face of authority” (p. 30). In contrast, the revolution in sovereignty that accompanied colonial independence concerned the second face of sovereignty—the rules governing the polities that could become recognized sovereign states. Through these two revolutions, the sovereign order has been globalized. But the story is not one of unaltering consolidation. The sovereign order has been simultaneously compromised by three counterrevolutions—the rise of minority treaties in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, European integration, and the recent development of internationally sanctioned interventions.

Revolutions in Sovereignty is a significant work of constructivist historical sociology. It is a compelling reminder that unless we wish to diminish human agency, interest and power must be treated as contingent categories to be explained, not assumed. And it is a convincing rebuttal to the all-too-pervasive view that logics of appropriateness have little if any impact on international relations.

Philpott’s understandings of the constitutional structure of international society and revolutions in sovereignty are not unproblematic, though. Obscured by his framework is arguably the most important revolution in sovereignty after Westphalia—the revolution that saw liberal sovereignty supplant absolutist sovereignty. Since the Age of Revolutions (1776–1848), the increasingly dominant conception of legitimate statehood in international society has been that of the liberalconstitutionalist polity, a polity that constrains executive authority with the rule of law, that expresses and defends the interests of its citizenry, and that respects the collectively sanctioned rule of law internationally. This ideal is deeply contradictory, as it employs universal ethical values to justify territorial particularism. Nevertheless, most of the revolutions and counterrevolutions in sovereignty identified by Philpott can be seen as part of the gradual, contradictory unfolding of this liberal-constitutionalist ideal. Minority treaties, aspects of European integration, and recent international interventions all fit, and so does decolonization. First-wave postcolonial states consciously used emergent human rights norms to construct the right to self-determination that licensed the wholesale dismantling of European empires. What he sees as a “double movement” can thus be seen, alternatively, as a single, complex, and contradictory one.


— James C. Murdoch, University of Texas at Dallas

This book deals primarily with the relationship between infectious disease and international development and national security. Andrew Price-Smith presents a convincing case that since the early 1970s, we have been increasingly faced with emerging and reemerging infectious diseases (ERIDs) that spring from previously declining or even nonexistent pathogens, such as tubercle bacillus, malaria-causing parasites, HIV, Ebola virus, hepatitis A-C, and, more recently, a host of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. Moreover, with global climate change, the rate of (re-)emergence for some diseases seems likely to accelerate. The main argument is that these diseases adversely affect development on a scale that rivals or exceeds the magnitude of the effects for the factors that are so often studied in political economy, for example, interstate war, civil war, migration, foreign aid, natural disaster, revolution, income distribution, and diversity of cultures. Prima facie, the argument certainly applies to HIV-ravaged sub-Sahara Africa. The book is written as a wake-up call to the professional political economists, politicians, policymakers, and, indeed, global citizens to begin to pay more attention to the causes and consequences of the human health-development relationship.

While one might argue that more attention has been paid to health in the development literature than Price-Smith implies, his work is certainly one of the few that attempts a systematic, even social scientific, approach to the problem. The monograph begins with a theoretical model of the relationship between ERIDs and development. The dependent variable is SC or “state capacity”: the capability of the state to respond to outbreaks of infectious disease and confounded by other important determinants of SC. The model is very qualitative. There is no attempt to parameterize it or to address estimation issues. However, it
succeeds at formally highlighting the author's foremost hypothesis—ERIDs cause SC.

While the model of Chapter 1 depicts a complex relationship between ERIDs and SC, Price-Smith concentrates on the bivariate relationship in the remaining chapters. To some extent, this approach works to focus the reader on the primary relationship, although the potential for left-out variable bias (both quantitatively and qualitatively) may distract some readers from fully engaging the analysis. Data on empirical indicators of SC (GNP per capita, government expenditure per capita, secondary school enrollment ratio, net long-term capital inflow, and military spending per soldier per capita) and ERIDs (infant mortality rate and life expectancy) are assembled for a random sample of 20 countries for the years (approximately) 1950 to 1991. He carefully develops a case for using infant mortality and life expectancy as indicators for infectious diseases. In fact, there are cases where infectious disease may account for a substantial percentage of the variation in these variables. Still, the reader should recognize that the potential for measurement error to cloud any inferences seems very high.

A series of Pearson's correlations are presented for all of the bivariate combinations of the indicators. Generally, infant mortality correlates negatively with any of the indicators of SC, while life expectancy correlates positively. It is interesting to note that by looking at lags in the variables, it appears that while some simultaneity exists between SC and the ERID indicators, the ERID indicators precede the indicators for state capacity, hinting at a causal relationship. Thus, there appears to be empirical evidence in favor of the main hypothesis. Price-Smith incorrectly attributes more power to the empirical results than is justified, however. This weakens the entire argument as the empirical results seem to take on greater and greater importance as the book progresses. The problem is that since the correlations are computed with trended data and with trends in both series, the observed correlation can be spurious. To gauge how serious this problem could be, I analyzed data on infant mortality and real GDP per capita from Italy, one of the sample countries. I could not reject the hypotheses of unit roots in each series, nor was there any evidence that the raw series or the detrended series cointegrated, suggesting that the Pearson statistics could be seriously misleading. My analysis does not necessarily mean that there is no statistical evidence that ERIDs and state capacity are related, but it does suggest that some caution be used in making inferences from the findings as presented in the text.

The issue of causation remains difficult regardless of the empirical results. Price-Smith addresses causation using a “process-tracing” approach. Essentially, Chapters 3–5 consider specific cases of disease outbreaks and how they may influence state capacity. The synthesis of factual information from the specific cases with speculation on the scope of the potential for disaster provides a fascinating and scary picture of the interactions among ERIDs, climate change, national security, and economic development. It is clearly the strength of the book and easily accessible to a general audience. Noticeably lacking from the discussion is an appreciation for the policy options to address ERIDs. In particular, and given the structure of the model outlined in Chapter 1, the reader might be looking for some sense of the policy trade-offs. For example, are we at the point where education (or physical investment) dollars should be redirected to prevention? Or, given that disease monitoring takes on the nature of a global public good, what options appear available for funding surveillance?

Despite the empirical shortcomings, The Health of Nations manages to offer a powerful commentary on the potential of ERIDs to influence the course of humankind. For the academic community, it provides a point of departure for additional, perhaps more empirically sophisticated, research and policy analysis. Certainly, the book is worthwhile reading for anyone interested in the social scientific study of the role of human health on international development.

**Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy.**

By Kenneth A. Schultz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 301p. $65.00 cloth, $23.00 paper.

— Karen A. Feste, University of Denver

A striking feature of post–Cold War politics is the extensive popularity of democracy: a consensus of its legitimacy has emerged throughout the world. This trend is evident in contemporary international politics scholarship, too: Researching the democratic peace hypothesis is popular sport, and strong evidence is mounting that although democracies in general may not be less conflict prone than nondemocracies, they rarely go to war with one another. Still, democratic security communities may take time to mature. The effect of widespread democracy is unlikely to be evident immediately because democratization processes are often accompanied by violence. What makes a democracy distinctive in international decision making? One argument is that its institutional arrangements limit the autonomy and discretion of leaders to launch war, and because democracies are open societies, major problems in international communication, for example, misrepresentation of policy positions and the difficulty in establishing credibility, should be alleviated. What exactly is the role of structural constraints on a government’s ability and determination to make threats in crisis?

Kenneth Schultz examines how the open political process within democracies influences whether or not crises are resolved short of war by using game theory to develop a creative theoretical argument (the role of information and signaling and oppositional parties in international crises, and their combined effects on credible threats) and applies it by using both aggregate data and case studies. Mathematical proofs, data, and methodology rules are provided in appendices. A main point in his study is that democratic governments are less likely than nondemocratic ones to initiate crises by threatening to settle disputes by force. Further, the threats democracies make tend to be quite effective: “Open deliberation and debate, essential for representation and accountability domestically, have profound effects on whether and when democratic governments can effectively use threats of force to prevail in international crises” (p. 1). Democracy lowers the probability that a state will initiate a crisis and the prospect of domestic opposition makes a democratic government unwilling to make threats that it is unlikely to carry out. Foreign decision makers interpret dissent by opposition parties as an indicator that the government has low expected value for war, but when domestic opposition parties support a threat to use force, foreign decision makers interpret this support as an indicator that the government is willing and able to carry through on the threat. Militarized actions taken by democratic states are less likely to be reciprocated in kind than are militarized actions taken by nondemocratic states, and extended deterrence threats made by democratic governments and supported by major opposition parties are more likely to be successful than are threats made by nondemocratic governments. Democratic governments are less likely than nondemocratic governments to initiate crises by threatening to settle disputes by force.

What impact does public competition have on behavior and outcomes in international crises? Schultz notes that when opposition parties would have incentives to oppose the use of force, governments have incentives to refrain from making threats, anticipating both the domestic and international response. Uncertainty generated by the opposition party’s dissent thus means that more types of
target are willing to resist than are willing to do so when the opposition supports the government. The probability that the target will resist when the opposition opposes the threat is consequently greater than the probability that it will resist when the opposition supports the threat. In equilibrium, a democratic government lowers the rate at which it bluffsin order to preserve the credibility of opposed threats. As a result, supported threats are more credible than threats made by a nondemocratic government, and opposed threats are no less credible.

In the empirical section, Schultz tests six hypotheses with the Militarized Interstate Dispute data containing information on 2,024 crises in the period 1816–1992. Three hypotheses are largely confirmed: Democratic institutions decrease the probability that a state will initiate a challenge; targets of threats by democratic states are less likely to resist than are the targets of threats by nondemocratic states; and democratic institutions lower the probability that a state will initiate a crisis that escalates to war. Two hypotheses are partially confirmed: Democratic institutions increase the probability that a state will be the target of a challenge, and democratic institutions lower the probability that a state becomes the target of a crisis that escalates to war. One hypothesis is not supported: Democratic targets are less likely to resist threats than are nondemocratic targets. In further exploration, Schultz examines situations of extended immediate deterrence. In 31 of 56 cases, democratic states made retaliatory threats, although only five contained domestic opposition. Two hypotheses were tested: Democratic defenders are more likely to succeed if their deterrent threat is supported by the opposition than if it is opposed (not supported); and democratic defenders whose threats are supported are more likely to succeed than are nondemocratic defenders (partial confirmation).

As a last step, Schultz examines and concludes support for two more hypotheses within a case study format: Expected dissent from the opposition party reduces the likelihood that the government will bluff; and when a democratic government makes a threat, foreign decision makers will interpret domestic opposition as an indication that the government has political incentives to avoid using force. He selects four instances where Britain’s main opposition party decided to oppose threats to use force: The Boer War, 1899, and the Suez Crisis, 1956, when the government decided to use military force; and the disputes over Germany’s remilitarization of the Rhineland, 1936, and Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence, 1965, where no explicit threats were issued because the government sensed an opposition to such a policy. Not surprisingly, Schultz sees a trade-off associated with public competition and transparency: openness and privacy each have their place in international politics. In the end, he believes transparency is beneficial since the evidence indicates democracies are more likely to get their way without having to fight, and less likely to end up in unwanted wars—fighting that begins when the target of a threat resists because it perceives there is some chance the threat is not genuine.

To sum up: Schultz has forged a creative argument linking elements of crisis—threat creation, credibility, resolve, and the use of force—to democratic decision making. The varied levels of data examination are useful: aggregate analysis over broad sweeps of time, and detailed case studies though a reader might yearn for a contemporary application to at least one post–Cold War crisis, for example, the Gulf War or Kosovo intervention. As a methodological caveat, Schultz’s study, like most of the work on democracy and international conflict, is affected by the usual limits of a nonexperimental design. Short of manipulation of the independent variable (even under a quasi structure), we cannot fully understand the extent or precision of impact produced by a democratic society that leads to decisions of international consequence. We are stuck with existing variance patterns, which in the end may be limiting. Overall, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy is particularly insightful on the theoretical side—in argument outline and hypothesis generation—and makes a significant contribution to understanding the democratic peace hypothesis. Continual empirical examination of his hypotheses in different settings will be a useful way to further validate his research.


— David B. Carment, Carleton University

This is a well-researched, carefully documented, and balanced book consisting of seven chapters, including an introduction and conclusion. It begins with a succinct overview of theories on the relationship between ethnic diversity and democracy. The central criticism of existing theories is their failure to take into account the role of international forces that influence and shape institutional design. According to Anita Inder Singh, an appreciation of international factors is necessary in order to explain the process and sequencing of ethnic mobilization. To the extent that comparative analysis has implications for policy choice and diagnosis leads to prescription, this book holds important lessons for modern states facing ethnically driven struggles.

**Democracy, Ethnic Diversity, and Security in Post-Communist Europe** makes an important contribution by challenging conventional statist and ethno-nationalist interpretations. In essence, there are four kinds of problems the postcommunist states face in managing their ethnic problems: failure of political leadership to anticipate and resolve disputes before they turn violent; an absence of skills, mechanisms, and institutions for resolving disputes peacefully; the exploitation of existing religious, social, and other group differences for short-term political gain by local or national leaders; and the deliberate exclusion or marginalization of particular communities. Each of these claims is advanced in case study chapters evaluating conflict management success and failure in, respectively, the Soviet Union and South Asia; the former Yugoslavia; and the international response to ethnically driven wars and the fate of the Magyars in Hungary and Russia. These case studies pick up on two relevant discontinuities in the literature. First there is a discontinuity of discourse between adherents of domestic explanations of managing ethnic diversity and proponents of international strategies. Second, there are discontinuities between levels in postcommunist state polities, between the goals set in the inner circles of policymaking in the central governments, on the one hand, and the realities of regional and local structures of power and decision making in the provincial capitals and in the districts, on the other hand. Sources of instability are continuing social unrest and socioeconomic instability. The inherent problem, as the author shows, is that efforts to retain stability and address sources of instability will likely exacerbate the situation. The postcommunist state does not merely respond to crises, produced by uneven economic development and social change, but is itself the leading force providing differential advantages to regions, ethnic groups, and classes.

As the author shows, structural solutions have been of some utility in managing ethnic conflict. In theory, federalist approaches regulate conflict by scattering power territorially. Decentralization and group autonomy approaches assign to different groups the right to decide on domestic issues of concern to them. Consociational approaches create policy incentives for intraelite cooperation, and are designed to encourage policies that align economic interests and reduce disparities between groups according to interelite agreement. The institutional purpose is to influence the distribution of the capabilities of leaders (and the power...
between groups) and to influence the preferences of elite decision making so as to reduce their power and render them less capable of taking unilateral action. The book implicitly challenges the assumption that decentralized institutional designs can inhibit secessionist tendencies, treating it as a double-edged sword that can simultaneously weaken the state-center and provide the impetus for dissolution.

The author concludes that ethnic struggles will continue to persist and are perhaps unavoidable in some cases. In the context of incontrovertible demands, how, asks the author, can states be encouraged to find alternative political arrangements that lie somewhere between dissolution and secession? What role should the international community play? In brief, nearly all ethnic conflicts with origins inside a state have an important international dimension. In turn, the actions of states external to a conflict greatly influence the dynamics and resolution of a conflict. Depending on the motivations of the external actors, external involvement can cause an ethnic conflict to spread through encouragement and diffusion, or it can prevent it from spreading by concerted intervention. The author argues that the international community should make conflict prevention a top priority. Preventive action requires a two-track strategy to deal with mass-level factors (or the "permissive environment") as well as the proximate (elite-triggered) causes. In choosing when to intervene, the international community should support those who are making efforts at democratization. The author indicates how this might be done through her examination of the role of international institutions to protect and enhance ethnic minority rights. Here the evidence is mixed. Although the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe has made significant strides in developing a response to ethnic minority issues for countries under its purview (by establishing a commissioner on national minorities, for example, and through its early-warning and fact-finding roles), some parts of postcommunist Europe such as South East Europe clearly lag behind. This is because, as the author argues, many of these states are lacking in common security perceptions that can give resonance to international law.


— T. David Mason, University of North Texas

Jack Snyder’s book charts a thoughtful and provocative middle ground between the “end of history” and “clash of civilizations” theses on the future of the post–Cold War international order. It begins with a paradox. On the one hand, the end of the Cold War has accelerated the diffusion of democracy worldwide, which should portend a more peaceful international environment if the democratic peace holds. On the other hand, third-wave transitions to democracy have been accompanied by a resurgence of nationalist conflict that threatens to divert democratic experiments into a “lengthy antidemocratic detour” (p. 20). When elites who were privileged under the old order perceive their status to be threatened by democratization, they may resort to nationalist rhetoric as a means for building the base of popular support necessary to survive as elites under democracy. For Snyder, there is nothing inevitable or intractable about this resurgence of nationalist conflict. His purpose is to explain why and under what conditions nationalist appeals might succeed, what form nationalism might take when it does arise, and in what circumstances it will lead to conflict that sidetracks democratic transitions.

Snyder develops a conceptual framework to define four distinct types of nationalism: ethnic, civic, revolutionary, and counterrevolutionary. The four are distinguished from one another on the basis of “the nature of their appeals to the collective good and their criteria for including members in the group” (p. 69). Those who are excluded from the group become the target of nationalist resentment and the scapegoat for the crises that inevitably arise during democratic transitions. The framework itself is based on two dichotomized variables: 1) “the adaptability of the skills and assets of powerful government or economic elites to a situation of increasing democracy, and 2) the strength of democratic institutions at the moment when political participation begins to expand” (pp. 71–72).

Detailed case studies are used to illustrate the dynamics that produce each form of nationalism and the impact that each can have on democratization. Thus, counterrevolutionary nationalism emerged in Germany between the wars as the product of strong administrative institutions and elite interests that were not adaptable to the new democratic circumstances. Counterrevolutionary nationalism appeals to the masses to defend the nation’s traditional institutions against social classes, religions, cultural groups, or political groups that are depicted as threatening to those traditions and, therefore, constitute enemies of the nation. The result is an aggressive nationalism that, in the case of Germany, sidetracked the Weimar experiment and plunged Europe into war.

Revolutionary nationalism emerged in France after 1789 as the product of weak institutions combined with adaptable elite interests. Revolutionary nationalism appeals to the masses to defend a revolutionary ideal that has supplanted an exploitative old order but remains threatened by enemies within and outside the nation. French revolutionary nationalism provided the ideological force behind the Napoleonic wars and French colonial expansion.

Ethnic nationalism of the sort witnessed in Serbia between the wars (and in numerous Third World as well as several successor states of the former Soviet Union) is the product of weak institutions and unadaptable elite interests. In this “institutional desert,” the only remaining basis for elite appeals for popular loyalty is shared culture, language, and religion. Ethnic nationalists use these sources of identity to blame nonmembers of the favored ethnic group for the crises that arise during the transition to democracy.

Finally, civic nationalism of the sort found in Great Britain and the United States is the product of strong institutions and adaptable elite interests. Civic nationalism is based on a shared commitment to a set of political ideals and institutions, not on the ascriptive criteria of ethnicity. For Snyder, civic nationalism is the form least hostile to a smooth transition to democracy.

A noteworthy contribution of this book is Snyder’s analysis of how variations in the organization and development of a nation’s mass media affect the ability of antidemocratic elites to persuade citizens to their nationalist vision and mobilize them behind a movement that subverts the democratic project. At the same time, his analysis raises some questions that seem worthy of deeper scrutiny. First, while the meaning and empirical referents of the “strength of administrative institutions” variable may be evident, what “the adaptability of elite interests” involves is less clear. How would one identify a nation as having elites with adaptable versus unadaptable interest before the transition revealed elite interest in the form of the nationalist appeal they employ? Are there developmental parameters that make elite interests more or less adaptable to democratic circumstances? Snyder’s discussion of Britain as an example of adaptable interests suggests that adaptability is a function of the source of elites’ wealth and income. Where trade and industry have supplanted agriculture as the dominant source of wealth and income, elites find themselves in a positive sum game whereby they can grant concessions (political and economic) without their own interests necessarily being threatened by democracy. By contrast, where a trading economy and an
industrial base are absent, land and its outputs become the focus of zero-sum political struggles between elites and masses, and democratization may threaten elite interests to the point that they resort to antidemocratic nationalism as a means of diverting the democratic threat.

A more critical question concerns variations in the form of conflict that emerges from nationalist movements. The pre–World War II case studies (Germany, Serbia, Britain, and France) all resulted in international aggression, no matter what the form of nationalism. By contrast, the conflicts emerging from “third wave” democracies are far more likely to be civil wars of the revolutionary or secessionist variety. Empirically, this shift from interstate to civil war is so dramatic that it warrants more attention. While a similar dynamic may be at work in both eras to divert the democratic project toward some authoritarian recidivism, the question of whether nationalist mobilization will lead to civil war or interstate war should be addressed more explicitly in the framework.

These issues do not diminish the value of From Voting to Violence as an innovative, intellectually stimulating, analytically rigorous, and eminently readable exploration of the relationship between democratic transitions and nationalist conflict.


— Richard Ned Lebow, Dartmouth College

The security dilemma has been a central concept in international relations since John Herz published his seminal article in 1950. In recent decades, neorealists have argued that the security dilemma not only dictates key foreign policy decisions but also encourages homogeneity among units. Liberals have made a different set of arguments about international forces but also maintain that they encourage sovereign states to become more alike in their structure. In a well-written and tightly argued book, Georg Sørensen evaluates these claims and asserts that the dynamics of uneven development produce just the opposite effect: heterogeneity among states. He finds evidence for both “outside-in” and “inside-out” perspectives on international politics, and devises a framework that accounts for this variation.

The opening chapters of the book provide a good review and intelligent discussion of the relevant theoretical literature and competing claims of neorealists, liberals, and constructivists concerning the respective logics of hetero- and homogeneity. This is followed by a case study of the Soviet Union and Russia, which effectively establishes the author’s claim that states are not “like units” but develop in different ways in response to their traditions and different combinations of internal and external constraints and opportunities. Sørensen does not deny the powerful impact of international influences but insists that their impact is far from uniform.

The Russian case leads to a typology of states. Sørensen contends that international economic forces since 1945 have created three kinds of states: modern, postmodern, and postcolonial. International forces are refracted differently in each type of state. The modern state is characterized by central rule, an established legal order, and a governmental monopoly on the legitimate use of force. It comes the closest to realizing the ideal of the nation-state, a political unit in which nationality and the state are largely coterminous. The modern state is sustained by a national economy in which most, if not all, of the sectors necessary to sustain the economy are located on national territory. Sometime in the late nineteenth century, many of the countries of Western Europe and the United States could be classified as modern states.

The postcolonial state has weak administrative and institutional structures, and rule is based more on coercion than law. This reflects the inability of governments to establish a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. In large part, this is due to the absence of a national community. The population is fragmented along ethnic or communal cleavages, and the state has a low level of legitimacy. Such states also lack coherent economies but are dependent on and largely subordinate to world markets. Many states conform more or less to this pattern, the quintessential examples being the states of sub-Saharan Africa.

The postmodern state is the product of economic and political developments that have created a dense network of cross-national, transnational, and multilateral ties that make state borders increasingly permeable and states increasingly dependent on one another for their economic and political well-being. Governance and its institutions are to some degree supranational, encouraging collective identities beyond the nation-state. The members of the European Community are moving toward postmodern status.

Sørensen reminds us that the classic security dilemma was predicated on a world of modern states, characterized by hierarchy on the inside and anarchy on the outside. But for many states, the world is more complex because they face serious internal threats. Their leaders have to negotiate external and internal security dilemmas, which have the potential of being reinforcing. Sørensen, inevitably in my judgment, uses the Soviet Union under Stalin as his example. That the Soviet Union had external enemies is undeniable, but the internal threat to which Stalin responded with crippling purges was largely imaginary. The broader point is, however, valid, and there are numerous states whose leaders reasonably feel at least as threatened from within as without.

Internal security dilemmas are, of course, most acute in postcolonial states, where regimes are unable to establish legitimacy beyond their ethnic or communal base and may not be able to establish authority over their entire territory. In many cases, they not only fail to provide security and economic benefits for their populations but they also exacerbate violence and poverty. Pace Robert Jackson, *Quasi States* (1993), Sørensen notes the irony that the norms of statehood have protected the most predatory kinds of leaders and regimes by keeping them from paying the ultimate price: termination of their state. This began to change in the 1980s, but greater involvement on the part of Western states and the financial institutions they support has created a different set of problems. Internal stability and economic development remain distant goals, and intrastate violence has increased. Sørensen rejects the Darwinian solution proposed by some neorealists as only likely to make the situation worse. Judging from a relatively small number of successful cases, he concludes that outside pressures aimed at state building and democratization remain the best strategy.

Postmodern states face a different set of problems. As Susan Strange (“The Westfall System,” *Review of International Studies* 25 [no. 6, 1999]: 345–54) has argued, national governments are increasingly incapable of addressing the range of political and economic problems they face, and this calls for far-reaching changes of existing forms of governance. But judging from the evolution of the European Community, these institutions have not emerged at a pace, or in a form, that responds adequately to the challenges of globalization. Nor have they adequately addressed the changing nature of collective identities, increasingly tied to levels above and below the nation. All of these developments problematize the very concept of security but suggest that it is best served by some form of multilevel governance. To the extent that such structures emerge, they might spell the end of the state as the principal unit of the international system.

Sørensen addresses a number of controversial issues, and not every reader will come down on the same side that he does. My principal grievance is his unquestioning acceptance of the
relevance of the security dilemma to modern liberal states (p. 191). As the security dilemma is so central to his analysis, traditional claims about it deserve a fuller and more critical treatment. On the conceptual level, the book ends without addressing the most important question it implicitly raises: the nature of the interactions among modern, postcolonial and postmodern states and the possible consequences for each. As recent events make clear, these interactions are vital for all three kinds of states, and one hopes that Sørensen will tackle it in his next publication.

These observations in no way diminish the overall value of Changes in Statehood. It is a provocative study, full of big ideas, mobilized to address big questions. Sørensen's principal contribution is a conceptual framework that provides a useful architecture for working through the complex relationships between state structure and international forces. By identifying different ideal types of states, he provides the kind of helpful comparative perspective that is often lacking in otherwise insightful analyses of regions like Europe or sub-Saharan Africa.


— Eric Helleiner, Trent University

This well-written and clearly argued book has an ambitious theoretical objective. It challenges liberal interpretations of international cooperation and posits an alternative “realist-constructivist” approach. Its criticism of liberal cooperation theory has both a deductive dimension and an empirical one.

The former is developed in impressive detail. Jennifer Sterling-Folker dissects liberal theories of international cooperation to highlight how they rely on the changing perceptions of national decision makers. She shows how interdependence leads to cooperation in the liberal view only because policymakers are assumed to learn to value international cooperation over unilateralism as a way of maximizing their country’s economic interests. In her view, this assumption is not convincing. She draws on “neoclassical realist” thinking to argue that policymakers remained committed to the preservation of national autonomy because of the enduring influence of domestic institutions and social practices that comprise the nation-state. In an innovative analysis, she strengthens this perspective by drawing on constructivist insights to demonstrate how the nation-state shapes the identities and mentalities of policymakers to reinforce this commitment. The defense of national autonomy emerges, in her words, as “social practice.”

The author then sets out to demonstrate the superiority of this realist-constructivist approach through an examination of U.S.-international monetary policymaking between the early 1970s and the early 1990s. Despite growing economic interdependence, she shows how U.S. support for international cooperation in this area was sporadic and was used only “to avoid making the types of structural adjustments anticipated by the cooperation literature” (p. 3). International cooperation, in other words, became a tool to preserve U.S. policymaking autonomy in this sphere by deflecting the burden of macroeconomic adjustments onto foreign countries. The enduring American “preference for unilateral decisionmaking” (p. 5) in conditions of interdependence is seen to be consistent with her realist-constructivist productions.

Sterling-Folker’s interpretation of the U.S. international monetary policymaking in this period is persuasive, but she occasionally overstates its novelty. To support the claim that she is shedding “new light” (p. 32) on U.S. policymaking in this area, she needed to highlight how her interpretation went beyond that of previous writers, such as Susan Strange, Randy Henning, David Calleo, and Michael Webb. Each of these authors has offered similar analyses that emphasize the unilateralist tendency in U.S. international monetary policymaking throughout this period. Although the work of some of these authors (e.g., Henning) is cited in the book, others are neglected (the works of Calleo and Webb, for example, are not cited in the bibliography, and Strange’s writings on this particular theme do not received much attention).

I was also not fully convinced that this empirical case proves the weakness of liberal cooperation theory. As Strange long argued, the United States retained a uniquely dominant position in the global monetary system throughout this period, despite all the claims of its imminent hegemonic decline. This position meant that growing financial interdependence rarely constrained its monetary policymaking autonomy. In fact, the globalization of finance even enhanced U.S. policy autonomy in important ways, a point that encouraged American policymakers to support the process at key moments. The kind of systemic environment that liberal theory predicts will encourage a change in policymaking behavior, then, did not appear in a significant way for the United States throughout this period. As a result, if U.S. policymakers remained committed to policy autonomy in this context, this pattern of behavior could still be consistent with liberal cooperation theory. Put differently, one could argue that it is “hegemony,” rather than “anarchy,” that has generated this pattern of U.S. behavior in conditions of interdependence.

If the author devotes little time to the task of addressing this potential counterargument (see a brief comment on pp. 106–7), it is because few liberals have made this case. Sterling-Folker correctly notes that leading liberal theorists have, in fact, usually cited the monetary sector as one of the leading cases where they anticipated a change in American policymaking. These theorists have argued that international monetary developments after the early 1970s are best seen as a product of declining American power in conditions of rapidly intensifying financial interdependence. This interpretation left them vulnerable to the kind of realist critique that the book offers. It is ironic that her critique would have been much harder to make if liberals had embraced the more convincing view of Strange and others that monetary developments in this era were more often a product of American unilateralist policy choices in the context of enduring U.S. monetary hegemony.

For this reason, the U.S. case may not be the best empirical example to use in critiquing liberal cooperation theory. Another reason may be a point briefly acknowledged by the author on page 229: that the distinct culture and domestic institutional design of the United States make “autonomy as social practice” particularly prevalent among American policymakers. (Indeed, the author wisely cautions against dismissing liberal interpretations of international monetary developments after the early 1970s correctly notes that leading liberal theorists should not be dismissed on the basis of a single issue area case study from one nation-state”; p. 34). But this does not take away from the interesting theoretical insights of the book. The discussion of liberal cooperation theory is among the most readable and interesting that I have encountered. And the initiative to mix neoclassical realism with constructivist theory is also innovative and promising. In sum, although this book’s analysis of U.S. international monetary policymaking is less novel than it suggests, its theoretical analysis and insights—which make up the bulk of the book—are impressive and deserving of a wide audience.


— Scott Taylor, Georgetown University

This book seeks “to understand Pretoria’s post-apartheid foreign policy through its engagement
with a variety of multilateral organisations” (p. 8). In fact, the notion of foreign policy in this quotation and the subtitle is narrower than it might seem. Whereas post-apartheid foreign policy in South Africa has dealt with issues as diverse as a fight over AIDS drugs and the botched military intervention in Lesotho in 1997, Ian Taylor’s book deals narrowly with the adoption of neoliberal ideology by the African National Congress (ANC), and how that now solidly neoliberal orientation influences the government’s interactions with the international community, and to a lesser extent, with South Africa’s domestic constituents. This is a full menu of issues, regardless, and Taylor deals with them in a thorough, succinct, and highly readable manner.

“Stuck in Middle GEAR” is, of course, a play on words. GEAR, South Africa’s Growth, Employment and Redistribution program, the economic policy promulgated in 1996 and drawn up with substantial input from the business community, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. The notion of being “stuck” in the “middle” is also a double entendre, and refers to South Africa’s status as a middle power, as well as to its compromised position between a domestic constituency that expected social democracy and an international community that preaches neoliberal doctrine.

Taylor is concerned with how the ANC has attempted to position itself, as a middle power, vis-à-vis a number of multilateral institutions, namely, the World Trade Organization, the Cairns Group of agricultural exporters, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the Commonwealth. In keeping with the essentially foreign economic policy focus of the book, the author’s discussion of the South African role within each of these institutions dwells almost exclusively on issues related to trade policy, rather than on more explicitly political issues.

At the core of Taylor’s analysis is the notion, adapted from the work of Robert Cox, of South Africa’s “middlepowermanship.” While acknowledging that middlepowermanship is a “vague conceptual category” and “highly debatable” within international relations, Taylor endorses the view that the middle power position affords states a degree of autonomy, without the burden of structural leadership (p. 19). From its middle power position, South Africa can engage in what Taylor labels “tactical multilateralism” (p. 8). As such, it would be simplistic, he writes, to label South Africa a “lackey of the West” (p. 86). Indeed, in his chapter on the WTO, for example, Taylor notes that South Africa has attacked what it sees as the selective application of WTO regulations by Western countries. Similarly, within the Cairns Group, South Africa attempts to push developed countries to practice actual neoliberalism in their agricultural policies by dismantling subsidies and a protectionist agricultural regime. At the same time, middlepowermanship allows South Africa to straddle the developing world. However, Taylor points out that because the ANC has become such a strong believer in neoliberal orthodoxy, South Africa’s participation in such “counter-hegemonic” organizations as UNCTAD and the NAM has helped to deradicalize their agendas.

Yet Taylor’s argument about the benefits of middlepowermanship for South Africa seem unconvincing. Although “tactical multilateralism” allows middle powers to criticize the developed countries, there are few cases where those tactical maneuvers have yielded tangible results. In short, it is not clear that South Africa enjoys the “autonomy” within this hegemonic system that Taylor ascribes to it. Also unpersuasive is the author’s point that South Africa is not “some sort of unquestioning ‘disciple’ of the West or international capital” (p. 165). In fact, his own analysis suggests that the disciple has become more of a “true believer” in the benefits of neoliberalism than the countries that spawned it.

On the other hand, in his analysis of UNCTAD and the NAM, also the subjects of separate chapters, Taylor demonstrates more forcefully that South Africa is indeed a powerful actor within that bloc. Here, his argument finds much greater support, as South Africa has helped move its developing world counterparts, particularly in Africa, into acceptance of the dominant discourse. The global demise of “counter-hegemonic” ideologies was scarcely a South African initiative. However, employing Gramscian analysis, Taylor shows that the country’s own hegemonic position within the developing world, coupled with its embrace of the market, has enabled it to play a definitive role in shaping the acceptance of neoliberalism among its counterparts. Critics on the left, of course, note that South Africa has betrayed counter-hegemonic interests and helped to stifle international discourse on alternatives to neoliberalism.

At least as interesting as Taylor’s international relations focus is his discussion of domestic politics and the rapid transformation of ANC policy from one of social-democratic redistribution toward embrace of neoliberalism; it involved coaxing, prodding, good intentions and bad, and occasionally outright deceit. Two excellent chapters are devoted to South Africa’s internal politics, although the domestic context forms an important subtext throughout the book. Africanists will be well aware of the ANC’s rightward shift, but Taylor’s concise analysis illuminates the causes of the party’s abandonment of its redistributive goals. ANC’s political alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the Communist Party appears increasingly fragile and anarchonistic. Indeed, ANC’s interests align far more closely with white capital, big business, and international actors, contrary to the interests of the left and the South African majority. Although this has allowed ANC to “negotiate” globalization, at home the political effects, and the potential fallout, are only beginning to be felt.

But Taylor’s analysis suggests that the ANC’s commitment to a leftist agenda, even under Nelson Mandela, was always very shallow, undergoing a “steady, if nonlinear, trajectory rightwards by the ANC since its unbanning in 1990” (p. 75). By the mid-1990s, it is not surprising that alternatives to GEAR were “rubbish” and marginalized, along with intellectuals on the South African left as “irrelevant and unrealistic” (p. 34). The ANC expected that the adoption of GEAR would spur Western investment increases and expanded export opportunities. “GEAR explicitly posits redistribution as a by-product of growth,” rather than an activity of the state (p. 82).

Unfortunately, as Taylor acknowledges, GEAR has failed to meet its goals. Moreover, the economic situation in South Africa has worsened since the publication of this book. FDI flows to South Africa have fallen substantially, economic growth rates are sluggish, unemployment remains intractable, and the rand lost over 50% of its value in 2001, even though the country has done all the “right” things in terms of economic strategy. Although these conditions have multiple causes, South Africa’s inability to reap measurable rewards from either its staunchly neoliberal economic platform or its “middlepowermanship” perhaps serves as a cautionary tale for those who would reify either concept.

Indeed, for those reasons, Stuck in Middle GEAR is an interesting and timely read, particularly amidst South African President Thabo Mbeki’s current attempt to champion a “New Partnership for African Development” (NEPAD) with the West, which calls for a deeper commitment to neoliberal policies by his African counterparts. NEPAD contains explicit appeals to the Western countries to effectively “reward” states that adhere to sound, market-oriented policies. The contemporary climate provides a useful test for the advantages, if any, that the middle might yield

— Abdalla M. Battah, Minnesota State University, Mankato

This volume is a product of a conference organized by the Sadat Chair program at the University of Maryland, College Park. As its title indicates, it is a study of the relationship between identity and foreign policy, using case studies from the Middle East. The book's concern with identity is not new in Middle Eastern studies; what is new, however, is that neither identity nor the national interest is treated as a fixed, unexplained given or exogeneously derived. And, unlike much of the writing in the field, which tends to be abundantly descriptive and captive to the cultural “uniqueness” notion of the region, this is happily theory oriented. The quest to establish mutual relevance between the field of international relations and Middle Eastern studies will continue, to be sure; but this volume will go a long way toward a theoretical and methodological rapprochement between the two. Serious students of international relations (IR) and Middle Eastern studies will have ample reason to welcome this book.

The primary aims of the volume are to establish the pivotal role identity plays in shaping foreign policy interests and outcomes, illustrate how this happens, and determine which version or interpretation of identity under certain conditions becomes ascendant in the interactive contestation over collective identity among the key actors in the state. These are indeed formidable tasks, but the contributions, with varying degrees of success, prove the effort to be a worthwhile endeavor.

The editors proclaim that they eschew systemic and rationalist models in favor of a constructivist approach, which they feel can more satisfactorily account for the linkage between identity and foreign policy. However, this should be considered as a commitment only in principle, as the chapters really feature constructivist as well as realist interpretations, and even the constructivist-inspired analyses never fully divorce themselves from rationalist interpretations. In some respects, the volume represents a sort of internal dialogue among all contributors, including the editors. Shibley Telhami (a neorealist), and Michael Barnett (a constructivist) note that while this exercise does not represent a “happy convergence” (p. 5) between their respective approaches, it nevertheless “led to shifting of positions and to greater clarification and appreciation of each approach’s strengths and weaknesses” (p. 6).

Constructivism is an approach that emphasizes the role of social structures (both ideational and materialist) in shaping and defining interests and identities within an interactive process where agents and structures are mutually constitutive. The relationship between identity and foreign policy outcomes, as the editors explain, is not directly causal but constitutive (p. 18). They do not see identity as “fixed” or, on the other end of the spectrum, ultra-elastic (p. 17), and admit the possibility of the simultaneous existence of multiple identities in the state (p. 19). The chapters that follow the editors’ Introduction attempt to test these claims in case studies by Marc Lynch (Jordan), Barnett (Israel), Suzanne Maloney (Iran), Aceded Dawisha (Iraq), Yahya Sadowski (Syria), and Ibrahim A. Karawan (Egypt). The case studies feature the gamut of identity types and interpretations: subnational (e.g., Kurdish in Iraq), national (e.g., Egyptian), transnational (e.g., Arabism), religious/ideological (e.g., pan-Islamism, Jewishness). As indicated, the degree of adherence to a constructivist ontology varies from one chapter to another—the first two chapters (by Lynch and Barnett, respectively) being the most faithful, Maloney’s chapter on Iran straddling the middle ground, and the remaining case studies outright realist.

Lynch argues, “Jordan has often lent itself to unreflective assumptions about communal identity. Analysts who would never accept primitivist or essentialist arguments about identity in other contexts are surprisingly tolerant of bloodline conceptions of ‘Palestinian’ or ‘Jordanian’ identity” (p. 33). Jordanian identity, he contends, is tied to nation building and has evolved over the years. In the early years, Arabist and international “public spheres” debated and defined Jordanian identity, with Jordanians remaining largely marginal in the process. This intensified Jordan’s insecurities and constrained its foreign policy. The strategic decision by King Hussein to open the “public sphere” in the mid-1980s led to lively debates about Jordanian identity that redefined Jordanian interests in such a way as to make possible a formal peace between Jordan and Israel in 1994.

In Chapter 3, Barnett explores how identity politics in Israel influenced political leaders’ approaches to the peace process. Using familiar constructivist concepts and applying them to the election cases of Yitzhak Rabin and Benjamin Netanyahu, Barnett illuminates how the different strands of Israeli identity shape different positions on the Oslo accords.

Maloney’s case study on postrevolutionary Iran (not originally a part of the conference) emphasizes the role of elites and institutions. She argues that three competing identity strands (nationalism, Islamism, and anti-imperialism) have long coexisted in Iran. Under the Islamic Republic, these identities account for contradictory outcomes as well as continuities from the Shah’s era (e.g., quest for regional hegemony). Maloney argues that her case study “demonstrates the powerful, but paradoxical, instrumentality of identity in foreign policy” (p. 90).

Dawisha’s chapter traces the genesis and development of Israeli identity by examining five key episodes, beginning with the 1936 coup. Like others in this volume, he finds that competing identities provide the leaders a “menu of choice.” He emphasizes the role of the ruler’s motivations, which serves as an “intervening variable” (p. 118) between identity and policy. Nevertheless, he notes, the importance of identity led Iraqi rulers, including Saddam Hussein, to reevaluate their policy orientation, both for and against Arabism. Dawisha asserts that his case study demonstrates that identity can be “both a dependent and independent variable” (p. 135).

In the chapter on Syria, Sadowski notes that the most paramount feature of the Syrian identity is its fluidity (p. 137). This fluidity, he points out, gives ample room for the ruling elites to shape Syrian interests and policy according to dictates of realpolitik (p. 151). Regardless, Syrian national interests, more than Arabism and the personal whims of the ruler, guide the conduct of foreign policy (p. 151).

Of the cases covered in the volume, Egypt has the most homogeneous society. Yet the evidence shown in the other cases about multiple identities, as Karawan points out, obtains here as well. Like Dawisha, he argues that the elites play a crucial role in shaping identity and giving primacy to one version over another. He notes that the role of the elite is especially significant in societies with a restricted “public sphere.” Anwar Sadat’s peace overtures toward Israel were based on “Egypt-First” identity politics and required an important role for the mass media to change the “national mood” in Egypt.

Stephen Saideman, in the role of discussant, provides in the concluding chapter an integrative and evaluative analysis. He assesses the various claims made about identity (whether and how it matters, its sources, multiplicity, fluidity,
and actors’ strategies). He concludes by examining the contributions and relevance of the volume’s research project and suggests possible directions for future research. Readers might benefit from reading this chapter first and then again in the normal order.

Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East would make an excellent text in IR and Middle Eastern studies for either upper-division undergraduate or graduate courses. Its most obvious strength is that it problematizes both identity and national interest, challenging the usual givens assumed by traditional IR approaches. Barnett and Lynch succeed in at least demonstrating the promise and robustness of constructivist analysis. Contributors, constructivists as well as realists, laudably show that IR and Middle Eastern studies are mutually relevant and productive, providing an antidote to notions about Middle Eastern cultural uniqueness and exceptionalism. Saideman’s discussion of the volume’s weaknesses, few to be sure, is cogent and insightful. I wish, however, to note three relating to the constructivist approach. First, the question of how rationalism relates to constructivism is still somewhat ambiguous and problematic. Second, the question of defining “foreign” policy is a bit muddled, as the two cases demonstrating constructivism (Israel and Jordan) show. In both cases, the physical constitution of the state is fundamentally at stake, not ordinary issues of foreign policy. Third, and in agreement with Karawan, is the question of how the “constructivist dialogue” can take place in cases where an authoritarian government is either completely or near completely in control of the media. Is it really a case of “dialogue” or “monologue”?