history and politics of South American border disputes. It is to the author’s great credit that he does so in a way that will satisfy readers whose sympathies lie with post-modern approaches as well as those more comfortable with traditional political science theories and methods. “The difference between Ecuadorians, Bolivians, Chileans, and Peruvians is basically rooted in territorial disputes,” he states in his concluding chapter (p. 138). If the reader had any illusion to the contrary, he or she will most likely be convinced after reading this slim volume. It undermines the mainstream notion that South American boundaries are rooted in some type of objective historical and rational process that today provides a useful guide to understanding differences among South American populations.

Parodi is a Peruvian who had an impressive academic career in Lima before coming to the United States to earn a Ph.D. in political science. His writing is accessible, well organized, and abundant with detail. The title of the first chapter, “Boundaries as Instruments of Power,” is somewhat of a misnomer. Although it offers a discussion of the means used by power brokers to manipulate boundaries to their favor, the chapter is much more a history of boundary making in South America. This is no criticism. He provides an excellent and very well documented survey of the region’s border history that should easily become the standard reading on the subject.

In Chapter 2, Parodi offers what comes closest to his articulation of an organizing conceptual frame for the book. This chapter explores the “boundary theory,” which is not a theory that the author himself offers to explain boundaries and their politics, but instead the composite of ideas, rationalizations, and assumptions that powerful political actors used (and continue to use) to justify drawing boundaries as they chose. Thus, he examines in great detail how the “boundary theorists” employed everything from supposedly “scientific principles” (p. 62) to political violence in order to draw boundaries that not only met the power needs of colonial rulers but also tore apart indigenous nations. The chapter also reveals much of the myth behind colonial border history: that colonial and early nation-state lines were drawn to ensure that each emerging political unit had a distinct territory. Rather, they were drawn and redrawn to fit the often conflicting territorial needs of the monarchies, their successor states, and the church. After the Europeans withdrew, boundary theorists took over the notion of tying territory to a sense of nationhood. The boundary theory chapter informs any casual observer of South American politics, and no doubt some serious observers of the same, that there was much more behind the creation of national borders than simply the decisions of a few colonial cartographers. Missing is a comprehensive discussion of who most of these boundary theorists were. The prose suggests that anyone who had a connection to drawing or justifying a border was such a theorist. Nonetheless, most readers will be fascinated to learn of the lengths to which many participants in this process went to try to convince populations that “territory was so important to the nation. Sadly, this often meant creating a strong enemy image of surrounding populations, a process that not only sent many innocents to their deaths in territorial wars but also divided populations who culturally and historically had no reason to hate each other.

The two case study chapters, on border disputes between Ecuador and Peru and in Amazonia, respectively, identify many of these boundary theorists, at least for the cases under study. These studies are often not as satisfactory as the earlier and last chapters. Parodi describes nearly all boundary theories employed in these conflicts as rationalizations for some unworthy political goal. He makes a strong case that the 1995 Ecuador–Peru border war, fought over a tiny piece of remote territory in the Andes, makes no sense outside of a constructed world in which Ecuador and Peru are enemies because of a border dispute. Few will argue with that conclusion. But he does not appear to accept that in the modern nation-state system, borders are a reality (if a necessary evil), a reality to which the author offers no alternative.

That said, The Politics of South American Boundaries is a superb examination of the embedded interests and power behind boundary decision making. The consequences of those decisions are enormous. They range from the survival of indigenous peoples to the artificial dividing of South American nations in a way that distracts them from a common goal of economic development, to the terrible loss of life in border wars. Parodi quotes María Luisa Tamariz Tormen, an Ecuadorian anthropologist, appealing to her country to abandon the dispute with Peru: “Would it not be more honorable to leave aside our rhetorical and chauvinistic patriotism . . . and make defeating poverty and achieving better life conditions for all our population the basis on which we build our national pride?” (p. 97) [my translation].

There is not a soul in South America who could disagree with Tamariz’s sentiment, not only for Ecuador but for all the other poor countries in the continent. After reading Carlos Parodi’s book, you will understand why the South Americans have such difficulty in following Tamariz’s prescription.


— Donald F. Kettl, University of Wisconsin-Madison

Guy Peters and Jon Pierre have assembled an exceptionally thoughtful and comprehensive review of public management reforms. This book is a world tour, from the popular reform spots of New Zealand and the United Kingdom to lesser-known efforts by Greece, Austria, and Hungary. It paints a rich and textured portrait of the global administrative reform movement—and how varied it has been.

The chapters present detailed case studies of reform in 14 different nations. Comprehensive evaluations of such efforts, such as Allen Schick’s definitive study of the New Zealand reforms (*The Spirit of Reform*, 1996), are extraordinarily difficult to produce. The case studies aim instead at descriptions of what public officials in each country tried to accomplish and how their reforms evolved. Readers looking for a Schick-like assessment of the reforms’ impacts will be disappointed. Peters and Pierre focus instead on one big issue: How has the reform movement affected the relationship between career civil servants and their political masters?

Along with the goal of improving the efficiency of government services, their question is central to the administrative reform movement. As elected officials began struggling in the 1980s to streamline their governments, they portrayed civil servants as insufficiently responsive to the needs of citizens. These workers were locked in inefficient routines and standard procedures that hindered efficiency. Only by transforming that relationship, the reformers believed, could governments improve their results and lower their costs. The reformers deregulated personnel systems, empowered employees, measured performance, and pursued “agencification,” contracts specifying results in exchange for budgets. Under the broad banner of “managerialism,” these reforms aimed to increase the accountability of civil servants.

Peters and Pierre conclude that in many countries, the reforms had the opposite effect. They increased administrators’ power, made them harder to control, and created conflict between administrators and politicians. The contract system diminished the emphasis on
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harmony, which had characterized pre-reform systems, and substituted tough bargaining. Top administrators, hired under management contracts, often did not see their careers as focused on the public sector. Some observers suspected, in fact, that they sought to use their government employment to enhance their private sector opportunities. By emphasizing external, measurable outcomes instead of hierarchical compliance, politicians might paradoxically have reduced their capacity to control bureaucrats—precisely the reverse of what the reforms intended.

The managerialist movement sought to separate policy from administration. The assumption was that enhanced controls over results would transform bureaucrats’ incentives and improve outcomes. That assumption was critical, in both practice and theory. In practice, it represented an innovative solution to the nagging problem of shrinking bureaucracy and improving its results, especially since bureaucracy seemed hardwired to grow and results seemed disconnected from bureaucratic behavior. In theory, it represented an effort to reconcile a century-old issue in public administration.

Since the early twentieth century, some theorists had suggested that bureaucracies could best be managed by separating policymaking from its administration, and that administrators’ decisions ought to be focused on how most effectively to carry out the policies framed by elected officials. In the mid-twentieth century, theorists argued that any effort to separate policy from administration was folly—that the two were inextricable. The managerialist reformers believed that this linkage of policy with administration created incentives that drove spending up and performance down. They concluded that they could solve the policy-administration dilemma by replacing it with an explicit principal-agent relationship.

Perhaps the most significant conclusion of Politicians, Bureaucrats and Administrative Reform is that the very effort to wring out policy politics had, itself, produced major political consequences. The finding circles theoretically back to a lasting proposition in public administration: that policy ultimately cannot be separated from its administration. It also points to a central paradox: The predominantly technical issues underlying managerialism had profound political implications.

These findings are of fundamental importance. The evidence supporting them, however, is largely suggestive. Each of the chapters in the book takes its own approach to administrative reform, and the chapters do not all speak to the policy-administration dichotomy. Moreover, variations among the countries are so deep and profound that drawing any generalization is difficult. In his chapter on France, for example, Philippe Bezes finds that the country’s bureaucracy was hostile to managerialism and that the movement had not taken hold strongly there. The German bureaucracy has done everything possible to prevent reforms from introducing any real change, Eckhard Schröter found. Brian W. Hogwood, David Judge, and Murray McVicar conclude, “Making generalizations about the relationships between politicians and agencies in Britain is hampered by the huge variations which exist” (p. 44), and Britain is one of the nations where managerialism has become most deeply rooted. The reform effort in Spain moved from bureaucratization of politics to the politicization of bureaucracy, according to Carlos R. Alba. Akira Nakamura reaches a pointed diagnosis of Japanese government: “[T]he country lacks solidified and competent leadership” (p. 179).

The dizzying variation in management reforms, coupled with the lack of a standard methodology for assessing results, makes generalization difficult. Nevertheless, Theo A. J. Toonen charts the book’s overarching theme, that the reformers’ efforts to separate policy from administration make even more clear that it cannot be done. “Democratic politics needs a well functioning public administration, and the other way around,” he writes (p. 200). Moreover, the chapters in this fascinating volume point to another paradox: The reformers’ embrace of a formal principal-agent approach led to distinctly nonformal implications. The chapters, for example, point to an important role for organizational culture and subtle political analysis for an understanding of the complex linkage between policy and administration. It is in exploring these paradoxes that this richly textured volume makes its greatest contribution.


— John M. Owen, IV, University of Virginia

A rough consensus of international relations scholars exists that liberal democracies fight wars against one another significantly less often than random chance would predict. Most have taken this fact to imply that democracy somehow causes peace. Thus have they labeled the finding the liberal or democratic peace, and have labored to discover the causal mechanisms through which democracy produces peace. Lurking along the edges of this research, however, has been an endogeneity problem: Might it be that peace causes democracy?

Mark E. Pietrzyk is convinced that the case for the peace-causes-democracy proposition is stronger than that for democracy-causes-peace. His argument is in four parts. First, he notes a secular decline in the number of great-power wars year after the past five centuries. This decline precedes the emergence of modern liberal democracy, although it continues along with the spread of democratic regimes after the late eighteenth century. He offers a number of causes of the increasing prevalence of peace, including the solidification of state borders, hegemonic authority, legitimacy of the international order, economic interdependence, and defensive dominance (enhanced most recently by nuclear deterrence).

Second, Pietrzyk argues that the evidence for democratic peace is actually weak. His particular target is case studies purporting to show that liberal norms, democratic institutions, common identities, or some combination thereof keep democracies at peace with one another but not with nondemocracies. He challenges both the ways by which case-study authors have categorized states’ domestic regimes and their explanations for war or peace in particular cases. Third, he builds a theoretical case that peace causes democracy, using the work of Otto Hintze (1861–1940). Hintze argued that because building a state required war, and making war effectively required hierarchical authority, early modern nation-states tended toward authoritarianism. For Pietrzyk, states that developed defensible borders lost their need for centralized authority and could thus develop in more democratic directions. Fourth, Pietrzyk tests propositions from the democracy-causes-peace and peace-causes-democracy theories on four case studies: the American Revolution, the French Revolution, the transformation of Germany (ca. 1871–1950s), and Israel. On the whole, he finds that the evidence is more consistent with the notion that peace produces democracy.

Many of Pietrzyk’s points are well taken. The general 500-year trend toward peace is compelling and at the least reminds us that peace is at best only partly about democracy. Case studies on the democratic peace have yielded mixed results, and the temptation toward tendentious interpretations of history is strong. The notion that peace, or at least external security, is conducive to democracy is intuitively plausible and empirically supported. And much of the author’s evidence is compelling. One cause for the replacement of the U.S. Articles of Confederation (1783) with the Constitution
Pietrzyk’s positive case for peace-causes-democracy is also problematic. His theory treats peace as generated by international-systemic factors, but his own narrative attributes the wars of the French Revolution to domestic French politics. If wars among the American states in the 1780s were so likely, then it is difficult for the author to explain why the states remained democratic. Germany had more years of peace between 1871 and 1914 than did Great Britain, yet the latter democratized while the former did not. These and other cases suggest that degree of external security may be a better independent variable than years of peace. After all, as his own evidence makes clear, preparations for war, triggered by external insecurity, can inhibit a state from democratizing; insecure states that avoid war might just be deterring it because they are better prepared for it.

In the end, International Order and Individual Liberty is a helpful book. Its achievement is to help turn scholarly attention away from the notion that the relation between democracy and peace is one way—namely, that the former causes the latter—and toward the notion that the two things’ relation is recursive. As other researchers also are beginning to argue, we have reason to believe that liberal popular government within states and pacific international relations among them are mutually reinforcing, and that the same is true of authoritarian domestic government and international war. Under broad conditions, democracy and peace may be in a virtuous circle, authoritarianism and war in a vicious one.


— Jon Pevehouse, University of Wisconsin

In this fine book, Bruce Russett and John Oneal attempt more than a simple review and synthesis of the litany of democratic peace work in international relations. Rather, they strive for a far-reaching, integrated, and complex understanding of international politics based on a Kantian approach to interstate interactions, which emphasizes democracy, trade, and international organizations. They achieve this goal in a book that is clearly written and accessible to a wide audience—even with little background in the study of international relations.

Russett and Oneal begin with a broad review of international politics, centered on theories and patterns of conflict and cooperation between nation-states. They describe traditional realist theories of anarchy, balance of power, and hegemony as constituting a “vicious circle” of world politics, where conflict is endemic in interstate relations. They follow with a counterrendition of IR based on the liberal, Kantian school, which holds that three concepts—representative democracy, international law, and organization, as well as commerce and free trade—are the basis for a “virtuous circle” of peace, which lies in the center of the circle. Peace creates a positive feedback, which promotes the three pillars of Kantianism in a reciprocal fashion, while each of the pillars may promote one another.

The book then proceeds to systematically examine the relationships between each section of the Kantian system, beginning with two chapters on democracy and peace. While there is little new theoretical material in the first of the two chapters, it does provide a rich and well-analyzed review of the democratic peace debate. The second democratic peace chapter provides a systematic test of the proposition using a comprehensive data set from 1886 to 1992. Chapters 4 and 5 examine the role of trade and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), respectively, in reducing conflict. A major strength of this examination lies in Russett and Oneal’s choice to tackle each of these questions piecemeal, using a consistent data set and baseline model throughout each chapter, providing some of the most systematic empirical tests to date on the question of the liberal peace.

Chapter 6 examines the various feedback propositions involved in the Kantian system. By means of case material and statistical robustness checks, Russett and Oneal examine the role of IGOs in shaping democracy, democracy in building IGOs and trade, and trade in buttressing growth, democracy, and international institutions. The penultimate chapter provides an innovative empirical test of Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations (1996) argument, which the authors soundly reject. The final chapter, with an eye toward the policy community, discusses the importance of the Kantian arguments with respect to foreign policy toward both Russia and China. While systematically analyzing positions to the contrary, they argue that to achieve a lasting Kantian system of peace, Russia and China must be engaged and brought into a system of collective security as the twenty-first century proceeds.

The book’s case-oriented material nicely illustrates and enriches the discussion of the theoretical concepts and empirical findings. All of the actual statistical estimates and technical econometric discussions are placed in the appendix. Although more technically skilled
Triangulating Peace much more accessible to a wide variety of audiences—undergraduates, beginning graduate students, policymakers, even the attentive public. Moreover, moving the technical material out of the center of attention allows the authors to concentrate on the key substantive issues at stake, rather than to engage in debates over estimation techniques or the coding of variables, which (while important) would seem quite droll to anyone outside these research circles. Thus, the book is clear in focus and maintains wonderful continuity.

There are a handful of conceptual issues begged by Russett and Oneal’s analysis. At the center of the virtuous circle of international relations is peace, which is both a cause and effect in relation to democracy, trade, and international institutions. Ironically, as the authors review the beginning of the twentieth century, it is war, not peace, that has spurred the growth of democracy and international organizations. From the founding of the Concert of Europe after the Napoleonic wars to the League of Nations and the United Nations system after each world war, conflict provided a key impetus for the creation of IGOs. Moreover, Huntington’s first and second wave of democracy coincide quite nicely with the end of the Napoleonic wars and World War II (The Third Wave, 1991). These trends themselves do not necessarily undermine the book’s analysis, since in these cases it is clearly the desire for peace after war that spurs these changes. Nonetheless, it does beg the issue of why societies around the world need to be reminded of the vicious circle of world politics in order to strive toward the virtuous one.

Another issue that is slightly underexplored is the feedback present in the Kantian model. Presumably, the causal mechanisms that create the feedback processes do not function in a mutually exclusive manner—for example, IGOs may create and be engendered by trade relations. This would suggest more of a simultaneous system, which is (rightly) eschewed by Russett and Oneal in favor of a simpler approach of modeling each process independently in order to establish the initial validity of their theory. Still, their assumption seems to be that in a simultaneous system, the Kantian processes will be additive—all leading to greater peace, democracy, trade, and so on. Equally likely, however, is a substitution dynamic, whereby one causal process overwhelms another. In other words, as one creates a more general model of interstate relations in the Kantian framework, some processes may prove more important at causing peace than others.

While these and other questions may drift into readers’ minds as they review this book, they should not be distracted from its overall quality. As Russett and Oneal admit, advances in econometric techniques and data availability will certainly advance our ability to test these complex interactive and simultaneous relationships. Yet the foundational argument and statistical findings of this book will be with us for many years. The authors have set a high standard for comprehensive and systematic investigation of the liberal peace. Future investigations will no doubt build on their own strong foundations.


— Chandra Lekha Sriram, *International Peace Academy*

Will a dialogue of communities or civilizations help us to be simultaneously cosmopolitan and communitarian? The proliferation of international conferences suggests a strong belief that conversation and dialogue engenders understanding, if not solutions. Richard Shapcott makes no grand claims for the revolutionary power of dialogue, but he does argue that it can help us do justice to different actors through engaging respect for difference, allowing a move toward the universalizing aspirations of cosmopolitans without sacrificing the particularities of communities. In this he is a follower of Hans-Georg Gadamer, from whose philosophical hermeneutics he develops a thin theory of cosmopolitan solidarity. This dialogic account, Shapcott argues, can help to resolve tensions between identity and community. In so doing, he engages several familiar and important literatures—those that address the challenges facing liberal multiculturalism, such as that of Will Kymlicka, of justice broadly within and across societies, building in part on the work of John Rawls and his critics of a more communitarian bent, such as Michael Walzer. He challenges a standard perceived divide in normative international relational theory, between communitarians and cosmopolitans, arguing that it is possible to reconcile them on the question of doing justice to difference.

The book then makes two major claims: first, that it is possible to achieve a thin cosmopolitanism, one that can do justice to difference through recognition; and second, that such a community is developed through communication and dialogue that recognizes difference. It is structured around several theoretical discussions, which emphasize key contemporary debates in international ethics. Shapcott examines several alternate approaches to community and communication, including those deriving from critical theory and poststructuralism, before articulating criticisms of these and offering his own approach. Finally, he addresses potential critics, and restates his claim for a “thin cosmopolitanism.”

Several key concepts are critical to this enterprise: cosmopolitanism, justice, and community, defined in part by their relationship to one another. “The central proposition of cosmopolitanism as a moral and political doctrine is that humans can and should form a universal (that is, global) moral community” (p. 7). Justice as recognition, a central aspect of the book, arises from a key critique of Rawls made by communitarians, namely, that he fails to take account of the ways in which communities shape individuals. The idea is that well-being encompasses more than purely legalistic or economic matters, but should also include recognition of identity (p. 10).

It is traditionally suggested that there is a divide between communitarians and cosmopolitans on the question of doing justice to difference. The divide has come because while communitarianism rejects universalistic projects and seeks to preserve the identity of communities, cosmopolitanism is a universalistic project, and is thus thought likely to undermine community and cultural diversity. The theoretical divide, however, can be bridged, according to Shapcott, through recognition of difference.

What does this recognition entail exactly? It is achieved, he argues, through acts of communication, specifically conversation. Recognition can be achieved through such communication, it is argued, because identity is shaped and articulated through language.

It might be expected, from the emphasis on communication, that Shapcott follows Jürgen Habermas in his approach to international justice. However, he distinguishes his work from the discourse ethics of Habermas or those who apply his work to international ethics, such as Andrew Linklater. Habermas’s work emphasizes the role of communication in generating discourse leading to understanding, with a goal of consensus. Shapcott argues that the telos of consensus means that Habermas and those who rely on him will excessively narrow the range of persons and topics in a conversation. This means that the ethics that result cannot be universalizable.

On the other hand, he argues, if one builds upon the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer, and relies upon communication and dialogue, one can create a thin theory of communitarianism and cosmopolitanism that does not exclude actors or issues from discussion. This is the case, he continues, because knowledge is constituted linguistically, and

— Erica R. Gould, University of Virginia

In this book, Randall Stone addresses an empirically and theoretically important question: How does the International Monetary Fund influence borrowers? Despite the fact that numerous countries participate in Fund-conditional loan agreements each year, scholars vehemently disagree over whether these programs help countries stabilize and grow, or whether they lead to economic contraction and greater income inequalities. A number of empirical studies have been undertaken, but Stone rightly argues that most are plagued by various problems that cast doubt on their conclusions. Most fundamentally, though, the author argues that these scholars have misconceived the very nature of the Fund's influence. The effect of a Fund program on borrowers is not constant; instead, it varies on the basis of the credibility of the Fund's commitment to enforce this program.

According to Stone, the Fund can be beneficial to borrowers. It provides sound economic advice and can help borrowers overcome their time-consistency problem by more credibly committing to pursue anti-inflationary policies. But in order for the Fund to help governments tie their hands, the Fund needs to enforce its own programs. Ironically, the Fund faces its own credibility problem: It cannot credibly commit to enforce the programs of certain countries and thus is least able to help those countries that are favored by the powerful states. Powerful states, mainly the United States, can force the Fund to be lenient with politically important borrowers, like Russia in the 1990s. Employing a key insight from the new economics of organization that "discretion is the enemy of optimism," Stone argues that U.S. discretion prevents the Fund from achieving a Pareto-improved outcome. (See Kenneth Shepsle, “Discretion, Institutions and the Problem of Government Commitment,” in Pierre Boullieu and James Coleman, eds., Social Theory for a Changing Society, 1991.) By contrast, when the Fund has the greatest autonomy, its commitment to enforce its programs is most credible and borrowers benefit most from its involvement. This argument echoes a refrain heard frequently in the halls of the Fund itself: that the Fund would be successful and effective if only it were not subject to politically motivated pressure by its major shareholders.

Stone brings an impressive trio of tools to bear on this question, constructing a formal model and substantiating it via both large-n statistical analysis using an originally constructed data set and four in-depth case studies. The formal model includes three key players—the Fund itself, the borrowing country, and international investors—and centers around the Fund’s decision to enforce its conditional loan agreement. The Fund prefers anti-inflationary policies, but also responds to political pressures from its powerful state principals. As a result, the credibility of its commitment (and consequently its influence) varies on the basis of the borrower’s "political influence and strategic importance" (pp. 21, 30). Borrowers and investors adjust their moves correspondingly. For instance, more important borrowers will more frequently deviate from Fund programs and have their programs suspended more often, but for shorter time periods, than those of less important borrowers (see pp. 59, 236).

The formal model yields hypotheses about how each of the three players should act if the Fund’s enforcement is credible (for less important borrowers) or incredible (for more important borrowers). In the fourth chapter, Stone statistically tests nine different hypotheses using an original data set. The author has coded a potentially important new variable that represents the variation in Fund enforcement; he calls it the "punishment interval" or period of time when the country is not in "good standing" with the Fund, which was inferred mainly from the timely disbursement of loan installments (pp. 51, 247). The four case chapters trace the post-Communist transitions in Bulgaria, Poland, Russia, and the Ukraine during the 1990s, and the role of the Fund in those transitions, by means of primary materials and interviews with key actors.

Despite the book’s theoretical and empirical rigor, three issues raise questions about Stone’s interpretation of Fund influence. First, Stone argues that Fund influence varies on the basis of the borrower’s importance and due to pressure from the United States, but it is not entirely clear what this importance means or how this pressure works (pp. 21, 30). The cases of Russia and Ukraine suggest that importance may fluctuate and depend on relatively unpredictable U.S. preference changes (pp. 158–60, 184). His theory suggests that the Fund should be "closely controlled" by powerful state principals, but both the large-n and small-n empirics indicate that other factors may be more important in explaining variations in Fund enforcement (pp. 11, 66, 195, 203). If a borrower’s importance is based on fickle preference changes and if enforcement patterns are determined by factors outside of the model, then one wonders how borrowers and investors can anticipate the credibility of the Fund’s enforcement and, thus, how much of the Fund’s strategic behavior is elucidated by the model.

Second, Stone has undertaken a massive data collection effort. However, questions remain about his central variable, the so-called punishment intervals, which were inferred
from Fund loan disbursements. Since the schedule of Fund disbursements is often not public information, it was not obvious how he coded loan suspensions and whether this coding could be easily replicated. Assuming accurate coding, the interpretation of loan suspensions as punishment intervals may still be flawed. Fund loan installments are suspend-

ed for many reasons. Countries may decide not to borrow when their economy rebounds, or programs may be suspended and renegotiated in the case of a natural disaster. Suspensions often reflect Fund flexibility, not Fund stringency; they may reflect economic improve-

ment, not “poor standing.” Moreover, even if suspensions do reflect punishment, suspensions of equal length may not represent equiva-

lent enforcement due to variations in program design.

Third, Stone’s research design raises ques-

tions about the generalizability of his findings. His theory-generating case is Russia, which by all accounts is an outlier (p. 15). The question is whether the Fund’s interactions with Russia, as a former superpower with nuclear capabilities, are different in degree or kind. He tests this theory on an arguably unrepresentative sample: post-Communist countries in the 1990s (p. 50). One important implication of his study, which runs counter to much of the existing literature, is that the Fund’s commit-

ment should be credible; its activity should be effective and countries should comply most of the time, since most Fund borrowers are relatively “unimportant” countries. This discrepan-

cy raises the question whether the “success” of the less influential countries in his study had more to do with Fund enforcement or with other factors that make these countries system-


tically different from most Fund borrowers. To address this, Stone has begun coding cases outside the region.

These reservations aside, Lending Credibility is an impressive piece of scholarship and makes several important contributions. It is one of the first studies to explicitly consider the politics, not just the economics, of Fund activity. It highlights that Fund influence can vary, and that simply using a dummy variable to assess the influence of Fund involvement drastically distorts the Fund’s effect. It develops a model of the strategic interaction among the Fund, borrowers, and investors, which Stone tested on post-Communist cases here and which he has begun to test on other cases with promising results. It sets a high bar for scholarship in international relations broadly, employing truly diverse tools and taking causal inference seriously. Finally, the book makes an important empirical contribution, providing extensive data on the patterns of Fund enforcement and a detailed account of the post-Communist transitions of four countries.

The Institutionalization of Europe.

— David M. Andrews, European University Institute

Sometimes—or rather, for some purposes—it is neither what you say nor even how you say it, but when you say it that matters most. Good timing certainly helped sales of Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1987), a tome whose central arguments closely echoed a number of previous studies. Kennedy had the good fortune to publish his account of how leading states tend to overreach and overspend at the height of one of official America’s recurrent cycles of self-doubt. Little more than a decade later, with the Cold War won and the Japanese economy on the rocks, the current fashion in “policy relevant research”—as reflected in the pages of Foreign Affairs, International Security, and elsewhere—is instead to emphasize the supposedly enduring features of American economic and military preeminence. Kennedy’s thesis is passé; with America ascendant, explanations of the inevitability of great power decline have, at least temporarily, lost their market. They may find resonance again, however, and sooner rather than later.

As with Kennedy and great power decline, so as well with Ernst Haas’s work on European integration. In his theory of neofunctionalism, Haas developed what seemed a compelling explanation—probably the most compelling explanation of its time—for the incipient pheno-

menon of European integration. As integration progressed in the late 1950s and early 1960s, so did the fame of his work. Later, as integration appeared thwarted by de Gaulle in the mid-1960s and then derailed by divergent national strategies in the face of the economic challenges of the 1970s, Haas’s reputation and that of the theory he helped develop declined in tandem. Now, following some two decades of sustained European resurgence, it may well be time that neofunctionalism enjoys a similar renaissance.

Such is the argument of The Institu-

tionalization of Europe, the second volume (on the heels of European Integration and Supranational Governance, 1998) produced by a small group of scholars following a series of workshops at Berkeley, Laguna Beach, and Florence. The organizers of this project had two tasks in mind: to rehabilitate Haas’s reputation as a major theorist—perhaps the major theorist—of European integration, and to reclaim neofunctionalism as a premier theoretical approach for understanding the European Union as a system of governance. To do so, both volumes open with lengthy and carefully crafted statements of a research pro-

gram generally faithful to his work, while framed in light of arguments and evidence that have emerged since neofunctionalism’s heyday. In a few carefully chosen instances, the editors—Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet for both books, joined by Neil Fligstein in the second—depart from Haas’s central precepts (e.g., reconceptualizing “spillover” and abandoning his insistence that integration necessarily entails a reconfiguration of the political loyalties of European citizens). But by and large the tone here is respectful, even honorific.

As James Caporaso and Stone Sweet put it in the concluding essay of the text under review, “the editors of both volumes . . . think that Haas got most things right, and that the longer the time-frame we adopt, the more prescient his ideas become.” Alternative approaches come up short, they argue, partic-

ularly in trying to address the question of governance: “Nothing in neorealism is relevant to how supranational governance has devel-

oped subsequent to the [founding] treaties, or how Europe impacts upon state-to-state relations today.” Similarly, “liberal intergovern-

mentalism . . . systematically downplays the extent to which European rule structures, and the spaces they organize, generate institutional innovation within the interstices of the grand bargains with which [it] is concerned” (pp. 223–24). International regime theory is likewise criticized by the editors for ignoring “the dynamics of intra-institutional, regime evolution” (p. 5).

There is much to commend these argu-
ments. But the editors’ central claims about neofunctionalism and its place in the literature were all made, and made well, in European Integration and Supranational Governance. Where does this successor volume break new ground? While the first book focused on “how supranational areas emerged and were institu-

tionalized,” the current tome examines the “institutionalization of Europe per se” (p. 3) or, more abstractly, “the complex processes through which rules and social interaction, structure and agency, are coordinated over time” (p. 9). Thus, Adrienne Héritier examines overt and covert means by which policies are occasionally “Europeanized” despite the appar-

ent opposition of the member state govern-
ments; Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson demonstrate how the European Commission

— Shampa Biswas, Whitman College

Christine Sylvester’s enormous versatility as a scholar is evident in this compilation of her many essays written over the last couple of decades. Beginning with two introductory chapters that situate her work at the multiply, if often unseen, “internationalizations” of international relations and feminism, the book is then divided into three sections (“Sighting,” “Siting,” and “Citing”) in which she journeys into many different, and sometimes obscure, “sites” of gender/international relations, “sighting” in the process women in and around war, peace, diplomacy, and development in order to “cite” them and hence carve out an ontological and epistemological space for them in the disciplines of international relations and feminist theory. She travels well, often using the metaphor of “traveling” quite self-consciously (most clearly in her borrowings from Mary Lugones’s world traveling theory) to narrate both the roads already traveled and the work still left undone.

Pointing out compellingly the instability and porosity of disciplinary boundaries, more easily acknowledged in the “immodest inclusiveness” of feminism (p. 293) than in the rigid border-enforcing practices of IR, Sylvester promises in the first part of the book a more healthy and productive interdisciplinarity in her invocations of “feminist IR/IR feminism” as the intellectual framework for the volume. Yet the book is located much more comfortably within feminist IR than IR feminism, mapping out and situating itself in the many debates and theories of IR (including the seminal works in feminist IR) and speaking primarily to an IR audience already familiar with those debates and theories. The author elaborates on the feminist theories that undergird her own work and the work of those she discusses, but there is little attempt to map out the field of feminist theory and assess the contributions made to that field by IR feminism.

In the promise of interdisciplinarity there is the glimmering of those liminal spaces, the borderlands à la Anzaldúa that transcend the ontological and epistemological separateness of disciplinary boundaries. Sylvester’s many essays (especially “Internations” and “Empathetic Cooperation”) hint at those spaces, but the book’s framework as elucidated in the first two chapters, as well as some of the other essays, remain a lot more mired in disciplinary divides (“borrowing” from one and “aplying” to the other) than she promises or probably intends.

In the first chapter, Sylvester does a fine job of navigating the terrain of IR, and an even better job of highlighting the uphill battle faced by feminists in the field to carve out more than an obligatory mention or a simple addendum to the big works, even in scholarship that is self-consciously oppositional and resistant to the claims and exclusions of mainstream/realist IR. One could argue that it has become “mainstream” now to challenge realism from many quarters; the weak challenges of neoliberal institutionalism have been surpassed by the much stronger and debilitating critiques offered by constructivists of many hues, critical theorists, postmodernists, and most lately postcolonial theorists. And success in being mainstreamed brings “canonization,” so that the canon has been enlarged considerably in the last few decades despite the continuing bad habit of upcoming scholars to locate their work vis-à-vis realism (hence, reproducing the centrality of realism) and continuing attempts by many undeserving claimants to use marginality to seek legitimacy. But Sylvester is correct that the canon, even in its enlarged capacity, still identifies “big (white) men” as founding fathers and dissidents, the work of feminist scholars often dropping out of sight and cite. Her attempt, however, to correct this in the second chapter by offering the lives and works of Jean Elshtain, Cynthia Enloe, and J. Ann Tickner as “progenitors” and “lodestars” of feminist IR (p. 18), while useful to the task of acknowledging their groundbreaking scholarship and surveying the field, fails to acknowledge the irony of a new form of canonization around the works of “big (white)” women. What exclusions are created anew—what voices silenced—it is curious that these questions are not even raised for a writer otherwise so attentive to the subtle logics of invisibilizations! Moreover, and in keeping with my point above, while it is clear what insights the three feminists bring to IR, it is less clear in what ways these IR scholars contribute to feminist theory.

The individual essays, each prefaced by a short and useful introduction explaining its context and motivations, are evidence of the many roads—ideological, empirical, professional, and geographical—traveled by Sylvester, and her laudable ability to bring her many experiences to bear in her thinking and writing. It is in these essays that we see her refusal to be disciplined by IR—in the eccleticism of her empirical interests that range from peaks at the seemingly mundane work of presidential secretaries (“Handmaid’s tales”) to conversations with local Zimbabwean women working in silk cooperatives weaving patterns and meanings of cooperation unavailable in IR literature (“Reginas”); in her imaginative and unorthodox methodologies for finding the unfamiliar and invisible in international relations (fiction in “Handmaid’s Tales,” “Gendered Development,” and “Internations” and avant-garde art in “Picturing” and “Feminist Arts”); and in her ability to put to use an impressive repertoire of feminist theories (standpoint and postmodern feminism in “Some Danger,” psychoanalytic feminism in “Feminists and Realists,” etc.). An occasional essay like “Four International Dianas” reads as a reflective piece and is unclear in its implications for feminist IR. But “Emperor’s Theories” still remains one of the best works outlining the occlusions of IR on the question of gender, and “Empathetic Conversation” does an especially fine job of developing a feminist methodology for students of IR.

Feminist International Relations is an important book for students of IR, not only because it brings together in one place the many writings of Christine Sylvester, but also because it pushes scholars of IR to reckon with the enormous fecundity of feminist approaches and their ability to open up new ways of “sighting,” “siting,” and “citing.” She is a bold and
imaginative thinker and writer, and her femi-
nist interventions in IR challenge a field in
which “[a] conversation, to say nothing of a
debate, on gender and IR has simply not occu-
pied any center stage” (p. 246).


— David L. Cingranelli, Binghamton University, SUNY

This is a provocative, analytical treatment of the inevitable dilemmas that arise when humanitar-
ian action is undertaken in a militarized envi-
ronment. Fiona Terry writes with the authority that come from several years of working in
emergency relief programs in different parts of the world. The book’s main contribution is its
identification, discussion, and analysis of the predictably negative consequences of humani-
tarian intervention. After an excellent introduc-
tion to the argument of the book and review of
the pertinent literature, there are four chapters,
each providing an in-depth analysis of a specific
example of humanitarian intervention. The four
examples are the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan, the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran refugee camps
in Honduras, the Cambodian refugee camps in
Thailand, and the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire. The case studies include helpful maps of the
region that mark the locations of the camps
discussed in each chapter. They illustrate the
author’s argument that the paradox she describes is not case-specific. Similar value conflicts arose in each of the cases examined, even though the specific details of the dilemmas faced by aid workers and the types of militarized situations were quite different. In each case, the mix of benefits to the victims of militarized con-
flicts, along with unintended negative conse-
quences, also was different.

The “paradox” of humanitarian action, as Terry describes it, might be summarized as follows:
In militarized situations, aiding those in need is never a neutral act. It always requires
taking sides and always generates winners and
losers. It often prolongs military conflict by protecting former and actual combatants.
Sometimes, the intervention even affects the outcome of the military conflict itself, though there is much controversy on this point. Therefore, in the name of moral principles, she
contends that governments and nongovern-
mental aid organizations at times should refuse
to provide food, medical treatment, water,
clothing, and shelter to those who desperately
need it when the unintended effects are
substantial, negative, and predictable. In

instances where aid organizations have already
begun to provide humanitarian assistance, they
should cease when the negative side effects become apparent.

By emphasizing consequences as she does, the author self-consciously leaves the ethical
safe ground of the deontological imperative requiring that we help the innocent victims of
war. She enters the more difficult terrain of
utilitarianism (p. 217). Terry contrasts her perspective with the work of Mary Anderson
(Do No Harm: Supporting Local Capacities for Peace Through Aid, 1996), who contends that
aid organizations should strive, first and fore-
most, to do no harm. According to Terry, “such an idea is an illusion” (p. 224). Instead, the
best an aid organization can hope for is when it intervenes to help refugees of a mili-
tary conflict is to minimize the negative effects of
its action (p. 224).

The decision-making principle one would expect to arise on the basis of utilitarianism is
that humanitarian intervention into milita-
rized situations should not be conducted unless the expected benefits exceed the expected
costs. As a corollary, humanitarian interven-
tions, once in place, should be terminated whenever the costs of such actions exceed the
benefits. The author is aware of this benefit–cost approach. She writes: “Whether decisions should be based on doing more good than harm, doing no more than a minimum
amount of harm regardless of the total good, or
ensuring that no harm is done, is open to
debate” (p. 25). She never explains why she
rejects the first approach. She advocates the second, and, as noted, she rejects the last as unrealistic.

As a footnote, the author does not contend
that the paradox she describes arises in the con-
duct of all humanitarian actions—only those
conducted during military conflicts. The book
is about aid efforts designed to help refugees
from war or warlike situations. I doubt that
most refugees could be classified as “refugees from military conflicts.” Moreover, a substantial proportion of the world’s total humanitarian effort has been directed toward helping people
who are not refugees at all, but rather have been
the victims of natural or man-made disasters.

Terry describes several reasons that impor-
tant negative consequences of humanitarian
action are often overlooked by aid organiza-
tions. Sometimes aid agencies view the cause
they are aiding as just, even though their efforts are clearly partisan (e.g., helping Afghan
refugees during the Soviet occupation). Also, aid workers sometimes focus first and foremost
on meeting the material needs of refugees,
refusing to consider bigger political side effects or ethical issues. Often, the leaders of aid agen-
cies and aid workers are aware of the negative side effects, but assign higher priorities to other
principles.

In the last chapter, the author does a good
job of drawing lessons from the case studies,
providing explanations for what she views as
misguided humanitarian efforts, and supplying guidance for those who must make the
tough “aid–no aid” decisions in the future. The
analysis is insightful and interesting. Terry’s
suggestions are that future humanitarian assis-
tance efforts in militarized situations must be
mindful of the obligation to minimize harm,
be motivated by a concern for the welfare of the
people (p. 240), be in response to a crisis
that was not caused by the provider of the aid
(p. 241), and be intended for victims (p. 241).
Furthermore, she argues that acts, themselves,
are not good or bad. Rather, they must be
judged in terms of their likely consequences
(p. 244). These principles and others explicit
and implicit in Condemned to Repeat? constitute a good start, but they would not be
enough to help an aid organization decide
when to intervene or when, after intervention,
to withdraw. The author has convinced me on
two points. First, humanitarian interventions
into militarized situations are certain to have
some bad consequences and to raise difficult ethical dilemmas. Second, despite her argu-
ment to the contrary, the real question that
governments and nongovernmental aid organi-
izations must ask and answer is whether the
good consequences of contemplated humani-
tarian interventions into militarized conflicts
are likely to outweigh the bad ones.


— Sheldon W. Simon, Arizona State University

If there is a caveat lector in this otherwise splendid study of Asia-Pacific strategic rela-
tions, it is certainly not the fault of the author. As in most books on global security published
in 2001, William Tow’s volume was written before the tragic events of 9/11. Consequently, many of his well-argued propositions would require alteration in the new context of the
global war on terror. Nonetheless, this book provides an excellent baseline against which to
compare these changes.

Tow examines security relationships among major powers (China, Japan, the United States)
and middle powers (the Koreas, Taiwan, Australia, and selected members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]), applying both realist and liberal
criteria. That is, he explores the relative economic and military capabilities of the actors (realism), as well as their memberships and policies within regional cooperative security institutions (liberalism), as the basis for making the case that future stability in the Asia-Pacific region would be enhanced by a combination of both approaches. He argues that “moderate postures” emphasizing “diplomacy and reassurance” should prevail over the quest for “strategic advantage” (p. 2). Nonetheless, the author acknowledges the need to maintain U.S. bilateral security arrangements, particularly with Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in Northeast Asia, as the region strengthens reassurance via stronger “multilateral infrastructures” (p. 9). Hence, the book’s policy-directed subtitle: Seeking Convergent Security.

Tow proposes a kind of defensive realism—my phrase, not his—which incorporates the values and concerns of Asia’s middle powers for the purpose of creating consensual security norms. He sees this development as an alternative to American-dominated hegemonic stability or great-power concert (p. 204). Yet in what seems to this reviewer something of a contradiction, he suggests the creation of a two-tier arrangement, the first of which would be a great-power concert of China, Japan, and the United States underwriting the overall security environment. The second tier would be dominated by the middle powers, which would “take the lead in developing mechanisms for trust-building and conflict avoidance” (p. 204). The author prefers to see the great powers (China and the United States) agree to defer to middle powers in assuming responsibility for shaping a new regional security order (p. 213)—though how such a transition might be achieved is undetermined.

The greatest strength of Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations lies in its discussion of the security agendas of the major and middle powers. The region’s most important bilateral security relationship between Japan and the United States, until the late 1990s, had been almost entirely asymmetrical, with Japan dependent on the United States for regional protection. This began to change in 1996 with a new Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, followed the next year by revised U.S.–Japan Defense Guidelines. The net effect of these changes has been to enhance Japan’s role in defense ties, acknowledging “a more strategically capable Japan” (p. 53). The new Guidelines broaden Japan’s strategic role to include noncombat activities and assistance to U.S. forces away from the home islands, as well as the use of Japanese facilities against a regional adversary. Post-9/11 implementation of these Guidelines has included the unprecedented dispatch of Japanese destroyers to the Indian Ocean to assist British and U.S. naval vessels deployed there as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.

U.S. efforts to strengthen its alliances in East Asia complicate its relations with China, which sees the alliances as a continuation of the Cold War containment policy. How then can convergent security be attained in Sino-American relations? Tow adapts Murithia Alagappa’s notion of viewing security as a regional “public good” (p. 216). If East Asian states can regularly consult on current security concerns that are not threat based, then habits of cooperation rather than confrontation will be reinforced. While this proposal may work for issue areas that are cooperative-sum, such as maintaining freedom of the seas and agreeing to joint exploitation in overlapping maritime exclusive economic zones, it is unlikely to resolve core security concerns. It will be very difficult to convert the future of Taiwan—incorporation into China versus independence—into a win-win solution. Tow suggests a modified Hong Kong-type settlement guaranteeing Taiwan’s autonomy alongside China’s gradual political liberalization. Although such an arrangement might be acceptable to more moderate members of the People’s Republic of China leadership, it would be less attractive to Taiwan, especially given the gradual erosion of political liberties in Hong Kong since its 1997 reversion. Convergent security is challenged even further if the United States and Japan ultimately deploy theater missile defenses that could be used to neutralize Beijing’s missile deployments opposite Taiwan.

Tow emphasizes the importance of middle power roles for the realization of convergent security since most conflict flash points involve them, particularly the Korean peninsula, Taiwan, and the South China Sea islands encapsulated by the ASEAN states. He notes that these states pursue military modernization and seek to diversify their politico-security relations. They are also the drivers behind security multilateral dialogue in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). However, because the ARF is an ASEAN-dominated organization, South Korea has been promoting separate Northeast Asian venues, the most successful of which was the creation of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Between 1994 and late 2002, KEDO succeeded in mothballing Pyongyang’s old nuclear reactors—capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium by-product—and constructing in its stead new, less dangerous nuclear power plants funded by Japan, the ROK, and the United States (via petroleum contributions), with additional support from the European Union and others. Although the KEDO arrangement has unraveled, it had demonstrated that multilateral security cooperation could be successful in halting the potential fabrication of nuclear weapons. North Korea’s revelation in 2003 that it is producing weapons grade plutonium reflects KEDO’s breakdown, although future negotiations could restore these arrangements. Indeed, until recently, KEDO was probably Asia’s best example of Tow’s convergent security in action.

In conclusion, William Tow urges closer security collaboration initially among the United States and its main allies (Japan, the ROK, and Australia) and subsequently extension of these contacts both to smaller states and to China. The emphasis would be cooperative security rather than power balancing and could include peacekeeping protocols of the kind developed for the International Force for East Timor in 1999. Bilateral alliances would remain (realism) but would be succeeded by regional security arrangements from which all could benefit (liberalism). This prospect is certainly feasible, though in the end, it is no solution to the core security concerns that continue to bedevil great power relations over Taiwan and Korea.


—Davis B. Bobrow, University of Pittsburgh

Stimulated by the fiftieth anniversary of the San Francisco system of U.S.–Japan relations (keyed on the 1951 Peace Treaty and the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty), this volume undertakes three tasks: summarizing changes and continuities in the bilateral relationship; explaining them through major emphases in contemporary analysis of international relations; and suggesting what each of those changes makes likely for the future of the relationship. The various authors (all American) do so through chapters focused respectively on the “balance of power, economic performance, foreign policy paradigms, domestic politics, the media, international organizations, finance, and technology” (p. 2). The declared intent is to show what each focus can and cannot explain in a causal sense about the relationship as a whole in the half century since San Francisco and, by implication, in the coming years. The collection can then be viewed from each of two knowledge perspectives: informing us about U.S.–Japan relations; and informing us about the gains from applying a particular general focus in international relations analysis to relations between a superpower and a major power.
Success in the first perspective would make the book valuable for those concerned with American and/or Japanese international relations; success in the latter, for those concerned with more general arguments about the key determinants of international relationships when applied in a case-study fashion.

In trying to make knowledge contributions of both kinds, the respective chapters of U.S.–Japan Relations in a Changing World provide a well-informed review of what has changed and continued in each aspect of the relationship and competently apply the major elements of each more general focus. Yet, if only because of limited space, the result is that much of the respective discussions go over ground familiar to specialists either in a particular aspect of the bilateral relationship, or particular analytic focus. Is that price worth paying? A positive answer follows from three demonstrations in the various chapters. The first is that general approaches to international relations analysis can illuminate important aspects of the bilateral relationship, that is, an antidote to uniqueness arguments. The second is that explanation often can benefit from the de facto pooling of explanatory emphases. For example, realist Michael Green (Chapter 2) draws on domestic politics to explain the military relationship, and economics oriented William Grimes (Chapter 3) makes much of perceptions (that is, constructions) to explain policy disconnects from economic actualities. The third demonstration is that sweeping characterizations of international relationships and roles, such as conflictual or cooperative, tense or harmonious, passive or active, dependent or managing, are not so much false as often partial and apply only to some and not all aspects of relationships between nations with complex policy systems and substantial skills and resources. That contribution can be found in particular chapters (e.g., Leonard Schoppa’s on domestic politics) or by comparisons across chapters, for example, arguments that Japan tended to accept a U.S. definition of its place (in the individual chapters put forward conjectures, as does the editor (not necessarily representing all of the other authors) in his conclusion. There is less than complete agreement on those conjectures, nor are the differences explicitly addressed. Of particular note is the significance given (Nitta, pp. 90) or not given to the possibility and consequences of highly assertive U.S. unilaterism across numerous issues and primacy-serving “anticipatory” military interventions. More bluntly, the conclusion (Vogel, pp. 268–69) that the utility of military force will decline calls out for discussion about the “when and why” of the extent to which that conviction will prevail in either one or both nations.

The merits of the approach for the collection’s third task (forsight about the future of the relationship) hinge on one’s acceptance of the interpretations of the past and imagining of the future. For each, doubts are raised by unattended possibilities. For example, with regard to the past, Steven Vogel (Chapters 5–7) defines cooperation as Pareto-like outcomes for the two nations (both or one better off and neither worse off) and a variety of events graded in those terms. Is that an absolute judgment or only one relative to the consequences of different conceivable events? Were the consequences actually positive from a national net outcomes point of view or only expected to be positive by those setting policy? Could they have provided agreements that postponed needed adjustments in papering-over, symptom-relieving senses and fostered illusions and future disappointments on one or both sides of the Pacific?

More generally, the “San Francisco system” is seen not so much as collapsing but as having some of its foundations become shakier, losing the clarity of its import in a more complex, fluid world both of ideas and tangibles. The central scenario is less one of collapse than of erosion, more intense bargaining, and greater doubt about its merits. To what extent does that comparison hinge on the availability of hindsight into the manageability of previous stresses and shocks or on their severity (actual and perceived) at the time when they had to be dealt with? Are relevant aspects for the United States or Japan likely to change more fundamentally in the next fifty years than they have in the past fifty? In effect, over the past fifty years both national policy systems have been making expectations bets, which they factored into their current relations. Have those bets stabilized or not? If doubts and uncertainties are growing about assigning odds to those bets (as Keith Nitta’s “paradigm drift” in Chapter 4 implies), will that lead to more or less effort to prolong the life of the San Francisco system?

As for more specific futures, a number of the individual chapters put forward conjectures, as does the editor (not necessarily representing all of the other authors) in his conclusion. There is less than complete agreement on those conjectures, nor are the differences explicitly addressed. Of particular note is the significance given (Nitta, pp. 90) or not given to the possibility and consequences of highly assertive U.S. unilaterism across numerous issues and primacy-serving “anticipatory” military interventions. More bluntly, the conclusion (Vogel, pp. 268–69) that the utility of military force will decline calls out for discussion about the “when and why” of the extent to which that conviction will prevail in either one or both nations.


— Jonathan Golub, University of Reading

Oran Young has spent 25 years contributing to our understanding of regimes for environmental governance. Like much of his earlier work, this new book examines the roles that institutions play in causing and resolving global environmental degradation. While it borrows liberally from the 1999 Science Plan of the collaborative research program on Institutional Dimensions of Global Environmental Change (IDGEC), it meticulously elaborates IDGEC’s main conceptual themes and uses them to organize a truly vast array of institutional issues that have never before been assembled together in one place. The result is an important conceptual guide that will prove useful for both academicians and practitioners.

By tapping into several current debates at the forefront of political science, the first two chapters establish an analytical framework of unusual intellectual breadth. One debate involves what counts as an institution. Young, like many other new institutionalists, takes institutions to include everything from formal and informal systems of rules to social practices, discourse, and identity. He then goes on to explain why a satisfactory understanding of environmental change requires consideration of all these factors. A second, related debate, especially evident in international relations literature, pits rational choice against constructivist explanations of political outcomes. Recast under his preferred terms, “collective-action model” versus “social-practice model,” Young adapts the debate to illuminate the various mechanisms through which institutions might affect environmental decision making.

This adaptation is clever but also open to question. At the conceptual level, the division between the two models is not nearly as neat as Young suggests. Many would object, for instance, to his appropriation of domestic political factors as a distinguishing characteristic of social-practice models (p. 43). Likewise, rational choice institutionalists who invoke transaction costs to explain the politics (and longevity) of international environmental institutions will wonder at Young’s attempt to distinguish social-practice from collective-action accounts on the basis that the latter are somehow incapable of explaining the “stickiness” of regimes (p. 44). And constructivists will be disappointed that he mentions (p. 125) but does not pursue the possibility that the politics of regime formation might differ from those of daily regime operation. Surely the presence of common norms does not necessarily constitute a prerequisite for long-term environmental regime success, as he suggests. Rather, the key test of constructivism, and thus of the social-practice model, should be whether such norms develop as institutions, socialize, and reconstruct actor identity and interests. Overall, though, since distinguishing
constructivist from rationalist theories remains a central objective within mainstream international relations, we should expect that over time, our ability to extract and test competing hypotheses from Young’s theoretical framework and his two models will improve.

Far more problematic, however, is that much of the theoretical framework serves more as a guide to future work on environmental governance than as a foundation for the present book. Chapter 2 is curiously self-standing, and only three times in subsequent chapters does the author link the discussion back to collective-action or social-practice models.

The next four chapters elaborate upon three interesting analytical themes that receive only brief consideration in the IDGEC Science Plan: fit, interplay, and scale. Fit refers to the (mis)match between institutional arrangements and ecosystems. To fit properly, environmental regimes must, for example, cover the full geographical range of migratory species, must address not only the extraction of resources but also their shipment and ultimate disposal, and must take proper account of an ecosystem’s regenerative capacity. Mismatches that persist over time can simply be the product of scientific ignorance, but Young demonstrates the larger role played by a host of institutional factors, such as path dependence, rent-seeking behavior, jurisdictional disputes, and the dominance of false analogies and inappropriate paradigms in the decision-making process. Interplay refers to how institutional arrangements at the same or different levels of social organization affect one another. Interplay can complicate environmental governance in numerous ways, such as when international obligations clash with territorial sovereignty as well as existing national and local practices, and when goals of environmental and commercial regimes conflict. Scale refers to the generalizability of knowledge pertaining to institutions. To scale up, one would attempt to address global environmental challenges, such as climate change and biodiversity, by applying lessons learned from the ways in which small groups successfully manage to preserve local resources such as, say, Swiss pastures or Philippine aquifers.

It is a testament to Young’s grasp of the enormous complexity of his subject that The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental Change does not offer any easy solutions. Instead, guidance mostly comes in the form of carefully identifying the numerous institutional trade-offs involved when one (re)crafts institutions to deal with fit, interplay, and scale. As antidotes for poor fit, for example, Young advocates greater use of continuous monitoring mechanisms (known as “systems of implementation review”), the injection of more flexibility into the provisions of regimes, and adherence to the precautionary principle, but he recognizes that these measures often yield limited or double-edged results. As for interplay, while he makes a convincing case on behalf of taking local knowledge seriously and experimenting with forms of environmental comanagement (p. 107), he acknowledges that effective enforcement of holistic ecological solutions in a world of prevalent cross-border externalities often demands authoritative institutions at high levels of social organization.

The final two chapters deal with the issue of scale. Young identifies the numerous problems one encounters when trying to scale up, and how these undermine the institutional design principles developed by students of small-scale common pool resource (CPR) problems (e.g., Elinor Ostrom (1990) Governing the Commons, Robert Keohane and Elinor Ostrom (1995) Local Commons and Global Interdependence). Under the heading of “usable knowledge,” he makes a persuasive case that unlike CPRs, where small groups of fairly homogenous appropriators each benefit directly if they can avert a tragedy of the commons through building trust and spontaneous self-regulation, environmental problems at the global level are much more difficult to deal with because they involve pervasive negative externalities, nonunitary actors, disparate cultural norms, and national sovereignty. In short, knowledge about the actors, interest structures, and culturally embedded understandings that underpin CPR solutions simply does not scale well. In contrast to CPRs, solutions to large-scale environmental challenges typically require recourse to higher authority and formal external sanctions. One can of course imagine exceptions, and Young reminds us that battle-of-the-sexes situations obviate the need for external enforcement (p. 172), but he provides no reason to believe that global environmental problems actually exhibit this game structure.

Perhaps because the main objective was to provide a sustained critique of scaling, Young ultimately does not glean much usable knowledge from the previous chapters on fit or interplay. He advocates that practitioners shift their focus from Ostrom’s design principles to what he calls “institutional diagnostics,” which effectively means that they should not overlook interdependencies, and should recognize the potential value of the precautionary principle and the limitations of strictly linear models. This sort of advice is unobjectionable, even if it stops short of providing clear recipes for how to improve compliance with international environmental rules, make those rules more equitable, or resolve perennial problems associated with distributive politics, rent seeking, externalities, and national sovereignty. It is to be hoped that Young’s conceptual guide will enable students of environmental governance eventually to develop such recipes.