Online Appendix for:
“Why Preelectoral Coalitions in Presidential Systems?”

A Data Set

The data set includes presidential elections in the following countries during the specified years:

- Brazil: 1986–2006
- Chile: 1989–2009
- Colombia: 1978–2006

B Identifying Preelectoral Coalitions

I identify a preelectoral coalition between a pair of parties when (a) one party officially nominates the presidential candidate from the other party as their own candidate or (b) the two parties (and possibly other parties) officially contest the presidential election as a coalition. Here are a few notes regarding the identification of electoral alliances or coalitions:

- Just because the name says “Alliance ..” does not mean it is coded as an alliance. For example, Alianza por el Futuro in Peru is the new name for the political party formerly known as Cambio ‘90–Nueva Mayoría, which itself I do not consider a coalition despite the hyphenated name.

- In some cases, the party name is the same as the alliance name, but the alliance also includes other parties. Two examples are the Unión por el Perú and the Plan Progreso para Bolivia.

- I treat some coalitions of parties/factions/movements as political parties because their seats are not distinguished in the legislative results and because the internal groups do not really operate independently from the larger “party,” such as the Frente Amplio in Uruguay.

- In other cases, even though I code a coalition as a coalition (because previously parties did win seats separately), I sometimes cannot separate out the individual seat shares under the coalition, as is the case with the Coalición Unidad in Costa Rica.
I do not include as preelectoral coalition members parties that may have participated in a presidential preelectoral coalition but did not win seats themselves. My dataset includes parties that won at least 1% of the seats or 1% of the presidential vote in the current election or any preceding election covered in the data set.

Preelectoral coalitions often appear in official electoral results, but not always. I used official results from national electoral tribunals whenever possible to identify coalitions. In addition, the following sources provide coalition information, often in footnotes, for several countries:


*Latin American Weekly Report* from Latin American Newsletters. London, UK: Intelligence Research Ltd.

Other country-specific sources that I used besides the national electoral tribunals include:


Uruguay: Area of Politics and International Relations Data bank, Social Science School, Universidad de la República: http://www.fcs.edu.uy/bancoDatos.php
C Classifying Parties

A widely used classification of the ideological positions of Latin American political parties comes from Michael Coppedge’s (1997) survey of experts. Coppedge classified parties that competed in elections until 1996, and Grigore Pop-Eleches (2009) updated Coppedge’s classification through 2003.¹ The classification criteria that Coppedge asked experts to use focused specifically on “the social classes to which parties direct their appeals, as suggested by positions and rhetoric regarding the priority of growth and redistribution.” Party classifications as left, center-left, center, center-right and right distinguish parties along the main, macro-economic policy dimension.

Importantly, Coppedge’s classification scheme also allows experts to indicate those parties that cannot be classified in these left-right terms. The guidelines specifically state that, “parties that are classifiable in left-right terms do not meet the criteria for the ‘Personalist’ or ‘Other Bloc’ categories.” He intends for experts to resort to these residual categories only in “relatively rare” instances, since most parties are roughly classifiable in left-right terms even if personalism, populism, or clientelism make their ideological purity questionable (Coppedge 1997). In my analysis, I consider parties that have been placed in the residual categories as off-dimensional parties, and I count them as particularistic parties in my analysis.

- “Parties that represent an identifiable ideology, program, principle, region, interest, or social group that cannot be classified in left-right or Christian-secular terms” belong in the other bloc.

- Personalist parties are those that base their primary appeal on the qualities of their leader “rather than on any principles or platforms, which are too vague or inconsistent to permit a plausible classification of the party in any other way.” Independents and “unusually heterogeneous electoral fronts” also fall in the personalist category.

Another source of party classifications is the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001). The Database of Political Institutions codes whether the three largest government parties in a country and the largest opposition party can be recognized as espousing economic policies that are left (more redistributionist), right, or centrist; or whether instead the party has no clear stance on these issues (Keefer 2011). Keefer (2011) uses this information to identify parties that are programmatic or not. As he observes, this type of classification is likely to under-count, but not over-count, non-programmatic parties:

The underlying assumption in this coding is that if observers cannot detect efforts by political parties to project a programmatic stance, it is unlikely that the parties are able to do so or that they invest resources in doing so. In fact, the coding rule is generous....The coding rules suggest that some countries may be credited with having programmatic parties that, in fact, do not. It is unlikely, though, that the coding procedures miscode as non-programmatic those parties

¹I am grateful that Michael Coppedge has made this classification publicly available on his website and that Grigore Pop Eleches kindly shared his data.
that do succeed in conveying a programmatic stance to the electorate. (Keefer 2011, 23)

My classification of particularistic parties is largely consistent with these data sets of party classifications, which were compiled with input from country experts. However, I also used detailed case studies to verify classifications and code parties that were missing from these established data sets.

There are a few parties that I have coded as being particularistic-oriented, despite being classified in left-center-right terms by Coppedge or Pop-Eleches. Most of these are parties that case studies show to be primarily focused on the attainment of pork and patronage, with a reputation of political opportunism and an ideological positioning that is centrist, broad, widely varied or otherwise ambiguous: the Nueva Fuerza Republicana in Bolivia (LARRAG 7/23/02); the Frente Nacional de Trabajadores y Campesinos in Peru (Coppedge 1997, fn xlix); the Union Republicana Democrática after 1963 in Venezuela (Molina Vega and Alvarez Diaz 2004); and the Partido Trabahista Brasileiro and the Partido Movimiento Democrático Brasileiro in Brazil (Power 1991; Mainwaring 1999; Ames 2001; Savarese 2009). I also include two Venezuelan parties in the particularistic classification because they are described as personalist electoral vehicles: the Movimiento Quinta Republica in 1998 only and Proyecto Venezuela (Molina V 2002). Finally, although Coppedge’s classified the Argentine Peronists as ‘other’ (to avoid volatile ideological classifications), I code the Partido Justicialista as centrist from 1983–1987 and center-right from 1989–2001 (consistent with the modal rating by country experts reported by Coppedge and with Pop Eleches’ data), and thus do not include them as a particularistic party.

C.1 List of Particularistic Political Parties

Below is a list, by country, of particularistic parties that won at least 1 % of the legislative seats or presidential vote.

F. = Frente, M. = Movimiento / Movimento, P. = Partido, U. = Union

**Argentina**
Blanco de los Jubilados
Confederación Federalista Independiente
F. Cívico por Santiago
F. P. Bonaerense (Buenos Aires Province)
F. P. Nuevo (Corrientes)
M. Popular Neuquino
P. Renovador de Salta
P. Unión y Libertad (San Luis)
Pacto Autonomista Liberal (de Corrientes)

**Bolivia**
Conciencia de Patria
Nueva Fuerza Republicana / Plan Progreso para Bolivia (*CR*)
U. Cívica Solidaridad
Vanguardia REvolucionaria 9 de Abril

**Brazil**
P. da Reconstrução Nacional
P. M. Democrático Brasileiro (*C*)
P. Trabalhista Brasileiro (*CR*)
P. Verde

**Chile**
P. de Acción Regionalista de Chile
U. de Centro Centro Progresista

**Colombia**
Convergencia Ciudadana
Huila Nuevo y Liberalismo
Integración Regional
M. Colombia Siempre (*CR*)
M. Convergencia Popular Cívica
M. Político Comunal y Comunidad Colombiano
M. Unitario Metapolítico
M. Voluntad Popular

**Costa Rica**
Agrario Nacional
F. Nacional
Integración Nacional
P. Accesibilidad sin Exclusión
P. Acción Democrática Alajuelense
P. Demócrata
P. Independiente
P. Nacional Independiente
P. Renovación Democrática
P. Republicano
P. Republicano Calderonista
P. Republicano Nacional
P. Republicano Nacional Independiente
U. Agrícola Cartaginesa
U. Cívica Revolucionaria
U. General

**Ecuador**
Acción Popular Revolucionaria Ecuatoriana
Concentración de Fuerzas Populares
Federación Nacional Velasquista
M. Independiente para una República Auténtica
M. Municipalista por la Integridad Nacional
M. Reivindicación Democrática
M. Transformación Social Independiente
P. Nacionalista Revolucionario
C.2 Cross-Validation of the Particularistic Party Classification

At the party system level, I compare my coding of particularistic-oriented parties using the residual categories of Coppedge’s (1997) classification scheme to two published indices. One comes from Rosas’s (2005) analysis of survey data from the Parliamentary Elites of Latin America project, administered by Manuel Alcántara and the Inter-University Institute of Iberian American and Portuguese Studies (IIEIP) at the University of Salamanca, Spain (Alcántara Sáez and Freidenberg 2001), which interviews Latin American legislators about their ideological orientations, policy positions and political goals.

Table 1 reveals a significant correlation between the share of the seats going to particularistic parties around the time of the Salamanca survey, and the extent to which the survey responses revealed a strong ideological organization in the legislature. Legislatures in these countries are ideologically organized “to the extent that inferred partisan spaces are (a) comparatively good at discriminating among parties and (b) comparatively good at conveying as much information about as many issue stances as possible” (Rosas 2005,
Table 1: Particularistic Parties and Ideological Organization, circa 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Particularistic Parties</th>
<th>Index of Ideological Organization*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(% Seats Won †)</td>
<td>(Election Year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This is Rosas’ (2005) calculation, based on the University of Salamanca’s 1997 Parliamentary Elites of Latin America survey. Countries are ordered in this table from highest to lowest according to this index.
†Includes seats won by particularistic parties that are not listed above because they won less than 1% of the seats. Includes independents but excludes “others” category, if any.

High scores indicate that more information is carried by party labels. In countries scoring high on Rosas’ index, particularistic parties hold fewer seats. In contrast, where particularistic parties have a larger legislative representation, survey responses of legislators indicate less ideological organization. (Note that Table 1 sorts countries from highest to lowest according to Rosas’ index.)

I also compare the classification of particularistic parties to a measure of party system nationalization calculated by Jones and Mainwaring (2003). Figure 1 shows that the share of seats won by particularistic parties across legislative elections is negatively associated with the degree of nationalization in the party system. Jones and Mainwaring’s (2003) party nationalization score is based on a Gini coefficient and assesses the extent to which a party wins equal vote shares across all the sub-national units within a country. The party system score is a weighted sum of the individual party scores. A nationalized party system suggests a more homogeneous electorate with similar patterns of partisan support in place of distinctive regional alignments.

Particularistic parties receive low levels of support in nationalized party systems; when and where they control a larger share of the seats the partisan configuration in district-level electoral support is less nationalized. One earlier election in Costa Rica and two recent elections in Bolivia stand out from this overall pattern. In Costa Rica in 1982, the personalist Partido Republicano Calderonista was the major party in the Coalición Unidad, which won approximately 32% of the seats. In Bolivia, the particularistic seat share in both of these legislative elections was split between CONDEPA and the Unión Cívica Solidaridad (UCS). While CONDEPA’s support was highly concentrated in the Department of La Paz, support for the UCS was more nationalized, as was support for Bolivia’s traditional parties (namely, MNR and ADN).
At the individual party level, I examine the expert ratings of particularistic parties that were included in the survey administered by Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009). In particular, I compare the ratings of particularistic parties to the ratings of programmatic parties in terms of the importance of the taxes vs. spending dimension to the political party, rather than its position along this dimension. Figure 2 reveals that particularistic parties rank among lowest in terms of the salience of policies of economic redistribution.

Together, these comparisons provide cross-validation that the particularistic party classification includes parties that emphasize regional and particularistic interests over identifiable left-right macro-economic policy programs.

Figure 1: Particularistic Parties and Regionalism
Figure 2: Particularistic Parties and the Salience of Economic Redistribution
Table 2: Probability of Presidential Electoral Coalition Formation, Alternative Analyses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Alternate Coding(a)</th>
<th>Alternate Distance(b)</th>
<th>Without VP Cases(c)</th>
<th>Restricted Data(d)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy-Seeking Party</td>
<td>1.381***</td>
<td>0.956***</td>
<td>1.031***</td>
<td>0.664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.404)</td>
<td>(0.280)</td>
<td>(0.359)</td>
<td>(0.407)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Distance</td>
<td>-0.337</td>
<td>-0.219***</td>
<td>-0.895</td>
<td>-1.219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.682)</td>
<td>(0.0311)</td>
<td>(0.674)</td>
<td>(0.832)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy-Seeking Party x Distance</td>
<td>-0.598</td>
<td>-0.0356</td>
<td>-0.289</td>
<td>0.322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.699)</td>
<td>(0.0217)</td>
<td>(0.703)</td>
<td>(0.852)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate Reelection Possible</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>-0.0362</td>
<td>-0.189</td>
<td>-0.494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.617)</td>
<td>(0.545)</td>
<td>(0.608)</td>
<td>(0.766)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy-Seeking Party x Reelection</td>
<td>-0.394</td>
<td>-0.384</td>
<td>-0.129</td>
<td>-0.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.557)</td>
<td>(0.480)</td>
<td>(0.548)</td>
<td>(0.750)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Party</td>
<td>-0.482</td>
<td>0.235</td>
<td>-0.709</td>
<td>-0.638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.624)</td>
<td>(0.749)</td>
<td>(0.756)</td>
<td>(1.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runoff System</td>
<td>-0.515</td>
<td>-0.571</td>
<td>-0.794*</td>
<td>-0.548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.418)</td>
<td>(0.424)</td>
<td>(0.452)</td>
<td>(0.434)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concurrent Elections</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>0.0658</td>
<td>0.0626</td>
<td>-0.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.489)</td>
<td>(0.495)</td>
<td>(0.534)</td>
<td>(0.508)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged ENPS</td>
<td>0.163*</td>
<td>0.188*</td>
<td>0.187*</td>
<td>0.197*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0964)</td>
<td>(0.0985)</td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Legislative Polarization</td>
<td>-0.860</td>
<td>-0.989</td>
<td>-0.785</td>
<td>0.362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.293)</td>
<td>(1.315)</td>
<td>(1.419)</td>
<td>(1.437)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Seat Share</td>
<td>-0.0762</td>
<td>-0.0402</td>
<td>-0.221</td>
<td>-0.823***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.236)</td>
<td>(0.237)</td>
<td>(0.258)</td>
<td>(0.305)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.620***</td>
<td>-3.786***</td>
<td>-4.158***</td>
<td>-3.441***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.679)</td>
<td>(0.635)</td>
<td>(0.699)</td>
<td>(0.690)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>6,414</td>
<td>6,263</td>
<td>6,390</td>
<td>2,558</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 ; election-specific random effects included.

\(a\) Stricter coding of particularistic parties; alters ideological polarization as well.

\(b\) Calculates ideological distance as the absolute value between parties’ positions on Baker & Greene’s (2011) 1 to 20 left-right scale.

\(c\) Excluding parties that accepted the vice-presidential nomination in an electoral coalition; n=24, plus 2 missing.

\(d\) Restricting the analysis to include only parties that held seats in the legislature at the time of the presidential election.
Figure 3: Estimated Marginal Effects Based on Supplementary Results

**Policy-Seeking**

Original
Alternate Coding
Alternate Distance
No VP cases
Current Leg. Parties Only

**Distance**

Original
Alternate Coding
Alternate Distance
No VP cases
Current Leg. Parties Only

95% confidence interval for difference in predicted probability of PEC

Note: The top panel illustrates the marginal effect of being a policy- rather than office-seeking party. The bottom panel illustrates the marginal effect of increasing ideological distance between the presidential candidate’s party and a policy-seeking party from 0.5 to 1.0.
### Figure 4: Robustness Check

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Excluded</th>
<th>Number of Observations</th>
<th>Number of Elections</th>
<th>Coefficient (p-value)</th>
<th>Percent Change in Predicted Probability of PEC *</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Policy-Seeking</td>
<td>Distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>5676</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1.15 (.002)</td>
<td>-0.87 (.234)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>5531</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>1.13 (.001)</td>
<td>-0.70 (.217)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>6020</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1.27 (.000)</td>
<td>-0.48 (.436)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>6270</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0.91 (.007)</td>
<td>-0.81 (.182)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>5896</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1.08 (.001)</td>
<td>-0.64 (.257)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>5390</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1.03 (.004)</td>
<td>-0.56 (.326)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>4923</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0.96 (.009)</td>
<td>-0.69 (.278)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>6374</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>1.10 (.001)</td>
<td>-0.67 (.244)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>6037</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1.00 (.004)</td>
<td>-0.61 (.282)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>6326</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1.05 (.002)</td>
<td>-0.68 (.229)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>5697</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0.96 (.011)</td>
<td>-0.73 (.206)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* All of these marginal effects are statistically significant at the 95% level.
References


