**New Books**

*Sameness and Substance Renewed*
By David Wiggins,

This book is a new version of David Wiggins’s well-known *Sameness and Substance* (*SS*), originally published by Blackwell in 1980. Wiggins has painstakingly revised and updated his original text, introducing one new chapter and rewriting another. Since *SS* was itself an expansion and development of an earlier work, *Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity* (Blackwell, 1967), *Sameness and Substance Renewed* (*SSR*) presents Wiggins’s latest statement of positions on which he has been working for almost four decades. No doubt some will dismiss *SSR* as the philosophical equivalent of a ‘digital re-mastering’ of a classic recording, supplemented by a couple of ‘bonus tracks’, and of interest to connoisseurs alone. But this would be a mistake. *SSR* offers a vibrant and engaging treatment of some of the deepest questions of metaphysics and epistemology. The new material, comprising almost half the text, is consistently insightful, just as the old is of enduring relevance. This is a book that deserves to be widely read and discussed.

Wiggins’s principal aim is to present ‘a theory of the individuation of continuants’ (p. 1). By ‘continuants’, he means things that persist whole through time and change (in contrast to events, universals, etc.); that is, substances, living and non-living, natural and artificial. By ‘individuation’, he means the exercise of a subject’s capacity to single out a continuant from its surroundings and keep track of it through time and change.

Any account of individuation will presuppose a conception of *identity*. Wiggins argues that identity is ‘sortal dependent’. When a thinker singles out an object, *a*, the question ‘What is *a*?’ will have an answer, whether or not the subject knows it. The answer will be given by citing some sortal concept, *f*, under which *a* falls throughout its existence (e.g. *frog*; *house*) and which determines a principle of identity for *a*. All other sortal attributions true of *a* (e.g. *animal*, *amphibian*; *dwelling*, *mansion*) will be restrictions of this preferred sortal. To take *a* to be an *f* is to commit oneself to a view of what it is for *a* to persist through time and to be identical or not with any *b* thought to be the same object as *a*. If *a* is identical with *b*, then *a* and *b* have the same history, so to determine whether *a* is *b* we have to look ‘forwards and backwards’ along the trajectory of their life histories to establish whether those histories coincide, and to do this we have to know what kind of objects *a* and *b* are: hence sortal dependence.

It is crucial that, for Wiggins, ‘sortal dependent’ does not mean ‘sortal relative’. If we ask whether *a* and *b* are the same object, the answer is not relative to how *a* and *b* are classified; objects cannot be identical *qua f* but
distinct qua g. Neither can it be objectively indeterminate whether a is b. It might be difficult to determine whether a is b, but that is a fact about our epistemic situation, not about the nature(s) of a and b—either a is b or it isn’t: identity is ‘absolute, determinate, and all or nothing’. The fundamental insight here is this. If a is identical with b, there are not two objects somehow identical with each other, but one that we sometimes refer to as ‘a’ and sometimes as ‘b’. Thus Leibniz’s Law must be true: if a and b are identical, any property a has, b has. There is no room for a’s properties to diverge from b’s: they are one and the same object. Thus someone who understands identity understands why, if a is b, then a’s properties are b’s properties, but identity cannot be explained as coincidence of properties. The identity of indiscernibles is false in any version that is not trivially true. Identity is primitive; there is no prospect of reducing it to some other relation.

Wiggins’s strategy against proponents of the relativity of identity is as follows. First, he argues that their position is inconsistent with Leibniz’s Law, which cannot be abandoned because it underwrites the substitutivity of identity, a principle fundamental to our reasoning (pp. 28, 45–50). No attempt to modify or restrict the law has succeeded. Second, Wiggins considers and rejects various supposed examples of the relativity of identity (pp. 28–52). Consider a statue, S, which has endured since antiquity, but has been greatly repaired over the years. A relative identity theorist might say that S, now in the British Museum, is the same statue that originally stood in the Parthenon, but is not the same block of stone. Wiggins would respond that a statue is not identical with the matter that composes it. If we say that the statue ‘is’ a block of stone, we are using ‘the “is” of constitution’ not ‘the “is” of identity’. We should therefore describe the case thus: S, the statue once of the Parthenon and now in the British Museum, is not composed of the same material as it originally was. Likewise, the same train may have a different engine and coaches, the same pitch different grass and goalposts. Nothing here supports the relativity of identity. Other cases require somewhat different treatment, but all can be rendered consistent with absolutism about identity (e.g. Geach’s famous example of Tibbies the cat(s), discussed by Wiggins on pp. 173–76).

In the case of a natural substance, the preferred sortal concept determines what Wiggins, following Leibniz, calls a ‘principle of activity’: the substance’s ‘way of being, acting-and reacting’ (p. 72 note; no agency is implied—a rock has a principle of activity). Such a principle is nomologically grounded in the causal and dispositional properties of members of the kind and is discoverable a posteriori. It constitutes a ‘real essence’: that upon which the very existence of members of the kind is conditional as a matter of de re necessity. Wiggins thus embraces the sort of semantics of natural kind terms propounded by Putnam and Kripke. A seemingly natural kind is initially identified deictically (e.g. a ‘tiger’ is anything relevantly like one of those) and thus the meaning of a natural kind term makes ineliminable allusion to members of its actual extension.
Where a genuine natural kind has been identified, the standards of relevant likeness among its members will be set by their common principle of activity.

Wiggins dubs his position ‘conceptualist realism’. It is conceptualist because the sortal concepts we bring to bear on reality determine what we can find there. It is realist because whether what we take to be in the world is in the world, and whether it has the nature we suppose it to have, rest, for the most part, on how things are independent of us. Individuation is mind’s work, and the character of our conceptual scheme reflects our cognitive and practical interests. But though we invent ways of seeing things, we do not invent what is there to be seen.

In his final chapter, Wiggins argues that the identity of persons coincides with the identity of living human beings. The mode of activity of human beings essentially involves the exercise of our distinctive psychological capacities, so the integrity of our mental lives is vital to our identity. But, in turn, continuity of consciousness must be seen as an expression of the life activity of a creature engaged with the world. In this way, Wiggins undermines the traditional dichotomy between psychological-continuity and bodily-continuity theories. Personal identity is not a matter of the continuity of either mind or body, but of the enduring existence of an embodied minded being.

Those familiar with SS will recognize these doctrines. What, then, is new in SSR? The most dramatic development is that the chapter on persons has been entirely recast. Wiggins used to represent his ‘human being theory’ as an attempt to preserve the truth in Lockean approaches that construe personal identity in terms of the continuity of consciousness mediated by experiential memory. Though he retains admiration for Locke, Wiggins now sides with Butler’s famous objection that experiential remembering presupposes personal identity and cannot explain it. Accordingly, he targets contemporary neo-Lockean views, revisiting Sydney Shoemaker’s brain transplant thought experiments that influenced his earliest writings on personal identity.

Shoemaker invites us to consider a case (A) where Brown’s brain is successfully transplanted into another body, preserving psychological continuity. Wiggins formerly concurred with Shoemaker’s view that the resulting person, Brownson, would be Brown. What exercised Wiggins was a second case (B) where Brown’s brain is split to produce two viable hemispheres, each successfully transplanted into distinct bodies. Assuming that psychological continuity is preserved, the result would be two ‘splinter’ Brownsons each with a claim to be Brown. Wiggins’s view of identity compels him to deny that either splinter Brownson is Brown, but it is hard to give a principled rationale for this judgment. If, in case A, only Brown’s left hemisphere had been transplanted and the right destroyed, we would surely have said that the resulting half-brain Brownson was Brown. Yet half-brain Brownson is identical to one of the splinter Brownsons who, it seems, cannot be Brown because of the existence of the other splinter. But, for Wiggins, whether a person X is identical with person Y is supposed to
depend only on the nature(s) of $X$ and $Y$, and not on considerations about the existence of rival claimants.

Wiggins’s original response to the problem was simply to insist that the vital functions of a person must be ‘subserved by a single organized parcel of matter’ (p. 208). But he was never happy with this question-begging ‘one-parcel stipulation’ and almost relieved, I think, when it was upstaged by Derek Parfit’s very different response to the puzzle. Parfit argued that such cases show that it is not identity that matters to survival, but psychological continuity, a relation both splinters bear to Brown. Parfit was therefore compelled to introduce a notion of psychological continuity that did not presuppose personal identity. To this end, he minted his infamous conception of ‘quasi-memory’, where a subject has an accurate quasi-memory of a past experience if (a) she seems to remember having the experience, (b) someone had the experience, and (c) her ‘memory’ is causally dependent, ‘in the right way’, on the experience. It follows from this definition that ‘normal’ memories are a sub-class of quasi-memories.

Quasi-memory is anathema to Wiggins. He argues that experiential memories are not self-interpreting presentations that might be shared like photographs (so that someone else’s might get into your collection). To be recognizable as a memory, a state must be a candidate to play a certain epistemic role, and that is possible only if what is remembered is placed in the context of the life history of the rememberer. It follows that memory is essentially identity-involving, and quasi-memory can be dismissed as a philosophical chimera.

Vanquishing Parfit, however, leaves Shoemaker’s puzzle intact. Wiggins’s latest response involves re-evaluating his initial reaction to case A (pp. 232–6). In keeping with his earlier stance, he maintains that if we think identity is preserved in case A, then we must see this a limiting case of identity and survival (p. 211). But he now argues that we should be wary of granting that Brownson is Brown. A person is an embodied physical presence. If Brown is to survive the brain transplant, we need to be able to recognize him in the demeanour of the new body. Yet when we think hard about matters of physiognomy, it is by no means evident that Brown will be there to be found. We do not wear our bodies like clothes: we are our bodies. This may be an example of the ‘is of constitution’, rather than identity, but it does not follow that radical reconstitution is a live option. Philosophy needs to pay due attention to the intimate relation of persons to the specific physical character of their embodiment.

If the relation of Brownson to Brown is not one of identity, then we must see Brownson as a clone or replica of Brown, a judgment also apt for the two splinters. It might, of course, be suggested that we should view Brown not as a particular, but as a concrete universal that finds instantiation in his psychologically continuous successor or successors. But to understand persons in that way is to abandon our normal conception in favour of a quite different notion. Wiggins expresses grave moral reservations about doing so, and about creating a world which world appear to necessitate such a change in our self-conceptions.
The new chapter is a success, but a qualified one. Though the discussion of Parfit and Shoemaker is compelling, the tortuous argument is long and ungainly (Wiggins himself describes it as ‘endless’ (p. 237)). The chapter omits important material from SS, including the thought-provoking treatment of social constructionist views of persons, and incorporates little of Wiggins’s more discursive treatments of personhood from the intervening years. As a result, though it refutes some rival views, it does not really develop Wiggins’s important view of the consilience of the concepts person and human being. The chapter therefore should not be seen as the definitive successor to Wiggins’s other writings on persons, but should be read in conjunction with them.

SSR incorporates much other new material, including a chapter designed to consolidate Wiggins’s absolutism about identity. This contains extended discussion of the difficulty of reducing identity to other relations, a critique of the idea of indeterminate objects, and an engaging denial that there can be ‘near misses’ in the domain of identity: one object cannot be almost numerically identical with another, Wiggins has also made significant modifications to arguments in other chapters. For example, he now endorses not just the necessity of identity (if \( a \) is identical with \( b \), then it is necessary that \( a \) is identical with \( b \)), but also the necessity of difference (if \( a \) is different from \( b \), then it is necessary that \( a \) is different from \( b \)). This leads him to assert that ‘facts about the identity and difference of individuals are part of the necessary structure of reality and are completely invariant across possible worlds’, and thus that we cannot envisage possible worlds ‘in a way that would conflict with the identities and distinctnesses that actually hold’ (p. 117). In addition, everything retained from SS has been edited in the interest of perspicuity or style (though some changes are just plain eccentric: what was a vole in SS (p. 10) is a water-vole in SSR (p. 11)).

It is important, however, that SSR’s significance resides not just in its innovations. Indeed, it is striking how much of the older material retains its freshness and relevance. Indeed, the aptness of Wiggins’s treatment of conceptualism and realism has been heightened rather than diminished by the years. The last two decades have seen incessant discussion of scope and limits of realism. What distinguishes Wiggins’s approach from so many others (including Rorty’s, whose Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature appeared just before SS) is that Wiggins is utterly unperturbed by the spectre of scepticism. He does not think that our view of the relation of concepts and reality should be defined by the threat of scepticism, or by the need to defuse or subvert the sceptic’s position. Nor does he see scepticism as a symptom of a philosophical malaise that can be cured only by embracing scientific naturalism or deconstruction. He thus finds it easy to advance the remarkably sane view that our concepts determine what we are able to find in the world, but not what is there to be found. Though Wiggins defends this view principally by releasing the pressure to embrace more radical species of conceptualism or realism, it is not presented merely as a naive conception to be protected from philosophical distortion.
Conceptualist realism is itself philosophically motivated: it is justified by its role in a satisfying account of individuation.

Another important survivor from SS is the discussion of artefacts. That artefacts can survive disassembly and renovation poses special problems for an absolutist view of identity. The classic puzzle-case is Hobbes’ Ship of Theseus example. Over many years, the planks of Theseus’s ship are replaced, until none of the original matter remains. The discarded planks are nonetheless kept and are finally reassembled to form a ship. Which ship, the renovated or the rebuilt, is identical to Theseus’s original?

Unlike the parallel case of Brown and the Brownsons, everything relevant to the identity question seems open to view: we know exactly what happened and how. It thus seems unlikely that the problem emerges from a deep philosophical confusion or that its solution depends on the discovery of some presently hidden metaphysical truth. It is therefore, tempting to suggest it must be resolved by decision or stipulation. In the absence of its rival, we would likely say of either ship that it is Theseus’s. But where there are rival claimants, we must consider which has the best claim to be the original and that depends on questions of interest or perspective. Do we care more that the renovated ship is united to the original by a continuous line of functioning, or that the reconstructed ship is composed of the same matter as the original ship? It is not clear that we can force this issue, or even that we should. If someone wants to know which ship is the Ship of Theseus, why not simply explain the details of the case and let her decide, or decide whether or not to decide?

Wiggins, of course, can have none of this. He needs the question of whether ship A, at time $t_0$, is identical with ship B, at time $t_1$, to have a determinate answer, and one that does not depend on the rival claims of some other ship, C. Wiggins admits, of course, that the continued existence of an artefact is consistent with its occasional disassembly, a measure of replacement of its parts, and some modification in its functions or their significance. What he cannot permit is ‘arbitrarily much of all three kinds of change’ (p. 170). But how much change is too much? Concerning renovation, he makes the following proposal: an artefacts parts may be replaced so long as it retains more than half its original matter (or ‘the material of some individuatively paramount nucleus’) (p. 100). Wiggins immediately apologizes for the ‘comical precision’ of this ‘first attempt’, but the very idea of such a quantitative criterion seems a counsel of despair, motivated solely by the need to render artefact identity determinate and rule out the possibility of rival claimants.

In my view, what must be recognized is that the extent to which an artefact can survive the replacement of its original matter depends on the particular nature of the object under scrutiny. Wiggins holds that certain works of art, being the realization of an artist’s vision, have something close to a particular essence. The artist aims to create a certain effect that cannot be expressed in instrumental or non-aesthetic terms but is conveyed by just this aesthetic object. For this reason, interfering with the matter of the artwork threatens its obliteration. Wiggins, however, draws a
sharp distinction between artworks and ‘ordinary’ artefacts, which have a
purely nominal essence and identity conditions accordingly determined
by the relevant sortal concepts. The sharp distinction, however, fails to coun-
tenance the importance of the fact that many created objects have a special
significance for us bound up with the specific matter that composes them.
Consider a wedding ring, a family heirloom, or trinkets exchanged by
lovers. Such objects will survive far less renovation than Wiggins’s no-
more-than-49% rule permits. This reflects deep facts about the ‘meta-
physics of constitution’. An object may not be identical to the matter
that comprises it, but its matter is nonetheless that with which we interact,
that in which we perceive significance (aesthetic, personal or other), and that
to which we ‘become attached’. The character of our attachment influences
the extent to which we will tolerate the object’s renovation, because, I want
to claim, it influences what the object is. This is not true, of course, where
an artefact is valued purely instrumentally. Dishwashers can survive far
more than 50% part-replacement, because we are indifferent to their matter;
their parts simply subserve their functioning.

This ‘particularist’ insight complicates the doctrine of sortal dependen-
cy, forcing us to acknowledge that the identity conditions of some artefacts
will be determined not by the relevant sortals alone, but will require qual-
ification in particular cases. Moreover, it will be contestable—perhaps
essentially contestable—how much renovation or reassembly such an arte-
fact can withstand. It may also be essentially contestable whether the
artefact is such that its conditions of identity are affected by the signifi-
cance of the matter that constitutes it. This is surely true of the Ship of
Theseus. In my view, this is a case where functioning trumps constitution.
I take the renovated ship to be the original and see the reconstructed ship
as a replica of the ship in its original condition, made from the very wood
that originally composed it. My grounds for this judgment are that the
original ship was built to sail, and it is a feature of working wooden ships
that they regularly require repair. Diamonds are forever, but ships spring
leaks. What Theseus dedicated to Apollo was a vessel, not a collection
of planks, and anyone properly imagining its the future life-history would
anticipate its gradual renovation, recognizing that the longer it endures the
more its original matter will be replaced. Indeed, I am prepared to grant
that the prospect of radical renovation is, ceterus paribus, part of the iden-
tity conditions determined by the sortal ship. The Ship of Theseus is not,
in my view, a case where considerations about the significance of the
particular matter that composes it should pull much weight. But this
solution is certainly open to reasonable dispute, and on the grounds that in
this particular case other things are not equal.

Some will suspect that the introduction of a degree of particularism
about artefact identity is inconsistent with Wiggins’s view of identity as
absolute, determinate, and all-or-nothing. First, when over-zealous repair
destroys my wedding ring, is it not natural to say, with the relative-identi-
ty theorist, that this is the ring that I left at the jeweller’s, but not the same
wedding ring? Or perhaps that this is the same object, but not the same
ring? Wiggins is forced to say that the repair has created a new object: a new ring. Second, it will be argued that if the identity of certain artefacts rests on the significance we perceive in their matter, and that this depends on interest or attitude, we are far too implicated in the construction of the relevant facts to think of them as part of the metaphysical contours of reality. At least in such cases, identity is surely a matter of invention not discovery, and that will inevitably introduce vagueness and indeterminacy. Wiggins, in contrast, must insist that, even where significance matters, our thinking about artefact identity is guided by the thought that there comes a point at which further renovation fails to preserve identity and that our attitudes are not sovereign over the outcome. We do not think it up to us to decide whether a cherished object has survived repair. Wiggins has always been talented at reconciling the cognitive and subjective dimensions of moral judgment, portraying moral properties as both creatures of sentiment and genuine features of reality. A similar dialectical sensibility is needed to properly appreciate the nature and importance of the artefactual. Again, this will complicate Wiggins’s initial picture according to which artefacts have a nominal essence that is, in principle, verbally definable. But that picture deserves to be complicated to do proper justice to the sense in which the world we create acquires a life of its own. (Are we so confident that the essences of such objects as economic markets, cities, computer viruses, and medicines, are merely nominal?)

In all this, the key question is whether Wiggins can maintain his absolutism without doing violence to our considered intuitions about identity. For Wiggins represents himself as elucidating conceptions of identity that are deeply entrenched within our conceptual scheme. Such conceptions may appear unfamiliar when first made explicit, but they should not seem alien to us after due critical reflection. I am optimistic that Wiggins can sustain his position, even if it is modified as I propose. But no doubt his opponents will not share my optimism.

Wiggins’s vision of philosophical method is, I believe, as important as any specific doctrine advanced in SSR. Wiggins is a practitioner of descriptive metaphysics in Strawson’s sense. He is contemptuous of philosophers who aspire to renovate our conceptual scheme by revising or eliminating our deeply entrenched concepts, and he is scathingly critical of the excesses of mereology, possible world theory, and reductionisms of various stripes. Such frameworks, if coherent, are ultimately parasitic upon the ‘everyday’ concepts they are supposed to displace. Wiggins in contrast aims is to make explicit the conceptions of identity and individuation that inform our modes of thought and talk and to elucidate them by exploring the connections they bear to other concepts that are, so far as possible, independently intelligible. To this end, he insists we reflect hard upon the way these notions are deployed in light of the practical and cognitive interests they serve. He uses philosophical terminology often, but only to abbreviate, summarize or systematize our ways of speaking, not to replace them with something better. Similarly, he employs formal logic to exhibit the structure of our thinking, not to transcend it. For all his book’s
technical adeptness, Wiggins appreciates that tough-minded analysis and
deductive argument only go so far. Philosophy aspires to render perspicu-
ous our concepts and their commitments, to deepen our understanding of
them, of the world they disclose to us, and of ourselves. This takes
wisdom, not just rigor, and Wiggins works hard to cultivate in his readers
appropriate sensibilities of theoretical judgment. His thought is richly
informed by historical figures, ancient and modern: especially, Aristotle,
Leibniz and Frege. Wittgenstein’s influence is also felt, but Wiggins lacks
the Wittgenstein’s anxiety about the sickness of philosophical theorizing
and his consequent romanticism of language ‘at home’. For Wiggins,
philosophical reflection upon our forms of thought and talk can be gen-
uinely illuminating, helping us see far beyond how things are with us to the
nature of things. The resulting insights may be anthropocentric, qualified
by our theoretical and practical interests, but they are nonetheless real.

This combination of formal dexterity and rhetorical sophistication in
the service of descriptive metaphysics, informed by rare scholarly
integrity and profound appreciation of the history of philosophy, makes
Sameness and Substance Renewed a superb example of the best analytic
philosophy in the British, specifically Oxford, tradition. It is to be hoped
that this fact will not be lost on present students of the genre, or on future
historians of philosophy.

David Bakhurst

Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience
By M. R. Bennett and P. M. S. Hacker

Long after a child has attained a measure of agility and originality in fram-
ing sentences there is still the need for adult supervision and guidance, lest
this acquired power be misused. One must be instructed in the art of polite
conversation, in the need for clarity and economy of expression, in the
moral fault of exaggeration and deception. It is just this task that Bennett
and Hacker accept as they examine recent decades of those conceptual and
linguistic confusions likely to number among the more embarrassing
bequests of ‘cognitive neuroscience’. The project they set for themselves
is ‘the clarification of the conceptual scheme of discourse concerning the facul-
ties of mankind and other sentient animals’ (p. 114). Philosophically tutored
readers who, saved by the Fates or by productive distractions, have been
spared exposure to the gaudy rhetoric of the brain sciences, will be
shocked by the rampant, basic, habitual and even banal conceptual confu-
sions on which ‘neuroscience’ stakes its claims. Bennett and Hacker have
identified these with clinical precision and with such relentless good sense
as to leave no room for any honourable response other than contrition. It
is doubtful, however, that this will be the response, and this for reasons to
be briefly considered later.
The book contains fourteen chapters under three major headings, these followed by one appendix devoted to the work of Daniel Dennett and another to John Searle. In Part I the authors sketch the early history of sciences relevant to the development of ‘neuroscience’, moving next to significant figures in the twentieth century (Sherrington, Adrian, Eccles, Penfield), and then to contemporary figures of prominence (Crick, Blakemore, Damasio, et al.) who exemplify in an especially instructive manner the lingering confusions of the Cartesian bequest. Where Sherrington and his students were content to affirm a mentalistic dualism, the current generation would retain the mysterious inner world but demystify it. How? Simply by assigning the mental predicates to the brain, as if something of ontological consequence, let alone explanatory progress, were thereby achieved.

The pages devoted to the early history of the larger subject do not pretend to be detailed. The major developments are summarized in a manner the non-specialist will find accessible. If there is a missing Prince of Denmark in these pages it is Gall, whose neuroanatomical labours and whose failed phrenology provided most of the impetus to the work of Flourens and his successors. Gall would have been useful to the authors in still another way for, in the face of systematic misunderstandings of what he was actually claiming, he was careful to distinguish between a theory of causation and a delineation of the conditions necessary for various psychological outcomes.

Chapter 3, ‘The Mereological Fallacy in Neuroscience’, launches the philosophical project of the book. Fully indebted to Wittgenstein, the authors expose the incoherence of ascribing psychological events to the brain, an incoherence arising from the failure to comprehend the nature of part-whole relationships, hence the mereological fallacy. (A special bonus in these pages is the reminder that Aristotle never succumbed to such a fallacy; pp. 15–16 and fn. p. 71). Against the predictable defences, Bennett and Hacker leave no doubt but that offenders are not trafficking in mere metaphor or analogy. Leaders of thought in today’s neuroscience speak of the brain’s memories, emotions, perceptions, representations, aims, etc., not in a figurative but in a factual way, as in, ‘What you see is not what is really there, it is what your brain believes is there’ (p. 75, quoting Francis Crick). The remedy for such truly odd expressions is administered throughout the book and is given in an easily managed dose thus:

‘It is not the mind that is the subject of psychological attributes, any more than it is the brain. It is the living human being—the whole animal’...(p. 65)

In Part II there are separate chapters (4–12) devoted to specific faculties or powers: Sensation and perception, cognition, emotion, volition and voluntary movement, consciousness and qualia, self-consciousness. Each is rich with philosophical insights and a well earned scolding. Making clear (as if it should be necessary!) that, e.g., one sees not with one’s brain but with one’s eyes (for the brain ‘sees’ nothing), the authors then remind the will-
ing reader that perception is itself part of the overall cognitive power of an entity capable of acquiring knowledge through experience. The first lines of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* would have served the authors well on these pages but even more so would have been Thomas Reid’s defense of that common sense realism that seems to be readily embraced throughout chapter 4. Unfortunately, Reid is given no more than a footnote (p. 193), but an instructive one. Nonetheless, Reid scholars will recognize if not his influence than surely his vindication in the pages of chapter 4 that challenge the representational theory of perception, which Reid dubbed ‘the ideal theory’. A normal percipient sees the world, not a picture of it, except in art galleries and photographs. And, of course, the brain ‘sees’ nothing, for it has neither eyes nor a presence in the visible world.

How pathetic that it would be necessary in the 21st century to have to insist that ‘only what one cares about … can be an object of one’s emotion’ (p. 238). How worrisome that, again in the 21st century, a serious treatise must reserve space to remind readers that the cause of an action is different from the reason for its performance (chapter 8), that it is the person, not the brain, that is subject to conscious and unconscious states (chapter 9). One might have hoped that, even if Reid is not prominent on the B. Phil. examination, good sense alone would dispose Damasio and other to recognize that, ‘qualia are not the qualitative characteristics of experiences at all, but the qualities of objects of experience’ (p. 275). There are no ‘blue experiences’.

The chapters on consciousness and self-consciousness also test and tease the methods and confident conclusions of today’s neuroscientific leadership. The mysteries and predicaments are traced by Bennett and Hacker to stock reductionistic dogmas, to a naive physicalism, to the ghost of Descartes and to sundry conceptual hobgoblins. Thus, ‘If we think that physics is the ultimate arbiter on what exists … we are confused both about physics and about what physics reveals’ (p. 300), for on this account the ontological status of Gothic cathedrals, novels and flourishing economies must be doubtful in the extreme. The seemingly daunting question of just what ‘advantage’ is conferred by the evolution of consciousness is also subjected to a common sense appraisal: Does one seriously question just what is gained by a creature aware of its surroundings? And, once an interlocutor has specified just what a zombie is, a serious turn of mind is all that it takes to recognize the conceptual impossibility. As for reductionism (chapter 13), it draws inspiration from contexts radically and fundamentally different from lived life and is tied to an explanatory scheme (Hempelian ‘covering law’) uniquely unsuitable. Neither William Dray nor Peter Winch is cited in this chapter, but the authors fully appreciate the weighty criticisms each developed against the proposition that human social, cultural and historical events are subsumable under general laws.

Readers must decide whether the two concluding chapters, devoted respectively to Dennett and to Searle, add much to the volume as a whole. Perhaps these chapters serve to illustrate how the right method of philosophizing might readily identify confusions in works that continue to be influential. Dennett, as the author say, is widely read by the neuroscience
community, and Searle has provided authoritative philosophical support for the mind-as-brain thesis that animates the intellectual life of this same community. This much granted, it is not at all clear that so rich and thorough a critique required these two additional chapters.

What reasonable expectations might the authors have, now that they have done so much to clarify and guide discourse in the neuroscientific realm? And is clarification sufficient as a guide? Put another way, what point is there in showing the fly the way out of the bottle, just in case the fly wants to stay put? These are large questions and do not benefit from compression; It is best to begin with something of a coda on Cartesianism and that mode of conceptual analysis made somewhat doctrinal by Wittgenstein and his philosophical adherents.

Descartes was a man of affairs, an itinerant soldier, a man on the move, an original thinker in mathematics, optics and physiology. On the face of it, it would be odd if his deepest thought on philosophical matters produced little more than a gaggle of textbook fallacies. In his reply to Hobbes’s third objection, Descartes states that the faculty of understanding is distinct from the one who understands. He then explains his own use of language in this regard as arising from the desire to strip the act itself of all features or properties not belonging to thinking proper. Only on this basis, he says, does he employ ‘the most highly abstract terms’. This, as it happens, is entirely consistent with the aim of Bennett and Hacker to extricate cognition from the domain of material-biological processes. Bodies do not cogitate, persons do. What sort of persons? Surely not comatose ones; surely not sleeping ones. It must be those with the power of thought now exercised or deployed. Thus, it is the person as res cogitans and not some extended property of that entity, such as its brain.

Note that this reading of Descartes is not one that would seek to redeem weirder versions of ‘Cartesianism’. The salient point has to do with certain dispensations that Wittgenstein and, in a different way, Ryle owe to ‘dualism’. Bennett and Hacker are not grudging in this respect. Their ready enlargement of the domain of sentient and conscious striving to include non-human animals, their recognition of the immunity of significant human endeavours to physicalistic reduction, their persistence in according relevance and status to the ordinary understanding of actual persons engaged in actual lives—in these and in many other ways Bennett and Hacker lead the reader to a world beyond physics, beyond reductive science, beyond biology. If theirs is something of a discursive dualism it is not for want of a settled translation-algorithm but owing the very facts of the matter: Perception, emotion, volition, social life, culture, are the work of persons, not organs, and it is the conceptual resources of philosophy that save one from strange, unwarranted and even dangerous conflations. Even the misguided dualist will find authentic kinship here.

In this same connection, perhaps a few words based on personal experience will not be wasteful. Sherrington and his coterie are the target of criticism in Bennett and Hacker’s early pages. A famous member of that circle was John Eccles, with whom I had the pleasure of friendship and the
joint authorship many years ago of a book intended for laymen. What we shared was a principled resistance to reductionism and related manifestations of the nothing-but school of modern neuroscience. What we did not share was agreement on dualism, at least in what I regarded as its mystery-format. As mysteries go, I was persuaded that the scientific form of dualism was especially strange and, in any case, I was not then (nor am I now) prepared to legislate on the fixed and final number of irreducible sorts of stuff comprising all of reality.

Eccles, as with his teacher and Oxford colleagues in Sherrington's laboratory, was fully aware of traditional objections to Cartesianism, for these had been developed within the tradition, so to speak. From Gassendi to T. H. Huxley, from La Mettrie's enlightened machine to Du Bois' Ignorabimus!, the scientific assessments of 'dualism' were frequent and systematic. Indeed, in Descartes' own replies to Gassendi, Hobbes, Marsenne and others he often showed himself to be 'anti-Cartesian'! Whence the resistance, then, to the forms of criticism developed by Bennett and Hacker? Properly understood, it has two distinct grounds, even if one chooses to occupy both at the same time. First, and in full conformity with Bennett and Hacker, there are those (e.g., Sherrington, Eccles, Penfield) whose scientific orientation must lead to the conclusion that, at the end of the day and for all scientific purposes, physics is complete. Granting that much, and at the same time, taking human nature seriously, there is Hobson's choice: Either abandon science (thus understood) or so deflate human nature itself that it poses no threat to the completeness of physics. The alternative to these equally objectionable positions was for many in the old school to find the right sort of psychophysical algorithm. On the one hand, one must not trivialize the psychological in order to make it tractable; on the other, one must resist romantic flights that would remove human nature from nature itself. Thus is Eccles, toward the end of his long life, publishing a final technical theory that would have conscious decisions altering quantum-probabilities at the neurochemical junction.

At present, there is another ground on which to base a rejection of Bennett and Hacker. To point to it at all is to risk giving offence where there is only the aim of pointing to the obvious. Today's commentators are a generation or two removed from the Oxford—from the scientific world—of Sherrington. It would be naive to ignore one fundamental difference between that world and the present: the gargantuan monetary stakes and associated perquisites on offer to those who can make and keep the brain sciences big science. There is so much of all this to go round that even philosophers of the right sort stand to gain. Needless to say, there are few of any scientific or intellectual stature who will be bribed into theoretical compliance. But no one wants to be left behind. Philosophers, long holding that Gnothe se auton was their unique mission, have now come to regard neuroscience as either a serious threat or an invaluable collaborator. In the circumstance, it is, therefore, also naive to think that this thoughtful and wonderfully useful treatise by Bennett and Hacker will have any
discernible influence within that large, busy and prosperous schoolhouse where words now can mean whatever the programme needs them to mean.

Daniel N. Robinson

Forgiveness and Revenge
By Trudy Govier

The book of Deuteronomy (32.35) advises us that vengeance belongs to God alone, and one important reason for this is that, when God exacts vengeance, it is in order to restore justice to the world, whereas when man exacts vengeance it is out of weakness, offence, and a sense of self-love. God’s vengeance is the vengeance of justice; man’s vengeance is the vengeance of emotion and, as such, it is to be eschewed. Not all have embraced the advice offered by the book of Deuteronomy: in particular, many modern moral philosophers have sought to defend revenge as a natural reaction to wrongdoing, and a necessary precondition of recognizing and responding to injustice in the world. It is, they claim, not only God who seeks vengeance as a way of restoring justice; man is also capable of this, and even where man’s vengeance is based in emotion, it is may nonetheless be morally laudable.

In this irrepressibly optimistic book, Trudy Govier takes issue with these claims. She denies that revenge is natural, and goes on to argue that, even if it were, it would not thereby be morally laudable. For her, ‘seeking revenge is objectionable for both practical and moral reasons... the desire for revenge is not deeply “natural” in the sense of being an elemental, culturally independent feature of human nature; and even if revenge were to be natural in that way, such naturalness would not constitute a moral argument in its favour’ (p. viii). What is needed, she says, is not revenge, but forgiveness, understood as an overcoming of the attitudes of resentment and anger prompted by wrongdoing. Moreover, forgiveness is appropriate in a secular world as well as in a religious one, it is appropriate for groups as well as for individuals, and it is appropriate in one-sided as well as bilateral cases (i.e. even when the wrongdoer does not repent). The book of Deuteronomy may speak truly when it reserves vengeance for the Lord, but the gospel according to St. Mark (2.7) is mistaken when it asks rhetorically ‘who can forgive sins but God only?’ On Govier’s account we can all forgive sins; and indeed we must try to forgive even the unforgivable; since failure to do this can involve conflating the sinner with the sin; the actor with the action. It can imply that some people are ‘morally rotten’ and beyond redemption The secular doctrine of respect for persons, if not the King James Bible, gives ample reason to show forgiveness, and forgiveness is the appropriate response to wrongdoing both morally and prudentially.

It should be clear by now that Govier is concerned to reject revenge and embrace forgiveness. Moreover, her reasons are, in part, politically inspired. In the Preface to her book she notes that her interest in forgive-
ness in politics was stimulated by a visit to South Africa in 1997. ‘I was’ she says ‘deeply moved by this “rainbow nation”, in which victims, perpetrators, and the nature of forgiveness were daily topics in the popular media. Could something as deeply personal as forgiveness have a plausible application to the domain of politics?’ (p. vii). She concludes that it not only could, it must. Her conclusion is life affirming, but her arguments are suspect in a number of important respects and the reader (this reader, anyway) is left with the uneasy thought that hard cases make bad law or, more precisely, that it is dangerous to commend the actions of extraordinary people to us lesser mortals.

Throughout the book, the case of South Africa does not simply inspire, it also serves as an exemplar of what we can be at our best, and what we must aspire to in our mediocrity. The words of Nelson Mandela and of Archbishop Desmond Tutu are quoted admiringly and frequently, and they serve as a constant reminder of what we could be if we would only renounce the destructive emotions that prompt revenge and embrace the prospective and constructive perspective characteristic of forgiveness. However, there are several problems here: first, we might wonder whether revenge is quite as destructive as Govier insists; second, we might question her commitment to forgiveness at group levels and finally we might wonder whether the acts of forgiveness which she takes as exemplary (the forgiveness shown by Mandela and Tutu) can be transposed to a secular context as seamlessly as she suggests.

On the first, Govier takes issue with writers such as Robert Solomon and Jeffrie Murphy, who defend revenge as natural and as a morally appropriate response to wrongdoing. Indeed, and for Solomon, emotions such as resentment and envy, together with a desire to ‘get even’, provide the origins of our sense of justice. Against him, Govier points to the fact that revenge can escalate and generate vicious cycles of violence and destruction. Beneath this practical concern, however, lies a deeper, moral concern: ‘what is wrong with revenge’ Govier says ‘is that to act as agents of revenge, we have to indulge and cultivate something evil in ourselves, the wish to deliberately bring suffering to another human being and contemplate that suffering for our own satisfaction and enjoyment’ (p. 13, original emphasis). So defined, revenge is indeed morally suspect, but the definition ignores the possibility that revenge is not only about inflicting suffering, but also about righting wrongs. This Govier simply denies, but her denial seems too easy, for there is surely something in the thought that our sense of justice, and our willingness to pursue justice is in part prompted by our ability to recognize injustice and be moved by it. Of course, the emotions stirred by reflection on injustice will not be the most edifying ones, but they may nonetheless be morally appropriate and indeed morally valuable.

Having denied that revenge is either natural or morally laudable, Govier goes on to state the case for forgiveness. Here her argument proceeds in two stages: first, she shows that forgiveness may be desirable even when it is ‘one-sided’, that is to say, even when the wrongdoer denies that any
wrong has been done or refuses to repent. Second, she shows that forgiveness is possible not merely for individuals but also for groups. Both stages are informed by her experience of South Africa, and in particular by her reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, for here is a case in which a whole group (black South Africans) have apparently forgiven another group (white South Africans and Afrikaners), and where they have done so even though many white South Africans deny that they personally did anything wrong.

Govier’s discussion is intriguing and of immense practical significance, but it depends crucially on the claim that forgiveness may properly be offered not only by the immediate victims of injustice (the primary victims, as she calls them), but also by secondary and tertiary victims—by friends, family, members of the same community: ‘a group may be morally entitled to forgive in virtue of the harms done to secondary and tertiary victims’ (p. 95) she says. It may indeed, but the real problem is not whether the group may forgive, but who it is who speaks for the group and with what authority. Here, Govier notes that some black South Africans resent Tutu’s insistence on reconciliation and forgiveness. They argue that he did not suffer under apartheid as they did, and therefore he is not entitled to forgive on their behalf. She quotes Mpho Tsedu ‘black people are made to reconcile while they are not being reconciled with. Tutu knows very well that he is not the person to forgive on behalf of victims’ (p. 93). Her response to this complaint is to note that, since the primary victims are not the only victims, it is possible for the group to forgive. But it is quite unclear how far this will get us in the practical cases that form the heart of Govier’s work. This is not to say that a philosophical theory must deliver ‘right answers’ to complex political problems. It is simply to note that the distinction between primary, secondary and tertiary victims is likely to cause as many problems as it solves. Few, if any, would claim that Tutu suffered not at all under the apartheid regime, but the question is whether from his privileged position, he is morally entitled to offer forgiveness on behalf of those whose suffering was inestimably greater.

In discussing these problems, Govier tends to veer towards the romantic. She emphasizes—surely correctly—that there comes a point when it is better for all concerned if resentment and bitterness are put aside, and energy is devoted to building a better future. But the problem arises precisely when and because some members of wronged groups cannot do this. Often, these are the primary victims and their resentment is not assuaged but exacerbated by leaders who offer forgiveness on their behalf. Govier quotes one woman as saying: ‘The oppression was bad, but what is much worse, what makes me even more angry, is that they are trying to dictate my forgiveness’ (p. 93). The lesson here is that group forgiveness may well be possible, and it may well be morally desirable, and it may well be legitimately offered by people other than the primary victims, but it is not an unalloyed good either politically or morally. When offered against a background of continuing bitterness and resentment, and when offered by
those who were not themselves the primary victims of injustice, forgiveness can be morally offensive and politically dangerous. This is, of course, a cause for regret, and we might all wish that people could find it in themselves to be more forgiving. But the political problem arises when they cannot, and Govier’s appeal to classes of victim, any and all of whom may forgive for the group, is unlikely to commend itself to those who were the primary victims. Nor is it clear to me why it should.

In her discussion of the unforgivable, Govier notes that many of those who find it in themselves to forgive heinous crimes do so for religious reasons. However, she argues that it is also possible to find non-theological arguments for this position: ‘the humanity of human beings, their dignity and worth as persons, and the distinction between the wrongdoer and the wrong are defensible from a secular point of view’ (p. 111). The last is crucial to her defence of forgiveness, and especially to her call for forgiveness even of the unforgivable. We must, she argues, cling on to the distinction between a murderous act and a murderous person. In particular, we must resist the temptation to see another human being as ‘morally rotten’: ‘to regard human agents as capable of redemption is the morally appropriate attitude to adopt towards them, an attitude that is a kind of secular faith’ (p. 137). But, as her practical examples illustrate, it is a faith that is much more accessible to the religious than to the secular. Christian believers have grounds for thinking that no-one is beyond redemption, and they also have grounds for thinking that, if vengeance is called for, God will answer the call. For those of us who live in a world without God, there is no such assurance and no obvious reason to adopt the faith.

Govier’s book deals with a topic of great practical importance, and her treatment of it is sensitive and engaging. What she attempts to provide is indeed a secular defence of forgiveness in both moral and political contexts, but I remain unsure whether this can be achieved, and doubtful about whether it should even be tried. It is surely no accident that most of those who have found it in themselves to forgive the unforgivable are Christian believers, and even they enter dangerous moral territory when they presume to offer forgiveness on behalf of others who suffered more. Despite Govier’s arguments to the contrary, I still wonder whether the forgiveness she commends is possible only for religious believers and saints. And I note that even religious believers seek an assurance that there will be not merely forgiveness, but revenge in the next world, if not in this one.

Susan Mendus

_Hegel, Nietzsche, and Philosophy: Thinking Freedom_  
By Will Dudley  

In his _Hegel, Nietzsche, and Philosophy_, Will Dudley attempts to offer a theory of freedom that improves upon liberalism. His strategy is to use
Hegel and Nietzsche’s criticisms of liberal ideas (building from Kant’s criticisms), as well as their alternative theories of freedom, to develop a more ‘comprehensive’ theory of freedom. For Dudley, the more comprehensive a theory of freedom, the better that theory is: ‘In moving from one conception of freedom to another that is more comprehensive, nothing is lost and something is gained’ (p. 3). The book is divided in half between analyses of Hegel’s and Nietzsche’s theories of freedom followed by a brief conclusion.

Dudley’s four chapters on Hegel defend a highly controversial position in the literature. Most commentators on Hegel’s social and political thought argue that Hegel’s main treatise on the subject—the *Philosophy of Right*—ought to be interpreted independently of his system of speculative philosophy. In so doing, the *Philosophy of Right* should be considered apart from Hegel’s widely discredited metaphysical system in order to rescue Hegel’s arguments in political theory from being discredited by implication.

On the contrary, Dudley presents a powerful defence of a systematic reading of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*. While he admits having difficulties with clearly presenting aspects of Hegel’s technical vocabulary (p. 11), the interpretation of Hegel is original and groundbreaking. In chapter one, Dudley considers the central place of freedom in Hegel’s philosophy. Most of the chapter offers a clear presentation of Hegel’s vocabulary found in his *Science of Logic* and *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. Dudley argues correctly that much of the terminology employed in the *Philosophy of Right* is elaborated at greater length elsewhere in Hegel’s system. Thus, a familiarity with Hegel’s more substantive discussions of terms such as ‘freedom’, ‘thought’, ‘spirit’, etc. becomes necessary to understand Hegel’s use of these terms with regard to his political thought.

This discussion is continued in the second chapter focusing on Hegel’s use of ‘the will’. Most commentators readily acknowledge the importance of the will for Hegel, usually contrasting Hegel’s use of the will with that of Rousseau. Dudley’s unique contribution is that he looks at Hegel’s discussion of the will that arises in the third volume of his *Encyclopaedia* and supplements the discussion of the will in the *Philosophy of Right*: the *Philosophy of Right* is an elaboration of the section ‘Objective Spirit’ in the *Encyclopaedia*. However, Hegel’s discussion of the will begins in the previous section of the *Encyclopaedia* called ‘Subjective Spirit’. Dudley clearly demonstrates how the will develops from ‘subjective’ to ‘objective’ forms of spirit. Throughout, Dudley does an excellent job at explaining the relations between logical terms (such as ‘the concept of judgment’) and how it relates to various distinctions raised in the *Philosophy of Right* (such as the moral will).

Dudley’s third and fourth chapters examine how Hegel develops his theory of freedom beyond the *Philosophy of Right* in his system. Here

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Dudley argues that much of the secondary literature on the subject fails to take stock of the fact that the *Philosophy of Right* does not contain Hegel’s entire theory of freedom. This claim represents Dudley’s clearest illustration of what a systematic reading of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* might offer us which non-systematic readings lack: that Hegel’s development of freedom moves beyond ‘right’ towards art, religion, and philosophy. Thus, any discussion of Hegelian freedom cannot end with the *Philosophy of Right*, as so often is the case in the literature. Instead, we must understand how freedom moves beyond ‘right’ towards the practice of philosophy.

While his treatment of Hegel is excellent, it is not flawless. In trying to present the various ways that Hegel’s *Science of Logic* informs the *Philosophy of Right*, some readers might think that greater attention ought to be given to the social or political significance this raises rather than a heavy (and largely too sympathetic) focus on speculative logic. Indeed, Dudley avoids questions relating to the tenability of a political theory tied so intimately with a discredited philosophical system. If this system is at best highly suspect and it informs Hegel’s political theory more strongly than previously thought, some explanation is due as to why we should not treat Hegel’s political theory with suspicion as well. One might also wonder why a discussion of the role of categories in Hegel’s system and its beginning in pure being is saved until the end of Dudley’s analysis of Hegel (see pp. 104–5).

Another difficulty is with his discussion of Hegel’s theory of punishment. For Dudley, Hegel’s theory is presented in the section of the *Philosophy of Right* entitled ‘Abstract Right’ and not substantively later. There are several problems with this view. First of all, Hegel’s discussion of punishment in ‘Abstract Right’ relates to the cancellation of contractual stipulation violations amongst private individuals logically prior to their membership in a political community, which arrives later in ‘Ethical Life’. Thus, Dudley is incorrect to speak of punishment in ‘Abstract Right’ as an action taken by ‘society’ (p. 38). If this were Hegel’s theory of punishment, it would be a curious one indeed: no laws yet exist, there are no judicial institutions, no notion of moral responsibility, etc. These deficiencies are all remedied within ‘Ethical Life’ in the section ‘The Administration of Justice’.

It is a pity that a systematic approach to interpreting Hegel’s theory of punishment fails to take stock of punishment’s development later in the system. Instead, a systematic treatment of Hegel’s theory of punishment might have provided a concrete example of how Dudley’s interpretive strategy is an improvement over other non-systematic treatments.

The second part of the book is on Nietzsche’s theory of freedom. Whereas the discussion on Hegel was pitted against mainstream commentators, it is less clear who Dudley is responding to when looking at Nietzsche. Dudley’s fifth chapter makes the case for reading of Nietzsche,

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despite Nietzsche’s unsystematic writing style. Despite claiming that interpreters of Nietzsche are ‘obligated to justify her interpretive choices’ in a way that interpreters of Hegel do not, all Dudley says is: ‘I am interested in the topic of freedom rather in a particular text, and, having read all of Nietzsche’s corpus, I am convinced that freedom is at issue throughout’ (pp. 124–25). Nevertheless, Dudley does proceed to present an interesting and crisp look at various features of Nietzsche’s theory of freedom. He also does well at demonstrating a genuine connection on freedom between Nietzsche’s various texts.

As with Hegel, Dudley locates Nietzsche’s theory of freedom within his use of the will. In chapter six, he presents Nietzsche’s distinction between the decadence and nobility. This discussion involves well done looks at Nietzsche’s use of ‘herd morality’, the ‘true’ world versus ‘actual’ world, and the destruction of the moral will. For Nietzsche, one must forge one’s own will in order to be free and void falling into ‘decadent dependence’. The implications of this position are explored further in chapter seven where Dudley examines the movement from nobility to tragedy. Notably, Dudley highlights how Nietzsche’s theory of freedom is grounded on the idea that ‘the path to freedom involves a series of stages in which a variety of selves and wills is found and forged, lost and destroyed’ (p. 178). In addition, Dudley does well at presenting Nietzsche’s famous uses of will to power and the eternal return. Chapter eight looks at the liberating potential of Nietzsche’s theory of freedom.

Dudley’s interpretation of Nietzsche is thoroughly well done. However, the entire discussion takes place with hardly a single mention of the previous look at Hegel. Thus, the reader gains the sense that the two parts appear completely separate and any connection between them is far from clear. Indeed, it is easy to forget why we are engaged in treatments of Hegel or Nietzsche beyond an interest in wading through the entire corpus of each individually.

Dudley attempts to bring these parts together in his conclusion. On the whole, this conclusion is unsatisfactory. For example, Dudley discusses the relation between Hegel and Nietzsche’s theories of freedom in relation to ‘modern liberalism’ (p. 227). Yet, no modern liberal thinker is discussed. Dudley does claim that Hegel and Nietzsche’s theories build off Kant’s critiques of liberalism, but elaborates only slightly beyond what he already said of this in the book’s introduction.

Dudley makes numerous comparisons between Hegel and Nietzsche that are illuminating, but it is unclear that these very different thinkers complement each other in the substantive way Dudley claims. He admits:

Although Hegel and Nietzsche agree that the practice of philosophy is essential to freedom, it is evident that their understandings of philosophical practice and the liberation it affords differ greatly. Moreover, it might seem that their understandings of philosophy and freedom are not only different, but actually incompatible (p. 235).

Dudley’s argument seems to be that for Nietzsche’s philosophical project
to work as a negation of Hegel’s project, ‘we need ... to attempt to make a
go of it (i.e., to practice Hegelian philosophy)’ (p. 237).

This is a curious position for Dudley to have. After explaining so clearly
the centrality of Hegel’s peculiar speculative logic to his Philosophy of
Right, it is odd that the more comprehensive theory of freedom Dudley
aims at constructing uses Hegelian ideas such as self-determination of the
will piecemeal. Moreover, it is difficult to consider Nietzsche’s position as
complementary because it apparently stands in opposition to Hegel’s posi-
tion. For these reasons, Dudley does not entirely succeed to bring Hegel
and Nietzsche together in a new theory of freedom superior to liberalism.

The great strength of Dudley’s work is its contribution to scholarship
on Hegel and Nietzsche individually. Each examination is exceptionally
well done and his interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy is very persuasive
and groundbreaking. I have no doubt that those in this field will discuss
this book—a major contribution on Hegel’s and Nietzsche’s philoso-
phies—for some time to come.

Thom Brooks