BOOK REVIEWS

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This is two books in one. The English portion of the book (132 pages) establishes historical and linguistic context for al-Mubarrad (d. 898) as an early objector to Sibawayh’s (d. 79) Kitab, in his Radd ‘ala Kitab Sibawayh (Refutation of Sibawayh’s Book). Bernards condenses the history of this period efficiently and mentions all the prominent personalities of the Basra and Kufa “schools.” Once the Kitab became part of the linguistic dialogue, references to it became constant. In this sense, the so-called School of Basra became prominent. Some of the issues that are dealt with in this treatise reappear later in al-Mubarrad’s al-Muqtadab; others are overlooked; and still others are reformulated. Bernards shows the gradual acceptance and coming into prominence of the Kitab as more linguists read, commented on, and taught it. Since the beginning of the 9th century, seventy-six commentaries have been written on it (p. 3 fn.).

Chapter 2 sketches the life and works of al-Mubarrad: his teachers, his many students, and his pivotal position in transmitting the Basran linguistics to the next generation. The figure on page 36 shows that Sibawayh had only al-Akhfash as a student, while al-Mubarrad had eight who became the luminaries of the linguistic movement after him.

Chapter 3 is about al-Mubarrad’s objections to Sibawayh’s Kitab. What is available is not the original Radd but the quotations preserved in Ibn Wallad’s (d. 943) refutation of al-Mubarrad. There are 134 such objections from more than 400 original objections (p. 8). This analysis sifts through their status, history, and possible source(s) and draws conclusions about the status of the objections that were retracted, re-argued, and reformulated. Charts (pp. 48–52) give a clear picture of the sources of these objections and those who favored and did not favor them.

Chapter 4 touches on the substance of the objections and selects four for comment. It follows the same general format: it states Sibawayh’s position, the objections to and retractions of it by al-Mubarrad, and the position of the later grammarians and draws conclusions. This gives readers a synoptic view of how arguments were marshaled for and against any one grammatical position. In the cases taken up, one sees how al-Mubarrad argued the issues vis-à-vis Sibawayh. One would like to have seen the actual text in translation rather than the summaries to get a feel for the style of the writer. In the Radd and al-Muqtadab the arguments change, and so do the opinions. Chapter 5 concludes with a summary of the discussions that brings together the results of the previous chapters. It also touches on the notion of “school” one more time. The author is not satisfied with the given definitions but provides a definition that suits her purpose better.

The author adopts the working hypothesis that “the position that in retracting his criticisms of Sibawayh, al-Mubarrad was in effect acknowledging the authority and long and ‘firm’ tradition of the Kitab in order to legitimize his position and to emphasize his Basran identity” (p. xi). One would like to agree with the spirit of this objective, except for the reservations that not all the
objections were his but rehearsals of objections by others—for example, al-Akhfash (d. 830). Besides, he did not withdraw all his objections. One would rather say that al-Mubarrad typified the spirit of the time to discuss issues freely without fear of being thought an outsider. Other linguists objected to certain issues in the Kitab but did not withdraw them, and objections continued after al-Mubarrad. After all, Sibawayh takes issue with many linguists in the Kitab and favors some over others. He even takes issue with his teacher, al-Khalil. Not all Basran linguists—for example, al-Khalil and Yunis—said the same thing on all the issues, as the Kitab proves. The English section is followed by a bibliography of primary and secondary sources, a general index, an index of names, and an index of grammatical terms.

The Arabic section of the book consists of a one-page English introduction followed by a critical edition of Ibn Wallad’s Kitab al-Intisar (212 pages). One should consider the English section of the book also as part of the introduction to the Arabic text, since it is there that it is contextualized and historiographically situated. The Arabic text is a bonus to this introduction to al-Mubarrad’s Radd. This is Ibn Wallad’s text, partitioned into 134 numbered masā’il. Each mas’ala includes a quotation from Sibawayh that is followed by the objection of al-Mubarrad, which in turn is followed by Ibn Wallad’s refutation of the objection. The footnotes and the critical apparatus, at the bottom of each page, give the appropriate references to the Kitab and other sources. The text is well done and easy to read. It is followed by various indexes: marāji’ al-tahqiq (sources of verification), fihrist al-āyāt (list of verses), fihrist al-ash’ār (list of poetic lines), fihrist al-arjāz (list of metered lines), fihrist al-’ālam (list of authorities), fihrist al-ṣarf wa al-nahw (list of morphology and syntax), fihrist al-amthāl wa al-namadhīj al-nahawiyya (list of examples and grammatical patterns), and fihrist al-lughā (dialect list). These are two great contributions to our knowledge of early Arabic linguistics. One is amazed at the linguistic sophistication among the Arabs more than 1,000 years ago.

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The Self-Disclosure of God is the second installment in William Chittick’s excellent interpretive studies on Ibn al-‘Arabi’s (d. 1240) monumental work al-Futuhat al-makkiyya. The first volume appeared as The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-‘Arabi’s Metaphysics of Imagination (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), and an overview of the projected The Breath of the All-Merciful: Ibn al-‘Arabi’s Articulation of the Cosmos is included in the introduction to the present book (pp. xxviii–xxxii). In his previous studies of Ibn al-‘Arabi, Jalal al-Din Rumi, Afdal al-Din Kashani, and others, Chittick’s effort has been to translate extensively from the original sources to convey not just the messages of the authors but also their voices. This practice is amply in evidence in The Self-Disclosure of God, as well, but to regard the book as only a translation would be both to underestimate Chittick’s erudition and to come away with the erroneous impression that Ibn al-‘Arabi’s work utilizes categories that would make intuitive sense to a modern reader. The passages Chittick has chosen for translation obviously shape the picture of Ibn al-‘Arabi we receive, and the Futuhat translated outright, without his schematization and continuous commentary, would be an obscure text for anyone not already familiar with Ibn al-‘Arabi’s compositional idiom.

The book’s Introduction provides a brief overview of Ibn al-‘Arabi’s thought as it pertains to cosmological concerns, and the main text of the book is divided into chapters grouped in
sections focusing on Ibn al-`Arabi’s understanding of God (“God and the Cosmos”), the world (“The Order of the Worlds”), and the human being (“The Structure of the Microcosm”). The chapters are followed by an appendix discussing Ibn al-`Arabi’s views of three Sufis: Abu al-`Abbas al-Sabti, Rabī’at al-`Adawiyya, and ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jilānī. The material covered in this appendix seems to be unrelated to the book’s main theme and should be seen as an additional contribution to the field of Ibn al-`Arabi studies. The book also comes with an appendix of technical terms, a short supplemental bibliography, and separate indexes for sources, Qur’anic verses, hadith statements, proper names, Arabic words, and technical terms. This extensive apparatus in the back matter of the book makes it a considerable resource for scholars seeking to incorporate Ibn al-`Arabi’s views into thematic or historical studies.

As anyone familiar with Ibn al-`Arabi’s thought can appreciate, the contents of The Self-Disclosure of God are far too complex and filled with nuances to present (or even represent) adequately within the limitations of a book review. Chittick’s choices for translation include both prose and poetry and convey a rich sense only of not the great Sufi master’s thought but also of his linguistic and aesthetic sensibilities. His brief comment on the difficulties of translation in the introduction (pp. xxxv–x) should be illuminating for anyone undertaking a similar task in the future. In addition, throughout the book Chittick is careful to keep the reader aware of the fact that a translation of Ibn al-`Arabi should never be taken as an adequate substitute for the original. As an author, Ibn al-`Arabi is phenomenally sensitive to his choice of words and deliberately uses vocabulary that conveys ranges of meaning rather than singular significations. The translator, however, has to choose a particular term in English, which, first, makes the text more “fixed” than the original, and second, has the danger of conveying the false impression that the original necessarily implies the whole semantic field of the chosen English word. A translator’s difficulties are further compounded by the fact that Ibn al-`Arabi is also a very precise writer, and any part of his work is linked to other points in the text through numerous linguistic and contextual clues. Chittick’s commentary in The Self-Disclosure of God continually invites the reader to appreciate the challenges and ambiguities resulting from these factors, and close attention to his discussion would be very valuable for anyone wishing to master the technicalities of medieval Sufi discourse from a modern academic perspective.

The density of Ibn al-`Arabi’s prose means that, even with Chittick’s illuminating accompanying discussion, understanding his ideas fully requires patient acquisition of the technical terminology used in the text. For example, Ibn al-`Arabi discusses the concept “body” under the terms jism, jasad, badan, haykal, shabah, markab, and qālab (pp. 279–80), with slight changes of nuance from one term to the next. In one instance, the interconnection between a body and the spirit that animates it is described as follows: “[i]n the spirit, the body has intelligible, known traces, because it bestows on the spirit knowledges of tastings and what cannot be known except through it; and in the body, the spirit has sensory traces that every living thing witnesses in itself. So also is the cosmos with the Real. In the cosmos God has manifest traces, which are the states within which the cosmos undergoes fluctuation. This is one of the properties of His name Aeon” (p. 280). The cosmological significance of this passage lies in the fact that it discusses the relationships between souls and bodies and God and the cosmos in a parallel way. While it is easy to see how this idea would connect to the general theme of the cosmos being an aspect of God’s self-disclosure, a full appreciation of Ibn al-`Arabi’s view requires familiarity with the technical meanings ascribed to the terms spirit (rūḥ), trace (athar), tasting (dhawq), cosmos (‘ālam), state (hāl), fluctuation (taqallub), and Aeon (dahr). All of Ibn al-`Arabi’s works in the original present similar challenges of prior knowledge to the reader, and it is a tribute to Chittick that he makes portions of the Futuhat accessible in English while retaining a considerable proportion of the original’s highly textured quality.

The Self-Disclosure of God will make instructive reading for specialists and non-experts on different grounds. Those aware of Sufi thought will find much that is familiar in the book, since Ibn al-`Arabi’s work summarizes or responds to his predecessors among Sufis, and he exercised
tremendous influence on authors living in the centuries after his death. Readers who are not well versed in Sufism will find the book a demanding but rewarding window into the thought of an author who is quite central to understanding the Islamic tradition. *The Self-Disclosure of God* is sure to remain crucial for any bibliography on Ibn al-‘Arabi, Sufism, and medieval Islamic intellectual history for much time to come.

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Given the historical and institutional differences between Christianity and Islam, the sociologist Bryan S. Turner once questioned the propriety of speaking of “saints” in a Muslim context (*Weber and Islam: A Critical Study*). Yet despite Turner’s misgivings, first voiced in 1974, scholars of Islam continue to apply unabashedly the term “saints” to the *awliyāʾ allāh*, or God’s elect. A key sticking point for Turner was the absence of an ecclesiastical process of canonization in Islam. Indeed, how one becomes acknowledged as a saint in Islam remains a compelling question. The conventional answer—that the *awliyāʾ* demonstrate their *baraka* through *karāmāt*, or miraculous displays, and receive wide public acclaim either in their own lifetime or later—only half addresses the problem. Posthumous reputations are subject to the vagaries of history. In the case of Muslim saints, their reputations depend, much like the maintenance of their shrines, on the success of their caretakers’ efforts.

No better illustration of this process can be found than in the case of the Ayyubid-era poet ʿUmar ibn al-Farid. One of the best-known of all Arabic poets, his subsequent reputation as a Sufi saint is the subject of Homerin’s *From Arab Poet to Muslim Saint*. First published in 1994, this valuable study has been reissued in paperback. For the new edition, the author has added a brief preface, a page of corrections and emendations, and a select bibliography of recent related works.

In this study, Homerin—who has published a range of articles about various aspects of Ibn al-Farid’s poetry and career—steers clear of broad sociological analysis and theological exegesis. Instead, he focuses narrowly on the primary sources pertinent to Ibn al-Farid’s standing as a saint. Copiously documented, the ninety-seven pages of text tightly follow a chronological narrative that carefully places every author and reference in historical context.

In the first of four chapters, “Metamorphosis,” Homerin considers Ibn al-Farid’s career as a poet in his own lifetime and his early postmortem transformation into a figure of Muslim piety. Two works in particular—the *al-Khamriya* (Ode to Wine) and the *al-Taʾiyya al-kubra*—form the cornerstone of Ibn al-Farid’s reputation as a poet and as a Sufi saint. Both poems appear in an annotated translation recently published by Homerin, ʿUmar Ibn al-Farid: Sufi Verse, Saintly Life (New York: Paulist Press, 2001).

Although the process of Ibn al-Farid’s sanctification began soon after his death in Cairo in 1235, there was nothing inevitable about it. Indeed, the “beatification” of Ibn al-Farid—who neither founded a Sufi order nor led a *zāwiya*—is somewhat anomalous. In the earliest accounts written by his former students, Ibn al-Farid is revered “more as a poet than a mystic.” A generation after Ibn al-Farid’s death, the biographer Ibn Khallikan noted the poet’s interest in mysticism but “never called Ibn al-Farid a Sufi nor did he even mention the poet’s study of ḥadīth.” Nevertheless, Ibn al-Farid’s reputation for personal piety encouraged some commentators such as Saʿīd al-Dīn al-Farghani to view Ibn al-Farid as an “ecstatic” poet who composed his verses in a mystically intoxicated trance. Moreover, al-Farghani and other commentators saw in the *al-Taʾiyya al-kubra*...
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intimations of Ibn al-`Arabi’s mystical doctrine of the unity of being. The ensuing condemnation of the poet by Ibn Taymiyah created a frisson of heresy that would forever be part of Ibn al-Farid’s reputation—and part of his attraction as a Sufi saint, as well.

Chapter 2, “Sanctification,” examines in detail the hagiography composed by the poet’s grandson `Ali Sibt Ibn al-Farid. Significantly, as Homerin points out, `Ali never actually claims that his esteemed grandfather was a wali, although every anecdote he cites forcefully conveys that impression.

Chapter 3, “Controversy,” looks at Ibn al-Farid’s reputation in the late Mamluk period, a time that saw the construction and amplification of the poet saint’s shrine as well as unsuccessful efforts by some scholars, among them Ibn Khaldun and Ibn Hajjar, to demolish his reputation. The tale that Homerin expertly teases out of his sources involves a hadith scholar named al-Biqa`i who, in accusing Ibn al-Farid of heresy, ran afoul of the sultan Qa`it Bay. Rather than see this strife as a theological battle between “orthodox” ulema and heterodox Sufis, Homerin offers a convincing interpretation based on generational conflict between scholars and the ruling elite’s need to quell disorder at all levels of society.

“Disjunction,” the final and most discursive chapter in the book, follows Ibn Fadil’s posthumous reputation under the Ottomans and on through the 19th and 20th centuries. In the late 17th century, Ibn al-Farid’s fame as a saint was at its height. Evliya Celebi and `Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi both left literary souvenirs of visits to a thriving shrine. But two centuries later, the shrine was in ruins, a byproduct, according to Homerin, of the secularization of Egypt’s elites and reformist attacks on Sufism. Ironically, although the saint’s mawlid celebration was discontinued in the 1960s, Ibn al-Fadil’s literary reputation actually grew over the past century. The trend began among European champions such as Nicholson and Nallino, but eventually Egyptian critics such as Muhammad Mustafa Hilmi also took up the cause. In the 1980s, under the auspices of the Rifai`is, Ibn al-Fadil’s mawlid was again instituted, evidence of the poet’s enduring appeal as a popular saint. Finally, in an epilogue the author examines Naguib Mahfouz’s recourse to Ibn al-Fadil’s verse in the novel The Thief and the Dogs.

In his straightforward telling of a story that spans more than eight centuries, Homerin has made an obvious effort to keep his book accessible to the non-specialist. To this end, the book also contains a glossary of basic terms and an introduction dealing with the mystical imagery of love and intoxication. Could the book be used successfully in an undergraduate class? I think so, although the career disputes of Mamluk notables may require more parsing for students than the author anticipated. In any event, From Poet to Muslim Saint is an insightful, judiciously argued study, and its reissue in paperback is indeed welcome.

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From defecation to menstruation, medieval Islamic scholars debated how human biological functions and emissions pollute the performance of core rituals. That normal bodily activities somehow taint the fulfillment of divinely required duties affects how Muslims perceive themselves as earthly creations striving to fulfill Allah’s many commands. On any given day, believers repeatedly mitigate expected and unexpected bodily effluents before they execute any mandatory prayer or fast. Because ritual purity is so intimately entwined with basic human experience (and often in tension
with it), early scholars argued over what constituted pure and impure acts. A journey into the detailed contours of these debates is the subject of Marion Katz’s *Body of Text*.

Katz skilfully translates the disputes in the Qur’an and the *Musannafs* of ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-San‘ani, and Ibn Abi Shayba. Chapter 1 scrutinizes Qur’anic statements that link purity regulations regarding for example, menstruation, urination, and sexual intercourse with a burgeoning covenental community whose ritual obligations connect it with, yet distinguish it from, its Jewish and Christian neighbors. Chapter 2 examines the *Musannafs* for their varied comments that command, for example, one to wipe one’s feet before prayer. Because the majority of scholars favored washing over wiping, Katz posits a privileged “living tradition” that opposed a less popular but more authoritative scriptural exegesis. The Umayyad court’s insistence on the performance of minor ablutions from cooked food, or from the touching of one’s genitals, to further its political agenda, constitutes Chapter 3. Chapter 4 recounts numerous versions of the Islamic “Fall” story to demonstrate how Adam and Eve’s transgression resulted in the transformation of whole, perfected humans into hollow, porous creatures—appetitive on one end; waste producing on the other. This chapter will be of greatest interest to non-specialists. It contains examples and methods that cross disciplines and traditions. In general, *Body of Text* is aimed at professionals in the field whose detailed knowledge of the early tradition will allow them to appreciate fully Katz’s nuanced translations and subtle (re)interpretations of legal sources. Scholars of Islam will also find intriguing the broad-scale attack on the revisionist works of Joseph Schacht, Norman Calder, and John Wansbrough. The generalist interested primarily in the question of purity may wish that more of Katz’s polemic had been relegated to the footnotes.

Katz’s study is most engaging when it compares Islamic purity laws with those in Zoroastrianism, Rabbinic Judaism, and Christianity. More efforts might demonstrate how an Islamic understanding of purity emerged in the context of sectarian debate. For example, Katz notes how early scholars pondered whether touching one’s penis cancels *wudu‘*. Both al-Shaybani and ‘Abd al-Razzaq record traditions stating if you think a part of your body is impure, you should cut it off. These remarks are tantalizingly similar to Jesus’ observations that if your hand, foot (a rabbinic euphemism for penis), or eye “causes you to stumble, cut it off” (Mark 9:43–48; Matt. 5:29–30). What might account for the fact that this Christian reference appears in the Islamic context as a sarcastic rebuttal against those “extremists” who view touching the penis differently from fondling the nose? A broader, comparative lens would show that the opinions of Muslim scholars were not created in isolation but articulated within a milieu where such issues were hotly contested by rival monotheists. While specialists will cherish the meticulous analyses of widely scattered and seldom translated legal materials, both generalists and specialists should take issue with the methodological orientation of this work. Woven throughout each chapter is an ongoing argument with modern anthropologists who argue for a religion’s underlying purity “system” or logic. By surveying the range of opinions on whether expelling bile from the mouth is analogous to purging feces from the anus, Katz convincingly argues that early Islamic purity laws may only in part reflect a desire to contain “matter out of place,” or to recover a “loss of bodily control.” Because idiosyncratic concerns had as much to do with shaping the individual opinions of early scholars as anything else, Katz concludes there is no overarching, imagined system of purity that emerged within the documents themselves or was projected back by later scholars attempting to legitimate current practices. While Katz’s evidence certainly points to an amalgam of opinions that defy systematization, one often wonders whether the forest is not lost through the trees. What is most profound about Mary Douglas’s work is her identification of a universal human need to establish order in the midst of chaos, to catalogue and thus control anomalies that are, at first glance, incomprehensible. Order is established only through a rigorous analysis of marginal substances or questionable acts, which either renders (through analogy) those ambiguities as unambiguous or contains the danger they pose to the system of order through ritual. Without these larger categories in place to structure the world, human action becomes meaningless. Meaning here is not construed in any universal sense
but within the constructed worlds of those who defined how order must be separated from chaos. Islamic law, like other religious codes, often operates according to idealized sets of classificatory rules based on divine expectations. The idea that no single operative was in place to separate “pure” from “impure” is somewhat counterintuitive, especially as purity laws became part of one’s identity as a Muslim.

It is, of course, easy to fault a book for not doing more. The fact that Body of Text questions established understandings of ritual purity and invites us to continue this discussion of purity beyond the last page underscores the success of the argument. Most significantly, Katz’s work broadens our comprehension of what it means to be religious. Religious piety and expression can just as easily be located in debates over the status of semen, farts, and urine as it can in discussions of prayer, pilgrimage, and paradise. Katz’s study draws us into a vibrant, lively world where one’s body becomes a map through which believers try to navigate the divine will. Katz’s focus on the conflicts, debates, and humorous anecdotes about how one can be fully human in a divinely created world allows us to hear voices very much like our own. For its ability to capture the dynamism of these debates over bodily functions, Body of Text represents a breath of fresh air among most traditional studies that engage the history of Islam’s formative period.

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The poetry of Jalal al-Din Rumi (b. 1207) has in recent years captured the imagination of both popularizers (most notably, Coleman Barks) and serious academics. In Reading Mystical Lyric, Fatemeh Keshavarz, associate professor of Persian language and literature at Washington University in St. Louis, seeks to focus the attention of lay and scholarly readers alike on Rumi’s poetic skill. Her main premise is that scholars have not yet come to terms with Rumi the poet and that his poetry has been considered “second-rate” and merely a “vehicle necessary to convey his mystical thought” (p. 13). In this largely accessible and often refreshing book, Keshavarz argues, with considerable success, that Rumi should be recognized as an important developer of the ghazal, whose “artistry and poetic vision” has been largely “unappreciated” (p. 20). Keshavarz’s discussion of paradox in medieval Persian poetry (esp. pp. 32–36) is engaging and provides a reasonable basis for further research, while her use of modern literary theory and substantial reference to Beckett (pp. 11, 56, 64–65, 71), Wittgenstein (pp. 50–51), Kierkegaard (pp. 54, 61–64), and Heidegger (pp. 22–26) suggest an attempt to package Rumi for the 21st century. Her study of Rumi’s use of silence (pp. 49–71) is also intriguing, although to devote more time to the discussion of Rumi’s use of silence than the influence of music on his poetry—or his use of stress to augment rhythm (p. 111)—may strike many as odd.

This book is not, however, without flaws. One fundamental methodological problem is that Keshavarz treats the Divan as a united corpus, a single and coherent entity, rather than what it is: a vast compilation of individual poems of varying length, meter, and subject matter arranged according to rhyme. Keshavarz claims to base her findings on the whole Divan as “an embodiment of a world view” (p. ix) rather than on single ghazals, as she feels others have done. Surely any critical study of a poetic output as immense as Rumi’s is by definition selective. Keshavarz’s belief in the “unified nature of the Divan” (p. 10) causes her to see the path of an “experiential journey from ghazal to ghazal” (p. 86) where there perhaps is none and to derive meaning from the “haphazard lengths of the ghazals” (p. 120) as they appear in print. Throughout the book, we
get the sense that Keshavarz views the Divan primarily as a written text, but is this necessarily the case with medieval lyric poetry?

Keshavarz at times seems to confuse Rumi the man with Rumi’s poetic persona, at once referring to his “personal and intimate” interaction with his audience (p. 2) and suggesting that “flashes” of his “dynamic personality” (p. 3) are to be seen in poems that border on the “autobiographical” (p. 2). This strikes me as a questionable reading of the medieval Persian ghazal, which was generally composed for public performance and cannot be assumed to be confessional or personal to any substantial extent. Keshavarz refers alternately to the “reader” of a particular poem, to its “audience,” or the “listener” (e.g., pp. 3, 46, 91) but largely ignores the performance context of Rumi’s ghazals, engaging with them primarily as written texts (the book is entitled “Reading Mystical Lyric, after all). Keshavarz chooses to see the abundance of textual repetition between poems in the Divan as “intratexual resonance” (p. 10) rather than of evidence of variant performance versions of a given poem (p. 116). This is not to say that there is no discussion of the musical context surrounding the performance of Rumi’s ghazals (pp. 100–105), but this is not given sufficient attention. Keshavarz skips over the link between Rumi’s use of meter and the Sufi dhikr and sama‘ (p. 127), which are both central to the performance of mystical ghazals. She does stress the greater variety of meters employed by Rumi when compared with Hafiz and Sa’di (p. 133) but does not compare the circumstances of the composition and performance of courtly and mystical ghazals, let alone the requirements imposed by patrons.

Keshavarz is critical of the selectiveness of other scholars who have written on Rumi (p. 14) and tries to avoid presenting “selective” and “unrepresentative” examples or privileging any specific “section” of the Divan (p. 11). However, the vastness of the Divan has required her to provide the reader with “a large number of excerpts from across the entire Divan” rather than ghazals quoted in full, as this would take “inordinate space” (p. 11). The decision to quote poems in full only when “absolutely necessary” (p. 12) is, I feel, a serious flaw of her book. Quoting a larger number of poems in full could in fact have strengthened some of Keshavarz’s arguments, since it is easier to grasp the impact of the rhythm, imagery, or sound of a whole poem than of a portion. Moreover, Keshavarz often presents selected verses from a given poem alongside one another, with no mention of the content of the intervening verses (e.g., p. 53, where verses 1–3 and 6–8 of ghazal 132 are quoted in one chunk) or of the length of the whole poem. Practical constraints of space do justify a certain amount of selective quoting, but perhaps this book might have benefited from an appendix of fifty poems reproduced in full Persian text with English translations and representative of various styles, lengths, and subject matter. Keshavarz seldom provides the original Persian text, believing that the foci of this study, such as Rumi’s use of paradox and silence can be “fully appreciated” in translation (p. 12). Keshavarz’s English renderings of Rumi’s poems on the whole read well, although it is difficult for the reader to immediately judge their accuracy without the original text.

Keshavarz’s prose style is often choppy and unfocused, jumping from one point to another (e.g., p. 64) at a pace that often makes it difficult for the reader to follow her line of argument. A rather colloquial tone, I feel, at times detracts from the impact of insightful statements on her part, although it may make this book more appealing to undergraduate students of Persian literature, who presumably form the target readership. By contrast, Chapter 8, titled, “Turning the Funeral into a Whirling Dance Remapping the Generic Horizons” is, to Keshavarz’s credit, clearly written and well argued. Keshavarz’s continual reference to the inherent “playfulness” (e.g., pp. 17, 82, 99, 118) and essential childlike quality (e.g., pp. 118, 133, 134) of many of Rumi’s poems may grate on many readers, but it highlights an important point—namely, that in search of the mystical depth in the poems of the Divan-i Shams, many scholars have overlooked the fun element of the genre.
The *Oneirocriticon* of Achmet is a mysterious work. Written in Greek, this Byzantine text purports to transmit the teachings of the Egyptians, Indians, and Persians on dream divination. It also contains references to Achmet, the son of Seirem, a figure seemingly to be identified with Muhammad ibn Sirin, the legendary founder of the Muslim tradition of dream interpretation. The *Oneirocriticon* is a work well known to Byzantinists. Not only is it the only full-length Christian dream manual in Greek. It is also—potentially—a valuable source for investigating a number of subjects: the transmission of knowledge between the worlds of Islam and Byzantium; the role of divination in Byzantium; and a variety of social-historical issues, not least because the text is a “mine of linguistic information especially pertinent to material culture” (p. 69). Unfortunately, until now, all such uses of the text have been hampered, primarily because we have not understood some of the most basic information about when it was composed, where, and by whom—and more important, what sources its author used. As recently as 1985, Gilbert Dagron, the doyen of French Byzantinists, could write, “If all specialists . . . agree today in recognizing in the *Oneirocriticon* a Byzantine work influenced by Islam, no one has yet elucidated the complex problem of its borrowings from the Arabic literature of the ninth and tenth centuries” (as cited p. 23).

In the present volume, Mavroudi has two primary goals. The first is to determine whether and to what extent the *Oneirocriticon* made use of Muslim sources. The second is to clarify its relationship to the 2nd-century Greek dream manual of Artemidorus. The latter undertaking is not simple, because Artemidorus’s work was also known to Muslims through an Arabic translation. Thus, if the *Oneirocriticon* used Artemidorus, one must determine whether it did so by way of Muslim sources or by way of the original. The satisfactory resolution of these issues is essential for any future use of the text. Indeed, as Mavroudi wisely argues, “Before tapping into the wealth of information [the *Oneirocriticon*] provides on the material culture of the Middle Byzantine period . . . it is imperative to know where the interpretations offered in this dreambook came from and what changes, if any, they underwent in the process of transmission” (p. 5).

In preparation to the main subject of her study, Mavroudi begins by establishing approximate dates for the text’s composition, which, she argues, must have been after the restoration of icons in 843 and before about 1075, the dates of the manuscripts that first cite it. She next turns to an examination of the earliest scholarship on the text, then to a mature analysis of the linguistic context within which it was produced, with convincing examples to suggest that its author was equipped with a sophisticated knowledge of neither Greek nor Arabic and further examples to illustrate that there are passages in the text that, while unintelligible in Greek, make fine sense if understood as too literal translations from Arabic. Mavroudi next turns to a discussion of the manuscript tradition of the work and the history of its editions and translations. It may be noted that she identifies seven new Greek witnesses and establishes that the standard edition was based on less than sound philological principles. (Perhaps it is now time to contemplate a new edition—a task for which Mavroudi seems uniquely suited.)

For the main purposes of her project, Mavroudi chooses five Muslim dream manuals for comparison with the *Oneirocriticon*. Two criteria guide her selection: for some, their early date of composition, such that they were written as close as possible to the *Oneirocriticon*; for others, their accessibility to scholars, in hopes that the use of widely available texts will facilitate further discussion. The five dream manuals used are those of Ibn Qutaybah (d. 889), Dinawari (d. ca. 1020),
Dari (fl. 11th or 12th centuries), Zahiri (d. 1468), and Nabulusi (d. 1731). While many other dream manuals are known to exist from the early Middle Ages and later, Mavroudi is justified in restricting herself to this selection because of the homogeneity that has characterized the Muslim tradition of dream interpretation almost from its inception.

Well over two-thirds of Mavroudi’s study is devoted to the resolution of her two main questions, which is accomplished primarily through the detailed comparison of selections from Artemidorus, the Oneirocriticon, and her five Muslim dream manuals. The evidence she marshals is convincing and at last puts the study of the Oneirocriticon on a solid foundation. In sum, she concludes: (1) the author of the Oneirocriticon did not make use of Artemidorus directly, but via Muslim sources; (2) in terms of structure and content, the Oneirocriticon represents a Christianization of one or more Muslim dream manuals; and (3) the composition of the Oneirocriticon is to be understood against the background of the process whereby Muslim works on science were in the 9th and 10th centuries being translated from Arabic into Greek. In the end, Mavroudi is unable to find the specific source or sources that the author of the Oneirocriticon may have used. It must be remembered, however, that many manuscript collections remain uncatalogued or inadequately catalogued.

The present volume is well written and meticulously researched and argued, an excellent example of the best manner of historical-critical textual analysis. Mavroudi’s arguments are compelling, as well. There can now be no doubt, I think, that the Oneirocriticon represents a Christian adaptation in Greek of one or more Muslim dream manuals. While others have suggested this, they have more often than not done so without direct knowledge of any Arabic sources. Mavroudi, however, has based her arguments on an intimate acquaintance with the relevant Greek and Arabic sources, including some as yet unedited. It is to be hoped that her work will stimulate further research on the Oneirocriticon, its nachleben in medieval Christendom, and the light it can shed on the material culture of Byzantium and the transmission of knowledge between Muslims and Christians.

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Hagiography is a much tortured genre. Starting with the assault of positivism and historicism, it has all too often been viewed as a repository of fanciful miracle accounts and exaggerated piety. There is also the problem of reading this genre as a straightforward biographical narrative, particularly in the context of devotional communities.

The main development in the recent critical study of hagiographies has been to probe the genre as a source for the social history of the pre-modern period. Here one can point to the groundbreaking works of Carl Ernst, Vincent Cornell, Jo-Anne Gross, Devin DeWeese, and others. The present study utilizes a different method, intertextuality, by putting various biographical dictionaries in dialogue with one another to discern underlying structures and presuppositions of each author.

Mojaddedi’s The Biographical Tradition in Sufism represents one of the most thorough studies of early Sufi sources. The chapters in the study focus on six of the most important figures in the history of Islamic hagiography: Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Sulami (d. 1021), Abu Nu’aym al-Isfahani (d. 1038), ‘Abdullah al-Ansari (d. 1089), Abu’l-Qasim al-Qushayri (d. 1072), ‘Ali al-Hujwiri (d. 1074), and ‘Abd al-Rahman Jami (d. 1492). It will be easily recognized that five of the six figures flourished in the 11th century, a formative period in the systematization of Sufism. The sixth figure, Jami, emerges almost 400 years later. Biographical dictionaries are a very important source of information about Sufi figures, particularly before the 11th century, which saw the development
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of hagiographies devoted to a single figure, such as the Asrar al-tawhid devoted to Shaykh Abu Sa‘id ibn Abi al-Khayr.

The foundational texts studied here are largely familiar to students of Sufism, and many of them have long been available in good translations: Nicholson’s translation of Hujwiri’s Kashf al-Mahjub and Von Schlegell’s partial translation of Qushayri’s Risala are both valuable resources. Others, such as al-Sulami’s Tabaqat al-Sufiyya and Jami’s Nafahat al-Uns, while widely consulted, have not been translated in toto. Isfahani’s Hilyat al-awliya and Ansari’s Tabaqat al-Sufiyya (not to be confused with Sulami’s work of the same name) are far less well-known as a whole.

The late and great scholar of Sufism Henry Corbin once described the methodology of his mentor, Louis Massignon, as the “helicopter” method: Massignon would majestically survey texts, sweep down on any mention of Hallaj, lift up that particular reference, and then move away. That “helicopter” method of mining traditional biographies has been more popular than many of us would care to admit, not just in the case of Sufism, but for all the studies of Islamic thought that have relied on the ubiquitous genre of biographical dictionaries. Mojaddedi takes major steps to move away from this flawed methodology by considering the structure and ideological aims of each work as a whole. The value of Mojaddedi’s study is not in translating large excerpts from these six sources but in reading these volumes side by side in an intertextual manner to discern connections and disruptions among them.

Mojaddedi convincingly demonstrates that the works in this genre, which emerge over a period of 400 years, are interconnected not just in terms of content of individual biographies, but also in terms of the structure of the various biographical generations that each volume uses. Even more important, Mojaddedi astutely proves that the structure of each tabaqāṭ work reveals important insights about the presumptions of its author. Qushayri offers a narrow definition of Sufism that excludes controversial Sufis such as Hallaj and often depicts other mystics as little more than pious transmitters of traditions. Sulami acknowledges the controversy over Hallaj but focuses on those who praise him. Hujwiri, by contrast, offers a full “Hallaji” lineage. Jami, being the much later author, privileges his own Naqshbandi order.

Clearly, it would be a mistake to read any one of these texts as somehow naively and purely conveying “what Sufism is,” in light of each author’s construction of Sufism in a contested intellectual and political milieu. One important point that Mojaddedi demonstrates is that not all Sufi biographies are made up of recognized Sufis: Isfahani’s Hilyat al-awliya’, for example, is overwhelmingly made up of individuals in the first few generations of Islamic history, before there was a distinct group known as the Sufis. The reason for this is understandable: Isfahani was attempting to link Sufism with the authoritative generations of earlier figures. Nor are all important Sufis in each work.

There are a few minor criticisms to be made of this work, none of which detracts from the originality of the study. The volume started as a dissertation and in parts still reads in “dissertationese”: there are so many details that it becomes hard to discern the forest for the trees. Also, the work as a whole might have benefited from a stronger theoretical underpinning, particularly from the recent conversations in historiography and hagiography. The bibliography cites the groundbreaking works of Carl Ernst, Jo-Anne Gross, Marcia Hermansen, and others, but they do not seem to have informed the study in a substantial manner. This is somewhat symptomatic of the current state of Islamic studies, with its tensions between a religious-studies model on one hand and the philological/textual model on the other. One can hope that in the next generation of scholarship in Islamic studies, very capable and imaginative scholars such as Mojaddedi continue to engage the theoretically sophisticated works being undertaken. To be fair to Mojaddedi, there are a few interesting engagements with Gadamer (pp. 5, 177), Ricoeur (p. 181) and other contemporary thinkers.

It is delightful to see a textual study of Sufism that does not limit itself to the Arabic sources. Clearly, one point that Mojaddedi demonstrates is that even in the so-called formative period of Sufism, scholars need to engage both Arabic and Persian sources. Students of Sufism are
recommended to take advantage of this important study. It might suitably be used in graduates level courses on Sufism and Islamic texts. Research libraries are urged to purchase this volume.

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Harald Motzki is the most prominent contemporary scholar of early Islamic jurisprudence and hadith studies, and this translation of his seminal work Die Anfänge der islamischen Jurisprudenz: Ihre Entwicklung in Mekka bis zur Mitte des 2./8. Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart, 1991) will make his revision of the Schachtian model much more accessible. In 1950, Joseph Schacht opened a 150-year gap between the lifetime of Muhammad and the first authentic legal texts of the nascent schools of the 8th and 9th centuries by questioning the authenticity of the hadiths contained in those legal texts. Schacht concluded that isnâads, which claimed to provide transmission histories during the first 100 years of Islam, were fabricated and arbitrary. It is this conclusion that Motzki seeks to overturn.

In his first chapter, Motzki provides an excellent survey of development of skepticism towards hadiths starting with Sachau, von Kremer, and Goldziher. His focus, however, is on Schacht. He attempts to demonstrate that Schacht relied on questionable assumptions and methods, which made his main conclusions untenable. In particular, Schacht’s “e silentio procedure” proves problematic, since the recorded hadiths do not represent all the extant hadiths at the time (pp. 21–22). Motzki provides an example later in the book to demonstrate that authorities did not necessarily cite all of the relevant hadiths that they knew.

The second chapter analyzes the Musannaf of ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-San‘ani (744–827), a source that had been unavailable to Schacht. In the course of investigating the transmission of this text and of its sources, Motzki concludes that the extant text “very probably reproduces faithfully ‘Abd al-Razzaq’s teaching material” (p. 72). Also, the diversity and unique characteristics of each of the three major sources in the Musannaf suggest to Motzki that ‘Abd al-Razzaq did not forge these materials.

The third chapter (about three-quarters of the book) attempts to demonstrate that the earlier sources within the Musannaf are authentic and, having done that, to reconstruct the development of jurisprudence in Mecca. He does this by examining the material ascribed to ‘Ata’ ibn Rabah and ‘Amr ibn Dinar, especially as transmitted by Ibn Jurayj. Motzki’s basic assumption is that, had the traditions been produced by systematic projection or fabrication, “one would expect uniformity” (p. 81). This lack of uniformity is evident in external and internal criteria. The external criteria include genre (dicta versus responsa, and the variations within these genres, such as personal material versus that from others) and the proportion of earlier sources that are cited. The internal criteria include the relative use of ra’y, statements by Muhammad, and statements by his Companions; the use and quality of isnâads, terminology of transmission, anonymous transmission, and indirect transmission; and such noteworthy features as disagreement with earlier sources, variant traditions, uncertainty, the infrequency of reference to the Companions, and the marginal significance of Prophetic traditions. All of this diversity leads Motzki to conclude that the material is largely authentic.

Motzki then suggests that Meccan fiqh has its roots in the teaching of Ibn ‘Abbas, but that even at the end of the 7th century ‘Ata’, for instance, normally expressed his own opinion and only
occasionally cited the Prophet or Companions. By the time of Ibn Jurayj in the first quarter of the 2nd century, more traditions were being used to support legal views. Even so, Motzki concludes that even as early as the 1st century, both the Qur'an and the Prophet were invoked as sources of law, a conclusion that undercuts the main theories of Schacht (and John Wansbrough).

_Die Anfänge der islamischen Jurisprudenz_, or this translation, is a must read for every scholar of early Islam. (The English version offers the reader the added benefit providing Motzki’s responses to critiques of the original German version). By arguing that the beginnings of Islamic _fiqh_ lie one-half to three-quarters of a century earlier than Schacht had proposed, Motzki seems to have shown that Schacht was incorrect in his generalization that most _isnāds_ were fabricated and thus also seems to undercut much of the scholarship on the development of Islamic jurisprudence of the past fifty years. Furthermore, by arguing that a number of hadiths are authentically attributable to Muhammad’s Companions, who are a link to Muhammad himself, Motzki can further argue that they represent “a historical kernel” (p. xiv). Many “sanguine”/”traditionalist” scholars will see Motzki’s work as the final word on whether hadiths can be trusted. Many “skeptical”/”revisionist” scholars will not be convinced, but the burden of proof has shifted to them: Motzki’s detailed evidence and strong arguments must be addressed. Some might object that the _Musannaf_ is not an authored work but a later collected work and so its sources might not be as authentic as Motzki suggests. Others would contend that Motzki’s assumption that either traditions are systematically fabricated (in which case there should be much uniformity) or mostly authentic (in which case there is much diversity) is too simplistic. Traditions may have been unsystematically (and not consciously) fabricated, which would also produce the obvious lack of uniformity, especially if, as Motzki himself suggests, oral and written transmission sources were “inextricably intertwined” (p. 104). The debate is clearly far from over, and Schachtian skepticism might yet prevail, but Motzki’s paradigm is likely to replace that of Schacht for quite some time.

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This book makes an important contribution to the study of Egyptian Christianity from the 5th to the 8th century. It begins with a discussion of earlier scholarship on the cult of saints in Egypt. This scholarship had emerged from the study of patristics and theology and mostly focused on the literary sources and composition of hagiographical texts, the veracity of their accounts, the authentication of the saints’ existence, and the survival of pagan practices under Christian guise. By comparison, the evidence from papyri and inscriptions can help switch scholarly focus from the origins of a saint’s cult to its social function and supplement (or even dramatically alter) the picture conveyed by narrative sources. For example, based exclusively on narrative sources, P. Maraval, _Lieux saints et pèlerinages d’Orient_ (Paris, 1985, pp. 311–27), records forty-three Egyptian shrines, concentrated in Alexandria and the Delta, as well as the region between Antinoe and Panopolis; Papaconstantinou (p. 14) contrasts this evidence to the 232 shrines documented in papyri and inscriptions, distributed throughout Lower, Middle, and Upper Egypt. Papaconstantinou’s arguments rely on her alphabetically arranged inventory of 167 saints that constitutes Part 1 of the book (pp. 40–225). The inventory does not include saints exclusively attested in hagiography—therefore, De Lacy O’Leary’s _The Saints of Egypt_ (London, 1937) remains indispensable. Nor does it include “Saint
Mary” to avoid dealing with excessively abundant material and conjecturing, frequently without sufficient evidence, whether mention of Mary’s name refers to the Virgin or a homonymous saint. Each entry lists the papyri, inscriptions, and other sources where the name of the saint can be found and gives the epithets applied to it therein (hagios, apa, martys, etc). Whenever the provenance of the source material is known, its discussion is arranged geographically and, given sufficient evidence, an essay on the saint’s cult is provided. A bibliography citing the editions of primary sources and secondary literature on each saint concludes the entry. Representations of saints in art and issues of iconography are not addressed, except when this can help establish their identity or better understand their personality.

Part 2 of the book (pp. 229–367) discusses in three chapters some broader issues based on the documentation presented in Part 1. Chapter 1 reviews the types of holy figures venerated in Egypt (mostly Egyptian; martyrs rather than monks and bishops; adult men rather than women and children; popular military and physician saints) and the rather limited array of titles, honorary epithets, and other terms applied to them. It also carefully evaluates the importance of the cults based on references to shrines, festivals, and invocations, and the distribution of these references in space and time. Papaconstantinou’s examination of the sources uncovers a number of local saints totally unknown from hagiography, although some of them, such as Phoibammon, enjoyed considerable popularity. Chapter 2 discusses the terms used in the sources to designate the shrines of saints (a useful discussion, given that archeology provides little information on early Coptic shrines) and their geographic distribution. The latter is subject to two patterns: first, contrary to the evidence of hagiographical texts that were frequently compiled to promote a given shrine and stifle competition, papyri and inscriptions document the existence of multiple shrines in the same or neighboring locations. Second, although by the 6th century the cult of saints is concentrated around shrines in the midst of villages, at the end of the 7th century it is mostly found around monasteries, either because their founders began to be venerated in addition to martyrs and biblical saints, or because the relics of earlier saints were transferred to monasteries, evidently due to insecurity in the countryside (p. 308). Chapter 3 addresses the dates and manner of celebrating the saints’ feasts, as well as the various manifestations of personal devotion to saints. These include inscriptions of their names on tombs, monuments, various everyday or liturgical objects, mentions of them in oracles, amulets, prayers, defixiones, and oaths, taking care of their sanctuary, and being named after them.

Five appendixes further analyzing and tabulating the source material, a bibliography of all the primary sources used, and two maps accompany the book. Quotations in Greek and Coptic wisely preserve the spelling and the syntactic and grammatical particularities of the original document; translations into French are generally provided, although a reader who is able to follow both Greek and Coptic can consult the book more profitably. It is regrettable that the book does not include an accumulative bibliography (besides the list of abbreviations on pp. xiii–xxiv and the bibliography of sources on pp. 419–68) and an index that would have made the work significantly easier to consult. The impact of the Islamic conquest on Egyptian Christianity, a topic of particular interest to the readership of IJMES, is also briefly discussed (pp. 10–12, 371–72). Papaconstantinou suggests that the sources she examined are little influenced by the conquest and convey a process of slow evolution rather than abrupt change. By exhaustively listing all the epigraphic and documentary sources relevant to the period, she provides interested researchers with a starting point to probe this topic further.

Le culte des saints en Égypte received the Charles and Marguerite Diehl Prize from the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres in 2001. The honor is well deserved, as the book is the product of careful and thorough research offering fresh and richly documented insights. Its conclusions are cautiously formulated, and the limitations of the surviving evidence—what it can and what it cannot tell us and for what reason—are thoughtfully assessed. Its inventory of primary-source material is bound to make it of lasting value as reference work for researchers in a wide array of
disciplines interested in Egyptian Christianity and the cult of saints in the Mediterranean during the Late Antique and Early Medieval periods.

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*Metaphysics as Rhetoric* is a challenging book for all the right reasons. It is skillfully and philosophically argued. It revisits the politics of Plato and al-Farabi, challenges received interpretations, and offers a new thought-provoking reading. It proposes that al-Farabi held a more sophisticated understanding of Plato’s political writings than commonly believed. And, finally, it contextualizes al-Farabi’s politics within the Muslim umma of his time.

Parens argues that the traditional Platonist metaphysical reading of Plato (from the later Neoplatonic and Christian [Augustinian] traditions to Heidegger) is responsible for making metaphysics the foundation of politics, which in turn has been used by Medievalists, Arabists, and Islamicists to read al-Farabi’s political works. With his close reading of Plato’s *Laws* and *Republic* and of al-Farabi’s works—most notably, his *Summary of Plato’s Laws*, but also his Political Regime, Principles of the Opinions of the Inhabitants of the Virtuous City, Enumeration of the Sciences, and the Book of Religion—Parens shows that, for these two authors, politics does not rest on metaphysics. Politics rests on more pragmatic psychological considerations that belong to the realm of the rhetorical (convincing the people that it is the best regime). These considerations provide greater insight into the recognition by al-Farabi that politics fall short of the ideals of the virtuous city (on the model of Plato’s *Republic*) and can be ascribed only to the second-best city. Politics must yield to pragmatic considerations and consequently is distinct from and does not rest on the metaphysical.

The work is divided into three major parts. Parens sets out first to show that neither Plato nor al-Farabi is a “metaphysical dogmatist” (p. 143) by rejecting the claim that laws have metaphysical foundations (against Heidegger). The psychological realm provides these foundations (p. xxxv) and serves to support a rhetorical defense of laws. In the second part, he shows the divergences that exist between the city governed by reason (*Republic*) and the city ruled by the written law (*Laws*). In the later work, these laws need to be defended by “subrational” arguments, or what Parens identifies as al-Farabi’s “kalām” (p. xxxv). The need for rhetorical arguments, and thus the need for religion and the art of kalām (p. 143), illustrates the gap between the best city—the virtuous city—and the second-best city. In the last part, Parens shows that laws can provide individual access to a rational way of life by means of the passage from the rule of written law to the rule of reason (p. xxxv) via the work of the “poetic art of persuasion” (p. 75), such that the rhetorical art (of kalām) serves as a prelude to the life of reason and the prelude to the law.

In addition to his willingness to critically analyze Plato and al-Farabi’s work, Parens skillfully develops and defends arguments. The strength of this study rests in his argumentative approach and close reading of Plato’s *Laws* and al-Farabi’s *Summary*. Parens analyzes al-Farabi’s omissions, silences, and departures from Plato’s *Laws* with his non-metaphysical reading of al-Farabi’s *Summary* (as well as Plato’s *Laws*) and introduces a new “rhetorical” reading of their politics. Parens demonstrates admirably what constitutes a serious reading of philosophical texts. His insight into al-Farabi’s politics is enriched by his critical evaluation of contemporary readings of Plato’s politics (Heidegger and 19th-century German scholarship). Paying heed to the work of earlier scholars of Plato, he deconstructs the “metaphysical” Plato, a central element of his
argument, before doing the same with al-Farabi’s work. In so doing, he reviews (even questions) the interpretations of those who have inspired him, people such as Strauss (p. 159, n. 25) or Mahdi (p. 168, n. 26; p. 171, n. 9) and others like Heidegger (cf. 178, n. 2), Walzer (pp. 22–24), Galston (p. 25), Watt (p. xxv), Gabrieli (p. xxxi, 168, n. 26), Stern (p. xxv), Gutas (p. xxxi), and so on. Equally important is the fact that Parens is able to demonstrate al-Farabi’s familiarity with the Laws of Plato and the way in which the new cultural and religious context, and not merely philosophical considerations, account for al-Farabi’s choices of interpretation (e.g., the second-best city and the Muslim umma).

Parens understands “discussion” (kalâm) (found in al-Farabi’s texts) as belonging to two different types of discourse: one within the traditional theological mutakallim tradition and another within the philosophic mutakallim tradition (p. 12). In this, he appears to follow Straus’ “philosophical kalâm.” Although Parens does have a point in arguing for the importance of a rhetorical defense of law, his use of kalâm may not be as felicitous. Parens appears to conflate the semantic field of the term to subsume the field of rhetoric. However, “kalâm” consists of discussions taken to be rhetorical—at times theological; at others via arguments from a “subrational” level (pp. xxxv, 15). Are both philosophical and theological arguments subsumed under this “subrational” level? Parens clearly has in mind the “rhetorical defense” of laws (passim), but at times the term kalâm appears to allude to the theological justifications that underpin the rhetorical defense of laws—for example, “theology is a rhetorical defense of his politics” (pp. xiv–xv). It is unclear what constitutes the demarcation between demonstrative theology and the rhetorical art of kalâm, especially in view of the “subrational” nature of kalâm arguments, which include poetry but eventually also dialectics (p. 143). And finally, Parens’s claim that “Plato is not the founder of metaphysics,” which he upholds against Heidegger, can merely be inferred (and only for the realms of politics) from his analysis, as he only set out to show, albeit quite eloquently, that politics is grounded not in metaphysical presuppositions but rather in “political psychology” (p. 144).

On the whole, Islamicists, Islamists, theologians, and theorists in comparative religion, as well as students of al-Farabi’s political philosophy and those interested in Arabic or Islamic political thought, will all be interested in this work, along with those interested in al-Farabi’s “phenomenological” analysis or contemporary philosophy (Heidegger and post-modernism) (p. xxxvii). A last note: the addition of Arabic and Greek terms would have increased the usefulness of the index.

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This comprehensive study presents an overview of the Ottoman Empire—or, rather, its ruling class—from its emergence in late medieval times through its maturation in early modern times. Lucidly written, Colin Imber’s book lays out this large subject for a non-specialist audience. It is important at the outset, however, to be aware of what the book does and does not do. Imber himself states in the Introduction that his approach to the subject is “narrow.” To wit, the book examines the institutions and practices of Ottoman government—“the structure of power” of the title—through the empire’s formative centuries and into the stressful first half of the 17th century. It does not concern itself, except peripherally, with society, religion, or culture—in other words, with the subject population’s own experiences and responses to the power exercised on it. What this study does, it does extremely well, by virtue of the author’s wide reading in both the primary...
sources and the secondary literature and his own previous contributions to the study of dynastic ideology, law, and the navy, and his reconstruction of a chronology of the early centuries.

Following a long and dense account (“Chronology”) that details the creation of the empire and its first significant losses in the 17th century, Imber takes up a variety of topics in individual chapters. Given the book’s focus on power, which Imber regards as residing above all with the sultanate, the first two chapters treat “The Dynasty” (its structure, reproduction, and modes of legitimation) and “Recruitment” (the non-dynastic cadres of the ruling class and the shifting strategies that underlay their composition). Subsequent chapters (“The Palace,” “The Provinces,” “The Law,” “The Army,” “The Fleet”) trace the various venues and institutional structures through which power was enacted, delegated, negotiated, and sometimes stymied. Particularly outstanding is the discussion of decision-making in the chapter titled “The Palace” and its account of the Imperial Council. For this non-military historian, the chapters on “The Army” and “The Fleet” offered new information and perspectives. A brief conclusion is followed by a glossary of terms; a list of primary sources quoted; a select bibliography by chapter of secondary works in English, French, and German; and an ample index.

All the chapters delineate change over time, though Imber pays more attention to the 15th and 16th centuries and rather less to the transformations of the 17th. Each chapter stands alone, happily making it possible to read in random order (or to assign select chapters in undergraduate courses). Apart from the rather daunting (though valuable) “Chronology” chapter, the book is eminently readable—indeed, enjoyably so. This is in no small part because of the wide range of illustrative examples and the many marvelous and telling quotations from contemporary (primary) sources. One of these is an early-17th-century work called The Laws of the Janissaries, from which Imber culls observations such as the ban on recruiting “fresh faced and beardless” lads because they will appear “despicable to the enemy.” Another example is the 15th-century Genoese merchant Iacopo de Promontorio’s list of Rumelian provinces—including “Aranti’s Albania,” “Scanderbeg’s Albania,” “Lazar’s Serbia,” and the “Despot’s Serbia”—which Imber cites to bolster his point about the remarkable degree to which the Ottoman regime preserved the boundaries (and the memory) of pre-Ottoman rulers. My personal favorites among the chapters are “Recruitment” and “The Law”; my least favorite is “The Provinces,” which bogs down somewhat in a prolonged treatment of the timar (military fief) and suffers from the absence of provincial power brokers and thus of the dynamics of center–periphery “structures of power.”

On its surface, this work is descriptive rather than analytical. Although the book is about structures of power, the author is less interested in relations of power as they are approached in cultural studies than in the anatomy of authority and government. As he does in his study of the 16th-century mufti Ebu Su‘ud, Imber for the most part leaves readers to draw their own conclusions. However, knowledgeable readers will readily discern a degree of analytic commentary in Imber’s choice of material, incidental remarks, and emphases. An example of the latter is the recurring emphasis on Islam, and in particular its law, which the author regards as the principal formal limitation on sultanic power. Another example is Imber’s discussion of the pro-war policies of the late 16th century, which, without trumpeting the point, belies common assumptions about the inattentiveness of Sultans Murad III and Mehmed III. Even the chronology chapter, more a reference document than a narrative overview, has, as a result of its admirable comprehensiveness, the potential to support debate about the nature and evolution of the Ottoman regime.

In Imber’s definition, the Ottoman Empire was multinational, neither exclusively Islamic nor exclusively Turkish. It was also dynastic, an empire in which “the only loyalty demanded of all its multifarious inhabitants was allegiance to the sultan.” Power was disseminated through personal ties centering on the figure of the sultan. When, from the end of the 16th century, the empire suffered a long season of military, economic, and social disruptions and sultans could no longer sustain the kind of heroic career exemplified by their forebears, the empire’s “capacity to weather crises,” Imber argues, depended on two institutions: the legal system and its courts, which kept
the confidence of subjects, and the scribal bureaucracy, which collected taxes and equipped the military, despite rapid turnover at the top. He concludes that it was “the continuity in these mundane functions of government that ensured the Empire’s survival.”

As a comprehensive and well-written digest of current knowledge about Ottoman practices of government, Imber’s book is a welcome contribution to the field of Ottoman studies, which has until recently suffered from the lack of general treatments that are both accessible and scholarly. One of the particular virtues of the book is the rich illustration from a wide range of primary sources. If it is largely innocent of analytic commentary, this account of the pre-modern Ottoman Empire arms readers with the knowledge to articulate their own conclusions.

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The 1990s witnessed the publication of several books that presented useful surveys of the history of Ottoman Jewry. This book, a solid work that relies on a wide array of rabbinic sources and academic studies, focuses on one community during a specific period, which allows the author to present a study that is both comprehensive and rich in detail. Minna Rozen methodically examines every conceivable aspect of Jewish life in Istanbul. The Jewish community of Istanbul was the most important in the Ottoman Empire, and what took place there reflected on Jewish life throughout the realm.

It was also uniquely diverse. The indigenous Greek-speaking Byzantine Jews, the Romaniots, included large numbers forced to resettle in Istanbul as part of Mehmed the Conqueror’s policy to repopulate the city. Throughout the late 15th and 16th centuries, large numbers of Jews began arriving from the Iberian peninsula (Sephardim), Italy, the German lands (Ashkenazim), Hungary, and other European countries. These immigrants formed congregations based on the country, or even city, of their origin.

Chapter 1 describes the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople. During the heat of the battle, Ottoman forces did not distinguish between Greeks and Jews, and their fate was alike. Nevertheless, over time a tradition emerged that the Jews, unlike the Greeks, had not resisted and were therefore entitled to certain privileges in accordance with Islamic law. This was the basis for several decrees that permitted Jews to keep their synagogues, repair them, and even construct new ones.

In Chapter 2, Rozen supports the conventional view that the Ottomans were generally flexible and pragmatic in applying traditional restrictions of the Pact of Umar. This chapter contains a lengthy discussion of the various taxes that Jews had to pay and the manner of their collection.

Chapters 3 through 5 discuss related issues of migration, settlement, and demographic trends. While the information is generally solid, Table 1, listing the Jewish population of Istanbul from 1477 to 1688, does not distinguish between official Ottoman counts and estimates. Thus, the figure for 1535, which lists 8,070 Jewish households, is totally inconsistent with later figures that place the number of households between 2,000 and 2,500. Rozen’s hypothesis that at the beginning of the 16th century Istanbul “was only a way station for immigrants who subsequently went to other places” (p. 53) does not concur with what we know about patterns of Jewish migration from the Iberian peninsula.

Chapters 6 and 7 discuss the internal structure of the Jewish community and the relations among the different groups. From the mid-15th through the 16th century, the Romaniots were
united under one rabbi, whereas the Sephardim had a collective leadership; their distinguished rabbis would meet on an ad hoc basis to decide important issues. In matters pertaining to the entire Jewish population, joint meetings, including Romaniot and Sephardic rabbis, would be held. Over time there was growing integration between Romaniots and Sephardim, especially intermarriage among economic elites, and the defection of individuals to other congregations. This led to a growing Sephardization of the Romaniot population—interesting since the Sephardim were greatly outnumbered by the Romaniots.

Chapter 8 discusses the family, covering a wide range of topics—marriage, divorce, custody and education of children, inheritance, and the different customs practiced by various groups. These differences could be considerable. For example, while Ashkenazi custom absolutely forbade polygamous marriages, Iberian and Romaniot traditions permitted them. Most Jewish families in 16th-century Istanbul were monogamous. However, Iberian and Romaniot men whose first wife could not bear children were inclined to marry second wives. In Istanbul, Ashkenazi men could under special circumstances maintain a polygamous family. A full third of the book’s text, this chapter contains much new data and offers numerous examples derived from the rabbinic literature. However, it tends to digress into lengthy discussions of the technicalities of Jewish law in far greater detail than is necessary for a work in social history.

Chapters 9 through 11 deal with issues of social stratification, economic activity, and culture. Among Istanbul Jews, social standing was determined by proximity to the Ottoman court (this could also lead to disaster), wealth, and ancestry. Unlike the Ashkenazi of Central and Eastern Europe, the Jews of Istanbul respected rabbinic scholarship only up to a point. This, argues Rozen, was influenced by the strong entrepreneurial spirit that dominated important segments of society. Nevertheless, the wealthy took pride in supporting schools and charitable institutions, which helped turn Istanbul into a major center of Jewish scholarship and printing. With the help of Ottoman authorities, Jewish merchants attained the pinnacle of economic success in the mid-16th century.

Chapter 12, one of the most interesting, discusses Jewish relations with the general society. Romaniot and European Jews were unaccustomed to the strict segregation of women. However, influenced by dominant Muslim culture, similar behavioral patterns were adopted, although Jewish women continued to enjoy greater freedom of movement than their Muslim neighbors, which allowed them to engage in a variety of economic activities. But since life revolved around the family, segregation of the sexes strengthened the segregation of society in general by religious and ethnic groups. Nevertheless, the author describes numerous points of contact between individuals across religious and ethnic lines necessitated primarily by economic activity but also by a shared interest in material culture, art, and entertainment.

One would hope to find at the end of such a richly detailed work some discussion of the broader meaning of the information assembled here. In a five-page “Conclusion” Rozen argues that the end of Süleyman the Magnificent’s reign marked the end of the “Golden Age” of Ottoman Jewry. This seems rather arbitrary for a work that deals with broad social phenomena, especially since some of the best-known Ottoman Jewish personalities—Joseph Nasi, Solomon ibn Ya’ish, and Solomon Ashkenazi—attained the pinnacle of their careers after Süleyman’s death. And despite the title’s dates, the main focus of the book is on the entire 16th century, with substantial forays into the 17th century and later.

An appendix of some sixty pages of translated excerpts from several responsa collections is a welcome addition. The responsa literature is a major source for this study, and the excerpts give the reader a flavor of this genre as well as concrete examples of the wealth of subjects with which it is concerned. Although the style of this work tends to be argumentative and not always easy to follow, as a volume intended primarily for specialists it constitutes a major contribution to Jewish and Ottoman social history.
REVIEWED BY JULIA CLANCY-SMITH, Department of History, University of Arizona, Tucson; e-mail: juliac@u.arizona.edu

It used to be that the century preceding the 1830 invasion of Algiers represented a siècle obscur. The historical obscurity stems in part from the nature of Ottoman rule in this particular province of the empire. However, the most compelling explanation lies in the immense devastation wrought during the first decades of France’s occupation and the wanton destruction of much of the written record documenting Algeria’s pre-colonial history. Compared with other countries of the Maghrib—or, indeed, to eastern Ottoman lands—Algeria suffered a systematic erasure of its historical memory at the hands of invaders and settlers to a degree experienced only by Palestinian society.

Tal Shuval’s work is part of a collective scholarly endeavor that seeks to recuperate the lost history of Algeria’s urban past. Research produced in the past decade or so has deepened our knowledge of pre-colonial Algerian cities and their populations—for example, M. Amine’s 1991 doctoral dissertation devoted to commerce and merchants in Algiers in the late Ottoman period; Miriam Hoexter’s Endowments, Rulers and Community: Waqf al-Haramayn in Ottoman Algiers (1998); and Isabelle Grangaud’s 1998 doctoral dissertation, “La ville imprenable. Histoire sociale de Constantine au XVIIIème siècle.” Shuval’s study of Algiers, a revised version of his doctoral dissertation, is divided into two major sections. The first analyzes in depth the various segments of the city’s population, divided into rulers and ruled, and also tackles the complicated question of population densities in Algiers over time. The second part deals with city structures, the urban core, residential zones, and the distribution of the urban populace in space. While the author provides an excellent overview of the city’s history from the period prior to the Ottoman takeover, he concentrates on the eight decades between 1711 and 1791. This era, marked by stable government and prosperity, brought the city and its inhabitants into its second Ottoman “apogee” under Mehmed Pasha ibn Osman, who held the office of dey for a quarter of a century. His death in 1791 represented the terminus ad quem of this golden age.

The kinds of questions that the historian can raise—and, more important, answer—about this era are, needless to say, determined by kinds and quantity of documentation available. Despite the loss of considerable historical material, the author made very fine use of microfilmed documents in Turkish and Arabic, often extremely recondite in nature, housed at the Centre dees archives d’outre-mer in Aix-en-Provence. Several categories of documents, each serving to illuminate one of the two major dimensions of this study—population and the social uses of city space and built environment—were used. For reconstructing the capital’s population, the records of the bayt al-māl, particularly the mukhallafāt, provided a veritable “mine d’information” for certain social groups—above all, the military institution and its various constituent parts. Shuval’s findings regarding the composition of the military by the close of the 18th century are intriguing. On the one hand, the odjak had come to include indigenous Algerians due to the inability to draft sufficient new recruits from Anatolia or the Balkans; on the other hand, despite the admission of locals into the militia, ethnic-based distinctions between the civilian population and the askeri appeared to have been maintained. This contrasts significantly with the situation in the neighboring beylik of Tunis, where similar lines of distinction had not only blurred but had virtually disappeared by this period. Waqf records reveal much about city quarters, economic activities, residential patterns, and so on, and also supplement the lacunae found in the bayt al-māl documents, particularly for information on the Andalusian segment of the population, the sons of the odjak, and women. Notably absent from the narrative are two important communities—the Jews and the Mzabites—a regrettable omission caused by the absence of available sources.
Shuval’s meticulous research makes a number of scholarly contributions. First, he takes on the contentious issue of the size of the city’s population, employing a comparative historical methodology throughout to make compelling arguments regarding over-estimates of urban densities. Second, at a larger level of analysis, this methodology is deployed quite effectively to highlight similarities as well as differences between Algiers and other Ottoman or Mediterranean cities. He also reminds us that—unlike most other Arab Ottoman cities—Ottoman rule transformed Algiers in a much more profound manner than was true of other such urban areas, such as Cairo or Damascus. As was true of Carthage to the east, Algiers was founded by the Phoenicians, one of a string of port-city colonies along the North African coast, but it remained a small, relatively unimportant Berber town until the 16th century. As Andrew Hess observed several decades ago, and as Shuval demonstrates in this study, the incorporation of Algiers into the Ottoman Empire was historically as significant as the 7th-century Arab Muslim conquests of North Africa. Finally, Shuval was clearly concerned with recuperating the history of the city’s women residents to the extent permitted by the sources. For example, he devotes a section to “La milice et les femmes” in which he refutes much of what Pierre Boyer had to say about restrictions on marriage for the political-military class.

Taken together, the work of Shuval, Hoexter, and Grangaud, as well as other research in progress, has resulted in a significant paradigm shift in terms of our understanding of Ottoman Algerian history. The only quarrel this reviewer has with Shaval’s very competent work is the fact that there is no index, an omission that may perhaps be attributed to the publisher rather than the author. This is all the more curious since the volume includes a good glossary as well as three excellent appendixes devoted to the distribution of city markets, caravanserais, and public baths.

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For the past four decades Edward Allworth has carefully studied Central Asia’s intellectual and cultural history. Since the publication of Uzbek Literary Politics in 1964, he has written or edited more than sixteen books and eighty articles and earned a reputation as one of the United States’ leading scholarly authorities on Central Asia. The book under review is an analysis of three allegorical dialogues written by the famous Bukharan reformist and author ‘Abdalrauf Fitrat (1886–1938) and their important contribution after 1917 toward a literature of resistance against Soviet domination. As seen in an earlier study, The Preoccupations of ‘Abdalrauf Fitrat, Bukharan Nonconformist: An analysis and list of his writings (2000), Allworth presents Fitrat in courageous terms: as an intellectual who proclaimed the urgency of Central Asia’s revival through education and innovation and who, despite aggressive Soviet censorship, adroitly criticized the “Sovietizing” (p. 30) of his culture through a variety of evasive literary devices such as allegory, metaphor, satire, and oppositional subtexts. Based on his examination of these three dialogues, a genre that the author first employed in The Dispute (1911–12), Allworth argues that Fitrat’s evolution from a “worldly crusader” (p. 30) to a “frantic evader” (p. 30) failed to diminish his defiance of unjust rulers, his moral challenging of his audience, and his persistent criticism of those “who carelessly succumbed to the temptations of communism.” (p. 184)

The book alternates between analytical chapters and translations and concludes with an appendix of original texts of The Judgment Day (1923), Bedil. In One Session (1923) and Satan’s Mutiny
against the Lord (1924). All of these dialogues, which were published in Moscow, appeared after Fitrat was dismissed from his ministerial positions in the Bukharan People’s Conciliar Republic and subsequently “exiled” (p. 176) to the Soviet Russian capital. During this period, Fitrat’s literary and scholarly activities appear not to have been severely curtailed, although he was “subject to a dangerous Marxist regime militantly dedicated to atheism and to russifying Central Asian history” (p. 175). But if, as Allworth asserts, “Bukharan communist politicians of 1923–24 wanted him and his ideas gone” (p. 176), why was Fitrat permitted to publish these three dialogues that might serve to undermine their authority? Discussions of this question by Begali Qosimov and Hamidulla Boltaboev, two prominent Uzbek literary scholars, suggest that Fitrat’s Moscow exile hardly merits consideration as punishment: he lectured and conducted research at the Lazarev Institute of Eastern Languages; he edited the journal Bukharan Life, which was intended for Central Asian readers; and, apparently at the request of the Communist Party leader Fayzulla Khojaev, he translated from Russian into Uzbek a book entitled Lenin and the East. Although Fitrat (and many other former Young Bukharan reformists) suffered this “quintessentially Russian punishment of banishment” (p. 176), his remarkable productivity while domiciled in Moscow belies his discredited status—evidence that the government continued to value his service.

Allworth sustains his thesis throughout each analytical chapter; the subtexts and their applications as political critique are identified and discussed lucidly. In The Judgment Day the deceased main character, Pachamir, awakens into an afterlife that grotesquely parallels Soviet society: cruel, bureaucratic angels accost the newly arrived crowds of dead to demand their passports, and a queue (already an unpleasant reality in Soviet Central Asia) is formed but moves with such slowness that the hero’s determination to enter paradise wanes (“Pachamir waited two and a half years” [p. 68]). The legacy of an important 18th-century poet is debated by a small group of educated Bukharans in Fitrat’s next dialogue, Bedil. In One Session. With his great knowledge of the region’s literature, Fitrat selected a bilingual figure whose reputation for complex, allegorical poetry remained well known within Central Asia. According to Allworth, Bedil’s bilingualism (Persian and Turki) was immediately at variance with Soviet nationality policies that were based on a rigid monolingual and monoethnic republican order. Because Bedil is depicted as a brave critic of sectarianism, the work was erroneously classified as an anti-religious essay, which, Allworth argues, “testifies to Mr. Fitrat’s effectiveness in concealing his real attitude as well as the message he means to convey” (p. 119). Fitrat continued his polemical allegories against the Soviet state, publishing Satan’s Mutiny against the Lord as another anti-religious text, but one that criticized the “insidious encroachment of a new, materialist ideology” (p. 191).

For these three dialogues to contest Soviet authority, Central Asian readers and audiences needed to recognize their subversive allusions, overt confirmation of which would have increasingly dire consequences in that authoritarian era. The extent to which these works were understood as allusive, and therefore subversive, remains unclear throughout this study; nor are the small number of available contemporary reviews indicative of an authentic readership with whom Fitrat surreptitiously criticized the Soviet state. Underlying this correspondence between fictional dialogues and imperial reality is Allworth’s idealized representation of this author, who, despite “some accommodation to the regime” (p. 30), remained miraculously uncorrupted. But a more compelling representation, one that renders Fitrat vulnerable to the profound moral complexities mediated through his dialogues and simultaneously contextualizes the ordeal of co-optation during the early Soviet period, would dispute Allworth’s almost mythic image of the heroic intellectual committed only to the cause of Central Asian resistance.
Orna Almog reassesses Anglo-Israeli relations during the turbulent years from the coming of the Sinai War through the 1958 crises in Jordan and Lebanon. Her study offers international historians of the Middle East important insights in three areas. First, she examines the connection between regional developments and the growing significance of Cold War politics. Second, she uses Israeli and British documents and interviews with former Israeli officials to understand policy-makers’ motivations on both sides of the bilateral relationship. Finally, she stresses the importance of the period after the Suez crisis for bringing about closer ties between Britain and Israel. Almog’s principal argument is that it was the crises of the summer of 1958, rather than the war against Egypt, that produced a “breakthrough” in Anglo-Israeli relations.

British interests in the Middle East prevented close relations with Israel and contributed to an unfavorable British view of the Jewish state throughout much of the 1950s. These interests consisted of access to Middle Eastern oil, so crucial to Britain’s postwar balance-of-payments position, and maintenance of the British military presence in Jordan, Egypt (until 1954), Iraq, the Persian Gulf, and Aden. Britain therefore needed good relations with the Arab states, and British officials regarded Israel as an obstacle to securing London’s economic and strategic goals. A critical, even hostile, attitude toward Israel prevailed among British diplomats, who blamed the Israelis for regional instability.

Almog also identifies Israel’s “iron fist” policy of retaliation in response to fedayeen raids on its territory as a hindrance to closer Anglo-Israeli relations. Though popular with the Israeli public, this doctrine failed to enhance Israeli security and undermined Israel’s perennial attempts to obtain arms. It stemmed from the belief by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan that Arabs would perceive Israeli restraint as weakness. Israeli officials felt that the British discriminated against Israel by suspending arms sales to it following retaliatory strikes while continuing to arm Arab states from whose territory the fedayeen staged attacks. Britain also refused to recognize the borders established by the Arab–Israeli armistice agreements as final, fostering Israeli concerns that London would try to impose a territorial adjustment unfavorable to Israel.

The coming of the Cold War to the Middle East and the rise of Arab nationalism under the leadership of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser initially intensified the strains in Anglo-Israeli relations. Israel opposed Britain’s sponsorship of the Baghdad Pact and resisted the Alpha Plan, the British and American proposal for an Arab–Israeli settlement that was intended to check Soviet influence with the Arab states. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s 1955 Guildhall speech confirmed the Israelis’ worst suspicions by proposing a compromise over Israel’s borders. But the Czech–Egyptian arms deal, the failure of Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact, and Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal set the stage for Anglo-Israeli cooperation in the Sinai War.

Collaboration between the two countries in 1956 was of a limited nature. Though Almog finds evidence that British and Israeli officials conferred about a possible attack on Egypt as early as December 1955, Ben-Gurion deeply mistrusted Britain during the planning and execution of military operations. The Israeli raid on Qalqilya and resulting clash with Arab Legion forces prompted King Hussein to try to invoke the Jordanian defensive treaty with the United Kingdom and threatened to create a crisis prior to the tripartite attack on Egypt. While the war strengthened Israel’s position, Anglo-Israeli collusion “did not bring any major change in the two countries’ relationship” (p. 106).
By 1958, greater Soviet and American influence and the spread of Pan-Arab nationalism had altered politics in the Middle East. Almog credits Ben-Gurion with adapting to the new circumstances and with overcoming Israel’s isolation. During the Anglo-American interventions in Lebanon and Jordan, Ben-Gurion “was determined to use the moment to the full” in aligning with the Western powers against Arab nationalism (p. 190). Despite Soviet threats, Ben-Gurion complied with American requests to provide overflight rights to British aircraft. While he sought to deter a Nasserist seizure of Jordanian territory in the event King Hussein’s government collapsed, the prime minister’s diary shows that he opposed Israeli occupation of the West Bank. The overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy ended Britain’s traditional policy in the Middle East and removed a major obstacle to closer relations with Israel. Harold Macmillan’s government repudiated Eden’s Guildhall speech and provided Israel with Centurion tanks. Although Israel’s relationship with Britain did not grow as close as its ties had been with France, or as strong as its “special relationship” with the United States would become after the Six-Day War, 1958 opened a new chapter in Anglo-Israeli cooperation.

Almog’s reliance on published U.S. sources makes her discussion of American policy less nuanced than her analysis of bilateral Anglo-Israeli diplomacy. In addition, the series editor Peter Catterall may overstate the novelty of Almog’s argument. Her book covers some of the same ground as Zach Levey’s Israel and the Great Powers, 1952–1960 (1997), and a growing number of studies recognize the 1958 crises as pivotal in the Anglo-American transfer of power in the Middle East and in the forging of a closer U.S.—Israeli relationship. Nevertheless, Almog presents some significant new information from Israeli sources, and her well-written study is an example of skillful multiarchival research.

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Writing a history of the Armenian people presents a number of challenges. That history spans close to three millennia during which time the political geography of Armenia shifted as a result of domestic struggles and foreign occupation. During long stretches of time, the country lost its central authority or was fully governed by stronger neighbors. Furthermore, beginning in the 7th century some of its people emigrated in waves, a process that continues to this day, creating a diaspora that has remained relevant to the history of the homeland. Because Armenia is a nation that has had more than its share of calamities, historical controversies are painfully present in most contemporary Armenian narratives. Questions about who lost what and why are not just a matter of debate among historians; they appear in arguments concerning post–Soviet Armenia’s independence, security, and relationship with its neighbors and the world. For these reasons, writing Armenia’s history is not a task undertaken by many.

Nevertheless, the need for a survey has become urgent, given the proliferation of endowed chairs and courses in Armenian history, language, and literature in American universities, as well as the increased interest of the general reader. The first attempt was a two-volume work edited by Richard G. Hovannisian (1997), a much more scholarly yet less coherent work than the one under review, the second such attempt.

Bournoutian’s volume has two parts. The first, made up of eleven chapters, covers the history of Armenia from earliest times to roughly its partition between the Ottoman Turkish and Safavid Persian empires in the 16th and 17th centuries. The second part contains thirteen chapters, the last of which covers the first twelve years of the “post-Soviet” Republic of Armenia. While the
periodization and organization of the first part follows the conventional dynastic order, in
the second part the author introduces an intriguing yet questionable principle of organization
whereby five chapters on various diasporan communities separate the chapters on the history of
Armenia itself.

In a work of this scope, one expects some factual errors, although those relating to contemporary
affairs are difficult to understand. Bournoutian’s timelines are a welcome addition, as they place
developments in Armenia in the context of events in neighboring countries and the rest of the
world, although the relevance of these events is not always made evident. The photos are of poor
quality, but the maps are extremely useful in their simplicity and abundance. The style is easy,
quite narrative, sometimes anecdotal, and entertaining.

In a brief Introduction, Bournoutian explains his approach to Armenian history in the following
way: “[h]ow [the Armenians] managed to survive while larger and more powerful states
disappeared, and how, at the same time, they were able to make significant contributions to world
civilization, is the history of the Armenian people” (p). That is where the problem of this volume
begins. By comparing states to the Armenian people, the author creates a conceptual confusion that
underlies his near-celebration of that history. Someone else might have thought the history of the
Armenian people consisted of continuous losses and might not have considered the recognition of
contributions to world civilization as an appropriate compensation. Evidently, Armenia and Arme-
nians have barely survived. This ability to survive Bournoutian assigns to Armenian rulers—often
responsible for the loss of statehood, population, and territory—and to contributors to culture,
mainly in the diaspora, rather than the peasants, craftsmen, and commoners who remained on the
land, provided the essential continuity in Armenian history, and made all else possible, including
the present independent state of Armenia. There is no question that communities in the diaspora
have provided substantial support to Armenia and continue to do so. Yet their role remains to be
seriously analyzed as far as the politics and economy of the homeland are concerned.

Equally disturbing is that, despite its title, the volume has little to do with the Armenian
“people”—at least, until the reader reaches the modern period. Understandably, the term is used to
suggest that the volume will cover more than Armenia in the geographic sense, given the importance
of the diasporan communities in the last millennium. Nevertheless, the work reads more like the
story of Armenian kings, princes, and catholicoses. The author also fails to provide any serious
discussion of the institutions and institutional contexts within which those who ruled Armenia and
spoke on behalf of the Armenian people for centuries made their decisions. The royal, feudal, and
church rulers represented differences with the “people” and pursued institutional and class interests
that were often more important in the decision-making processes of Armenia’s native rulers than
their being “Armenian.” Survival and relevance to others are the substance of diasporan identity
politics, and Bournoutian may have written this work with such concerns in mind. In the process,
however, he avoided delving into some of the most important internal struggles throughout the
centuries that have determined the outcome of Armenia’s relations with neighbors and conquerors.
For example, the early 4th century—one of the most fascinating periods in Armenian history, when
the struggle for power among kings, princes, and the catholicoses determined the fate of Armenian
statehood—is hardly analyzed. The fascinating Paulician reformist movement that started in the
7th century is ridiculed in terms more severe than those used by the orthodox clerics who feared
and battled it. Another consequence of this avoidance is a tendency to blame external forces for
all the tragedies that befell Armenians. This volume could have benefited from valuable research
produced both by Soviet Armenian and other scholars. The author is on firmer ground when he
deals with the modern period.

Bournoutian is often careful to introduce the reader to a variety of interpretations when dealing
with sensitive issues such as the genesis of the Armenian people, the genocide, political-party
rivalries, and contemporary politics. While readable and useful, this volume falls short of the
promise of its title.
Keivandokht Ghahari argues that the political language of modern Iran is shaped by three major discourses: “national-modernist,” “socialist,” and “Islamic.” This study, which is based on her Ph.D. dissertation, undertakes an analytical examination of three influential journals—Kaveh (1916–22), Iranshahr (1922–27), and Ayandeher (1925–28)—which represented the dominant currents of “national-modernism” during the years marked by the emergence of Reza Shah (1925–41).

Ghahari uses the term “national-modernist” for this dominant ideational pattern based on her identification of notions of “nation” and “progress” presented in the three journals. Each called for a strong central government to create a unified Iran by means of a strong army and “education for all.” For the “national-modernists,” the creation of an Iranian nation-state represented the fundamental prerequisite for Iran’s progress; they believed that only through these means could the political independence and territorial integrity of Iran be maintained.

Considering the hegemonic significance and the changing meaning of these terms in Iran’s political discourse, Ghahari perceives her work as “a contribution to the research of Iran’s modern political culture.” Her work does fill a gap in contemporary research. It is a successful discourse analysis of a period of Iranian development that until the Islamic Revolution was so emotionally charged that it virtually precluded dispassionate research. Ghahari’s work is therefore an example of the increasing professionalism of Iranian social scientists who have learned to deal with their own history in an increasingly detached manner. Her book is even more remarkable for its empirical focus on the socio-genetical and psycho-genetical driving forces of this history, with the emphasis placed on the latter. Nevertheless, her examination lacks the appropriate conceptual precision. For instance, Ghahari describes the “setting of conditions” under which the aforementioned journals were published. She points out non–Iranian challenges to Iranian nationalism such as colonialism, Pan-Turkism, and Pan-Arabism, and carefully highlights the “dangers for Iran’s political independence” as observed by the “national-modernists.” But she does not have a concept of the dynamics of self-esteem in inter-state relations. That said, one has to acknowledge that Ghahari’s work offers excellent empirical proof of the relevance of the inter-statial dynamics of self-esteem between the established colonial powers and the weaker semi-colonial Iranian state. She examines “national-modernism” as a thrust of assimilation among sectors of the professional bourgeoisie, which was indeed a function of their “identification with the aggressor” and which could be understood as a defensive strategy adopted by Iranian intellectuals, who then became the carriers of nation-state building process between the Constitutional Revolution (1906) and the Islamic Revolution (1979).

Indeed, the modernization of the Iranian state took place as a result of the identification of parts of the Iranian establishment and the professional bourgeoisie with the colonial aggressor. They tried to achieve the sovereignty of Iran through “progress,” by which they meant modernizing the Iranian state and society according to the model of the more powerful states. Ghahari’s careful content analysis of the axiomatic creeds and value preferences of the “national-modernists,” as well as of their socially and culturally critical diagnoses of Iran’s developmental problems, constitutes the main component of her book. The normative image of Iran’s social reality, which stems from the “national-modernists” desire for self-assertion as proud Iranians vis-à-vis the colonial powers and the emerging “Pan” movements in the Middle East, is Ghahari’s primary interest. Essentially, she examines the changes in the needs and desires of parts of the professional bourgeoisie as they...
were manifested in the axiomatic creeds and value preferences of the “national-modernists” as a prerequisite for the emergence of an authoritarian modernism.

The examination of the constraints steering the behavior and sentiment of the “national-modernists” is a practical de-mystification of Iran’s recent history, which is often understood as the history of an “autocracy” affording no further explanation. Ghahari’s analysis reconstructs how and why its emergence was discursively prepared by elements of the professional bourgeoisie, who perceived the “iron fist” of Reza Shah as necessary to enforce and promote progress, which in itself was seen as the unalterable precondition of Iran’s sovereignty under the perceived double pressure of inter-statial power balances and the efficacy of the clergy having a far-ranging influence on the Iranian masses’ behavior and sentiment.

The book is organized into four chapters. In Chapters 1 and 2, Ghahari analyzes the general historical background, then the establishment of the three journals she studies. The “dangers for the political independence and integrity of Iran” are examined in Chapter 3. Through content analysis of these journals, Ghahari elaborates what they have in common and what distinguished each from the others. In addition, she analyzes the ways in which each of the three journals explicated “political independence through nation-building” and “political independence through progress”. The differences between them are shown by their different emphases on institutional and habitual dimensions for the development of Iran. Quite remarkable is the highlighted importance of “mentality” and “social habits” as problems of development, which the “national-modernists” believed they could solve through massive education programs. In Chapter 4, Ghahari concludes by assessing the effects of the national-modernist ideology and providing a short survey of its further development in the more recent history of Iran.

Ghahari’s book is not only a contribution to the de-mystification of recent Iranian history; it is also an excellent empirical contribution that provides the basis for efforts toward a theoretical conceptualization necessary for explaining problems of modernization in less-developed societies. Therefore, it will be valuable not only to Iran specialists but also to scholars dealing with problems of social development in general. Had the author utilized the results of her excellent empirical study for a more substantial conceptualization, she would have complemented her profound analysis with a corresponding synthesis. Unfortunately, that is still far from common in the present atmosphere of institutional separation between “empiricists” and “theorists.”

Michael Fischer assisted in the translation of this review.

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Itamar Levin, an Israeli journalist who has devoted past efforts to reporting on the lost assets of Holocaust victims, focuses his energy in this book on the fate of property left behind in the Arab world by emigrating Mizrahi Jews (Jews from North Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia). The result, a detailed and at times impassioned examination based on archival documents, clearly is designed as a primer for those who Levin hopes will raise compensation claims for Mizrahi property in future Arab–Israeli peace negotiations—most notably, the Israeli government.

From the beginning, Levin admits this agenda: “[t]he timing of this book [completed in April 2001] is no accident…. This book presents decision makers and public opinion shapers with information on Israel’s counterdemands [to Palestinian claims for compensation for abandoned..."
refugee property], as regards property belonging to Jews from the Arab states” (p. xv). Indeed, his research and publication were supported by some of these same “decision makers” who promoted the cause of Israeli counter-claims in the past. The book under review is a translation of Levin’s original Hebrew-language work, Sheki’ah be-Mizrah: Hisul ha-Kehilot ha-Yehudiyot be-Medinot ‘Arav ve Shod Rekhushan (Sunset in the East: The Liquidation of the Jewish Communities in Arab States and the Robbery of their Property), which was published by two such interested parties, the Israeli Ministry of Defense and the Jewish Agency for Israel. In 2000, Levin wrote a shorter work for the World Jewish Congress, long a champion of Israeli counter-claims for lost Jewish property, titled Confiscated Wealth: The Fate of Jewish Property in Arab Lands.

The author delves deeply into valuable archival material, much of it never before published. His research took him to the Public Records Office in Britain as well as to four archives in Israel: the Central Zionist Archives, the Israeli State Archives, the Haganah Archives, and the American Joint Distribution Committee Archive. Levin also consulted secondary sources, many of them in Hebrew. His research focuses on the loss of Jewish property in four Arab countries: Iraq, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. The choice of these four also serves the author’s diplomatic goal, for these four contained the wealthiest Jewish communities in the Arab world, where future Israeli compensation claims would be the highest. They also represent, in his opinion, the cases where future negotiations might actually result in compensation.

The result is the only English-language book to date on this under-studied topic. It contains many valuable details on the seizure of Jewish property, the attitudes of the various Arab states, anti–Jewish sentiment in the Arab world, as well as how the Israeli government and Jewish nongovernmental organizations have championed, or demurred from championing, the cause of Mizrahi compensation. In the latter case, Levin waxes critical of Israel’s reticence to press the issue on certain occasions despite its stated policy of linking the Mizrahi property question with any future compensation it pays for Palestinian refugee property.

There are several problems with this book, however. One deals with Levin’s polemics. For example, he states in his Introduction that the “Arab countries stole Jewish property, cruelly, illegally, and unjustifiably. I do not pretend to be objective on this issue” (p. xvi). Fair enough, but Levin’s emotions sometimes get in the way, such as when he compares Syrian and other Arab states’ treatment of their Jewish citizens to the policies of the Nazis. The Syrian record is indeed shameful, but comparisons to the Nazis are so overused in the Arab–Israeli arena that they only work against the book’s credibility. Such moral indignation can also become a double-edged sword. Levin ignores the fact that Israel has sometimes carried out the same actions as the Arab states he demonizes, including confiscating the property of refugees and minority groups and listing religious identity in passports and identification cards. He also eschews any discussion of Israel’s seizure of Palestinian refugee property, as he concedes in his Introduction. A truly in-depth study of the Mizrahi property question—particularly a study that openly seeks to serve diplomats and policy-makers—cannot avoid discussing this intertwined topic at least to some extent. One also notes that much of the book deals with the persecution of Jews in Arab countries generally and less with the specific question of property seizures that constitutes the book’s putative subject.

The book also suffers from some errors and omissions. Levin does not always cite his sources. Despite his admirable archival research, the author sometimes relies on flawed secondary sources when discussing topics of major importance and is thereby led astray (see his inaccurate discussion of the activities of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine on p. 227). His translator has transliterated certain proper names quite poorly, such as “Ghamal Abd al-Nasser” (p. 101) and “Husni Mubaraq” (p. 150). At times, Levin is simply incorrect, such as when he asserts (on p. xvi) that, in contrast to the four countries he discusses, North African Jewry was able to emigrate with its property. Libya certainly sequestered Jewish property, especially in the wake of laws in 1961 and 1970. Finally, it is a pity that Levin did not write
about the lost assets of other Mizrahi Jews, especially the under-studied case of Yemenite Jewish property.

Despite its flaws, Levin’s book is essential reading for those interested in Mizrahi property confiscation. When read critically and in conjunction with sound work on the topic by scholars such as Yehouda Shenhav, Locked Doors can provide invaluable information about the unfortunate plight of Mizrahi Jewry.

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Alice Moore-Harell’s book is a carefully researched study of one chapter in the career of General Charles Gordon, the military careerist who remains one of the most compelling figures in the history of late-19th-century British imperialism. Drawing on an extensive pool of archival sources from Europe, Egypt, and North America, the book considers the period of three years, from 1877 to 1880, when Gordon served as governor-general of Turco-Egyptian Sudan, a territory that had been conquered, incrementally expanded, and ruled by the armies of Egypt’s Muhammad ‘Ali dynasty beginning in 1820.

In 1877, Khedive Ismail asked Gordon to administer Sudan with a special mandate to end the slave trade (though not slavery itself) in accordance with a convention that Egypt had recently signed. Gordon accepted on condition that he be granted authority to direct all the provincial governors and to report exclusively to the khedive—thereby demanding a degree of centralized control unknown by previous governors-general in Sudan.

Gordon’s governor-generalship coincided with a fascinating moment in Egyptian, British, and Sudanese history. The Turco-Egyptian empire was at its greatest geographical extent. Indeed, the Sudanese territories entrusted to Gordon included parts of what are now Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Egyptian finances were nevertheless suffering, making Egypt vulnerable to French and British economic and political encroachment. Against this context, Gordon worked to consolidate Sudan’s administration and placed the country on an independent financial footing for the first time since 1820—a necessity, given that Egypt’s treasury was in no state to offer subventions.

Conditions for Gordon were less than ideal. Many officials in Egypt and Sudan resented his sweeping mandate as well as his status as a Briton and Christian and therefore undermined or ignored his efforts. Since many Egyptians regarded Sudan as a punishment post, morale among administrators was low, and corruption (especially bribery and extortionate taxation) was rampant. Meanwhile, efforts to combat the slave trade were hindered by the limited reach of the army (itself filled with slave conscripts), the adept organization of the slave merchants, and the participation of some Turco-Egyptian officials in the traffic. It made matters more difficult still that slave owning itself was widely accepted and practiced within Sudanese Muslim society.

Moore-Harell describes Gordon as a political reformer who tried to establish a more locally responsive and conciliatory government. Reversing long-standing Turco-Egyptian policies that had sought to marginalize Sudanese Sufi leaders, Gordon adopted a tolerant attitude toward Sudanese Islam and included more Sudanese in his administration. He worked to develop local infrastructures—for example, by improving Khartoum’s sewer system and water supply. He tried to root out corruption, albeit with limited success. More symbolically, perhaps, he affixed a suggestion and complaint box to the gates of his palace so that the people could express their concerns.
Moore-Harell asserts that Gordon was neither a tool of British interests nor a modern Christian crusader—though many authors over the years have portrayed him in just this way. Gordon, she argues, acted with local interests in mind while remaining loyal to khedivial, not British, authority. Out of deference to and respect for local Muslim society, she mentions, Gordon forbade the Church Missionary Society (a British Anglican organization) from proselytizing among Sudanese Muslims, although he did allow them to pass through the country en route to non-Muslim regions in what is now Uganda.

Frustrated by the problems of administration and lacking an affinity to Khedive Tawfiq, who succeeded Ismail in 1879, Gordon resigned his governor-generalship in January 1880. Given his brief tenure, what, then, was the import of his rule, and how should historians consider it in light of the Sudanese history that followed? Although the book’s subtitle suggests that Gordon’s rule in Sudan was a “prologue to the Mahdiyya” (anticipating though not in itself causing the Mahdist revolution), Moore-Harell makes the more interesting argument within the book that Gordon’s governor-generalship anticipated British colonial (Anglo-Egyptian-era) policies in certain respects—notably, in early attempts to isolate the southern provinces from the influence of northern traders, with consequences for north-south dynamics. She suggests, too, that Gordon’s experiment in centralized administration and financial self-sufficiency was an early episode in Sudanese autonomy. Extending her argument further, one could argue that some of the problems that Gordon encountered remain problems for the Sudanese central government today—notably, the challenge of maintaining effective control over a vast country with limited, inadequate resources.

Moore-Harell may not have been an admirer of Charles Gordon when she embarked on this project, but she became one by the end. Until Gordon’s last day in office, she writes, he “invested all his energy in efforts to improve the public administration and to better the life of the Sudanese” (p. 53). She concludes, “Justice, honesty, loyalty, perseverance, open ears, involvement in communal life, and the empathy he demonstrated, symbolised a new approach to the [Sudanese] population. He proved that it was possible to institute a different administration, [and] that the Sudanese were entitled to an honest and honourable life without suffering from oppression” (p. 233). Focusing on a brief historical moment of dramatic political change, Gordon and the Sudan is a fascinating book that will appeal to historians of Egypt, Sudan, and the British Empire while perhaps also explaining some of Gordon’s enduring mystique.

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The “conscience of Lebanon” is a grand title. Etienne Sakr was a minor Lebanese militia leader who founded the Guardians of the Cedars (Hurraas al-Arz). He is better known by his nom de guerre, Abu Arz, Father of the Cedar, the cedar being both Lebanon’s national symbol and the name of his son. He is best known for having allied his militia with Israel during its long occupation of southern Lebanon. In whose eyes, then, is he the conscience of Lebanon? In Mordechai Nisan’s, the author of this hagiography, whose political sympathies have blinded him to Lebanese realities.

Nisan believes that no Lebanese had a more compelling vision for a truly independent Lebanon and no one was more selfless and uncompromising in his pursuit of that vision than Etienne Sakr. Sakr’s Lebanon was to include all Lebanese, regardless of religion or sect and “free of all foreign forces and alien ideologies” (p. 33). Specifically, it was to be free of Palestinians and of Syrian influence and at peace with Israel. According to Nisan, Sakr was unable to realize his vision
because his closest allies abandoned him. First, during the 1980s he fell out with many of his fellow right-wing Lebanese Christian militia leaders, who, Nisan argues, allowed their personal ambitions to undermine the cause of Lebanese “independence.” Second, Israel withdrew its army of occupation, which had armed and worked with anti–Syrian and anti–Palestinian forces in southern Lebanon. Sakr’s Guardians of the Cedars and the renegade South Lebanon Army were left without protection from Syrians and from their fellow Lebanese. As a result, Sakr and others like him took refuge in Israel. He has lived there ever since.

Sakr was born in 1937 into a Maronite family in a village close to the Lebanese frontier with Palestine and therefore far from the Maronite enclave in Mount Lebanon. His large family belonged to the provincial middle class. Sakr completed his secondary education at the Carmelite Brothers School in Beirut and began his career at age seventeen in government intelligence and security work.

From the mid-1950s until 1970, Sakr worked all over Lebanon and at the presidential palace, where he tried to counter Arab-nationalist ideas and influence. His experiences in this period shaped his strategic thinking about Lebanon’s future. So did his relationship in the late 1960s with the maverick Lebanese poet and ideologue Sa‘id ‘Aql, who gave coherence to Sakr’s growing fears about Lebanon’s openness, especially to the Palestinian resistance movement. Sakr and several other like-minded Lebanese Christians formed a political salon in East Beirut, where they debated how to purify Lebanon of what they defined as foreign elements within the framework of ‘Aql’s hostile view of Arabism and the Arabic language.

The Guardians of the Cedars party emerged indirectly from the Beirut salon and owed its ascent to the outbreak of the Lebanon war in 1975. Nisan sees eye to eye with Sakr on the causes of that war and its prolongation: both blame foreign intervention and especially the Palestinian resistance and the Syrians. Nisan clearly does not regard Israel as a major contributor to the escalating violence in Lebanon, and he makes no effort to understand the domestic Lebanese social and economic conflicts that helped to spark and extend the war for nearly two decades.

The Guardians developed a doctrine that emphasized Lebanon’s Phoenician heritage. Officially, the party did not privilege Christians, but Sakr believed that the Maronites had a special responsibility for protecting Lebanon and that the Maronite patriarch was in effect the patriarch of Lebanon. The party was rooted in the Maronite community and never attracted a large or religiously diverse membership, although Nisan makes much of a sprinkling of Shi‘is who joined party ranks after being dislodged from their villages in southern Lebanon when the Palestinians built up their military presence in the 1970s. Sakr’s only political and military allies, apart from Israel, were the leaders of right-wing Christian political and military organizations. The party had limited appeal to mainstream Lebanese Christian elites because its ideology of purification contradicted Lebanon’s natural advantage as the leading financial and cultural entrepôt for the Arab world and the West, a position that required Lebanon to maintain an open society.

Nisan bases his study mainly on interviews with Sakr and some of his party comrades who also took refuge in Israel. There is no sense that he systematically questioned Sakr or checked his interpretation of key events against those of other participants. He makes only sparing use of published secondary works on the war for Lebanon. Given the fawning quality of Nisan’s biography, the specialist will not find probing analysis or even a reasonably complete record of Sakr’s thoughts about and activities during the war. What Nisan chooses to neglect or treat as inconsequential is quite astounding. For instance, he barely mentions the 1982 massacre of hundreds of Palestinians in Sabra and Shatila in Beirut by Lebanese right-wing militias. Nor does he mention Israeli complicity in these events, except to write that Sakr found no reason for Israel to blame itself for what happened. In contrast, Nisan catalogues Lebanese leftist, Palestinian, and Syrian atrocities against Lebanese Christians, and the book’s only appendix is titled, “The Massacres and Crimes Committed by the Palestinians and the Syrians against the Lebanese (1975–1990).”
Perhaps the most revealing parts of the book are those that deal with Sakr’s relations with other right-wing Lebanese leaders. Nisan points out that the odds were against Sakr’s rising to the top of the rightist hierarchy because he did not inherit the family connections or wealth of the Gemayels and Chamouns. He was more like Elie Hobeika, Samir Geagea, Fady Frem, and other right-wing Lebanese Christian militia leaders. And although Nisan does not intend it, he provides the reader with a fairly clear sense that the demise of the Lebanese right had as much to do with competing political ambitions and internecine rivalries of its various leaders as it did with Syrian military intervention. And while there seems little doubt that Sakr’s Robin Hood–like qualities and uncompromising stance vis-à-vis the Palestinians and Syrians endeared him to Lebanese sympathetic to the right, his long-term collaboration with Israel irreparably damaged his reputation.

Nisan writes about Lebanon in terms of what he believes is good for Israel; he considers Sakr good for Israel and Israel’s military withdrawal from Lebanon foolhardy. Such a judgment suggests ignorance of the crucial factors behind Israel’s decision to withdraw—in particular, the fracturing of the Israeli consensus built around “self-defense,” which the occupation of Lebanon did not fit, and the rise of Hezbollah and its success in guerrilla warfare against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. This book is not a systematic work of scholarship. Nor does it make a contribution to knowledge.

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According to Kenneth Pollack, the purpose of *Arabs at War* is twofold: to explain why Arab armed forces so consistently lose—or just barely win—wars, and identifying the central strengths and weakness of these militaries. Pollack notes that the prevailing explanations for the overall limited effectiveness of Arab militaries tend to focus on such explanatory variables as unit cohesion, generalship, tactical leadership, information management, technical skills, weapons handling, logistics, maintenance, morale, training, and cowardice. *Arabs at War* seeks to test these prevailing explanations through an examination of twenty-eight post–World War II conflicts involving six Arab militaries (those of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Syria). Pollack argues that four of the commonly cited explanatory variables—poor tactical leadership, poor information management, poor employment of weapons, and poor maintenance—are foremost in accounting for the lack of military effectiveness of Arab forces. He asserts that the other factors prove to be either of secondary importance or to have no broad or measurable impact on the effectiveness of Arab militaries.

Pollack’s argument is compelling. While such factors as generalship, training, unit cohesion, and morale varied widely over the twenty-eight cases examined, critical failures in tactical leadership, information management, weapons employment, and maintenance were central to all of them. Pollack offers dozens of examples of junior officers’ failing to make independent decisions, seize the initiative, employ maneuver warfare, or execute combined-arms operations. He explains how the unwillingness or inability of these officers to re-orient their forces—even within defensive fortifications—allowed the opposing armies to quickly exploit penetrations by simply turning ninety degrees and “rolling up” Arab units fixed in place and unable to shift fire. After reading just a few cases, the reader begins to recognize that the point at which the opposing forces penetrate Arab defensive lines is the moment at which battle is essentially over. Likewise, the reader soon sees the consistent inability of Arab forces to maintain high-end military equipment, repair even
minor breakdowns, or generate sufficient sortie rates to allow Arab air forces to play a decisive role in any campaign. Despite these recurrent shortcomings, Pollack does not make sweeping condemnations of the Arab armed forces. He is willing to give Arab militaries credit where it is due. His flattering depiction of the logistics support of the Iraqi army in the 1973 Arab–Israeli War and the al-Faw Peninsula campaign, of Egyptian forces during the Yemen war, and of Libyan units in Uganda and Chad is convincing.

Arabs at War is a comprehensive assessment of the performance of Arab ground and air forces in conventional conflicts (the region’s few naval battles and the use of military forces to quash domestic dissent are not the focus of this work). Pollack’s depictions of battlefield events and command decisions are excellent. His writing style is accessible to non-experts, and the level of detail provided is helpful and appropriate. His depiction of the subtler elements of the battlefield is just detailed enough (e.g., the Egyptian army’s inaccurate estimates of whether certain Sinai soil formations would support the passage of Israeli mechanized units during the 1967 war, or the inability of Israeli anti-tank weapons to penetrate the front armor of Jordanian M-47 Patton tanks). When such detail is not central to explaining the outcome of a battle or the effectiveness of armies in the field, it is omitted. There are no Tom Clancy–like explanations of military hardware in this book. The accompanying maps and tables are clear and helpful. While Pollack draws heavily from U.S. and Israeli sources for this book, there is a notable absence of Arab primary sources. The “Arab” perspective on military performance has yet to appear in English.

The primary area in which this book could stand improvement is in the internal organization of the chapters. Each country’s modern military history is depicted in a distinct chapter. Chapters are internally divided into historic periods addressing specific conflicts. Each historic period has a “mini-conclusion” that recaps military effectiveness during that period, highlighting the key explanatory elements (e.g., generalship, tactical effectiveness, maintenance, logistics, etc.). Each chapter then has an overall conclusion that summarizes the entire post–World War II period in these same terms. In most cases, the analysis contained in the mini-conclusions is strikingly consistent across historic periods, and the final overall concluding section in the chapter summarizes these same points yet again. In the end, this method generates considerable repetition. This can be all the more frustrating given that Pollack’s narrative is sufficiently clear that the reader already appreciates the key issues, trends, and explanatory factors before reaching concluding sections. By the time the reader gets to the eighth reflective summary of Syrian military effectiveness within a single chapter, thoughts turn to whether the book needs 698 pages.

Nevertheless, Arabs at War is a valuable contribution to the literature. It should become a standard reference work for students and scholars of the politics, strategy, and military history of the Middle East. Given the ongoing political and military turmoil in this region, military planners, intelligence specialists, and policy-makers inside and outside the Middle East would benefit from reading this book.

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The study of the modern history of the Middle East has long suffered from a tendency to play catch up to new methodological and theoretical work pioneered in European historiography, seeking merely to apply such work to the Middle East. Elizabeth Thompson’s excellent work is a different
sort of endeavor. Her path-breaking book, recipient of the American Historical Association’s Joan Kelly Memorial Book Prize and the Berkshire Conference of Women Historians First Book Prize, is an attempt to introduce a serious gendered perspective into the history of Mandatory Syria and Lebanon but to do so in a way that asks far broader questions about the nature and meaning of citizenship in the context of colonialism. Rather than limit her analysis of citizenship to the political language of liberalism and law, Thompson traces the emergence of a hierarchical colonial citizenship in Mandatory Syria and Lebanon. Using a variety of French, Syrian, and U.S. archival sources, as well as Arabic periodicals and personal interviews in Damascus, Thompson argues forcefully that this citizenship was defined largely by the social policies of the French Mandatory state mediated by male elites—religious patriarchs, urban notables, and rural landowners. These policies, however, were also contested by women’s organizations, labor, and Islamic populist movements that challenged the gendered hierarchy of colonial power.

Without losing sight of the soldiers and the repressive state apparatus that undergirded the French Mandates, Thompson suggests that the French Mandatory state and its colonial citizens created a “civic order”—a broad arena in which state and citizen interacted, negotiated, dueled, collaborated, and bargained with one another. She argues that it was the dislocating context of World War I, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and the introduction of French Mandatory rule in the newly created states of Lebanon and Syria that engendered a “crisis of paternity,” or the destabilization of male authority as heads of households and of the larger community and concomitant transformation of women’s roles. This produced a “gender anxiety” that she then traces across two decades of French Mandatory rule as a struggle between republican rights and paternal privilege. Thompson sees three conflicting models of reconstituted authority emerge at the end of the 1920s (in tension with one another): (1) paternalistic privilege; (2) republican fraternity; and (3) universal democracy, each with a different vision of proper gender relations at home and in the civic order. These developments in turn led to the evolution of a “colonial welfare state.” By detailing the health, educational, and labor policies; press; and civic organizations, Thompson elaborates on her idea of a hierarchy of citizens (which privileged men, Lebanese, and Christians because of their better integration into the French Mandatory state’s mediating institutions) wherein paternalistic social aid bestowed by France through its collaborating intermediaries was gradually transformed into social rights claimed directly upon the state itself.

According to Thompson, women’s citizenship became a focal point of debate around the nature and limits of the this new civic order in the 1920s. Therefore, the heart of the book (chaps. 6–9) explores with nuance the vibrant elite women’s movement that emerged in Lebanon and Syria in the 1920s. Thompson then goes on to map what she refers to as the “spatial boundaries of the colonial civic order” (p. 171) in which she interprets the rise of violent gender conflict in cities across Syria and Lebanon in the 1930s as an effort by male rivals to control public space by mobilizing and holding mass demonstrations against, for example, unveiled women’s street presence or against elite female movie-goers. Targeting women, these demonstrations were as much an attempt by different male groups to resist as to reshape the terms of negotiation with the Mandatory state. Gender, Thompson argues, was a crucial site of solidarity and compromise that lessened class and religious tensions between competing male elite and subaltern groups. Thompson concludes her study with a discussion of what she describes as “gender bargains” that sought to stabilize the colonial and post-colonial civic orders in Syria and Lebanon. These bargains abandoned the promise of equal citizenship for men and women by depriving women of various civil and political rights, particularly suffrage and egalitarian personal-status laws. Both the Lebanese sectarian political system that cohered around the 1943 National Pact and what Thompson refers to as Syrian statist paternalism reflected these bargains.

Thompson’s deft and ambitious interweaving of social, cultural, and political history inevitably generates questions. For one, the Ottoman background to this “crisis of paternity” is underplayed, in part because Thompson respects too much the historiographical break around World War I
between Ottoman and Arab studies. Thompson is clearly well read in 19th-century Ottoman history, so it would have been interesting if she had elaborated on how the late Ottoman-era tension between rights and privileges (the abiding tension of the post–Tanzimat empire) defined and shaped the French Mandatory–era tension that she emphasizes. Moreover her notion of a “crisis of masculinity” is overemphasized to the point of burdening the otherwise convincing argument of the book. And perhaps most intriguing is Thompson’s conclusion that the drive toward a democratic welfare state ended with the decolonization of Syria and Lebanon. Such an assertion sits uncomfortably with her own emphasis on colonialism’s central role in fomenting “gender pacts” that preserved men’s privilege and reinforced religious and class hierarchies. It also leaves open the question that Thompson alludes to in her final chapter—namely, how the post-colonial Lebanese and Syrian states “preserved and even extended, in variant ways, a spirit of paternalism alongside the rhetoric of rights” (p. 284).

These questions, however, only underscore the importance of Thompson’s profound work. By demonstrating that inequalities of gendered citizenship are not inherent in Muslim or Arab culture but are historically produced, Thompson contributes greatly to a more critical and sophisticated historiography of the modern Middle East. Despite her modest disclaimer in the Introduction to the book, Thompson has managed to reshape the history of Syria and Lebanon by bringing in gender analysis in a serious and sustained manner; she has, in short, exposed the poverty of nationalist and Orientalist historiography of the modern Middle East. She has also moved beyond the often stifling paradigm of post-colonial history that reduces the role of non-Western actors to simple and heroic “resistance” by showing how resistance to colonialism is itself inevitably bound up in simultaneous projects of power. Equally important, she has made the vibrant history of the Mandatory period of Syria and Lebanon accessible to a wide range of readers outside Middle Eastern studies without sacrificing detail or nuance.

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On 22 November 2001, the Turkish Parliament passed a new civil code that changed women’s legal status in the family, establishing full equality between spouses. The New Legal Status of Women in Turkey, a booklet published by Women for Women’s Human Rights (WWHR), a women’s non-governmental organization (NGO) based in Istanbul, provides a comprehensive overview of the new legal status of women in Turkey.

This booklet focuses mainly on the gains of the new civil code, which came into effect on 1 January 2002, replacing the Civil Code of 1926. While the former code, which was based on the Swiss civil code, granted women considerable rights (by outlawing polygamy and gender inequality regarding divorce, custody of children, and inheritance), it included several discriminatory articles that relegated women to a subordinate status and reinforced unequal power relations between men and women in the family. The former civil code, for instance, stated that the “husband is the head of the family,” thus giving him the final say over the choice of the place of residence and over matters related to children. The husband also represented the marriage union in legal matters. The new civil code removed these and similar discriminatory clauses that disempowered women in relation to their husbands. It has established equality between spouses, thus granting women equal say in decisions regarding the marriage union and their children (pp. 8, 18–19).
The booklet also discusses the new property regime, which gives spouses equal rights over property acquired during marriage (pp. 21–22). This property regime has been supported by a majority of women’s groups and organizations in Turkey, as it recognizes that women contribute to the well-being of the household through their unpaid, invisible labor. During discussions on the draft new civil code, however, nationalist and religious conservative members of Parliament opposed the acquired-property regime, arguing that it would turn the marriage union into a corporation, increase divorce rates, and thus threaten the very foundations of Turkish society (p. 7). While nationalists and religious conservatives eventually accepted the acquired property regime as the new property regime, in part yielding to the pressure exerted by women’s groups, they passed a law, stipulating that the new property regime is valid only for assets acquired after 1 January 2002 (p. 24).

Pointing to the existing “tensions and contradictions between official laws and customary practices” (p. 2), the booklet argues that legal changes, such as the adoption of the new civil code, are not sufficient to enable women to enjoy their rights in the public arena and in their everyday lives (p. 1). Indeed, secular gains and constitutional equality have often been circumscribed and undermined by customs and traditions. Under customary practices, the booklet discusses such practices as “bride price” (p. 16), “virginity testing” (pp. 53–55), and “honor crimes” (pp. 55–56), which violate legal provisions protecting women’s rights and bodily integrity.

While the booklet recognizes the powerful impact of potential European Union membership on Turkey’s domestic politics, it rejects the argument that the civil code was revised merely to make Turkey’s legislation conform with that of the E.U. member states and thus to speed Turkey’s membership in the union. It is rightly argued that two decades of activism, lobbying, and campaigning by the women’s movement played a key role in the revision of the seventy-five-year-old civil code. The booklet also highlights the successes of the women’s movement in the revision of certain articles of the penal code and in helping bring into effect a new law against domestic violence that allows for a protection order against the perpetrator of the violence (p. 5).

The booklet has several strengths. There are, for instance, frequent references to the former civil code with the effort to better highlight the key gains women made under the new code. Also, a great deal of information is provided under the headings such as “Conditions for Marriage,” “Women’s Right to Economic Independence,” “Women’s Right to Political Participation,” “Reproductive Rights and Health,” “Violence against Women,” “Homosexuality,” “Transsexuality,” “Sex Workers,” and “Pornography.”

While the booklet covers a wide range of issues concerning women, it has several limitations. One such limitation concerns the omission of any discussion on the headscarf (türkban) issue, which has triggered considerable debate in Turkey since the mid-1980s. Another limitation is the absence of any discussion of dissent among women’s groups concerning the content of the revisions demanded in the civil code. While the Preface indicates that 126 women’s groups got together to voice their common demands regarding the new civil code, it does not mention any groups or activists who opposed the proposed revisions. Future editions would benefit from a preface that provides a more detailed account of the context within which the amendments to the civil code were debated and subsequently passed to better appreciate the political significance of women’s activism. These limitations aside, the booklet is a valuable resource for activists, NGOs, researchers, scholars, and all those interested in women’s legal status in Turkey.

While the reform of the civil code is a major step forward in the struggle to achieve gender equality in Turkey, it needs to be followed by other reforms aimed at eliminating sexism in all spheres of life. Women’s groups and organizations in Turkey continue with their efforts to bring into public attention the laws that discriminate against women. This booklet is part of that effort.
In Daniel L. Byman’s most recent work, *Keeping the Peace: Lasting Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts*, the reader is treated to some of the most concise and understandable analyses of ethnic conflict in the literature today. Byman is able to explain the most difficult concepts in the fields of ethnic conflict and security in terms anyone can read, avoiding the jargon and impenetrable approaches so common in the field of international politics. In thirty-one pages, Byman is able to explain the field better than most authors do in two hundred.

The main thrust of the book is to unpack the difficult concept of ethnic conflict to shed light on how to prevent future conflicts. Thus, Byman’s approach is not merely a theoretical treatise without reference or application to the real world. Byman nuances the concept of “hegemony” in a way that encapsulates the subtleties of power relations and examines state policies used to suppress minority groups. He also includes many issues long ignored by other scholars in the field. For example, he rightly includes the impact of education and language policies as a mechanism of exacerbating or mitigating ethnic conflicts—something that has had huge impact on community relations but is rarely ever mentioned by scholars.

Although Byman’s explanation of outbidding could use a more robust definition, the review of the literature is where he excels at making accessible and clear security studies and theory. He nuances different forms of control and assesses whether they succeeded or failed in exacerbating conflicts or unleashing the security dilemma. Byman intersperses his theoretical arguments drawing on empirical cases, most of which, relevant for this journal, are in the Middle East. This is a valiant attempt to theorize a region long under-theorized because of the almost dictatorial control of regional specialists who argue the *sui generis* character of the Middle East and each case in particular. This is especially the case with regard to any treatment that contrasts the Palestinian–Israeli conflict with other conflicts in the region—for example, between the Kurds and Iraq or Turkey—or tries to contextualize the Palestinian issue within the global phenomenon of ethnic conflict. Byman does this precisely—contrasting the same control mechanisms across cases and across time, at the same time making reference to non–Middle Eastern cases such as Sri Lanka. His portrayal of Israeli policies in the initial period until 1956 is an exceptionally well balanced account of the mistakes made; some *IJMES* readers may find that he has let Israel off easily. Much to the contrary, Byman’s portrayal is an objective one that avoids the usual vitriol common in any discussion of such highly charged issues. Israeli policies are contrasted with Iraqi policies under the Ba’th vis-à-vis the Kurds, leading up the Anfal campaign of 1987–88 in which thousands of Kurds in the northeast were systematically rounded up and killed by the regime. Byman succinctly explains the details of his cases, although he is sometimes too abbreviated in his treatment. The cases would have benefited from more detail; nevertheless, he gets the main thrust of conflicts in the region and elsewhere to make cogent points.

In his chapter on co-optation, Byman effectively explains how elites in Morocco have been successful in co-opting ethnic groups by preventing political organization by quashing independent association and forms of civil society, making it wholly subservient to the monarchy. “When independent leaders arose, they were given a simple choice: join the government publicly or be removed from the public sphere” (p. 90). This form of control avoided much of the nastiness of other mechanisms of control outlined in the book. He contrasts this co-optation with policies of the Ba’th regime under Assad, which was decidedly more repressive that those of the king.
Byman distinguishes ways of manipulating ethnic identities from Bakhtiyaris in Iran to Berbers in Morocco and Kurds in Iraq and discusses how partition, a hotly debated issue at the moment, is effective or ineffective by contrasting the experiences of Israel and examining how the safe havens in Iraq have protected lives but also complicated Iraqi politics. In essence, Byman takes an advocacy position and bravely concludes that borders should not been seen as permanent if their continuation does nothing but foster hatred, oppression, and violence. Although he emphasizes that this should be a rare occurrence, he argues that it should remain an option if it promotes peace (p. 174).

Essentially, Byman boldly discusses many of those taboo topics (e.g., “transfer” or population exchanges, military intervention, or backing one side) of control policies but does so creatively, fairly, and objectively. This book is an excellent example of balanced scholarship that travels throughout this highly contentious region to highlight the similarities and differences among diverse Middle Eastern cases. The book makes an important contribution to the fields of political science and Middle East studies and should serve as an example of the care and sensitivity with which we should all approach contentious topics. This book is appropriate for specialists in the field as well as the general reader, in large part because of Byman’s masterly treatment of obtuse concepts that makes them easily accessible to non-political scientists. Keeping the Peace is sure to become a classic in the study of ethnic politics and seminal to the study of Middle Eastern conflicts.

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This volume brings together contributions that explore rural development in parts of the Middle East, the former Soviet Union, and the Mediterranean basin. The wide geographic scope of the volume is matched by an equally broad thematic focus: the chapters cover urban–rural relationships and population movements; describe tensions between traditional strategies for resource use and agro-industrial practices; and engage debates about individual land-holding size. Problems of post-colonial change (including change in post–Soviet states) and tensions between global integration and self-sufficiency are recurrent themes throughout the book. However, much of the thematic focus of the volume is roughly bifurcated along geo-political boundaries: rural development in the Middle East is framed in terms of resource scarcity and conflict, while the chapters on Eurasian states center primarily on land reform and demographic change.

A number of the chapters directly or indirectly engage the tension between boilerplate modernization projects and contextually appropriate policy. Michael Bonine’s chapter on development and sustainability in the Middle East develops this theme. In some cases, this theme could be further developed by reference to the now substantial literature critical of universalizing approaches to modernization and development policy. Paul Kaldjian argues in his chapter on smallholders in Turkish agriculture that, because of substantial urban–rural linkages, modernization through agro-industrial consolidation will have a strong negative effect on urban as well as agricultural workers. Here, land fragmentation acts as a hedge against hazard, where the ordinary constraints of agricultural production combine with unstable employment in urban areas to militate toward the preservation of small farms. A similar phenomenon is apparent in Russia, where Stephen Wegren and Gregory Ioffe both suggest that household production on small, privately owned plots has helped generate social-political as well as economic stability in the post–Soviet countryside.
Several chapters focus on the implications of population movement and change for land reform. Ioffe points to an important caveat in studying this problem: statistical measures, interpreted without sufficient reference to the context in which they are produced, can mislead. Ioffe convincingly argues that a taxonomical shift explains a substantial portion of the apparent movement toward rural in-migration in Russia during the early 1990s. As people left rural areas, their depopulated settlements were reclassified: townships officially became villages, and urban residents became rural people. In other words, statistical trends indicated the reverse of actual demographic change.

The chapters focusing on environmental constraints emphasize the relationship between agro-industrial development and increasingly limited pools of natural resources. Colonial legacies in the Middle East, together with urbanization and population growth, have led to continuing intensification of resource use amid the deterioration or destruction of traditional models of irrigation (such as qanat systems) and crop rotation. The authors suggest a variety of remedies—ranging from crop substitution to population control—for the problem of unsustainable cultivation practices. All describe or advocate greater intervention by state institutions in resolving problems of sustainability. Philip Micklin’s chapter on resource conflict in the Aral Sea basin emphasizes the importance of transnational strategies for conservation.

The main weakness of this book lies in the frequent confusion of authorial focus with case-level specificity. For example, the Introduction notes that peasant farms in Uzbekistan rely on former collective and state farms for inputs and services. This happens to be true in most Eurasian states, including Russia, but the non-specialist reader could be forgiven for interpreting that fact as a peculiarity of the Uzbek rural economy. The failure to distinguish adequately between structural conditions common to Eurasian institutional settings and issues specific to individual states or regions obscures causal patterns as well as certain legacies of Soviet development across Eurasia. As a result, some readers may reach general conclusions about the relationship of reform, resource use, and development that might not be supported by a broader evidentiary base. For this reason, the book would have benefited from more explicit comparison of reform and demographic processes across states.

This problem continues elsewhere in the book. Readers who lack specialized knowledge of individual cases occasionally may have difficulty interpreting the conclusions authors reach. Renee Giovarelli’s chapter on land reform in the Kyrgyz Republic describes the October 1998 referendum as having been “held to introduce the concept of private ownership of land to the constitution in the hopes that such a constitutional amendment would provide the impetus for much-needed land legislation”. The author notes that the referendum “passed by a large majority.” The reader is thus left with the impression that land reform in the Kyrgyz Republic may not have faced the same public or political opposition that it did in Russia and other Eurasian states. What Giovarelli does not mention is that the referendum in question was an omnibus package. The package included among its multiple provisions a clause on the protection of press freedom (see the Draft Law of the Kyrgyz Republic “On amending and supplementing the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic”). For Kyrgyz citizens to have registered opposition to private land ownership, they would also have had to vote to allow limitations on freedom of expression. At best, we cannot draw firm conclusions about political support for land reform from the results of this referendum.

The editors of this volume took on a complex and exceedingly difficult task. Creating a coherent whole would have required the editors to be as expert in each of the chapter topics as the authors themselves. In part because of this obstacle, the Introduction does not provide either non-specialist readers or those who lack specific knowledge of particular countries with enough comparative background to make clear and accurate sense of the book as a whole. Nevertheless, this book will be of interest to some scholars with specific area expertise, as well as to readers engaged in policy debates about land reform and resource use.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Egypt adopted numerous political reforms that seemed to herald the beginning of a democratic transition. The regime released political prisoners, eased constraints on the press, allowed the growth of civil society, and permitted opposition groups to gain influence in Parliament, professional associations, and campus organizations. According to Eberhard Kienle, it was all a “grand delusion.” These reforms were little more than tactical liberalization that adapted Egyptian authoritarianism to a new set of conditions without any significant reduction in the regime’s power.

For example, Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court ruled in 1990 that the country’s electoral law discriminated against independent candidates. In response to this ruling, the Parliament was dissolved and a new electoral law was adopted that improved the competitiveness of elections. Many observers saw this as a step toward democracy. Kienle presents a more skeptical view. He argues that the regime adapted to the new electoral landscape by arresting popular candidates and their supporters (particularly Islamists), manipulating voter registration, and rigging the vote count. These measures ensured that the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) retained control of Parliament. In Kienle’s view, the seeming progress toward democracy suggested by the new electoral law was offset by the regime’s reduction of liberties in other arenas. The net result was a modified form of authoritarianism rather than any meaningful progress toward democracy.

Kienle’s analysis draws a distinction between positive liberties (such as the freedom to vote) and negative liberties (such as freedom from government restrictions on expression and assembly). He traces the rise and fall of each type of liberty over the course of the 1990s through study of the regime’s relationship with political parties, the judiciary, nongovernmental organizations, human-rights groups, the media, and Islamic groups. Despite the title, he does not examine the government’s economic reforms in detail. Rather, he focuses on the regime’s tactics for suppressing its opponents.

In the concluding chapter, Kienle argues that Egypt’s modern history contains several periods of relatively liberal authoritarianism, followed by reversion to more brutal and comprehensive repression. The expansion and contraction of political freedoms in the 1990s was merely the latest example of this cycle. Furthermore, Kienle believes that Egypt is unlikely to escape this cycle in the foreseeable future. Illiberal attitudes toward politics are gaining ground among secular nationalists as well as Islamists. Economic reform has produced a private sector with very close ties to the state and little interest in constraining state power. And the longevity of the regime has enabled it to construct a vast network of supporters who benefit from its patronage and services. This network will resist efforts to improve the rule of law, increase governmental accountability, and enhance transparency. In short, Egyptians face a bleak political future.

Kienle supports his argument with a vast amount of information that he carefully documents in more than 600 footnotes. He draws extensively on primary and secondary sources in Arabic, as well as on relevant works in English, French, German, and Spanish. The book is by far the most detailed work in English on Egyptian politics in the 1990s.

The book’s primary shortcoming lies in its exclusive focus on the government’s use of various forms of repression to protect its power. While this is an important feature of Egyptian politics, the regime also works assiduously to co-opt its adversaries by granting them subsidies, government contracts, positions in the NDP, and other benefits. The regime’s strategy for survival is built on combining threats with incentives. Kienle has provided extensive details on the regime’s use of intimidation in a wide variety of forms. He has said virtually nothing about its use of persuasion.
to recruit allies and co-opt opponents. The only other significant gap in Kienle’s analysis is his neglect of politics within the ruling NDP. Throughout the 1990s, the NDP experienced a substantial increase in the number of “independent” members. These were members of Parliament who joined the NDP after winning election as independent candidates. Their electoral success meant that they were not beholden to the party for their seats. They helped to initiate increasingly lively debates within the NDP on a wide variety of issues, including the nature of economic reform, relations with the United States, political and civil liberties, and strategies for dealing with political Islam. These debates suggest that the primary arena for politics in Egypt is within the NDP rather than between the NDP and its opponents. This observation does not detract from the value and quality of Kienle’s book. It simply suggests that a comprehensive understanding of Egyptian reform (or lack thereof) requires equally detailed research on the internal politics of the ruling party.

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DAVID KRETZMER, The Occupation of Justice: The Supreme Court of Israel and the Occupied Territories (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002). Pp. 272. $65.50 cloth; $22.95 paper.

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This is an important book. David Kretzmer provides a wealth of information about Israeli policies in the territories it has occupied since the 1967 war. More important, perhaps, he demonstrates the limited ability of any judicial authority to restrain military actions in a war-like situation. The Occupation of Justice is a “must read” for anyone interested in either subject.

The Supreme Court is an active policy-maker within the Israeli political system. Relatively early in Israeli history, the civil courts won their independence from direct political intrusions. Since Israeli democracy is based on wide-open, robust competition among a multitude of political parties, Israelis came to value decisions based on non-partisan considerations. Over the years, the court became increasingly activist, especially in the matters relating to individual rights. The Supreme Court took the lead in institutionalizing liberal, democratic values in Israeli society. This judicial approach, and the public’s response to it—the Supreme Court enjoys public support that is second only to that of the Israeli Defense Forces—has resulted in a situation in which the net of judicial review extends over all arms of government and over almost all types of activities.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Palestinians in the occupied areas brought cases to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice. (In that capacity, the Supreme Court, sitting as a court of first instance, has the jurisdiction and is authorized to grant relief against government actions “in the interests of justice.”) What is surprising is that Palestinians in the occupied areas were granted access to the Israeli High Court by a decision of the government not to oppose such applications. Allowing residents of an occupied area access to the courts of the occupying nation is unprecedented in international law and was not authorized by Israeli statutes. With the passage of time, however, Supreme Court decisions treated it as accepted practice. Thus, the High Court of Justice deals with Palestinian claims that the Israeli occupying authorities have exceeded or misapplied their powers in the same way that it hears petitions by Israeli citizens against their own government’s decisions.

In clear, concise language that is easily understandable by the non-lawyer, Kretzmer addresses the policies that have resulted from the unprecedented review by the Supreme Court over the Israeli government’s actions in the Occupied Territories. Part 1 examines the basis for the court’s jurisdiction, the substantive norms applied by the court, and its attitude to the application and interpretation of international law. Part 2 discusses the High Court’s decisions relating to two major political issues: the establishment of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the
status of the Palestinian residents of those areas. Part 3 focuses on how the High Court has handled petitions challenging security measures against Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. This framework enables Kretzmer to conclude with a well-documented and insightful set of conclusions.

Two polar positions have emerged in the dialogue about the Supreme Court’s policy-making role in the Occupied Territories. One holds that the High Court has been a significant restraint on the actions of the occupation authorities. The other maintains that the court has done little more than attempt to legitimate the repression associated with the long-term control of a hostile population.

Kretzmer concludes that the Israeli High Court’s insistence on bringing the government’s actions in the territories under a legal umbrella has indeed restrained the occupation authorities. In notable decisions, the court held that the establishment of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories, preventive detention, the interrogation of suspected terrorists, the demolition of the houses of terrorists’ families, and the deportation of Palestinian activists must conform to basic norms of civilized, democratic society. While only a few court decisions were based on those substantive principles, the justices’ concerted efforts to strengthen procedural constraints, he finds, did limit the arbitrariness and harshness of the occupation. Moreover, many accommodations have been reached in the “shadow of the court”; the authorities frequently back down or compromise before the matter reaches the court (pp. 188–89). “In fact, when out of court settlement is taken into account, the rate of actual success of Palestinian petitioners from the Occupied Territories is higher than the overall success rate of petitioners to the Supreme Court” (p. 189).

Nevertheless, Kretzmer concludes that the court’s legitimating function dominates its restraining function. This is especially true if one focuses, as his study does, on the actual decisions of the High Court of Justice. Basic human-rights principles are invariably “balanced” against the security needs raised by the Israeli occupation authorities. “The jurisprudence of these decisions is blatantly government-minded.” (p. 188). “The judges may be independent, but they are not neutral” (p. 191) because they, too, are Israeli patriots unwilling to place their nation at risk. In this, the Israeli judges are no different from their counterparts in other democracies. It is simply too much to expect that judges of any country can be neutral decision-makers when they perceive that their nation and compatriots are in danger.

Kretzmer’s careful, detailed study has made a notable contribution. He provides considerable insight into the policies and workings of the Israeli presence in the territories it has occupied since 1967. He also provides an acute analysis of how a court “that has played such a dominant role in forging a democratic and essentially liberal body of jurisprudence [in Israel proper] has consistently displayed a government-minded approach in decisions relating to the Occupied Territories.” (p. 191). It is essential reading for anyone who thinks that an independent judiciary can restrain executive and military actions when a nation’s security is at risk. This message is of utmost importance in light of events since Kretzmer completed his manuscript—the re-ignited conflict between Israel and the Palestinians and the U.S. war on terrorism with the accompanying Patriot Act.
three stages of change and development. In all these stages, the state played a pivotal role, whether one speaks of Ottoman rule, the monarchy (up to 1958), or the republican regime that followed the monarchy. Mahdi informs us that, following the re-occupation of Baghdad by the Ottomans in 1831, a number of economic and administrative policies were introduced that set in motion a process of land tenure and agricultural taxation reform. These state-induced changes led to the expansion of agricultural production to meet the needs of both domestic and foreign markets, on the one hand, and to enhance the interest of urban capitalists in land acquisition, on the other. One of the outcomes of this expansion was the use of agricultural-export earnings to pay for imports of consumer goods to meet the demand of the more affluent urban population. It should be noted that this expansion was made possible by increasing traditional low-yield cultivation and by employing idle resources. An interesting side effect of this expansion of agriculture was the settlement of tribes. This relative decline in the power of tribes was to change under the British and monarchical regimes.

The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I found Iraq under British occupation. Instead of ruling the country directly as a colony, Britain opted to run Iraq as a mandated territory with its own king, which it installed, and its own government. To ensure a social base for the new regime, Britain, Mahdi asserts, found it in its interests to create a third pillar to support the political structure—in addition to the king and the government—composed of land-owning tribal shaykhs. These new arrangements had the effect of safeguarding Britain’s interests in Iraq at a relatively low military cost. To strengthen this particular form of social and political structure, policies were adopted to encourage the acquisition of agricultural land by tribal shaykhs and wealthy urbanites. Moreover, the 1932 Land Settlement Law enabled the same upper strata to secure ownership of state lands against the customary rights of tribesmen. These policies of ownership led to an unparalleled degree of land concentration. Thus, by 1957 it was calculated that 1.7 percent of landowners possessed 63.1 percent of the area while nearly 84 percent of owners had 15.3 percent of the land. The combination of rural poverty and peasant indebtedness to landlords resulted in conditions of near-serfdom.

It was on the back of this Britain-induced structure of socio-economic relationships that the rise of oil revenue began to make itself felt in all sectors of the Iraqi economy. Increasing oil revenues prompted the government to create the Development Board to accelerate economic growth, provide employment, and diversify the economy to lessen its dependence on the oil sector. As far as the agricultural sector was concerned, development plans tended to concentrate investment in long-term and large-scale projects in such fields as flood prevention and water storage. Given the concentrated nature of Iraq’s land-tenure system, it was not surprising that the benefits of such investment would accrue to landlords with considerable landholdings rather than to poor peasants and tribesmen.

The pro-landlord policies of the British and the monarchy came to a sudden halt when the government was overthrown in July 1958. One of the earliest acts of the new regime was the adoption of agrarian reform in September 1958. According to this new policy, land ownership was to be limited and excess lands were to be distributed to landless peasants. The agrarian reform law was a major political act that successfully broke up large landholdings and distributed some of the expropriated lands to designated beneficiaries. The problem with the reform law, according to Mahdi, was its failure to formulate a stable policy regarding the new class of small land holders to ensure their success. Attempts by subsequent governments to give priority to collective farms had the impact of further weakening the position of small land holders. Although considerable funds in successive development plans were allocated to the agricultural sector, such funds were never fully expended.

Looking back at the long history of agricultural and economic development between 1950 and 1980, one cannot help but notice that oil revenue overwhelmed economic policy-making. The most outstanding feature of policy was the increasing dependence of the economy on oil revenue and
the continued rise in Iraq’s dependence on food imports to meet more than two-thirds of its food requirements. There can be no more powerful testament to the failure of policy in Iraq.

The main shortcoming of this work, if one were to be pointed out, is its failure to treat developments in agriculture in the past two decades. But this perhaps is an error of commission rather one of omission.

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In terms of scholarly research, Egypt of the 1950s is a crowded slot. We know much about the Free Officers’ seizure of power. We understand fairly well how they managed to stay in command and the details of their foreign policy. We have a good sense of their economic policies, the structure of society under their purview, and a host of other more specific information. However, despite such apparently detailed knowledge, early scholarship propagated the myth that the revolution had no specific ideology and was propelled forward by a vague nationalist orientation. Many archive-oriented studies took the regime’s foreign policy (Pan-Arabism, non-alignment) to represent the core of its ideology, even though that policy was entirely silent on domestic matters. Many studies engaged with the period through the writings of Nasser, Sadat, and Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal. (The influence of Haykal’s work was particularly detrimental to modern scholarship.) Despite the enormous worth of such studies, when it comes to the regime’s early ideology we have been left with only a vague picture.

Roel Meijer’s new book provides the definitive—and by far the most substantial—statement on early revolutionary ideology. In this work, a much improved version of a previous edition (Amsterdam, 1995), Meijer begins the story in the post-1945 era, which he identifies as the cradle of radical reformist thought. From the ruins of this quarrelsome period he salvages a surprisingly coherent body of ideas, articulated through the writings of forgotten second- and third-tier intellectuals. Three questions frame his study: Why did Egypt of the 1950s take the authoritarian road to modernity? Why did so many intellectuals join the new regime, even though they were ostensibly the builders of the civil society that was supposed to object to it? And finally, how did these intellectuals contribute to Nasserism?

By grappling with these questions, Meijer develops a notion of ideology that was focused on this young generation’s common cause: an urgent need to modernize. The origins of this ideology are to be found in the diversity of political and economic thought as advocated by secular-liberal, socialist, and communist movements. By following these secular trends from the 1940s into the 1950s, Meijer illustrates how authoritarian modernism appeared as a full-fledged ideology.

According to Meijer, during the monarchic period Egypt produced two contradictory political traditions: civil society and state authoritarianism. Operating from within this framework, reformist movements were characterized by intellectual and structural ambivalence. Since these two movements were the outcome of the second wave of modernization and its discontents (post-1930s), radical solutions were selected almost by default (Young Egypt) while the dangers of authoritarianism were almost entirely overlooked. Consequently, authoritarian modernity in the 1950s was a natural choice.

Through their Society for National Renaissance, the liberals sought to “deepen” the structure of a self-regulating civil society. Perhaps naively, they expected that the state would accelerate this process by executing reforms. The prolific political economist Rashid Barrawi represented
the socialist option. He called for technocracy through state power as the most efficient way to overcome the "chaos of civil society" that hampered modernization. His influence on Nasserist ideology would be critical. The communists had joined the revolution only in 1955–56, after a long and unsure journey. Despite various initial responses to Nasserism, all three movements eventually joined the regime. As Meijer clarifies, "This change of attitude was . . . part of the authoritarian modernism most intellectuals upheld in their writing even before the July Revolution" (p. 202).

By the mid 1950s, increasing numbers of intellectuals were given the prestigious status of "experts," "engineers," and, by extension, "ideologues." They inhabited new and idealistic institutions. Their source of authority, like that of the regime itself, was based on the application of science for the benefit of progress. They developed a centralist ideology of planning that launched extreme projects of social engineering. Much of the programs of collectivization and industrialization were conditioned by the structural historical analysis of the communists. Their application of Marxist theory helped pin down the exact "historical laws" that hampered or pushed modernization. The regime acted on these insights. Thus, an analytical perception of the past and a critical view of the present were fused into a new futuristic vision of modernity. This holistic system is precisely what made authoritarian modernism an ideology. Once operative, it was applied to all fields of political action, foreign policy and culture included.

Meijer's discussion, however, goes far beyond the subject of authoritarian modernity. He raises revisionist arguments, such as the denial of the centrality of Pan-Arabism since the 1930s. Though such a claim could probably be supported, Meijer does not substantiate his argument through direct engagement with Pan-Arab thought. Consequently, it appears merely as an informed hunch. In addition, he neglects the populist character of Nasserist politics, the most important means by which authoritarian modernity was legitimized. Beginning in the workplace, and including the monopolization of leisure, a great deal could be said about the dissemination of this ideology. All things considered, however, to say that Meijer is familiar with his sources is to underestimate his achievement of being at home with Egyptian historiography in general, and rare source material in particular. He has used both to the fullest possible extent and provided an essential statement on Egypt’s early revolutionary experience. Now we await the rest of the story: the period from the authoritarian modernism of the 1950s to the troublesome years of the infitah.

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Rule of Experts is the most exciting and intellectually stimulating book about the Middle East to come my way in a long time. It is a brilliant set of inter-related essays about late-19th- and 20th-century Egypt. Virtually every page is laced with theoretical insights—theory, that is, in the grand sense of social vision or, at least, critical dissections of other people’s visions. The book’s original subtitle, “Political Economies of Postcolonialism,” tells more about Timothy Mitchell’s enterprise than the publisher’s final set of keywords. “Postcolonial” here “refers to forms of critical practice that address the significance of colonialism in the formation and practice of social theory” (p. 7). Grounded in a post-colonial critique of modernization theory, the author is challenging us to rethink our categories of social understanding and escape the prison of 19th-century thought as we move into the 21st century. Nineteenth-century social theory was, after all, embedded in colonialism and imperialism.
The book’s nine chapters are divided into three trilogies about early-20th-century “para-sites” of capitalism, peasant studies, and “fixing the economy” in recent decades. Three of them had already been published elsewhere, including a slightly revised and expanded version of “The Invention and Reinvention of the Egyptian Peasant,” which first appeared in this journal (IJMES 22 [1990]: 129–50). A new one, “The Market’s Place,” incorporates some fieldwork about a village economy done in 1996–97. The theme that unites all of Mitchell’s chapters is the practice of modern expertise, whether in civil engineering, surveying, accountancy, administration, political science, or economics, for the apparent sake of development and modernization. Egypt, land of the pyramids and gift of the Nile, is fertile soil for these practices, already anticipated by the Saint-Simoniens working for Muhammad ‘Ali in the early 19th century. In this sense, Rule of Experts is a worthy sequel to Mitchell’s earlier work, Colonizing Egypt, and in fact improves on it. He presents new material about Egypt’s landed estates in the mid-19th century that enables him to trace the evolution of the ‘izba from isolated temporary straw huts of seasonal laborers to the private village “where [as French scholars observed in 1930] the proprietor is the absolute master” (p. 70). The Hekekyan papers provide a map of a “model village,” a sort of 19th-century gulag of hierarchically arranged workers’ huts, rows of houses for the “middling classes of fellahs,” shops, and so on. The landowner’s “Manor House” commands a strategic corner of the village; conveniently nearby are a row of lodgings for government officers and travelers and a “House of Prostitution” (p. 69).

Mitchell is at his best debunking the idea that private property emerged as some sort of natural evolution toward “Principles True in Every Country,” which is the ironic title of his chapter on the subject. The cotton and sugar crops planted by Muhammad ‘Ali and his successors to maximize export revenues had tremendous costs. The government had to impose a functional equivalent of the slave labor used for similar crops cultivated in the United States and the Caribbean. Private property whereby “the proprietor is the absolute master” was the flip side of peasants’ running away from corvees and other exactions imposed by the authorities. Those that escaped lost the use of their land to the notables who were prepared to work with the government and keep the workers in line. The muqābala (equivalent) of 1871, rendered compulsory in 1874, exacted taxes that drove many cultivators into debt and is better viewed as a penalty imposed on them than as a property right they won for themselves (p. 67). Certainly, control rather than productivity was the logic behind the large estates.

Mitchell argues that all of our categories of social understanding, such as private property, are rooted in social practices. They are not socially constructed, for that would have given them some sort of ontological status; rather, they are part and parcel of the social practices that they define. Thus, producing cotton and sugar required forms of domination akin to that of slave labor camps. Private ownership of the ‘izba was apparently more absolute than that of any contemporary homeowner, whose rights are conditioned by zoning laws, building codes, and so on.

The economy, the object of the “fixes” of international financial institutions, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), etc., discussed in the third part of the book, is, like private property, a problematic category. Mitchell traces its origins to British colonial practices in India, where John Maynard Keynes and others before him had to manage the circulation of money in an enclosed geographical space. Well into the 20th century, “economy” was equated with household stewardship or the efficient use of things, and “political economy” was synonymous with management or public administration. As an abstraction, “the economy” slipped into English usage only in the late 1930s, as empires were contracting and countries were becoming more isolated under the impact of the Great Depression. Promoted by economists such as Keynes, “[I]t came to refer to a self-contained structure or mechanism whose internal parts are imagined to move in a dynamic and regular interaction, separate from the irregular interaction of the mechanism as a whole with what could now be called its exterior” (p. 82). Economics, a discipline grounded in the statistics that were being collected in Egypt as elsewhere in the 20th century, finally acquired its principal object: a national economy. Mitchell might have looked further, in fact, into the Statistique
component of the Société Khédioviale d’Economie Politique, de Statistique et de Législation, founded in 1909. The practices of collecting statistics accompanied the new surveying and mapping of Egypt that he so carefully documents, and they were clearly, even linguistically, tied to state power.

Mitchell focuses on the “kinds of social and political practice that produce simultaneously the powers of science and the powers of modern states” (p. 312, n. 77), and he revealingly contrasts his concerns with those of a fellow political scientist, James Scott, whose Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998) documented state misuses of the powers of science. Mitchell’s “techno-politics” is more elusive. In his words,

Techno-politics is always a technical body, an alloy that must emerge from a process of manufacture whose ingredients are both human and nonhuman, both intentional and not, and in which the intentional or human is always somewhat overrun by the unintended. But it is a particular form of manufacturing, a certain way of organizing the amalgam of the human and nonhuman, things and ideas, so that the human, the intellectual, the realm of intentions and ideas seems to come first and to control and organize the nonhuman (pp. 42–43).

For Mitchell, an expertise like engineering has no autonomous scientific status: “the projects themselves formed the science” (p. 37), and the human agency associated with engineering only “seems to come first.” More fundamentally, “overlooking the mixed ways things happen, indeed producing the effect of neatly separated realms of reason and the real world, ideas and their objects, the human and nonhuman, was how power was coming to work in Egypt, and in the twentieth century in general” (p. 52).

In other words, the author insists on a strange way of political theorizing that “avoids the method of abstraction from the particular that usually characterizes a work of theory.” So much does the theory lie “in the complexity of the cases” that Mitchell confesses that his Introduction is “opaque” and “no substitute for what lies in the chapters themselves” (p. 8). Practice precedes theory, as Mussolini used to say against the Marxists. The problem with this post-modern approach to political theory is that it escapes any concrete politics and the sorts of systemic confusion Scott and the present reviewer (in Images of Development: Egyptian Engineers in Search of Industry, 2nd ed. [Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1994]) captured between political and scientific authorities. Although our categories of social understanding are subject to broad transformations of the sort Mitchell so brilliantly documents, we need to fix them for purposes of analysis when discussing concrete policy-related topics such as land reform and economic adjustment. Floating above it all on a meta level, Mitchell tends to miss some of the real “techno-politics,” or how in concrete cases various political authorities could manipulate professional associations and learned societies to legitimate various projects. As he says, he is not interested in the problems raised by political scientists because he prefers to analyze the genesis of the various disciplines that “frame” modern society and the violence that underlies the framing.

Thus, returning to the peasants, he repeats the story of Richard Critchfield’s plagiarizing from Father Ayrout, a source who knew little about peasant life, and then discovers evidence that may or may not be true from Marshal Amer’s Committee to Liquidate Feudalism about peasant bullies torturing and murdering their fellow villagers. This time, the source, properly documented, is an appendix in Hamied Ansari’s Egypt: The Stalled Society (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1987, 255–60). It summarizes a memorandum signed by the commander of Military Criminal Investigations concerning “the feudalist Ahmad Hasan Abdun,” a Wafdist deputy from Sharqiyya before 1952. The reader may still wonder whether Amer’s military police, while vividly documenting the violence that Mitchell needs for his enframing theory, is not as artful a fabrication as Critchfield’s. Still, Mitchell is right to observe the squeamishness toward violence of most political-science fieldworkers and also to raise serious questions, transcending Critchfield’s
possible CIA connections, about the structure of academic expertise that enabled his prejudiced work to achieve widespread acceptance.

In this reviewer’s opinion, however, Mitchell’s critique of the generations of engineers, primarily British and Egyptian, who tamed the Nile and converted much of the Nile Valley from basin irrigation derived from the annual flood into perennial irrigation also tends to be prejudiced. Offsetting the well-known ecological arguments against the various dams at Aswan and the adverse consequences of more disease and salinity associated with a more intensive use of the land without adequate drainage are the positive gains of productivity and human welfare that accompany steady supplies of water. Within a decade of the filling of Lake Nasser behind the High Dam, the reserves saved Egypt from what would otherwise have been a very painful drought.

Mitchell will amuse his readers by pointing out the flaws of those less than exact modern disciplines, be they engineering, surveying, or development economics, but are we to conclude that they are somehow less than legitimate? Take economics, for example. The models of the economists never quite correspond to reality, and Mitchell correctly points to the many “externalities,” “market inefficiencies,” and the like that wreak havoc on efforts to isolate “the economy” from its unruly environment. The economy may indeed be a “fabrication” that is never quite “complete” (p. 301) because family disputes, fraud, secrecy, and other matters are always messing it up. How, for instance, can we quantify of the costs of sustaining family networks that, if left unattended, might have devastating consequences, such as the collapse of Egypt’s largest privately owned bank (p. 293)? Mitchell concludes, however, not only that the economy is “incomplete” but that “economic discourse works very hard to help format and reproduce the exclusions that make the economy possible” (p. 301). Are we to conclude, then, that because International Monetary Fund and USAID reports “exclude” politically sensitive matters such as military expenditures and mention of dominant families, economics is somehow fraudulent?

Is there no longer room in the post-modern, post-colonial world for human agency to keep striving for ideals of truth and exactitude, even if they can never quite be attained? Mitchell’s epistemology rejects the sorts of dichotomies between concepts and reality on which such striving depends. Rather than painting “gray on gray,” as Hegel tried to do, Mitchell abolishes all distinctions when he rejects fixed categories (even provisionally fixed ones for a particular historical period) of social understanding and rejects the idea that we can evaluate the correspondence of our concepts to any reality. His critique of “techno-politics” is meta-political, not political in the sense of analyzing clashes between different forms of authority. At the meta level, neither disciplines nor states have authority or legitimacy.

Yet “techno-politics” does connote a style and way of thinking about Egypt shared by Gamal Abdel Nasser and his successors, the World Bank, and USAID. James Heaphey, who is not cited in Mitchell’s extensive bibliography, captured this in 1966 in the title of his “The Organization of Egypt: Inadequacies of a Nonpolitical Model for Nation-Building” (World Politics 18, 2 [1966]: 177–93). The image of the overpopulated little country strung up the Nile into a tiny fan-shaped delta surrounded by vast empty desert turns any politics into a problem of managing scarce resources rather than distributing them equitably. Mitchell usefully attacks the traditional hydraulic-society image of Egypt along with the plans of international financial institutions and USAID to “fix the economy.”

But an alternative he proposes seems equally removed from the political realities of the Egyptian countryside. Let everybody eat less meat and import less grain and grow less berseem for the cattle to resolve the issue of food security. Is it not normal, however, for people with a rising per capita income to be spending more on meat? Readers may also be amused to discover how Egypt saved billions of dollars by growing local hemp (bango) to substitute for imports of Lebanese hash (p. 288). There is much more to tell, and this book will surely be required reading for most students and faculty in Middle East studies.
AMAL OBEIDI, Political Culture in Libya (Curzon Press, 2001). Pp. 266. $85.00 cloth.

REVIEWED BY ALI ABDULLATIF AHMIDA, Department of Political Science, University of New England, Biddeford, Me

In 1951, Libya became an independent state, a federal monarchy. In 1969, a military coup overthrew the Sanusi monarchy and brought Muammar el-Qaddafi to power. Since that time, Libya has become politically and socially invisible, the least known of the North African states compared with Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. Continuing conflict with the United States over terrorism and the question of Palestine have made Libya irascible to foreign scholars. In the absence of serious scholarship, competence in Arabic, and reliable knowledge of Libyan society and politics, Western mass media and many academics have reduced Libyan politics to the persona of Qaddafi, who is frequently characterized as a “mad dog” ruling a “rogue regime.” This study by a female Libyan political scientist, Amal Obeidi, is therefore an especially welcome contribution to Libyan studies.

Obeidi is one of few scholars, such as Lisa Anderson, Dirk Vandewalle, Monte Palmer, Omar El-Fathaly, and John Davis, who have actually done research inside Libya since 1969. Obeidi’s book is based on the Ph.D. dissertation she presented to the University of Durham in England, and she is currently a professor of political science at Garyounis University in Benghazi, Libya.

Obeidi’s text is based on the study of political socialization and culture as analyzed by structural-functionalist American political scientists, especially Gabriel Almond, Bingham Powell, and Sidney Verba. Her main concern is to “understand the influence of state ideology on the young generation in Libya, since the revolutionary regime has made substantial effort to create a ‘jamahirian citizen’, by employing the main agents of political socialization, namely media and education. It has targeted the younger generation, in particular students” (p. 2). The author sets her task as assessing the influence of state ideology on a group of Libyan students by asking how effective Qaddafi’s regime has been in creating politically active and motivated students who believe in the regime’s ideology of Arab nationalism and unity.

Obeidi used the quantitative survey method to gather her data on 500 male and female students at Garyounis University in Benghazi, the capital of the eastern region and the second-largest city in Libya. The data were collected during the spring and the summer of 1994, and Obeidi combined multiple-choice questions with follow-up interviews with some of the students.

Obeidi’s basic premise is that the revolutionary regime in Libya has had mixed success in reproducing its values among Libyan students. The regime has been most successful in advancing women’s rights, education, Arab nationalism, Arab unity, and support for Palestinian people. However, it has failed to create participant citizens and to develop alternatives to kinship ties (p. 224). The study’s body of argument projects an analysis of the survey on questions such as Arabism and Islam, tribes and tribalism, political participation, women’s role in society, and Arab unity and the Palestinian question.

Obeidi points out that the Qaddafi regime advocates Arab nationalism and Islam and promotes them as an alternative to local Libyan identity and regional and tribal identities. Her findings show that the students, like the regime, did not distinguish between Arabism and Islam and viewed both as significant to them. Yet this result should not surprise the reader: for most North Africans, including Libyans, Islam and Arabism are two sides of one coin because the majority of North African people are Muslims who confronted European colonialism rather than the Ottoman Empire, as in the case of the Arab East.

The survey indicates that tribal and kinship identity is strong among a majority of the students (p. 131). At the same time, many students preferred that there was no tribal system. These views
reflect the regime’s position, which accepts a social role for tribalism but—at least, in the first
decade after 1969—opposed a political role for it, and after 1975 accepted its role as a social base
for the security of the regime.

The third topic surveyed by the author is political participation. Her survey demonstrates that
the students held a negative view toward this topic. Most of the students did not participate in the
popular committees and congresses organized by the regime (p. 163), suggesting that the regime
has failed to engage students in its political organizations.

On the question of women, the survey demonstrates that the regime championed women’s
rights in Libya. Consequently, female students expressed strong views toward women’s rights
and equality. These students also voiced traditional views on the issue of joining the military, as
demanded by the regime. The regime clearly managed to include women in education and jobs,
and this is a positive achievement in a conservative society such as Libya’s.

The issue of Arab unity and the Palestinian question was also surveyed. The survey indicates
that the regime made some gains in persuading students to support the Palestinians’ struggle for
self-determination and that they held a positive view toward Arab unity. Both issues are high in the
ideology of the Qaddafi regime and both issues are significant in Libya’s modern history because
of the brutal experience Libya had with Italian settlers’ colonialism between 1911 and 1943. The
students favored complete liberation of Palestine. The author concludes her study with a summary
of the positive and negative attitudes of the students regarding the outcome of their socialization
by Qaddafi’s regime. She gives the regime high marks on Arabism, Islam, and women’s rights and
low marks on participation and kinship and local identity.

The study has some minor errors in dates and translation of names. For instance, Sayyid Ahmad
al-Sharif al-Sanusi succeeded his uncle Muhammad al-Mahdi not in 1917, as the author states, but
in 1902 (p. 39). Sukana is misspelled “Socra” (p. 45), and Halim Barakat is misspelled “Baakat”
(p. 59, fn. 41). These mistakes can easily be attended to in subsequent editions.

There are two methodological problems in the book. First, the author admits that 64 percent
of the 500 students surveyed came from the city of Benghazi (p. 77). In addition, 10 percent
came from the suburbs of Benghazi, and only 4 percent each came from Tubruk and Tripoli.
Thus, 78 percent of the surveyed students came from Benghazi in eastern Libya. Thus regional
bias may raise questions about the validity of the study’s conclusions beyond the eastern region,
especially if we keep in mind that Libya is a huge country known for its social diversity and regional
economies.

Second, the text leaves out two important questions. How are the main issues surveyed by
the author contested and configured by the state and the revolutionary elite itself? And how are
ideological goals set by the state such as popular committees and congresses appropriated by
students for causes different from the original state ideology? These two questions may be the
next agenda for research on Libyan political culture.

Aside from these two problems, Obeidi’s book is a new contribution to the field of Libyan
studies, especially political socialization and culture under the military regime since 1969. The
study applies an empirical survey analysis, still a relatively new field in the study of the Middle
East and North Africa. The author updates the data on political socialization on Libya pioneered
by her mentor Zahi El Mogherbi (1978) and on political culture in Libya by Omar El Fathaly and
Monte Palmer (1980). It is useful for undergraduate and graduate students interested in the study
of political socialization in the Middle East and North Africa.
This concise book is an important contribution to the study of informal-sector domestic service in Turkey. It concerns various issues such as the workings of patriarchy in economic, gender, and class relations; sources of power for structurally weak actors; migrants’ interpretations of tradition and modernity; the institution of door keeping; formation of working-class identity in migrant rural women; and the interaction of the urban middle class with rural migrants.

Ozyegin’s venture in exploring domestic service in Turkey is unique, as there is no previous empirical or theoretical study on the structure of this sector or of domestic workers. Considering the unpredictable growth of this informal sector in the post-industrial and developing countries, her extensive research is a crucial contribution to the disciplines of economy, sociology, and gender studies.

Two groups of rural migrant women working in domestic service are the subject of this study: women of the basement (doorkeepers’ wives living in the basements of middle- or upper-middle-class apartments, or “outsiders within”) and women of squatter settlements (“outsiders in third space”). Grouping these women according to their setting in the urban space aims to locate the differences in their class and gender identity; in the effects of patriarchy on them; and in their interaction with rural and urban communities. The empirical foundation consists of four sources of field data: a survey (160 participants), participant observation, in-depth interviews, and focus-group research. These data were collected between 1989 and 1990 from domestic workers living in various neighborhoods in Ankara.

The first chapter introduces some theoretical questions about shifting gender and class conceptions in passage from traditional rural to modern urban space and how these dynamics affect domestic workers’ identity construction. The following questions are raised for analysis in subsequent chapters: what is the agency of domestic workers under the patriarchal construction of social identities? How does the stigmatized situation of doorkeepers and their families within middle-class households influence their interpretation of gender and class? How is the superfluous binary opposition of tradition and modernity experienced by “margin dwellers”? Are the structure and internal workings of domestic service (in terms of the wages, schedules, and recruitment patterns) such that such service can be categorized as part of the informal sector of the economy?

The author’s introduction of scholarly works on domestic service in the developing countries provides a theoretical background from which the divergent internal dynamics of this sector in Turkey will be observed. A brief historical background presenting industrialization, modernization, and gender construction in modern Turkey and detailed information about her field research draw us into the comprehensive analyses provided in the following chapters.

What makes Ozyegin’s text a strong qualitative (as well as quantitative) analysis is her sensitivity in presenting the individual lives, voices, or “self-definitions” of domestic workers. Their narratives on building gender and class identity both materialize and humanize the analysis of research data. Chapter 2 combines some of these narratives on how the “outsiders within” and “outsiders in third space” become domestic workers. Women of the basement’s relative ease in overcoming the patriarchal objection to work (compared with women of squatter settlements) is explained through their spatial immobility (since they usually work for the residents of the apartment building where they live) and easy control of their labor. A significant finding about the relationship between the workings of patriarchy and the domestic-service sector in the Turkish context is that patriarchal control makes migrant women’s labor scarce and expensive. Thus, although there is huge supply
of domestic workers that could lead to their exploitation when they surpass demand, the control of entry into the labor market by men leads to proletarianization of the actual workers. There is a continuous demand for their labor; they have stable schedules and definitions of work; and they have power in negotiating wages.

However, as we see in Chapter 3, domestic workers do not identify themselves as “specialist” proletarian cleaners; nor do they identify themselves as “generalist” traditional maids. They choose an in-between work identity that is “housekeeper.” A desired personal relationship with their employer in terms of schedules, patronage benefits, and autonomy over the work process reflects their ideal definition of themselves. Although domestic workers may not have a rigid working-class identity, an overall analysis of the modes and structure of employment in this informal sector reveals the correlation with a formal sector. Regular and stable wages, as well as schedules and recruitment patterns, reveal the organized and dynamic nature of domestic service in Turkey.

Domestic service provides a dynamic space for the interaction of different classes of women—traditional rural worker and modern urban employer. According to classical and Marxist definitions of power, the domestic workers would have no power in their relations with the upper-class employers. However, applying James Scott’s definition of power of the weak and “routine resistances,” Ozyegin attributes agency to the domestic workers. She claims a relational concept of power that is sustained through continuous negotiations of conflicting interests. These “femininities in competition . . . selectively utilize and negotiate patriarchal gender beliefs in numerous, subtle, and equivocal ways in their day to day interactions with each other” (p. 151).

Chapter 5 presents an inquiry into door keeping, concluding that both class and gender servility is imposed on the migrant families through this institution. Based on the exploitation of family labor, door keeping uses the migrant family as a laboring unit. As the husband’s “gender anxiety” heightens with the feminine tasks of door keeping, patriarchal authority is increasingly asserted in the family. This discussion is crucial for an understanding of the differences between women of the basement and women in squatter settlements in transformation of their economic power to gender equality in the household. Although both groups of women still derive their identities from their roles as wife and mother, and although their wages are spent in an altruistic manner, still they have a sense of economic agency. Ozyegin concludes that these women’s pleasure in the perception of agency and empowerment through working is an integral part of their reconfigured gender and class identity.

The only question and concern about Ozyegin’s work would be a statistical one. As she admits herself, we cannot consider the sub-sample of women in the squatter settlements as a representative one because of the number of participants and the selection process. The survey was conducted with only 57 women from this group (compared with 103 women from the women of the basement group) who are mostly related to one another through kinship. This fact makes the statistically necessary independent and random-sampling procedure questionable. Still, we should not devalue this path-breaking intensive fieldwork emphasizing the individual voices and agency of many domestic workers.

In sum, the unique field research produces many conclusions on domestic service as an informal sector and on gender and class relations within and between rural migrant and modern urban populations. The book clearly shows the challenges to rural identities in new spaces and conditions of life and how the migrants re-create their space by inventing a new adaptive culture. In all, Ozyegin’s meticulous empirical analysis of traditional migrant women, supported by a strong theoretical framework, is a valuable resource for those who inquire into the complexities of modernization in developing countries.
Curtis Ryan’s *Jordan in Transition* fills a major gap in the literature as a timely, well-written, and accessible book. Ryan places the passage from Hussein to Abdullah within the context of multiple, overlapping transitions since the late 1980s—in foreign policy, economic policy, and domestic liberalization. Of these transitions, Ryan argues, political liberalization has been the least complete. With lively prose and an impressive base of primary research and interviews, *Jordan in Transition* is the best single book-length introduction available to Jordanian politics.

Ryan grounds his discussion of these transitions within a theory of “the political economy of regime security.” The emphasis on the primacy of economic considerations recalls Laurie Brand’s decade-old claims for the centrality of “budget security” to Jordanian foreign policy. Beyond capturing an additional decade of history, Ryan’s approach is both more subtle and more flexible, and he applies his argument to a wider range of topics. Ryan does not overplay his claims for political economy, and in his concrete discussions of foreign policy and liberalization the political economy of regime security often disappears for pages on end in favor of shrewd, grounded analysis. While this can be frustrating for the political scientist looking for the testing of specific hypotheses, it works well for a pragmatic but theoretically grounded analytical overview of recent Jordanian politics.

Ryan’s strength is his intimate knowledge of Jordanian politics and extensive research; his familiarity with a wide range of theoretical traditions; and the breadth of his coverage of topics. He draws on an impressive array of Arabic-language sources and has interviewed many of the appropriate individuals in a series of research trips spanning nearly a decade. His discussions of Jordanian–Palestinian relations and of the political impact of economic reforms are subtle and nuanced and attentive to the texture of its politics, and they refrain from making the generalizations that tend to mar discussion of that subject. The discussion of the tense times surrounding the transition from Hussein to Abdullah is first-rate, as is the detailed analysis of the 1997 general election and the 1999 municipal elections. The comparison between the 1989 and 1996 riots nicely captures what had changed and what had not after years of “transition.”

Ryan is convincing on the limits of the Jordanian experiment with liberalization and offers a gloomy verdict on the results of the fevered and excited liberal moment of the early 1990s. He argues convincingly that economic development occupies a rather higher position in elite priorities than does genuine democratization. His straightforward presentation of the manipulation of the 1993 and 1997 elections leaves little doubt about the chilling effect of regime policy on democratic choice. The general trajectory of a regime backsliding on its liberalizing promises emerges clearly. Given the importance of its “moderate” and “pro-Western” image to relations with the United States, one almost wonders from Ryan’s account whether the process is more about putting on a liberal face to the outside world than it is about internal reform. Such an argument would fit nicely with Ryan’s political-economy argument, since it would place the pursuit of American aid and international investment at the center of the story.

His explanation of Jordan’s decisions in the Gulf War, and of Jordanian foreign policy more broadly, is less convincing. The book does an excellent job of describing the deep shifts in foreign policy over the course of the 1990s, as Hussein tied Jordan’s fortunes to the peace process and to close relations with the United States. Like others who emphasize economic factors, however, he has difficulty accounting for the cross-pressures of Iraqi and Gulf (and American) economic interests and tends to downplay the importance of more political incentives and constraints. It is in this
chapter that the tension between his political-economy analysis and rich empirical analysis comes into greatest tension. He repeatedly introduces public opinion, the king’s personal preferences, or other non-economic variables on an ad hoc basis to explain outcomes, without modifying his theoretical claims in response.

The chapter on economic adjustment offers a clear-eyed assessment of Jordan’s efforts, with an eye more toward its political impact than its economic success or failure. Oddly, given the book’s emphasis on economic factors, little detailed evidence is presented here about the impact of economic liberalization. A richer presentation of Jordan’s changing economic circumstances, and the extent of its reforms, would have been appropriate.

Although Ryan’s presentation is fresh and compelling and offers a wealth of useful detail, few of his conclusions will surprise readers familiar with Jordanian politics or the growing scholarship on the country. For example, the central argument that Jordan began its liberalization process in 1989 defensively and then began to retreat over the course of the 1990s follows rather than challenges the conventional wisdom. This can in part be attributed to the book’s aspirations to provide an accessible and comprehensive introduction to Jordan’s politics—something at which it succeeds. Still, the book would have been even better had Ryan been able to translate his rich knowledge of Jordan and his theoretical insights into more surprising or controversial conclusions. Overall, Jordan in Transition is a welcome addition to the growing literature on Jordan. It is now the best available single-book introduction to Jordanian politics at the undergraduate level and would be useful for courses on Middle East politics, comparative politics, foreign policy, and democratization.

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Any ethnically, racially, religiously, or nationally mixed city is something of a gold mine for any social researcher. The research questions seem to emanate almost directly from the field. At the same time, however, it is usually quite difficult to make novel theoretical statements about such contexts. In her research on Acre, Rebecca Torstrick succeeds in doing just this by combining sociological and anthropological perspectives and research methods and by integrating micro and macro levels of analysis. On the theoretical side of her work, Torstrick focused her research on the ways in which personal and collective identities are employed, the process through which they undergo change, and the interplay between collective and personal identities as well as different forms of identity over time. She further examines the interaction between identity and spatial boundaries. The result is a piece of research that offers an in-depth understanding not only of the relationship between the Jewish (both Ashkenazi and Mizrahi) and Arab citizens of Acre, but also of the relationship between the Israeli state and its Palestinian citizens and the forms in which local inhabitants and officials of the city of Acre engage in dialogue with this relationship by translating, accepting, or rejecting it.

Acre is an old city whose history dates back approximately 4,000 years. It was never part of the biblical Israeli polity; nor was it ever a Jewish city until it was conquered by Jewish military forces during the 1948 war. Prior to the latest Jewish conquest of Acre (which was outside of the territory allocated to the Jewish state by the United Nations’ Partition Plan), it was ruled by innumerable regimes, including the Egyptian, Assyrian, Greek, Seleucid, Roman, Byzantine, Arab, Crusader, Mamluk, Ottoman, and British, as well as by different local (Arab) strongmen. Almost all of these groups left some overt or covert marks on this ancient city. Before the 1948 war, the city was
predominately an Arab (both Muslim and Christian) town. Following the war, most of the Arab inhabitants fled or were uprooted from their homes, and the city was populated by several waves of Jewish population composed mainly of new immigrants from North Africa and Romania and, in the past two decades, from the former Soviet lands and Ethiopia. Since then, the Jewish–Arab demographic ratio has reflected an Arab minority: Arabs make up approximately 25–30 percent of the population, with the remainder of the population made up by the Jewish majority. Torstrick carefully documents, describes, and analyzes both the tension between and the coexistence of these two ethno-national communities and the ways in which this has varied from period to period. She insightfully shows the ways in which different patterns of coexistence and tension were influenced by local factors and events as well as by exogenous occurrences and macro-political realities.

The basic problematic, which is discussed astutely by the author, is the self-definition of the Israeli state as “Jewish and democratic.” This dual collective identity is correctly analyzed as being a contradiction in terms, where the democratic value contradicts that of “Judaism,” conceived of as a mixture of an exclusive religious and primordial or racist identity. This definition of the state has far-reaching legal, political, economic, and cultural consequences for the status of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel, not only in terms of locating them in a marginal and underprivileged position, but also in terms of the ways in which it comes to be articulated in local and personal relationships between Jews and Arabs, even in situations where they have common interests. To this the author adds another aspect of the Jewish Israeli political culture, which she terms “security nationalism” (other Israeli social scientists have used the terms “cultural militarism” or “military-cultural complex”). This cultural orientation serves to construct any Arab as an actual or potential enemy. This is especially pronounced during periods of heightened tension in Jewish–Arab and Jewish–Palestinian conflict. This point is illustrated very well by the author in her recounting of an anecdotal event whereby a Jewish couple invited an Arab couple to a dinner at their home. During dinner, the national television reported on a Palestinian terrorist attack that had just occurred in Tel-Aviv. The Jewish husband declared indignantly, “All the Arabs must be killed.” In response, the Arab friend offered his Jewish host a knife and said, “Okay. I’m an Arab; take the knife and kill me.”

Torstrick further notes an interesting symmetry between the Jews and Arabs in Acre, and perhaps in all of the holy land whereby both perceive the “others” as illegitimate intruders in their territory. On the one hand, the Jewish immigrants were told that they were coming to the Jewish fatherland to be freed of the fear of gentiles and of persecution, only to find themselves among real or imagined threatening Arabs (especially in the mixed Wofson neighborhood). It is not surprising therefore that there was a high turnover of Jewish population in mixed neighborhoods and cities. Nor is it surprising that the “transfer idea” (i.e., ethnic cleansing of the Arabs) achieved such widespread popularity. On the other hand, the Arabs view Acre (and the entire land) as an Arab land and hold steadfast to the belief that, if they cannot turn back the historic clock, then the very least they can do is attempt to preserve their own identity and the Arab or Palestinian character of the city.

The central and most important conclusion of this book is that the very existence of a considerable Arab Palestinian minority of citizens within boundaries of the Jewish state not only serves as a point around which Jews grapple with their own Jewish identity; it is also used as a litmus test for the quality of the Israeli state’s democracy, its regime, and its social tolerance. Overall, the book is an important, well-researched, and well-written piece of scholarly work. It is a pity that it was published in hardcover and is so pricey, since this usually serves to limit the circulation of important books. It would be very unfortunate if this factor hindered access to the book. It is highly recommended and worthwhile for anyone interested in issues of ethnic relations in Israel in particular, and in the Jewish–Palestinian conflict more generally.
The Rebirth of Uzbekistan: Politics, Economy, and Society in the Post–Soviet Era

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The Rebirth of Uzbekistan may indeed be the first lengthy monograph on post–Soviet Uzbekistan to present “systematically” a wide range of conventional social-science topics—society, politics, economics, foreign policy, and external relations. The fairly detailed and comprehensive coverage of these areas in one volume may be the work’s greatest strength in that it constitutes a shift beyond lone chapters on Uzbekistan in the numerous edited volumes on the republics of Central Asia and the former Soviet Union. But the book has several major shortcomings.

First, according to the author, the book’s aim is “to trace the main direction and developments in the country after the break-up of the Soviet Union” (p. 5). While the author traces Uzbekistan’s developments in several important areas in helpful detail, the framing of these developments and the issues most at stake leaves a lot to be desired. This is especially true if the book, as indicated by the author, is intended to be both “easily accessible” and “used as a textbook.” It neither asks nor answers many of the most provocative questions that interest Central Asian specialists or that might draw those who seek an introduction to the region, or just to Uzbekistan. Such questions might include: What has been the impact of Soviet policies on national identity and other forms of identity in post–Soviet Uzbekistan? What challenges does this impact pose to the current government’s efforts to establish and maintain its legitimacy, given that the top leadership came to power under Soviet rule with the help of socialist ideology? Given the largely effective Soviet modernization policies, how best might we understand the renewed interest in Islam, including the rise of Islamic movements that advocate violence? How do political elites define democracy, toward which they claim Uzbekistan is making a transition? The author’s failure to raise and address many important issues detracts from the book’s accessibility and systematicity, resulting often in dry encyclopedic reading with little guidance for the novice reader.

Second, there is no use of Russian-language sources. In such a broad and ambitious study of Uzbekistan, one would expect to find a more extensive bibliography that includes Russian sources. While knowledge of the Uzbek language is an invaluable asset for conducting fieldwork in Uzbekistan, it is probably least useful for interviewing members of the government and non-governmental organizations, almost all of whom speak Russian. Yet this is precisely the constituency the author has chosen to interview. Furthermore, official documents, newspapers, and scholarly writing in Russian form a significant part of the state archives and academic literature.

Third, several key English-language sources, which were published in the late 1990s, are also missing from the bibliography. Adeeb Khalid’s historical study of Jadidism (1998) is not cited; nor are numerous works in anthropology and political science, including articles and unpublished dissertations by Foltz, Jones-Luong, Kamp, Kandiyoti, Northrop, Roi, Schoeberlein-Engel, Shahrani, and the reviewer himself, to mention a few. These would have enhanced several, if not all, of the chapters, especially the two on history and societal transformations.

The important contributions of scholarship to the analysis of post–Soviet Uzbekistan combined with only recently improved access for American, Western European, and Japanese scholars to local archives and field sites make the omission of these works all the more disappointing. This weakness arguably has affected the author’s own analysis of social and political transformations, which suffers from unmarked and inconsistent shifts between face-value policy claims by Uzbek officials and analyses of various trends, resulting in clichés and other over-simplifications. For example, in the Introduction, the author writes, “All the empires formed [in Central Asia] had
an impact on the people’s lives, but none attempted to build a serious civil society” (p. 1), as if civil society were a universal concept that is neither historically nor culturally contingent. The sentence “[E]arly measures taken by the government to silence its opponents were not meant to prevent the emergence of a pluralist democracy in Uzbekistan” (p. 299) makes the author sound like an apologist for the early 1990s government. Another sentence, “The present period is witnessing the demolition of the old political system, the rejection of the former ideology, the establishment of new relations in the economic, political and spiritual spheres of society, and the formation of democracy and democratic institutions in Uzbekistan” (p. 303), has a similar effect. The situation, which is more complicated than implied here, would be better characterized as one of selective rejection and re-appropriation of elements of past, including Soviet, ideology. Moreover, such statements, and there are many, echo official rhetoric like extensions of titles of books and pamphlets written by or on behalf of Uzbekistan’s President Karimov. In all fairness, the author is not alone among Central Asianists in committing these errors, which is why characterizations of how people invoke concepts such as democracy, civil society, and transition in local contexts and theoretically informed discussions of the rhetoric of political leaders would be useful.

The book’s strengths are in the details, especially the discussions of Uzbekistan’s demographic composition, with helpful sections on each of the main ethnic groups and its relations with other countries, including an interesting characterization of three phases of Turkey’s relationship with Uzbekistan from 1991 to the present: raised expectations, disillusionment, and readjustment. These topics also happen to be among the author’s areas of specialization. ‘Rebirth’ is clearly an ambitious (perhaps overly ambitious) project that falls short of advancing significantly most specialists’ understanding of the field. At the same time, its extensive detail and organization do not make it a particularly accessible introductory text. However, it is a useful one-volume resource for those who already have some familiarity with the recent history of Uzbekistan and are interested in brushing up on their facts.

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Ashk Dahlens’s erudite dissertation sets up the comparative legal philosophies of Iran’s contemporary Shi‘i scholars against the backdrop of Western legal and epistemological schools. This is an ambitious project—and ambitious, indeed, that the book’s complicated title hardly does justice to the its vast scope, which includes a thorough examination of the legal philosophies of ‘Abdollah Jawadi Amuli and Mohammad Mujtahid Shibestari (author’s transliterations) as the representatives of the traditionalist and modernist schools of Iran’s post-revolutionary Shi‘ism. In this scheme, Sorush is assigned the position of the Shi‘i post-modernist. Although at times the claim seems over the top (e.g., when the author declares Sorush’s hermeneutics tantamount to advocating the death of the divine author [p. 348]), Dahlens often uses post-modernity in its weaker sense (as high modernity), a usage that could be reconciled with Sorush’s self-understanding.

Dahlens’s mastery of Persian is admirable, but his insufficient grasp of Arabic, besides causing occasional lapses (e.g., pp. 116, 246, 256, 264) forces him to rely on secondary sources (mostly in English) on issues of Islamic philosophy and law that he makes central to his project. Oddly, Dahlens decides to study Iran’s post-revolutionary Shi‘i intellectual ferment through the narrow aperture
of comparative epistemology, which produces the effect of listening to a virtuoso performance of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony on a piccolo. Iran’s recent theological, epistemological, and legal innovations must not be isolated from the context of the socio-political pressures of a quarter-century of troubled theocracy. Dahlen’s examination of the Iranian Shi’i responses to modernity as a series of subjective and voluntaristic decisions produces an anatomy but no physiology. The hypothetical readers may want to know “what” Sorush, Jawadi Amuli, Shabistary, Bazargan, Paiman, and others have to say about the revealed law and the truth and applicability of the religious texts. But it is inconceivable that they would have no interest in knowing “why” they take such positions.

Dahlen produces a provocative and learned philosophical commentary on the contemporary Shi’i legal and epistemological theory, but he also tends to over-intellectualize. For instance, he associates a modern Islamic thinker trained in engineering (Mahdi Bazargan) with “Stoics through Cicero and Thomas Aquinas” (p. 152) and describes a lay dentist (Habibollah Paiman) as “inspired by Martin Heidegger and Hans-George Gadamer” (p. 160). Even if one considers these influences to be at work unconsciously or subconsciously (for they certainly were not present in any real sense), the fact remains that the political context of their thoughts would have been far more interesting than the pedigree of their views. In this manner, Dahlen’s scholasticism misses the forest for the trees, and the trees for their Latin names.

And yet Dahlen is neither a joyless pedant nor a star-gazing scholar. He begins and ends his book with exuberant lines from Rumi and Sepehri. Behind the seven veils of epistemological jargon there is a heart that beats with genuine love for Iranian mysticism and Islamic purity. Alas, this occulted sentiment expresses itself only in a muffled authorial voice and in passive tense. In half a dozen passages throughout the book the indirect admonitions hint that Sorush could have made other choices “instead of” contributing to the attenuation and demystification of the Islamic tradition. “Instead of developing an exact and systematic theory of ethical behaviour on the Qur’anic ethical contents,” Dahlen accuses Sorush of portraying “ethics in terms of human conventions” (p. 237). “Instead of calling for a wholesome return to the traditional system of learning where all sciences possess a sacred aspect and are never divorced from the total religious life of Islam,” Sorush’s ideas are castigated as leading “undoubtedly to a desacralisation of Islamic learning” (p. 250). “Instead of making a systematic study of the historical development of the traditional Islamic disciplines, Sorush adopts the conceptual framework and terminology of analytical philosophy” (p. 269). And finally, “Instead of establishing Islamic self-referentiality to respond to what he identifies as the normative closure of traditional legal methodology, he employs the evolutionary dynamics of cognitive openness in order to propose a theoretically alienating exercise in which Islam is ultimately reduced to the confines of Western cognitive matrices” (p. 357). Dahlen’s nostalgia for an Islam unadulterated and fiercely defiant against modern ideas is unmistakable.

He is dismayed that “instead of” defending the integrity of a self-referential Islam Sorush seems to throw the gates open to secularism and deracination. But he never asks “Why?” Sympathetic Orientalism represented by a few Western observers (and now by Dahlen) bemoans the lack of backbone in Muslim intellectuals charged with preserving the authenticity of the shari’a and Islam against the contagion of Occidentosis. But such viewers are unable to see the social and political contexts that make Sorushism and its equivalents in the Islamic world inevitable. Dahlen criticizes Sorush for leaving behind “the most important characteristic of traditional shari’a as distinct from modern Western law, namely the ideal that the determination as well as the result of law is the expression of the divine commandment.” He is charged with rendering meaningless “the traditional belief that Islamic law not only regulates man’s relationship with his neighbors or the state but also his relationship with God” (p. 228). As if Iran has not been dragged by such hegemonic interpretations of shari’a for a quarter-century, through eight years of a ruinous war, international isolation, economic collapse, moral degradation, and the brutalization of the its Muslim and Shi’i subjects. I did not say “citizens”—advisedly.
Accommodating women’s rights in high-context cultures has become one of the most difficult challenges facing the modern world. Ending religious repression is an area of deep concern to many Islamic and Western publics. This issue has grabbed more attention in the context of globalization, which has generated contradictory processes and outcomes. Human solidarity and interconnection has, for example, increasingly been accompanied by rekindling of the forces of local identities and religious extremism. The rise of religious fundamentalism has unleashed two opposing trends: (1) the intensification of women’s subordination; and (2) the emergence of a backlash in the form of women’s legal rights in particular and women’s rights to religious freedom more generally.

The book under review is organized into seven sections, and its chapters are built around four perspectives: international human rights, national law, grass-roots, and theological. The book’s first section examines the link between religious radicalism and gender. John S. Hawley sees a use for the term “fundamentalism” to the extent that many militantly conservative religious groups focus on a “restoration of divinely sanctioned core values—fundamentals—that have been attacked, obscured, or overridden by the forces of modernity, often in colonial or imperial disguise” (p. 7). In the United States, Christian fundamentalists’ “abstinence-only” approach reflects parents’ rights over children’s sex education, but it also demonstrates parents’ desire to control women’s sexuality (chap. 2 [by Susan D. Rose]). In Algeria, respect for others’ culture and religion has strengthened fundamentalist ideology (chap. 3 [by Mari-Aimee Helie]). Jewish fundamentalism in Israel and in the diaspora is perceived as an empowering movement, given the larger political agenda of such movements (chap. 4 [by Nira Yubal-Davis]).

The second section explores the politics of difference and displays the flaw of cultural relativism. The authors here question the claim that local culture is superior to the global culture (Michael Singer); that a confrontational approach to setting women’s rights against religious rights may be helpful (Christine Chinkin); that cultural relativity means the same thing in the West and the Muslim world (Mahnaz Afkami); and that state religious law could trump women’s international rights (Radhika Coomaraswamy). All of these authors call into question cultural relativism, arguing that it has been used to prevent women’s voices and rights.

The third section tackles the issue of the international legal framework. The role of the state in providing effective legal remedies for women abused under certain laws is crucial (Courtney Howland). In most Islamic countries, including Morocco, Kuwait, Pakistan, and Algeria, the state’s political contingencies—not Islamic beliefs—are the reasons behind reservations that these countries have about entering into the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, or CEDAW (Ann Elizabeth Mayer). Bahia G. Tahzib-Lie argues that international human-rights treaties forbid discrimination on the basis of sex. This means that women have an equal right to freedom of religion or belief. The same argument applies to girls’ right to education under international law (Geraldine Van Bueren and Deirdre Fottrell).

The fourth section deals with the issues that religious fundamentalism poses for national laws. Women’s rights in the context of the rise of the Hindu right in India appear to be connected with the broader political program of cultural nationalism (Ratnar Kapur). The institutionalization of legal inequality for women in Israel is linked to the fact that the state delegates autonomy to different religious groups. This has resulted in patriarchal norms’ being enshrined into law (Frances Raday). In Belgium, the adoption of the choice-of-law rule of domicile (the law of the person’s permanent
place of residence) is an attempt to prevent discrimination against women under the family law of their nationality (Marie-Claire Foblets).

Especially problematic is fundamentalists’ attempt to control women’s bodies, sexuality, and reproduction. The authors in the fifth section deal with this issue. Lynn Freedman argues that fundamentalists co-opt and redeploys the element of “choice” and that the link between reproductive health and social justice is threatened by fundamentalists. Sustaining reproductive freedom and social justice is the key to women’s struggle. Frances Kissling discusses how the Roman Catholic church’s opposition to abortion is caused more from the fear of women than for the purpose of protecting human life, even though its teachings may imply otherwise. To Muslim fundamentalists, Asma M. Abdel Halim writes, women’s sexuality is destructive of society, family, and social norms. The male-centered Buddhist culture and monastic establishment in Thailand, according to Lucinda Joy Peach, provide an atmosphere conducive to the sex trade and trafficking.

The sixth section of the book looks at the alternative remedies and strategies of resistance for women. There is a broad consensus that the most effective way for women to resist fundamentalists is by attaining education. Sakena Yacoobi explains how her establishment of the Afghan Institute of Learning has contributed to women’s educational attainment in refugee camps. Cecile Richards discusses how she formed the Texas Freedom Network, a non-partisan grass-roots organization of religious and community leaders, to provide an alternative to the religious right. Women’s opposition to social religious norms is an expression of political belief, which is a legal reason for gender-based asylum in cases of religious persecution (Paul Nejelski). Women’s resistance in Iran, according to Azar Nafisi, is historically demonstrable by the way in which women have resisted wearing the “veil.”

The book’s final section addresses religious challenges to religious fundamentalism. The authors here provide alternative interpretations to fundamentalist readings and provide their own interpretations. Jewish feminists, Paula Hyman writes, have argued that patriarchy and the resultant subordination of women are not essential parts of Judaism. Hyman, however, fails to point out that all religions have developed in patriarchal settings; they are largely expressed in patriarchal terms; and they are heavily influenced by patriarchal values. Suwanna Satha-Anand discusses Buddha’s allowing of women’s ordination, a fact that could establish the rights of women to religious pre-eminence. Latin American women, Maria José Rosado Nunes points out, have reformulated women’s rights as integrated into collective rights, including social rights and reproductive rights. Criticizing reformers for failing to articulate a theological basis for a secular state, Ghazala Anwar advocates a critical and historical interpretation of the hadith and Qur’an.

The task of textual re-interpretation, although it remains a crucial aspect of challenging religious fundamentalism, is inadequate in and of itself. Ultimately, reform in political economy and legal empowerment of women are imperative. Not all structures of dominance can be uprooted by re-interpretation of the religious texts. Granted that global solidarity among groups, non-governmental organizations, and individuals is an effective strategy against religious fundamentalism, it is also essential to examine politico-economic structures of dominance, both internally and externally. Furthermore, the archaic and fundamentalist application of Islamic law has forced women to resort to international law (e.g., CEDAW) to win their rights. If we seek to end human-rights abuses against women and girls throughout the world, we must develop strategies to counter religious fundamentalisms that are oppressive to women. This requires a multi-faceted campaign and cooperation by activists, policy-makers, and practitioners together, a point not fully elaborated in this volume.

This problem notwithstanding, the book is rich in perspectives and gives insightful overviews of the typical tensions characteristic of modernizing societies. The case studies chosen in this volume are significantly relevant and especially helpful in understanding gender issues in the context of modernization. The book is a valuable effort in outlining conditions necessary for the establishment of cultural and institutional bases for promoting the human rights of women.
Reviews


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We live in an age of clashing interpretations of world religions, not only by scholars but by the faithful themselves. This heated “intra-faith” dialogue has eclipsed the more ecumenical interfaith dialogue of the last century. The widely divergent interpretations of Christianity by evangelical fundamentalists, on the one hand, and the liberal-mainstream, on the other, provide a well-known example for Western observers. What is less recognized is the Islamic equivalent of this debate, which features similar adversaries: Islamists versus Islamic reformers. This crucial battle over the soul and the goal of Islam has raged in every Islamic society from Morocco to Indonesia for the past century. The debate continues, with added urgency, among Muslim immigrant communities in the West, whose opinions filter back to Islamic homelands with ease and speed. It is against this backdrop that the relevance of Abdolaziz Sachedina’s new book can be evaluated. He is a proponent of Islamic reform, and as a widely traveled Muslim scholar and a polyglot he has had the opportunity to encounter alternative visions of Islam on four continents.

Sachedina’s The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism, a timely and meticulous meditation on the affinities of Islam with the values of our complex and diverse global society, unfolds in four chapters and an Epilogue. Establishing the compatibility of the “normative aspects of Islam” as a religion and as a historical and cultural reality with the “pluralistic world order of the twenty first century” (p. 11) is a daunting task, indeed, but the author is well versed in traditional Islamic lore and modern scholarship to face the challenge. Sachedina marshals carefully culled and judiciously assembled theological and historical evidence in defense of a tolerant pluralistic vision of Islam. He aptly characterizes this work as a contribution to an Islamic “theology of inclusiveness.” According to this thesis, the Qur’anic principles of the unity and equality of creation, divinely ordained “mystery” of diversity of religions, and forgiveness and compassion toward all humankind (pp. 23, 103, 109, 119) lead us to a tolerant, humanistic, and pluralistic horizon in Islam. Thus, throughout the book, Sachedina mines rich streaks of textual and historical evidence to articulate a “vocabulary of inter and intra religious understanding” and conduct in Islam (p. 41).

The author hastens to remind the reader that his reading of Islam is not just an academic and theoretical extrapolation but an Islamic trait salient enough to have given rise to remarkable instances of pre-modern pluralistic tolerance, such as the “Millet system” of the Ottoman Empire (p. 101).

What of the historical and textual evidence to the contrary? Sachedina contends that instances of intolerance and suppression of human rights and freedoms in Islam are due to historical contingencies such as ethnic rivalries and the realpolitik of the Islamic empire rather than the inner logic or nature of the teachings of Islam. In Sachedina’s words: “post Koranic” considerations have tended to eclipse the “Koranic provision for a civil society” based on freedom of conscience, tolerance, and acceptance of plurality of the communities of belief (p. 81).

Even those who would argue that the author has had limited success in proving that Islam is, indeed, a tolerant, pluralistic, and democratic religion would have to agree that Sachedina has succeeded in arguing that such an interpretation of Islam is possible—and, indeed, plausible. After all, this is a hermeneutical exercise reminiscent of similar endeavors in Judaism and Christianity that have led to dramatic revision of those religions in the course of the past three centuries. Sachedina and other reform-minded Muslims are attempting to launch a similar project in Islam. The answer to the rather scholastic question of what justifies a selective retrieval of tolerant, forgiving, and pluralistic strains in a sacred tradition in order to make it compatible with the
modern world is that the harsh, intolerant representations of sacred traditions themselves are selective, local, and limited interpretations achieved at the expense of suppressing the forgiving and compassionate aspects of those traditions. Sachedina is keen to demonstrate such instances in the history of Islam (p. 90). On a broader historical and sociological level, the necessity of bold and earnest efforts to reinterpret Islam along democratic, pluralistic, and humanistic themes is beyond question. It is both necessary and desirable to meet the stream of tried and tested ideas of pluralism and democracy from without with innovative reinterpretation of the tradition from within.

From a stylistic point of view, the author’s calm, deliberate, and earnest voice, which explicates fine points of Islamic jurisprudence with the same authority as the ideas of such Western thinkers as Georg Simmel, Martin Buber, and John Rawls, is reassuring to the scholarly reader. The general reader, however, may find the first half of the book tiring and difficult to navigate. Arguments appear as if from beyond a gossamer veil of abstraction and at once removed from the palpable realities the book addresses. This book is not, to use a popular expression, a “page turner.” The reader who perseveres will probably end up wishing that the first two chapters of the book were animated with the same lively and engaging prose that pervades the last two chapters.

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MATTHIJS VAN DEN BOS, Mystic Regimes: Sufism and the State in Iran, from the Late Qajar Era to the Islamic Republic, Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East and Asia, 83 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2002). Pp. 294. $99.00 cloth.

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This book, richly documented and cogently argued, sheds significant light on Sufism as a societal actor in Iran during the 20th century. Its focus on Sufism’s varied configurations under the Pahlavi dynasty and Islamic Republic opens a window—hitherto largely closed—on religion and religion–state relations in Iran. The author, an anthropologist, analyzes social and cultural change in two branches—Sāfī-‘alīshāhī and Sulṭān-‘alīshāhī—of the Shi‘ī Ni‘māt Allāhī order within a tripartite horizon: internally with other Sufis, laterally with jurists or clerics, and vertically with state rulers. Arguing against previous, more static definitions—especially the Corbinist view of Sufism as trans-historical, perennial wisdom, and the Weberian one as protest against political and clerical power—van den Bos convincingly demonstrates the integration of Sufism into changing socio-political circumstances under the patrimonial and traditional rule of the Qajar monarchy (treated, along with methodological concerns, in part 1); the absolutist and royalist rule of the Pahlavi monarchy (part 2); and the absolutist and clericalist rule of the Islamic Republic (part 3).

Building on and greatly adding to previous studies that show Sufism to have played a vital role in Iranian society and state formation since the Safavid dynasty, van den Bos gives us a detailed and comprehensive treatment within the nationalist period, in which Iranian Sufism has had to adapt to nationalist absolutism, whether royalist (i.e., Pahlavi, 1921–79) or clericalist (i.e., Islamic, 1979–). The author’s analysis suggests that it is no longer enough to view Iranian Sufism as opposition and dissent under a clerical or clerically aligned regime, or as support and rapprochement under a monarchy pressing its own claims to rule. Sufism—with its dual emphasis on explicit and implicit religiosity—can accommodate and reflect both clerical and monarchical notions of religious authority—that is, vilāyat-i faqīh and farr-i ḵādī, respectively—while generating its own specific claims to authority through the prestige of shaykh and qutb as heir to and representative of the Shi‘ī imam.
Indeed, antagonism toward Sufism cannot be explained merely in terms of clerical ascendance; it must also account for clerical self-understanding and socio-political circumstances. The absence of centralized rule under the Qajars allowed both Sufis and clerics “autonomous local influence” (p. 54), and it was only with the re-assertion of clerical claims to an exclusivist religious authority—epitomized in the victory of the Usuli over the Akhbari school—that Sufi orders and Qajar rulers related symbiotically. In contrast, Khomeini’s ideological definition of clerical authority as the basis of national identity and political rule reduced Sufi orders, like all other groups, to extensions rather than co-existent of the state.

Equally true are the subtleties of Iranian Sufism in relation to monarchy. While identification with Qajar rulers effected little change in Sufism, the Pahlavi drive to modernize Iran contributed greatly to both the suppression of the arcane and antinomian elements of Sufism and its association with intellectual modernism. While Sufism elsewhere has been similarly reshaped by modernity and the modern state (e.g., Egypt), modernization in Iran nearly obliterated Sufi identity itself, especially in the case of the Safi-alishahi order, whose play to freemasonry and bureaucratized structure—in addition to its close ties to Pahlavi patronage and politics and its coupling with the Society of Brotherhood—effectively did away with traditional forms of tariqa coherence in favor of an elective principle of decision-making. In contrast, the Sultan-alishahi order, despite one attempt to redefine Sufism as “a modern scientific enterprise” (p. 84) instead of a shaykh-mediated mystical initiation, was able to maintain a genealogical line of hierarchical leadership, define clear rules of a modernized Sufi identity (e.g., Pand-i sālīh [p. 89]), and discourage political involvement if religious matters were not at stake.

By highlighting the diverse ways in which Sufism is configured in response to the state, this book will contribute to the comparative study of Sufi–state relations in the Middle East and Asia. For example, the responses of the two Ni’mat Allahi branches to Pahlavi rule may represent broader dynamics within Sufism: Safi-alishahi affinity with absolutist rule as an embodiment of divine power vested in the physical person of the ruler (cf. Syria), and Sultan-alishahi quietism that transforms into cautious activism only when a modernizing agenda transgresses the boundaries of religious conscience (cf. Turkey and Soviet Central Asia).

Sultan-alishahi adaptability to Khomeini’s absolutist and clericalist rule is evidence of Sufism’s ability to exist alongside even the utopian and revolutionary politics of Islamic fundamentalism (cf. Sufi alignments with the Muslim Brotherhood in pre-1982 Syria). Is this ability merely chance of circumstance and previous affiliation or another example of the resources of Sufi stratagem? While Safi-alishahi identification with Pahlavi royalty reduced the order to internal bickering and a ceremonial existence with little Sufi content under Khomeini, Sultan-alishahi re-alignment with clerical rule allowed it to maintain a viable Sufi identity, even if it was in the image of the Islamic Revolution. It was this survival tactic—the long-standing Sufi willingness to compromise on externals—that set the stage for a partial return of Sufism in post–Khomeini Iran. The state’s promotion of a post-revolutionary ideology, which includes mysticism, has enabled Sufi orders—especially the Sultan-alishahi—to reassert the prestige and authority of tariqa mysticism apart from both clerical authority and state-sponsored mysticism (‘irfān), even if it continues to emphasize the coherence of shari’a and tariqa. For its part, the Safi-alishahi order took the opportunity to reassert its particular identity by obtaining a copy of the tafsīr of Safi-alishah (d. 1899) from one of his granddaughters in 1995.

If, as the author has clearly demonstrated, Sufism can adapt to the demands of state, it is not clear where Sufism’s own vision is to be located in this process. Is Sufism nothing more than a strategy for survival and prestige that reacts to the state, or does it have its own goals as a societal actor? Van den Bos does argue in part 4 that the “hidden” concerns of Sufism are essential to its ability to contribute, even if in a limited fashion, to civil society. But does Sufism negotiate and re-negotiate its identity and existence vis-à-vis other societal actors for the sake of an institutional presence alone (i.e., the mystic regime) or for the realization of goals (e.g., preservation and
promotion of the human experience of the divine apart from political and clerical regulation that require a viable institutional presence)? Is Sufism’s strong emphasis on mystical companionship understood simply as the service of cronyism—that is, preservation of the mystic regime—or is it understood by Sufis themselves as a moral force generating charitable participation in social and national welfare? And if alignment with religious nationalism—whether royalist or clericalist—has been a distinguishing feature of Iranian Sufism in the 20th century, is it more suitable to analyze Sufism within a larger framework of national identity than the framework of state formation? Such questions, which this work neither intends to treat fully nor neglects entirely, are, however, raised by its very admirable treatment of a long “hidden” dimension of Iranian religious nationalism. For that reason alone, this book will be welcomed by specialists in the study of both contemporary Iran and contemporary Sufism and will shape future research on Sufism and politics in Iran.

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This new book on Islam is definitely not part of the genre of literature written in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States that has sought to exploit an emerging mass market. On the contrary, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam represents one of the most significant contributions to our understanding of the dynamics of power and change within contemporary Muslim societies. It challenges conventional wisdom that portrays the traditional authority within Muslim society as anachronistic and oblivious to the rapid transformations wrought by modernity. Its central thesis is that the ulema have astutely negotiated and subtly re-articulated the millennium-old tradition of Islamic learning with the “reflexivity of modernity” (i.e., the need to constantly adapt existing forms of knowledge, institutions, and social relations to relentless flows of information), such that they now occupy an enlarged role within the public sphere (p. 1).

Zaman not only draws on the best of modern scholarship on religious studies and contemporary Muslim societies. He has also enriched his well-balanced and thorough study by consulting many primary Urdu and Arabic texts written by the key ulema figures whose lives, activities, and thought he focuses on.

The book comprises an Introduction, six chapters, and an Epilogue. In the Introduction, Zaman carefully lays out his theoretical approach. He critically engages cutting-edge scholarship on the contemporary role of religion in public life. He draws on the nuanced theoretical insights of scholars such as Barbara Metcalf, William Graham, Alisdair MacIntire, and Talal Asad in illuminating the critical concepts of “tradition and modernity.” Building on Asad’s proposition that Islam in general ought to be approached as a “discursive tradition,” the author makes a case for approaching particular aspects of the Islamic tradition, such as the shari’a, Islamic historiography, and institutionalized Sufism, as discursive traditions in themselves (p. 9). He contends that it is the ulema who not only self-consciously represent these multiple discursive Islamic traditions but who also skillfully negotiate and re-articulate its veracity in the face of unprecedented ruptures wrought by the “reflexivity of modernity.” Explicating the complex nature of this process and illuminating the intricate changes within the framework of the traditional Islamic discourses it evokes is the subject of Zaman’s book.
Chapter 1 investigates the South Asian ulema’s responses to the challenge of colonial India. Chapters 2 and 3 illustrate the creative ways in which the ulema began to reassert their religious authority in the face of encroachments made possible by the onset of print technology. Zaman argues that the ulema rapidly adapted to the technology of print and, through discursive commentaries on classical madrasa texts, began to re-establish their traditional authority.

Chapter 4 usefully illustrates how the ulema’s conception of an Islamic state differs from that of the Islamists. Non-specialist scholars—and every so often, even Islamicists—neglect this important nuance. As a consequence, analysts and policy-makers are invariably unable to fully appreciate and understand the internal diversity of contemporary Muslim movements.

Chapter 5 demonstrates how in the last decades of the 20th century, in response to the reconfiguration of the social, political, and religious landscape at the local and transnational level, the ulema in Pakistan began to take on a more radicalized political role. Zaman correctly identifies most of the important factors: the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and Pakistan’s active support for the Afghan jihad against the Soviet occupation. An obvious oversight here, however, is the impact that Islamist movements or Jama’at-i-Islami, had on the ulema’s new radical political stance. This oversight reveals a lot about Zaman’s own bias. In trying to write a compensatory account of developments within contemporary Muslim societies, Zaman has perhaps tried too hard to downplay the wide-scale impact of Islamist movements on all aspects of Muslim societies, including the ulema. The same fault line is evident in studies of the role of the Shi’i ulema in the Iranian Revolution. To what extent Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionizing of the quietist Shi’i theology was a direct response to the sharp critiques and reinterpretation of Shi’i theology by non-ulema Islamic intellectuals (such as the influential Iranian sociologist Ali Shari’ati) is a question that has yet to be fully explored (though the impact of Islamist ideology on the public role of the ulema is discussed, for example, in Abdul Kader Tayob’s Islamic Resurgence in South Africa: The Muslim Youth Movement [Cape Town: UCT Press, 1995]).

Ironically, the major weakness of The Ulama in Contemporary Islam is related to its strength. Its author dedicates the entire sixth chapter to providing his readers with a comparative perspective of the dynamics of change within the ulema of South Asia and that of Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the southern Philippines. In making the South Asian ulema the major focus of his study, Zaman has wisely drawn on his expertise in the Urdu language and intimate knowledge of the inner dynamics of the long-standing South Asian madrasa system of Islamic learning. His fine-grained analysis of the sectarianism on which the South Asian ulema’s new political role is predicated is unparalleled. Needless to say, the same detailed analysis is absent in his account of the ulema from the non–South Asian contexts. The book would have benefited from a more thorough comparison with ulema outside of the South Asian context. Nevertheless, Zaman has opened the way for scholars with greater expertise in these contexts and languages to confirm or contest his findings through similar thick descriptive studies.

The Ulama in Contemporary Islam caters primarily to an academic audience. The non-specialist may find the book’s technical terms and subtle discourse heavy going. The language is lucid, but the author has a penchant for trying to do too many things in one sentence. Moreover, time and again the lengthy sentences commence with “yet.” This, combined with a few other glaring grammatical errors, such as “which is emphasizes” (p. 11), clearly suggests that the book might have benefited from more careful editing. Readers will, however, find the carefully constructed glossary useful in understanding traditional vocabulary and concepts. The book is richly annotated and has a useful index and an extensive bibliography that expose the reader to most, if not all, of the most influential contemporary studies on religion and Muslim society. The book fills an important gap within existing research on contemporary Islam and is essential reading for anyone interested in understanding the dynamics of change and authority structures within Muslim societies.
This modest volume by a long-time ethnographer of Kufr al-Ma, a village in Jordan, will serve lower-division college classes with a non-confrontational and comparative way into some of the issues surrounding contemporary fundamentalisms. Antoun uses “fundamentalism” in the singular as an “ideal type” constructed of six characteristics (scripturalism, “traditioning,” selective modernization, totalism, cosmic struggle of good and evil, activism) not applicable to any individual or in toto to any group. This has advantages and disadvantages. The advantages are that Christian, Jewish, and Muslim fundamentalisms can be seen against a common repertoire of strategies yet as responding to distinctive historical contexts: the Holocaust for Jews, colonialism for Muslims, positivist science and secularism for Christians. “The aim,” says Antoun, is “to bring out the commonalties in thought and action, belief and practice” (p. xi). The disadvantages are that one gets a typology of groups and strategies without much in depth socio-historical analysis or transnational connectivities or any other conclusion than a genial—but very important—ecumenicism.

Insofar as there is an explanation of why fundamentalisms should have arisen at the end of the 20th century, Antoun relies on Bruce Lawrence’s definition of the “ideology of modernism” (valuing change, quantity, and commerce) and sees fundamentalism as protest and outrage against modernism, often by well-educated leaders and laity. The chapter on scripturalism is in many ways the best. Antoun stresses not only the emotional worlds built by the selective use of proof texts, but (quoting Marty and Appleby’s edited volumes on fundamentalism) the “scandalous character” of much fundamentalism: practices or beliefs, chosen deliberately, emphasized only recently, precisely to challenge “enlightened” or “sophisticated” secular common sense. The comparative approach may help students to see fundamentalisms as parts of rich ecologies of religious forms. The implications, however, are not drawn out for civil society. Is dialogue acted out only through non-negotiable symbolic violence, withdrawal into communities of the pure, and militancy? Here the interesting legal, political, and media mobilization of American Christian, and Jewish Israeli, fundamentalists could be used for striking comparison with Hindu fundamentalists in India and Muslim fundamentalists in Turkey, Iran, and elsewhere.

Antoun briefly draws attention to Mark Juergensmeyer’s observation that much religious imagery is symbolically violent, and “actual commission of religious violence . . . is also deliberately symbolically violent . . . dramatic, often shocking, and designed ‘to elicit feelings of revulsion and anger,’ involving notions of sacrifice and war in the cosmic struggle between absolute good and evil” (p. 104). Most of Antoun’s cases of violence involve minority groups against majorities in their own tradition or secular modern society, not against other religions. There is discussion of the biblical imagery of the Boer covenant and wars but not of Christian missionary activity that has provoked violence in the Islamic and Hindu worlds, or Hindu–Muslim communal violence in India, the campaigns against the Fulang Gong in China, or cult formation in Japan. Indeed, there is something odd about yet another book claiming universal “ideal types” that overlooks expertise and examples from India, China, and Southeast Asia, particularly for an American classroom that nowadays will include many Buddhists, Hindus, Jains, Sikhs, and African New Christian churches.

Antoun says that his paternal grandfather was “religiously unmusical”; his maternal grandfather was atheist but married to a believer in the Melkite rite; that he himself was raised Methodist but learned nothing of religion; that he participated in Quaker, Lutheran, and Unitarian churches and recently married a Reform Jew. His main religious education was in Kufr al-Ma: the imam dictated sermons slowly to him so he could understand and transcribe them. He attributes his interest in
religion to his lack of real religious education as a youngster, and he comes by his ecumenicism honestly.

“Religious musicality” could bear development. Bonhoeffer, the Christian leader against the Nazis, credited African American congregational prayer, sermons, and gospel singing with a profound tuning of his religiosity. Were his and Adam Clayton Powell’s fundamentalisms mere diatribe against modernism or, rather, constructive contributions to a modernist mosaic? Note also: the fundamentalists Antoun has indirectly encountered in Kufr al-Ma since 1986 are the moderate South Asian Tabliqat-i Islami. They are not Hamas; the Muslim Brothers; Hezbollah; Wahhabis; Saudi money for mosques, madrasas, or Muslim student organizations; or any of the other recent newsmakers. Since 1986, youths have worried that Antoun was polluting their mosque and have tried to convert him; the causes are left unexplored. Antoun says that we need to know about his background to evaluate the book he has written, and the pieces do seem to fit together.

Antoun says he is more interested in popular religion, in what ordinary people do and believe, than in state- or national-level religion. The term “hizb” (party) was, in Kufr al-Ma, pejorative. The village ethos promoted consensus and eschewed political discourse. Thus, although we get statistics of militant fundamentalisms and violence (by country in Algeria, Egypt, and Turkey), and a sketch of Hamas (but no account of its growth in West Bank universities such as Bir Zeit), we learn little about religion and politics. By focusing on Kach (Baruch Goldstein, Meir Kahane), the haredim, and the Lubavitchers, he gives a bit of understanding of fundamentalism vis-à-vis the State of Israel. By some accounts (not Antoun’s), the most serious looming political conflict for Israel is religious versus non-religious more than Palestinian versus Israeli or Sephardi versus Ashkenazi. (Antoun does not mention Sephardi fundamentalists; they do not fit his account of Yiddish insistence, but they, too, are key in Israeli politics.) There is a passing reference to Hammond’s thesis that American Christian fundamentalisms today are a nativist phase of periodic Great Awakenings (what Anthony Wallace taught anthropologists to call “re-vitalization movements”), but there are no references to similar accounts of longer historical formations in which Muslim fundamentalisms arise. Antoun’s account of the Iranian Revolution, for instance, relies heavily on his student Mary Hegland’s dissertation in a village near Shiraz and the popular writings of Karen Armstrong, avoiding much of the growing literature on Iran.

Quibbles aside, this is a straightforwardly written, mature piece of comparative reflection that can be a useful teaching tool. A complementary book with a more cultural-ecumenical approach to the intertwined histories of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism contesting over Jerusalem, is Kanan Makiya’s The Rock (2001), a collection of histories and stories about the Dome of the Rock in the narrative voice of Ishaq ibn K‘ab, son of Islam’s first important Jewish convert. The two books together might make a challenging exercise as starters in methodological approaches for upper-division and graduate-level seminars. But that is a different review.