Optimality Theory (OT) has been a major force driving developments in formal linguistics during the past decade. Like parameter-setting accounts, OT seeks to describe the range within which languages can vary; but instead of fixing parameters, OT proposes that languages, and children learning languages, arrange a set of constraints in a hierarchical order of strength that determines specific linguistic characteristics. The constraints proposed by OT are constraints on the well-formedness of the output of a grammar, and they are of two types: (i) markedness constraints, which exert pressure toward unmarked types of structure such as CV syllables or voiceless final obstruents; and (ii) faithfulness constraints, which maintain lexical contrasts such as CV and CVC syllable types, or voicing distinctions in final obstruents. The two types of constraints are in conflict, so that no particular constraint can be satisfied without violating others. In OT, “satisfaction” and “violation” are not absolute but a matter of degree, because all constraints play a role in the grammar of each language, though in a different order of strength or priority within a dominance hierarchy.

For example, a markedness constraint disfavoring the occurrence of voiced obstruents in final position would have a very high ranking in Cantonese, where final voiced obstruents do not occur at all in the phonological system; a high ranking in German, where obstruents represented in the phonological (and orthographic) system as voiced (alternating with voiced variants in prevocalic and preconsonantal (cluster) positions) are virtually always devoiced in final position; a somewhat lower ranking in African Vernacular English, which like German tends to devoice final stops, though more variably; and a lower ranking still
in other varieties of English, where final obstruents show a tendency to devoicing, but generally to a lesser degree and even more variably. These tendencies are balanced in different languages or varieties by variable tendencies to preserve surface contrasts. In OT terms, a faithfulness constraint maintaining voicing contrast in final position would be ranked higher in English than in German.

On first sight, the sociolinguist may be tempted to dismiss OT as one in a line of formalist theories that can safely be ignored by those working in “real-language” linguistics. It is, however, worth knowing about the impact OT is having in formal linguistics, where it has sparked debates about the adequacy of universalist accounts of language, the nature of linguistic theory and its accountability to language-specific phenomena, and the functional basis of language. Debates about OT shade into discussions of the context in which language is used and acquired, and the points and modes of connection between an internally represented grammar and the external world. In addition, much of the discussion surrounding OT has involved attempts to handle the facts of language variation and language change within linguistic theory – issues that have also been uppermost in the minds of variationist sociolinguists such as William Labov and those influenced by him. (See Labov 1994, 2001 for the most comprehensive treatment of these facts to date, and Guy 1997a,b for discussion of OT within the context of variationist sociolinguistics.) Among many who would still count themselves as formalists, the working out of constraint theory has thereby moved the terms of discussion closer to the concerns of sociolinguists.

OT was first developed in phonology and morphology, with key early works being Prince & Smolensky 1993 and McCarthy & Prince 1994. Three important recent works are April McMahon’s *Change, chance, and Optimality*, René Kager’s *Optimality Theory*, and Bruce Tesar and Paul Smolensky’s *Learnability in Optimality Theory*. Following a brief introduction to the coverage in each book, we review the main issues raised and the answers given in these three volumes on OT, focusing on issues of language variation, language acquisition, and language change in regard to phonology.

McMahon’s book is a critical review of OT phonology. Her orientation includes work in historical linguistics, which gives her a particular interest in language change and evolution, and in Lexical Phonology (Kiparsky 1982), an approach similar to OT in several respects, though it differs in being rule-based and multilevel (i.e., with derivational “depth”) rather than constraint-based and surface-level (i.e., without derivational “depth”). McMahon is skeptical of the claim that universal constraints will suffice to cover the range of actual language-specific data without the inclusion of parochial rules, and she finds fault with a number of the particular constraints and mechanisms regulating these that have been proposed in the OT literature. She is especially skeptical about a constraint-based account of language acquisition and language change.

Kager’s book provides a comprehensive overview of OT theory and practice, focused on phonology but with a chapter devoted to syntax. It is noteworthy for
its attention to detail and its analysis of arguments against the theory from the point of view of one who works in OT. Tesar & Smolensky address the implications of OT for language acquisition and learnability. Tesar & Smolensky argue that OT “provides sufficient structure at the level of the grammatical framework itself to allow general but grammatically informed learning algorithms to be formally defined” (2000: 15). The significance of Tesar & Smolensky’s work is the small number of informative examples that are needed to acquire the target grammar (a specific ranking of constraints) relative to the number of possible grammars (the set of all possible constraint rankings).

McMahon raises many questions about the nature and universality of OT constraints, highlighting variation and lexical (or morpheme) alternants as being outside the scope of OT constraint mechanisms. In her view, “OT, in attempting to confront the universal component of phonological behaviour is in danger of failing to cope with the language-specific part” (p. 10). McMahon argues that many of the supposedly universal constraints that have been proposed in OT phonology are in fact language-particular and are thus better handled by phonological rules, as in Blevins’s (1997) proposals combining constraints and rules to account for alternations involving word-final /r/ (e.g., Cuba(r)/draw(r)ing) in English as spoken in eastern Massachusetts.

As reviewed by Kager, recent versions of OT propose a variety of extensions or alterations to the theory for dealing with specific cases involving variation, alternations, and irregular phenomena of various sorts, by means of constraints. These include such mechanisms as local conjunction of two or more constraints to take care of such phenomena as chain shifts; “sympathy” of one form for another to account for cyclic phonology–morphology interactions and opacity; co-phonologies, in which the grammar is split “into multiple constraint hierarchies . . . each of which selects its own optimal candidate by its own ranking” (Kager 1999:405); and probabilistic constraint interaction, based on degree of dominance rather than strict dominance, as has been developed in functionally oriented OT phonology (Boersma & Hayes 2001) and syntax (Asudeh 2001). These proposals are not without problems, but they are also not without promise, and all make advances in the types of phenomena OT can handle (see Kager 1999, especially the final chapter, for discussion). However, one can argue – as McMahon does – that they fundamentally alter OT in ways that challenge its claims to universality and superiority to rule-based accounts.

As a different sort of argument against OT, McMahon contends that the number of constraints proposed in some versions is counterintuitive and unworkably large, as in accounts that explode general constraints into several more specific constraints (e.g., the Obligatory Contour Principle, or OCP, into feature-specific OCP-cor, OCP-son, OCP-cont, etc.). McMahon argues that positing constraint families involves “introducing extreme complexity, and perhaps making acquisition impossible” (112). She offers no specific proof, however, of an upper limit on the size or complexity of an OT constraint system that would be learnable.
(e.g., by a particular approach such as Tesar & Smolensky’s procedures involving Robust Interpretive Parsing and Constraint Demotion; see below), nor proof of any greater processing demands in an OT-type constraint-system than in a rule-based system.

McMahon further claims that explanations internal to OT (e.g., constraint reranking) do not suffice at the level of sound change, and that reranking at best describes rather than explains sound change. McMahon does not believe that constraint reranking can even describe the synchronic aftermath of all cases of sound change – at least, not without extra mechanisms such as “sympathy.” McMahon sees the modeling of sound change as a fundamental problem for OT and an issue for any phonological theory, as Labov 1994, 2001 also recognizes in his detailed discussion of internal and social factors affecting phonological systems.1

As an additional challenge to an OT account of language change, McMahon asks whether change motivates reranking or, conversely, whether reranking motivates change. This question must be grappled with if one claims that a particular phonological or syntactic outcome has an internal explanation, constituting a response to particular constraints in the grammar. However, McMahon’s question can be avoided by viewing reranking as a consequence of the disruption or failure in transmission across time of a certain constraint ranking or rankings (Kroch 2000). Many factors can affect transmission (see Labov 2001 for extensive discussion of factors affecting transmission in the context of phonological change) and therefore cause reranking, such as social factors, memory limitations, and parsing preferences. Kiparsky 1996, for example, argues that the historical change in word order of OV → VO in Old English was caused by both the attrition of OV order in subordinate clauses and a parsing preference for uniform head-complement order.

In regard to language acquisition, McMahon makes the following observation:

One might initially imagine acquisition to be less of a concern for OT than for most theories of phonology, since the more we assume to be innate, the less needs to be learned. However, even if we accept the strongest possible version of universalism within OT, with absolutely all constraints seen as innate, two major tasks still confront the language learner: ranking the constraints, and internalizing the lexicon. (52)

McMahon is skeptical about children’s ability to learn constraint rankings and believes that “imperfect learning” is not compatible with the Tesar-Smolensky (1998) learning algorithm (100). At the same time, she comments that “[i]t is impossible to evaluate acquisition under OT fully at present: issues of constraint ranking cannot be resolved in the current state of indecision about the types of constraints and interactions permitted” (56). Kager 1999 is more optimistic, believing that the effectiveness of Tesar & Smolensky’s (1993, 1998) learning algorithm for learning constraint rankings, “as long as the input data are consistent”
Kager expresses some concerns about other aspects of learning an OT grammar, notably the assumption – made in Tesar & Smolensky’s (1993, 1998) learning algorithm –

that the learner has already mastered the lexicon, including the correct underlying representations for each morpheme. . . . In ‘real-life’ language acquisition, underlying forms are hypothetical and have to be inferred from combined analytic assumptions about the output and the constraint hierarchy. Of course this problem is not unique to OT – in fact every theory of phonology which assumes that contextual alternants of a morpheme derive from a single underlying form is faced with it. (322–3)

Kager suggests resolving this problem by extending the algorithm to incorporate iterative learning, as discussed by Tesar 1996. Kager (section 7.5) illustrates how iterative learning, which involves repeated testing and revision of hypotheses about the match between the output’s representation and the constraint ranking, makes it possible to discover “alternations in the shape of morphemes” (324).

The version of the learning algorithm presented and tested in Tesar & Smolensky 2000 incorporates some significant changes from the original 1993 version, especially iterative learning. This mechanism is built into the algorithm as Robust Interpretive Parsing and Paradigmatic Lexicon Optimization. Robust Interpretive Parsing assigns a structural description (e.g., a grouping of syllables with their stress levels into feet) to an overt (“candidate”) form (e.g., a string of syllables with their stress levels) that has been generated by the grammar. The algorithm makes an assignment even when there is no description matching the overt form that is grammatical (well-formed or optimal for its underlying form) according to the current ranking of constraints. Tesar & Smolensky (2000:77–83) address the issue of how the child learns morpheme alternants via the mechanism of Paradigmatic Lexicon Optimization, which operates at the level of the morphological paradigm, selecting the underlying form of a morpheme that yields the correct surface forms and the most optimal paradigm. Another procedure, Constraint Demotion, operates by demoting constraints that disfavor occurring or best candidates so that they are dominated by constraints that disfavor nonoccurring forms generated as output of the grammar.

Tesar and Smolensky 2000 present simulation results of their learning algorithm as applied to an OT theory of metrical stress in a system of 12 constraints. The hypothesis space of total constraint rankings is 12! (12 factorial), or 479,001,600 total rankings. They show that this enormous hypothesis space is successfully navigated by their algorithm in an average of seven learning steps (i.e., constraint demotions). In general, then, the majority of languages learned were learned in fewer learning steps than the number of constraints (Tesar & Smolensky 2000:70–71).
Tesar & Smolensky’s learning algorithm offers evidence to counter McMa-
hon’s claims of unlearnability because it shows how children might learn con-
straint rankings. Different external factors will determine what comprise the child’s
trigger experiences. For example, memory limitations and parsing preferences
may influence the variability of word orders that a child learns (Kirby 1999).
Evidence of so-called imperfect learning is thus not an argument against Tesar &
Smolensky’s algorithm.2

Kager raises several issues regarding the reliance on underlying representa-
tions in OT, speaking of the possibility of eliminating these “in favor of an ‘allo-
morphic’ model” (420) and noting that “allomorphy may also offer an alternative
account of opacity, a phenomenon for which current OT has no genuinely surface-
based analysis” (420).3 Given the derivational underpinnings of all types of gen-
erative phonology, the elimination of underlying forms from OT constitutes a
break with the traditions from which OT evolved. Clearly, this and other sug-
gested changes – including proposed “hybrids” of OT and Lexical Phonology4 –
alter the original “orthodox” version of OT in ways that address problems ident-
ified by OT’s critics, including McMahon. These developments and the continu-
ing debate surrounding them illustrate the rapidly shifting landscape and high
level of activity that characterize current work in phonology in the attempt to
account for the complex patterns of occurring forms within the context of lan-
guage learning and language change.

NOTES

1 Even if they are excluded in principle from any formalization of phonology as an autonomous
system, there is no obvious a priori reason that social factors (e.g., of the types Labov 2001 describes
as motivating language variation and change in phonological systems) cannot be incorporated into
linguistic theory in a systematic way (Pennington, forthcoming). Bender 2000 argues that sociolin-
guistic factors that influence variability should be treated as part of language competence and offers
some proposals (chap. 6) for incorporating social meaning into this competence by “associating social
value with signs” (289).

2 One might also question the notion of “imperfect learning” as applied to children, who are in fact
highly competent and robust learners, and in general as applied to the explanation of language change
(for discussion, see Yang 2000:237).

3 Flemming (1995) argues that a satisfactory account of surface contrasts and alternations utilizes
constraints that operate exclusively on surface representations. This type of account, involving sur-
face contrasts and comparison of output forms (i.e., “output-output” correspondence, as in the original version of OT), leaves no role for underlying representations.

4 Kiparsky 2000, for example, presents an OT version of Lexical Phonology and Morphology in
which stems, words, and sentences are subject to separate stratified constraint systems.

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Most of us content ourselves with passing on our alphabetical literacy to others all the while extolling the virtues of both the alphabet and of literacy; but Roy Harris, Emeritus Professor of Linguistics of Oxford University, sets out to chal-
lenge our fundamental (mis)conceptions about writing. Rather than extol the virtues of the alphabet, he threatens to reveal the “tyranny of the alphabet.” Arguing about literacy, he says, is likely to be unproductive until writing itself is better understood.

Harris shows that the standard view of writing and literacy got off on the wrong foot, for two reasons. First, evolutionary theories of writing put the alphabet at the pinnacle of the evolution of writing systems. The alphabet was the first system that could, by means of a small set of characters, capture and represent the ultimate, basic building blocks of speech – the phonemes. Alphabets, that is, are visual signs for the phonemes of speech. Other writing systems, such as the Chinese or the Mayan, are only rough first steps toward capturing these basic elements. Second, at the hands of linguists from Aristotle to Saussure to Bloomfield, writing was seen as the handmaiden to speech – not language, but a representation or transcription of language. It was a record of speech, not a system of communication. Both assumptions need to be challenged.

Harris points out that alphabets are only one of many types of notational systems or scripts that can serve communicative purposes. There is no essential connection between writing and speech, nor between letters and phonemes. The peculiar nature of the alphabet – its relation to the phonological properties of speech – is just one example of the integration of different symbol systems through such practices as dictation and reading aloud, which “lead participants to treat these as alternative or correlative forms of linguistic expression” (211). That is, because of such practices as oral reading and dictation, people come to see the written form as a representation or transcription of what they actually say. Other uses or forms of writing, such as stop signs or signal lights, can be employed and obeyed without any such translation into speech. The link to speech, then, is contingent rather than essential.

Even written texts bear only an indirect relation to what people normally say or the way they say it. Written texts lead a kind of life of their own while building up lexicons, grammatical rule books, literary genres, and the like. These evolved forms then come to be taken as ideal models for speaking. “Speak grammatically!” I say to my children, much to the annoyance of the linguists who insist that incorrect grammar is an impossibility. But in doing so, I – like the grammar and composition teachers they encounter in school – am teaching them the properties of the formal, schooled variety or register essential to functioning in the institutions of a literate bureaucratic society. Ways of writing thus come to be taken as models for speaking, rather than the reverse.

The tyranny of the alphabet, Harris proposes, comes not only from our naive assumptions about how an alphabet works but also from the fact – a fact that Harris does much to establish through a critical analysis of Saussure – that written models provide the categories we use to think about our speech, and in particular the phonology, rather than speech providing the model for writing. It is tempting to assume, as do most pedagogues, that the phonemes of the language are already
known by any speaker of the language, that they constitute a small set (some-
where between 20 and 40), and that in learning to read, children attach visual
signs to those phonemes. Not so, Harris argues. Rather, it is the alphabet that
offers the finite inventory, which has evolved to serve a variety of purposes,
including reading aloud and recovering meanings; speech is then analyzed – that
is, reheard – in terms of those categories. Consequently, there is no simple map-
ning between putative units of sound and the letters of the alphabet. Harris cites
Fred Householder’s Linguistic speculations (1971) as showing that the rules that
relate the pronunciation of words to their spellings are much more complicated
than those relating spelling to pronunciation, indicating an ambiguity in phonol-
ogical structure that is absent in the spelling system. Further, not all of the visual
marks indicate phonetic values. Harris mentions the differences between the names
“Mr. White” and “Mr. Whyte,” which, although they sound the same are in fact
different names, and the capitalization of letters, which, although they do not
distinguish phonetic values, do indicate something about the meaning.

Harris seeks to account for the essential autonomy of writing systems – that is,
the possibility of using visible marks to convey any sort of meaning – within his
“integrationist” theory of language, a theory that subordinates the structural prop-
erties of both speech and writing to the exigencies of communication. The rela-
tion between speech and writing is only one of the many possible uses of writing.
We can use whatever devices are at our disposal, as long as they allow us to
cooperate in joint enterprises. Harris sees no primacy of speech over writing,
contrary to the urging of writers since Aristotle, who held that writing is little
more than a cipher of speech. But while such linguists are denying a significant
role to writing, they are (no less than the rest of us) thinking about and analyzing
speech in terms of the categories offered by the alphabetic writing system. That is
the real tyranny of the alphabet. An integrationist would take all such categoriz-
ing as contingent and contextual, rather than as a direct account of the intrinsic
properties of speech.

Once freed from the constraints of thinking about writing as mere transcription
of speech, Harris is free to embrace the equally important question of how
writing systems are related to cognitive and cultural change. He writes that, even
though there is no simple link between writing and civilization, writing has had a
lasting impact on the evolution of human culture, for good or evil, through lead-
ing people to think about language in a new way: as a technology subject to
design, and as an analyzable object of consciousness.

The book is not an easy read. A good deal of conjecture has gone into my
simple précis of the central argument of the book. After some 100 pages of talk
about signifiant and signifié and of the importance of a semiological theory of
the written sign, I felt more beleaguered than enlightened. As long as Saussure’s
comments on writing are taken as the starting point, as they are by Harris, perhaps
such concepts are essential. I would prefer a more Fregean vocabulary of sense,
meaning, reference, concept, idea, sign, and the like (cf. Olson 1994).
Harris, along with a small group of contemporary linguists including Sampson and Coulmas, has brought writing back under the microscope. He not only provides some important insights about how writing works but also alerts us to how our familiarity with writing leads us to view language in a distorted way. His goal is to clear up the distortions, not to reduce writing to a mere copy of speech.

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JÜRGEN BOHNEMEYER

The past decade has seen a remarkable resurgence of interest in the possible influences of language on “thought” – that is, relativism, the “Whorf Theory Complex” (cf. Lee 1996), or the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis (LRH). On the occasion of the Whorf centenary in 1997, a number of international conferences, workshops, and symposia were dedicated to the topic. This volume presents a collection of papers from the 26th International LAUD Symposium held at Gerhard Mercator University in Duisburg, Germany, April 1–5, 1998, under the title “Humboldt and Whorf Revisited: Universal and Culture-Specific Conceptualizations in Grammar and Lexis.”

The contributions can be grouped broadly according to three topics (though individual contributions may address multiple topics). Articles by E. F. K. Korner, J. Trabant, and P. Lee deal with Whorf’s precursors, the tradition in which he developed his ideas, and the actual formulation of these ideas in his writings. This is useful reference work, since the literature on the LRH is replete with vague references to Humboldt, Boas, Sapir, and of course Whorf himself, too often without laying out what these authors actually said. Further essays trace the impact of Whorf’s writings on translation theory (J. House) and the recent movement known as Ecological Linguistics (P. Mühlhäusler).

Other articles address theoretical perspectives on relativism. They argue, for instance, that the LRH is a plausible or necessary consequence of a particular view of the evolution of human cognition (P. R. Hays), a particular theory of brain architecture and neuronal connectivity (S. M. Lamb), or a particular approach to the nature of linguistic meaning (W. Chafe). Papers by P. Lee and N. J.
Enfield focus on differences between two theoretical and methodological interpretations of relativism (to be discussed shortly).

Finally, a number of contributions present case studies speaking to various aspects of relativism. G. B. Palmer & C. Woodman discuss the extension of a noun class in the Bantu language Shona in view of culture-specific conceptualizations. B. W. Hawkins analyzes the media coverage of a crime and subsequent trial, arguing for relativism in the way the use of metaphors and linguistic image schemata influenced public opinion. L. I. Thornburg and K.-U. Panther discuss “subject-incorporation” in English – which occurs with intransitive bases (snow fall, nose bleed) much more regularly than with transitive bases (e.g., in fox hunt, fox cannot be understood as corresponding to the subject of hunt) – as an instance of a Whorfian “cryptotype” (a “covert” ergative pattern in English). M. Zhou addresses the role of “metalinguistic awareness” (e.g., awareness of homophones) in cultural practices among the various Chinese language communities. In addition, two authors try to explain why case studies they carried out, on the kinship system of Fanti in Ghana (D. B. Kronenfeld) and the color-term systems of Mesoamerican languages (R. E. MacLaury), have failed to produce evidence in favor of the LRH. The flavor of the nonhistorical articles is decidedly theoretical and often speculative, but they all contain original and thought-provoking ideas.

The essays in this collection address relativism from a particular viewpoint. When the cognitive revolution began to change the fields of psychology, linguistics, and anthropology in the 1950s, it also stimulated a reinterpretation of relativism. The hallmark of this new approach to relativism was an emphasis on effects of language on nonlinguistic cognition, and consequently an emphasis on experimental psychological evidence. Let us call this interpretation of relativism “cognitivist,” acknowledging that the term is misleading when used outside the present context. Classical exponents of the cognitivist approach include Brown & Lenneberg 1954, Carroll & Casagrande 1958, and Kay & Kempton 1984. The “resurrection” of relativism in the 1990s, led by Lucy 1992a and Gumperz & Levinson 1996, is based squarely on the cognitivist interpretation. It is surprising, then, that most contributors to Pütz & Verspoor 2000 presuppose, address, and advocate or criticize a view of relativism that disagrees with the cognitivist interpretation. For example, the case studies seek evidence for or against possible Whorfian effects entirely within the linguistic sphere. That is, they assume that such effects originate from linguistic categories (e.g., color or kinship terms; a Bantu noun class; an English metaphor) and manifest themselves in linguistic behavior (i.e., the use and extension of these categories), without attempting to test nonlinguistic cognition.

Table 1 contrasts some basic cognitivist and “non-cognitivist” views of relativism. Each set of assumptions characterizes a “prototypical” proponent at best; actual scholars who are generally perceived as advocates of one view may well hold some of the positions attributed in the table to the other view. Lee, in her
<table>
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<th>“Non-cognitivist” views of relativism</th>
<th>“Cognitivist” views of relativism</th>
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<td>Relativism as a program – the question is not so much, <em>Does language influence thought?</em> but, <em>Given that language influences thought, how are we to study language, culture, and cognition in view of relativism?</em></td>
<td>Relativism as an empirically testable hypothesis – the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis (LRH).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relativism is whatever the original proponents – in particular, Whorf – “really” meant when formulating the program.</td>
<td>Whorf’s proposals are but historical reference points; testing the LRH, however broadly construed, is a valid research program independently of Whorf.</td>
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**Thought in language:** Relativism presupposes a view of the mind in which language is an important modality of thought (possibly the only modality); nonlinguistic cognition remains outside the scope of the program.

**Thought vs. language:** It is assumed that language and nonlinguistic cognition can be studied independently of each other. The question is, does language influence nonlinguistic cognition? Empirical testing of this presupposes a representationalist and (at least minimally) modular view of the mind.

| Separation of linguistic and psychological evidence in attempts to confirm relativism misses the point – this way we are bound to overlook the primary effects of language on thought. | Empirical testing of the LRH proceeds by assessing language structure and use and cognitive representations independently and then looking for alignments. If alignment is found, further evidence (e.g., from developmental studies) is sought to illuminate the direction of causality (from language to cognition or vice versa). |

| The primary effects of language on thought are expected to show up in categorization – conceptual categories are determined by (or homomorphic with) linguistic categories. | Languages impose codability constraints on cognitive representations, which are expected to manifest themselves in memory, attention, co-speech gesture, and representational formats. |
contribution, argues that Whorf’s own understanding of relativism was non-cognitivist in the sense of Table 1. If true, this may explain why cognitivist work generally has not paid much attention to narrow readings of Whorf’s writings, as Lee points out.

Enfield’s and Lee’s articles present articulate criticisms of the cognitivist view. Both authors attack Lucy’s (1992a) accusation of “lingua-centrism,” the failure to identify possible nonlinguistic correlates of relativity and to test these using language-independent psychological methods. Enfield counters that “cultural conceptualization is essentially linguistic in nature” (130): Culture is transferred first and foremost through language, and it depends crucially on processes of “symbolization.” Because cultural conceptualization relies so strongly on language, Enfield reasons, “it is unrealistic to expect to be able to divorce ‘culture’ and ‘thought’ from ‘language’, in any attempt to independently determine whether there is any relationship between them” (144).

Perhaps Enfield’s and Lee’s most important message to proponents of the cognitivist view is that a substantial part of human cognition proceeds within the cultural sphere and is based on culture-specific knowledge and conceptualization (although this message is in fact echoed by some advocates of cognitivist relativism, e.g. Levinson in press). The transfer of cultural knowledge from one generation to the next proceeds to an important extent through linguistic practice; therefore, linguistic practice may influence the ontogenetic development of culture-specific conceptualization. However, when Enfield appears to suggest that the study of such culture-specific conceptualizations requires methods different from those employed by psychologists to study culture-INDEPENDENT conceptualization, his position seems overstated. There is no reason to assume that culture-particular thinking can be studied only through language; in fact, Kay & Kempton 1984, Lucy 1992b, and Pederson et al. 1998 have convincingly demonstrated, using standard psychological methods, that culture-particular conceptualization can be studied language-independently. Nevertheless, cultural practices of language use, such as those explored in some of the contributions to this volume, may well provide important clues to possible influences of language on cognition.

However, cognition – in the sense that is presupposed by the cognitivist interpretation of relativism – is only partly culture-specific. A substantial part of human cognition is not even SPECIES-specific: The essential workings of perception, memory, attention direction, and motor programs were shaped by eons of evolution even before human languages and cultures appeared on the scene. Once this is acknowledged, one of the most important questions raised by the ideas of Whorf and his followers becomes this: Just how much of human cognition is culture-specific? We do not know the answer. For example, until recently it was assumed that the preference for using one frame of reference rather than another in solving a particular problem of (nonlinguistic) spatial cognition was culture-independent; then Pederson et al. 1998 showed that this is just not so. Drawing the line between culture-specific and culture-independent cognition thus becomes one of the cru-
cial goals of those interested in an empirical validation of relativism, and on this
goal, cognitivists and non-cognitivists may be able to agree.

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LAURA WRIGHT (ed.), The development of Standard English, 1300–1800. Cam-

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This important book – hereafter DSE – demonstrates for all linguists how an
insightful observation by a young scholar can question basic assumptions and
fondly held beliefs. In 1996, Laura Wright published an essay in a Festschrift for
Eric Stanley in which she pointed to the fragility of the received wisdom that the
modern prestige dialect of Britain emerged from a medieval “Central Midland”
progenitor brought to London from the north and promulgated through the scribes
in the Court of Chancery. In 1997, a conference was held in Cambridge to pursue
the questions she had raised; then, in 1999, further discussion at the University of
London led to this volume.

The “Central Midland” hypothesis – perhaps better termed the Samuels-
Fisher hypothesis, after the scholars who offered detailed evidence in support of
it – is found in nearly all the textbooks now in use, as several contributors point
out. Yet it fails to account for complexities of language history that seem obvious
now that they have been pointed out.

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DSE is divided into two sections of six chapters each; the first concerned with “theory and methodology” and the second with “processes of the standardization of English.” These are, of course, fuzzy categories; the data-oriented chapters in the second half seldom omit problematizing the idea of standard, and the theory-oriented chapters of the first half are, fortunately, not always lacking in facts. (There is no consensus about whether this standard English is an ideology, an abstraction, a dialect, or some combination thereof.) The date range in the title is also an approximation; for instance, Gabriella Mazzon’s useful chapter on “extraterritorial Englishes” mostly begins after 1800, with the migration of English speakers (and teachers) to southern Africa, India, Australia, and New Zealand.

The chapters show solid agreement that Wright’s 1996 critique of Samuels-Fisher is justified: that “we cannot claim to have identified and understood a process of standardization until we have treated not only spelling, but also morphology, vocabulary, phonology and syntax” (quoted in DSE, p. 117). This objective is satisfactorily pursued in the treatment of legal language (Matti Rissanen), scientific language (Irma Taavitsainen), inflectional vs. periphrastic comparative adjectives (Merja Kytö and Suzanne Romaine), and the vowels of path and pot (Roger Lass). There are also discussions of two other centers of English standardization within the British Isles: Ireland (discussed by Raymond Hickey) and Scotland (Anneli Meurman-Solin).

Samuels-Fisher (and its adherents) need not be abashed, however. Studies of Chancery English gave great attention to spelling, for the straightforward reason that spelling meets the requirements laid out by William Labov in his foundational work in sociolinguistics in the 1960s. Spellings are frequent, salient, and (relatively) immune to conscious control. Wright’s challenge can be supported now, as it could not earlier, by the existence of huge and reliable collections of basic material in the Linguistic Atlas of Late Medieval English (McIntosh et al. 1986), the Helsinki Corpus, and the now completed Middle English Dictionary (Kurath et al. 1952–2001). (Helsinki, Penn–Helsinki – the expanded and parsed corpus – and MED are available as electronic databases and are therefore of far greater value than printed books for scholars at subscribing institutions around the world.) With these tools, it is now possible to study features that are frequent (if not common), salient, and (relatively) immune to conscious control. In addition, the huge, expanding, and wonderful corpus found in the Middle English Compendium (McSparran 1998–) can allow further inquiry along the lines demonstrated in DSE.

DSE thus advances a paradigm that was given influential form in Samuels-Fisher, by broadening the sources of data both to additional linguistic features and to further text types. Taavitsainen’s study of scientific language (especially medicine) pursues both these directions successfully, with minute attention to details. In her conclusion (146–47), she offers two proposals that, like Wright’s 1996 essay, pose questions of great interest. What is the relationship of the lan-
guage of these texts to the Wycliffite religious writings that have (formerly?) been presumed to be influential for the development of the prestige variety of English? Is it possible that the collection of forms found in “Chancery Midland” were promulgated by the prestige of these scientific texts, rather than by the migration of scribes to the Chancery scriptorium?

A quite different essay also merits special notice: Derek Keene’s “Metropolitan values: Migration, mobility and cultural norms, London, 1100–1700” (93–114). Keene is the director of the Center for Metropolitan History in London. He seeks “a marriage of historical and linguistic understanding” (94), and the information he provides is fascinating. Isopleth boundaries show the costs of shipping heavy goods (like wheat) to London. Merchants obviously took the routes of least cost, whether overland or by water, and it would be entirely reasonable to expect these trade routes also to be channels of linguistic community and dispersion. To advance these ideas, Keene displays maps showing the regional origins of butchers’ apprentices (in the late 16th century) and the network of borrowing and lending capital (c. 1400). After so much attention in linguistic history to social class, power, and gender, it is refreshing to be reminded that geography has much in it to instruct the historian of English.

DSE is written for and about the triangle whose angles are in London, Oxford, and Cambridge, though this longstanding research focus is founded much more on political than on linguistic grounds. (It does not take a Scottish nationalist to believe that Meurman-Solin has shown that Edinburgh provides a richer and more abundantly documented locus for the study of standardization in English than does the triangle.) Geneticists have decided to concentrate attention on E. coli, and British Anglicists have made a similar decision to concentrate on their capital. For “extraterritorials” like this reviewer, however, this perspective is by no means obvious or natural. It is particularly vexatious to be told, by Wright, that “Oxford English, Cambridge English, and London English were very different from Standard English then and now” (1). One wonders just what this variety is that is “developing” in the minds of these authors. Discussing two pronunciations of the word moss, for instance, she writes: “It is only in the 1920s that the situation seems to settle down to the present-day pattern” (8). At the end of the book, Roger Lass reveals just what the “present-day pattern” consists of (227–28). In reading the introduction, I felt annoyed to be obliged to consult the excellent pronouncing dictionary by Wells in order to determine just what exotic innovation in moss might have taken root among the socially self-conscious in the triangle to replace my own entirely satisfactory vowel (first stigmatized by Walker in 1791).

At Kew Gardens outside London, a brochure declares that it is “the largest botanical garden in Britain, and hence the world.” This dizzying leap from the local fact to the global generalization has become a by-phrase in my family. More than one of the authors in DSE succumbs to the impulse to attach it to claims that might be made more modestly. Thus, Keene states: “Of all European countries,
that of the English is the one with the deepest and most continuous historical roots” (93). And hence the world. Italians, Greeks, or Jews might, however, have a different opinion. Similarly, James Milroy declares that “until quite recently, linguistic theorists have not in the main used data from spoken interaction in their database” (14), a statement dubiously true even within the triangle – unless the Survey of English at UCL counts as recent – and certainly not true of such linguistic theorists as C. C. Fries and Kenneth L. Pike in Ann Arbor (where Milroy has lived for a decade). But it was mostly true of the triangle – and hence the world.

Small matters of editorial detail do not inspire confidence. Would it not have been helpful to indicate that the Halifax of Figure 11.1 is the same person as the Montagu mentioned on the same page (206)? Why are the references on p. 169 not in alphabetical order? How did it happen that the most junior of the compilers of McIntosh et al. (1986) is jumped up to senior author (26)? Mencken’s American language was published in 1919 (not 1941 as on 76), and Mulcaster’s Elementarie in 1682 (not 1852 as on 45). Richard Carew’s “Excellencie of the English Tongue” was written after 1605 and published for the first time in 1614, so why is the composition assigned to 1586 and the publication to 1674 (39, 43)? And why is the “unreliable” and error-ridden edition of 1870 employed (45)? The five quoted lines (43) show twelve spelling departures and one mistaken word when compared with the edition based on Cotton ms. Junius F.xi (see Dunn, 42). If they rely on such editions, it is no wonder that scholars form the impression of early standardization inside the triangle.

In large matters, however, this is an important volume, particularly in its clear demonstration that techniques of corpus linguistics can lead to a resumption of interest in the historical evolution of English. Laura Wright (of Cambridge University) deserves particular thanks for having raised a major question and then pouring her considerable energy into the conferences and this volume that flows from them.

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Latin language and Latin culture is a short, concentrated treatise on the Latin language and its impact, past and present, on those who have come in contact with it.¹ The author is not a linguist, nor is this book written in any way as a contribution to the linguistics or sociolinguistics of Latin. If it were being reviewed from the perspective of Classical philology and literary theory in which it is written, the assessment of it would be very different from the evaluation that follows; so in a sense, my review is biased a priori in that I can approach the issues it raises only from a perspective that is wholly different from that of the author. Nonetheless, a book about language and culture invites the attention of the linguist, and we would be derelict if we were to dismiss it as linguistically uninteresting. Indeed, it is both interesting and provocative.

The book contains five thematically connected chapters: “The nature of Latin culture” (1–27); “The poverty of our ancestral speech” (28–51); “The gender of Latin” (52–83); “The life cycle of dead languages” (84–112); and “The voices of Latin culture” (113–133). These are followed by an appendix containing the Latin text of a lengthy passage cited in chap. 3 by the 1st-century BCE biographer Cornelius Nepos. There is a useful index.

In “The nature of Latin culture” Farrell attempts a characterization of Latin culture, tracing it from the goddess Juno’s foundational assessment in the Aeneid: Culture is defined by what people wear, what they call themselves, and most important, by what language they speak (p. 2). Farrell wishes to present Latin culture (“latinity”) as a fundamentally linguistic construct, not a collection of other behavior patterns and beliefs. Latin itself is the chief embodiment of latinity, serving as the primary vehicle for Roman cultural and linguistic imperialism. The author makes his case for Latin culture mainly on a literary basis, drawing on the well-known authors Ovid, Martial, and Cicero, in addition to Vergil and others. He characterizes it as follows: “The culture of latinity . . . is embodied by the language to which all who study and value the language belong” (7). Modern

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latinists participate in this culture by virtue of their preoccupation with the Latin language. Farrell is deeply concerned with questions of continuity, which lead him to the issue of separating true latinists from medievalists, Renaissance scholars, and others concerned with Latin. This is in part a question of when Latin ceased to be Latin and started being Romance, and the corollary question of whether Latin is really “dead,” or whether the Romance languages are simply modern dialects of the ancient language. These issues naturally lead Farrell to discussions of the medieval forms of Latin, the Carolingian Renaissance (in which Charlemagne tried to restore Latin in a correct, Ciceronian form), and the use of Latin as a medium of discourse in the modern Roman Catholic Church. Given these later developments in the history of the language, Latin surely doesn’t look like a dead language, nor does Farrell argue that it is. The issue, however, is much more complicated than he leads us to believe, at least in this chapter, and really can be fully appreciated only through the careful linguistic inspection and analysis of Latin through space and time, with appropriate attention to structural, functional, and typological minutiae. In other words, this famously intractable issue cannot be handled adequately without some fairly sophisticated view of the nature of language and society, the nature of linguistic change, and the difference between written and spoken languages, in addition to a thorough examination of the linguistic details of Latin throughout its history. Although Farrell addresses these issues in a novel and interesting way, his treatment is ultimately undermined by his failure to make contact with explicit linguistic arguments that are well represented in the literature, and by his worrying about an issue that is fundamentally a straw man: If Latin is dead, when did it die?

Scholars of Classical and Romance linguistics are certainly familiar with this issue, and we need not go far to find a linguistically satisfying solution. Pulgram puts it this way:

Written (Classical) Latin is not the ancestor of any Romance speech; it is, rather, the kind of dialect which, once elevated to serve as standard idiom, must needs become arrested, unnaturally petrified, and which eventually . . . must die. Thus Classical Latin, although it could and can be used by anyone willing to impose upon himself the labor of learning it, has not been anyone’s native tongue, and therefore has been a dead language, for many centuries. (1978:30–31; see also Pulgram 2001)

The operative notion here is that the classical language is not acquired by anyone, but has to be learned. (Interesting in this regard are Claudian [4th century CE], a Greek who wrote better Classical Latin than his contemporaries because he was not in contact with the living Latin language (Late Latin) when he “learned” Latin, and Ammianus Marcellinus [3rd century CE], another Greek who wrote excellent Latin.) Farrell returns to the “dead language” issue in chap. 4, where his discussion is much more satisfying.
In “The poverty of our ancestral speech,” Farrell tackles the issue of the well-documented linguistic inferiority that the Romans supposedly felt in relation to Greek. Once again, he addresses the issue not from a linguistic standpoint but rather from a literary one, and once again he fails to see the issue in its brighter light. It is true that educated Romans elevated themselves socially by speaking Greek, a prestige language in Rome and elsewhere. Furthermore, it is well documented that speakers of Latin were quite liberal in their borrowing habits. Indeed, Latin is full of loanwords from a variety of languages— not only Greek, but also Celtic languages, Etruscan, non-Latin Italic languages like Oscan and Umbrian, and more. Farrell approaches the problem of the perceived inferiority of Latin as if it were a real one—wondering whether Latin was felt to be inferior in some ways to Greek because “the Greeks have a word for it,” or because the 1st century BCE philosopher Lucretius had to borrow some exotic terms from Greek philosophy. Of course, Farrell doesn’t really believe that Latin was “inferior,” but he could have shown it in more enlightening ways if he had simply made contact with some standard linguistic positions on the equality and intertranslatability of languages, the sociolinguistics of prestige languages, and the conditions that motivate linguistic borrowing. Latin inferior? Certainly not. Educated Latin speakers culturally fascinated by Greeks? Absolutely. Roman writers following Greek originals? All the time. In my view, however, the real issue here is a larger, non-linguistic one: how the Romans approached matters such as differences among peoples, including but not limited to the languages they spoke. Romans were above all practical people—great engineers, great warriors, great administrators. Most Roman authors, not to mention everyday Roman citizens, didn’t puzzle over philosophical issues like whether the Greeks had a word they needed, or whether Greek had a verbal mood that was absent in Latin, any more than they worried about whether it was right or wrong to keep slaves, to coopt conquered lands, or to put enemies to death. They just did it if it was in their practical interest. Even in the area of grammar (not mentioned by Farrell), no one would ever confuse a Roman grammarians like Priscian or Donatus with Dionysius Thrax or Aristotle. Greeks wrote philosophical grammars; Romans, especially later ones, wrote pedagogical grammars. So too with language in general; the Romans imposed their language on others in the same way they imposed themselves on others—because they needed to. Did the Romans have a language policy? I would say no (contra Gibbon 1909–1914; cf. p.3, fn.1); they had a policy of practicality. If you have some item we need, we’ll take it, along with the word you use to refer to it. And if you want to have a place in a Roman-dominated land, you’d best speak Latin, at least in the western Empire (predictably, Greek continued to be used, even in official decrees, in the Greek part of the empire).

If there is a chapter in this book that is likely to irritate a linguist, it is chap. 3, “The gender of Latin.” Farrell claims that Classical Latin is a “masculine language,” while Vernacular Latin is “feminine.” The notion of a gendered language is foreign to linguistics, but it appears to be a staple of current feminist theory (see,
e.g., Wittig 1986, Hallett 1993). Farrell has apparently adopted the notion of Classical Latin as masculine and the spoken language as feminine as if this notion should be clear to everyone, since he offers no definition or characterization of gendered language. What he does offer is a string of unconnected observations related to the language/gender issue. First, he suggests an analysis of the phrase *sermo patrius*, which is normally translated ‘ancestral speech’, but which for Farrell is ‘paternal speech’ (cf. the parallel use of *paternus*, lit. ‘paternal’, to mean ‘native’ or ‘ancestral’). Farrell’s reading is etymologically defensible because *patrius* derives from *pater* ‘father’, though conventional interpretations suggest the more gender-neutral ‘ancestral’ or even ‘native’. This is one bit of evidence that cannot be argued convincingly either way. Another form of evidence discussed by Farrell (52 ff.) is the fact that “there is no Latin Sappho.” Indeed, the number of women who wrote in Classical Latin is vanishingly small; Vibia Perpetua (1st – 2nd centuries CE) is the most notable exception (and discussed extensively here), but even Vibia is said by critics to lack rhetorical ornament and prose rhythm. Farrell draws on all manner of unconnected bits of evidence and argumentation to support his view of the classical language as male: Women talk differently from men (with the obligatory citation of Lakoff 1975, but with no data to support the claim); the cross-cultural support is found in the Jewish tradition of treating Hebrew as a man’s language and Yiddish as a woman’s language; there are literary allusions, such as one in Horace, in which a Greek female captive falls into the possession of a Latin-speaking male conqueror; text evidence suggests that men regarded women as inferior speakers; and the masc./fem. noun *parens* ‘parent’ (from *parere* ‘to bear, give birth’) normally refers to ‘father’ rather than ‘mother’ when used in the singular. Clearly there are some fundamental confusions here over issues such as differences among the users, functions, and structures of a given language. If what Farrell means is that Classical Latin as it has come down to us is the product of overwhelmingly male authors, inaccessible to certain segments of the population, we must agree. After all, Vibia Perpetua, Egeria (who wrote a late 4th century CE pilgrim text), and a handful of others are not a significant force. Farrell’s argument is summed up in the final paragraph of this chapter:

In Latin culture women play the linguistic role of the Other. At best they may attain to a nearly masculine culture. The most successful can pass as men . . . More typically, women represent an inferior and degenerate latinity that correlates with various substandard types: socially with plebian, spatially with provincial, religiously with Christian, chronologically with medieval and vernacular speech. (83)

What’s missing here is an appropriate comparison. Farrell is comparing educated, literate men in a male-dominated society with uneducated women in the same society, and he is drawing a gender conclusion from his comparison. An appropriate comparison would be the language of Cicero, Martial, Ovid, or Vergil with the language of male soldiers, stonecutters, or farmers of the same period. If such
a comparison were possible (difficult, but not impossible, because the latter were largely illiterate), it would reveal that the very features Farrell attributes to female speech (plebeian, provincial, etc.) would be the same for male speakers. The distinctions he is finding are not directly about men and women; they are about the educated and the uneducated, the literate and the illiterate, the powerful and the powerless, the urban and the rural. Gender is secondary. Although there is evidence in the Late Latin and Romance record for each of these variables, there is no evidence of gender-differentiated language in the descendant systems.

Readers of this journal need not be reminded that languages don’t have gender – and Farrell knows that, despite strong rhetoric to the contrary. I think he means that there are masculine styles and feminine styles, and that Classical Latin is “masculine speech” in that it was accessible mainly to educated male writers. But while languages don’t have gender, speakers do, and societies place those speakers in different roles with different linguistic consequences. Men talk differently from women in identifiable ways. *Parens* is ‘father’ in its unmarked sense, at least in some authors, and there are also unmarked masculine readings of *hostis* ‘enemy’, *dux* ‘leader’, and a host of other nouns with common gender. But even if markedness conventions are partial reflections of societal norms (such as the fact that most enemies and most leaders are male), all this tells us is that in patriarchal societies men are more important than women – not that the language has a gender identity of its own. Finally, the gender argument is not supported by Farrell’s fanciful explanation that *parens* is a masculine synonym for ‘father’ because in certain metaphorical expressions utilizing the passive voice, “masculine achievements in the social sphere are implicitly equated with women’s ability to give birth. Nowhere is the male’s awe and envy of the female’s biological role more evident than here. It is related to this awe and envy, I suggest, and remarkable in any case that *parens* normally means ‘father’ rather than ‘mother’” (62).

In chap. 4, “The life cycle of dead languages,” Farrell revisits in considerable scholarly detail the question of “dead” languages, concentrating in part on the biological model of linguistic evolution in which languages experience birth, growth, and decline. This chapter is by far the most satisfying one to a linguist, not only because it is more adequately informed by established scholarship but also because finally Farrell has framed his argument in nonmetaphorical and nonliterary terms and has come to grips with the facts of the history of the language. After edifying analysis of 19th-century scholarship and a discussion of the identification of linguistic families, he returns to his central point, the status of Latin as a living or dead language. He identifies the culture of latinity as a culture of diglossia, with the two registers (Classical and Vernacular) verging on each other. If Latin in the classical sense is dead, the question arises whether it can be revived (à la Hebrew). For Farrell, “the notion that Latin was or is a ‘dead’ language [is] revealed as the merest of metaphorical constructs possessing limited
basis in reality or explanatory power. The time may be at hand not to revive the language, but to replace the metaphors" (112). A linguist couldn’t agree more (see the graphic illustration in Pulgram 1978: 30).

In the final chapter, “The voices of Latin culture,” Farrell pleads for a replacement of the common metaphors of “living” and “dead” languages, as well as a rethinking of the periodization of Latin, as is common in literary (Silver Age, Golden Age) and linguistic (Old Latin, Late Latin) circles. “The Latin language has developed not in a series of horizontal periods stacked like uniform blocks in a simple pattern of rise and fall, but in strands now running in parallel, now intertwined, some broken and some continuous, from antiquity down to today” (113). He suggests a characterization of Latin as “not dead, but turned to stone,” which he eventually rejects as an apt description of the language. The discussion is not so much an assessment of the metaphor as it is a rambling account of attempts by the Russian composer Igor Stravinsky and others to compose in Latin, and what these efforts mean for the living/dead language issue. Here Farrell returns vigorously to his literary roots, dropping the empirical perspective and retreating into a sea of metaphorical musings and rhetorical flourishes, hopping from Stravinsky to the English Renaissance to the Catholic Church to the New Testament. He pulls it together in a way, arguing through a quote from Cicero at the very end of the essay that Latin is a “varied” thing, and that an appreciation of its vitality in variety will deliver pleasure to those who use it.

Stimulating and provocative, Latin language and Latin culture is certain to capture the attention of those who have come to the study of Latin through the traditional regimen of classical philology and literary analysis. When viewed from the perspective of historical and Romance linguistics, on the other hand, it resonates as a document that inadequately discusses questions that have dogged the professions for centuries, largely by ignoring the enormous bodies of serious literature and paths of analysis that have provided substantive answers to essentially empirical questions. Ultimately, how one reacts to this book will depend on how one has been trained.

NOTES

1 Thanks and exculpations to my Classics colleagues Garrett Fagan, Stephen Wheeler, Juana Djelal and Paul Harvey, who read and commented on a draft of this review.

2 For example, Farrell might have profited from a study of the Latin of Claudius Terentianus, a Roman soldier who composed letters to his family while a soldier in Egypt during the period 99–120 CE. See Lehmann 1988 for an assessment.

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This book proposes to examine how the development of the city is intrinsically connected with language interactions and social norms. How can one account for social behaviors in urban settings without explaining why such behaviors are specifically urban? The studies collected here aim at expounding how five cities – Rouen (France), Venice (Italy), Berlin (Germany), Athens (Greece), and Mons (Belgium) – are places of tension, conflict, and community sharing through the use of dialectal or sociolectal language varieties.

The book’s preliminary chapter quickly outlines the theoretical positions and frameworks used by the six coauthors. The point of view adopted here is that of urban sociolinguistics, with a focus on the relationship between urbanization and language practices. The first research keyword in this domain is the important notion of urban identity and its linguistic staging – a tentative translation of the editor’s mise en mot. Each inhabitant has attitudes of convergence toward and divergence from some dimensions of urban life, be they geographical, social, political, or linguistic. By listening to these people express their attitudes with words, the researcher is able to build a better understanding of the nature of the urban “fracture,” a favorite term in recent French politics and sociology.

Following the conceptualization of Louis-Jean Calvet 1994, we are invited to include language as a main factor of urban construction and not to limit ourselves to the usual criteria of urbanity (population density, habitat, etc.), for language is
the vehicle of a collective discourse able to include, exclude, alienate, or stigmatize individuals and social or ethnic groups. Thus, urbanization is more than a mere synonym of growth: It implies that urban space is built along the lines of a spatial mobility that structures daily life in the city with the help of discourse. Urban harmony, tensions, or conflicts are linguistic echoes of current social change – hence the second key concept, LINGUISTIC MOBILITY, in which we understand that moving up the social scale often implies adopting dominant linguistic varieties. Bulot provides us with an efficient analysis – inspired by Calvet 1994 – of the development of linguistic identity, focused on the kinds of linguistic insecurity and security a speaker may go through, on formal grounds (the language itself) or statutory ones (the status of the language in a given group).

The studies presented here are far from being limited to theory. The first chapter, by Bulot, focuses on the “linguistic staging” of urban identity in Rouen (France), where the alleged accent used on the left bank of the River Seine – which divides the city – is stigmatized. In a long and often jargon-ridden article, Bulot studies the interesting hypothesis that the social evaluation of an urban form of speech contributes to the socio-spatial shaping of the city. With the help of qualitative (interviews) and quantitative (questionnaires) methods, he embarks on a Wallace Lambert-inspired analysis of language attitudes. In the answers to his questionnaires, the author looks for forms of evaluations of Rouen’s speech, particularly along the three axes of regionality, urbanity, and ethnicity. As regards the methods used, besides the usual precautions uttered by specialists such as Fasold 1984 and Edwards 1994, we are required to trust the author and his conclusions without any quantitative indications, since he does not indicate how many questionnaires were gathered and how many interviews were carried out. This is undoubtedly detrimental to the article, although its purpose is to examine how Rouen dwellers voice their territorial belonging through language judgments: their relationship with the norm, their acceptance or refusal of deviation to the norm, the stereotypes they develop, and finally, the reproduction of dominant linguistic – therefore social – forms. Another regret one may have after reading this chapter is that no instances of genuine speech are provided to support the argument.

Another long chapter (52 pages), by Gabrielle Gamberini, applies the concept of “linguistic staging” to the Italian city of Venice. The article is based on the following framework: The author shows when and why Venetians choose between the dialect (Venetian) and the standard language (Italian), how it influences their identity, and to what extent the dialect is stigmatized and thus endangered. An awkward and even rather opaque presentation (p. 78) of quantitative results is followed by an efficient conversation analysis of many excerpts from interviews. Gamberini concludes that, although generally stigmatized, the dialect is still a powerful vehicle of Venetian identity and history, and city and language are closely knit together for affective reasons. Venetians even
seem to suffer from the denigration of their dialect by outsiders. In fact, Venetian identity seems to be built around and by Venetian speech – one often uses the dialect to claim that the latter is part of one’s identity. The author continues with an interesting analysis of codeswitching and error-controlling in Venice, both of which lead to a sense of linguistic insecurity in the standard language. The end of the article is partially devoted to the loss and the maintenance of dialect practices in Venice, which shows to what extent the command of the dialect is linked to the maintenance of geographical identity.

Sybille Grosse’s chapter on language attitudes and use in reunified Berlin starts with a historical overview of how the Berlin accent used to be perceived on each side of the wall. While it was devalued in the West, on the other side of the wall it held the prestigious position of the speech of East Germany’s capital city. The author emphasizes that the Berlin dialect’s main distinguishing attribute is its numerous lexical borrowings from Huguenot French. Her thesis is that the recent socio-political recomposition of the city has initiated linguistic changes, or at least modifications, in attitudes to and discourses on language use. Based on questionnaires and interviews whose methodologies are clearly outlined, the author first verifies one of her hypotheses: Berliners do associate the dialect spoken in their city with the use of lexical borrowings from French. She confirms that the distinction between dialect use in East Berlin and in West Berlin remains a reality in their minds, and that the city is today still “divided” clearly along linguistic lines (her interviewees are able to name certain districts where the dialect is spoken). What comes out of her interview data is not only that those who speak the dialect must be from lower classes and restricted urban areas, but also that they will probably remain so because the Berlin form of speech is severely stigmatized. Finally, this article shows well how dialect use in Berlin does not convey the same sense of urban identity and belonging as Venetian does in Venice.

The second part of the book, devoted to the construction of identity in urban settings, starts with a chapter on identity and epilinguistic discourse (that is, what people say about a language) in Athens, the capital of Greece. Nicolas Tsekos quickly reviews the well-known history of Greek diglossia (cf. Ferguson 1959), concluding with the necessity of redefining the relationship between the high, puristic Katharevusa and the low, popular Dhimotiki (Demotic) forms. What Tsekos shows well in this article is that in Greece, language use is crucial in shaping a collective identity and is heavily linked to the construction of the nation – hence the role of Katharevusa as an echo of ancient Greek greatness and history. Basing his conclusions on 50 questionnaires and 10 interviews, he aims at discovering to what extent age, in relation to the educational system (Katharevusa, Demotic, or both), has initiated differences in the way the speakers perceive the role of language in their country. The results of his serious field investigation are that the split between positive associations found with Katharevusa and the stigma cast

on Dhimotiki persist, but what is also devalued is the attempt to obtain prestige through the use of Katharevusa. The latter is generally highly valued because it is now exclusively linked to written practice and to ancient Greek civilization. Thus, Tsekos contends that Greece seems to experience a situation of post-diglossia, in which a third system known as “modern Greek” apparently is functioning to neutralize the language crisis in the country. In conclusion, Tsekos’s findings show that the alleged opposition between Demotic and Katharevusa is in fact less important for his interviewees than the contrast between a “rich” language and a “poor” language. In the end, the Greek linguistic conflict is but a reflection of a conflict about identity, which opposes historicity and modernity.

The book ends with a short article, by Cécile Bauvois and Bertrand Diricq, on geographical identification in French-speaking Belgium. This article stands a little aside from the general economy of the book, mainly owing to the investigative methods used: Inhabitants of the southern Belgian city of Mons were presented with recordings of conversations held with people in five other francophone cities, and their task was to situate them geographically in regions and try to locate their cities of origin. Furthermore, here the concept of identity and urban language is not focused on the usage of the people of Mons, but on how they perceive others. The essential conclusions are that there seems to be a form of geographical egocentricity that make listeners locate others according to their own geographical belonging. This results in an “annexationist” tendency, the fact that they situate the origin of many speakers from elsewhere in their own city. Bauvois and Diricq show that an increase in age correlates with a greater number of correct answers. The language and the methods used are clear, but this article suffers from a serious problem of either wrong or missing bibliographical references. The reader will appreciate the maps which Bauvois and Diricq have included in order to situate their Belgian fieldwork, and regret the absence of such maps in the rest of the book.

The book as a whole conveys challenging hypotheses and illustrates some of the current stands of French sociology of language, halfway between Conversation Analysis and the sociolinguistic construction of identity. Although the volume suffers from some problems in production, the research presented here is clearly original and challenging.

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This book is the result of the project Sociolinguistic and Psycholinguistic Aspects of Linguistic Minority Groups in Spain, started in 1993. After the introductory chapter by the editor, the book is divided into four parts, which contain 16 articles on the sociolinguistic situation of a series of established and migrant communities in Spain, viewed from an interdisciplinary standpoint. There are numerous maps and graphics, but no index.

Part I is dedicated to the “larger established minority groups” – that is, the major minority groups whose languages possess the status of “co-official languages.” Chap. 2, by M. A. Pradilla, addresses the Catalan-speaking communities. The author explains the history of the Catalan language and its geographical distribution and describes its major sociolinguistic characteristics, as well as its use in education and institutional support. Additionally, he presents examples of codeswitching between Catalan and Spanish. Chap. 3, by J. Cenoz and J. Perales, presents the Basque-speaking communities. After an introduction to the past and present of the Basque language, they describe its geographical distribution, the percentage of speakers in the different areas, and so on. The authors describe the different types of schools in Basque-speaking areas and give examples of borrowing and of codeswitching between Spanish and Basque. Chap. 4, by C. Hermida, addresses the situation of the Galician language, spoken in northwestern Spain on the Atlantic coast. After an extensive overview of the situation and evolution of Galician from the 9th century on, the author explains its present distribution, variation, status, and interaction with Spanish. The chapter includes a short examination of language attitudes and language shift from Galician to Spanish attributed to the higher prestige of Spanish, as well as codeswitching and interference between the two languages.

Part II deals with the “smaller established minorities.” In chap. 5, J. Suïls and À. Huguet give a short overview of the Aranese language, a variety of the Gascon variety of the Occitan language spoken in France. After discussing geographical location, legislation, and language planning and offering a short language description, the authors highlight contact with Spanish, Catalan, and French, examining some interference phenomena. The focus is on language attitudes and the role of Aranese as a marker of identity. In chap. 6, R. González-Quevedo presents the Asturian (also called Bable) speech community, located in Asturias. After a description of the diglossic situation, the author examines the role of Asturian
(which still has not been granted the status of co-official language) as a language of education and the creation of written Asturian literature. The chapter also gives insight into various language contact phenomena and finishes with sociolinguistic profiles of four Asturian speakers. Chap. 7, on the Spanish sign language communities, is by R. Vallverdú. The author provides a short history of the ups and downs of this sign language, which has been used in Spain since the 16th century, and describes difficulties, linguistic behavior, and its present status. There are several examples of Catalan sign language (lacking an explanation of their meaning), but it is not clear whether different sign languages actually exist in the different linguistic areas of Spain. The article includes appendices with lists of Deaf organizations and manifestos.

Part III is dedicated to “other established minorities.” Chap. 8, on the Gitano communities, by A. Marzo and M. T. Turell, starts with an overview of the history of the Gypsy migrations from India to Europe, the history of the presence of this minority in Spain, and the linguistic situation of the Gitano communities that adopted the Spanish language centuries ago, developing it to Caló, a Spanish variety deeply influenced by the Gitanos’ original language. The authors present social and cultural aspects that allow them to characterize several types of modern-day Gitanos. Also mentioned is the difficulties of the Gitano community regarding the educational system (high dropout rates, etc.). Chap. 9, by B. Vigil, traces the history of the past Jewish presence in Spain, which is not the origin of the Jewish presence today: The Sephardic Jews were expelled from Spain in 1492, and only in the 19th and 20th centuries did Jewish people resettle there. The article gives an overview of social institutions and associations and discusses language contact between Spanish and Hebrew.

Part IV deals with the new migrant minorities. In chap. 10, M. T. Turell and N. Lavratti present the Brazilian community, located especially in the major cities. The authors highlight its strong social organization. Chap. 11, by L. López Trigal, gives an overview of the nature and location of the Cabo Verdean community and explains the cultural and linguistic situation of Cabo Verdean immigrants, characterized by the presence of two languages, Portuguese and a Portuguese-based creole. Chap. 12, by J. Beltrán and C. García, examines the situation of the Chinese community. This group is less integrated than the others and seems to learn Spanish for practical reasons, maintaining Chinese and a very strong Chinese identity. It is suggested that, possibly owing to great structural differences, Chinese and Spanish are kept separate, and that there seem to be no interference phenomena; as a consequence, there are no linguistic examples given. Chap. 13, by R. M. Torrens, is dedicated to the Italian community; it describes the distribution of Italian speakers and the evolution of the modern Italian migration in Spain, which at present is an élite migration, but it does not give any hints about the history of that migration, which undoubtedly is not as recent as one might conclude after reading the article. The authors provide many examples of language use and of language
contact patterns, including phenomena such as codeswitching. In chap. 14, B. Garí comments on the Maghrebi communities, paying special attention to the linguistic plurality (such as the coexistence of French, Arabic, and Berber) in their home countries and to the importance of traditional stereotyped sex roles. The author describes the different language domains and the most salient interference phenomena of learners of Spanish with Maghrebi origins. Chap. 15, by L. López Trigal, analyzes the situation of the Portuguese community. After a description of the patterns of Portuguese migration and a characterization of the community, Trigal comments on the generally high level of integration among Portuguese immigrants. Linguistic attitudes and characteristic language use are briefly described, but without examples. Chap. 16, by M. T. Turell and C. Corcoll, deals with the UK community, made up especially of retired British citizens living in Spain and younger people migrating to Spain for personal or professional reasons. After an introduction to the demographic facts and (socio)linguistic structures of this group, the authors comment on language behaviors and contact phenomena; notably, the retired immigrants do not normally learn Spanish. The last chapter, also by Turell and Corcoll, is dedicated to citizens of the US living in Spain. The authors describe the migration patterns of this group and its distribution, language attitudes, and use of English and Spanish in different domains, and they also comment on the most salient language contact phenomena, such as codeswitching and borrowing.

The background information about the different established and immigrant minority groups, as well as the numerous tables, maps, and examples of language use, make this a valuable tool for scholars involved with Romance linguistics, sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics, and variational linguistics in general. The inclusion of the sign language community and the Gitanos as not only linguistic but also cultural communities can only be praised. Nonetheless, there are some notable gaps. The Aragonese-speaking community, with about 12,000 speakers, is not mentioned as an established minority, nor are the Portuguese-speaking communities in Extremadura, Zamora, and other sites, which are not the result of migration movements. Moreover, there are no contributions on the German, French, and Dutch communities, which undoubtedly are more important for the areas where they are to be found than, for example, the highly integrated Portuguese immigrants or the numerically insignificant Cabo Verdee migration. As shown in chap. 1, there are 45,898 Germans registered in Spain, yet the number estimated by the German authorities or registered at the German embassy is much higher. On the Levante coast and in the south of Spain, there are villages with a high percentage of German residents; some of them even have German mayors. In Majorca and the Canary Islands, there are huge residential areas owned and populated by German-speaking immigrants, and there are several German newspapers published regularly. Majorcans speak of a “German invasion” that is changing the social structure of their island, and the Majorcan authorities even had to create a law making Spanish or Catalan product descriptions obligatory.
Despite these points of criticism, the book remains a very useful publication. It is the most extensive account of language diversity in Spain, and an important contribution to the study of the linguistic and cultural composition of multilingual countries in general.

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This book consists of seven chapters; its main aim is “to apply certain theoretical insights into linguistic variation and change to the Spanish speaking world” (p. ix). The first three chapters are devoted to explaining fundamental concepts related to variation and change; the following three, to presenting the broad patterns displayed by geographical and social variation in Spanish; and the last, to the history of the standardization process of Spanish. From the beginning, Penny makes clear that he is not claiming to advance variationist theory, but he hopes that the data presented in the book will test and support such theoretical approach to language, which I understand he refers to in the sense of the quantitative paradigm. Similar disclaimers are made throughout the book regarding the unequal attention paid to the correlation between linguistic and sociological features of Spanish-speaking communities, given the paucity of data available.

Penny’s overview of variation and change in the Spanish-speaking world is constructed, on the one hand, on the basis of his own knowledge of the language and situations, and on the other hand, on an extensive review of classic and recent literature in both Spanish and English, which includes materials ranging from general and descriptive studies on phonological, grammatical, and lexical aspects of particular varieties, to historical, dialectal, and sociolinguistic studies and linguistic atlases. To this review he adds a profound knowledge of documents of historical value and literary texts from medieval times to the 19th century. This effort to encompass the most representative literature on Spanish and other Peninsular Romance varieties allows Penny to provide a consistent comparative perspective in dealing with both synchronic or diachronic variation. One important contribution of this book lies in the fact that concepts and theoretical issues derived from studies in English and other Germanic languages are now well illustrated with data taken from Castilian and other Romance varieties spoken in the Iberian Peninsula.
Two broad themes are pursued throughout the book. One is that of the seamlessness of language variation (that is, the fact that language presents itself in the form of orderly but undivided heterogeneity). The other, more particular to Spanish and historical in kind, is the claim that Castilian has evolved at a more rapid pace than the varieties of Romance that developed in other parts of the Iberian Peninsula.

A longstanding tradition in Spanish historical linguistics is the background against which recent developments on diachronic variation are explained in relation to new and reexamined data. Linguistic change is pictured as the replacement of one state of variation by another, and the variationist framework is seen as the only one in which it is possible to explain reversals, backtrackings, and blind alleys in the history of the language. Although geographical, social, and historical variation are treated as independent parameters, the fact that some features may show variation in these three dimensions simultaneously is highlighted through the concept of co-variation.

Chapter two addresses the old problem of the definitions of language and dialect. Like many others, Penny finds this question to be unanswerable on linguistic grounds, since any difference between the two concepts “resides not in the subject matter of linguistic description, but in the social appreciation accorded to particular codes of communication” (9). Here, Penny advances the idea of variation as a subtle, seamless reality that poses insuperable problems in defining the concepts of dialect and language. He finds that there is no way of demarcating one social dialect from another, although he is very aware of the relative value of the isogloss as a tool to define boundaries between geographical dialects. Strong statements such as “we are forced to reject the notion of a dialect as a discrete or separately delimitable entity” and “there is no such thing as a dialect” (11), however, contrast with the extensive use of labels such as Castilian, Asturian, Andalusian, and the like throughout the book. Labeling seems to be an inevitable practice that in itself evokes the idea of existing boundaries, but as long as it helps in the construction of the whole picture of variation in both the geographical and social dimensions, there seems to be no way of abandoning it. This practice is also behind the discussion of the relationships between languages and dialects and between varieties in general, and of the models used to represent these relationships, the best-known of which is the tree model.

Chap. 3 deals with mechanisms of change and the processes by which change spreads through social and geographical space. Penny argues that today, as in the past, almost all changes are spread through face-to-face conversation. Focusing largely on dialect contact as the situation that typically frames most processes of linguistic spread and change, he draws on Trudgill’s (1986) notion of accommodation to explain the mechanisms through which speakers of mutually intelligible varieties adjust their speech to that of their interlocutors. Permanent adjustment resulting from dialect contact is seen as particularly relevant to Spanish, since from at least the 10th century there has been constant mixing.
of speakers of mutually comprehensible varieties of Hispano-Romance in the Peninsula and in America. Such long-term contact usually results, at first, in fairly chaotic dialect mixture in which a large number of variant features are in competition, and later in the emergence of new dialects, when mechanisms such as leveling of linguistic differences, simplification of linguistic systems, hypercorrection, and hyperdialectalism come into play. Penny contends that cases of leveling and simplification are very frequent in the history of Spanish. To illustrate them, he discusses several well-studied cases affecting the phonological and grammatical system of the language. He convincingly shows that Castilian has undergone more leveling and simplification than other Romance varieties as a result of repeated phases of dialect mixing, which have produced in the modern language a simpler phonology and a more regular morphology than those of the other standard Romance varieties. Other characteristics in the history of Hispano-Romance arose from hyperdialectalisms — that is, interdialect forms that originally do not exist in either of two varieties in contact, and that are created in one variety in order to sharpen the difference or to regularize the contrasts between one and the other. Once leveling and simplification reduced the great abundance of variants produced after repeated periods of dialect mixing in medieval Spain, residual competing forms were reallocated, becoming variants associated with differences of social class or differences of register rather than the original geographical variants. In a further section of this chapter, Penny discusses the wave model as a useful way of representing the spread of innovations across a territory. The propagation of innovations in social space is explained with the help of social network theory.

Chap. 4, the longest in the book, is devoted mostly to the geographical distribution of features in Spain, with only four pages out of 61 dealing with social variation. The present geographical distribution of features is seen as determined, on the one hand, by the existence of a northern dialect continuum, and, on the other, by the territorial expansion of northern varieties that accompanied the Reconquest of Islamic Spain.

Chap. 5 deals with variation in Spanish America, which Penny argues is considerably less than the variation observable within Peninsular Spanish, owing to the effects of the colonization process. Since dialect mixing was also a constant in Spanish America, special attention is paid to the linguistic effects of migration, settlement, and communication patterns in order to explain major features such as yeismo, seseo, 2 pl. address, weakening of syllable-final /s/, neutralization of syllable-final /tr/ and /l/, and 2 sg. familiar address (voseo and tuteo). Related short sections broadly describe social variation in American countries, new distinctive dialects such as fronterizo, and the Spanish-based creoles Papiamentu and Palenquero.

Chap. 6, “Variation in Judeo-Spanish,” describes the history and characteristics of a now dying variety of Spanish. Finally, chap. 7 presents a chronological
summary of actions of status and corpus planning, the two aspects of the standardization process that have led to the present form of Standard Spanish.

As a whole, this book owes its value to the comprehensive view of the internal diversity within the limits of the Spanish-speaking world. Because of its focus on variation and change, however, it contrasts with similarly inclusive but more sociolinguistically oriented works (Mar-Molinero 1997, Silva Corvalán 1995). It is strongly recommended as essential background reading for hispanists in general and as an introductory account for dialectologists and sociolinguists before more in-depth studies of variation in American or Peninsular Spanish (e.g., Lipski 1994, Alvar 1996a, b) are examined.

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This fourth volume in the series “Language, Power and Social Process” is an excellent ethnographic and sociolinguistic study of youth culture in Barcelona. Joan Pujolar brings research on Catalan-Spanish bilingualism into the poststructuralist era without pretense or puffery. The book is a systematic exploration of bilingual practices in relation to the variable construction and performance of gender and class as well as ethnic identities. Drawing inspiration from Bakhtin, Pujolar has an acute – and, as far as I know, unerring – sensitivity to the voices of the Catalan context.

The book is based primarily on fieldwork in Barcelona in 1992 with 25 men and women in their late teens and early twenties, who formed the two cliques Pujolar calls the “Ramblers” and “Trepas.” Most of them were from Spanish-speaking homes, the children of working-class immigrants from other parts of Spain. However, they belonged to the first generation of students who had expe-
rienced substantial amounts of required schooling in Catalan. Pujolar set out to see how these young people experienced and reconstructed the class/ethnic divide that had been described in earlier anthropological studies of post-Franco Catalonia. He came to focus on the way that language contributes to shaping the world youths construct in peer-group activities.

Pujolar first took up his study by asking why so many young people in Barcelona refuse to use Catalan, and why some develop anti-Catalan feelings. His quick realization of the key role that gender divisions played in organizing youth identities and peer practices brought other questions to the fore. As a result, the book has an ambitious agenda that reaches beyond the study of language acquisition, maintenance, or shift. It addresses the reproduction of gender and class inequalities and the persistence of risk-seeking practices among young people, as well as the social positionings that they enact through language choices.

After a brief, efficient introduction to Catalan sociolinguistic history and politics, the book is divided into three parts. The first part explores social practices of the two cliques, especially as they organize and are organized by gender distinctions. The focus is on the relation of particular constructions of masculinity and femininity to cultural sensibilities and taste (in music, leisure activities, work, politics) and to transgression and risk-taking. The second part takes up linguistic practices in relation to the social practices and gender constructions that the first part has established. Pujolar looks not just at the mobilization of Catalan and Spanish as distinct languages, but also at uses of a repertoire of linguistic resources, including a stylized Andalusian accent and inner-city argot. The final section considers the foundation of these social-linguistic practices in experiences of social class, and the possibility of symbolic resistance to and practical restructuring of such experiences.

Pujolar draws from several theoretical approaches to develop a context-sensitive, politically committed sociology (p. 37). The work is informed by Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), treating discourse as constitutive of these young speakers’ social reality. However, CDA has not generally paid attention to particular languages and language varieties and the meaning of choices among them, leaving those issues to sociolinguists and linguistic anthropologists. Pujolar works to bring the two streams together. He also engages Bourdieu’s theories of practice and social reproduction. The principal analysis draws on Goffman’s dramaturgical approach, and most directly – as the title suggests – on Bakhtin’s concepts of heteroglossia, voicing, and dialogism.

The book is based in the claim that particular speech varieties (including consciously stylized accents) are used in youth-controlled contexts to construct views of the world and of speakers’ relationships with one another and with other groups. These views and relationships are seen as positionings within the macro-social structure that can result in reproduction or change of that structure. Following Bakhtin, Pujolar does not see meanings as given or finalized in linguistic forms, but rather as always open to re-accentuation and change.
Pujolar finds links among particular forms of gendering, ideological valuations of particular language varieties, and political positioning. The two cliques have different clusters of such practices. The Ramblers function as nearly exclusively Spanish-speaking in peer activities (despite Catalan capabilities that some put to work in other domains). The Ramblers men adhere to a gender ideology that Pujolar terms “simplified masculinity” — a valorization of unsophisticated naturalness, directness, and spontaneity, along with ritual displays of aggressiveness and transgression. All these qualities are projected through Spanish, particularly the stylized Andalusian accent, and a distaste for Catalan, which is constructed as artificial, formal, and effeminate. The Ramblers women generally display a “mainstream femininity” oriented toward intimacy, caring, and orderliness, as well as a more positive disposition toward Catalan.

The Trepas include some Catalan speakers and some members from middle-class backgrounds, despite a predominantly working-class and Castilian-speaking shared orientation. In contrast to the Ramblers, the Trepas generally adopt a self-consciously progressive gender identity, rejecting simplified masculinity and endorsing feminist constructions of masculinity as well as femininity. Theirs is a more socially aware, politicized identity, valuing transgression as a kind of activism. Along with this self-conscious positioning go certain positive stances toward and uses of Catalan.

Pujolar’s contrastive descriptions of the two groups never fall into caricature. Even within these small-scale networks, he finds “gender crossers,” individuals who try to construct different versions of their masculinity or femininity, and who participate within the group in practices associated with the other gender. The analysis of variable forms of masculinity is fuller, more acute, and more innovative than the analysis of females’ experiences, but the book directly addresses women’s as well as men’s agendas in these groups.

Despite the differences between their social ideologies and practices, Pujolar finds that both networks participate in a youth culture that involves closer identification with and greater use of Spanish linguistic resources than of Catalan. “Doing being young” (to use an ethnomethodological formulation that the book does not) gets done in Spanish in both cliques. The symbolic devaluation of Catalan as snobbish, stodgy, infantile, and unmasculine was performed by the linguistically mixed Trepas as well as the Ramblers. Although Pujolar shows that each language is heteroglossic and polyvalent, he also makes clear their growing symbolic specialization to construct different ideologies and identities and to say and do different things in the social world.

All points of the analysis are developed through the presentation and discussion of excerpts from conversational and interview data. Transcription conventions are set out clearly in the front sections of the book. This is not close linguistic transcription or analysis, and it adapts some of the usual conventions from Conversation Analysis. “Eye dialect” is used to represent the stylized Andalusian accent. Some readers will wish for more detailed representation and analysis of
the linguistic data. Many of the examples are given not in the original languages in the text but in English, no doubt to make the account more fluid and accessible for general readers; however, it’s not always obvious how the language of presentation was chosen for specific examples. Fortunately, original transcripts for all examples are given in an appendix. I was surprised that the author found only two typefaces necessary to index language variety. There is no discussion of any difficulty in deciding to which language any element belonged, and no marking of hybrid or polyvalent elements. Nonetheless, the level of detail is generally appropriate to the questions the book addresses.

Almost all of the book’s claims, both empirical and theoretical, ring true to me. Among its most admirable qualities is that it doesn’t oversimplify but still manages a clear and explicit analysis. Pujolar faces paradoxes and apparent contradictions frankly, but he avoids complicating maneuvers and posturing. I found the tone throughout very pleasing: honest, earnest, and even-handed even when taking issue with analyses or policies. This is a work that is neither naive nor cynical, and it resists easy, cheap criticism of both Catalanist and anti-Catalan positions.

As a Catalan committed to the promotion of that language as well as to a vision of social justice, Pujolar has an admittedly political as well as academic agenda. Although he does not make policy recommendations as such, he tries to develop an explanation of youth cultural practices that could be useful to language planners, social workers, and cultural activists. To that end, he emphasizes not external explanations of why, for example, young people drink heavily or don’t speak as much Catalan as planners hoped, but how these particular practices make sense in peer-dominated social contexts. The linguistic policy of “normalizing” Catalan comes to a dead end, he says, in part because activists lose sight of linguistic practice as a struggle over symbolic and economic capital, over class and gender as much as ethnic identity. Evading pessimism nonetheless, Pujolar briefly sketches the possibility of a dialogic, emancipatory politics of language that recognizes the twin dangers of ideological control and liberal laissez-faire support of hegemonic forms.

Pujolar’s book is a significant addition to recent anthropologically informed literature on young people in the language contact zone. I recommend it highly as a companion to work on this general topic by researchers such as Ben Rampton, Monica Heller, Jacqueline Urla, and Penelope Eckert. The writing is clearer and more enjoyably accessible than most of the anthropological and sociolinguistic work now on the American market. The book gives a particularly nice introduction to Bakhtin’s ideas in relation to this field of inquiry. I’m biased toward viewing the Catalan case as intrinsically interesting, but I believe the issues, approaches, and insights of this book will appeal to a broad audience. It should be useful and successful with students in upper division undergraduate as well as graduate courses in anthropology, sociology, sociolinguistics, and education.
Anita Puckett’s *Seldom ask, never tell* is an important, long-needed work that enables us to conceptualize “Appalachian speech” not only in terms of dialect or traditional aesthetic resources, but also according to characteristic “ways of speaking” and the ideology of pragmatics that informs them. Building on Irvine’s (1989) realization that “speech economy” is not merely a metaphor, Puckett has created a meticulous and insightful ethnography of the range of “requesting behaviors” that index and constitute the “socioeconomy” of a community in coalfield Appalachia.

Puckett’s theoretical goal is “to contribute to linguistic anthropological knowledge of the constitutive role played by language-in-use in the construction and constitution of language and political economic relations” (p. 5). Her ethical goal is to demonstrate the logic and efficacy of the system through which community members exchange goods and coordinate labor, thus defending them against misperceptions of Appalachians as stubborn, uncooperative, or lazy.

Puckett refuses to define Ash Creek people as “other,” in part because many of their interactional norms were familiar from her family background (12), yet she reflects evocatively on the learning process necessary for her to participate in the speech community. Readers may not keep straight the 36 individual interlocutors she describes in an appendix or remember details of community geography, yet we never forget that it is individuals, the ethnographer included, whose words and interactions we are studying. Puckett also gracefully navigates the minefield of representing the distinctiveness of a stigmatized variety. Her decision to represent present participles without a final g but also without an apostrophe to mark its supposed loss (*tellin*, not *tellin’*) strikes an important blow, insisting that the consistent use of *n* instead of *ng* in this position is a substitution made by speakers of many American English dialects, not an Appalachian deficiency (xiv).

Puckett builds her argument systematically, first laying out the terms and principles on which subsequent elucidation of specific speech practices depends. Chap. 2 describes local possessive constructions, revealing fundamental ideas about who may perform certain tasks or control certain tools or others’ labor. Chap. 3 explicates the structuring principles of participant frameworks based on local metapragmatic descriptors: “rights,” “place,” and “claims.” When asserting that an action or utterance is or is not “right,” people reference relations of equality or dominance legitimated by scriptural authority (and not by wealth or edu-
cation). When describing a person as in or not in her “place” to make certain requests, speakers index the requestor’s position within her “belongin” network. Individuals develop reciprocal “claims” on one another through ongoing interaction with people who meet “rights” and “place” criteria and have the ability to fulfill their “needs.” This structure enables Puckett to move beyond stereotypes expressed as blanket rules. Rather, in Ash Creek specific requesting behaviors are appropriate and effective between people in certain relationships and contexts, and not in others. The system is reinforced (and revealed to the ethnographer) by criticisms of inappropriate attempts, yet it is flexible because speakers continually negotiate and reinforce “claims” in ways that may transform their “place” in “belongin” networks.

Puckett offers comprehensive and revealing interpretations of the range of communicative practices (verbal and nonverbal) through which Ash Creek residents share labor, exchange goods and services, and access commodities and jobs from outside the community. Her practice of drawing on both tape-recorded conversations and field notes proves exceptionally effective. She often bolsters analysis of the principles on which speakers apparently relied in a transcribed excerpt with explicit metapragmatic commentary on an analogous interaction that she heard but could not record. Her presentation clarifies both the logic of Ash Creek speakers’ behavior and interpretations, and the ways in which outsiders run afoul of the system. The most approved way to garner assistance (chap. 4) is not to ask for it directly, but to tell a narrative about your “needs” to a person in the appropriate relationship who has the capacity to help and who understands that she should “volunteer.” Conversely, nonlocals’ use of please backfires because acting “proper” asserts superiority in terms not locally condoned. Direct “askin” is more appropriate in situations where money is exchanged (“tradin”) or in which access to resources is markedly unequal (chap. 5). The party in control receives loyalty but expends resources and time.

A salient aspect of Ash Creek speech ideology is adults’ emphatic resistance to orders: “Ain’t nobody tellin me what to do.” Imperative constructions are common, nevertheless. Many are not perceived as “orders.” Task-focused imperatives employed by the leader of a work group are expected when “helpin somebody out” (chap. 7). Utterances that are recognized as “orders” are appropriate only in dominant–subordinate relationships, from parents to children or from men to women – never between adult men – and even these are liable to be contested. Properly used, “orders” and compliance with them index love in close relationships, while directives voiced by someone not in the proper “rights,” “place,” and “claims” relation will evoke noncompliance, nonverbal “warnings,” or physical violence (chap. 8).

By focusing on her empirical data from Ash Creek, Puckett offers a cogent interpretation and defense of speaking practices familiar to others who study Appalachia. She thus provides a baseline for future study of variation and change in speaking patterns within the region. There are, nevertheless, three respects in
which readers may find her analysis frustrating. First, her argument would be extremely valuable for Appalachian Studies courses and in the preparation of medical personnel, teachers, and environmentalists who want to work in the region, but her presentation in this monograph is too technical to be accessible to those without linguistic training.

Second, Puckett confines herself to a synchronic interpretation that does not address how language-in-use might constitutively change, rather than simply reinstitute, local ideology and practice of communication. She goes far beyond the typology of ethnosemantic categories devised for her dissertation (7) to demonstrate how ideology and practice mutually reproduce each other. However, she depicts Ash Creek speaking practice as effectively a closed system, without reference either to historical development or to change in response to contemporary pressures. She provides concrete evidence that Ash Creek residents (despite their economic marginalization and desire for self-isolation) do have ties to the surrounding society, but her model of network does not recognize the strong influence toward linguistic innovation potentially exerted by weak ties connecting marginal members to outsiders (Milroy & Milroy 1992). It is thus difficult to judge whether the system truly resists change, or whether she has simply not documented it.

Finally, among the various possible approaches to “language ideology,” Puckett emphatically defines “ideology” as ideational rather than political, and as neutral rather than susceptible to criticism (see Woolard 1998). She unflinchingly reports data that would be highly susceptible to Marxist or feminist analysis: For instance, the only economic transaction with outsiders that locals find congenial is the impersonal interaction at large discount stores, while local businesses close because owners are so obligated to provide services free to their “belongin” network that they cannot support themselves; and the primary way to express “love” is to acquiesce in highly unequal gender roles. However, she eschews theoretical interpretation. This is a conscious and principled stance: “[P]robing how the indexical ‘facts’ expressed in socioeconomic interaction systematically construct relations among social beings, valued economic entities, and language has a more basic value that does manipulation of ethnographic observations and data to support or reject certain socioeconomic models” (215). I respect Puckett’s determination to stare down equally those who would label the Ash Creek socio-economy “dysfunctional” and those who would rush to its rescue. Speakers of Appalachian English are sick of outsiders telling them to change, and I admire Puckett’s ability to live her own lesson and refrain from joining that chorus. Figuring out how to communicate our conclusions to our research subjects and to solve problems along with them is much more easily theorized by philosophers (e.g., Schutte 2000) than accomplished in practice. Still, linguistic anthropologists must lead the way rather than shirk that duty. Ash Creek people live in poverty, and their speaking practices play a role (positive or negative) in constituting this economy. Who better than Anita Puckett to offer a constructive analysis?
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