REVIEWS


Reviewed by ARMIN SCHWEGLER
Spanish & Portuguese, University of California
Irvine, CA 92697-5275
aschwegl@uci.edu

Meant to be challenging, controversial, and even radical, McWhorter’s (McW) latest work on creole genesis may well be the most revisionist book on contact languages to appear since Bickerton’s Roots of Language (1981) and Thomason and Kaufman’s Language contact, creolization, and genetic linguistics (1988). It will therefore be required reading for anyone interested in the ongoing exploration of the origins of plantation creoles and of contact languages in general.

In the book under review, McW questions an enduring paradigm among linguists by claiming that the “limited access model” of creole genesis is seriously flawed. According to this reigning model – deeply rooted in creolist thought – plantation creoles of the New World and the Indian Ocean arose as a result of African slaves having had limited access to the dominant European language (the lexifier) spoken on the plantations. Access was, so the argument goes, unusually restricted because of a significant disproportion of blacks to whites. In such settings, slaves attempted, often successfully, to create a lingua franca (a pidgin or creole) on the basis of heavily constrained input from the dominant lexifier. Under the “limited access model” paradigm, plantation social structure is thus said to have acted as a linguistic filter or constraint.

As McW rightly points out, “limited access is not the sum total of anyone’s model,” but in the final analysis, “all work on plantation creole genesis uses some version of the limited access conception as a springboard” (1). For example, Thomason and Kaufman 1988 view fragmentary transmission of a lexifier as a key factor in the formation of creoles. Chaudenson 1979, 1992, who essentially considers (French) creoles as dialects of the lexifier, relates the variance between a creole and its lexifier to the advent of disproportion between slave and master. Bickerton’s Language Bioprogram Hypothesis (1981, 1984) “identifies ‘dilution’ of lexifier input, as slaves’ access to the dominant language recedes, as the source of creole genesis” (2).

Convinced that “creole studies is a field on the brink of a serious mistake” (1), McW urges creolists to revise their decade-long uncritical stance toward a model of genesis that, on closer scrutiny, is questionable because it leaves so many questions unanswered. But McW’s book goes well beyond merely finding fault with earlier work: He also proposes an audacious new account of creole genesis that is
meant to answer longstanding questions that the limited access hypothesis has been incapable of resolving. This new model he calls the Afrogenesis Hypothesis.

The most fundamental, and at the same time the most radical, aspects of the Afrogenesis Hypothesis are:

1. The Caribbean and Indian Ocean plantation creoles are all said to have originated in a West African pidgin spoken in trade settlements; this pidgin was then disseminated to the respective plantations at an early stage in their existence, thus functioning as linguistic seed among subsequent black slaves.

2. Pidginization, which created the plantation creoles, did not occur on the plantations themselves but rather took place in West Africa as a result of trade-settlement interaction between Europeans and Africans. Plantation creoles are thus hypothesized to be transplants of a West African pidgin.

3. Large plantation settings did not significantly filter, hinder, or impede the transmission of a European language to slaves. McW thus postulates that limited access to European languages did not play a key role in the initial genesis of plantation creoles.

To bolster his claims and to organize an impressive array of data (historical as well as linguistic) from a wide range of languages and geographic areas, McW divides his book into five main chapters of roughly equal length (Chaps. 2–6), plus an Introduction and Conclusion (Chaps. 1 and 7, respectively). The brief introduction (1–5) describes the “limited access model” and delineates the nature of the problems posed by this traditional hypothesis. Already, McW stresses that he does not subscribe to the views of Chaudenson 1979, 1992, and of Mufwene 1996 that plantation creoles are merely moderately transformed varieties of their lexifiers. Unlike Chaudenson and Mufwene, he assumes that creole genesis by definition begins with pidginization.

Past theories of creole genesis have suffered from a geolinguistic bias in that the vast majority of data were culled from English- and French-based creoles, thereby essentially ignoring Spanish American plantation contexts where demographic disproportion (high ratios of black slaves, very low ratio of “dominant” whites) would seem to have favored pidginization and/or creolization. As McW rightly points out, “creole genesis work on Spanish colonies has generally assumed that under the Spaniards, massive African labor crews were [exclusively] a phenomenon of nineteenth-century Cuba and Puerto Rico” (7). Nothing could be further from the truth: In the Chocó (western Colombia), for instance, the establishment in the 17th century of large-scale mining led to a situation where the proportion of whites to blacks never exceeded 1:20. In Chocó’s remote jungles, slaves working in riverine mines had little sustained contact with whites, and whatever whites there were rarely, if ever, worked alongside blacks. According to the “limited access model,” Chocó settlements should thus have been a canonical breeding ground for a contact language. As far as we know, however,
this and other isolated regions (e.g., the Chota Valley of highland Ecuador) where blacks predominated numerically never developed an Afro-Hispanic pidgin or creole. This is not to say that some African transfer did not take place in these settings, but it does mean that, in contrast to Sranan or Haitian, Chocó Spanish morphology has remained singularly robust (Schwegler 1991).

Chap. 2, “Where are the Spanish creoles?,” elaborates on these and related overlooked facts so as to substantiate McW’s claim that plantation or mining settings (like those of the Chota or the Chocó) never limited slaves’ access to the lexifier so much that they could achieve only pidgin-level command of the superstrate. What the evidence suggests, instead, is that adult slaves and children alike were indeed “capable of obtaining a viable second-language register of the lexifier” (201). According to McW, the synchronic evidence can be found all over South America and Mexico, where black speech is consistently devoid of creole features. The diachronic evidence comes from bozal Spanish (Cuba and elsewhere), which offers ample evidence for L2-like variation but not for pidginization or creolization.

To avoid misunderstandings, an immediate clarification is in order here. McW is not arguing that demographic disproportion is irrelevant to creole genesis: this would fly in the face of the well-known fact that plantation creoles are indeed more robust where demographic disproportion was high. What McW does propose is that situations of high disproportion of black to white preserved creoles, but did not create them. The author thus acknowledges that demographics are indeed vital in a creole’s life cycle, but claims that their role was not to generate pidginization: “If it were, Chocoanos would speak a creole” (205).

As mentioned above, McW hypothesizes that the Caribbean and Indian Ocean plantation creoles all originated in a West African pidgin spoken in trade settlements. This is tantamount to claiming that in these territories, plantation creoles arose only if an African trade pidgin was in fact implanted. According to McW – and this is the main thrust of Chap. 2, such a transplant did not take place anywhere in Spanish America because the Spaniards were the only European colonial power legally barred from trading in West Africa (so there was no Spanish trade pidgin); and, more to the point, the absence of Spanish-based creoles is so peculiar and anomalous that this in itself constitutes prima facie evidence against the “limited access model.” This second point is bolstered by the fact that a central West African Portuguese pidgin played an important role in the genesis context of the only two “Spanish-based” New World creoles: Papiamento and Palenquero (Schwegler, in press), both of which are often said to be Portuguese rather than Spanish creoles (the reason for this is that, while these two languages are clearly Spanish-based synchronically, they can be shown to have had an original Portuguese base).

Chap. 3 – “The Atlantic English-based creoles: Sisters under a skin” – seeks to demonstrate that even if it is applied solely to Atlantic English-based creoles (AECs), the “limited access model” still fails, except perhaps for the islands of
St. Kitts or Barbados, where creoles may indeed have formed in response to demographic disproportion. In this chapter, McW’s arguments are predominantly linguistic; he discusses a list of features (the locative copula *de*, the equative copula *da*, the 2nd person pl. pronoun *unu*, the anterior marker *bin*, and *self* as an adverbial) whose wide attestation among AECs had already been noted by Hancock 1969, 1986, 1987, on whom McW relies extensively. (McW’s arguments must be sharply distinguished from earlier related arguments in that, by McW’s own admission, many features common to AECs can be attributed to sub- or superstrate features and/or universals. The specific assembly of AEC features discussed by McW are, therefore, neither derivable from source languages nor universals. At the same time, “diffusion” via borrowing is also ruled out by McW [e.g., 91–93] as a possible explanation for the noted similarities among AECs.) The probing question McW asks is this: Given that the Anglophone Caribbean (other than Suriname) is essentially “a single speech community” (Holm 1989:446), how plausible is it that each, or even many, of the creoles spoken therein arose independently? His answer is that these creoles could not possibly have arisen independently within each colony (as the “limited access model” would require it), and that the comparative data presented by McW give every indication of having originated via a single encounter with English. If the AECs were really separate developments, one would expect them to be much more different from one another than they are. Keeping in mind both linguistic and socio-historical factors (not mentioned here), this suggests that a single English-based pidgin formed in a single place and was subsequently disseminated.

Where, then, is this single place from which that pidgin disseminated? Chap. 4, “The creationist at a cocktail party: Afrogenesis and the Atlantic English-based creoles,” answers that question. McW links AECs to a specific trade settlement, the Cormantin Castle of coastal Ghana, where slaves needed a communication vehicle for use with Englishmen; and he postulates that transportation of this pidgin English to the Caribbean must have taken place in the 1640s.

Around that time, Cormantin Castle slaves were all drawn from the surrounding locality and thus would all have spoken a dialect of Akan. McW further contends that, “often serving in positions of authority, these slaves served as models and teachers for sale slaves brought to the colony” (115). The pidgin of these African-born slaves thus became the model for the sale slaves and later evolved into AECs. Taken with pioneer settlers to other colonies, some of the new slaves who had acquired the creole in turn transmitted this new contact vernacular to slaves subsequently brought to that second colony from Africa. An English-based creole was thus diffused throughout the Caribbean, everywhere maintaining its essential structure, including the shared features mentioned above. According to McW, “Barbados would have been the most likely destination of castle slaves from Cormantin” (115). From there, it must have been brought to Suriname.
Much later (in the 1800s), Jamaican maroons brought it back to Sierra Leone in Africa, where it developed into Krio.

Nowhere in the book is the radical nature of McW’s genesis hypothesis more evident than in Chap. 2, where he insists that “all of the AEC owe their structure to one initial transplantation, from Ghana to St. Kitts or Barbados” (117; my emphasis). Tracing West African pidgins to the Caribbean creoles has always been tempting, but no one has ever proposed a scenario in which a few dozen (or hundred) slaves on a single ship became the creators of such numerous and widespread contact vernaculars. This, I suspect, is a conceptual leap that many readers will find difficult to accept.

In defense of McW’s thesis, there are a number of compelling arguments that make the “single transfer scenario” less radical than it might appear at first. In Chap. 2, McW outlines a sequence of sociohistorical inductions that suggest that AECs were indeed born in Africa and subsequently transferred to the Americas. The author furnishes historical evidence that documents the transshipment of slaves from Cormontin to Barbados around the key period (mid-16th century). He also shows that Sranan must already have existed in Suriname by the 1660s, well before any disproportion between blacks and whites had set in, which in turn suggests that Sranan may have been an import rather than a local creation. There also exists linguistic evidence that licenses his Cormantin Castle slave hypothesis. Comparative, historical, and synchronic analyses have consistently suggested that the vernaculars spoken on the West African coast from Ghana through Nigeria served as models for much of the structure of the AECs, thus relegating to a lesser status prominent languages (e.g., Kikongo) from other, equally important African slaving areas. One of the languages spoken within the Ghana area is Igbo. Strong Igbo influence in AECs has been noted repeatedly; the best-known feature perhaps is the 2nd person pl. pronoun *unu* (found in Sranan, Ndjuka, Saramaccan, Krio, Gullah, and others). One would expect that this strong Igbo bias was the result of a numerical dominance of Igbo-speaking slaves on Caribbean plantations, but this was by no means the case, because slaving activities in Igbo-speaking territories were consistently overshadowed by those in other regions (e.g., the Slave Coast or Congo area). How, then, can we account for the strong linguistic influence of Igbo in AECs? McW suggests (129) that the Igbos turned out to be not just a present but a dominant force precisely because they served as castle slaves in English forts, including Cormantin. If Igbos dominated the castle slave force for even a brief (but critical) period, then their transshipment to the Caribbean could, in McW’s view, set the stage for widespread linguistic influence once they arrived in Barbados or St. Kitts. Thanks to their early arrival in the colony, where a stabilized Afro-American speech repertoire had not yet been established, these castle slaves constituted a seed population and had a particularly profound effect on the unfolding language history of Caribbean colonies.
As should be clear by now, the Cormantin monogenetic hypothesis proposes a scenario that differs sharply from the old, more general monogenetic proposal of the 1960s, which traced all creoles back to an original Portuguese pidgin (Taylor 1956, Thompson 1961, Whinnom 1965). Besides assuming an English-based rather than a Portuguese-based pidgin source, McW’s proposal is founded on features that are not traceable to universals or source languages, and “upon numerous socio-historical and linguistic observations which point to a specific location where such a pidgin would have emerged” (134). McW’s hypothesis also differs from Hancock’s earlier proposition (1969, 1986, 1987) that the AECs descended from a single contact language between Europeans and Africans on the West Coast of Africa. It does so in part because McW rejects Hancock’s postulate that an ancestor of Sierra Leone Krio could be the primary source of AECs. Traditional hypotheses hold that Krio formed around 1800, when Jamaican maroons were transported to Freetown, and no truly convincing arguments have yet been offered that push the formation of Krio further back in time. For that reason, Krio cannot be a plausible monogenetic source for AECs.

Chap. 5 – “Off the plantation for good: The French-based creoles” – argues against the plantation-based polygenesis approach held by all leading scholars of French plantation creoles (FPCs). As McW rightly points out, “Afrogenesis is held in distinctly faint regard by some FPC specialists” (176). Moreover, few if any scholars of FPC genesis have ever bothered to test their hypotheses against a wider database so as to include the Latin American context.

In this chapter, McW lends further support to his monogenetic hypothesis by showing that all FPCs of the Atlantic and Indian oceans can plausibly be traced back to a single West African pidgin ancestor. Thus Mauritian Creole and Haitian Creole, for instance, are said to stem from the same encounter with French, not separate ones. Once again, McW places the locus of the original donor pidgin in a specific Senegal trade settlement, on the Île de Bieurt (later called St. Louis), where the French established a trade settlement in 1638. The author argues that the existence of seven shared features in the FPC data deliver the coup de grâce to the “limited access model.” Among these shared features are certain preverbal tense-mood-aspect markers (e.g., completive Haitian fin / Mauritian (f)in); the “exposed position” copula ye; the predicate negator napa (< Fr. n’a pas ‘has not’); and the postnominal placement of the determiner -la, as in tab-la ‘table-the = the table’. Within the Caribbean, these similarities potentially could be attributed to intercolonial movements, but for Mauritius – on the opposite side of the globe – no such socio-historical intersection can be posited. Crucially, however, Mauritius and Haiti were both supplied with slaves from Senegal’s trade settlements. According to McW, this historical connection, combined with other facts including the above mentioned linguistic data, suggests that the FPCs, like the AECs, arose as ordinary work pidgins rather than as limited access-based plantation creoles. To McW’s credit, the cross-linguistic data presented are not
idealized to the point where only similar constructions are highlighted. Thus, the author does not claim, for instance, that the FPCs all make exactly the same etymological choices for their TMA markers, as they clearly do not. Nevertheless, the overlap among the choices is too great to be attributable to chance, especially when two geographically very distant vernaculars, Haitian and Mauritian, pattern exactly the same way. More to the point, attributing creoles simply to language contact, as some scholars have done (e.g., Mufwene 1996), “undergenerates” the data, according to McW. Plantation creoles combine three traits that otherwise are found only in pidgin: absence of inflection, tonelessness, and no noncompositional derivation–root combinations (for elaboration of the typological distinctiveness of creoles, see McWhorter 1998).

The final section of Chap. 5 examines the applicability of the “limited access model” to Portuguese creoles. In this case, the model can be rejected easily because no Portuguese creole has developed amid conditions of sharp demographic disproportion (apart from Cape Verdean, Portuguese creoles were all the product of marriages between Portuguese men and local women). But this naturally raises the question of why no Portuguese creole developed in Brazil. McW is explicit on this point: He postulates that in Brazil, no founding contingent of Portuguese-pidgin-speaking trade settlement slaves ever arrived from Africa (204).

Chap. 6 synthesizes the main points and revises pertinent theoretical issues raised by the findings in the previous chapters. In doing so, the author answers several questions that arise naturally from the theoretical proposals he has made. For instance: If it was indeed the case, as McW argues, that the lexifier was far more available to the slaves than is traditionally assumed, then why would they have insisted in so many places on developing their own special language, rather than adopting the superstrate itself? The answer, says McW, is found in the slaves’ association between linguistic expression and black identity; but, and here we return to the book’s central argument, “the recruitment of a West-African-born pidgin as a vehicle of black identity occurred only where a pidgin had been imported in the first place” (203). What ultimately determined whether a lexifier was pidginized (and later creolized) was the degree of motivation to acquire the lexifier. Following this reasoning, such motivation must have been higher in Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking territories of Latin America than in those where AECs or FPCs are in use today.

I hope the preceding remarks have made clear that The missing Spanish creoles: Recovering the birth of plantation contact languages is an unusually ambitious and thought-provoking book. Eminently familiar with the latest theoretical trends in contact linguistics, and well acquainted with both a wide range of creole languages and the history of the transatlantic slave trade, McW has produced a work whose Sturm und Drang approach may well engender the kind of lively (even heated) discussion that followed the publication of Bickerton’s Roots of language (1981). The extent to which his monogenetic hypothesis may eventu-
ally find acceptance among creolists cannot be assessed here, because an extensive critical revision by specialists of various theoretical and linguistic backgrounds is needed first. I will say, however, that although I generally find his proposal inspiring, his arguments and data analyses are not always airtight. For instance, like others before him, he assumes that the predicate negator *napa* (Haiti and Mauritius) is by necessity the product of a process of pidginization that involved the reinterpretation (or “misinterpretation”) of French *n’a pas* ‘has not’. Assuming that fossilized *napa* does not exist in French, he concludes that its attestation in both Haitian and Mauritian is strongly indicative of a common source (i.e., a West African pidgin). On the face of it, McW’s conclusion is plausible, but there exists an alternative – and, in my view, more plausible – explanation, a purely dialectal French origin. As a close inspection of French linguistic atlases reveals (for references and details see Schwegler 1983, 1988), *n’a pas* coalesced into monomorphemic *napas* [napa] in several French dialects where language-internal developments (negation cycles) rather than pidginization triggered the reinterpretation from ‘has not’ to simply ‘not’. It is thus entirely possible that Mauritian and Haitian *napa* is a direct transfer from one or several continental French dialects.

In discussing the genetic connections of Palenquero, McW relies excessively on Granda’s early 1978 work, thereby subscribing to the idea – no longer held even by Granda himself – that the creoles of São Tomé and Palenquero are directly related. Although there is no denying that some of Colombia’s slaves were shipped via São Tomé, currently available evidence simply does not allow us to postulate that the creole of that island constituted the linguistic seed from which Palenquero evolved. McW is also, at times, insufficiently critical of certain etymologies that have been proposed. For example, Granda’s claim (1978:455–62), that Palenquero *bobo* ‘speak’ (supposedly a ritual term) comes from Kikongo *vóva* is simply an error (*bobo* does not exist in Palenque, and is the result of a false transcription in Escalante 1954:82). In other instances, the author reaches “firm” conclusions that are not supported by currently observable facts. He argues (29) that schoolroom chastisement and negative evaluation by outsiders of certain black dialects (e.g., that of the Chocó) constitute insufficient pressure to cause the abandonment of long-established speech forms. In his view, it is erosion of social rather than linguistic pressure that causes once vibrantly transmitted dialects to disappear. As it turns out, however, modern-day Palenque is a clear counterexample to McW’s claim. There one can observe an abrupt generational language shift away from the creole in the direction of Spanish, despite the fact that self-identification with and social allegiance to Palenque may never have been greater than today (Schwegler & Morton MS). After having lived in that community over prolonged periods of time (1985–1996), I am convinced that schooling and critical evaluation of the creole by outsiders are the principal (though not the only) causes for the abandonment of the local speech.

Finally, McW’s interpretation of currently available evidence is, at times, overly categorical. One can perhaps agree with him that the Chocó, the Chota Valley,
Mexico, Venezuela, and Peru may never have harbored a widespread Afro-Hispanic creole, but the absence of reliable historical and linguistic evidence makes it simply too risky to argue outright that the same territories had never imported an Afro-Iberian pidgin (203). The truth is that we simply do not know at this juncture whether such a contact vernacular was ever spoken anywhere in the Americas.

These are, however, relatively minor quibbles when compared to the overall merit of McW’s fascinating book. Written in an engaging style, neatly typeset, and virtually free of typographic errors, this is an impressive work and a valuable resource for further exploration of genesis theory.

REFERENCES


(Received 22 October 2000)
LEELA TANIKELLA


Reviewed by LEELA TANIKELLA
Anthropology, University of Texas at Austin
Austin, TX 78712
ltanikella@mail.utexas.edu

Following a long tradition in anthropology and linguistics, introductory textbooks typically claim that all languages are equal and have an equal potential for communication and thought. The theoretical model posed in this anthology, as articulated by contributor Angela Gilliam, similarly suggests that “all languages are equal in terms of their expressive potential” (p. 84). However, editor Arthur K. Spears and the contributors aim to situate linguistic relativity within a framework of political, social, economic, and (most centrally) racial inequalities. The key theme of the collection is the centrality of politics, particularly what Spears terms “racial hierarchies of oppression” (13), in the study of language and linguistic diversity. As the contributors provide detailed historical, economic, and social frameworks for their studies, they demonstrate a claim made by Dell Hymes more than two decades ago that linguistic relativity “omits the costs and the constitutive role of social factors” (1973: 64). Thus, this edited volume challenges the tradition of claiming linguistic equality and demonstrates sociolinguistic inequality; it is part of a theoretical movement in this direction also exemplified by Zentella 1995, Hymes 1996, Schieffelin, Woolard & Kroskrity 1998, and Kroskrity 2000.

The contributors to this anthology work primarily in the fields of anthropology and linguistics, and their chapters include topics critical to current research on race and racism in the US and in several developing countries. Spears’s introduction and afterword provide the theoretical framework for the anthology. Spears states that the chapters are concerned with discourse, “but also with policies, images, institutions, and facets of popular culture” (17). Thus, the volume is concerned with “social discourse,” which includes “all that which is typically said in a society, group, or an institutional setting or otherwise communicated, for example, via non-linguistic communication” (35). Social discourse reflects the ideology of racist state practices and manifests itself in social inequalities and social stratification, but it also provides the space and opportunity for creativity and collective movements for social change. Thus, Spears situates the study of language within its social contexts, and the contributors explore both the agency and the complicity that researchers demonstrate in analyzing racist structures.

Spears states that the chapters in this collection are “about the struggle for cultural freedom in the face of the constraining force of race/racism, both nationally and globally” (16). He maintains an “optimism” (8) that is evident in his inclusion of two chapters written by undergraduate students in his anthropology classes in film and television at the City College of the City University of New York.
York. This commitment to developing critical readings of race and culture among undergraduates demonstrates “the importance of encouraging participation in cultural analysis at all levels of the university (and public school systems) in addition to within society in general” (8). Spears places this anthology within a framework of anti-racist theory and practice. His introduction can be situated with the work of other scholars who analyze white privilege and its centrality to the maintenance of racial hierarchies and social inequalities in the US (cf. Goldberg 1993, Lipsitz 1998). Spears asserts that because white privilege is a crucial factor in determining social position within the US and the world capitalist system, articulating an anti-racist identity requires a “resignation from whiteness” or a rejection of “inequalities and forms of exploitation” (16).

The contributions to this collection fall into two broadly defined parts: linguistic, symbolic, and institutional manifestations of race and racism; and language and symbolism in popular culture that exemplify racial situations in the US. Part 1 begins with Spears’s discussion of language and culture in education, with particular attention to the 1996–1997 Ebonics debate. Spears suggests that “prestige languages (or dialects) owe their status primarily to factors that are ultimately political and/or economic, not to any inherent superiority claimed on the basis of grammatical features” (66), thus situating language within a political context in relation to state power. He also suggests that “language attitudes are basically attitudes about people” (70); thus, the Ebonics debate was part of a discourse of fear perpetuated by institutional racism and socio-economic inequality. The chapters by Angela Gilliam and Yves Dejean can be read together, along with the Spears chapter, as a comment on the relationships among national language use, state power, and the choice of language for use in mass education. Emphasizing the impact of social relations and historical processes in the neo-colonial situation of contemporary Papua New Guinea, Gilliam suggests that direct linguistic interventions must supplement linguistic and cultural resistance as part of a community’s response to colonialism to further linguistic development (89).

The chapters by Lee D. Baker and Pem Davidson Buck deal specifically with institutional manifestations of race. Baker clearly situates his examination of forms of address in a number of office settings within the dialectical relationship between structure and agency: “On the one hand, people’s everyday lives are shaped by legal, economic, bureaucratic, political, or state structures; but on the other, people shape their everyday lives to resist or manipulate the structural forces that oftentimes repress them” (116). Analyzing forms of address to determine where power resides in office settings, Baker critiques ethnic diversity as a means of shifting power in institutional settings. He suggests that affirmative action does not go far enough to address power differentials in professional settings. Buck provides an excellent overview of the prison industrial complex and increasingly militaristic law-and-order practices, along with the attendant racist rhetoric that justifies such racist practices to the general public. Buck situates this
discussion within a clearly politicized reading of this rhetoric as legitimating the exploitation and “super-exploitation” of communities of color.

An interesting but not elaborated theme in this edited volume traces the role of anthropologists and other scholars in combating social inequalities. Both Baker and Ian Hancock examine the role of scholars in perpetuating and also in critiquing racist structures. Hancock questions academic complicity in the perpetuation of stereotypes and the exoticization of the Romani, or Gypsy, population (111). Baker asks, “What can linguistic anthropology offer to help explain the menacing problem of the color line?” (116) He suggests that it may be effective to “draw from the discourse of anthropologists interested in issues of political economy who employ ethnographic methods to interrogate how culture is woven into social structure and how culture affects people as social agents” (116). Thus, the emphasis in this anthology on the centrality of politics in the study of language and linguistic diversity can provide theoretical and practical material to examine collective organizing and group agency within the framework of structural forces.

Part 2 contains cultural analyses of television, film, and rap recordings; it reinforces several key themes of the anthology, particularly the importance of placing linguistics within social and cultural contexts. Contributor Jon Yasin provides a comprehensive examination of rap from a historical standpoint that emphasizes the agency of African Americans and their continued critiques of racist social environments. The contributions by Brenda Abalos and Donovan G. Whylie examine the inclusion of negative racial stereotypes in television shows and films produced by people of color. The chapters by Abalos and Whylie, who are undergraduate students, provide a model for undergraduate-level popular culture analysis. These chapters also add to the relevance that this edited volume may have as part of an introductory anthropology or linguistics course, emphasizing not only linguistic and cultural relativity but also language and culture in the context of existing social inequalities and social stratification. This anthology is an excellent resource for scholars interested in examining race, racism, and social inequalities as crucial aspects of the study of language.

REFERENCES

Reviewed by LEILA MONAGHAN
Anthropology, Temple University
Philadelphia, PA 19122
monaghan@temple.edu

Lynn Messing and Ruth Campbell’s *Gesture, speech and sign* provides an interesting overview of the fields of gesture and sign language research, including work by a number of the best-known names in the field. The strongest chapters have fascinating insights from psychology, neuropsychology, and Deaf studies on the interconnections between language and gesture. Paul Ekman catalogs different kinds of gestures found accompanying speech, including “emblems,” or socially learned gestures with consistent meaning like “the finger”; “illustrators,” like deictic pointing gestures; “manipulators,” which include scratching and fiddling with hair; “regulators,” the gestural equivalents of the “uh-huhs” and “mmms” of the attentive listener; and “emotional expressions” such as smiles and tears.

David McNeill, using descriptions of the retelling of the adventures of Sylvester and Tweety Bird, argues that interactions should be analyzed from the point of view of “growth points” of thoughts. He focuses on “illustrators” and their relationship to accompanying speech. This “unit of thinking irreducibly includes imagery and linguistic categorical content. This image-category is then ‘unpacked’ into an utterance with a gesture” (79). People have ideas, then translate them into words (items organized in “grammatical structures”) and gestures.

Although McNeill does not directly address sign language issues, his notion of a unit of thinking that includes speech and gesture is readily accepted by the sign language researchers and some of the other authors in *Gesture, speech and sign*. Justine Cassell, for example, uses the notion of a “single mental representation” to develop a model of human–computer interactions, including both verbal and nonverbal modalities. Susan Goldin-Meadow discusses the differences in the development of gestures in hearing and Deaf children. Hearing children at the one-word stage of linguistic development frequently gesture without speaking. As these children grow older, however, their usage becomes like that of the adults described by McNeill. Deaf children with no access to either spoken language or a conventional sign language like American Sign Language (ASL) use gesture differently from their hearing peers or from the hearing adults around them. They develop a large and varied systematic set of iconic gestures with a simple syntax.
Karen Emmorey also distinguishes between gestures and sign language, not between individuals but within single individuals’ repertoires. Gesture is one resource people call on when telling stories. A scene where a boy tells his dog to “be quiet and come look at some frogs” is done almost entirely in gestures and includes the miming of “come-on” and “shh.” The relation between gestures and signs here is similar to that between vocables and spoken language – both are parts of a communicative system that is seen as being outside normal linguistic constraints.

Signs that are part of conventional languages like ASL have a number of strict phonological and syntactic constraints, such as what shapes hands can take and when movement can take place during signs. Gestures, by contrast, do not have to follow these constraints. Emmorey’s most interesting argument is that because sign language and manual gestures make use of the same raw materials – hands moving in space – some types of gestures, like deictic references, coincide with signs in a way not possible in speech (with one movement, “Bob” can both be signed and pointed to). Other channels, such as facial expressions and body movements, can be layered over signed linguistic forms in much the same way that manual, facial and body gestures can overlie speech.

The late William Stokoe and Marc Marschark take an evolutionary perspective and argue that the distinction between gestures and signs is a fuzzy one. They provide (although very briefly) the best discussion in the book of the influence of cultural variation on gestures. Anglo-American and Japanese cultures – literate cultures with notions of “proper” ways of speaking influenced by books and scrolls – are seen as relatively low-gesturing societies and are contrasted to ancient Greece and Rome, where orators learned to gesture formally as part of their training to speak. Stokoe and Marschark’s basic argument is that “language had to begin with gestures . . . only gestures can look like or point to or otherwise visibly reproduce what they mean . . . vocal sounds alone cannot connect to meanings unless the makers and hearers of the sounds have agreed on the rules for connecting them” (178).

Lynn Messing looks at the issues involved in trying to communicate simultaneously in both speech and signing. Fully grammatical signing and speaking cannot occur at the same time at a normal rate, but a person who is trying to do both (referred to as “simultaneous communication”) can use a variety of strategies, including dropping words or morphemes from either or both of the communicative channels. Interesting forms of code-switching occur, however. Messing presents data on how English speakers familiar with sign language code-switch into signing while speaking. Normal gesturing during speech is influenced by sign language if signers are not self-consciously trying to suppress their ASL-like movements.

The picture we get from these articles (most of which are in the second half of the book) is that languages are perhaps best seen as islands of order within larger
seas of meaningful and even meaningless sound and movement. Although Ekman leaves out sign language in his categorization, Messing describes a similar categorization by Kendon 1988a and McNeill 1992 that includes signing: “gesticulation → language-like gestures → pantomimes → emblems → sign languages” (191). This, she claims, better reflects the range of meaningfulness. A similar spectrum would be possible for spoken languages – for example, random vocal noises → onomatopoeia → stylized vocables (e.g. doo-wop lyrics) → full spoken language. Although it is impossible fully to do any two languages, signed or spoken, at the same time, any function that is not quite a full language can be mixed in with the primary channel (hearing signers, for example, sometimes add a “pffffff” sound to the sign “i-don’t-understand” to imply thoughts rapidly passing by). As Campbell points out, lip movements, facial expressions, full-body gestures, eye gaze, and vocal expressions – including all forms of emotional displays – can add to the messages given, voluntarily or involuntarily, at any time.

I think the balance between which of these systems of expression is considered more important will be found to vary considerably across cultures. Kendon’s work in Aboriginal Australia (1988b) and southern Italy (1995) and Brenda Far nell’s work on Plains Indian Sign Language (1995) show relationships between gesturing (or signing) and speaking very different than what is common in mainstream US culture. McNeill’s notion of thought units that include both gestures and speech is a useful heuristic when we examine these multiple interactions. As Goldin-Meadow’s work shows, there is also a built-in tendency to having an ordered meaning system. If children are not exposed to a conventional one, they will make up their own.

I found the articles that did not refer to sign language to be the least engaging parts of the book. Whereas the researchers informed by sign language studies are aware of work in gesture research, some of the gesture researchers do not seem aware of work in sign language, and they seem the poorer for it. Krauss and Hadar disagree with the notion that gestures are communicatively important and instead argue that they are used mainly as part of word search functions. Pierre Feyereisen provides a useful and detailed review of work on the “neuropsychology of communicative movements,” but the denseness of the material makes it an uneasy companion to the rest of the articles in the book. In contrast, David Corina, who writes on aphasia and apraxia in ASL users, provides a much more accessible account of the effect of illnesses like strokes and Parkinson’s disease on language and gesture use in signing patients.

The odd fit between the gesture researchers and sign language researchers also causes problems for the overall structure of the book. Although the preface feels internally logical, there is a mismatch between the order in which the editors discuss the chapters and the order of the chapters themselves; this seems to reflect the difficulty they had in drawing all these pieces together into a whole. The piece most emblematic of these problems, however, is Messing’s brief introduction to sign language. It is a short, clear summary of the topic, useful to students of all
ages and horrifyingly basic. I was saddened to see that, after 40 years of research on sign languages, common-sense points like “There are no universal sign languages” and “American Sign Language is a real language” still need to be made. It is a problem far larger than this book, of course, and it has a profound impact on the lives of Deaf people everywhere. The American children studied by Goldin-Meadow, for example, should not have needed to invent their own gesture systems in order to communicate.

This book is recommended to anyone interested in a summary of the current perspectives on gesture, speech and sign. It is particularly recommended for those interested in rich data on and discussions of the nature of language. People wishing to educate themselves more on these topics should also look at McNeill’s (1992) *Hand and mind* and Kendon’s (1994) anthropologically informed review. Bellugi and Klima’s (1979) work is still the most accessible introductory review of sign language structure, and Gallaudet University Press offers a wide selection of more up-to-date books on sign language and Deaf cultural issues.

REFERENCES

(Received 15 January 2001)


 Reviewed by ROMAN KOPYTKO

*English Department, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland.*

kopytko@main.amu.edu.pl

The book under review is a special one in regard to both content and form. The rich content of *Against essentialism* (AE) includes philosophical, linguistic, and social claims as well as the interrelationships between them. The form of AE is a continuation of a respectable tradition of dialogical and argumentative writing from Plato to Feyerabend. However, the focus of Janicki’s investigations is not
Feyerabend and his iconoclastic principles – for example, “Anything goes,” or the critique of the scientific method that is, Feyerabend’s contribution to post-modern thought – but rather Popper’s (1945) rejection of Aristotelian essentialism (cf. Janicki 1990). The main goals of AE are clear: first, to show the errors and harmfulness of essentialist thinking, the unjustified belief in the importance and power of definitions (or defining concepts and terms in sciences), and the claim that words and their definitions adequately reflect physical, mental or social reality; and second, to propose language awareness as a remedy that can alleviate the problems produced by the uncritical acceptance of essentialist ideology and philosophy. The main object of Janicki’s critique is the social-scientific insistence on providing definitions of all concepts, including those that in reality cannot be defined. The eight dialogues in AE deal with crucial aspects of language use and its consequences for human (mis)communication, interpersonal relations, and various other social phenomena.

Dialogue 1, “How we like what we do not understand,” is a witty and instructive presentation of the problems associated with incomprehensible language use.

Dialogue 2, “Do linguists need to know about philosophy?,” focuses on the relationship between philosophy and linguistics. Janicki insists on the importance of philosophical commitment as a basic factor that facilitates dialogue and mutual understanding among scholars. This postulate seems to be obvious and uncontroversial, but not all practitioners in the sciences care to observe it. Janicki presents people explicitly committed to essentialism as believers in the existence of an objective truth, analyzed in terms of essences, which can be known – and these people also believe that they know truth better than others do. He suggests a strict relation among language, cognition, and social action. In his view, language may be and frequently is the main culprit responsible for human tragedy.

Dialogue 3, “On the tyranny of words,” focuses on words and their meanings. The main claim in this dialogue is that, in contrast to essentialists, non-essentialists believe that meanings are attributed to words by language users and, therefore, do not reside in the words themselves. A typical essentialist language user is convinced that he or she uses the only correct words to express an intended meaning. The following undesirable consequences ensue: “If you believe that you (and not your interlocutor) are in possession of the right meaning of words, you will as a consequence of that belief, tend to also believe that you see things correctly (as opposed to your interlocutor) that you analyze phenomena around you correctly, that you pass correct judgments, formulate correct opinions about people, etc. In other words, you will tend to think of yourself as infallible” (p. 64).

Dialogue 4, “On cognitive linguistics,” discusses what is, according to Janicki, one of the very few positive developments in non-essentialist linguistics. Cognitive linguistics, he writes, radically breaks the ties with Aristotelian essentialism. His main claim is that all concepts are fuzzy and to varying degrees imprecise. Janicki also suggests that linguistic objects and phenomena such as flexibility, creativity, and the treatment of metaphor in cognitive linguistics are in
Dialogue 5, “Why we misunderstand each other,” suggests that the main source of misunderstanding is the experiential grounding of concepts – the assumption that language users learn their concepts in their daily experience by talking to people, reading, writing, playing, and so on. Because our personal and interactional experiences are different, our concepts are significantly different from those of our interlocutors. As a result, misunderstanding is a frequent phenomenon in interaction and should be expected rather than viewed as surprising or unusual.

Dialogue 6, “On language-related conflicts,” presents an interface between human conflict and essentialist beliefs. Dialogues 6 to 8 reveal Janicki’s pro-social attitude and his desire to suggest some remedies and solutions to social problems, including the language-related conflicts that frequently spring from essentialist thinking. He maintains that “essentialism leads to a host of disagreeable phenomena, the most salient of which are: dogmatism, unwarranted feelings of certainty, dislike of criticism, a sense of infallibility, conceitedness, intolerance, authoritarian argumentation, disregard for other people’s beliefs and opinions, and a sense of power” (135). This dialogue is particularly interesting because the discussion of language-related conflicts is enriched and illustrated with data from real political, social, and religious conflicts in Poland (1989–1997). Such issues as abortion, censorship, Christian values, and the debates around them are adequately presented.

Dialogue 7, “The political correctness debate,” is, in Janicki’s view, highly relevant to the essentialism versus non-essentialism dichotomy. He maintains that essentialism is, first of all, associated with the political-linguistic practice of the political right. An important conclusion for the debaters in this dialogue is that social tension in language-related conflicts can be considerably alleviated or remedied by means of the changes in linguistic usage also advocated by followers of “political correctness.”

Dialogue 8, “Education against essentialism: why we need new words,” suggests practical solutions to social-linguistic problems. This is an optimistic and edifying dialogue on the possibility of protecting ourselves from the undesirable consequences of linguistic essentialism: interpersonal, intergroup, and international conflicts and misunderstandings. Janicki’s admirable pro-social attitude pervades the dialogue.

One of Janicki’s main observations, and complaints, is the fact that a large number of concepts have no lexical representation. The interlocutors in the dialogue discuss the inadequacies associated with the use of words such as catholic and communist, which, in fact, may refer to a variety of concepts. According to Janicki, promotion of non-essentialism could rely on the following recommendations: “We should teach that words are not sacred things which religious people treat with awe. We should teach that definitions of words should not be taken...”
seriously. We should teach that words do not have one correct meaning and that deviations from what might be the typical meaning of a word should not be seen as deplorable departures from some one central meaning. We should teach that words are not the things that they refer to. We should teach that words are best understood as convenient tools for handling reality. If the tools appear to be bad, outdated, or inconvenient, we should try to invent new ones” (226).

I hope that, this brief presentation of the major themes in non-essentialist dialogues (1–8) will encourage some readers to become acquainted with Janicki’s message in more detail. His program certainly deserves it. This book is flawless in presentation and exemplification of the linguistic issues associated with philosophical non-essentialism, the threats of essentialist thinking, and social remedies. The method of discussion by means of interpersonal dialogues has both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, the reader may be attracted by the informal style of presentation, the accessibility of complex and difficult scientific or philosophical questions, or the delight in taking part as the third party (or perhaps the referee) in the verbal exchange. On the other hand, the form of a verbal dialogue may oversimplify the problems under discussion. Janicki, however, carefully avoids these traps most of the time.

To conclude, Janicki’s message is important and deserves more attention and consideration. He is certainly “essentially” right in his non-essentialist claims. The role of language in a great number of complex social phenomena – interpersonal, intergroup and international conflict, social influence, language control, and language deception – has not yet received adequate description and explanation. Janicki’s book is a step in the right direction. Obviously, his attempt to redress the balance between dominant, unjustified and irrational essentialist thinking and the emerging pro-social, non-essentialist view of social reality can only be applauded. According to Janicki, linguistics is not an art for art’s sake; its social functions are numerous and should be fully accounted for. The author of AE does not make categorical claims (which is in accordance with his non-essentialist credo). His judgments are honest, well-thought-out, and socially useful. The first round of his fight against essentialism has been a spectacular success for the cause of non-essentialism, but the fight has not yet ended.

In sum, this is an extremely valuable book and a must for those uninitiated into the linguistic disputes of modern times – not just students but also their instructors. In addition, it is recommended to all who might wish to reconsider their attitudes towards linguistic essentialism and the relation between science and the philosophy of science.

REFERENCES


(Received 19 March 2001)
Characterizing the discourse functions of linguistic expressions is surely one of the most difficult tasks in linguistic analysis. The starting point for any study of discourse functions is the examination of naturally occurring data; the limiting factor is the lack of well-developed theoretical frameworks for understanding language use. Still, a good descriptive study has lasting value, and empirical claims invite further analysis. Overstreet’s study of the “general extenders” or something, and everything, and other members of this class makes a solid contribution on both fronts.

The book, which is based on Overstreet’s 1995 dissertation, presents an analysis of ten hours of conversation, supplemented with data from other sources. The perspective is firmly interactional: Formal accounts are reviewed and rejected in favor of a focus on the interpersonal dimensions of language use. The central claim is that “general extenders serve to mark an assumption of shared knowledge and experience, which may help to maintain a sense of rapport among the interlocutors” (18). Thus, for example, by uttering “She looks like she works in a grocery store or something,” the speaker conveys an assumption of shared knowledge: that the hearer knows what she means (73). By marking inexplicit information as shared, even if it is not, the speaker builds rapport with the hearer.

What is appealing about this analysis is that it appears to finesse an issue that has perplexed other analysts: What exactly is meant by “X or something,” and what (semantic and pragmatic) principles govern the understanding and use of such expressions? In an early exploration of and/or tags, Ball and Ariel 1978 propose that the basic functions of or something can be derived from the functions of or and the functions of something (like that): “to express non-commitment to the tagged element, while suggesting a vague set of alternatives along the lines of the first.” Speakers may be noncommittal because they don’t know or don’t remember, and they may choose to be vague because there is no need to be precise, or in order to highlight connotations of the tagged element by implicit comparison. Ward and Birner 1993 provide a detailed account of the semantics and pragmatics of and everything, arguing that the interpretation of and everything involves replacing the entire conjunction with a variable whose value is an inferrable set. Ward and Birner observe that speakers may choose not to specify other members of the set for a variety of reasons – for example, “because they are irrelevant, unmentionable, inferrable from the evoked element, or simply unknown” (1993:209).

Overstreet characterizes these approaches as narrowly “psycholinguistic,” by which she seems to mean that previous analysts of these expressions have fo-
cused on the cognitive rather than the interpersonal. Although actual psycholinguistic studies would doubtless be illuminating, interactional sociolinguistic accounts of linguistic phenomena clearly have much to contribute to our understanding of human language. After a useful discussion of intersubjectivity, in Chap. 5 Overstreet proceeds to develop her own analysis of general extenders as interactional markers (cf. Schiffrin 1987) and, more specifically, as markers of intersubjectivity. In support of this analysis, Overstreet observes that in her data, general extenders co-occur with *you know* (1a), which has been identified by Schiffrin as a marker of shared experience; and like *you know*, they seem to elicit displays of understanding, as shown in ex. (1b):

(1a) Maya: … if she’s gonna go through labor and delivery and she’s gonna have a baby and all this stuff (.5) you know I’d like to be able to be there.

(1b) Anne: Wull that’s the way – that’s who I was until
Roger: Uh huh
Anne: I got a PhD or something
Roger: Oh, okay. Right.

In Chap. 6, Overstreet turns to politeness, focusing on *and stuff* as a “marker of invited solidarity as interactive partner, much like *you know*.” In subsequent chapters, she looks at the use of *or something* as a Quality hedge and the use of adjunctive general extenders (e.g. *and stuff*) as Quantity hedges. The final chapter includes a discussion of each of the major types of general extenders found in her data.

This is a readable and engaging work that makes a contribution to our understanding of general extenders and opens up new territory for further analysis. In the interests of further contributing to that enterprise, however, it may be useful to draw attention to a few issues. The first set of issues revolves around the data. Although it was not standard practice in 1995 (the date of Overstreet’s dissertation) to seek Institutional Review Board approval for sociolinguistic research, times and sensibilities have changed: in particular, many readers may experience a frisson on learning that the equipment used for this study included a Radio Shack Telephone Pickup Device. One would have liked to see some discussion of the process for securing informed consent, as well as the mechanism for protecting the identity of the participants. In terms of the corpus, one may question whether any ten hours of conversation constitutes a representative sample of the English language, and it is wise to address the issue of generalizability before embarking on analysis. In this case, some consideration of language variation would also be in order: If the primary corpus was collected in Hawaii, were Hawaiian Creole English speakers among the subjects?

In terms of the analysis, Overstreet’s examples seem to support the claim that *or something*, *and everything*, and so on may sometimes function as markers of intersubjectivity in conversation among familiars (in Hawaii). However, it is not...
established that the management of intersubjectivity is the primary function of all
general extenders in all types of discourse. We now need studies that analyze
other samples of conversational data, as well as comparative analyses of written
data across genres and registers. Comparative studies will require attention to
quantitative analysis and comparability of results, which means wrestling with
the difficult issue of how to measure relative frequency (Ball 1994). It will also be
useful to develop further the argumentation that could support or refute claims
related to intersubjectivity. For example, I could observe that general extenders
occur in private diaries, where the interpersonal value of inexplicitness is not
obvious; on the other hand, it could be argued that diaries involve asynchronous
intersubjectivity. Careful studies that develop hypotheses, spell out predictions,
and make falsifiable claims will be welcome. There is clearly room for future
research here. For those who want to pursue these topics, I recommend Over-
street’s dissertation, which includes her data (US dissertations are available from
www.contentville.com for $29.95).

REFERENCES
Ball, Catherine N. (1994). Automated text analysis: Cautionary tales. Literary and Linguistic Com-
Overstreet, Maryann (1995). The form and function of general extenders in English interactive dis-

(Received 15 January 2001)

ANGELA BARTENS. Ideophones and sound symbolism in Atlantic creoles. (Suoma-
laisten Tiedekatemian Toimituksia/Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fenni-
cae. Sarja-series Humaniora, 40.) Helsinki: Finnish Academy of Science and

Reviewed by STEFAN ELDERS
Afrikanistik I, Universität Bayreuth
D-95440 Bayreuth, Germany
stefan.elders@uni-bayreuth.de

The central claim of Ideophones and sound symbolism in Atlantic creoles is that
ideophones constitute a relevant category in Atlantic creoles, and that they show
both functional and substantial correspondences with ideophones in African lan-
guages. The book consists of two main parts: a critical review of the literature on
ideophones (Introduction; Chap. 1, “Previous treatment of ideophones and sound
symbolism in the literature”; Chap. 2, “Characterization of ideophones: towards
a cross-linguistic prototype”), and an etymological database of ideophones in the
Atlantic creoles (Chap. 3, “The use of ideophone in the Atlantic creoles and their
tentative etymologies”). Two appendices present data sources and the approximate number of ideophones in some languages. The study is based on the available literature, supplemented by data on Atlantic creoles, African languages, European languages, and two Asian languages that was obtained either from specialists on certain languages or from first-language speakers.

Chap. 2 is a well-presented critical review of the literature on ideophones and gives the uninitiated reader a good introduction to the subject. Bartens rightly argues that ideophones do not form a homogeneous category that is easily defined; they should, therefore, be considered to form a prototypical category. A prototypical definition would be “a sound-symbolic word that often has a marked phonotactic shape.” Ideophones often feature phonological irregularities – atypical sounds, or sound combinations that are otherwise not found or rare in the language. They can be realized in discourse with expressive paralinguistic features. Though ideophones typically are morphologically invariant, reduplication is a characteristic morphological process.

Sound symbolism in ideophones can be onomatopoeic or synesthetic; some authors restrict ideophones to the latter type. Bartens argues that it is not always crucial to distinguish between onomatopoeic and synesthetic sound symbolism, since the two types easily fade into each other, whether in synchronic polysemy or in diachronic semantic shifts. Bartens observes some interesting shifts in African languages and Atlantic creoles; for instance, ideophones indicating a blow or slap shift to (i) intensity, (ii) rapidity of movement or rapidity in general, unexpectedness, and (iii) duration/reiteration. I would like to add that the semantic shift from sound to intensity also appears with adjectival intensifiers in European languages lacking true ideophones, as is shown by German *knallrot* and Dutch *knalrood*, literally “bang red.”

Do ideophones constitute a separate word class? There is disagreement about this in the literature. Part of the confusion comes from the fact that language-specific and general linguistic features of ideophones are not always sharply distinguished. What holds for ideophones in one language may not necessarily hold for ideophones in other languages. In my opinion, it is also important to distinguish two universally independent dimensions: syntactic class and form–meaning relationship (a scale from unequivocally sound-symbolic forms to unequivocally arbitrary forms). It may, of course, be the case that in some languages ideophones occur only as adverbs, or as complements of the verb ‘to say’ in a quotative construction.

The author distinguishes three types of ideophones, which relate to their freedom of syntactic occurrence:

- **type 1**: intensifying ideophones (intensifying a verb or an adjective)
- **type 2**: ideophones used in quotative construction (often onomatopoeic)
- **type 3**: syntactically independent ideophones (all ideophones that are not type 1 or 2; may be adverb, verb, adjective, noun)
Especially for type 3, the boundary between ideophonic and non-ideophonic words can be fuzzy. Though the invariant nature of ideophones is a useful criterion in inflecting languages like Bantu languages, it is not in isolating languages, like most Atlantic creoles. Bartens mentions some further complications: Phonotactically canonical adverbs may resemble ideophonic adverbs syntactically, as is the case in Yoruba; arbitrary words can obtain an ideophonic character, e.g. Jamaican *piki-piki* ‘stubby, prickly’ from Spanish *picar* ‘to sting.’ I have some reservations about the author’s statement that type 1 ideophones are completely abstract in meaning (p. 28). Though intensity is pragmatically the most salient semantic feature and intensifiers are translated by ‘very,’ this reasoning would result in a large number of synonymous intensifiers. If an intensifier occurs with only one lexeme or with a limited number of lexemes, I propose that the meaning of the intensifier includes the meaning of the lexeme it modifies.

The second part of the book consists of an inventory of ideophones in Atlantic creoles, with their tentative etymologies. A strong influence from the African substrate influences the importance of ideophones in creole languages: Thus, Atlantic creoles spoken in Africa (Krio, Guinea Bissau Kriyol) and the Suriname creoles are especially rich in ideophones. The presence of a European prestige lect negatively influences the existence of ideophones. Though Brazilian Portuguese has few ideophones, it still shares with Bantu languages the property that an ideophone can occur as a sentence equivalent. A common history of Atlantic creoles is reflected in shared ideophones, as shown in the Gulf of Guinea creoles and the Suriname creoles. Krio and Jamaican also share several ideophones, but the historical relationship of these two creoles is disputed.

As for etymology, ideophones in individual Atlantic creoles can be shown to have a unique etymology in an African language – e.g., *kaba kaba* ‘bad(ly), poorly done’ in Krio, Jamaican, Trinidad English Creole, Trinidad French Creole, and Guyanese English Creole reflects Yoruba *kaba-kaba*. In other cases, an African etymology is noncontroversial, but it is not possible to present an unique etymology: *potopoto or petepete* for ‘muddiness, wetness’ is found in Atlantic creoles and throughout the Niger-Congo family. Some ideophones in Atlantic creoles have to be considered to be a blend of several African ideophones; thus, Palenquero *kaklaka* ‘coarse, in a bad condition’ might be a blend of a Kikongo and a Mende form (94). (Bartens uses the term “contamination”; the term generally used for this phenomenon is “blend,” cf. Bolinger 1965.) Look-alikes are also presented. Bartens also points out that ideophones and ideophonic expressions sometimes originate from superstratal material – such as Haitian *piti-piti* ‘slowly but surely’ from French *petit* ‘small.’ Sometimes ideophones in Atlantic creoles have to be considered to result from convergence of substratal and superstratal material; thus, Haitian *bebe* ‘dumb’ resembles both French *bête* and African forms such as Kikongo *bebe* ‘deaf and dumb, taciturn, of limited intelligence.’ Convergence cannot always be sharply distinguished from universal sound symbolism; most of these cases concern onomatopoeia. Ideophones in Atlantic cre-
oles also show functional similarity to African ideophones, as is especially clear in the case of intensifiers and ideophones forming a sentence equivalent.

Some minor errors have to be pointed out. A few names of authors have been misspelt: Bonhoff (correctly, Bohnhoff ), Daelemann (Daeleman), Doneaux (Doneux), Hutchinson (Hutchison), Killian-Hatz (Kilian-Hatz). The languages Gbaya and Gbeya have been confounded. There is a Gbaya language cluster which has several dialects, but the dialect studied by Samarin is Gbeya (Central African Republic), while the dialect studied by Noss is Yaayuwee (Cameroon). The language sometimes called Baman is the same as Bambara (99).

This monograph is a welcome addition to creole linguistics and to the growing literature on sound symbolism. It supplies convincing evidence for the retention of Africanisms in Atlantic creoles. Its discussion of etymology is balanced and quite careful. The critical review of the literature presents generalizations about African ideophones, especially semantics. The elaborate database of ideophones may be helpful in future description of ideophones in Atlantic creoles and African languages. The literature review, either explicitly or implicitly, signals gaps in the study of ideophones and in descriptive linguistics. There is yet no detailed synchronic description of ideophones in an Atlantic creole, dealing with structural, paralinguistic and sociolinguistic features of ideophones, and I hope the author will select one of the languages from her large comparative database for such a description. This monograph once again pleads the case that sound symbolism is not a marginal subject in linguistics, because it implies one of the central issues in linguistic analysis: the relation between form and meaning.

REFERENCE


(Received 11 January 2001)


Reviewed by MARGARITA HIDALGO
Department of Spanish and Portuguese
San Diego State University
San Diego, Ca. 92182-0073
mhidalgo@mail.sdsu.edu

This is a collection of twenty matchless essays on the subject of language contact (Quechua, Guaraní, and occasionally Aymara in contact with Spanish). The first one serves as an introduction to the main theme and as a justification for the author’s rejection of certain methodologies. “Observaciones metodológicas sobre la investigación sociolinguística en Hispanoamérica” (pp. 7–18) offers an
excellent review of stratificational sociolinguistics, a field the author proves to know but prefers to discard on the basis of its inadequacy for studying marginalized Amerindian communities. The major deterrent is the application of quantitative methods to populations that do not belong to post-industrialized societies, where the continua of social strata and sociolinguistic variables are more easily grasped with contemporary methods of the social sciences. In contrast, groups in Latin American societies display wider socio-economic and socio-political gaps, not to mention massive peripheral strata.

“El influjo de las lenguas amerindias sobre el español: Un modelo interpretativo sociohistórico de variantes areales de contacto lingüístico” (19–49) identifies the influence of Amerindian languages (AL) on Spanish as phenomena of filtration of features, subsystems, or organizing patterns vis-à-vis the features of Peninsular Spanish (PenSpan). Since the 1960s, an increasing number of studies have re-evaluated the role and contributions of AL to New World Spanish (NWS). The latter are determined by both demographic and socio-cultural factors. Because of the early decimation of the indigenous population in the Caribbean area, Granda excludes Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Santo Domingo; to this area, he adds the Pacific coast from Mexico to Chile, where the attrition rate of the Amerindian population was high. Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Peru suffered catastrophic population losses; in Ecuador and Chile, the attrition rate varied from 50% to 70%. Another demographic factor that has impinged on some of the same areas was the importation of African slaves, whose presence was quantitatively significant along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, in southern Central America, and also – though in lesser proportion – along the Peruvian coast and in Chile. In these territories, African slaves replaced all or part of the Indian labor force. In areas such as Panama, the central coast of western Venezuela, the Caribbean and Pacific coasts of Colombia, and coastal areas of Ecuador, the massive presence of African slaves, criollos, Europeans, and mulattoes must have been conducive to the decline of the Amerindian population. Also excluded from this model are the southern territories of Chile (Aisén, Magallanes, and Tierra del Fuego) and the military frontiers in southern and central Chile, the Chaco area, the northern frontier of New Spain, the Atlantic coasts of Central America (the area of Miskito population), the Caribbean territories of eastern Venezuela, and the Calchaquíes valleys of northwestern Argentina. Finally, the coast of Peru – where Quechua was extinguished – and north central Chile, where Mapuche disappeared, are excluded from the transfer paradigm. Toward the end of the 17th or in the early 18th century, language shift also occurred in central and northeastern Colombia, where Muisca played the role of a lingua franca. In all these areas, only lexical borrowing took place.

Phonetic, morphosyntactic, and semantic types of transfer are present in the rest of the Spanish-speaking New World. Research on the subject has focused on strictly internal aspects of AL, and on the degree of deviation from general stan-
standard Spanish. Researchers have alluded to the convenience of incorporating the features in a “catalogue” of grammatical indigenismos of NWS. The problem, however, should be stated in a different manner, inasmuch as interference derived from language contact is socially conditioned by the relationship established between communities and by the kinds of processes that generate it. Structural transfer from AL to NWS is due to the interaction of social variables whose mutual intersections precipitate linguistic processes that can be observed in the Spanish of some areas. The variables are related respectively to different types of Amerindian societies affected by Spanish colonization (i.e., central, intermediate, and peripheral) and to the patterns of social restructuring that evolved in areas of prolonged colonialism. Transfer occurred mostly in areas in which these variables fostered situations of intersection that gave rise to dynamic processes of change, such as linguistic borrowing and language shift. Yucatán, Paraguay, and the Andean zone (extending from northern Argentina to northern Ecuador) are areas of considerable transfer. There, the Amerindian population remained monolingual for a long time, even after national independence. The transfer from AL to Spanish was at first common among ethnolinguistic groups of Amerindian origin, but the morphosyntactic features were (re)transferred to the Spanish-speaking population of the area, which uses them as part of the common regional dialect.

Some of the occurrences found in the areas of Quechua substrate have been studied by several researchers. In “Un quechuismo morfosintáctico en dos áreas extremas del español andino: Las perifrasis verbales de gerundio con valor perfectivo en el noroeste argentino y el sur de Colombia” (51–60), Granda observes the use of the gerund with a perfective meaning (e.g., lo dejé escribiendo = lo dejé escrito; el árbol que lo dejó sembrando un maestro = un maestro dejó sembrado un árbol). “Replanteamiento de un tema controvertido: Génesis y retención del doble posesivo en el español andino” (61–70) addresses redundant possessives – characterized by a double marker – which in general Spanish are expressed by a single morphosyntactic marker (e.g., la casa de mi papá = su casa de mi papá). Pervasive in Peru, Bolivia, and northwestern Argentina, the double marker in the third person (possessor) also existed in PenSpanish until the 17th century. Other variations appear with possessor–possessed order (e.g., de mi padrino su carro = el carro de mi padrino; de mí mi papá es carnicero = mi papá es carnicero). This coincides with a Quechua construction in which the 1st or 2nd person possessor is expressed twice, either through the iteration of the possessive adjective, or through the use of the possessive adjective and the preposition de plus the possessor, as in mi santo de mí lo han celebrado = han celebrado mi santo.

“Retención hispánica y transferencia quechua en dos fenómenos morfosintácticos del español andino” (71–84) reports the use of a negative word to the left of the preverbal marker no: in nada no ha sentío = no ha sentido nada; nadie no contesta = no contesta nadie; de nada no me enojo = no me enojo de nada; ninguno
no ha venido = no ha venido ninguno; note also the use of también no with the meaning of tampoco (mi mamá no vive, mi papá también no vive). These constructions occurred in medieval and classical Spanish (e.g., ninguno no diga; estamos aquí donde nadie no nos oye; nadie no está bien). Contact with Quechua only reinforced the internal Hispanic tendency to retain the syntactic structure in question.

Neutralization of all pronoun clitics in one form (ahi lo ponen la coca), use of lo as a marker of aspect (ya lo llegó), use of double clitics (a Juan lo veo en el parque), and omission of clitics when the direct or indirect object comes before the verb (la arcilla traigo de la mina = la traigo de la mina; a María nosotros rogamos que vaya al cine = le rogamos a María que vaya al cine) are considered transfers from Quechua to local Spanish and are discussed in “Origen y mantenimiento de un rasgo sintáctico (o dos) del español andino: La omisión de clíticos preverbales” (85–106). According to one school of thought, the omission of clitics of 3rd and 6th person in preverbal position is due simply to a focalized retention stemming from PenSpan. Others propose that the absence of special pro-object pronouns in Quechua is the main driving force. For an author who makes a strong point of multiple causation, the omission of clitics is related both to the internal Hispanic tendency and to Quechua–Spanish contact, an external factor.

Among Bolivian immigrants of Quechua and Aymara descent residing in Argentina (reported in “Quechua y español en el noroeste argentino: Una precisión y dos interrogantes,” 107–120), Granda finds the use of lo with intransitive verbs (ya lo murió; lo durmio rápido). This could be a functional calque of the Quechua suffix rqu [ʔlu], which has changed to express a swift process with a clear and complete aspect. Such forms appear in texts by Amerindian authors from the colonial period (lo había fallecido; lo es oficio fácil). In Peru, Granda documents lo parece como hombre, lo vino otro padre, lo llegaron a este pueblo, and lo rieron mocho; in northwestern Argentina, he finds se me lo perdió la plata, se me lo rompió el plato, and se me lo enfermó la guagua; however, there are no cases of lo with verbs of movement. The simultaneous impingement of internal and external factors is explored with respect to the use of conditional and imperfect subjunctive in contrary-to-fact clauses, as in si yo realmente tenía más tiempo, haría mi parte también, or si yo vendría más temprano te vería, or si vendría él, me iría yo. This phenomenon is vital in Quito, Sucre, and Potosí, and in rural areas of the provinces of Salta and Jujuy. The determining factors can be either Hispanic or Amerindian, while the internal or external causes may interact concurrently – the former being a determining factor, and the latter only a regulating force. The activation of the internal potential of change in Spanish (L2) merely necessitates an external catalyst (language contact and/or language shift), which occurred in both Old Castile and the Andean region. The former region has an ancestral connection with Basque, and the latter with Quechua. This fascinating discussion appears in “Condicionamientos internos y externos de un proceso de variación morfosintáctica en el español andino: Potencial/Subjuntivo en estructuras condicionales” (141–60).
The expression of aspect in Amerindian languages differs from that of Spanish in many ways. In Quechua, it is conveyed by derivational suffixes (yka, cka, -ki, ski), which appear in north central Peru. In contrast, in Guaraní there are two variations: One corresponds to the superior register, and the other to the vernacular. Simple sentences replaced by periphrasis with gerund – as in viene = está viniendo; me olvido = me vengo olvidando; venderé = me he de estar vendiendo; ahí llega = ahí viene llegando – are common in the Andean area, but a more extreme case of transfer from Guaraní to Spanish is the use of the marker hína to express duration, as in aquí trabajo hína todo el verano, llueve hína el fin de semana; el muchacho estudia hína en este colegio, or leo hína desde que vos te fuiste. The independent morpheme hína also appears in él trabaja hína en la capuera = el está trabajando en la capuera. In “La expresión del aspecto verbal durativo: Modalidades de transferencia lingüística en dos áreas del español de América” (161–74), Granda concludes that, in the Andean area, Quechua–Spanish convergence has taken place, whereas in the Guaraní area, interference has occurred. In the Andean zone, Granda points to ampliación de uso with respect to the use of periphrasis of duration with Spanish gerund. In contrast, in the Guaraní area, the adoption of a Guaraní morpheme has taken place. In the Andean territory, Quechua has exerted an influence in a concomitant situation of multiple causation, while in the Guaraní area, interference has led to the modification of the morphological inventory of local Spanish.

“Dos procesos de transferencia gramatical de lenguas amerindias (Quechua/Aru y Guaraní) al español andino y al español paraguayo: Los elementos validadores” (175–90) deals with pragmatic markers from Quechua, Aymara, and Guaraní, which have been incorporated into Spanish as functional calques (hago calentar el agua = caliente el agua; él hace decir = él dice). “Un proceso bidireccional de transferencia lingüística por contacto: El imperativo en guaraní criollo y en español paraguayo” (213–28) discusses the process of bidirectional transfer in the use of commands. Whereas Paraguayan Spanish has replaced all of the imperative expressions with only one form, accompanied with the morphological markers that retain the Guaraní semantic contents and rules (e.g., Mira, decime bien que na [kena]), Guaraní has simplified its imperative system by eliminating morphemes such as mo, mime, mimo, mipa. In “Español paraguayo y guaraní criollo: Un espacio para la convergencia lingüística” (229–40), Granda considers Guaraní–Spanish language contact as a case of morphosyntactic convergence. To this effect, he reduces the typology of transfer to the following categories: adoption, replacement, elimination, functional calque, restructuring, amplification, and reduction. The exemplification of the seven categories proves the development of isomorphic grammatical structures. This case of internal convergence is the result of a less conflictive relationship between the Spanish-speaking and Guaraní-speaking communities.

In “Marginalidad y relevancia de un factor de cambio lingüístico: la transferencia por contacto: Aportaciones al tema desde el quechua santiagueño”


(Received 16 January 2001)

Reviewed by Karen L. Adams
English, Arizona State University
Tempe, AZ 85287-0302
KLAdams@asu.edu

Speaking culturally is designed as a language-oriented introduction to ethnic and gender issues in the United States, concentrating on what the author perceives to be widely unrecognized intercultural communication problems. The text is divided into three sections, with the first – “Language in demographic and cultural perspective” – providing theoretical background on the relationship of speech to community. The second, “Locating cultural discourses,” provides overviews of language and gender and of three ethnic communities: African American, Hispanic and Asian American. The last section, “Language consequences and controversies,” addresses the consequences of linguistic and cultural diversity and current language policy designed to deal with this diversity.

The volume assumes no prior training in linguistics, communication studies, anthropology, or related fields, and it would be easily accessible to undergraduate and graduate students; it is well written for an uninitiated audience. Johnson nicely lays out what will be covered in each chapter and the reasons for its inclusion. In the first three chapters and in the introduction to the final section on consequences, she provides an overview of linguistic concepts such as phonology, syntax, pragmatics, register, and language varieties, as well as a brief but well-done discussion of discourse, ideology, and power. Also discussed are notions of culture and society and earlier theoretical approaches to these issues. It is here that Johnson introduces the concept of “cultural linguistics” and “cultural mindedness;” the latter is “the ability to understand that cultural systems play a major role in communicative conduct and symbolic interpretation” (p. 5). She uses the term “cultural linguistics” to draw together research from sociolinguistics, sociology of language, anthropological linguistics, ethnography of speaking, and related fields, and to emphasize to the reader “the larger cultural multiplicity of the United States and its demographics” (5).

Expert in those fields may not always agree with the characterizations presented either of the phenomena in question, or with the description of the historical treatment of these issues within the discipline, but for the nonspecialist reader, most of this will go unnoticed. The sometimes imprecise discussion of the concepts of culture, society, and related ideas (such as communities of practice and speech communities) might be problematic even for nonspecialists, however, and Johnson’s discussions of some linguistic concepts – such as Standard American English – can be misleading, but these problems could easily be handled in a class discussion if the volume were used as a text. Over all, the themes presented in this section are carried through the rest of the text and make for straightforward reading.
The second section focuses on language in relation to gender and ethnicity. The three chapters on different ethnic groups in the US are structured similarly, with an introduction to the community as a whole through census information, historical background, and descriptions of cultural themes shared among community members. The individual chapters then move into discussions of language and discourse issues related to the group in question. The precise information covered depends on the language configuration of the community: an interest in discourse genres and the development and maintenance of African American English; a discussion of code-switching and bilingual maintenance in Hispanic communities; and a focus on different Asian languages, such as Korean, Tagalog, and Japanese, in the chapter on Asian Americans. Given the wealth of information covered in these three chapters, it is not surprising that there are occasional lapses, such as using the term Mon-Khmer to refer to a single Asian language, or the author’s failure to discuss the problematic concept of “race.”

For the most part, the difference in topics among the three chapters is appropriate, and Johnson successfully negotiates her concern about “simplifying and essentializing cultural identities” (xiv). However, in the chapter on Asian Americans, there is a focus on gender roles and the notion of “sexual exotics” that skews the discussion. The other two chapters do have brief discussions about gendered discourse structures, and in the chapter on gender, there is a paragraph on gender roles in the African American community; however, the paucity of discussion about gender roles in the other two communities leaves the reader with the notion that gender inequities are problematic among the Asian American groups, but not in others.

Most of the problems with essentializing appear in Johnson’s notion that there exist members of “eurowhite/anglo” culture who are a major part of her intended audience and who, she claims, need to become “culturally minded.” She generally fails to recognize that even within and between the non-“eurowhite” ethnic communities in question, there are cultural stereotypes and misunderstandings based on ethnicity and class. Whether these stereotypes are due to the influence of dominant ideology or to a community’s own cultural notions, they exist. She also generally fails to address the issue that some categories of “eurowhites” historically have experienced and currently continue to experience prejudice, and thus she oversimplifies complex issues of race, ethnicity, and class. For example, during a discussion of discriminatory attitudes in job interviews based on language, Johnson says, “AAVE, for instance, might cause more problems than Norwegian-influenced English” (291). No doubt this is true in many, if not most, contexts, and Johnson clearly hedges her claim, but eurowhite speakers of Appalachian English might not fare well in job interviews either, just as Irish Americans would not have done in the 19th century. Johnson does not totally ignore such issues, but her choice of expression sometimes lacks balance.

The chapter on language and gender notes that gender is embedded in other socio-cultural groupings, but that most of the research on language and gender
has focused on eurowhite communities. This discussion, which precedes those on ethnic communities, tackles issues of gender essentializing and biological determinism and theories that claim cultural difference and ignore issues of dominance. Johnson chooses to summarize studies on different discourse strategies, such as topic control, turn-taking, prescriptive language use, and amount of talk, because these are ones she sees as critical for miscommunication. She also includes a section on gay and lesbian language. Over all, the chapter is well done, though one would have liked an expansion of the issue of variation within male and female communities of practice to reinforce her discussion of gender as part of a continually and variably constructed discourse.

The last third of Johnson’s volume deals with applied consequences of the cultural discourses characterized in the preceding chapters, and it works well as a conclusion. The effects of intercultural communication issues in the workplace, in health care, and in the educational and legal systems become the focus of the final two chapters. The first chapter of the final section begins with a particularly strong discussion of the relationship of discourse, ideology, and power, and then moves on to cover wide-ranging topics. For example, on communication in the health care system, Johnson addresses problems of language barriers for non-native speakers of English, speaking norms associated with relationship hierarchies in medical practice, and cultural constructions of health and medicine and notions of the speakable. The discussion of discourse issues in the educational system carries over into the last chapter on bilingual education and “Ebonics” in the classroom. It is an important one, given the recent successful attacks on bilingual education in both California and Arizona, which are now spreading to other states. Johnson notes that the criticism of bilingual education has at its base “beliefs about cultural pluralism and cultural assimilation” rather than about teaching effectiveness (313). She also explores the polarization caused by equating English with patriotism and American behavior while arguing that those who wish to maintain their native language are divisive, unpatriotic, and unwilling to accommodate.

A strong part of the section on Ebonics is the exploration of the role of the media in simplifying and misrepresenting this controversy – a factor that needs more discussion in all these contexts. Johnson also summarizes the history of bilingual education and the recognition of bidialectism in the classroom. She concludes by providing policy suggestions for universal bilingual education, with native speakers teaching in much earlier grades than is now typical.

As in other sections, occasional comments distract from the important points in ways that Johnson certainly did not intend. Her attack on the current teaching of languages other than English sounds like an attack on the teachers, not on the policies and policy-makers, though she surely recognizes that many English-speaking teachers work hard to provide language courses, certified or not (327). It is also puzzling that Johnson omits even brief consideration of the English-only movement to declare English the national language of the United States, which
continues to fuel the strong anti-bilingual movement and remains part of the political landscape.

Over all, however, this volume represents a valuable contribution and is rich in information and implications. The bibliography provides the reader with many opportunities to follow up on the groundwork provided here. Though aspects of the text need additional comment and balancing and a broader perspective on language beyond US borders, these amplifications can easily be accomplished by an instructor who selects this volume as a text.

(Received 6 February 2001)


Reviewed by JOSÉE MAKROPOULOS
OISE/University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M5S 1V6
jmakr022@hotmail.com

*The French in the United States* offers valuable insight on processes of identity formation among French-born individuals living permanently in the US. The book’s title foreshadows the ambiguity of how the French in America are defined in objective terms, as well as their subject positioning as members of an ethnic group. For instance, Lindenfeld cautions against relying on the criterion of ancestry used in census-based rankings to study the French presence in the United States, since census identification includes people of various national origins and does not distinguish the number of intervening generations since departure from France. The limitations of the native use of the French language as a valid indicator of direct French origin neglects the fact that native speakers of French who reside in the US often possess Canadian or Caribbean lineage. Although Lindenfeld does not say so directly, relying on native use of French to identify direct immigrants from France would equally exclude the possibility of identifying French citizens who do not speak French as their first language, as well as those who were raised speaking two or more languages. Another concern raised in the book is the broad significance of the label “French American,” traditionally used to identify Americans of French ancestry, such as Cajuns in Louisiana. The designation currently enjoys a certain popularity among French immigrants because it offers a direct parallel with other immigrant groups, such as Italian Americans. As a result of these conceptual ambiguities, Lindenfeld clearly indicates that she will highlight the concept of nativity or birthplace to designate direct immigrants from France who establish themselves in the US. On a critical note, I wish to emphasize that little attention is paid to how many generations immigrants from France can remain in the United States before losing their native French lineage, or how much time immigrants
from France must spend in the country to be considered as Americans of French ancestry.

Lindenfeld begins her book by providing background information for the analysis of contemporary French immigrants in the US. Her portrayal of French migration to North America (Chap. 1) includes an interesting historical sketch, followed by a description of the 1990 census data concerning the geographical distribution of French immigrants, presently a small group. Their highest concentration in terms of absolute numbers is in California, followed by the state of New York. Lindenfeld also provides detailed information on data collection procedures (Chap. 2), which consisted of some direct observations and 112 semiformal interviews of first-generation French immigrants living in Los Angeles and the San Francisco Bay area of California, and in the Rogue Valley in the adjacent state of Oregon.

The rest of the book is devoted to the analysis of these ethnographic data. The permanent voyage from France to the US West Coast (Chap. 3) is discussed in relation to the recent trajectories of the 96 participants who were selected for systematic analysis. A number of interesting findings are presented, such as the idea that contemporary French migration tends to be an individually oriented process in which “pull” factors, such as marriage and family situations, play a more salient role in the decision to settle in the US than do “push” factors of an economic nature. However, the role of the computer industry in Silicon Valley is not addressed in the analysis of the ethnographic data, even though Lindenfeld earlier mentions (p. 10) its contributing role in luring French people to the “Golden State.” The subject of the new economy would also be welcome in the next section (Chap. 4), which examines the integration of French immigrants into American society in relation to social and demographic factors of acculturation. By drawing on her ethnographic results and supporting census data, Lindenfeld shows that French immigrants tend to reside among non-French people, and that intermarriage is a common phenomenon, especially among women, who are also more inclined than their male counterparts to renounce their French citizenship. Occupational status tends to be high among both French-born women and men, who often pursue advanced studies as adults in the US. Lindenfeld further discusses the concept of acculturation (Chap. 5) by examining behavioral and interactional characteristics of French immigrants in their home life and in society. Of particular interest here is the analysis showing that French immigrants remain in touch with their culture of origin primarily through the French press and visits to the homeland, but they do not maintain strong ties or frequent social interactions with immigrant co-ethnics.

Lindenfeld also examines the subjective realm of ethnicity and identity maintenance (Chap. 6) as reported by the French-born participants in her study. The results described here suggest that almost half the participants chose the label “French American” for self-reference, and that about twice as many people self-identified as French as opposed to American. Unfortunately, the method used
does not allow for the verification of multiple ethnic identifications, a common phenomenon among immigrants living in the Canadian context (see Jedwab 2000). Other supporting data cited by Lindenfeld nonetheless confirm the idea that French immigrants living in the US often alternate between feeling French and feeling American, and that they commonly internalize different images of the French and American worlds. The analysis of linguistic heritage (Chap. 7) draws attention to the dual role of French and English among French-born immigrants and their children. The participants are described as a highly bilingual group who have maintained a high level of French language retention, even though English constitutes a primary language of everyday communication for most. Perhaps not surprisingly, the children of first-generation French-born immigrants are significantly less proficient in French than their parents and are more inclined to speak English at home. There are striking resemblances between these results and Canadian research on the maintenance of French among Francophone youth from linguistically mixed families living in minority contexts such as Ontario (Bernard 1990, Castonguay 1998, Office des Affaires Francophones 1999, O’Keefe 2000). Both sets of research indicate that endogamous couples find it easier to transmit the French language to their offspring than do endogamous couples composed of a Francophone and an Anglophone parent. To a certain extent, children of linguistically mixed families are more likely to master French when the Anglophone parent has some knowledge of it. Another trend observed in the Canadian setting is that youth from exogamous families are more inclined to adopt French as their primary language when the mother is Francophone than when the father is. It would be helpful to examine gender roles in the transmission of the French language among linguistically mixed couples in the US, especially in light of the 1990 census data cited by Lindenfeld, which indicate that two-thirds of contemporary French-born immigrants are women (20).

In the conclusion (Chap. 8), Lindenfeld refers to the key findings of the study to back up her claim that French-born individuals living in the US form more of a cultural community than an ethnic group. She defends her position with the argument that French migration to the US tends to be an individually oriented process characterized by a high level of integration into American society in the employment and educational sectors. Contemporary French immigrants also show high intermarriage rates, accompanied by a low degree of cohesiveness with other co-ethnics, which contributes to the challenge of transmitting the French heritage to the second generation. Another point raised here is the idea that many French immigrants share a common dual world that combines outwardly behaving as Americans with retaining a strong internal link to their country of origin. Lindenfeld also emphasizes that French immigrants can blend easily into American society as a result of the various privileges associated with being of European descent. However, little or no attention is directed to nonwhite French immigrants, even though France is home to an ethnically and racially diverse population, and many French citizens live in overseas territories such as Martinique and Martin-Beuada.
Guadeloupe. My primary disappointment, thus, has to do with the issues that are not discussed. Specifically, I wanted to know whether French immigrants of different racial or ethnic backgrounds live different experiences during their US integration than do fellow nationals who visibly resemble the white American majority. I also wanted to know more about the 16 participants who were not selected for the final analysis, as well as about French immigrants who were not considered for an interview because they were planning to return to France at a later point of their lives or had come to the United States at a very young age.

In conclusion, this book needs to be read in relation to the target group of the study, and its findings should not be generalized to all French immigrants living in the US. Despite these limitations, *The French in the United States* does successfully fill a gap in the study of immigration to the US and contributes significantly to the emerging literature on linguistically mixed couples and their children. Lindenfeld presents her data in a clear and concise manner that is readily accessible to a wide audience interested in the study of immigration and Francophone life. The book is ideal for reference purposes because it includes several illustrations (maps, tables, and figures), a subject index, and a copy of the interview guide, which may come in handy for graduate sociology students who require a well-designed model. Finally, Lindenfeld provides an interesting analysis which brings to light several issues worthy of further study.

REFERENCES


(Received 15 May 2001)