In their essay “Defending Modernity” (Politics & Gender 1 (March), 2005), Julia Adams and Ann Shola Orloff took gender and politics scholars to task for the ways in which they (we) engage gender and “high politics.” They call for a “more serious analytical engagement between gendered and mainstream students of politics,” with particular attention to “the relationship between gendered representations of war and actual military campaigns” (p. 179). Ultimately, they argue, scholars must consider that logics of masculine protection and domination “arise out of properly political sources that need to be better understood and incorporated into gender studies” (p. 179).

Iris Marion Young’s “The Logic of Masculinist Protection” (Signs 29 [Autumn], 2003) and Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris’s work (Rising Tide, 2003; Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide, 2004) were identified as examples of the ways in which gender and “high politics” scholarship has missed the mark when it comes to issues of modernity, politics, and power relationships at the macrolevel. Young, and Inglehart and Norris frankly disagree, and they present their refutations of Adams and Orloff’s claims in the following rejoinders. We have let Adams and Orloff have the last—though hardly final—word.

Modernization and Gender Equality: A Response to Adams and Orloff
Ronald Inglehart, University of Michigan, and Pippa Norris, Harvard University

Modernity, Emancipatory Values, and Power: A Rejoinder to Adams and Orloff
Iris Marion Young, University of Chicago

Once More into the Breach with Modernity: Rejoinder to Inglehart and Norris, and Young
Julia Adams, Yale University, and Ann Shola Orloff, Northwestern University
Modernization and Gender Equality: A Response to Adams and Orloff

Ronald Inglehart, University of Michigan
Pippa Norris, Harvard University

Julia Adams and Ann Shola Orloff’s insightful critical perspective in the first issue of this journal makes several important points about the relationship between modernization and gender equality. We agree with Adams and Orloff that—despite strong claims to the contrary (e.g., Young 2003)—modernization tends to be conducive to gender equality. And we also agree that the classic versions of modernization theory were inadequate. The basic insight that economic and technological development tends to bring coherent patterns of social and political change holds up well in the light of a large body of recent evidence; but previous models of modernization were mechanical and linear, and they omitted cultural factors that cannot be ignored. We join forces with Adams and Orloff in striving to develop a more adequate concept of modernization, recognizing that understanding ongoing processes of socioeconomic change is a long-term task that will need input from many perspectives.

The book Adams and Orloff discuss, *Rising Tide* (Inglehart and Norris 2003), reflects a revised version of modernization theory. It builds on previous work (Inglehart 1997), and a revised version of modernization theory is developed more fully in a more recent book (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). We will not recapitulate the full model here, but will focus on two main ways in which modernization theory needs revision:

1. The classic modernization models tend to be linear, assuming that the future will simply continue moving in the same direction as in the recent past. But in fact, the process of modernization can and does change direction, and with the rise of the knowledge society, social and political change have demonstrably started to move in a new direction.

2. Most previous models tend to neglect the fact that modernization is path dependent: A society’s cultural heritage shapes its future trajectory, so that where it is at any given time reflects where it started. Thus, although industrialization tends to propel virtually any society in a roughly predictable direction, there are multiple paths to modernization.

Let us discuss each of these points in more detail.
Although the classic view of modernization developed by Karl Marx, Max Weber, and others was wrong on many points, the central insight—that socioeconomic development brings major social, cultural and political changes—is basically correct. This insight is confirmed by a massive body of new evidence based on survey data from more than 80 societies containing 85% of the world’s population, collected from 1981 to 2002 by the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey. This evidence, examined in Rising Tide and Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy (Inglehart and Welzel 2005), demonstrates that the basic values and beliefs of the publics of economically advanced societies differ dramatically from those found in less developed societies—and that these values are changing in a predictable direction as socioeconomic development takes place. Changing values, in turn, have important consequences for the way societies function, promoting gender equality, good governance, and democracy.

Early versions of modernization theory were too simple. Socioeconomic development has a powerful impact on what people want and do, as Marx argued—but a society’s cultural heritage continues to shape its prevailing beliefs and motivations, as Weber argued. Moreover, sociocultural change is not linear. Industrialization brings rationalization, secularization, and bureaucratization, but the rise of the knowledge society brings another set of changes that moves in a new direction, placing increasing emphasis on individual autonomy, self-expression, and free choice.

The first phase of modernization mobilized the masses, making modern democracy possible—along with fascism and communism. Although industrialization gives increasing room for democracy and gender equality, authoritarian and patriarchal norms remain widespread. The postindustrial phase of modernization produces increasingly powerful mass demands for democracy—and increasingly powerful pressures for gender equality.

The evidence from the Values Surveys demonstrates that the worldviews of the people of rich societies differ systematically from those of low-income societies across a wide range of political, social, and religious norms and beliefs. In order to focus on a limited number of important dimensions of cross-cultural variance, we carried out a factor analysis of each society’s mean level on scores of variables, replicating the analysis in “Modernization, Cultural Change and the Persistence of Traditional Values” (Inglehart and Baker 2000).1 The two most significant

1. For details of these analyses at both the individual level and the national level, see Inglehart and Baker 2000 and Inglehart and Welzel 2005.
dimensions that emerge reflect, first, a polarization between traditional and secular-rational orientations toward authority and, second, a polarization between survival and self-expression values.

Agrarian societies tend to emphasize traditional values, while industrialized societies tend to emphasize secular-rational values. By traditional values we refer to orientations that are relatively authoritarian, place strong emphasis on religion, and emphasize male dominance in social life, respect for authority, and relatively low levels of tolerance for abortion and divorce and that have relatively high levels of national pride. Societies with secular-rational values emphasize the opposite characteristics.

The second major dimension of cross-cultural variation is linked with the transition from industrial society to postindustrial societies—which brings a polarization between survival and self-expression values. A central component of this dimension involves the polarization between materialist and postmaterialist values, reflecting a cultural shift that is emerging among generations who have grown up taking survival for granted. Self-expression values give high priority to environmental protection, tolerance of diversity, and rising demands for participation in decision making in economic and political life. These values also reflect mass polarization over whether “When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women,” or whether “A university education is more important for a boy than a girl,” and whether “Men make better political leaders than women.” This emphasis on gender equality is part of a broader syndrome of tolerance of outgroups, including foreigners, gays, and lesbians. The shift from survival values to self-expression values also includes a shift in child-rearing values, from emphasis on hard work toward emphasis on imagination and tolerance as important values to teach a child. And it goes with a rising sense of subjective well-being that is conducive to an atmosphere of tolerance, trust, and political moderation. Finally, societies that rank high on self-expression values also tend to rank high on interpersonal trust. Growing emphasis on self-expression values produces a culture of trust and tolerance, in which people place a relatively high value on individual freedom and self-expression, and have activist political orientations.

The unprecedented wealth that has accumulated in advanced societies during the past generation means that an increasing share of the population has grown up taking survival for granted. Thus, priorities have shifted from an overwhelming emphasis on economic and physical security toward an increasing emphasis on subjective well-being,
self-expression, and quality of life. Mass orientations have shifted from traditional toward secular-rational values, and from survival values toward self-expression values, in almost all advanced industrial societies that have experienced economic growth. But modernization is not linear. When a society has completed industrialization and starts becoming a knowledge society, it moves in a new direction.

Figure 1 shows a two-dimensional cultural map on which the value systems of 80 societies are depicted. This map was used in *Rising Tide* in order to illustrate the coherent way in which a society’s values are linked with economic development—but also continue to reflect its historical and cultural heritage. The vertical dimension represents the Traditional/Secular-Rational dimension, and the horizontal dimension reflects the

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**Figure 1.** Cultural map of the world in 2000. (Source: Inglehart and Norris 2003, 155.)
Survival/Self-expression values dimension. Both dimensions are strongly linked with economic development: The value systems of rich countries differ systematically from those of poor countries. A close examination of Figure 1 reveals the fact that Germany, France, Britain, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the United States, and all other societies with a 1995 annual per capita GNP over $15,000 rank relatively high on both dimensions. Without exception, they fall in a zone near the upper right-hand corner.

On the other hand, every one of the societies with per capita GNPs below $2,000—again, without a single exception—falls into a cluster at the lower left of the map; India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, Ghana, and Peru all fall into this economic zone. The remaining societies fall into intermediate cultural-economic zones. Economic development seems to move societies in a common direction, regardless of their cultural heritage.

But distinctive cultural zones persist. Different societies follow different trajectories even when they are subjected to the same forces of economic development, because each society’s entire historical and cultural heritage—not just its economic level—helps shape how it develops. Samuel Huntington (1996) has emphasized the role of religion in shaping the world’s eight major civilizations or “cultural zones”: Western Christianity, Orthodox, Islam, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, African, and Latin American. These zones were shaped by religious traditions that are still powerful today, despite the forces of modernization. And empirically, the 80 societies shown on Figure 1 fall into clusters that reflect these cultural zones fairly closely. The location of each society on this figure reflects each public’s response to the questions asked in the Values Surveys, in representative national surveys carried out independently in each country. The lines around the clusters could be drawn in various ways: Another figure might emphasize the polarization between rich and poor countries, but here, the boundaries emphasize the existence of distinct cultural zones.

Thus, all of the historically Protestant European countries fall into a zone in the upper right-hand section of Figure 1, reflecting the fact that the people of all of these societies tend to emphasize both Secular-Rational and Self-expression values. Despite their wide geographic dispersion, all seven English-speaking societies fall into another cluster characterized by strong emphasis on Self-expression values, but lesser emphasis on Secular-Rational values. Britain—being both an English-speaking society and a historically Protestant European society—falls near the border between these two groups; the border could have been drawn to include it in either cultural zone.
All four of the Confucian-influenced societies (China, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan) have relatively secular values, constituting a Confucian cultural zone, despite substantial differences in wealth. The Orthodox societies constitute another distinct cultural zone, as Huntington argued. And the 11 Latin American societies show relatively similar values. Similarly, the historically Roman Catholic societies (e.g., Italy, Portugal, Spain, France, Belgium, and Austria) display relatively traditional values when compared with Confucian or ex-Communist societies with the same proportion of industrial workers. And virtually all of the historically Protestant societies (e.g., West Germany, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland) rank higher on both the Traditional/Secular Rational dimension and the Survival/Self-expression dimension than do the historically Roman Catholic societies.

Religious traditions appear to have had an enduring impact on the contemporary value systems of the 80 societies. But a society’s culture reflects its entire historical heritage, not just religion. A central historical event of the twentieth century was the rise and fall of a communist empire that once ruled one-third of the world’s population. Communism left a clear imprint on the value systems of those who lived under it. East Germany remains culturally close to West Germany despite four decades of communist rule, but its value system has been drawn toward the communist zone. And although China is a member of the Confucian zone, it also falls within a broad communist-influenced zone. Similarly, Azerbaijan, though part of the Islamic cluster, also falls within the communist superzone that dominated it for decades. Changes in GNP and occupational structure have important influences on prevailing worldviews, but traditional cultural influences persist.

The ex-communist societies of Central and Eastern Europe all fall into the upper left-hand quadrant of our cultural map, ranking high on the Traditional/Secular-Rational dimension (toward the secular pole), but low on the Survival/Self-expression dimension (falling near the survival-oriented pole). A broken line encircles all of the societies that have experienced communist rule, and they form a reasonably coherent group. Although by no means the poorest countries in the world, the societies of Central and Eastern Europe have recently experienced the collapse of communism, shattering their economic, political, and social systems—and bringing a pervasive sense of insecurity. Thus, Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova rank lowest of any countries on earth on the Survival/Self-expression dimension—ranking lower than much poorer countries, such as India, Bangladesh, Zimbabwe,
Uganda, and Pakistan. People who have experienced stable poverty throughout their lives tend to emphasize survival values; but those who have experienced the collapse of their social, economic, and political systems experience a sense of unpredictability and insecurity that leads them to emphasize Survival values even more heavily than those who are accustomed to an even lower standard of living.

Adams and Orloff note that we emphasize both the impact of modernization and the persistence of cultural influences, and see the two as incompatible: They ask, “How it is that “basic values” . . . could simultaneously move and not move in tandem with modernization” (2005, 172)? Initially, it would indeed seem that values must either be stable or changing, but such combinations of change and the persistence of traditional differences are inherent in path-dependent processes. Adams and Orloff probably wrote their article on computer keyboards using the traditional QWERTY format. Originally, this format was adopted to cope with the limitations of mechanical typewriters. The underlying technology has changed to swift electronic word processors that have no need for the relatively inefficient QWERTY format, but it persists because people have learned to use it: Where you start shapes where you are.

Let’s take another look at Figure 1. If every society in the world were moving in the same direction at the same rate of speed on this map, their relative positions would remain unaltered: Cultural change is compatible with the persistence of traditional differences. Although all nations are not moving at exactly the same speed, this is roughly what has been happening. Figure 2 gives a concrete illustration showing how responses to a question about gender equality have been changing in four historically Protestant societies and four historically Roman Catholic societies. The Values Surveys asked each respondent whether he or she agreed that “When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women do.” In 1990, the publics of Protestant societies were significantly more likely to disagree with this statement than were the publics of historically Catholic societies. By 2000, the publics of both types of societies had become substantially more likely to support gender equality—but they remained roughly the same distance apart. This example reflects a pervasive pattern in which basic values were changing, but traditional cross-cultural differences persisted over time.

Our revised version of modernization theory implies that economic development should tend to shift a society’s value system from emphasis on Traditional and Survival values toward increasing emphasis on Secular-Rational and Self-expression values—in other words, from the
southwest corner toward the northeast corner of Figure 1. Data from successive waves of the Values Surveys show that during the past 20 years, virtually every country with a per capita GNP equal to or higher than that of Portugal actually did show a positive net movement on this map—shifting either upward or toward the right, or both. Most low-income nations have shown relatively little cultural change—so the differences between the value systems of rich and poor countries have not disappeared; they have actually grown larger during the past two decades.

Adams and Orloff state that we “imply that gender equality, including its encoding in politics, will flow relatively unproblematically from modernization” (2005, 172). Our analysis is based on a combination of modernization forces and the persistence of each society’s historical heritage. This means that gender equality will not flow unproblematically. We do indeed see modernization as a massive force that is difficult to resist: Once a society reaches the phase of the knowledge society, pressures for gender equality become increasingly costly to resist. Nevertheless, it is clear that some cultures are more resistant to gender equality than others—and it is not just a society’s cultural heritage: Our analysis

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**Figure 2.** Support for gender equality in employment in historically Protestant and historically Roman Catholic societies, 1990 versus 2000. (Source: Based on Values Survey data for France, Italy, Spain, and Belgium (“Catholic”) and Britain, United States, Germany, and Sweden (“Protestant”).)
recognizes that a society’s entire historical heritage, including social movements and leaders, helps shape it. Modernization is a powerful factor, but it is definitely not the only factor.

Adams and Orloff also state that Inglehart and Norris “extrapolate what they take to be a single ‘culture’ from variegated opinion data to a country or ‘civilization’ as a totality. On this basis we can capture neither the uneven development within and across states and societies, nor the ways that people struggle to link cultural signs and political practices differently within a given social space” (Adams and Orloff 2005, 173).

Most of the analyses in Rising Tide do indeed focus on cross-national comparisons, which are useful because they facilitate comparisons between societies at different stages of development. But these analyses are based on data from representative national surveys in each country, which can be broken down in any number of ways—and when one does so it is evident that, as Adams and Orloff claim, there is a great deal of variation within each society—as our analyses by age, gender, income, religion, and so on make clear. But there also are major differences between the outlooks prevailing in given nations—and between given groups of societies (or “civilizations”)—and in order to examine them, one must necessarily compare the prevailing values and beliefs of given societies as a whole.

Adams, Elisabeth Clemens, and Orloff (2005) argue forcefully that modernization is an important factor in the rise of gender equality—but that modernization itself needs to be reshaped. Despite approaching the subject from different perspectives, and despite some differences in interpretation, we strongly agree with them. Modernization does not take place without struggle, and the intervention of dedicated individuals and groups can accelerate or retard its pace and influence its direction. On the whole, however, we view modernization as having a positive impact on gender equality, particularly when a society reaches the postindustrial stage at which Self-expression values become widespread. It is not a matter of impersonal abstract factors. Economic development is not an impersonal force that automatically brings gender equality as soon as it reaches a given level. On the contrary, economic development seems to be conducive to greater gender equality only insofar as it gives rise to specific cultural changes—the most important of which is growing emphasis on Self-expression values. And these values are not disembodied forces: They exist within given individuals and are important only insofar as they help shape their choices and actions. The rise of a culture that emphasizes Self-
expression values seems to have a remarkably powerful impact on the extent to which gender equality becomes a reality within given societies.

Throughout industrial society, and even more strongly in postindustrial societies, large intergenerational differences exist in attitudes toward gender equality. They reflect a “rising tide” of change toward greater societal acceptance of gender equality in particular, and human equality in general. Figure 3 illustrates the powerful impact that modernization has on gender equality, insofar as modernization gives rise to increasing emphasis on Self-expression values. The measure of gender equality used here is the Gender Empowerment Index developed by the United Nations Development Program (Human Development Report, 2000). This index reflects female representation in parliaments, management positions, and administrative functions, as well as gender equality in salaries.

To get the correct causal sequence, Figure 3 examines the impact of Self-expression values, as measured about 1995, on each society’s score on the Gender Empowerment Index, as measured in 2000. As is evident...
from inspecting this figure, societies that place relatively strong emphasis on Self-expression values have a strong tendency to have high levels of objective gender equality; the correlation is a remarkably strong $r = .85$. In more detailed multivariate analysis, Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel (2005) demonstrate that this correlation seems to reflect a causal impact of cultural values on societal characteristics; the impact of Self-expression values on Gender Empowerment persists when one controls for a society’s level of development, the structure of its workforce, its cultural heritage, and other factors.

Adams and Orloff raise important questions that we have attempted to answer, at least in part. We view them as allies in the ongoing search for a better understanding of how modernization functions, and how it helps shape the struggle for gender equality.

**REFERENCES**


**Modernity, Emancipatory Values, and Power: A Rejoinder to Adams and Orloff**

*Iris Marion Young, University of Chicago*

As Julia Adams and Ann Shola Orloff rightly point out, one of the purposes of my essay “The Logic of Masculinist Protection: Reflections on the Current Security State” (2003) is to complicate our understanding of what it means to view events, institutions, and ideas under a gen-
der lens. Our society exhibits multiple logics of gender, that is, in varying ways that “masculinity” and “femininity,” as well as less heterosexual gender ideas, are defined and interpreted. In that essay, I suggest that a traditional meaning of masculinity less noticed recently by feminists, that of the husband/father as loving protector, has been mobilized by the Bush administration to justify both war abroad and the domestic contraction of civil liberties. Part of the lesson I wish to draw for feminist theory is that these varying gender logics may have loose or contradictory relationships to the comportments of actual men and women, especially today. Some women may stand in “masculine” positions, as soldiers or firefighters, and many men may stand in “feminine” positions, as fearful and protected citizens. Gender is better thought of as a set of ideational and social structural relationships that people move through, rather than attributes they have attached to their persons.

Adams and Orloff approve of this general approach to gender analysis. They take this essay to task, however, for failing to articulate a general method of feminist gender interpretation, for lacking public opinion research to determine whether the rhetoric of protection actually does resonate with citizens, and for failing to put its claims into the context of a general social theory of historical change. While I have no objection to such a research program, it is a little bit much to expect it to be executed in a short article!

In this rejoinder, I want to focus, however, on two more central problems Adams and Orloff have with this essay. They claim that the essay is an example of “feminist antimodernism,” which, they suggest, is not uncommon among feminist intellectuals today. They also claim that this essay recommends a conception of democratic politics in which state coercion has no place, a conception they find problematic.

In what follows, I take up each of these points and then connect them. Adams and Orloff certainly have my positions wrong on all counts. I have never in this essay or elsewhere said that I was “against” modernity. What we have and should learn from critics of modernization theory, I will argue, is that there is no automatic relationship between modern structures and institutions and the normative ideals of freedom, equality, democracy, and social justice. Sociological ideas of modernity must therefore be decisively decoupled from normative judgment. Nor have I promoted a conception of politics without state coercion. Democracies ideally are polities in which coercion is legitimated in some demonstrable way by processes in which those obliged to follow the coercive rules have had the opportunity to influence their formation. While we are far
from a condition in which such a democratic notion of legitimate coercion extends to international relations, our most realistic hope for an orderly world in the future rests on a project of conceiving and trying to bring about such a condition.

**Modernity and Morality**

Adams and Orloff claim that in “The Logic of Masculinist Protection,” I condemn what I take “to be a reflex of modernity: the necessary consignment of formerly colonized and peripheral women to the category of ‘other,’ and the elevation of ‘modern’ forms of life above others” (Adams and Orloff 2005, 169). They say further that my ideas are “representative of much new feminist writing, in which the once taken-for-granted association between modernization and progress toward gender equality, and the correlative ideological link between so-called traditional styles of life and masculine domination, have come under attack. . . . Thus it is not surprising that some analysts are ready to excoriate all things modern and even to dismiss modernity—any modernity—as a political destination as they construe the politics of the day” (p. 171).

It is a bit puzzling that Adams and Orloff take me as representative of “feminist antimodernism.” Neither in “The Logic of Masculinist Protection” nor anywhere else in my writing do I ever discuss modernity as a theme, much less take a stand against it. Their reason for seeing my analysis in this way rests only on my appeal to critiques of European imperialism that exposed the self-interestedness and self-righteousness of European claims in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries on grounds that they were helping backward peoples who needed guidance and governance toward becoming civilized. I suggest there, and I am certainly not the only one to do so in recent years, that the attitudes and actions of the Untied States in its present imperial adventure employ some similar ideas.

To construe this critique of Western imperialism as “anti-modern” strikes me as admitting that modernization is inevitably imperialist. In my opinion, however, a moral criticism of imperialism is logically independent of any critique of modernity as such. Indeed, as an intellectual enterprise, being “anti-modern”—or “pro-modern”—seems to me rather meaningless.

As Adams and Orloff point out, modernity as a concept refers to a multiplicity of social phenomena, including science and factory indu-
try; capitalist legal relations and practices; the decoupling of instrumen-
tal rationality from cultural values; urbanization, and the decline of small
community; and the development of media linking masses of strangers
in communicative networks. I do not know what it would mean for a
social or political theorist to reject these social facts that continue to sweep
the world in the process we now call “globalization.” They cannot be
avoided and must be responded to insofar as they may hurt people. For
one of the things that we have learned in the twentieth century is that
the effects of these developments on the well-being of persons have been
extremely uneven, both within and between societies. According to many
scholars, a global exploitative relationship between much of Western Eu-
rope and much of the rest of the world often imposed modernization in a
distorted form (Hoogvelt 1997). Many people have been excluded from
the benefits of modernization altogether, while modernization processes
have ripped apart the social supports their grandparents counted on. One
might claim that this situation describes, for example, the majority of
Afghanis today.

Sociologists once theorized the diverse structural transformations I
listed here as belonging to a single trajectory of “development,” which
also included the rule of law; enforcement of human rights, including
women’s rights; personalization of religion and its eventual disappear-
ance as an identity marker; cosmopolitanism; economic equalization
and the elimination of poverty; and progress toward perpetual global
peace. Events of the twentieth century have taught us that there is
no necessary relationship between the social structural transformations
called modernization and these institutions and conditions that most
people in the world today think of as normatively good. Tyranny,
genocide, mass aggression, nationalism, racism, gender domination,
and religious fundamentalism, to name a few evils, are quite compat-
ible with modern social structures; those enacting these projects often
have used capitalist economic relations and modern mass media to
unleash their fury in more horrible ways than earlier epochs could have
imagined.

In some respects, Adams and Orloff recognize this. Both in this
essay and in the volume they have edited along with Elisabeth
Clemens (2005), they refer to scholarship on “alternative modernities,”
which has challenged the idea that there is a neat and necessary
lineup between forms of institutional and structural change, on the
one hand, and normatively good social and political relations. Yet in
this essay, they decline decisively to break with the idea that modern-
ization tends to bring about societies that are normatively better than those they have displaced, and in particular, that modernity brings about gender equality. Modernity, they claim, offers a promise of gender emancipation that remains incomplete. Feminists therefore must internalize the proper critiques of modernization theory in order to “remake modernity” as a project to further that equality. Neither in this essay nor in their edited volume do Adams and Orloff tell us what such a “remade” concept of modernity is that we should so unambiguously get behind.

Honest scholars and political activists, it seems to me, can neither be “for” nor “against” modernity. We have to understand and respond to the realities of the complex, sometimes cruelly impersonal, social structures that describe most aspects of most of this world as modern, irrevocably different from the kinds of social structures and relations more typical of the world of the fourteenth century. What honest scholars ought to do, however, is separate our description of these realities from a normative teleology.

According to standards of equity, participation and voice, and mutual assistance, some societies are certainly better than others. This has always been true. Some premodern societies have manifested some or all of these values more than others. Some scholars argue, for example, that before contact with modern Europe, some indigenous North American or African societies were relatively democratic (Grinde and Johansen 1991; Wiredu 1997), and many premodern societies have had collective norms of mutual aid more committed to trying to meet the needs of everyone than do many modern states. Some even suggest that women had more power and respect in certain premodern societies than they did when capitalist relations separated a sphere of productive from family relations (Boserup 1970; Brown 1976). These are all controversial claims, of course, but they exhibit a more subtle approach to the relation of social structure to equality and democracy than do classic notions of modernity.

The ultimate point is that we should evaluate societies by these normative standards directly, and case by case, rather than assume that “traditional” societies were less morally developed than are modern ones. We should be “for” the freedom of all persons from domination and the access of every human being to the resources they need to live a decent life. If the Taliban were and are to be condemned, it is for rejecting these values. Insofar as “modern” societies fail to recognize and enact them, they should be condemned as well.
Power and Coercion

Adams and Orloff claim that I assume that “well-behaved, appropriate states . . . can simply do without coercion,” and that “wielding coercive power, even against terrorists or fascists,” is for me “simply beyond the pale.” They taunt that many like me “cannot conceive of the normative ideal of politics as anything more than deliberative debate or, at most, law enforcement on a global scale.” They suggest that I think away the “conflictual” nature of politics and that I fail to recognize that a fully democratic system will never shed this conflictual nature (Adams and Orloff 2005, 175).

If Adams and Orloff had read some of my other writings, such as my recent book, Inclusion and Democracy (2000), they could not make such ridiculous claims. In the first chapter of that book, I criticize those deliberative democratic theorists who take consensus as an ideal of politics, and I explicitly endorse the “agonistic” understanding of democratic process that Adams and Orloff extol. In Chapter 5 of the same book, furthermore, I argue against those democratic theorists who I think have put too much faith in civil society as a site of social change, and have denigrated positive features of state institutions. I specifically focus on the coercive character of state institutions, and there remind my readers of why even democratic institutions require coercion.

“The Logic of Masculinist Protection” certainly does not question that conflict is endemic to politics, nor that state institutions should often use coercion. It specifically criticizes the use by the most powerful state in the world of a kind of force in which those who have state power do what they think is necessary to get what they want, without regard to the rule of law, accountability to those affected, or the protection of rights. Some people disagree, but I think that the U.S. Patriot Act, as well as various extralegal activities such as detention camps in Guantanamo Bay and Afghanistan, constitute an illegitimate use of coercion. A legitimate use of coercion by democratic states is one exercised within a democratic rule of law.

I also think that the war against Afghanistan, and even more so the war against Iraq, are illegitimate. They have returned the world to the state of nature that many thought we could leave behind after the Cold War. Some saw the first war against Iraq as a historic turning point because the process leading up to it used the United Nations as an institution for international debate and the conferral of legitimacy on military action. Immediately after the attacks of September 11, some politicians and international relations scholars called for utilizing means of inter-
national law enforcement to capture and prosecute terrorists, rather than to put this conflict in a lawless state-to-state frame (Greenwood 2002; Kaldor 2003). Adams and Orloff dismiss the idea of a global rule of law as the mutterings of a spineless utopian who cannot face the reality of power. This seems to me to express disdain for the standard of a rule of law itself.

Their celebration of the place of coercive power in politics fails to distinguish the use of force by a powerful actor who can distinguish from the legitimate exercise of force. Many doubt that there is such a distinction, but they cannot be democrats. When I claim that the Bush administration has moved too close to authoritarianism, I have in mind its flagrant violation of standards of due process, privacy, public accountability, and presumption of innocence manifest in several of its policies of the last five years. While this regime is still better than many in the world by this standard, Americans should be disturbed about these developments, especially if we think that we have a modern legal system good enough for export. Adams and Orloff evince no worry at all.

**International Rule of Law**

Thus far, I have argued that emancipatory values of democracy, human rights, including women’s rights, and economic security, do not stand in any necessary developmental relationship with modernization. They must be fought for and defended on their own terms, and many modern societies have repressed some or all of them. I have also argued that the use of force, whether in domestic politics or in international relations, is morally legitimate only when undertaken within legal procedures that in the ideal are democratic. This ideal still needs much promulgation in international relations and does not exist in practice at that level. The connection between these two arguments lies in consideration of the behavior of the United States in recent years in aiming to impose its idea of proper institutions on whole societies by means of war and occupation. In their essay, Adams and Orloff do not tell us whether they think that more modern and emancipated societies are justified in trying to modernize more traditional societies, such as Afghanistan, by bombing them, invading them, and installing their governments. Their celebration of the necessity of force in international relations may indicate that they do approve of such adventures, but on this I will give them the benefit of the doubt. They certainly do not criticize making war for such purposes.

While the Bush administration tried to justify both the war against Afghanistan and the war against Iraq on grounds of self-defense, in nei-
ther case have these justifications been able to stick. Perhaps the bombing of Afghanistan weakened Al Qaeda, but the recent horrific bombing in London makes me doubt it. Some international relations experts have argued since September 11 that combating international terrorism networks requires a tighter international cooperation in law enforcement efforts, and that the paradigm of state-to-state warfare as the means of combating terrorism likely undermines such efforts.

Although the Bush administration continues to include the war against Iraq as part of its “war on terror,” there is little doubt that this war has motivated more men to join terrorist organizations. The primary justification that the United States and Britain have used for the war is that it freed the Iraqi people from dictatorship. This is true, but the war and occupation have largely destroyed what was left of Iraq’s modern institutions after 10 years of sanction, and has made the majority of people less secure and deprived them of the barest necessities. In today’s triumphalist atmosphere, there is far too little discussion of the human costs of the use of military force.

Both the war against Afghanistan and the war against Iraq should teach us that the attempt to “emancipate” a people through war is morally problematic most of the time. Such actions take self-determination out of the hands of those who have it by right, and usually do more harm than good. Certainly they should only be taken by a globally diverse multilateral force, with widespread international approval, so that the world can be confident that the action’s motive is not to serve the interests of particular states or organizations. As realists have long counseled, moreover, approval in principle of war for the sake of releasing people from unjust governments would gravely threaten international stability. The list of authoritarian and unjust regimes is too long. War, I would say, remains a primitive tool for trying to accomplish something good. The technological and state-building developments of modernity arguably have helped make war more awful today than it was in premodern times. Feminists and other lovers of justice should work to renew the hope that strong international institutions can be built that convert all legitimate uses of force to the status of policing.

We feminists should also be wary that our positions may be taken up by powerful actors and used as legitimation for unjust policies. This risk is partly the price of success: In the United States, at least, it seems that professing commitment to equal rights for women has become popular. I have argued here that there is no necessary connection between the complex social transformation of politics and economics called modern-
ization, on the one hand, and norms of gender equality on the other. Keeping in mind their contingent relation allows feminists to maintain a critical distance from claims to moral superiority at least partly grounded in military, technological, or economic power.

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Once More into the Breach with Modernity: Rejoinder to Inglehart and Norris, and Young

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With respect to modernity and women’s place in it, Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris and Iris Marion Young are sharply at odds. Young sees a rending and tearing of the social fabric, and no determinate relationship between gender equality and modernity, while Inglehart and

For their criticisms and suggestions, we thank Rachel Epstein, Bonnie Honig, David Weakliem, and Linda Zerilli. They bear no responsibility for the substance of our rejoinder, even if their arguments with us did help us think it through.
Norris think modernization and women’s rights are seamlessly joined at the hip. We think that neither of these analytical stances will do. Our assessment extends from a concept of modernity that embraces a relational complex of features and tendencies—one that is analytical, not normative, and that must always be historically situated. Modernity is a vulnerable achievement rather than the secure culmination of automatic social processes. When called to its defense, we have argued, feminists and small-d democrats may sometimes have to endorse means and modes of coercion controlled by imperfectly democratic states.

Inglehart and Norris respond to our criticisms of modernization theory by insisting that their reconstructed version improves on the original unilinear story (nicely summarized in Treiman 1970). We agree. It nevertheless falls short in a couple of important ways. First, the theory fails to identify the internal unevenness of processes that get bundled together as modernization. Thus, Inglehart and Norris call fascism and communism “interludes” in modernization—where it is clear that they are something more disturbing than that. Second, the nation-states at the core of their analysis are not simply more or less advanced on the various roads to modernity. These states (or, in some cases, parts of states) exist in systematic relationships with one another. Historically, some states have been net resource extractors from others, forcible exporters of religious doctrines and other social forms, and engines of political and military domination. Some of these relationships were organized under long-term colonial and imperial relations. In today’s world, these relationships tend to be temporary and unstable, less strictly state-based, and more multidirectional in flow, with former colonial territories likely to have cost far more in cash than they had ever brought in to metropolitan coffers (think of Britain’s Northern Ireland, for example). These days, debate is rife about whether empire is on the march once again, albeit in new and unfamiliar forms. Even if not, the old imperial relationships have left practical traces and forged enduring symbolic templates through which many people interpret the world.

All this matters for Inglehart and Norris’s argument about women’s equality. It is not otherwise comprehensible why the “rising tide” (Inglehart and Norris 2003) of gender equality also provokes difficulties with women-as-a-category—including shame, rage, and disgust at women’s uncovered bodies and public presence as the tokens of an excoriated modernity. With the Taliban, that reached the point of systematic mass confinement, institutionalized educational and medical neglect, and finally, retributive beatings, rapes, torture, and murder. The Taliban
are an extreme case, but they define one pole of a recognizable contin-
uum. Some regional national leaders—such as Saudi Arabia’s—have
not simply collaborated with but have actively encouraged the negative
Islamist coding of women-as-women and the associated punitive sanc-
tions against them. It is not clear whether Inglehart and Norris avoid
these painful topics because they think such negative symbolic associ-
atons between gender and modernity are not there, or are but a tem-
porary way station on the way to gender equality and full-fledged
modernity. Their conclusions about gender equality and moderniza-
tion rely on cohort differences, which purport to tell us about the effects
of economic growth if those cohorts grew up in dramatically different
economic circumstances. But in most Islamic countries, growth has not
been impressive (in the few alternative cases, mineral wealth looms
large, and elsewhere Inglehart plausibly argues that this does not deliver
modernity), and even the youngest cohorts did not grow up in anything
approaching an affluent society. In their own modernization-theoretic
terms, then, it is too soon to tell whether the classic convergence argu-
ment holds, or whether there is cultural lag, or whether religion will
trump economic development when it comes to gender relations. It is
impossible to tell whether the rising tide will be checked or will reach
full spate.

In Iris Young’s version of world history (in some ways the obverse of
Inglehart and Norris’s), the tide of modernization is also rising, but that
is deemed a problem. Young notes that she has never said she is “against”
modernity—indeed, “modernity” is not thematized in her work; in her
comment, she forwards a notion of the modern that reduces it to the
present day—and therefore a “set of social facts that cannot be rejected.”
Conceptually, this means that her discussions of democracy and security
lack historical content and context. Meanwhile, Young sweepingly ag-
gregates many complicated processes—modernization, capitalism, in-
dustrialization, and globalization—along the way eroding virtually all
contradictions within and among them. But these complexities cannot
be so readily foreclosed and assumed to be one thing—and that largely
negative. Nor is Young’s romanticized image of the alternative gender
relations of prestate subsistence societies a workable counterproposal.
Our analysis is much closer to Inglehart and Norris’s in this regard. For

1. It is the lack of scope conditions about which we initially complained; ours was not a call for
Young, or any other analyst, to “do everything.” Instead, we appealed for more carefully bounded
claims and historical specificity, referencing, for example, the relevant accumulated scholarship on
gender and the historical development of states and the system of states.
once states and systematic surplus extraction are in place, we take the
development of democratic rights and institutions and the discursive and
practical extension of rights to women to be absolutely necessary for
women’s full social personhood—and these achievements depend upon
the resources, institutions, and practices of modernity.

Let us presume that some such version of modernity is in place—as
it is in the contemporary United States. The question of how to deal
with violent threats to its integrity is a difficult one for feminists, who
do not, after all, control the means of coercion—or come near it, any-
where. This question is at the core of our disagreement with Iris Young.
We are indeed familiar with Young’s other works, in which she defends
some version of an agonistic conception of politics internal to capitalist
democracies, where contenders accept the fundamental democratic rules
of the game (e.g., Young 2000). But we differ on the ways in which
democrats and feminists should respond to the violent attacks perpe-
trated by those who do not share those operating assumptions, whether
they be fascists or followers of Al Qaeda or other radical Islamist move-
ments. In our view, national states—constrained and constituted by dem-
ocratic processes—have an important role, a role that in the last instance
embraces military force. Young claims in this issue of Politics & Gender
that “Adams and Orloff dismiss the idea of a global rule of law as the
mutterings of a spineless utopian who cannot face the reality of power.
This seems to me to express disdain for the standard of a rule of law
itself.” Perhaps there is a problem of cross-disciplinary communication,
of normative versus diagnostic analysis? What we take to be an accurate
description of empirical reality—that there is currently no functioning
international rule of law—Young seems to read as “celebration of coer-
cion” or “disdain for the rule of law” in general. Analytical description
is not celebration.

Since what we wrote was so different from Young’s summary of our
views, perhaps we should clarify our argument about modernity, state
coercion, and international threats. We certainly did not call for “mod-
ernization” of “traditional” societies by means of war (a hopeless pre-
scription if ever there was one!). Our point was rather that feminists
and democrats should be concerned with defending modern demo-
cratic societies, institutions, representations, and practices against move-
ments that seek to eliminate them. In this particular case, the immediate
impetus came from Al Qaeda’s attacks on U.S. and other civilians, most
spectacularly on September 11, 2001, but also in less dramatic epi-
sodes throughout the 1990s. Al Qaeda received crucial political and
logistical support from the Taliban’s state regime. A primary goal of the war in Afghanistan was to dislodge the Taliban from state power, and to remove the Taliban from state power required armed military action, not merely “global policing.” At the time, even George Bush, Tony Blair, and other allied leaders discussed Afghani democratization—not, by the way, “modernization”—as secondary to removing the Taliban and building a functioning state that would not sponsor terrorist groups.2

Elsewhere (Archibugi and Young 2002), Young admits that terrorist attacks are indeed problems of violence, although she prefers to understand them as “crimes” rather than “attacks,” for she does not want to invoke statist premises in her suggested response to them: “If the September 11 attacks are seen as crimes against humanity rather than against only the United States, an international tribunal instituted by the UN, based on the model of those for the ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda, with the processing judges coming from Western and Islamic countries, would be appropriate” (pp. 30–31). Her arguments on this point are contradictory. She has also written that “the United Nations needs its own military force under its own military command for peace enforcement” (2000, 273). At the same time, she complains that as currently constituted, the UN does not grant equal power to all states (ibid.). Does Young believe that if such a UN military force were organized—as a one-state-one-vote General Assembly alternative to, say, NATO—it would be an improvement? Sometimes the UN can be mobilized against fascism or terrorist violence, as in the case of Afghanistan, and sometimes not, as in the cases of Milosevic or (so far) Sudan. But there is an even thornier difficulty with relying on the UN as the final arbiter of the legitimacy of the use of force. Many powers on the Security Council, much less the General Assembly, are not in any sense motivated by democratic governance or equality; their opposition to action in response to violence comes in the interest of goals with which no feminist or democrat could possibly agree. Even imagining that there is an answer for all this, we note that the UN still depends on the armies of what we have called “imperfect democratic states.”

In her work on the “logic of masculine protection” (Young 2003), with which we were concerned in our initial Politics & Gender article, Young

2. Note that the incursions into Afghanistan and Iraq were two separate decision points, with different calculi. Here, as well as in our initial response, we discuss only the former, the war in Afghanistan, in which it was clear to us that deposing the Taliban depended upon armed force. Unlike Iris Young, therefore, we did support the war in Afghanistan. The invasion of Iraq was an entirely different matter.
goes still further. There, she asserts that the threats posed by radical Islamism to the U.S. state and citizens are either illusory or worse (i.e., a U.S.-organized, patriarchal protection racket). This is dangerously misguided. The recent London and Bali bombings, the spectacular murder of Theo van Gogh, and the continued threats to Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s life as well as democratic institutions and processes in the Netherlands—these are but three of the many illustrations that the United States is far from the only state confronting this problem. Those who adopt Young’s stance must address both the character of the political and military threats that face not only American citizens but also the world’s peoples, and the realistic means by which they might be surmounted. In doing so, they need not mortgage themselves to binarizing political logics. To consider Islamist terrorism a real problem does not mean taking the side of the Bush administration, just as opposing the war in Afghanistan does not make Iris Young a supporter of the Taliban.

The United States has had a long history of foreign policy engagements of a neoimperialist character. These include the so-called small wars (Max Boot 2003) that have been fought with more or less success since the early nineteenth century. Some—though not all—of these were justified with reference to various threats to national sovereignty that in retrospect turned out to be overblown. Quite a few feminists, and others on the Left, know this and are therefore almost instinctively prepared to reject any claim by a U.S. president that this country faces an international enemy, that some sort of military action is necessary, and that domestic security measures have to be beefed up as well. Such claims obviously merit the closest public scrutiny. But in our collective concern to unmask the strategies of America’s powers-that-be with respect to such claims, we would be wise not to sacrifice our own analytical abilities. Too often, the U.S. Left, feminist and otherwise, has been unwilling to craft an independent analysis for fear that any shade of nuance will nourish domestic political forces hostile to progressive politics. Yet there is another parallel history that bears underlining: that of Americans left, right, and center underestimating or misunderstanding social phenomena—particularly the fascism of interwar Europe—that came to pose the gravest dangers.

Alongside its misadventures, the United States eventually contributed decisively to the defeat of fascism and to the unraveling of the Soviet empire. Small-d democrats faced a tough challenge in supporting the constructive efforts of American governments, while simultaneously criticizing the terrible excesses and outright mistakes—for example, intern-
ment of Japanese citizens, COINTELPRO, McCarthyism—committed by those same governments, particularly when they would often be accused of offering aid and comfort to the enemy. Obviously, not all rose to that challenge. Today, feminists (now more numerous than in the mid-twentieth century) and democrats face similar hurdles. We believe that unless radical Islamism is taken seriously as a threat not just to Americans but to the world’s peoples, including Islamic publics (see, e.g., Moad-del 2005), feminists and democrats will not be in a position to put forward a credible alternative to policies that are noxious, ineffective, or both. We hope, at least, that we all can agree that we need our own autonomous analysis of how to respond to terrorist violence, and to gain clarity about the grounds on which different types of coercion are or are not warranted.

Autonomous analysis cannot magically deliver autonomous action, however. Contemporary feminism has uneven political strengths, with few representatives in government and none with their hands on any important buttons or triggers. Nowhere but in certain sci-fi novels do feminists control state power. Nevertheless, women’s equality has become such a widely accepted goal that even the Bush administration finds that it must frame its projects at least partly in terms of women’s rights. These tropes did matter, for example, when women’s representation was considered in the makeup of Afghanistan’s fledgling post-Taliban government and when concerns about women’s rights were referenced during the drafting of the Afghan constitution. (For another argument that framing has mattered for women’s issues in post-Taliban Afghanistan, see Ferguson 2005.) These are questions of political signification. They are also quintessentially political questions about struggles against patriarchal fundamentalisms abroad and at home, and in favor of democracy and women’s emancipation everywhere. In such situations, there will always be issues of the relative strength of feminists’ and democrats’ own mobilization as activists and voters, and our collective understanding of what most matters in defending democracy or advancing gender equality.3

Inglehart and Norris do not face this problem as an analytic one. Perhaps that is because as partisans of a retooled modernization theory, they

3. In the case of Afghanistan, we (Adams and Orloff) would have wanted anyone occupying the structural position of the U.S. presidency to have taken punitive action in response to Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks. It seems likely that John Kerry or Al Gore, for whom we voted, would have done the same. But in all such instances, there will always be a question of the continuing, contingent basis of overlap between democratic rights and gender equality, on the one hand, and what any given administration does for its own reasons, on the other.
argue that many of the processes associated with modernization—the rise of cities; the transition from agrarian to industrial and postindustrial economies; the spread of literacy; the rise of science and the circumscription of religious political powers—put overwhelming pressure on societies to make reasonably full use of women’s capacities. Inglehart and Norris argue that the opportunity costs of full-time housewifery (and how much more female seclusion!) become too great to sustain, so that social barriers to women’s societal participation must come down, against more or less political resistance. This is a very interesting—and testable—hypothesis that we would like to see further explored. But at this point, as we have argued, the jury is still out on whether the aspects of modernity conducive to gender equality will eventually triumph worldwide. Contra Young, however, it is not the case that acknowledging empirical associations between, say, the generalization of a discourse of rights and women’s equality smacks of “normative teleology”—whether that criticism is leveled against us or (in slightly different form) against Inglehart and Norris. The excellent historical work that gender scholars and others have carried out on the societies and systems that have risen and fallen since the origin of states and systematic surplus extraction persuades us that significant steps toward women’s full personhood and equal status have come with modernity. This leads us—as feminists—to call for the defense of modern democratic societies, institutions, representations, and practices and, we think, helps to explain why some fundamentalist movements seek to eliminate them.

Yet some forms of modernity can and have gone terribly wrong (even in the extreme sense of being evolutionarily unreproducible dead ends). And both social scientists and historians have raised important critiques of the concept of modernity itself. Thus, in our original Politics & Gender article (Adams and Orloff 2005) and in our Introduction, with Elisabeth Clemens, to our edited collection (2005), we called for “remaking” modernity—and would not claim that this is a finished analytical project. Scholars are really just beginning to examine the historically differentiated strands of modernity and their systematic and variable relationships in distinctive social settings. We repeat our view that this broad collective project rests on understanding all features, components, and associations, the historically hideous as well as the gorgeously inspirational. Is

4. That would only be the case if one insisted that modernity must guarantee women’s equality and social justice, and that that guarantee somehow impelled the construction of the necessary social arrangements. We would never say that, just as we would never argue that modernity as such is inevitably better than any possible social alternative.
it any surprise that we would also argue for a politics that takes both into account? We should defend modern democratic societies, institutions, practices—and states—against those who would seek to demolish them, while at the same time working to remake them in line with the normative goals of equality, participation, freedom.

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