BOOK REVIEWS

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This short history of Turkey, from Oneworld’s series of introductions to countries from Argentina to Japan, chronicles several centuries of Turkey’s political development with concision and authoritative detail. Beyond politics, however, the reader is left with only a scattered introduction to the building blocks of Turkey’s identity—be it Islam, Turkish nationalism, economic and social development, alliance with the United States, or convergence with Europe.

The first third of the book briskly outlines the main historical events after the Turks’ arrival in Anatolia in the 11th century, consisting mainly of the achievements of the early Ottoman conquerors, the politics of pashas during the Ottoman heyday, and the machinations of the Great Powers during the Ottoman decline. A solid chapter on republican founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk argues that, far from being an expansionist dictator in the mold of contemporaries such as Mussolini and Hitler, Atatürk was a pragmatist who implemented a genuinely revolutionary program that set the Turks on the road toward their modern democracy. Ahmad shows how this helped Atatürk’s republic become the only major Third World country to retain its independence throughout the 20th century.

The strongest section of the book deals with the often neglected years that followed Atatürk’s death until the most recent military coup in 1980. Details reveal eternal elements of Turkey’s political identity: the early reformers’ elitist slogan “For the People, despite the People”; the way Turkish deputies are chosen by party leaders to represent the nation, not by constituencies to further local interests; the people’s faith in the ballot box, coupled with their view of elections as an opportunity for taking revenge on the ruling party; the charm and folly of 1950s Prime Minister Adnan Menderes; and the idea that the army executed Menderes after its 1960 coup in an attempt to break the charismatic hold the former prime minister had on the popular imagination.

The last section of the book, about events after 1980, is less convincing. Ahmad relates the many spasms of political turmoil and fiscal crisis but tells little of Turkey’s extraordinary progress in other domains. While hearing of continued deprivation among the poor, corruption, and a tragic suicide by one impoverished woman, we hear nothing of the great strides forward by Turkey’s major companies, the greening and cleaning of Turkey’s big cities, or a media revolution over the past decade that has spawned two dozen national television channels. At a time that just one of several airports on Turkey’s southern coast welcomes 250 flights a day bringing in tourists, it seems unfair to dismiss the government’s bet on the travel industry as chasing something “fickle” (p. 160).

Such formal discussion of Turkey’s identity as there is concentrates on the great change from the Ottoman Empire to the republican nation-state. A well-rehearsed list includes moving the capital from cosmopolitan Istanbul to deep inside Anatolia, the early emancipation of Turkish
women, and the change from an autocratic court rooted in Islam to an explicitly secular Parliament and executive working with European-based laws. But this book does not dwell on changes in culture or society. Three sentences deal with the 1928 change from the Arabic to the Latin alphabet, for instance, but no mention is made of the equally traumatic but also invigorating rooting out of Ottoman vocabulary and invention of words to create modern Turkish.

One odd absence in a book that features a mosque on the cover is any sustained treatment of the question of religion. In sentences peppered throughout his narrative, Ahmad notes the milestones of political Islam in Turkey: the abolition of the caliphate in 1924, republican politicians’ use of Islam to “pander to popular sentiment,” the transition of Islamist politics from fundamentalism to a kind of “Islamic socialism” (p. 139), and its current incarnation as “responsible” conservatism today. The underlying popular attachment to Islam is never explained, however, nor are the reasons that it remains a powerful force of political mobilization in Turkey. The taboo-breaking idea that Turkey should make its call to prayer in Turkish is recorded, for instance, but without explaining why the Turks should want to make this change or why they changed it back. Typically, nevertheless, Ahmad gives the exact dates that the changes were made (26 June 1941 and 16 June 1950).

Other telling and unusual details are weakened by a lack of context. Few remember Adnan Menderes’s proposed loan-hunting trip to Moscow in July 1960, but was this a factor in the May 1960 coup against him? We are told that the second president, Ismet Inonu, was a “clever negotiator” (p. 101), but what were his tricks? If Ankara’s political circles were so often in turmoil, how does that account for another key element of the country’s identity, the relatively high stability of society and the family? The mostly precise text is not infallible, either. The infamous 1996 accident in Susurluk was caused by a truck, not a tractor, and the European Union’s informal membership overture was made to Bülent Ecevit in 1978, not to Süleyman Demirel in 1980.

The book sets out to be an overview, not to advance any particular area of academic or personal enquiry. Without footnotes, it is partly aimed at the general reader. Even so, the succinctness of the narrative makes it dry, and short bibliographies at each chapter’s end point only to academic works. Nevertheless, the overall dependability and regularity of the dates in the text, as well as an excellent chronology in an appendix, will make this a useful companion to any who need a quick reference volume for Turkey’s modern history.

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Hakan Özoğlu addresses the changing rapport between the Ottoman state and its Kurdish population from the incorporation of Kurdistan in the 16th century until the empire’s demise and assesses the role of Kurdish notables—the key figures in the state–Kurdish relationship—in the more recent rise of Kurdish nationalism. Of the topics in Kurdish history hitherto examined, the relationship of the Kurds to the Ottoman state and Kurdish nationalism have received the most attention. Nevertheless, Özoğlu’s reading both expands on existing studies and revises previous accounts in a concise, nuanced fashion.

The first half of his book provides a framework for understanding the origins of Kurdish identity formation by exploring the historical relationship of the Ottoman state to the Kurds,
particularly the notables. Instead of divide-and-rule, the strategy most commonly associated with state policies vis-à-vis the Kurds, Özoğlu contends that the Ottomans pursued a policy of “unite and rule.” The state provided incentives to Kurdish leaders to establish their dominance over fragmented groups, an arrangement that worked well for both state and notables. This allowed the Ottomans to limit the parties with whom they had to cooperate, to make this interaction more manageable and, in certain cases, more profitable, while also permitting the notables to expand their own regional influence. While not explicitly confronting the notion of a “classical” arrangement between state and regional actors, the portrait Özoğlu paints of a dynamic, ongoing interaction in constant transformation fits well with recent revisions to the paradigm of Ottoman “classical” institutions and their “decline” that has characterized the general field of Ottoman history.

How did this relationship come to the point where, in the 19th century, Kurds began to demand, through word and deed, autonomy or secession from an empire to which they had previously been loyal? They did not in fact become nationalist and secessionist, Özoğlu argues, until the empire disintegrated in the 20th century, an argument that both dispels nationalist historiography and corroborates the recent findings of other scholars on the timeline of Kurdish nationalism. In chapter 5, Özoğlu’s most important, the author provides extensive biographical details of several Kurdish notables who form the backbone of his study. Since such information was hitherto available primarily in Turkish-language sources, this is a great service for English-language readers. More important, it is here that Özoğlu goes beyond merely synthesizing existing biographical information and turns to tracing the careers of key early nationalists in support of two chief claims. First, he contends that it was really not until World War I, and particularly its aftermath, that Kurdish “nationalist” activities became actually nationalist and secessionist. Until the empire fell, Kurdish notables generally continued to regard themselves as Ottomans, viewing their fate as linked to that of the state, albeit while seeking to secure their own leadership privileges. Özoğlu also draws attention to a split in this nationalist camp. Herein lies his second important suggestion: Kurdish notables who had been members of the Ottoman bureaucracy or otherwise affiliated with the state, or who had more secular backgrounds and educations, opted for the secessionist camp sooner than those whose backgrounds were connected to Sufi brotherhood networks in Anatolia, who remained attached to the caliphate until it ended. Özoğlu further maintains that preexisting family ties and loyalties reinforced this split. While this is certainly plausible, a more complete discussion of the followings the notables enjoyed would be welcome. If Kurdish proautonomy or secessionist elites did indeed have followings, what were their bases of support beyond the Kurdish working class of Istanbul?

Another strength of this study is the author’s argument that, as the boundaries of Kurdistan shifted in the minds of both Kurds and outsiders, a parallel shift occurred in the notion of who was a Kurd. Özoğlu rightly challenges the nationalist/primordialist position that an identifiable and fixed notion of Kurds and Kurdistan has existed over time. But his attempt to link this position with his point on territoriality needs further elucidation. In chapter 2, the author traces the ascribed boundaries of Kurdistan and the corresponding shifts in Kurdish identity. Since the latter part of this argument is a key point of the study, it would be worthwhile to more clearly relate Kurdish nationalist territoriality to the disintegration of the empire. In concluding chapter 3, for example, Özoğlu suggests that the brief existence of an official province of Kurdistan in the mid-19th century may have inspired the later Kurdish leadership’s vision of an autonomous or independent political entity. While the idea is not far-fetched, Özoğlu fails to follow through in chapters devoted explicitly to nationalism, abandons his discussion of territoriality in his most important chapter, and only briefly restates the connection in his conclusion. While he rightly argues that Kurdish notables were not passive partners in the state–Kurdish relationship and that they supported the state because it could confirm their
positions of privilege and access to wealth (through property rights or privileges), he stops short of fleshing out this connection for those notables who became nationalists. Land itself, and not simply territoriality, became increasingly important for a certain segment of Kurdish society, and tribal notables in fact cared less about “Kurdistan”—until it served their purposes to frame their demands in a nationalist manner—than about securing their access to land and resources.

The author rightly draws attention to the historical interplay of forces that contributed to the shaping of Kurdish identity and to the gradual emergence of Kurdish nationalism. He challenges ahistorical, essentialist understandings, but framing this interplay as being alternately monologic and dialogic is rather confusing. His point that identity of a people and territory can be shaped at the behest of outsiders (what he calls monologic) is well taken, but isn’t this still part of the larger dialogic/dialectical process of identity formation?

Despite these few criticisms, Özoğlu’s work is a welcome contribution to the ongoing debate on Kurdish nationalism and the relationship of the state (explicitly Ottoman, implicitly Turkish) to the Kurds in its boundaries (and sometimes beyond). Readers interested in comparative nationalism, identity formation, center–periphery relations, and links between nationalism and the demise of empires will certainly make good use of this study. Even though Özoğlu does not delve deeply into the Republican period, he demonstrates that a better understanding of Kurdish history is not simply constructive but essential for comprehending Turkey. He leaves us to wonder what might have been if, rather than embarking on a nationalist/Kemalist path, Turkey had continued the (at least theoretical) multiethnic tradition of the Ottomans.

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Betigül Argun’s work is an important contribution in the area of transnational politics. A central question examined by the author is, “How are migration movements and the transnational communities they create connected to the possibility of enhanced political voice in sending countries?” (pp. 7–8). Her work also serves as a good introduction to the issues surrounding the effects of Turkish migrants in Germany on political developments in both Turkish and German politics.

Argun’s work focuses primarily on the development of Deutschkei in Germany and the influence of the Turkish diaspora in Germany on Turkish political development. According to Argun, Deutschkei consists of the “web of networks established by migrants from Turkey in Germany, . . . a syncretic union of Deutschland and Türkei, as these countries are called in German. . . . [It] is a trans-state or transnational entity” (p. 6). This situation developed initially as a result of the large numbers of Turkish citizens who migrated to Germany as guest workers during Germany’s Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) period following World War II. Although many returned home, there are currently still about 2 million Turkish citizens and their families living permanently in Germany, including both guest workers who remained and asylum seekers who arrived subsequently.
The myth that many would “return home” to Turkey engendered a view that residence in Germany was temporary. Today, second-, third-, and even fourth-generation Turks in Germany typically retain a strong sense of identity with their homeland and their traditional customs. Such attitudes, combined with German citizenship policies that reject dual citizenship and Turkish policies that create disincentives to renouncing citizenship (e.g., make it difficult to obtain inheritances without citizenship), have resulted in what many analysts have referred to as “ghettoization.” Most Turkish migrants in Germany do not integrate fully, living and working instead in Turkish communities within Germany (e.g., Kreuzberg, the “Turkish Berlin”), where they can retain their language and customs and obtain access to media (e.g., newspapers, the Internet, and satellite broadcasts) that keep them connected to their “home” country.

This development forms the basis for Argun’s most important arguments. Standard explorations of migration typically focus on traditional factors to explain emigration, such as economic disequilibrium, or the “safety-valve” approach wherein governments encourage or allow emigration of dissidents to release pent-up social, political, economic, or other pressures. It is subsequently assumed that these emigrants are largely removed from the political and social spheres of their “home” countries.

In contrast, Argun argues in this knowledgeable and balanced analysis that a reciprocal and much more dynamic relationship exists. Turkish citizens in Germany exist in the state of Deutschkei, being neither integrated into German society nor retaining fully their Turkish identity, although “leaning” significantly in the direction of the latter. The resulting territorialisiation is the creation of a largely Turkish civil society outside Turkey, existing beyond the normal conceptualization of geographic borders. This society’s influence on the “home” country can be pervasive. “At its worst, the cultivation of subversive ideas abroad may have profound destabilizing effects on a regime which is already suffering from legitimacy problems. At their best, such ideas can provide the checks and balances or the auto-critique mechanisms that a political system may be lacking endogenously” (p. 28).

For those interested in examining domestic Turkish politics, Argun’s work will serve as a useful introduction to the too often neglected role that the Turkish diaspora exerts from abroad. Her exploration of the organization and political effects of specific subgroups within Deutschkei (i.e., Alevis, Kurds, ultranationalists, and Islamists), which forms the second half of her book, is revealing, and this focus should be particularly welcomed by those wishing to learn more about the specific role of the Turkish diaspora in Turkish politics. For instance, she traces the reaction of the Kurdish community in Germany to the 1999 capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party, a Kurdish separatist organization. Protests and demonstrations throughout Germany, and elsewhere in Europe, resulted in governmental and nongovernmental pressures on the Turkish government. Clearly the threat “if Öcalan dies, Europe goes up in flames” had an important impact on domestic policies in European countries, such as Germany, resulting in significant foreign-policy efforts by governments to ensure a fair trial, among other things (p. 4).

Conversely, the Turkish government has tried to use the Turkish diaspora for its own political ends. For instance, Argun discusses briefly the efforts by the Turkish government to mobilize Turks in Europe to support its bid for European Union membership. Given the priority that Turkey has attached to this goal, and the important role transnationalism performs in this area, it is a potentially fruitful area of research. If expanded, it would strengthen the book, as would additional discussion regarding the effects that the Turkish diaspora has on German policies.

It is not unreasonable to conclude that Argun is essentially correct in her claim that “transnationalism promises to be a pervasive and prevalent phenomenon in the future” (p. 172). Future comparative work involving multiple cases would strengthen confidence in the conclusions of this important work.
This book is a commendably ambitious undertaking, but its author winds up biting off considerably more than he can chew, at least very easily. Jonathan Fox’s ambition is to explain the overall relationship(s) between religion and conflict in the last decade of the 20th century and, presumably, the first years of the new century, as well. This is an important topic if ever there was one. Anyone who doubts it should simply review recent newspaper headlines, in either online or hard-copy formats, or notice that library shelves are now groaning under the weight of all the recent works on the subject.

Fox begins by calling the reader’s attention to what seemed to many observers the virtually unexpected revival of religious practices around the world in recent decades. It was unexpected because reigning theories of modernization predicted the opposite: as societies became modernized and citizens became better educated, religion would play a diminished role. What follows is an extensive literature review in which Fox takes the reader through a procession of explanations for the contemporary religious revival. Looming large in these accounts are two related explanations. First, the process of modernization produces a kind of backlash against itself as the result of its profoundly disturbing social and psychological effects on large numbers of the tradition-bound. Second, at the personal level, modern secular societies leave individuals in a spiritual void because they fail to answer the most basic human questions about the purpose of life and death, especially since such “secular religions” as Marxism have been found wanting, to say the least.

Fox next turns his attention to the perplexing matter of religion and conflict: why the former should be related to the latter. Once again, readers are offered an extensive literature review, with contending theories grouped into discrete categories. Fox begins this excursion by noting the obvious paradox of the major monotheistic religions—Judaism, Christianity, Islam—expressing the lofty goals of peace and human reconciliation while simultaneously being associated with mass murder and the darkest forms of barbarism. Fox considers the possibility that Islam represents an exception, that it is a religion whose adherents are more susceptible to the appeals of violence than those of the other two revealed religions. But he marshals considerable evidence to demonstrate this is not the case. In so doing, Fox, employing his data set, emphasizes a number of structural explanations for the religion—violence link, including the nature of the political regimes that rule societies and the relative sizes of religious majorities and minorities functioning within them.

All this commentary—the extended literature reviews that take up more than half the book—constitutes the prologue to Fox’s real work, an analysis of Ted Gurr’s Minorities at Risk data set. Gurr’s data set was developed to assess threats posed to ethnic minorities around the world. Some of these ethnic minorities express religions differently from those of the majorities in the countries in which they live—for example, Tamils in Sri Lanka. But others, such as Basques in Spain, do not. In other words, Fox employs a data set intended to measure one thing—minorities at risk—and uses it for another purpose. In pursuing this goal, he restricts its use to cases where religion and ethnicity overlap. Hence, the analysis is really about ethnoreligious conflicts, not simply the role of religion in conflict per se.

At this point Fox deploys standard social-science techniques. First, he develops a model, a modified version of the one Gurr uses, according to which discrimination produces grievances,
which in turn stimulate mobilization, which gives rise to protest and rebellion. Fox’s model, naturally enough, begins with measures of religious discrimination and “provocative actions by a religious minority” before embarking on its journey through the chain of causality up to protest and rebellion (pp. 163–65). Second, from this model of ethnoreligious conflict Fox derives six hypotheses, which he then proceeds to test. Space does not permit a rendition of all of them. The first two and most important hypotheses are (1) that religious discrimination leads a minority ethnic group to the formation of religious grievances; and (2) that these religious grievances then produce protest and rebellion that are either not supported or only weakly supported by the data analysis. Fox then seeks to figure out why the results appear disappointing—that is, why the data do not conform to his logically deduced expectations. What follows is a combination of more sophisticated statistical analysis and the kind of ex post facto speculation common to many social-science enterprises. Fox’s general message is that the links between religious discrimination, ethnicity, mobilization, and protest/rebellion are far more nuanced than he had anticipated.

In sum, Fox has engaged in an ambitious and worthwhile project on an exceptionally important subject. But he has not discovered a Rosetta Stone, uncovering the secrets of the relationship between religion and political violence.

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Linda Walbridge, an anthropologist whose main research interests have revolved around Shi'ism and minorities in Islamic societies, now offers a work focused on the indigenous Catholic Christian community in Pakistan. Inspired by the 1998 suicide of the first Punjabi bishop, John Joseph, in protest against the blasphemy laws, The Christians of Pakistan seeks to tell the contemporary story of the impoverished and minority-status Christians of Pakistan.

The book is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the general historical situation of British India, the founding of Pakistan, and the conversion of the lower Hindu castes to Catholic Christianity. More detailed attention is then given to the contemporary political and religious atmosphere of Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s, ending with a discussion of the blasphemy laws. Amended in the early 1980s, the blasphemy laws, particularly Section 295c of the Pakistani penal code, have been the centerpiece of Muslim–Christian tension. Under this section, a person found guilty of “defiling” the name of the Prophet of Islam automatically receives a death sentence, regardless of intention or context. While the law applies to everyone, and Muslims have faced charges, the marginalized and lower-status Christians have become associated with this law and thus feel most vulnerable. Against this introductory background, Walbridge, in the second section of the book, launches into the heart of her research, which revolves around the life and death of Bishop John Joseph. Through him, she investigates the wider Catholic communities that he represented.

By marshaling a wide range of interview evidence collected from both supporters and opponents of the bishop, Walbridge attempts to exegete not only John Joseph, but also his community and the wider Muslim-dominated Pakistani population, particularly in its relationship with the Christian minorities. This entails a broad examination of the nature and enculturation of the priesthood along with their works of service and reputation among both
Muslim and Christian communities. Since Bishop Joseph was committed to human rights and justice as chairman of the Bishop’s Conference for Justice and Peace, Walbridge also includes chapters on the position of women in the church and society, the relationship between Catholic and Protestant communities, and the national status of John Joseph as the Awami (people’s) bishop. Further chapters focus on the mutual influence of Islam and Christianity; the ethical and practical dilemmas faced by Christians beyond the Punjab (Karachi in the south and Balochistan in North-West Frontier Province), which were outside the diocese of John Joseph; and the rise of fundamentalist Islamist groups such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba. The book concludes with a discussion of the ethical and political issues involved in the bishop’s protest suicide.

In evaluating Walbridge’s contribution, one immediately notices the challenge of adequately handling the historical background of Pakistan and Christianity along with the complex contemporary role played by Bishop John Joseph. Not only must the emergence of the lower socioeconomic Catholic communities within Pakistani society be discussed along with the religious and political factors of defining Islamic identity in Pakistan, but the author also has chosen to study the contemporary situation through the life of John Joseph. This challenge did not go unnoticed by the author, who at the outset carefully comments that the book is a balance between ethnography and biography. The need to address so many issues is perhaps one reason that the various chapters at times do not flow together but, rather, read as isolated segments of information. However, as the book unfolds, the reader is rewarded with greater insight into the complexity and suffering of the Christian communities along with the passion of Bishop John Joseph for justice, and perhaps discrete chapters are the best way to communicate these complexities.

The wide use of interviews and the desire to broaden the study to include Christians outside the Punjab enhance the value of the book considerably. Of particular note is the attention given to various relationships, such as that between Christian and Muslim, and between Rome and the local Catholic churches, and the varied views within the local Christian communities regarding Bishop Joseph. These insights further the scholarly contribution of the work precisely because the Christian community continues the struggle to coexist with Muslims despite mutual distrust, as seen in the blasphemy laws, and despite the poverty and minority status that leave communities on both sides vulnerable. These issues did not die with John Joseph, and they are not confined to Pakistan.

Walbridge is generally successful in providing a voice to an often unheard minority without vilifying Islam—noting the interplay of poor education, political corruption, and the concentration of wealth among the few, which is often addressed through religious discourse, as primary causes of Pakistan’s problems with its minorities. This book will be of interest to students and academics in anthropology, religious studies, and South Asian studies, as well as Christian–Muslim relations.
East at large, and in Lebanon in particular, in the development of the region in light of the rapid decline of their numbers due to emigration to the West. Dagher views Lebanon as an exception in the region and the Lebanese experiment of Christian–Muslim coexistence as a crucial element for the future of the Arab world, contending that “Lebanon’s failure as a meaningful experience will toll the demise of a once vibrant Arab culture and will impact the nature of Islam” (p. 4). This simplistic view, typical of some groups of Lebanese, grants Lebanon a more important role than it deserves in the regional constellation.

The book deals with some of the most important issues one has to contend with when dealing with Lebanon—namely, the issue of the identity of the state (chapter 1), the role of Muslims in postwar Lebanon (chapter 2), the problem of Christian emigration from Lebanon (chapter 4), the internal displaced (chapter 5), the exacerbated religiosity in Lebanon and the identification with the community in the postwar period (chapter 8), the circumstances of the Lebanese Christians in the years following the war, analyzing the role of “substitute leader” assumed by the Maronite patriarch (chapter 9), the role of the army in postwar Lebanon as an element for Lebanese integration (chapter 10), and, finally, the issue of political confessionism (chapter 11). Nevertheless, these important issues come as an aside, as an explanation in Dagher’s impassioned plea for Lebanon’s Christians and mainly its Maronites.

Yet while the book addresses an important topic, it is also disappointing. The main argument of the book is somehow lost in all the anecdotes and stories, left unsupported by the historical, sociological, and political explanations needed to buttress the main thesis. This problem is also evident in the bibliography, which is sadly lacking, especially in terms of Arabic sources. For example, Waddah Charara’s seminal book on Hizbullah, *Dawlat Hizbullah, Lubnan mujtama’an islamiyyan*, is not even referenced. In addition, important works in English are not referred to, such as the articles written in the postwar period by Richard Norton on Hizbullah and the volume edited by Deirdre Collings titled *Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction* (1994). Furthermore, the issue of *Arab Studies Quarterly* dedicated to Lebanon (Winter 1999), with contributions by Michael Hudson and Sami Ofeish, who deal with some of the arguments Dagher is analyzing when she broaches the issues of confessionism and the role of religious leaders in postwar Lebanon, is not included.

In short, this book is more a descriptive than an analytic work; it is not a scientific study of Lebanon in the postwar years. It is, rather, a journalistic account of some of the main events that followed the Ta’if Agreement in Lebanon. Dagher falls for the common fallacy in Lebanon of calling the country a “democracy” (pp. 52, 57, 159) while a more accurate description would speak of “the existence of democratic practices.” In addition, Dagher is not striving for objectivity. Some of her statements are highly debatable, such as her affirmation that Lebanon “is an absolute necessity, not only for Christians, but for all minorities in the Arab East. Christian presence leads to a civilizational and cultural interaction with the West” (p. 29; emphasis added). Her assertions that Lebanese Muslims are different from Muslims in other countries because of their interaction with their Christian counterparts (p. 44) and that they now feel “increasingly responsible for the preservation of the Christian presence in Lebanon and in the rest of the Arab world” (p. 47) are also highly debatable.

Hence, this work is not fit for the classroom. However, it is a valuable account of events never dealt with before, such as the Synod for Lebanon organized by the Holy See (chapters 6 and 7) and the visit of the pope to Lebanon and the implications of this visit for the future of Lebanon (chapter 12). The ideal target audience for this book is, I believe, experts on Lebanon who need some light shed on the role of the Holy See in Lebanon and on the soul-searching of the Maronite community. Researchers working on postwar Lebanon can also get a general idea of the situation in the country—once they do away with the main thesis.
Nissim Dana presents an overview of the Druze, known as the Unitarians or Muwahiddun, who live in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. The book’s title promises a broad study of Druze “in the Middle East,” but the focus is narrower, primarily on Druze in northern Israel and the Golan.

The Druze survived for a millennium in the Levant by shrouding themselves in secrecy and defending the most remote high ground, severely policing youth so no one married out of the group and refusing to emigrate even in the worst of times. A Druze writer described the task of defining who and what the Druze are as “the 1,000 year old question.” Since Druze society is closed to outsiders, the question is not easy to answer.

Dana’s thesis is that the Druze are a unique minority set apart from both the Arab and the Islamic world. The author explains how the sect operates within a larger society, but this leads Dana to overemphasize Druze particularism. The Druze do have a special minority status in Israel, encouraged by the Israeli government, and have a long history of distinguished service in the Israeli Defense Forces. But whether they really are a distinct minority or part of the larger Islamic and Arab world remains a much debated issue.

The book is divided into four major sections. First, Dana describes the Druze belief system, what he terms “the life cycle of the Druze,” and their relationship with non-Druze. In part 2, he describes community organization and the spiritual leadership. He then analyzes the demographic issues facing the Druze, describing what he terms “straying”—the very rare phenomenon of Druze abandoning their faith—so small as to be statistically insignificant. The last section outlines legal issues and personal status laws defining marriage, child custody, and inheritance, with appendixes of documents. The sections on legal issues, personal status laws, and spiritual leadership are the book’s strengths, as the author succinctly describes complex relationships and encapsulates Druze history in short, clear paragraphs. These sections are well organized and clearly written.

The book’s weaknesses are its limited geographical scope and lack of reference to key scholarship on some central issues. One problem is the brief discussion of Druze women. Dana states that they are forbidden from driving; however, Dahlia Scheindlin has described the growing number of Israeli Druze women obtaining driver’s licenses. Reference to Nura Alamuddin’s Crucial Bonds: Marriage among the Lebanese Druze would add much to the section on marriage laws.

The greatest challenge for any author attempting to define the Druze is to explain their belief system, since their texts are both esoteric and gnostic. For a millennium, their texts were purposely filled with dissimulation and the interpolation of tangential information. Copies were stolen and translated but remain indecipherable without the cooperation of a Druze aqqal, or “wise one.” Thus, any hermeneutical effort faces major impediments. Earlier efforts by Phillip Hitti in 1928 and Robert Betts in 1988 faced similar challenges. Sami Makarem’s The Druze Faith was written by a Druze, but even he acknowledged the inherent difficulties. Dana occasionally cites as absolutes behaviors that apply in some Druze areas but not in others.

Some passing references are inaccurate. Captain Carbillet of the French Mandate is transformed into “Capt Carbier.” Women’s veils are called naqab rather than the more common mandil.
Dana does a good job of describing the spiritual leadership but omits discussing political leaders who have played an important role. In the all too brief chronology, he omits key political events, listing only four in the past century: the Syrian revolt and the deaths of three Druze leaders. Dana does not mention the 1958 uprising in Lebanon led by Kamal Jumblat. He discusses Majid Arslan, but not Shakib Arslan, whose nationalist writings had a powerful influence in the Druze community and bridged the gap to the broader Arab nationalist movement.

Dana makes only a passing reference to Israel’s Operation Peace for Galilee, observing that the Israelis “found themselves ruling the Druze” in Lebanon without describing the tragic impact of the war (p. 14). He briefly mentions the turmoil this caused among Druze in the Israeli Defense Forces, but the impact of their deployment is still debated today.

Dana makes little mention of events that challenged the determination of the Druze to remain in the mountains: the post–World War I famine and the collapse of the Lebanese silk industry. Akram Khater found that fewer than 2 percent of Druze men emigrated to the United States, and there was no record of any Druze woman leaving, even as famine swept the region. But after a decade of war in the 1980s, many Druze fled the Shouf.

After focusing on their ability to guard their secrets, Dana argues that the Druze should undertake a program of public education to reinforce this separate Druze identity. He might have referred to Kais Firro’s The Druzes in the Jewish State, where this is discussed in detail. After a millennium of survival rooted in religious secrecy, the Druze do not seem likely to open themselves readily to the world.

Dana observes in the book’s preface that “finding out about the Druze religion is almost a mission impossible” (p. xii). In the end, this reader concludes that it remains one.
sustained at Israel’s hands. Put differently, the greatest value of this work is in its humanizing the Palestinians as well as making clear the reality of life under Israeli occupation and the farce of Oslo. This is no small achievement, given the widespread misrepresentations of Palestinians that exist in academe, government, the media, and society at large.

The interviews are divided into three sections, each consisting of six sets of interviews. Pearlman provides background to each interview that concisely contextualizes each story. Part 1 is titled “Generations of Intifada” and presents three generations of Palestinians whose stories situate the al-Aqsa intifada in a long struggle against dispossession and occupation. There is a grandmother activist who warmly recalls sharing holidays with her Jewish neighbors during the British Mandate. There is a mathematics professor who became a refugee when his family was forced to flee their home in 1948.

Part 2 is titled “Loss and Longing” and presents the stories of Palestinians whose lives have been transformed by the violence of the present chapter of the conflict. There is an interview with a mother and sister whose young son/brother was killed by Israeli soldiers. The depth and openness of their grief give the lie to the assertions that Palestinians rejoice when a loved one becomes a “martyr.” A particularly poignant interview in this section comes from a man whose house was bulldozed by Israeli soldiers.

Part 3 is titled “Faces of Everyday Resistance” and, in Pearlman’s words, “takes us from these devastating instances of violence [parts 1 and 2] to the more veiled, everyday cruelties of life under military occupation” (p. xxvii). These include stories from a filmmaker, an agricultural engineer, a clinical psychologist, two shop owners, and two members of a theater troupe.

In an epilogue, Pearlman writes about returning to the occupied territories in 2003, the third year of the intifada, and revisiting the people she initially interviewed. She provides the reader with a brief account of how these Palestinians have been personally affected by the ongoing conflict. It is an appropriate and satisfying end to the book.

The underlying message of this collection, Pearlman avers, is that “every Palestinian man, woman, and child in the West Bank and Gaza has a story to tell about how his or her life has been affected by the Israeli occupation in general and the present Intifada in particular. . . . Together, the occupied voices in this volume issue forth a collective cry for freedom and the right to live with dignity. It should be clear to anyone who, in good faith, allows it to be heard” (p. xxviii). There will be those who condemn this book for being “one-sided,” “unbalanced,” “biased,” and so on. To them I wish to reply that there so many thousands of books telling the Israeli story from so many different perspectives—none of which is “balanced” with the Palestinian viewpoint—that to delegitimize a book that tells the Palestinian story is unreasonable, unfair, and un-American, and violates the most fundamental principle of academic freedom.

Pearlman writes that one of the purposes of this book is to counter prevalent misconceptions in the United States about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. She has accomplished this objective admirably. All that remains is for it to be read. I recommend Occupied Voices for every level of education, including undergraduates, graduate students, and faculty, as well as for general readers. All will benefit from reading this fine book.

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Among the thousands of familiar television images and headlines that emanate from the Middle East, few mystify and bedevil Western publics more than the suicide bomber and the issue
of “martyrdom.” What prompts a young man (or woman, increasingly) to don an explosives-laden jacket with the intent of killing innocent civilians or, perhaps, enemy combatants in a blaze of fire and rage? And what constitutes a “martyr” in the Islamic world? Joyce Davis ably contends with these questions in *Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance, and Despair in the Middle East*, a book that is both accessible to the lay reader and sprinkled with important insights from the field for the specialist reader.

From the streets of a besieged Jenin (pp. 135–38) to the trail of the 11 September high-jackers (chap. 5), Davis explores the motives, psychology, intellectual and political influence, and social background of such famous “martyrs” as Mohammed al-Dirrah, the twelve-year-old Palestinian boy whose martyrdom came unexpectedly in a hail of Israeli bullets (pp. 27–45); Izzidene al-Masri, the Sbarro Pizzeria bomber who killed dozens of innocent Israelis (pp. 121–35); the Christian female activist Loula Abboud, whose suicide attack on Israeli soldiers in 1985 shows that the tactic knows no religious boundaries (pp. 67–85); and the Iranian child soldier Hossein Fahmideh, whose “martyrdom operation” taking out an Iraqi tank is still celebrated in the war lore of the Islamic Republic of Iran (pp. 45–67).

Threaded throughout Davis’s finely reported narrative is a basic theme, enunciated by several leading religious scholars: suicide bombings against innocents are anathema to Islamic principles. From the leading Mecca-based scholar Abdulaziz ibn Abdallah al-Sheikh to the top religious authority at al-Azhar, Mohamed Sayed Tantawi (pp. 111–13), Davis offers numerous quotes in support of this view. But she also points out the subtle distinctions, such as Tantawi’s and several other scholars’ view that suicide bombings against Israeli military targets represent a legitimate form of jihad, and the late Hamas leader Shaykh Ahmed Yassin’s prevarication when asked about the justice of killing innocents in the service of his cause.

By laying out the various arguments and counterarguments, Davis skillfully portrays the vigorous debate over the issue of martyrdom, ultimately coming to this conclusion: “In the end, Muslims, Christians, and Jews can find common ground in this: Whatever their motives, their grievances, and their suffering, those who kill and maim the innocent are not what Islam praises as holy warriors. They are not shuhada. They are not martyrs” (p. 202).

While the debate about martyrdom plays a central role in the book, the real strength of Davis’s work is her field reportage, bringing alive the subject with up-close interviews that explore the pain, loss, and contradictions surrounding the world of the suicide bomber/martyr. In the best tradition of journalism, she shatters commonly held stereotypes through skillful interviews. For example, her interview with Um Iyad, the mother of Izzidene al-Masri, the Sbarro Pizzeria suicide bomber, contradicts the commonly held view (promoted by both opponents and proponents of suicide bombings) that the mothers of martyrs feel great joy in their children’s work. “What can I tell you?” Um Iyad told Davis. “I have to say it was not a good thing that he did. There were many innocents there. So many children. We don’t support it when the Israelis kill our people, so we can’t support when their innocent people are killed” (p. 127). Later, when asked what she would have done if she had known beforehand, Um Iyad responded, “I would never have allowed him to go. I would have tied him down somewhere. I would have locked the house up. I would have chained him to the bed” (p. 128). Um Iyad’s honest reply counters the dozens of interviews aired incessantly on Palestinian TV or Hizbullah TV that depict the mothers of martyrs as joyful.

Davis’s interview with the mother of Mohammed al-Dirrah also leaves a lasting impression (p. 39). Al-Dirrah is widely remembered as the cowering twelve-year-old boy caught in the crossfire of an Israeli–Palestinian gunfight, cringing in fear as his father tried to protect him, only to die after being hit by stray Israeli bullets. The al-Dirrah image, captured by a French television crew, powerfully depicted the tragic fate of young Palestinians in a war zone and infuriated the world. Local Palestinian militants depicted al-Dirrah as a hero and a martyr, though he was, in reality, just a frightened boy in the wrong place at the wrong time.
Al-Dirrah’s mother offered details of his life—he used hair gel and pretended to shave like his father, he loved popcorn, and he loved to grill tomatoes and onions over a charcoal fire—that in an odd way humanized him even more than those frightening images of the crossfire. In the crossfire, he was yet another child caught in a senseless war, an image we have regretfully become accustomed to. But in his likes and dislikes, his personal quirks, he became a more complete individual—not just a symbol, but a living, breathing young man whose life was cut tragically short.

In the end, what Davis manages to do is remind us of the human tragedy of young men and women who—for reasons of desperation, anger, frustration, hatred, nationalism, religious zeal, political resistance—take the drastic step of becoming human explosives. She manages to tell the story with empathy, but without apology. She correctly notes that moderate Muslims must increasingly take a stand against militants, but the facts on the ground—particularly in the case of Palestine—help fuel the militants’ argument. While pointing out the struggle for the soul of Islam between the moderate majority and the militant minority, Davis also provides a unique, closer-to-the-ground view that is playing out every day in the Muslim world’s war zones: the struggle for the soul of young men torn between militants and their mothers.

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There is no better reminder of the futility of the single-minded use of military force in support of postconflict stabilization missions than the abysmal security situation in Iraq almost two years after President George W. Bush declared major combat operations there completed. Experiences with multilateral peace-support operations in the mid-1990s and the early years of this decade highlighted for many analysts the need to move quickly beyond a military response to nonmilitary actions that provide the conditions under which postconflict societies can return to a degree of normality. In Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? Robert Perito makes the case for the necessity of restructuring how the United States undertakes postconflict stability operations. He argues that if it is to be effective, the United States must overcome its traditional resistance to constabulary forces and plan for the coordinated implementation of more broadly conceived stability forces. Perito’s view is that this force must have four components: a robust and rapidly deployable military force that can compel warring parties to cease fighting, and if there is a peace agreement in place, to abide by it; an effective civilian, multinational Special Police Unit capable of undertaking law enforcement functions and controlling large-scale threats to public order; police, both civilian and military, that can restore and maintain public order and carry out law enforcement duties but will not usurp the role of an indigenous civilian police force (which would also have as part of its mission more mundane tasks such as traffic control and criminal investigations); and judicial and penal experts, working in courts and prisons, who can process those arrested and restore the public’s sense of justice for victims of crimes. In addition, Perito asserts that “all elements of a U.S. Stability Force must be assembled and ready at the outset of military operations” (p. 328).
Perito brings a wealth of personal experience and scholarly research to this task. Following a career in the U.S. Foreign Service, Perito served as the deputy director of the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program at the U.S. Department of Justice, where he supervised police-training programs for peace operations in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. All of these operations figure in his account in *Where Is the Lone Ranger?* In addition to this personal experience, Perito brings to the work a scholarly research background that includes an M.A. in peace-operations policy and a year as a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace. This confluence of practical and academic experience enables Perito to bring a clear understanding and unique perspective to his analysis and recommendations for what needs to be done in postconflict situations.

The book is organized into an introduction and nine chapters. The initial chapters (“Introduction,” and “Brcko: SFOR vs. Rent-a-Mob”) set the stage for the book, highlighting conceptually and through example the issues that concern Perito. The introductory materials are followed by two chapters (“Constabulary” and “CIVPOL: Police in Peacekeeping”) in which Perito explores what a constabulary is—“armed forces of the state that have both military capabilities and police powers” (p. 46)—and describes how such forces have been organized and used within a variety of Western democratic societies. Five chapters of case studies follow (“Test Case: Creating Postconflict Security in Bosnia,” “Blue Box: The Multinational Specialized Unit in Bosnia,” “Odd Jobs: Constabulary Forces in Kosovo,” “Policekeeping: U.S. Policy on Peace Operations,” and “Nation Building: Biting the Bullet in Afghanistan and Iraq”). From these case studies Perito makes observations and draws lessons that lead to his concluding chapter, “Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him?”

Perito’s work is based on thorough scholarship as well as original research. Anyone interested in the subject of the rule of law in postconflict settings or in peace-support operations will find in it much material to follow up. The text of *Where Is the Lone Ranger?* is extensively annotated with footnotes to published, Internet, and policy literature as well as with references to original interviews conducted by the author. Unfortunately, there is no consolidated bibliography listing the sources consulted. The book has an extensive and useful index that facilitates consulting it about particular issues or missions.

Since the United States first considered participating in peacekeeping operations, there has been a vigorous debate about the appropriateness of its military participating in constabulary activities. The view that such missions would dull the fighting skills of the troops deployed in them and that constabulary functions are not a proper role for U.S. troops has dominated this debate. *Where Is the Lone Ranger?* provides a corrective reality check to this view by demonstrating the need for constabulary functions in the design of postconflict stability operations. It goes a long way toward establishing the point that mission effectiveness and force protection will be enhanced by designing stability operations that include from the outset constabulary forces and the necessary elements for the rule of law. Some who demur from this view will see Perito’s relative lack of engagement with the literature on the negative effects of peace-mission participation on war-fighting skills as a failing. But his careful scholarship and practical analyses go a long way toward showing how that worry is itself a dangerous distraction rather than a core concern in the context of postconflict operations.

Several other books address the topic of the role of police and judiciary in postconflict operations, all of which are cited by Perito. *Where Is the Lone Ranger?* is unique in drawing together careful analysis and practical experience into a coherent framework for thinking about postconflict stabilization operations. As such, it will be of interest to students and scholars interested in peace operations. For those concerned about the Middle East, where the United States seems sure to be involved in further postconflict stability operations, this book will be of great interest. Indeed, this book is essential reading for anyone interested in improving postconflict interventions.
Zones of Conflict is rich in arguments encompassing U.S. foreign policy, the European Union as an international political actor, the dynamics of globalization and European integration, a critique of former U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski’s Realpolitik prescriptions for U.S. policymakers in the post–Cold-War era, as well as many others. However, it is difficult to identify the principal argument of the book from the introduction, the conclusion, or other chapters.

The author states two main objectives for the book. The first is to “present the ways in which the U.S. has attempted to hold sway in Western Eurasia since the collapse of the USSR and its satellite states” (p. 2). The second is to “examine the potential of the EU to become an independent political actor in world affairs” (p. 3).

The first objective has turned the text into a long narrative that is rich on the historical-descriptive side but thin on theoretical analysis. The author’s description of the text as “selective and, at times, discursive” (p. 5) is something of an understatement, since both selectivity and discursiveness have resulted in a weakening of the structure and consequently the clarity of the main argument of the book as well as each chapter. Furthermore, the author’s explanation that it would have been impossible to discuss in detail the foreign policy of the United States toward every Balkan or Middle Eastern state because it is “beyond the real and ideal capacities of any one individual,” although acceptable, does not hold. First, one could draw attention to those aspects of U.S. policy that are common for all the states in a given region. For instance, as far as the Middle East is concerned, most U.S. foreign-policy experts identify four pillars of American foreign policy in that region since World War II: protecting the state of Israel, ensuring the flow of oil at reasonable prices to the United States and its allies, working toward an Arab–Israeli peace settlement that serves U.S. interests in the region, and containing the influence of other great powers in the Middle East (the USSR during the Cold War). Second, the author in general spends considerable time describing the historical background surrounding many of the states in question but fails in most cases to create a dynamic relationship between the various arguments he offers. The space allocated to description leaves little room for elaborating on the theoretical-ontological underpinnings of the arguments involved. In addition to these structural weaknesses, certain stylistic habits further undermine the clarity of argument—for instance, using terms such as “the West,” “NATO,” and “the US” interchangeably, and failing to distinguish between the descriptive and the prescriptive (using “is” and “should be” interchangeably [p. 116]).

The second objective of the book—that is, the potential of the European Union as an international political actor—further complicates the matter by diverting attention away from analysis of U.S. foreign policy to issues surrounding the evolution of Pan-European integration and its impact on E.U.–U.S. relations. Much space is devoted to countries such as Cyprus, Germany, Greece, and Turkey, while other important international actors such as Russia and China, which arguably could have more impact on the making of U.S. policy toward Eurasia, are not given enough coverage. Most important, the way the E.U. argument unfolds brings into question the suitability of the book’s title. The title hints at the zones of conflict created and maintained as a result of the pursuit of American interests abroad. The reader therefore expects the main argument of the book to focus on analysis of American policy in the regions
mentioned. However, in reality the book deals more with the dynamics of U.S.–E.U. relations than the making and implementation of U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East and the Balkans.

Finally, the author’s preoccupation with Brzezinski’s *The Grand Chessboard* introduces an unnecessary twist in the explanation of U.S. foreign policy. If *Zones of Conflict* is intended as a “counterblast” to Brzezinski’s vision for post–Cold-War U.S. foreign policy, then its title should have been amended to address this objective. Otherwise, as the author surely appreciates, the making of American foreign policy toward any single state, group of countries, or region is the product of a complex interaction of the historical, domestic, international, and institutional context of that given entity. Brzezinski’s views do inform the U.S. foreign-policy community but do not necessarily determine policy direction or outcome.

In short, although there is no doubting the author’s research skills, his style and organization of the material are not effective in the presentation of the main thesis. Moreover, the author’s reliance on literature mainly on Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, with some on Germany and the European Union and a little on U.S. foreign policy and policymaking in the post–Cold-War era, further explains the theoretical shortcomings of this intellectual endeavor. Naturally, this limits the book’s contribution to knowledge in the field of American foreign policy.

The book’s descriptive style and its limited theoretical content should make it more appealing to the general public than to academics, and more appealing to historians than to political scientists. I would not recommend the book to undergraduate students in particular since its weak structure and the insufficient clarity of the main argument make it a difficult read. Research students, however, could benefit from the rich collection of arguments as well as the structural and analytical weaknesses that they should learn not to repeat.

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Joseph T. Stanik, a retired naval officer and Middle East scholar, served on active duty with the U.S. Navy as a surface warfare officer before returning to his alma mater, the U.S. Naval Academy, to teach in the history department. The book under review is based on an earlier monograph, “‘Swift and Effective Retribution’: The U.S. Sixth Fleet and the Confrontation with Qaddafi,” which takes its title from a comment by President Ronald Reagan in which he promised to respond to acts of terrorism with “swift and effective retribution.” Published by the Naval Historical Center in 1996, Stanik’s monograph was part of a series intended to highlight the contribution of the Navy to the national security, economic prosperity, and global presence of the United States.

In *El Dorado Canyon: Reagan’s Undeclared War with Qaddafi*, the author “presents a political-military history of relations between the United States and Libya from the beginning of Reagan’s presidency through the aftermath of the air strike, including the development of Reagan administration policies regarding international terrorism and its most prominent advocate, Muammar al-Qaddafi” (p. xiii). In so doing, Stanik develops five central arguments. First, the development of a comprehensive U.S. strategy for Libya was an extended and difficult process that took months to achieve. Second, the Reagan administration refrained from using force against Libya until it could reliably attribute responsibility for a specific
terrorist incident, in this case the La Belle discothèque bombing, to the Qaddafi regime and until it had exhausted alternative means. Third, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force prepared for the attack on Libya with “exceptional skill and precision” (p. xiii). Fourth, the Sixth Fleet played a key role in the prolonged confrontation with Libya, demonstrating the advantages of naval power in the achievement of foreign-policy objectives without resort to either all-out war or a prolonged deployment of military forces. Finally, Stanik argues that the 15 April 1986 attack on selected targets around Benghazi and Tripoli constituted a “devastating political and psychological defeat for Qaddafi” (p. xiii). On this last point, the author contends that the air attack on Libya undercut Qaddafi’s support for international terrorism, convincing him that he could no longer attack Americans without paying a terrible price.

As might be expected given his background, Stanik provides a superb military history of American-Libyan relations during the Reagan era. His depiction of military events—from the 1981 Gulf of Sidra incident and the 1986 attack on Benghazi and Tripoli to the 1989 air battle over Tobruk—are informed, rich in detail, and highly readable. In his discussion of military operations, he also provides a competent, workmanlike description of the policy alternatives explored at different points by the U.S. government, together with the diplomatic initiatives and covert actions employed.

Unfortunately, Stanik is not as successful in his depiction and analysis of political events. While his treatment of facts is generally accurate, his interpretation of events is sometimes overblown, too often tailored to fit military arguments or justifications. In so doing, Stanik relies almost exclusively on contemporary, official accounts as opposed to drawing on recent scholarship on Libya to assess the validity and impact of events in the 1980s. Consequently, his treatment of diplomatic and political events often lacks subtlety and nuance. A few examples make the point.

Arguing that the United States did not attack Libya until it could attribute to Qaddafi responsibility for a specific terrorist incident, Stanik accepts with little question the Reagan administration’s argument that the La Belle discothèque bombing was a “smoking gun,” proving the Qaddafi regime’s support for international terrorism. Yet the judge in the German court that convicted four people in 2001 for the La Belle bombing concluded that, while Libya bore a considerable part of the responsibility for the attack, the personal responsibility of Qaddafi had not been proved. Similarly, the author argues that U.S. forces demonstrated great skill and precision in preparing for the attack on Libya, on one hand, and, on the other, that the bombing of Qaddafi’s personal quarters at Bab al-Aziziyyah Barracks, which killed his two-year-old adopted daughter and wounded other family members, was not an attempted assassination. The collateral damage of this so-called precision raid included the French Embassy, a chicken farm on the outskirts of Tripoli, and other civilian sites. Unconfirmed reports put noncombatant casualties at up to 100 people.

Finally, Stanik argues the air strikes on Libya constituted a devastating personal defeat for Qaddafi and provoked policy change in Libya. While this remained the argument of the U.S. administration for the remainder of Reagan’s second term, the evidence available suggests that bringing the full weight of American power on Libya did not eliminate global terrorism, nor did it eliminate the support of the Qaddafi regime for terrorism. Official documentation supporting this conclusion can be found in a little-known Department of Defense report, dated October 1997, which concludes that Libya, through transnational actors, waged a campaign of revenge on the United States for several years after the 1986 air strikes.

The policy of the Reagan administration toward Libya anticipated central elements of the Bush Doctrine, including unilateral action, preemptive strikes, and regime change. In so doing, the failure of that policy to bring about either regime change or policy change stands in marked contrast to the success of the policy of step-by-step negotiations begun during the Clinton
administration, which eventually concluded with Libya’s renunciation of unconventional weapons in December 2003. The welcome decision of the Qaddafi regime to disarm and rejoin the international community was a victory not for a strategy of preemptive strikes, military confrontation, or bilateral sanctions, but for traditional methods of combating nuclear proliferation.

*El Dorado Canyon* is often a good read, especially in its treatment of military events. However, it is not well balanced and thorough in its treatment of both the causes and results of military action. Additional research on the diplomatic and political side of events during the Reagan administration would have resulted in a more accurate and complete treatment of the American–Libyan relationship during the 1980s. It would also have helped to clarify the significance of those events to U.S. policy toward Libya in the succeeding decade. While the book will find an audience within the general public, especially among the military community, it cannot be recommended for serious students of American foreign policy in general and American–Libyan relations in particular.

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Lawrence Ziring’s *Pakistan* is a breath of fresh air at a time of never-ending media reports and books in the United States and Europe that portray a “fundamentalist and nuclear armed Pakistan” as the “real rogue” state and, in the eyes of some, a threat larger than Iraq. Ziring provides a synthesized view of Pakistan’s history, politics, and complexity of society, and of the changing dynamics of U.S.–Pakistan relations. He is incisive in capturing and analyzing the Pakistani paradox—the tensions between the promise of a liberal, democratic, and modern nation-state and the peril of a potentially Islamist and Talibanized Pakistan. He uncovers how Islamic extremism and religious groups gained momentum and why it is more crucial for Pakistan to succeed today than ever before.

Ziring has devoted forty years of his life to exploring and understanding the complexities and predilections of Pakistani society, state, and politics. The title of his 1980 book characterized Pakistan as an “enigma of political development.” Today he finds Pakistan at the “crosscurrent of history” and cautions that the juncture is not only critical for Pakistan and its neighbors but that it also has implications for the global community. Ziring displays cautious optimism, and that merits attention.

From Jinnah (the founder of Pakistan) to General Pervez Musharraf, Ziring notes, Pakistan has had some leaders of good intent and sincerity of purpose who could not muster strength or show enough faith in the democratic ideal, thereby missing opportunities to change Pakistan into a democratic polity. Ziring is perceptive and insightful in analyzing and interpreting the infirmities, missed opportunities, and competing visions about Pakistan. Jinnah, Ayub Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and General Musharraf emerge as liberal modernist leaders struggling—and, in a limited way, succeeding—in providing some progressive and liberal framework. However, none of them, in Ziring’s estimation, could demonstrate faith in upholding the principles of democratic governance (tolerance for dissent and minorities and respect for rule of law). He is particularly unforgiving of Bhutto, who had a popular support base and was instrumental in producing the 1973 constitution. Bhutto failed to show respect for the
constitution and squandered an opportunity to move Pakistan to a possible parliamentary democracy. Under Bhutto (1971–77), Pakistan showed signs of social liberalism, an independent foreign policy, and an authoritarian civilian rule. Ziring glosses over social liberalism and independent foreign policy. He struggles to comprehend the enormity of these changes and concludes that, during and after Bhutto’s overthrow, so much attention was focused on the person of Bhutto and his rule that “little energy remain[ed] to fathom what Pakistan had become since the civil war” (p. 163). In my view, Bhutto’s socialist rhetoric, policies of socioeconomic reform, and independent foreign policy so alarmed the military and the Islamist forces that they began to collaborate actively with one another.

General Zia ul-Haq’s military coup and regime (1977–88) targeted the liberal and progressive face of Bhutto’s authoritarian rule. Zia displaced that face by coalescing religious groups and pursuing Islamization of Pakistan’s state and society. The external environment (i.e., the Iranian Revolution and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979) helped the resurgence of Islamic groups in Pakistan. “Zia envisioned a new Pakistan that he believed could become a model to all the Muslim nations” (p. 172). Zia stated that Islam was the only “integral factor that linked Pakistanis with one another, and also Pakistan with the Muslims of Afghanistan” (p. 176). His Islamization portrayed Pakistan as an Islamist, repressive, and authoritarian state, widening the gap between Jinnah’s vision and Zia’s reality and discrediting the relatively progressive, liberal, and somewhat reformist but autocratic civilian regime of Bhutto.

To put the rise of Islamic extremism and terrorist groups in proper context, Ziring links together domestic and external factors. He persuasively argues that Zia’s Islamization policies, the Iranian Revolution, and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan transformed Pakistan. These external and internal changes paved the way for an ideological and strategic partnership between the United States and Pakistan. (Chapters 6, 8, and 9 provide graphic details.) The Afghan war (1979–89) became the pivot of this new relationship. The U.S. objective was clear and narrow. Ziring boldly argues, “The CIA’s sole mission was the defeat of the Red Army, and the United States became party to an alliance that promoted the most aggressive form of Islamic fundamentalism” (p. 181). Zia was the principal architect of Pakistan’s tilt toward Islamism, while the United States and Saudi Arabia, respectively, served as the facilitator/patron and financial/ideological benefactor of the Afghan mujahideen. Today, countless studies reinforce this argument, including Hasan Abbas’s *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America’s War on Terror* (2004) and Steve Coll’s *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (2004).

Ziring is discomfortingly sympathetic toward the military-led regimes in Pakistan and generally dismissive of the civilian political leaders and political parties. As a realist, he recognizes Pakistani cultural dispensations and limitations of Western liberal democracy in non-Western societies, but then hastens to add that any form of democracy requires politicians and political parties. If Musharraf wants to “reconstruct Pakistan,” Ziring argues, “then he has no choice but to invite the free and open play of all the politicians. . . . If the Islamists are to be tolerated in the Pakistan of the future, then certainly this is no time to deny a voice and a place to all those wishing to take part in Pakistani politics. . . . It is time to accept the failures along with the frailties and to nurture a new generation of leaders unencumbered by blind doctrines” (p. 354). This is sound advice. The real test for Musharraf is to recognize the legitimacy of mainstream political parties and their leadership. Would Musharraf rise to the occasion and put Pakistan on its original path of becoming a liberal, modern, and democratic Muslim nation-state?

As its author promises, this book is a “quick read,” one that can be read as “a story rather than a scholarly tract.” It is an interpretive essay intended not only to broaden understanding
but also to explore consequences. Ziring is both persuasive and passionate in his arguments and interpretations and believes in the promise of Pakistan’s potential. He hopes Pakistanis find his work “instructive and positive” and helpful “in the reformulation of ideas about what it means to be a Pakistani at the dawn of a new millennium” (p. xiv). Thus, this book is important for Pakistanis in influential places, particularly the military top brass. Moreover, policymakers, opinion builders, researchers, and students will find the book useful, informative, and insightful, with an eye on Pakistan’s future.

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Jeffrey Record’s analysis of the second war in Iraq, Dark Victory, is a scathing critique of the Bush administration’s political doctrine of unilateralism and its hasty use of preemptive military force. Record, a former staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, argues that Iraq posed no threat to the United States and that the nation’s entry into war was an unnecessarily drastic measure that damaged American interests in the long term. Influenced by neoconservative elements in his administration, Bush was led to fear that Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) could ultimately end up in the hands of Osama bin Laden. Record carefully points out that the neoconservative position on Iraq and its possession on WMDs had more to do with a long-standing agenda to spread democracy to the Middle East than with safeguarding the United States against terrorism. The conclusion of the war has brought the administration no closer to achieving its implied or its stated objectives. Inadequate postconflict planning has led to an open-ended occupation. It has also created a situation in Iraq that is so unstable that it has only inspired terrorists to wage a new jihad against the American occupiers.

Record’s strength in his analysis of the second Iraqi war lies in his efforts to do exactly what the Bush administration failed to do: situate the current conflict within the context of the events that have been transpiring in the region for the past twelve years. He opens by contending that Saddam Hussein’s survival at the end of the 1991 Gulf War constituted a military defeat but also a political victory for his regime. America’s mistakes in its Iraq policy began with its failure to support the post–1991 Iraqi revolts and continued with its perpetuation of the ineffective sanctions regime. While Record’s criticism of these failings are well presented, he could have extended his argument even further to make the point that it is these same mistakes that created the atmosphere of distrust toward Americans that the Iraqis felt after their “liberation” in April 2003 and that is fueling the insurgency in Iraq today.

Aptly portraying the 2003 Iraq war as a sequel to the 1991 Gulf War, Record carefully demonstrates how the neoconservative officials in the first Bush administration who reemerged in the second were aiming to settle an old score and already working to build a case for war before the 11 September 2001 attacks. Saddam Hussein was not a traditional state sponsor of terrorism. Thus, for the administration to link the war on terror with a war against Iraq, it had to make the case that Iraqi WMDs could spread into the hands of terrorists—a concern that Record easily dismisses with the simple knowledge of how Saddam Hussein’s regime operated. He would have been reluctant to deliver the “crown jewels” of his arsenal to
terrorists he could not control. In fact, Saddam Hussein did not trust WMDs even to his own military, never mind bin Laden.

Record makes another valuable argument against the Bush administration when he delineates the differences between preemptive and preventive warfare. The former is fought when an attack is imminent based on incontrovertible evidence of threat. The latter is fought because there may be a threat in the future. A preventive war would have been harder for Bush to sell to his constituencies, so he marketed the conflict as preemptive war. Ironically, the United States in 2003 adopted Iraq’s definition of preventive war as applied to Iran in the 1980s. Just as Iraq invaded Iran because Khomeini’s revolution could have spread to Iraq’s Shi’i, the United States argued for an invasion because Iraq’s weapons could have fallen into the wrong hands.

Record also does well to emphasize the significant difference that declaring a “war on al-Qaeda” as opposed to a “war on terror” could have had on the outcome of the conflict. For example, the label “terrorist” alienated the Shi’i of Iran who could have aided the United States in its fight against al-Qa’ida, a known anti-Shi’i group. The general nature of the Bush doctrine also allowed it to be misappropriated by other countries, allowing nations such as Israel, China, Russia, India, and the Philippines to ignore legitimate grievances of their respective Palestinian, Uighur, Chechnyan, Kashmiri, and Moro communities in the name of aiding the war on terror.

Dark Victory is an excellent outline of the United States’ interest in Iraq and of its subsequent failure to develop viable plans for the area once its objectives had been achieved. The 2003 Iraq war was the culmination of the United States’ failed twin-pillars policy of the 1970s, in which it relied on Saudi Arabia and the Shah of Iran to protect its interests in the Gulf. After the Iranian Revolution, the United States could rely only on Saudi Arabia as its regional surrogate in the Gulf. The 11 September attacks altered this relationship, as most of the highjackers were Saudi, and the United States felt increasing pressure to withdraw its troops from bases there. The 2003 war represented an American attempt to create a new “pillar” in Iraq and to intimidate its lost pillar, “Iran.” The war had little to do with Iraq’s WMD “threat.” Rather, it represented a neoconservative effort to create an American base in the region. The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia in May 2003 gave Osama bin Laden a concrete victory over the Americans, a result whose implication should have been examined in more detail by Record in his book, as it represented bin Laden’s second victory after the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan.

While Record admits that the military aspect of the 2003 war was well planned, the reconstruction of Iraq was not. In post-Saddam-Hussein Iraq there were no contingencies for widespread looting, while at the same time U.S. troops closely guarded Iraqi oil facilities, giving the impression American interests were purely economic. In addition, the United States failed to realize that, while many Iraqis were content to see Saddam Hussein overthrown, they would not welcome an American occupation. Ironically, in the postwar chaos, some Iraqis have called for a dictator to bring security back to Iraq, a direct challenge to the stated U.S. goal of installing a liberal “elected” leader and undermining the whole neoconservative rationale for the war.

Record’s analysis is a valuable addition to a plethora of works that emerged soon after the 2003 Iraq war was concluded. It carefully carries its reader to the inevitable conclusion that, that in the aftermath of the Iraq war, al-Qa’ida attacks in the Middle East have in fact increased. He successfully argues that the war in Iraq, launched in the name of terror, failed to weaken it. Instead, it has given rise to a new jihad and fueled the fire of anger in the Arab and Muslim world from which al-Qa’ida feeds.
Political writing possesses a polemical intensity in these post-Iraq-invasion and Bush-second-term days that exceeds just about anything that has appeared since the time of the Vietnam War. The college bookshop in the small Virginia town where I live has a political-science section divided into “Democrat” and “Republican” subsections, with a largish “General” section left to house the rest. Unless some employee makes an egregious shelving mistake, this book will not find its way into the Republican corner.

For all its “no punches pulled” rhetoric, The Five Biggest Lies Bush Told about Iraq is fairly carefully referenced and, despite being designated as a “primer” by the authors, bears the marks of a fair amount of trawling in the seas of media-disseminated information and available government records. According to the authors, Bush’s five biggest lies are: (1) that al-Qa’ida had ties to Saddam Hussein’s regime; (2) that Iraq’s possession of chemical and biological weapons posed a significant threat; (3) that Iraq had embarked on a nuclear-weapons program; (4) that the occupying army would be greeted by the Iraqi masses as liberators; and (5) that a regime change would make Iraq a “democratic model” for the entire Middle East. By now, only the political equivalent of a flat-earther would believe that convincing evidence exists for any of these propositions. The book’s strength lies not so much in making the case against these declarations (though it does that, of course) as in showing how Bush the younger and his retainers came to think they could peddle disinformation of such a magnitude.

The Scheers and Chaudhry suggest that the road to these falsehoods stemmed from nothing less than a conspiracy, thereby giving the lie to the cynical view of government that declares, with a proverbial shrug of the shoulders, that states and their agents are simply too inefficient or too indolent (or both) to succeed in mounting large-scale conspiracies. This was, and still is, a conspiracy, one far more deserving of impeachment in the eyes of the authors than Clinton’s trysts in the Oval Office closet. According to them, Bush and his handlers had a “deliberate method of marketing a war” that would not have been supported had the American public been told the truth. Their rationale for doing this was the conviction that the installation of a “friendly” regime in an oil-rich Arab state would consolidate American power in the Middle East and, in the process, accrue political capital to the Republican Party while promoting the commercial interests of its corporate supporters. Given the fact that Halliburton, Bechtel, and other Bush-friendly enterprises have made a lot of money out of the occupation, and that the Coalition Provisional Authority was largely staffed by Republican Party trustees and affiliates, this, too, is hard to deny. A compliant media and a supine Democratic Party in the Congress ensured that, pockets of opposition apart, the public would quickly line up behind the Bush administration when it decided on the invasion.

A short book of this kind cannot, of course, provide the detailed historical background that made such neoconservative adventurism feasible. The authors acknowledge America’s long-possessed imperial propensities, something even historians not on the left do nowadays (Andrew Bacevich’s American Empire is a case in point), but, thus, leave it to other writers to chart this more or less complex history. The conditions put in place by these historical antecedents were hugely magnified by the events of 11 September. America dealt with this trauma by quickly seeking to wound someone else, and while some of this psychic venom (the
result of what the authors call “a fear-induced trance”) was directed at the perpetrators and their supporters in Afghanistan, there was enough left over to motivate a carefully orchestrated campaign against Saddam.

The authors are not content to look at the conditions that enabled the invasion of Iraq and its increasingly painful aftermath. For them, the accession of the Bush administration to power is itself deeply symptomatic of a crisis in American democracy, and only a remedying of this underlying crisis can curtail such adventurism in both the short and long terms. For the Scheers and Chaudhry, the first thing that needs to happen is a repudiation of Bush by the American electorate. This book, published in 2003, obviously could not deal with the recent American election campaign. The accession of Bush to a second term is clearly a disaster for all who share the viewpoint of this book. Significant change will come only when America is deprived once and for all of the cudgels it can wield against those who do not jump when its leaders click their fingers. Historians, invoking the notion of “overreach,” remind us that no previous empire has enjoyed an indefinitely long life. At the same time, as Louis Althusser reminded his students, the future does last a long time. But how long can the people of Iraq afford to wait?

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Since the tragedy of 11 September 2001, much time and effort has been spent on tracking the funding sources of numerous terrorist cells around the world in an effort to dismantle them. Loretta Napoleoni’s Modern Jihad attempts to unearth the funding sources and methods of terrorist organizations as well as governments (such as the United States and the former Soviet Union) that long financed counterinsurgency groups that suited their national interests. The author does an excellent job of describing the intricate web of relationships and funding sources, including the use of drugs by both France and the United States to fund and fight the various counterinsurgencies they were facing.

The author starts with the correct assumption that state- or group-sponsored acts of terrorism—whether by the Irish Republican Army, Basque separatists, or Islamic groups—have been with us for a long time. The book, alas, does not present a set of detailed data that could help the reader follow a story from the beginning to the end so as to understand better the multiplicity of links between these groups or governments that sponsor acts of terrorism. Furthermore, the style and organization of Modern Jihad is difficult to follow, because the book is broken into three parts, which are then divided into numerous smaller titled sections.

The author makes frequent use of the phrase “Muslim Zealots” without bothering to unpack this loaded term. The label is applied to all those who desire to free a Muslim land from foreign occupation (Afghans resisting the Soviet occupation or Algerians fighting French colonialism in their homeland). Following a rather strange logic, everything is reduced to an “Islamic struggle,” and we are not told how to distinguish between “Muslim Zealots” and freedom fighters. In one of the best chapters of the book, titled “Macroeconomics of Terror,” the author refers to the “Safari Club” as “a perfect example of how counter-insurgency doctrine
was adapted to a new international political landscape” as a host of countries were invited to participate in an indirect state-sponsored coalition of anticomunist forces (p. 19). Napoleoni states that Algeria declined to join because of the “self-described Islamic socialist regime of Boumedienne” (p. 20). Socialist, yes, but Islamic? Hardly. The opposition of Algeria to joining the “Safari Club” had more to do with its adherence to and leadership of the nonalignment movement than anything else.

The scholarship, while generally sound and well balanced, still leaves the reader with the thought that all terrorism is rooted in Islam and emanates from within the ranks of its faithful. The title itself and the book jacket, which shows the remnants of the World Trade Center, leads the reader in that direction even before he or she opens the book. This is despite the fact that Modern Jihad is not about the tragic events of 11 September per se, since the author shows how even governments engage in acts of terrorism to justify their own ends. Furthermore, the reader can still ask whether it is not possible that al-Qa’ida is invoking jihad—the most misused word in the current lexicon on terrorism—as a recruiting tool to justify its violent campaigns and nothing else. It is easy to describe acts of terrorism as emanating from Muslim countries, but it is also important to explain why some groups are led to commit these acts of violence in the first place. This is not to say that al-Qa’ida does not have a footprint in some terrorist activities, but the facts seem to indicate that we are moving more and more toward a state of freelance terrorism and free agency, where members are more likely to be fellow travelers than truly committed devotees of a cause.

Although the subtitle of the book is “Tracing the Dollars behind the Terror Networks,” Napoleoni could have done more to highlight the financial web of these networks. However, in fairness to the author, one has to acknowledge that this it is a very difficult task, considering the very nature of terrorism and its shady, vague, and difficult-to-trace financial networks. The author does a decent job of covering al-Qa’ida and presents some numbers and estimates that are of value. However, in my view, her contribution to existing literature is more significant when she sheds light on the sources and funding of state-sponsored terrorism. Nevertheless, Napoleoni should be reminded that the mere fact that roughly two-thirds of the U.S. money supply is overseas does not link that money to the funding of terrorism. The overseas money can be used in all sorts of legitimate ways, and its amount has been more or less constant since long before 11 September.

Overall, this book better serves terrorism scholars and students engaged in the study of the Middle East and terrorism in a post–11-September era than the general public. It is, however, conceivable to use this book as a supplementary text in an academic course dealing with the subject at hand.

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Iran’s macroeconomic performance, especially in terms of inflation, is an economic enigma for many observers. Since 1979, the economy has been destabilized by a revolution, massive nationalizations, a protracted war, trade sanctions, demographic change, and fluctuating oil prices in an economy that is very much dependent on oil revenues and on state and quasi-state
economic activities. The Central Bank of Iran, which is effectively under the control of the government, has generously financed government. Yet despite high inflation, low economic growth, and declining per capita income until recently, and the external and internal shocks, the rise in the price level has not reflected hyperinflation à la Latin American countries. The primary objective of Thierry Coville’s book is to decipher this economic puzzle.

As an economist who has closely followed the evolution of Iranian society in the post-revolutionary and post-Khomeini periods, Coville studies the political economy of “macroeconomic disorder” there and offers his prescription for a gradual move toward “economic order” in five chapters that hang together well. In this endeavor, he looks at the Iranian economy through the prism of money. Following Michel Aglietta-André Orléan’s conceptualization of “social totality of money” and the “legitimacy” of money, Coville asserts that monetary order in Iran reflects the interaction of social, political, cultural-religious, and economic factors. Based on this outlook, the author depicts the rentier nature of the Iranian economy and state in general, and the dependence of its monetary system on the Islamic government policies in particular, and explores the link among public finance, money, and the redistributive policy of the Islamic government. He also relies on analytical concepts and tools developed by monetarists and economists of the International Monetary Fund and the European Union for measuring the explicit and implicit size of fiscal and monetary accounts, such as budget deficits and extrabudgetary (or quasi-budgetary) funds (i.e., government expenditures and debt that are not directly recorded in budget accounts).

Chapter 1 presents the nature of the unstable macroeconomic environment of the Iranian economy in a system that is structurally dependent on oil revenues. It is argued that, in the face of exogenous shocks (e.g., revolution, oil revenues, and the Iran–Iraq War) and government policies, the Iranian economy has gone through high and sticky inflation, trade imbalances, foreign-exchange crises, and low economic growth. In 1980–99, the average annual increase in prices of consumer goods and services and in per capita income was 21.7 percent, and 1.1 percent, respectively (if the chosen period is 1977–99, per capita income declined on the average by 1.2 percent annually [pp. 26–27]). In the same period, the Iranian rial depreciated relative to the dollar on the black market by 12,600 percent (p. 36). Meanwhile, budget deficits have been financed by interest-free loans (that were not paid back in 1980–99) from the Central Bank. In 1980–99, the average annual share of explicit budget deficit in gross domestic product (GDP) was 4.3 percent, and on average 83 percent of the budget deficit was financed by the banking system; the average annual growth of broad money supply (M2; i.e., M1 plus savings and time deposits) was 22.3 percent; and despite its fluctuation, velocity of money (M2/GDP) increased as a trend, indicating the presence of a liquidity surplus (pp. 38–39). Yet if the growth of public debt explains an important part of the growth of M2 in 1980–98, in 1988–99 this growth is mainly the result of the expansion of the private-sector debt, including the debt of Islamic foundations (p. 31).

According to Coville, financing budgetary and extrabudgetary activities of a clientalist state through an accommodating and dependent banking system is the primary source of high inflation in Iran (p. 47). Chapters 2–4 are in-depth analyses of this claim based on budget data adjusted for implicit expenditures and revenues and income statements and balance sheets of the Central Bank. In the absence of classical distributive means, the redistributive policy of the government in favor of its sociopolitical supporters has been effectuated by extrabudgetary activities. The network that has mainly benefited from the choice of the government in terms of its explicit and implicit expenditures and receipts included Islamic foundations, merchants, and the “disinherited” (p. 80). The losers in this inflationary economic situation were those who saved and could not transfer their savings into rent or profit and all those with fixed incomes—that is, the majority of households. However, despite the persistence of
inflationary sources that have “reduced the moral authority of the central bank,” the high rate of inflation could not be called hyperinflation because the Iranian money “remained legitimate under the Islamic government” (pp. 81, 130). In the author’s opinion, the monetary order in Iran, especially during the first decade of the Islamic Republic, benefited from the fact that the state incarnated certain national–Islamic values “that a large part of the society identifies with them” (p. 175). Yet the objective and discretionary policy factors that have prevented the appearance of a very deep and long-lasting macroeconomic disequilibrium are the flow of oil rent, pragmatic change of economic policies, especially after the end of Iran–Iraq War, and, “in the final analysis, . . . the maintenance of certain social cohesion” (p. 175).

Given that the sources of economic dependence, inefficiency, and instability are still operating in the economy, Chapter 5 presents the author’s recommendations for avoiding a deep economic crisis. The critical point in the author’s economic reform is the change in the position of Iran in the international division of labor. Such a reform, preferably a gradual one, ideally would reduce the dependence of the economy on oil revenues and the weight of state and quasi-state economic activity by concentration on exports of industrial and agricultural goods produced by the private sector. However, Coville ends the book by asserting that the current state of politics in Iran is not very promising for such a reform.

In closing, Coville should be commended for a systematic, informative, and well-argued study of the political economy of macroeconomic disorder in post-revolutionary Iran. Yet more discussion on “non-monetary” sources of inflation, the social dimension of money, and redistributive policies of the government in favor of its sociopolitical supporters would have enhanced readers’ understanding of the complex and interesting relationship between politics and economics.

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STEPHAN DÄHNE, Reden der Araber: Die politische hutba in der klassischen arabischen Literatur (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag, 2001). Pp. 308. $57.95 paper.

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Speeches of the Arabs: The Political Khutba in Classical Arabic Literature is the dissertation Stephan Dähne submitted to the University of Halle, Germany, in 1996. It deals with political speeches (khutab) in early Islamic times (especially the time of the Umayyads and ‘Abbasids), a topic of great historical as well as literary importance. An urgent need is surely discernible among historians to develop adequate criteria for the classification of those speeches. The author’s intention to create a basis for the classification of those speeches as historical or literary documents arises from this need. After a preliminary introduction to his methodology and a short chapter on the emergence and tradition of the khutab texts, Dähne presents the translation and analysis of a sample of twenty-one khutab ascribed, among others, to Khalid ibn al-Walid, ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab, and ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan. These examples yield an interesting insight into the speeches and their variations. The author then analyzes several literary elements (formulas at the beginning and the end, Qur’anic and hadith material, verses, etc.) and stylistic elements (metonymies, rhetorical questions, metaphors, etc.) that demonstrate the rhetorical quality of the speeches. This is followed by a classification of the speeches. The book has an index that is useful but could be more comprehensive.
On the basis of the translation and analysis of a sample of certain *khutab*, the author deals with the speeches from a historical perspective, as well as from the perspective of literary studies. With regard to the historical perspective, he intends to answer the question of the authenticity of the speeches, whereas the literary analysis of the texts includes a typology/classification of the translated *khutba* texts.

The author’s historical analysis of the speeches, however, is unsatisfactory and contradictory. He expressly wants to avoid an analysis of the history of transmission and the *asānīd* but, at the same time, poses the question of authenticity: “[A]re the texts speeches which really have been held?” (p. 8). The question of authenticity is much debated in the literature. (On the methodology of the reconstruction of early Islamic tradition, see H. Motzki, “Der Prophet und die Schuldner. Eine ḥadīṯ-Untersuchung auf dem Prüfstand,” *Der Islam* 77 [2000]: 1–83; and in reply, I. Schneider, “Narrativität und Authentizität: Die Geschichte vom weisen Propheten, dem dreisten Dieb und dem koranfesten Gläubiger,” *Der Islam* 77 [2000]: 84–115.) The problem surely deserves a precise and painstaking analysis of the *asānīd* together with the texts and ways of transmission. The author, relying on Serjeant and Motzki by assuming the authenticity of the texts as a starting point, is soon confronted with manipulations and forgery. Dähne then develops three categories of criteria: textual criteria (such as anachronisms), intertextual criteria (the question, Could the speech have been held in its alleged historical context?), and criteria of tradition and *asānīd* (p. 11), which, however, he earlier described as unimportant (p. 1). He ignores standard methodological tools such as the common-link theory of Schacht—whose 1979 *Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence* he does not even list in the bibliography—and the recent ensuing discussion. Furthermore, he does not apply his criteria with requisite care and does not develop his arguments out of the material. For example, the author mentions the existence of several versions of the speech that ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan is said to have given after his election to the caliphate, but he does not analyze the relationship between the versions. In spite of this, Dähne concentrates on the version of Sayf ibn ‘Umar, which he categorizes as nonauthentic because of Sayf’s alleged tendency to harmonize conflicts, because the contents of the speech appear to be interchangeable, and because preclassical elements are not present in the speech. In his conclusion, the author admits that in the overwhelming number of his *khutab* he could prove neither authenticity nor nonauthenticity, rendering the objective he states in the introduction—to give criteria for the historical qualification of these *khutab*—unaccomplished.

The second level of the study comprises an analysis of literary and stylistic elements. It contains an interesting and extensive list of examples of different motives, stylistic elements, themes, and formulas contained in the *khutab* under investigation, as well as a typology or classification of the *khutba* texts. The author distinguishes four types: (1) the part of a *khutba* (“Redeteil”) that seems to be only quotations from speeches used in the traditions for the illustrations of special aims; (2) the monothematic type, which is a short speech held in a certain situation with one theme; (3) the polythematic type of speech without composition, being an accumulation of texts; and, (4) the polythematic type of speech, representing a composed and complex speech in which a strategy of persuasion is also discernible. This result is very interesting, especially when connected to another of the author’s observations—that the historiographic literature seems to preserve longer or more complex speeches than the speeches that are preserved in the *'adab* literature. This invokes the impression that the authors of the historiographical literature, or their informants/sources, put together the speeches from different fragments or parts. Finally, the author compares the structure of political *khutab*, the object of his research, with the themes, stylistic elements, and so on of Friday *khutab*, thus pointing to an important and hitherto not sufficiently noticed difference between these two types of *khutab*. 
To summarize, the author has presented an interesting collection of political speeches, a topic that is of great importance and interest to research into early Islamic history. Whereas the classification of these speeches as authentic or nonauthentic did not produce satisfying results, the literary analysis gives an interesting insight into the stylistic elements and themes used in the speeches and into the structures, themes, and classes of these speeches.

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In 1996, François Burgat, the internationally recognized French research scholar of political Islam, wrote *L'islamisme en face*, in which he presented a cogent and well-informed analysis of the Islamist phenomenon. Nearly a decade later, the book has been translated into English with a new foreword and conclusion added to the original text. Despite the momentous events that have transpired since the book’s original publication which involve the radicalization of Islamist politics from which a jihadist current has emerged that is engaged in global terrorism (most devastatingly expressed in the attacks of 11 September 2001), Burgat’s essential thesis remains valid. Unlike that of his well-known French contemporaries Olivier Roy and Gilles Kepel, who have portrayed political Islam as a spent force incapable of meeting the challenges of modernity, democracy, and equality, Burgat’s thesis focuses on Islamism’s authenticity as a populist voice of political democracy, cultural integrity, and social identity. While he emphasizes the robust nature of Arab authoritarianism in which incumbent regimes have forestalled the emergence of genuine democracy through survivalist strategies that mix coercion and cooptation, Burgat maintains that reformist-oriented political Islam of the kind represented by such movements as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, Algeria’s Islamic Salvation Front, Tunisia’s al-Nahdah party, and Morocco’s Justice and Welfare Association serve as the most legitimate, if not democratic, expression of mass-based political activism.

The evidence he presents is wide ranging and compelling. Like few other scholars of the subject, Burgat possesses the linguistic competence (fluent in modern standard Arabic and several regional dialects) and long-term in-country experiences (in North Africa, Egypt, and Yemen, among others) to fuse textual, attitudinal, and behavioral data into a coherent picture of political Islam’s multivaried expression. The author consistently maintains that Islamism is best understood through the prism of power politics, both domestic and global, rather than through any close investigation of Islam’s theological roots or textual meanings and interpretations.

The book is organized into twelve chapters, with an introduction and conclusion. The first five chapters present a historical narrative explaining how successive ideological incarnations—whether Arab nationalist, Nasserist, socialist, or communist—intended yet failed to capture the hearts and minds of the mass publics. This should not have come as a surprise, given the elite-oriented nature of Western-inspired political formulas founded on purely secular principles and rationalist calculations.

Despite adequate material resources in the form of oil and strategic or other “rents,” these ideological orientations often promised more than they could deliver. It was inevitable, therefore, that once the Arab state failed to deliver on the inflated promises of development and
democracy that its ideological rhetoric propagated, a counterhegemonic, if not a countercultural, project would emerge to fill the void.

Yet the rise of political Islam, according to Burgat, cannot be explained purely on instrumental grounds. To be sure, falling standards of living, economic mismanagement, wasted resources, and endemic corruption have all taken their toll on society’s lower and middle classes. Groups who have suffered disproportionately blame those in power for their deprivation. Economic discontent, coupled with social marginalization, cultural alienation, political powerlessness, and spiritual aridity, has created an environment conducive to Islamist appeals in which each of these real or perceived grievances finds resolution.

Several chapters are devoted to case studies, including Egypt, Algeria, and the Gaza Strip. These serve to illustrate Burgat’s central thesis that Islamic activism and its radical offshoot are inevitable responses to institutional exclusion and state repression. In Egypt and Algeria, for example, Islamist attempts in the 1980s to play by the “rules of the game” quickly degenerated into antisystem protest as military-backed regimes in both countries violently suppressed any attempts by populist forces to achieve power through democratic means. For Burgat, Islamic “terrorism” in Algeria seems a rational response to institutional exclusion, while state-directed “terrorism” is “nothing more than the retreat, the desperate solution, the last gasp of a regime that has not only lost the support of its core supporters but also the hordes of people in its own ranks” (p. 110).

The book’s last three substantive chapters focus on the highly contentious issues of Islam and democracy, Islamism and women, and “from imported to imposed modernity.” For his part, Burgat adds his name to an increasingly long list of scholars and specialists of political Islam who reject the notion that Islam as religion, culture, or “civilization” is antithetical to modern, procedural democracy. As far as Burgat is concerned, “two major processes occurring in the Arab world are anything but incompatible: the reconciliation of political discourse with Muslim culture on the one hand, and the slow and laborious emergence of pluralist and tolerant conduct in line with the democratic world on the other” (p. 138).

In his discussion on the view of women within political Islam, the author is unambiguous in his belief that patriarchal culture, and not Islam or Islamism, is the principal source of feminist exclusion in the Arab world. The quote of one female Algerian psychiatrist seems to capture this essence: “Compared to North African tradition, Islam is progress” (p. 148).

In his concluding chapter, Burgat attempts to incorporate and reinterpret the meaning of the events after 11 September 2001 in the context of Islam’s worldwide radicalization. While others see the futility, if not the destructive impulse, of Islamism, which needs to be countered by all possible means (“the war on terrorism”), Burgat continues to believe that the source of social unrest, violence, and terrorism is found in the authoritarian state that employs a combination of repressive and cooptive strategies to maintain itself in power at all costs. Incumbent regimes, he argues, “have all succeeded in putting their power well beyond the reach of their fellow citizens’ electoral whim by the means of timely constitutional reforms” (p. 166). Yet despite this effort at political stasis, significantly aided by external actors, Burgat believes that Islamism as a political discourse remains active in two areas: “in the internal contestation of Arab political orders and, internationally, in the context of East–West relations” (p. 183).

Whether one agrees with Burgat’s thesis or not, his book provides a deeply reasoned yet impassioned understanding of a complex phenomenon whose activism currently challenges world public opinion. While at times the translated text can be awkward and perplexing, this study remains essential reading for anyone interested in coming face to face with political Islam.

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The Islamic law of procedure has not been extensively studied. The present book—a German doctoral dissertation submitted to the University of Hamburg—focuses on the law of procedure on the basis of Maliki sources from the 7th to the 12th century, considering it as a link between legal rules and the application of these rules and thus closely connected to all parts of the material law. The author even makes the practicability of a legal system dependent on its law of procedure.

After a historical account of the shari'a and the Maliki school of law in North Africa and Spain, the author reviews the scholarship in this field, criticizing ahistorical approaches that ignore chronological developments, the plurality of legal opinions, regional specificities, and law-school–specific discussions among the jurists. Methodological aspects—such as technique of regulation, systematization, and formal argumentation—are also addressed. This is why the author chooses to focus on methodology and systematic argumentation on the basis of a clearly defined sample, spanning a period of six centuries, from the Maliki law school. This approach is convincing and meets the requirements for a critical historical study. It enables the author not only to analyze the plurality of legal opinions regarding the law of procedure synchronically but also to examine diachronically developments and changes that may have taken place in this school of law.

Extensive quotations, analysis, and comparison of the chapters on procedural law in the *fiqh* works of Malik (*Muwatta*), Sahnun (*Mudawwana*), Qayrawani (*Risala*), and Ibn Rushd (*Bidaya*) give valuable insight into the methodology of the jurists, as well as the pluralism of legal opinions. The author deals with procedural rulings in civil cases separately from those in the *huḍād*, which deserve special treatment because of their different rules of evidence. He proceeds according to the chronological sequence of the procedure rather than the order of presentation of the topics in the *fiqh* literature, starting with the involved persons, the litigants, the judge, and his staff. Developing his arguments out of the texts, he then meticulously analyzes the different stages of the procedure, such as the filing of action, the defendant’s answer, testimony and oath, and the judgment and enforcement. The typical formalism of the stages of procedure seems to confirm Schacht’s statement in *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford, 1964, p. 195): “The emphasis of the Islamic law of procedure lies not so much on arriving at the truth as on applying certain formal rules.” Thus, a sharp distinction between the roles of the plaintiff (claimant), on whom the onus of proof lies, and the defendant, whose statement is confirmed by the oath, with a special distribution of priorities of testimony and oaths, is typical for Islamic law. The author compares this situation with modern German procedural law, where both parties have the same right to bring evidence.

Regarding the chapters on the *qadi* in the *Muwatta*, *Mudawwana*, and the *Bidaya*, the perspectives and themes vary. The later sources—the *Mudawwana* and the *Bidaya*—deal with the relationship between the judge and the ruler, whereas the *Muwatta* does not. At this point, a historical-critical evaluation of the statements of these texts pertaining to the emergence of
judicial structures in Islamic law would have been appropriate. However, the author prefers the legal-comparative perspective, developing a comparison of these rules and procedures with modern German law. The discrepancy is, of course, striking. Whereas in classical Islamic law the ruler appoints and dismisses the judge at will—but cannot interfere with the jurisdiction itself—the modern system of law is based on the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary. The enforcement of judgments is dealt with in the case of debtors. At this point, a short discussion of the problem of the enforcement of judgments, which was normally a duty of the state authority, would have been interesting. The law of procedure of hudūd, the Qur’anic punishments, is dealt with but not in the same extensive way as the procedure in civil cases.

Extensive quotations from the sources, a meticulous analysis of the statements, and a comparison of the different statements of the texts give lively and valuable insights into the structure of the law of procedure, as well as the jurists’ reasoning. Every chapter contains a short side view of the modern German law of procedure. The Arabic technical terms are given in brackets. The quotations convincingly prove the shari’a’s flexibility and throw light on the plurality of approaches and concepts, as well as the methods of legal argumentation. An index would have been useful, as would a list of the Arabic technical terms with their translations.

To summarize, this study is a very good survey of the early and medieval law of procedure, with interesting insights into the methodology used by Muslim jurists and their systematic approach. The comparison with modern German law is surely interesting for comparative jurisprudence and the history of law. It has to be kept in mind, however, that the law of procedure in Islamic countries today has undergone a fundamental change since the 19th century under the influence of modern Western law. There is a multilayered court system in every Islamic country today which has replaced the jurisdictional monopoly of the qadi. Still, in many Islamic countries, testimony by a woman counts for half the testimony of a man. A second problem is the question of the practical relevance of the Islamic law of procedure, which the author himself raises in his introduction. The Islamic law of procedure is normally thought to have been neglected either partially or even totally, especially in the hudūd, for being unpractical. How is one to pass judgment on someone accused of fornication without having four male eyewitnesses? This aspect is not dealt with in Scholz’s book, for the sources are normative law books. A reconstruction of how the jurisdiction functioned in the first six centuries has not yet been undertaken. This would be possible only on the basis of court documents, which are not preserved for this time, or on the basis of historical-chronological sources—for example, the vast biographical lexic in Islam. (For an example from the 19th century, see I. Schneider, “Muḥammad Bāqir Şaffī [1180–1260/1766–1844] und die Isfahaner Gerichtsbarkeit,” Der Islam 79 [2002]: 240–73.) These remarks, however, are not meant to detract from the importance of this comparative analysis of procedural law regulations and their underlying methods, which gives us a fresh perspective and a new impetus for the study of Islamic law and comparative jurisprudence.

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Postcolonial studies purports to bring the margins of the global (and academic) order into the center and brings issues of identity and representation into disciplines that do not ordinarily
deal with them. The benefits of the postcolonial perspective for the study of Arabic literary texts are not, however, entirely straightforward. This can be seen particularly in the conjunction of postcolonial studies with the recent ascendancy of postmodernity as the designation for the cultural phase of the contemporary West. Postcolonial theory has arisen mainly as a mode of culturally privileging Euroamerican discourses about the non-West, as well as literary works of colonial background addressed to metropolitan audiences and marked by features that have come to be associated with postmodernity. Nevertheless, the relationship between the postcolonial and the postmodern remains ambiguous and problematic. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the status of the overwhelming majority of “postcolonial” literary works: those written in non-Western languages and addressed to non-Western readerships.

The Postcolonial Arabic Novel by Muhsin Musawi is a pioneering work in that it takes the postcolonial status of Arabic fiction since the 1960s as its point of departure. Musawi does not attempt to resolve the ambiguities of this status. Nor does he present any overarching thesis regarding the nature of postcoloniality in the Arabic context. What he accomplishes, instead, is to resurvey the corpus of 20th-century Arabic fiction in postcolonial terms. Therefore, his book has a great deal in common with the existing English-language introductions to and histories of the Arabic novel. Yet it differs from existing works of this nature in that it is organized not in terms of a chronological progression, but around the thematic issues foregrounded in postcolonial theory, including nationality, colonialism, gender, and marginality. Musawi’s work has the added benefit of introducing a number of authors, such as the Iraqis Dhu al-Nun Ayyub and ‘Aziz al-Sayyid Jasim, who have not had much prominence in English criticism. Moreover, Musawi brings into his discussion works by Arab authors written in European languages, such as Nedjma by Katib Yacine and The Map of Love by Ahdaf Soueif. The effect of Musawi’s work, therefore, is to remap the field of 20th-century Arabic fiction in a manner that will aid future researchers in exploring and working through the ambiguities of postcoloniality as it applies to the Arabic literary context.

The Postcolonial Arabic Novel is divided into ten thematic chapters. They revolve around a number of leitmotifs that lend cohesion to the staccato, surveying movement of the general discussion. Chief among these leitmotifs is the “trope of Scheherezade,” to which the second chapter is devoted. Musawi sees the fictional florescence and narrative experimentation of 20th-century Arabic literature as a kind of return of the repressed, figured in the rise of the formerly marginalized Al layla wa-layla to a position of cultural prestige through Western Orientalist mediation. Furthermore, the centrality of the female storyteller therein points to the feminine self-assertion and critique of patriarchy fostered in recent Arabic fiction. For Musawi, the central feature of postcoloniality is the drive to resist imperialism and to destabilize the neopatriarchal hegemonic discourses that rule contemporary Arab societies. Therefore, much of the focus throughout is on the oppositional character of Arabic fiction. Moreover, Musawi sees the experimental and aesthetically sophisticated techniques of recent Arabic fiction as responses to the challenge of grasping social complexity as well as to the need of evading censorship. For this reason, he regards contemporary Arabic fiction as an “amalgam” of the postcolonial and postmodern (p. 57). At the same time, however, Musawi finds that “the modern Arab novelist is searching for an identity of his/her own, which surely corresponds to a general rational search for a philosophy of life that restores the Arab’s pride in himself/herself and his past to counterbalance the predominance of western culture” (p. 157). These oppositional and reconstructive projects constitute the primary poles of Musawi’s discussion.

Musawi’s mode of presentation consists of a rapid movement through thematic issues and the narrative techniques of negotiating them by way of brief discussions of relevant novels. An astounding array of novels and criticism is cited, although frequent recourse is made to a more limited number of authors, such as Naguib Mahfouz, ‘Aziz al-Sayyid Jasim, and Nawal al-Sa’dawi, among others. The absence of plot synopses makes these discussions
often difficult to follow and evaluate. Surprisingly, the Lebanese authors Ilyas Khuri and Rashid al-Da‘if, whose work seems especially germane to Musawi’s project, find little mention. Musawi’s approach is taxonomical and exploratory in nature, allowing broad coverage, but would benefit from greater attention to the content of the categories on which it relies. It is difficult to determine, for example, the meaning and analytical role of the term “ambivalence,” occurring in both the book’s subtitle (“debating ambivalence”) and the title of chapter 3, in which no explanation, or even mention, of the term can be found. Nor does it seem possible to assume that Musawi is using the term in the postcolonial sense given it by the theorist Homi Bhabha. This problem unfolds more broadly in a persistence of ambiguity concerning the nature of Arabic postcoloniality. How well do the novels under discussion succeed in counteracting the mechanisms of hegemonic discourse? What sort of new Arab identities do their techniques create? To what extent are they implicated in hegemonic structures themselves? These questions are frequently touched on but not systematically worked through. The taxonomical approach, moreover, makes it difficult to grasp the trajectory of discussion in some chapters. Some more pronounced element of overarching argument would have been helpful. Also, certain recurring linguistic errors, such as the frequent use of the word “women” as an adjective (e.g. “women sexuality” [p. 97]), could easily have been corrected by better copyediting.

On the whole, however, _The Postcolonial Arabic Novel_ provides a welcome guide to rethinking the field of contemporary Arabic fiction in terms of a social and political framework that reveals its participation in global issues of representation so as to take us beyond the constraints of the national literatures framework.

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Ali Asghar Seyed-Gohrab’s study aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of Nizami’s _Layli and Majnun_, with an emphasis on the possibility of a “double” reading as a mundane love story and a parable of mystical love. While the poem’s focus on transcendental love is indeed suggestive of its mystic bent, most attempts at interpretation have gravitated toward a profane reading, stressing the moral-didactic and psychological aspects of the tale—that is, the essence of true love, the destructive effects of the love affliction in a restrictive society, love madness as an impetus for the full development of poetic genius. At the same time, in the past decade or two an opposite—no doubt ideologically informed—approach has arisen, notably among postrevolutionary Iranian scholars, advocating the esoteric comprehension of Nizami’s works along the lines of Sufi tenets. Seen against the background of these two tendencies in Nizamian critical studies, the book under review reflects the author’s awareness of the need for a multilevel interpretation of _Layli and Majnun_ that better conveys the quintessential characteristic of Nizami’s poetry: what J. T. P. de Bruijn called “the basic duality of meaning” in his _Persian Sufi Poetry_ (Richmond, Va.: Curzon, 1997, p. 99).

Seyed-Gohrab arranges his work in fourteen chapters followed by a truly impressive bibliography (pp. 341–57) and a detailed index (pp. 359–68). He begins with a brief survey of views on love as reflected in Arabo-Persian medieval writings, ranging from astrology and medicine
to mystical treatises (pp. 1–23), and proceeds through a general overview of Nizami’s poetic output, his language, and style (pp. 25–50) to a description of the narrative structure of Layli and Majnun, briefly treating the question of Nizami’s sources and summarizing the references to the two lovers found in the works of his predecessors (pp. 50–74). From chapter 4 onwards, the author plunges into the analysis proper of the principal characters of the poem. Each chapter is devoted to a certain property or aspect: Majnun’s outward appearance (chapter 4); his ascetic way of life (chapter 5); his relations with the animals (chapter 6); his death, madness, and ill fate (in that order, chapters 7–9); Majnun as a poet (chapter 10); his relationships with Layli and with his/her parents (chapters 11–12); and his friendship with the chivalrous Naufal (chap. 13). The concluding chapter 14 considers various narrative settings—for example, night, garden, war, cave, and desert—dwelling on their function in elucidating the characters’ feelings and mystical mood.

As can be seen from this synopsis—which for lack of space does not do justice to a variety of topics covered in the book—the author aims to provide an exhaustive examination of every thematic axis of the romance, exploring the possibility of a mystical interpretation. He opts for a comparative approach. The discussion of a concrete aspect of Majnun’s representation in the poem is usually preceded by or intertwined with an exposition of relevant material drawn from medieval mystical-theoretical treatises, hagiographic literature, and homiletic-mystical poetry. Thus, Majnun’s ascetic way of life and its manifold manifestations (vegetarianism, reluctance to speak, rejection of clothing) are considered against the prescriptions as well as the actual practices of abstinence among mystics (pp. 92–113). The discussion of Majnun’s death is set in the framework of the Persian mystical tradition reflected notably in the poems of Sana’i, ‘Attar, and Fakhr al-Din ‘Iraqi, which stresses the lover’s desire for martyrdom, in particular through the motive of kushtayi ma’shūq, or “death from the hands of the beloved” (pp. 130–34). Dealing with the representation of Layli and the relationship between the lovers, Seyed-Gohrab examines different layers of metaphorical expression in the poem to show that, alongside the conventional “secular” descriptions of the beloved current in Persian lyrical poetry, Nizami employs a religious vocabulary, presenting, for example, Majnun as a pilgrim and Layli as the place of pilgrimage, the spiritual Ka’ba, and as “an earthly representation, a kind of shāhid (witness) of the divine Beloved” (p. 242).

The investigation of Nizami’s poem with an eye intent on mystical Sufi concepts enables the author to advance a view of Majnun that transcends the conventional interpretation as a tragic lover of an ‘Udhrite kind, a “frenzied poet.” Rather, from Seyed-Gohrab’s analysis Majnun emerges as a “rational madman” (p. 149) whose actions and behavior are meaningful in his desire to release himself from worldly bonds in his mystical quest for unity with the Beloved. Seyed-Gohrab detects antinomian motives in Nizami’s treatment of Majnun (see esp. pp. 105, 156–57, 337–38), defining him, perhaps even too boldly, as a qalandar mystic (p. 339).

Alongside valuable observations on previously unexplored mystical dimensions of Nizami’s poem, the study under review offers an insightful discussion of the theme of kingship (chapter 6), which permeates all of Nizami’s writings as one of the central moral-ethical concerns of the poet. Majnun’s ascendency over the animal kingdom is attained by non-violence, compassion, and humanity, which, coupled with his contentment, clearly emerge as didactic guidelines intended by Nizami for a ruler to follow.

Erudite and well-grounded in sources as this study is, it is not flawless in terms of its methodology and organization of material. Arranging his investigation in a traditional descriptive vein and using comparison as his principal methodological tool to demonstrate the close affinity of Layli and Majnun to mystical concepts, the author not infrequently shifts his focus of attention from the close textual examination of the romance in favor of lengthy discussions of mystical tenets at large, thus losing sight of the main subject of his investigation:
Nizami’s poem. To note an instance of this methodological infelicity: in a section dealing with Majnun’s alienation from human society (pp. 109–13), a host of attitudes toward solitary life among mystics as found in various sources is cited. However, this very attribute of Majnun in the poem itself, perhaps supposed by the author to be taken for granted by an informed reader, is not illustrated by textual references or by a summary account, thus undermining the effectiveness and clarity of the comparison as such.

Besides, the author introduces matters such as Nizami’s reception in the West (pp. 29–30), his style and language (pp. 30–40), add later imitations of Laylī and Mājnūn (pp. 27, 74, 159, 164–65). All of these matters, which deserve separate treatment, are dealt with in a rather perfunctory manner. They seem to encumber the principal argument of the study and disturb the coherence of its structure.

A few theoretical forays that Seyed-Gohrab makes into the field of narratology—with reference to studies by Bal, Rimmon-Kenan, and Prince—are parenthetical, at best (e.g., pp. 41, 57, 59, 335). At the same time, the discussion of the narrator’s stance (pp. 40–50), as well as of time and setting (chapter 14), might have benefited substantially from the judicious application of narratological findings on narrative voice and ways of characterization. The lack of proper familiarity with narratological basics is perceptible in the author’s tendency to confuse narrative and extranarrative levels in referring throughout to events within the fictional world of the narrative by chapter numbers, a purely metatextual device (e.g., pp. 180–81, 183, 280). This tendency seems even more inapt in view of the fact that, according to Bertel’s (Nizami, Izbrannye trudy, Moscow, 1962, p. 249), the chapter divisions do not represent the original redaction and were probably introduced at the stage of the prolific copying of Nizami’s oeuvre in the 14th century. On this point, Seyed-Gohrab mistranslates the Russian original, speaking of sequential ordering of chapters instead of chapter boundaries; the correct reference to Bertel’s work in footnote 79 (p. 53) should be to page 249. There are a number of inconsistencies in citing the hijrī date along with the Gregorian one (e.g., pp. 71, 91, 128, 154, n. 46) and in providing dates of birth and death (e.g., pp. 133, 234, also in the index, cf. p. 21), as well as some misplacement of references (e.g., pp. 94, n. 23; 136, n. 34). The citation system used in the footnotes is cumbersome and not always consistent.

Laylī and Mājnūn is a rich and stimulating study that testifies to the author’s profound command of sources and his ability to synthesize. It succeeds in demonstrating the legitimacy—and, in fact, the desirability—of a multilevel reading of Nizami’s poem. The poem emerges as an “ambivalent” text, to use J. Lotman’s term, which should or can be interpreted simultaneously in two different ways by the same reader at the same time to be fully realized. It is regrettable, however, that the methodological flaws and material arrangement, which is not always well thought out and bears the imprint of haste, mar the otherwise positive impression made by the work.
some fifty years back. Nasir Khusraw’s writings play a significant role in the development of Isma’i’ism in the Iranian world, and his impact on Persian-speaking Isma’i’lis is extensive even today.

Information about Nasir Khusraw’s life is limited, and what we know about him derives largely from his own works, ranging from his collected poetry to travel reports and philosophical treatises in prose and verse. He was born in 1004 and died between 1072 and 1078 in Yumgan. His tomb is still a site of pilgrimage for Isma’i’lis and admirers. Nasir Khusraw studied the customary medieval curriculum with a specific interest in natural sciences, mysticism, and Persian and Arabic literature. For some time he worked as an official at Saljuq courts in the city of Marw. As he himself described in his travel book, he was prompted by a dream to leave the office and embark on a journey in search of knowledge. He went on pilgrimage to Mecca in 1045. The journey took seven years, during which he visited Mecca three times and spent some three years in Cairo. Nasir Khusraw left Cairo in 1050 and two years later returned to Persia as the leader of the Fatimid mission in the northeastern provinces. As soon as he arrived in Persia, he started his Isma’i’li propaganda, organizing sermons and writing prose and poetry praising and defending the Isma’i’li cause. It was from this time onward that he was called the hujjat of Khurasan. He faced severe resistance in Balkh for his missionary activities and was even forced to leave town. Later he took refuge in the inaccessible mountains of Badakhshan in the valley of Yumgan, where he wrote significant works in prose and verse. His output is not limited to his collection of poetry; he is also known as the author of several philosophical treatises in which he critically appraises the ideas of early Islamic philosophers.

Hunsberger’s biography is based on Nasir Khusraw’s works, including his poetry, philosophical treatises, and travel book, and is organized in twelve chapters, including a chronology, a map of Nasir Khusraw’s journey, and several black-and-white illustrations. The book appeared originally in 2000 and is now reprinted in a paperback edition. The first chapter offers a survey of Nasir Khusraw’s life, time, thought, and writings. In chapter 2, Hunsberger discloses the difficulties of writing a trustworthy biography of Nasir Khusraw, especially since accounts about his life are shrouded in myth, legend, and obscurities. Because he was an influential propagandist, friends and enemies wrote biographical accounts of Nasir Khusraw. Some of them approach him as almost a holy figure, while others present him as a heretic. Hunsberger discusses all these accounts in chronological order. Relying heavily on Nasir Khusraw’s own poetic imagery, Hunsberger explains how difficult it is to write a sound biography of this influential thinker: “To gain a true picture of him is rather like to see inside a jewel” (p. 17).

In chapter 3, Hunsberger treats Nasir Khusraw as a poet. The author makes a sharp contrast between Nasir Khusraw, who used his poetic talents for a spiritual quest, and court poets “whose usual task was flattery” (p. 38). Such a sharp distinction is somewhat contrived. Although Hunsberger agrees with Nasir Khusraw’s disdain of court poets, who write about mundane subjects quite literally, Nasir Khusraw follows the same tradition as his contemporaries. In his odes, he lavishes praise on the Fatimids in Egypt. Nasir Khusraw is not the only poet who composed odes for religious figures; other poets, such as Kisa’i and, later, Sana’i of Ghazna, composed poetry for religious personalities of their time. The poetic tradition of the period is minimally treated.

In Chapter 4, Hunsberger takes Nasir Khusraw’s own account as historical fact, relying largely on Diwan and the Safar-namih, in which the poet refers to his dream and makes up his mind to go on pilgrimage. He sees his journey as a visionary experience and a transformation in his life. In the Safar-namih, he explains how he comes to the service of al-Mustansir Bi’l-lah, the Fatimid Isma’i’li imam in Cairo, and swears an oath to become a propagandist for Isma’i’lism. Other important aspects of Nasir Khusraw and his writings also receive ample
attention. The important Isma‘ili doctrine of *zāhir* and *bātin*, referring, respectively, to outward and inward dimensions of Islam in daily life, is discussed in Chapter 5. Hunsberger discusses this doctrine as part of Nasir Khusraw’s quest to gain esoteric knowledge of the Qur’an.

Hunsberger devotes five consecutive chapters (chapters 6–10) to Nasir Khusraw’s travel book, reconstructing his life and the impact of traveling on his spiritual quest. Nasir Khusraw’s journey from his hometown to Jerusalem, his fascinating reports about his meetings with people, and his insightful observations on different places and buildings are discussed. Although other towns such as Neyshapur, Tabriz, and Aleppo are briefly referred to, Hunsberger focuses on Jerusalem, Cairo, and Mecca, to each of which she devotes one chapter. As in the rest of the book, Hunsberger’s style is popular and fluid, quoting extensively from the *Safar-namih* and Nasir Khusraw’s poetry.

The last two chapters are devoted to Nasir Khusraw’s life in exile. In these chapters the author focuses on Nasir Khusraw’s poetry, analyzing how the poet expressed his feelings about his exile and ill fate, the transient nature of this world, and his unquenchable thirst for knowledge. Here Hunsberger gives ample citations from Nasir Khusraw’s poetry, highlighting the function of poetry for the poet: poetry is a kind of emotional outburst that reveals his personal moods, his sorrow, “his anger at being misunderstood,” and his “regret for lost opportunities” (p. 241).

Hunsberger’s study is an indispensable contribution about Persian religious poetry, offering us interesting new insights into the life and thoughts of one of the most influential 11th-century Islamic thinkers. The main virtue of the book lies in its clear and fluent explanations of sometimes difficult concepts. Two minor critical remarks concern the impact of Sufism on Nasir Khusraw’s biographical references. During the 11th century, Sufism was becoming more and more pervasive in Khurasan, and mystical concepts undoubtedly colored the poet’s ideas. This possible influence of Sufism is not dealt with in the book. My second remark concerns the validity of Nasir Khusraw’s retrospective biographical allusions. Hunsberger sometimes takes the poet’s words at face value with little critical reservation.

In all, this monograph is certainly a precious contribution to the field of Persian studies and to the Islamic intellectual tradition. Although the book is essentially designed for a wide audience, specialists of Persian literature will greatly benefit from Hunsberger’s perceptive analyses and will surely enjoy reading it.