BOOK REVIEWS

DOI: 10.1017/S0020743806383067


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Modern Western religious sensibilities tend to draw a fairly sharp boundary between the spiritual and the sensual. At first glance, this seems to be the case in Islam as well. By examining the effects of human sexuality on ritual purity, Ze’ev Maghen convincingly demonstrates that this was not the case in early Islam. His study is divided into two major sections. The first examines early Muslim attitudes toward sexual activity and desire as evidenced by the Qur’an, hadiths, and legal literature and how later scholars have reinterpreted this material. The second focuses more specifically on *mulāmasa* and *ṭahāra* (cross-gender physical contact and ritual purity, respectively).

In chapter 1, Maghen demonstrates that early Muslims were not inhibited in their discussions of human sexuality. Sex is a blessing (Qur’an 5:87 and 7:32) both here and in the hereafter. According to several hadiths, Muhammad prohibited celibacy (or at least monasticism) and—as long as the sex is licit—encouraged his followers to enjoy this blessing. Maghen argues that, although sexual activity negates *ṭahāra* and, therefore, requires *ghusl* or *wudū’* (major or minor ablution) before prayer, sexual activity is not inherently impure or defiling. The neutral nomenclature suggests that, like urination, defecation, regurgitation, bleeding, and sleeping, sex is merely “prayer precluding.”

The remaining chapters in part I show how the early harmony between piety and carnality in Islam has been upset. Abdelwahab Bouhdiba in his *La Sexualité en Islam* (1975) had argued that *ṭahāra* is indicative of Islam’s strong division between the spiritual and the sexual, suggesting that the latter was considered impure and close to evil. Maghen takes issue with these conclusions in chapter 2, showing that Bouhdiba had used sources that were unrepresentative of Islam and poor in quality and quantity. Chapter 3 discusses the infamous story of Zayd and Zaynab, which has been used to attack Muhammad and Islam. Zayd was Muhammad’s adopted son, and he divorced his wife Zaynab, whom Muhammad subsequently married. Maghen deftly traces how the story, which initially depicts a very human Muhammad, evolved into one in which he is utterly devoid of romantic and erotic attraction; this asexual depiction is still promulgated by modern Muslim apologists, whether in scholarly works or on the Web. Chapter 4 argues that Rosenthal’s use of *adab* literature is not the best source, at least in the case of Muslims, to attempt to construct social realities. The Qur’an, hadith, *tafsīr*, and *fiqh* together provide a better insight into popular attitudes toward sexuality.

Part II delves into one specific issue, *mulāmasa* (literally, “touching another”), a term derived from Qur’an 4:43 and 5:6, both of which enjoin Muslim men who have “touched” women and cannot find water to use clean dirt before prayer (*tayammum*). The *fiqh* arguments revolve around the meaning of “touch.” For the Hanafis, “touch” is a euphemism for sexual
interruption, and so requires ghastl. Merely touching has no effect on tahāra. For the Malikis, Shafii’s, and Hanbalis, “touch” is read literally and so requires wudū’ to regain tahāra. Having introduced the legal issues in chapter 5, Maghen turns in chapter 6 to arguments used by both sides based on the Qur’an, including the philological and syntactical arguments from the Hanafis and the counterarguments from al-Shafi’i. Chapter 7 outlines the arguments that draw on materials from the Sunna. The Hanafis try to show instances of Muhammad having touched women before or during prayer without performing wudū’, whereas the other schools attempt the opposite. The inventiveness of the jurists is remarkable as they argue about the differences between active and passive touching and the role of intention, as they invoke abrogation or an exception for Muhammad, and in one case as they suggest he was wearing socks when his feet were touched by ‘A’isha. Chapter 8 explores Hanafis’ use of ra’y on this issue.

Chapter 9 returns to the issue of the importance of the laws of tahāra and what they can tell us about actual Muslim practice. Maghen states, “Purity practices are woven into the fabric of Muslim existence: they are integral and indispensable element[s] in the rhythm of daily life” (p. 218). His evidence that fiqh al-tahāra does in fact reflect social history comes from historical texts, literature, and the Internet. This is clearly the weakest link in Maghen’s argument, and to his credit, he realizes that his study can be seen as an essentialist analysis, and he is careful to use words such as “assume” and “speculation.”

Chapter 10 explores the source of the impurity or preclusion from prayer that mulāmasa causes, an issue particularly salient given the Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali position. That women must also perform ghastl or wudā’ and so achieve tahāra suggests that they cannot be inherently impure. Maghen argues that the preclusion is caused by shahwa (passion or erotic desire). This is an explicit position of the Malikis, but is implicit with many Shafi’i’s too. Maghen further illustrates his arguments by briefly discussing the legal arguments about homosexual contact; direct contact versus contact through various types of clothing; the touching of hair, teeth, and nails; and the touching of the dead. Maghen may be understating the role of bodily fluids and gases in causing the preclusion. Urination, defecation, flatulation, regurgitation, and bleeding all involve substances that cause impurity. Therefore, just as sleeping negates tahāra, because one cannot be certain that gas was not passed, so shahwa may negate tahāra, because one cannot be certain that pre-ejaculatory fluids were not present. Maghen cites several jurists who make this very point.

Maghen provides a fascinating look into the close connections between Islamic sexuality and spirituality. Given modern prejudices, contemporary scholars (Muslim and non-Muslim alike) might be taken aback by his conclusions. However, he has argued his case thoroughly and forcefully. That he accepts hadiths at face value (with only passing references to issues of authenticity) does not ultimately detract from his depiction of early Muslim jurists’ openness to discuss sexual matters and to portray their prophet as a sexual being. Virtues of the Flesh is a refreshing look into early Islamic law, both for its subject matter and its approach.

DOI: 10.1017/S0020743806383079


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Academic attention given to Middle Eastern dance, especially the form here glossed as “belly dance,” is scarce. This edited volume, whose contributors are academics as well as dancers,
proclaims itself the “first full-length, scholarly anthology” on the topic. Several chapters contribute to an understanding of dance in the Middle East, but the volume’s greater value lies in the way the authors identify belly dance as a site of Western eroticization of the exotic Orient. Seven chapters explore American appropriations of the art form, dating back to the 1800s but reaching a heyday with the American feminist movement of the 1960s and 1970s, when the dance was alternatively conceptualized as a way of liberating the female body and as a path to transcendent feminine spirituality.

A few contributions stand out. Roberta L. Dougherty’s thorough survey of Egyptian films about dancers is engagingly written. Andrea Deagon’s reading of a century’s worth of interpretations of Salome’s “Dance of the Seven Veils” (from Oscar Wilde’s 1894 play) is rich and engrossing. Deagon is sympathetic to the New Age strain of American dancers who contest an objectified female sexuality, yet she is also skeptical of the essentializing gender identities they posit. Linda Swanson’s concluding chapter, a meditation on the transnational and cyberspace circulation of images of famed dancer Tahia Carioca, is a lyrical piece of artwork.

Najwa Adra’s analysis of how Arabs dance in private spaces is useful for contextualizing later discussions of belly dance’s international transmutations on the professional stage, and also for understanding the ambivalence with which Middle Easterners regard dancers. Other chapters devoted to American dancer/teacher La Meri (Nancy Lee Ruyter), the development of American tribal belly dance (Barbara Sellers-Young) and “spiritual belly dance” (Donnalee Dox), the “Arabian dance” in Tchaikovsky’s Nutcracker (Jennifer Fisher), and the history of the Middle Eastern nightclub in the United States (Anne Rasmussen) are rich with historical information about these international appropriations of the dance and Western fantasies about the Middle East.

As the contributors acknowledge, there is considerable skepticism toward seeing belly dance as an art form, not only in the Middle East but also in the West, where the dance is often conflated with the cabaret or a striptease. The lack of scholarly attention given to the dance perhaps reflects this social stigma. Perhaps the most important reason that academia has neglected belly dancing is because of its transnational nature. This nature has made it a dubious subject for anthropologists and folklorists in search of authentic, local, and geographically bounded communities. This volume, by examining belly dance in a range of cultural and historical contexts, from its performance in Middle Eastern homes to its staging in U.S. nightclubs by American dancers, seems to authenticate its subject matter as legitimate for ethnographic inquiry. However, the elusive quest for the “authentic” belly dance persists: the editors speak of “the native dances and their Western derivatives” in the introduction (p. 25), although Adra asserts that true belly dancing is rarely performed “in environments that include foreigners,” thus preventing “foreign imitators” from learning “the proper form and appropriate behavior” (p. 37). (Why not see them as “foreign innovators” rather than “imitators”?)

The fact is that, even in the most “authentically” Middle Eastern contexts, belly dance cannot be extricated from a history of transnational influences, from the way Hollywood has dictated costume trends to postcolonial debates over the moral status of its performers to the way the global economy produces performers of the dance, whether American, Japanese, or Arab, and their audiences. “Authenticity” is an elusive target when Arab women learn to dance partly by watching movies starring Tahia Carioca, an Egyptian who took her stage name “from the Brazilian sambas she also performed” (p. 343).

Most of the chapters are accessible to a popular audience, and some seem to be targeted specifically at such. For example, a reader familiar with Islamic jurisprudence may be disappointed to find that the bulk of Anthony Shay’s chapter, “Dance and Jurisprudence in the Islamic Middle East,” is devoted to explaining the basic tenets of Islam and only a handful of actual fatwas are produced. However, a reader who is interested in belly dance but
unfamiliar with the Muslim world will find Shay’s discussion indispensable for understanding why competing claims about the legitimacy of dance exist within Muslim communities.

There are interesting tensions between the chapters, which the editors have wisely avoided editing out for the sake of consistency of viewpoint. For example, Adra’s inventive explanation for the contexts in which Arabs dance insistently writes sexuality out of the story. Contrast this with Shay’s assertion that dancers have historically been the “designated repository of sexuality” (p. 71). Another tension concerns methodologies. For example, Stavros Stavrou Karayanni, in his chapter on the 19th-century Egyptian dancer Kuchuk Hanem, critiques the sweeping temporal and geographical scale of Edward Said’s *Orientalism*. In contrast, Shay, who asserts the prevalence of male belly dancers throughout the entire Middle East up until European colonial intervention, apparently sees no problem with such a sweeping scope of inquiry.

The volume would have benefited from more editorial oversight in other respects. It is rife with inconsistent citations and archaic spellings (e.g., “Moslem”), and typographical errors appear on nearly every page. This finding is disappointing, not to mention frustrating. Repeatedly encountering misspelled names, missing end notes, and egregious grammatical and punctuation errors distracts from the reader’s ability to focus on the substantive contributions of this work.

DOI: 10.1017/S0020743806383080


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Books are ambitious when they tackle one of academia’s hottest topics: sex, class, race, gender, capitalism, or the nation state. Anna M. Agathangelou’s *The Global Political Economy of Sex* takes them all on, demonstrating the many ways in which peripheral nation states facilitate the use of female labor in the desire industries and illustrating the reasons for states’ participation in those industries. Agathangelou has several goals here. First, she seeks to uncover the nation state’s role in the sale and purchase of female labor. At the same time, she determines to uncover the connections between “the expropriation of racialized reproductive labor, or sex and domestic work, and the relations to gender, sexuality, race, desire, and identity” (p. ix). Claiming that most theories in international political economy (IPE) and feminism obscure the ways that “gender relations, sexuality, desire, constitutions of people’s personhoods are part and parcel of issues like labor, exploitation and projection of hegemonic power,” (pp. ix–x) the author offers Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey as examples of the role that the “productive economy of reproduction” (p. ix) plays in constituting state, self, and survival.

The nation state is Agathangelou’s bête noire, and uncovering its role in the facilitation of the desire industry and in the expropriation of female labor serves as her organizational leitmotif. Five well-developed and well-illustrated ideas constitute *The Global Political Economy of Sex*. First, the activities of domestic and desire workers must be viewed within the context of the state’s grasp and not that of the private household, to understand the full local and global impact of their labor. Second, states such as Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey—enriched by service industries rather than heavy industry—maintain and sustain capital power in the hands of owning classes by facilitating the movement and availability of desire workers. Third, the capital classes in Agathangelou’s test states seek to “whiten” themselves by drawing on the labor of lower income and further peripheral states such as Sri Lanka, Romania, Myanmar, Russia, and Belarus. (Agathangelou argues that these not fully white classes become white
through the labor of “white but not quite” or lower class workers from elsewhere.) Fourth, domestic and desire workers play central roles in the definition of a white, middle-class self in Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey, “enabling their employers’ middle-class desire of ‘having it all’—a full-time career, happy and healthy children and spouse, and a well-kept household” (p. 5). Finally, the state manipulates the racialized and gendered notions of “self” and “other” that result from the presence of desire workers to constitute national identity and to claim threats to national security.

Agathangelou explicates and illustrates each of these ideas through the use of theory; substantial secondary-source material about the region, its states, and economies; and substantial— and praiseworthy—field work. Indeed, each of the book’s six chapters is loaded with remarkable interviews with sex workers, domestic workers, employers, and immigration and police officers. We hear, firsthand, of smuggling, trafficking, and coercion. We experience the disillusionment of women who came to work as waitresses only to find themselves as sex workers. We read domestic employers’ accounts—sometimes patronizing, other times sincere—of their relationships to their hired help. A Cypriot immigration police officer speaks of desire (“The desire of man has changed, he is hungry . . .”) and of race (“The Filipinas are more educated and possess a better approach towards nurturing kids; they possess muscular power and nursing skills”) and of his role in their presence in his country (p. 63). Although each tells his/her own story, each also speaks to Agathangelou’s agendas, illustrating the ways in which race, sex, and class shape self and state. Agathangelou’s interviews with desire and domestic workers also illustrate the stark differences between the workers’ goals of survival and the results of their trade on employers’ self and national identity. “For everything . . . the Russian women are responsible . . . Their presence alone “excites” (erethizei) the young, resulting in the kinds of behaviors they currently exhibit” (p. 64).

If the strength of The Global Political Economy of Sex is its fieldwork, its weakness lies in Agathangelou’s frequently impenetrable prose. I found myself reading entire paragraphs three and four times to discern their meaning. I also wished, on more than one occasion, that Agathangelou had relied less on theory. Giving more space to the recent histories of her test states, illustrating the development of their economies, problematizing their “peripheral” status historically, and linking the histories of the (peripheral) Mediterranean to the (even further peripheral) sources of its domestic workers would both anchor the text and make it less reliant on the jargon of the social sciences.

Such critiques notwithstanding, The Global Political Economy of Sex will find its audience among those who use feminist theory to teach or to examine the political economies of the region (indeed, Agathangelou is the Cynthia Enloe of the Mediterranean world). The book will also find its fans among those who seek to globalize “Middle Eastern” states such as Turkey and to situate them in contexts that transcend—or at least extend and complicate—the more typical and traditional frameworks through which those nations are viewed.

DOI: 10.1017/S0020743806383092


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At a time when both Islam and Islamic movements are perceived as a major threat to Western civilization, Turkey constitutes an interesting case for the study of new Islamic movements. For a long time, social scientists as well as Turkey’s indigenous elite hailed Turkey as the exemplar
of a Muslim secular state in which the project of modernity was launched successfully. What makes this case more interesting is that Turkey currently is seeking entry into the European Union with a government ruled by a political party called the AKP, an offshoot of the most effectual and oldest representative of Sunni party politics. *Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey* is a timely contribution that examines the seemingly contradictory images that Turkey displays.

Following the conceptual framework of “alternative modernities,” through which the presence of modernity in a non-Western context is justified as a “creative adaptation,” the book attempts to analyze the trajectory of modernity in Turkey by examining both its adoption of official ideology by the founding state and challenges to it by the Islamists, who, according to the author, started to produce the ideology of an Islamic mode of modernization only after the 1990s (pp. 2–3 and passim). Regarding modernity as a series of acts and attitudes that aims to create a transformative intervention, Çınar sees no difference between the political means and the ideological techniques that were used by both the founding state and the Islamists to realize their own projects. To show how these two essentially nationalist modernity projects compete with each other, the book takes up the public sphere as its object of analysis; there the construction of the national subject, the making of national space, and the construction of national history can be observed through bodies, places, and time as emerging sites of negotiation. This argument also constitutes the original foundation of the book.

However, another major thesis of the book is that the public sphere must be studied as a visual field that is composed of performance and visibility rather than debate and dialogue (p. 9). Understood as such, the public sphere is presented as a site of performative politics that is pitted against identity politics (p. 29). The author argues that only through such a conceptual framework can the construction of a national subject be understood within the context of everyday life. Nevertheless, the book’s examples focus exclusively on public events and debates. The author mentions Turkey’s first beauty contest in 1929; Islamic fashion; the sex scandal of an Islamist couple in 1996 (chap. 2); a public debate about the never-realized construction of a mosque in Taksim Square in an effort to make (Ottoman) Istanbul, as opposed to Ankara, the capital of Turkey, in the center (chap. 3); and finally, a commemoration to celebrate the conquest of Istanbul with parades, firecrackers, and so forth, which was organized by the Islamists during the mayoralty of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (1994–98), the current prime minister of Turkey. The discourse developed around this performance is compared with the official narrative constructed to create the “founding moment” of the republic (chap. 4).

Although all these phenomena are narrated in a stylish way and include visual material that can also provide a good source of data for students, scholars, and the interested public, the elaboration of the conceptual framework of the whole text is based on extremely repetitious theoretical discussions in which drawn-out logical deductions overrun accurate, well-balanced theoretical reflections. Similarly, semiological readings and political and historical interpretations of chosen events are so rigidly interwoven with tightly framed logical reasoning that they do not invite the reader to ask further fruitful questions. Furthermore, the book’s inadequate and, at times, erroneous literature review creates another intertextuality problem. For example, a reference is made to Kandiyoti instead of Behar and Duben, although the latter’s arguments on 19th-century Ottoman family life are used (p. 25). Atatürk’s speeches on women and hat reform are quoted either from Yeğenöğlu or from Aktaş but never from their original sources (pp. 62, 66, 68). In chapter 2, footnote 32, although Yeşim Arat is referred to by name, her work is not in the bibliography. Scholars such as Ernest Gellner and Richard Tapper, who have already pointed out that Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey is the other side of the same coin, that is, Kemalist fundamentalism, are not even mentioned by name.
Equally important, the works of some scholars such as Scott and Singerman never appear in the book, although they have written extensively on the importance of the quotidian, which has been neglected in political science literature. In addition, despite the effort made by the author to compare and contrast two separate historical periods and also to analyze time, the book lacks historical depth. This lack is not only because it confines the enduring arguments of Islamist politics merely to the recent developments of the 1990s, but also because it overlooks the significance of historical processes and networks, as well as the relevance of the Nakshbendi praxis within them, which made that “creative adaptation” of Islamist modernity possible.

Despite these restrictions and despite that debating Turkish modernity as a question of visibility is hardly an original idea, by highlighting the voyeuristic aspects of the political performance, the book makes a valuable contribution to the observation of the kaleidoscopic richness of Islamist politics in Turkey.

DOI: 10.1017/S0020743806383109


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Yasser Elsheshtawy and his contributors examine complex transformations in Middle Eastern urbanities. This group of architects travels across space, examining Algiers, Baghdad, Sana’a, Tunis, Cairo, and Dubai, and also covers temporal distances, including explorations of medieval, colonial, and contemporary urban features and developments. As architects, they have keen eyes for spatial, structural, and formal elements that make and remake cityscapes and urban cultures. The realization that, in Western literature, Middle Eastern/Arab cities frequently have been dealt with as extensions of an ill-defined concept of “Muslim” cities initiated this collection. In his introduction, Elsheshtawy notes that such conceptualizations stifle meaningful engagements with complex past and present urban transformations. He somewhat overemphasizes the prevalence of such approaches in contemporary Middle Eastern urban studies. Central to this volume is the quest for an adequate analytical framework that does justice to the complexities of globalizing Middle Eastern metropolises.

Ultimately, however, Elsheshtawy and his contributors do not throw Islam as an analytical category overboard. On the contrary, they firmly reestablish Muslim forms and traditions as one concept among others that is relevant to Middle Eastern/Arab urban studies. Elsheshtawy indeed notes that “Islamic traditions” are a “vital part of this region” (p. 19). Moreover, he insists that, instead of focusing on “the narrative of loss” (p. 1) as an urban theme in the Middle East, scholars need to see these cities for what they currently are, that is, “vibrant, cosmopolitan entit[j]es” (p. 4) that are caught in complicated processes of globalization. Finally, he stresses the importance of examining local historical conditions, political climates, and their articulation with globalizing dynamics to understand contemporary Arab cities.

Jamel Akbar’s short introductory piece discusses ideals of Islamic urban planning. He explores ideas of how to (re)establish a truly Islamic city and in the process eliminate current spatial and social problems. Akbar argues for a reorganization of cityscapes from an abstract formal level to achieve a better city, or Muslim utopia. Although thought provoking, this chapter sits uncomfortable with Elsheshtaw’s critiques of analyses too centrally concerned with Islamic issues. The six city case studies are divided into two sections. The first examines Algiers, Baghdad, and Sana’a from a historical perspective, focusing on the impact of
modernity and modern architectural forms and planning. The second section (Tunis, Cairo, Dubai) engages more recent globalizing dynamics.

The chapter about Algiers by Karim Hadjri and Mohamed Osmani chronicles the rapid and often violent urban transformations that started to unfold after the French conquest of 1830. They review interactions between larger political and social phenomena (e.g., French military considerations, large-scale rural to urban migration) and how they created a new cityscape, but also political unrest and discontent. They note that, in the new millennium, Algiers is only reluctantly globalizing. The authors suggest that to become a successful regional hub, Algiers needs to “attract...businesses and ensure...a sustainable economic and social development” (p.54). Hadjri and Osmani identify hesitation on the part of the Algerian government to turn the city into an international hub.

Contemporary Baghdad is a difficult city to analyze. Hoshiar Nooraddin takes up this task focusing on modernist architecture and transformations in the city throughout the 20th century. He examines the changing legal structure of the city and traces the implementation of modern planning schemes, in particular until the 1960s. More specifically, he explores the role of local and international architects and “people” in the making and remaking of urban spaces.

Khaled Al-Sallal provides a detailed historical overview about Sana’a, starting from the 11th century. He emphasizes how spatial forms, ecological/climatic requirements, and social aspects had for centuries developed and been refined in harmony. Socioeconomic changes starting from the 1960s engendered architectural changes in Sana’a, whose modern quarters reflect developments in Egypt (apartment buildings) and the Gulf (villas behind concrete walls). However, neither one, Al-Sallal notices, is socially or environmentally adequate. He explains that recent changes have drawbacks—from water shortage to the restructuring of family units to the breakup of neighborhood communities. Instead of preserving the Old City of Sana’a for the benefit of tourism, Al-Sallal insists that it needs to be taken seriously to “teach cultural and ecological values that can help us create an appropriate architecture for Yemen today” (p. 112).

Bechir Kenzari probes the historical transformation of Tunis starting from the colonial period. His main focus is on the recent suburbanization of areas in the vicinity of the metropolis, more specifically with the “Project du Lac.” Using Middle Eastern money and Dutch technology, the northern part of this project, built in the 1980s and 1990s, elaborates on globalized notions of leisure and consumption. The project, a town apart from the city (a “third center”)—with upscale amenities (theme park, golf course), business facilities, and housing ranging from exclusive villas to condominiums—provides a beautiful and relaxed environment for those who can afford it and also relieves pressures on overstretched urban quarters and services elsewhere in Tunis.

Khaled Adham compares how the colonial planned quarter of Heliopolis and the contemporary project of Dreamland (gated community and malls; see Kenzari above) on Cairo’s desert outskirts share interesting moments and features in their social and political conceptualizations. He describes Heliopolis as a “European vision of the Orient” (p. 144), and Dreamland as an “Oriental Vision of the Occident” (p. 157). Despite their temporal distance of almost a century, Adham notes that the two projects are surprisingly similar in that they reflect the rationales of capitalist real-estate companies, cater to the fantasies of specific cosmopolitan constituencies, and by their price tags and exclusive imageries, exert influences on the existing cityscape and its less privileged residents.

Yasser Elsheshtawy provides an excellent and intriguing account and analysis of recent transformations in Dubai. Dubai’s growth and emergence as a global center are unparalleled. Elsheshtawy insists that these celebrated developments come at a critical cost and with controversial implications. The city’s construction (and economic) boom is based on the availability of cheap, largely South Asian, labor. Dubai’s glitzy cityscape (“not burdened by history” [p. 172]), its unabashed consumerism, and love for mega-projects (which “distinguish
themselves by using superlatives” [p. 180]) make it a showcase for a broad scope of globalizing possibilities. Planners and developers aim to propel the city to the forefront of upscale global business and tourism. Elsheshtawy notes that, in the process, the city is (re)created by the gaze of global tourists, multinational corporations, and real estate developers. In recent years, Dubai has increasingly served as a point of reference/inspiration for other cities in the region. However, Elsheshtawy is worried that Dubai has lost touch with its roots and, therefore, suggests that, to legitimately serve as a regional model, the city needs to recover “the real Dubai.” Elsheshtawy does not explain how to identify real or authentic Dubai or how to reinsert its lessons into local and regional cityscapes.

The authors’ architectural background, although a welcome addition to urban studies, has a few minor disadvantages, most notably, their occasionally uncomfortable use of theoretical concepts. For example, Elsheshtawy, who is adamant about the articulation of an adequate theoretical model for analysis of Middle Eastern urban complexities, fairly uncritically uses concepts such as “underdevelopment” (pp. 1, 3), which represent a very different theoretical outlook than the one he is aiming to construct. He also writes about “the Middle East city” when indeed his theoretical project aims at a refined understanding of the complexities of Middle Eastern cities. Similarly, in contrast to the volume’s tone of a critical engagement with westernization and globalization, Hadjri and Osmani bemoan that politicians in Algiers are hesitant to open their gates to global businesses as agents of positive urban transformations.

Despite such minor flaws, this book is a very informative and lively read that certainly adds a fresh perspective to the study of Arab cities. Written from an architectural perspective, the chapters take a sharp view at the interplay of material form, planning, and urban life. What makes this volume so interesting is the tension between or even within chapters with regard to both theoretical views and empirical descriptions of complex processes or colonial, modern, and globalizing transformations. Whether enforced (Algiers) or fostered by local rulers (Dubai), whether specifically furthered by individuals (Baghdad) or by a series of broader transformations (Sana’a), urban changes of the past century—taking different starting points and varying political, economic, social, and architectural routes—have yielded an urban kaleidoscope that cannot simplistically be analyzed using formulaic terms and concepts. That the authors at times contradict each other (Elsheshtawy and Akbar), use very different approaches (ecological in Al-Sallal; cultural in Adham), highlight different temporal contexts (Al-Sallal starts in the 11th century; Elsheshtawy and Kenzari focus largely on the past ten years), and take different stances toward globalization (Hadjri/Osmani and Elsheshtawy) makes this volume so inspiring, vibrant, and complex. The book draws out fascinating images of urban spatial, and to a certain extent also cultural, contexts and dynamics. The sum total of their analyses provides a glimpse of the contemporary complexity of Arab cities, which can best be analyzed one at a time but against the background of their shared and complex past and future. This collection could be an interesting text for undergraduate and graduate courses in Middle Eastern and urban/cultural studies.

DOI: 10.1017/S0020743806383110

JOE NASR AND MERCEDES VOLAIT, EDS., *Urbanism Imported or Exported? Native Aspirations and Foreign Plans* (Chichester: Wiley–Academy, 2003). Pp. 392. $95.00 cloth, $60.00 paper.

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A persisting common assumption about colonial and postcolonial cities is that they are essentially an elaboration of the disseminated European urban principles, models, and techniques
imposed by foreign experts and ideas on silent, oppressed, indigenous population. More recently, scholars have begun to challenge the narrowness of this vision and probe issues of resistance, responses, adaptations, modifications, hybridization, or domestications of these foreign city-building concepts. *Urbanism Imported or Exported?* falls into this intellectual trajectory. Like other books on this discourse—and I have in mind a long haul that runs from Robert Ross and Gerard Telkamp’s edited volume *Colonial Cities* (1984) to Vikramaditya Prakash’s *Chandigarh’s Le Corbusier* (2002)—the wider critical purchase of this volume lies in its intended focus on the local, individual narratives and personal stories of how urban patterns, spaces, functions, and strategies are generated through local agents interacting with foreign experts. By focusing on the microlevel, the book avoids the pitfall of essentializing and generalizing monolithic categories, including the category of the local. However, what distinguishes this volume and gives it its strength is the way it places the colonial urban experience among several other noncolonial experiences that bear some parallels. In broadening the scope of urban colonialism to include cases from the First World, the book shifts conventional framings of colonial and postcolonial urban transformations and puts new light on the complex web of interactions through which the diffusion of modern urban ideas has occurred. Owing much to a growing field concerned with the cross-influences and international diffusion of ideas, and I here think of Stephen Ward’s *Planning the Twentieth Century City* (2002), this new perspective allows readers to delineate refractions, echoes, and parallels among the various stories it narrates.

Edited by two talented researchers, and composed of an introductory chapter by Anthony King, an established authority on the subject, and twelve essays by an international cast of contributors from various backgrounds, the book raises important questions and sheds light on a variety of methodological and theoretical issues. For example, Nasr and Volait ponder in their introduction the methodological challenges facing researchers seeking local voices. They ask questions such as what constitutes the local? Where is evidence of local contributions to be uncovered? These questions and more continue in Anthony King’s introductory chapter, in which he comments incisively on the importance of recognizing the positionalities of the researchers and expresses his indignation with the limitations of macrotheories in understanding what he calls “transnational spaces.” The editors are to be commended for organizing the variegated themes tackled by the book’s essayists into four fairly coherent sections on “the latest models,” “city-building, state-building, and nation-building,” “powerful subjects,” and “foreign experts, local professionals.” With the exception of the chapter by Ray Bromley, which somewhat loosely fits with the common threads of this book, most contributors illustrate, with varying degrees of success, how urban transformations involve very dynamic processes, subject to constant changes and adaptations, dependent on power relationships specific to every case. Unlike most of the other chapters, however, Stephen Ward’s essay on the influence the United States has exerted on Western urban planning, although an interesting read and coalescing with the dominant theme of the volume, examines the subject without the benefit of a particular case study.

The diverse themes and problematics covered in this volume include the following:

1. selective borrowing was a common utility resorted to by local actors in introducing foreign urban planning ideas, such as the appropriation of the Garden City principles in Egypt and Japan;
2. imported Western concepts of urbanism were used politically either as a way to consolidate power or as a method to achieve political independence;
3. there are limitations to the potentials of imported ideas, particularly when they encounter local economic conditions, driven, for example, by the profit of purely speculative attitudes, such as in the city of planning Thessaloniki and the Étoile project in Beirut;
4. foreign involvement may intriguingly impose local and not foreign architectural and urban solutions, as in the case of socialist realism movement in East Berlin;
5. the local elites’ internalization of foreign culture, image of locals, and urban sensibilities may continue after foreign experts are gone;
6. the importation of a model had more chances of successful realization when the new concepts were superimposed on an existing network of local power configurations;
7. the role of foreign experts and their capacity of intervention change over time due to a gradual knowledge development of local professionals; and
8. personal, educational, and professional ties acted as determinant channels in the process of diffusing urban planning ideas. Perhaps the book could have benefited from slightly more scope had it expanded the ways in which the experience of foreign experts influenced their later works and theories.

Contributors to this volume rely mainly on original sources and demonstrate sound scholarship. Collectively, they make a positive contribution on the various modes of diffusing modern urban-planning ideas by opening up a vibrant intellectual space in which other researchers may start to explore more intricate stories. I warmly recommend this book to students of colonial and postcolonial studies, geographers, and historians concerned with the manners in which ideas are diffused and disseminated. Indeed, those interested in urbanism and the history of urban planning during the past two centuries will definitely find this scholarly collection of great interest.

DOI: 10.1017/S0020743806383122


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Julie Peteet situates this monograph about Palestinians in Lebanon within the theoretical literature on place and displacement. Based on years of fieldwork and extensive interviews, her work analyzes how place and identity are mutually constitutive and mediated over time by violence, resistance, and power among Palestinians living in refugee camps in Lebanon from the 1950s through the 1990s. The innovative work of this volume lies in two analytical themes that Peteet uses throughout: place and agency.

The first analytical trope of the book is the importance of place to Palestinians’ lives: the author focuses on the ways Palestinians use and recreate places in exile to establish social and spatial stability and meaningful identities. She adeptly discusses how Palestinians relied on the village structures of pre-1948 to settle in camps together with members of the same village, thus replicating social and familial structures and networks through spatial proximity. Peteet shows that, by recreating familiar place relations associated with their natal villages, Palestinians engendered a familial and social stability that stood in contrast to the daily humiliations they endured as refugees constantly monitored and disciplined by the Lebanese state and economically dependent on United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) rations.

The rise of the resistance movements in the late 1960s and the signing of the Cairo accords in 1969 (which allowed Palestinians in Lebanon the right to work, form organizations in the camps, and participate in armed struggle) provided Palestinians a newfound stability through their own administration of the camps. Affiliation with “the resistance,” which created new
public services and spaces such as offices and clinics, encouraged a broader Palestinian identity that went beyond and even replaced familial and village allegiances. Peteet then shows how during and after the “days of the wars” (1982, 1985–87), Palestinian relationships to place again changed due to the elimination of the resistance movement, the implementation of restrictive laws on Palestinian employment, increased poverty and immigration, and the influx of new residents to the camps. Restricted and disempowered within what Peteet calls “the geography of terror and reconfinement” (p. 170), Palestinians fell back on familial and village origin as a social and economic support structure.

The second analytical method that Peteet carries throughout the narrative is the constant attention to Palestinian agency within discussions of the much larger bodies that try to maintain and monitor them or threaten them. The author establishes this type of analysis early on by examining the effects of power and violence on Palestinian identification practices within the international efforts to define Palestinian “refugee” status and coordinate assistance to those determined to be refugees after 1948. She reviews the international efforts to rehabilitate and resettle the refugees, the discourse about bodies and health, and their economic solutions to political problems (that, thus, ultimately failed), showing how through their organization and practices they “produced in refugees new capacities for action” (p. 69). Throughout the book she maintains the focus on how Palestinian refugees internalized, acquiesced, resisted, co-opted, and repoliticized the efforts to rule over, manage, and provide for them by aid regimes, states, local powers, and even the resistance movements.

Peteet’s attention to gender and the local context of the refugee experiences complement the other themes of the book. She effectively charts the changing relationships of Palestinians to the space within the camp through gendered practices (both male and female) that are never static and relate to obtaining UNRWA aid; the significance of dress, travel, and work; and senses of responsibility and security. Similarly, each chapter discusses the changing relationships among Palestinians and Lebanese, initially felt as the responsibilities of “hosts and guests,” which then turned into new relationships and affiliations as the camps blended into the largely poor and disenfranchised Shi’a neighborhoods around them. Her interviews (before and after the war of the camps) with two women who remained friends but whose children and husbands fought each other in the camp wars reveal the complicated and powerful pull of both politics and friendships.

A short chapter on the Zionist production of knowledge about Palestine and its indigenous inhabitants’ relationship to the land seems out of place in this well-focused work on Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Similarly, a reliance in chapter 3 on Gaza source material and volunteers’ letters from the American Friends Service Committee archives to tell the story of the early years of refugee aid, before UNRWA, supports the author’s arguments; the material is extremely interesting, but it appears a bit incongruous with the rest of the chapter and a book that concentrates on Lebanon. Finally, it would have been useful to have dates on the many excellent and expressive photographs of the camps.

Landscape of Hope and Despair offers new analytical approaches to understanding Palestinian identity through the insights and research material of a scholar who has been working on the topic for almost thirty years. The volume is not a general introduction to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon; rather, it examines the subject through specific theoretical and analytical lenses—providing an analytical picture of the changing social and spatial structures in the camps from the 1950s to the 1990s within the context of the instability, poverty, and violence that characterized refugee life. The theoretical sophistication of the work makes it appropriate for upper division undergraduates or graduate students in any social science or humanities discipline, and it is a worthy acquisition by any library.

Scholars of Palestinian politics and society will find illuminating the ways in which this book reconfigures the conception of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon by examining their
relationships to, and experiences in, social and spatial structures, and their changing affiliations and identity practices enacted during their more than fifty years of living in exile in Lebanon. In this well-written book, Peteet powerfully shows that for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Palestine symbolizes their “longing for security of place and the rights entailed in being a citizen” (p. 216) rather than their nostalgic reflection on a distant place and past.

DOI: 10.1017/S0020743806383134


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Is suicide a disease or a social problem? This is a much-debated question in both sociology and psychiatry. Dabbagh’s Suicide in Palestine: Narratives of Despair is a valuable contribution to this debate. The book is based on the doctoral thesis of Dabbagh, a British–Palestinian psychiatrist. In its nine chapters, it covers a broad range of topics, ranging from Muslim attitudes toward suicide, suicide trends in Palestine, and the social construction of suicide rates in Palestine to gender differences in causes of suicide and suicide rates. Each topic is discussed authoritatively, but it is the rich ethnographic accounts of different topics that set this book apart from the very few other books on suicide in Muslim societies. It is based on extensive fieldwork in Palestine, mainly in Ramallah.

Whereas the author does not directly engage in the question of whether suicide is a disease or a social problem, her rich ethnographic accounts and statistical evidence clearly suggest that suicidal behaviors in Palestinian society are caused by social, cultural, economic, and psychological malaise and are exacerbated by the daily humiliation and oppression of Palestinians under Israeli military occupation. According to the author, the “book is about those people who at some point have not been able to cope with the situation they have found themselves in due to social, economic, or political forces or, more often, a mixture of them all” (p. 2).

The first three chapters examine two main sociocultural categories used in the public discourse on self-killing in Arab society, namely suicide and martyrdom. Suicide is a private act condemned by Islam and Arabic tradition, whereas martyrdom is the exalted act of self-empowerment for the sake of “greater good.” The next two chapters deal with the methodological issues of data collection and social construction of suicide rates in Palestinian society. The discussion about the social organization and construction of suicide rates is most insightful and shows that the relatively low suicide rate in Palestinian society may be due to the concealment of suicide resulting from bureaucratic procedures, inefficiencies, and sociocultural stigma. It is argued that suicide is a form of “moral panic” arising from the accelerated rate of modernization of Palestinian society after the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority and the social dislocation caused by the 1993 intifada. The second part of the book offers analyses of case studies of male and female suicides.

The evidence shows that suicidal behavior in Palestinian society, like suicide in other societies, is caused by the relative degree of social integration, regulation, and isolation, as well as social and cultural control and oppression of individuals in society. The concept of honor and shame are used as instruments of social and cultural oppression, mainly of women by men. However, the suicide bombings by organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas are targeted acts of resistance and weapons of the weak against an unjust and hated occupier of the homeland. In this context, suicide attacks are a means of achieving multiple ends, including
self-empowerment in the face of powerlessness, redemption in the face of damnation, and honor in the face of humiliation. Thus, the acts of suicide and suicide attacks are “caused” by different types of social reality.

As shown in the book, suicide rates in Palestinian society are relatively low. The reason offered for this finding is that “suicide is about despair, about giving up. Losing hope, which goes against everything that it means, at least in the popular psyche, to be Palestinian” (p. 81). An alternative explanation for the low rates, however, may be the pervasiveness of external violence resulting from Israeli occupation. They may also be due to suicide’s stigma, which results in concealment by family and friends. This factor is also acknowledged by the author.

Chapters 6, 7, and 8 provide case studies of male and female suicides and are rich in primary material dealing with the probable causes or triggers of suicidal behavior among Palestinian men and women. The evidence shows that female suicides are mainly related to oppressive patriarchal attitudes and practices, such as domestic and sexual abuse. One can argue that through the act of suicide, Palestinian women empower themselves to shame their oppressors. The other side of this explanation is that, in a patriarchal society, failure to fulfill the male roles of providers and protectors due to high unemployment and the violence inflicted on the society by the Israeli military occupation brings shame and psychosocial stressors for men. Dabbagh argues that, for men who had “failed as men,” the intifada provided an important outlet for feelings of frustrations and unhappiness. It thus acted as a potential source of regaining lost honor.

The material in the book could have been better organized and the argument better grounded through the use of existing international studies dealing with issues such as the social construction of suicide. However, this finding does not detract from the fact that this book is an important and valuable contribution to the field of suicidology. It is one of the very few studies of suicide in Muslim society. The evidence reported, reviewed, and discussed in the book clearly shows that suicide is by and large not a disease but a malaise. Any prevention program would be effective only when these factors are properly recognized. The book would be of interest to anyone interested in Palestinian society and the comparative study of suicide. In particular, it should be of interest to students and scholars of social sciences, medicine, social work, and public health.

DOI: 10.1017/S0020743806383146

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In recent years, the idea of the “Sufi order” in the Weberian sense of a discrete religious institution possessing a history and structure shaped by predictable processes of routinization has come under increasing scrutiny as a construct useful for describing the phenomenon of the Sufi tariqa. Situated at the intersection of recent revisionist discussions of the Sufi revival of the 18th century and the legacy of the Moroccan Sufi master Ahmad Ibn Idris (d. 1837), Mark Sedgwick’s Saints and Sons proposes a new paradigm that envisions the Sufi tariqa as a dynamic entity marked neither by easily discernable institutional continuities nor doctrinal consistencies but, rather, by complex and recurring instances of organizational transformation and thematic change. Using the case of a widespread Sufi order with a history spanning two centuries and three continents, Sedgwick shows that almost from its inception in Mecca at the end of the 18th century through its diffusion across much of the Arab Middle East,
the Sudan, and Southeast Asia, the history of the Ahmadiyya is best described as a roughly cyclical process of individual “remakings” wherein a particular expression of the order rises under a great scholar or saint, then splits as it spreads, and then stabilizes, from whence it can either decline or be remade anew with the emergence of another great scholar or saint (pp. 2–3). As the author’s carefully documented study displays, this cycle has occurred at least five times and, if its most recent remakings are any indication, shows no sign of abating.

By way of introducing the subject, the book opens with a lengthy exposition on the career of Ibn Idris and the influence of his concept of the tariqa muhammadiyya on the rise and subsequent transformation(s) of the Sanusiyya and Khatmiyya, two major orders that themselves resulted from earlier remakings of the Idrisi tariqa as such. Although largely derivative, such stocktaking is appreciated and serves to contextualize the material comprising the rest of the book, namely a carefully crafted history of the tariqa, which sprang from the teachings and activities of Ibn Idris's Sudanese disciple Ibrahim al-Rashid (d. 1874), an energetic propagator of his master's teachings whose followers quickly disseminated his version of the tariqa muhammadiyya from the Sudan to Southeast Asia.

As the second part of the book, entitled “The First Remaking of the Rashidi Ahmadiyya,” argues, although Ibrahim al-Rashid appears to have stuck much closer to the teachings of Ibn Idris than the founders of the Sanusiyya and Khatmiyya, the order he inspired did not. The succession of, among others, the unlikely Muhammad al-Dandarawi (d. 1911)—an illiterate deserter from the Egyptian army—set a precedent for a recurring positive valuation of charismatic claims to saintly authority in Ahmadi lineages. In addition, from this remaking also emerged the recurring theme of the widespread popularization and integration of the order into local contexts by means as varied as linking Ahmadi zawiyas to trade networks in the Sudan to capitalizing upon struggles between reformers and conservatives in Damascus. Alongside this remaking, a concomitant remaking took place in Malaya, where the Mecca-educated Malay scholar Muhammad Sa’id (d. 1926) disseminated an Ahmadi lineage from Seremban, which grew increasingly distant from Ahmadi centers in the Arab world.

The third and final part of the book, entitled simply “Sons,” concentrates on yet another series of remakings in the history of the Ahmadiyya, transformations differentiated from those preceding them by a shift toward hereditary leadership. Thus, the son of al-Dandarawi, Abu al-’Abbas (d. 1953), gained enough popularity after his father’s death to elicit millennial speculation among his followers in the Sudan. Similarly, in Southeast Asia, the sons and grandsons of Muhammad Sa’id were able to garner enough popular support to dominate the post of state mufti of Negeri Sembilan, as well as redefine the order, after a period of disarray and subsequent reconsolidation, as a thoroughly Malaysian family tariqa with little overt connections to its founder’s Meccan or, indeed, Idrisi roots. As Sedgwick shows, the case of Muhammad Sa’id’s son ‘Abd al-Rashid (d. 1992) and the Singapore Ahmadiyya further evinces just how substantial such remakings can be (pp. 181–94).

When considered in the aggregate, what Sedgwick’s detailed narrative shows is that each remaking of the Ahmadiyya has been deeply tied to the local contexts in which it transpired. This tie is nowhere more striking than in the final case he discusses, contemporary Cairo and Beirut. Here, we encounter the charismatic millionaire son of Abu al-’Abbas, Fadl al-Dandarawi (b. 1934), who despite his own denial to the contrary is venerated as a Sufi shaykh by thousands, and Su’ad al-Hakim (b. 1946), a former graduate student of the well-known Iraqi Jesuit scholar of classical Sufism, Paul Nwyia, and presently chair of the philosophy department at the Lebanese University in Beirut. In the early 1970s, they set out to gather together the remains of the Dandarawi Ahmadiyya and transform it into an Islamic social organization whose mission was not to practice Sufism as such but, rather, to remedy the disunity of modern times. The resulting organization, the Usra al-Dandarawiyaa, rejects being called a tariqa in favor of presenting itself as a movement committed to improving the moral
and spiritual state of the Muslim world by propagating an ethically focused and nonsectarian țariğa muḥammediyya that is as thoroughly modern and cosmopolitan as its remakers. In contradistinction to the Singapore Ahmadiyya of ʿAbd al-Rashid, however, it has met with very limited success.

The final chapter of the book, entitled “The Authority of the Shaykhs,” serves to summarize the study and to synthesize its main contentions, pointing out that the only two constants in the history of the Ahmadiyya are its written literature and, more importantly, the expectations of a particular shaykh’s followers. Here, the role of the charismatic authority of individual shaykhs and the vital importance of local context in shaping the order’s various remakings is well explained.

Based on the evidence adduced, Sedgwick’s paradigm provides a convincing model for the particular, although perhaps rather idiosyncratic, case of the Ahmadiyya. How well it might account for the development of other Sufi orders, however, is still open to debate. Overall, in writing the history of the Ahmadiyya, Saints and Sons fills a major gap in the literature on the Sufi orders and associated movements springing from the teachings of Ahmad Ibn Idris and will certainly serve as the standard work on the subject for the foreseeable future.

DOI: 10.1017/S0020743806383158


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Following the French takeover of Algiers in 1830 and through its defeats at the Battle of Isly in 1844 and in the war against Spain fifteen years later, the Alawite sultanate of Morocco came under growing political and economic pressure from Europe’s leading powers. The “Moroccan Question,” what fate would await the Sharifian empire within the context of a rapidly partitioned African continent, became a constant feature in late 19th-century European diplomacy and was ultimately resolved in 1904 when Great Britain recognized the special interest of France in Morocco. Eight years and two international crises later, Morocco was forced to sign away its independence and accept a Franco–Spanish protectorate regime.

Great Britain’s role in shaping Morocco’s fate during the past eight decades of its precolonial existence, thus, is paramount. From the mid-1840s to the mid-1880s, Britain’s interests in Morocco were in the hands of its representative in Tangier, Sir John Drummond-Hay. Single-handedly at times, this old-fashioned diplomat shaped not only his country’s policies toward Morocco but those of other European powers as well. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Drummond-Hay is placed at the center of the monograph under review.

A bit like his subject, Khalid Ben-Srhir is an old-fashioned diplomatic historian in the best sense of this title. Having spent a good portion of his life in the British Public Record Office, Ben-Srhir has a familiarity with the documentary record on Morocco probably second to none. His extensive archival work—including some hitherto untapped series and a significant array of printed sources in Arabic, English, and French—has enabled Ben-Srhir to present the most detailed, balanced account of bilateral relations between the two countries ever written. As Daniel Schroeter notes in his forward, no previous study has “succeeded in giving the Moroccan perspective on this relationship the way this book does” (p. xv).

Ben-Srhir opens his book with a brief history of Anglo–Moroccan relations before 1850, concluding with the appointment in 1845 of the twenty-nine-year-old Drummond-Hay to
succeed his father, who had served as Britain’s Consul-General in Tangier since 1829. In the first of the book’s six chapters, Ben-Srhir delineates the negotiations that produced the 1856 Anglo–Moroccan Treaty that redefined commercial ties between the two countries and greatly facilitated European economic intrusion and the destabilization of Morocco’s social and economic infrastructure.

Professing (and quite possibly genuinely believing) that free trade would best serve Morocco’s long-term interest, Drummond-Hay pursued a vigorous opening of Moroccan markets for European importation. In the process, he bullied the sultan, Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman, and his representatives into compliance. In February 1856, for example, facing a critical deadline in the negotiations, Drummond-Hay “proposed that one of Her Majesty’s ships of war should be sent by the Admiralty to Moroccan waters ... to convince the Moroccan rulers that the British Government was prepared to resort to force to compel it to yield” (p. 44).

Similar tactics would reappear in the next stage of the relationship, during the brief Spanish–Morocco conflict of 1859–62 (Tetuan War) and the peace settlement brokered by Britain. Discussing the unfolding of the trilateral relationship, Ben-Srhir illustrates the clear ulterior motive behind the British mediation: pressure on the makhzan to pay heavy reparations to regain the occupied northern city of Tetuan. The money to cover those reparations came from a British loan, facilitated by Drummond-Hay, a move that “greatly increased his standings in Makhzan circles” and allowed “London financiers” to profit (p. 110).

In chapter 3, Ben-Srhir covers commercial transactions between Britain and Morocco in the two decades after the signing of the 1856 treaty. Drawing on numerous British reports on the volume of bilateral trade, he illustrates the impact of the treaty “to the irreversible opening of the Moroccan market” as well as to the “marked increase in the number of Europeans pouring into Morocco, the majority of whom were British” (p. 120). Makhzan attempts to halt the foreign intrusion and avoid the erosion of its authority over the indigenous society focused mostly on the growing practice of consular “protection” granted to native Moroccans, many among them Jews. In chapter 4, citing numerous incidents involving protégés, Ben-Srhir describes Drummond-Hay’s rather halfhearted attempts to help the makhzan alleviate the problem all the way through the 1880 Madrid Conference. At that international gathering, Morocco found itself supported by Spain and Britain alone as the concluding resolution gave “further support and legitimacy to the principle of consular protection.” Thus, “[t]he Sultan’s hopes had been dashed and Britain’s policy regarding Morocco frustrated” (pp. 192–93).

Drummond-Hay was similarly frustrated in his frequent attempts to convince the sultan to implement structural reforms in Morocco’s economy and agricultural production, the makhzan administrative system, and local governance—a matter covered in chapter 5. The consul was able to introduce a regular pay scale for port officials charged with Morocco’s foreign trade (pp. 234–39); however, attempts to extend that principle to other functionaries of the state failed to carry the day. In assessing Drummond-Hay’s motivation for implementing those measures, Ben-Srhir asserts that, although he “adopted a discourse of reforms, it was to serve the goal of bringing Morocco to serve European interests in general and British interests in particular” (p. 245). The same could be said of his involvement in the military reforms pursued by Mawlay al-Hasan during the 1870s.

Drummond-Hay was frustrated in his final diplomatic endeavor, an attempt to persuade the sultan to renew the 1856 bilateral agreement. Soon afterward, in August 1886, he was retired by the Foreign Office and replaced by a new representative. In the twenty-six years that would pass between Drummond-Hay’s departure from Tangier and the end of Moroccan independence, London would be represented by several diplomats, none of whom would regain his stature. Meanwhile, the Anglo–French rapprochement and the signing of the Entente Cordiale in 1904 would mark a British departure from the policy exercised throughout the second half of the 1800s to protect and guarantee Morocco’s sovereignty and independence.
vis-à-vis other European powers. To be sure, that policy was not derived from any altruistic motives. Rather, as Ben-Srhir asserts in his concluding remarks, “Britain was only interested in safeguarding its Mediterranean interests” (pp. 281–82). Be that as it may, the fact remained that, more than any other factor, Britain’s policy toward Morocco delayed for several decades the demise of precolonial Morocco and its passing under direct European domination.

For anyone interested in the modern history of Morocco, Ben-Srhir’s study, published originally in Arabic in Morocco, offers an invaluable contribution. Given the quality of this work, one should assume—and hope—that the author’s follow-up study of the period between 1886 and 1904 will also be made available in English translation.

DOI: 10.1017/S002074380638316X


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Mireille Rosello’s book is a tour de force in many ways. Informed by a deep understanding of the cultures and literatures of the Maghreb, the book examines the “encounters” between France and North Africa in literature, in history, in contemporary cultural enactments, and in the linguistic imagination. What makes these encounters “performative” is the subject of Rosello’s book. Hers is a theoretical intervention into the conflictual and continual relationship between these two worlds.

Rosello defines a performative encounter thus: “a type of encounter that coincides with the creation of new subject-positions rather than treating preexisting (pre-imagined) identities as the reason for, and justification of, the protocol of encounter” (p. 1). Rosello does a close reading of Austin’s concept of “performativity” but goes beyond Austin by focusing on encounters that not only enact the cultural scripts but also supercede them. In other words, she takes off where Austin ends; working with what Austin termed “misfires” (the miscommunications that result when interlocutors possess different “codes of procedure”), she analyzes how new subject positions are formed precisely in the interstices of cross-cultural failure. This strategy does not mean that she concentrates on the negative, however. As she notes, “Encounters that we encode as “unhappy” or even “tragic” can be felicitous because they produce an imaginative way out of an historical, individual, or cultural impasse if they invent a new grammar or theoretical model that goes beyond the distinction between harmony and happiness, tragedy, and conflict” (p. 8). Rosello’s book performs a kind of performative encounter of its own, enacting new understandings for the reader by exposing the limits of the scripts we use to read and interpret *France and the Maghreb*.

In Rosello’s introduction, she does a beautiful reading of Algerian writer Assia Djebar’s work, “Annie and Fatima,” a tale of the difficulties of communication between a French mother and her daughter who grew up speaking Berber with her father in Algeria. In the poignancy of this tale, Rosello demonstrates the way the most intimate of performances are haunted by national and cultural scripts and notes that performative encounters are only possible when the scripts are realized and their determining power is diffused with creative responses.

In chapter 2, Rosello analyzes France’s “Year of Algeria” in 2003, critiquing the notion that binational “dialogue” “necessarily constitutes an improvement of the relationship between France and Algeria” (p. 29). Instead, she demonstrates how the simplest decisions (calling the festivities the “Year of Algeria in France,” for example, instead of using the Arabic name El Djazair) are fraught with power relations and how the disruptive performances at the games
made the limits of dialogue and the weight of history clear to both French and Algerian actors.

Rosello is at her best when discussing the work of Algerian writer Assia Djebar, but perhaps that is because Djebar’s writing is so richly beautiful that uncovering its layers always invokes the pleasure of the text. Djebar’s story, “Félicie’s Body,” as retold and analyzed by Rosello, is a magnificent rendering of the complexities of hybrid identities and, in this case, how the contradictions of subjectivity are revealed through the name. Félicie is a dying woman in Paris who spent her life happily married to her Algerian husband in Algeria. Her children, who all have both Muslim and Christian names, have assembled around her in her last hours. Djebar recounts the stories of the parents through the voices and stories of the children, and their ability to come to terms with their multiple designations and identities.

Rosello’s text is also beautiful—for its writing and for its insights. She analyzes the masterpieces of Maghrebi literature (Djebar, Khatibi), elucidating their themes (the intercultural couple as metaphor for the relationship of nations, the mother tongue as a jealous and deceived lover), and she pushes forward from those metaphors toward new understandings of the hybrid subject. Her tools are many: she uses writings on memory and the Algerian War by Benjamin Stora as well as the theories of “interrupted borders” by the cultural theorist Etienne Balibar. She also introduces the reader to less well-known works by writers such as Moroccan writer Fouad Laroui and “Beur” novelist Akli Tadjer.

“Ultimately a performative encounter makes something happen where nothing was,” says Rosello in her conclusion (p. 183). Rosello not only creates a lens for analyzing the relationships of the former colonizer to the former colony, but her text redefines that relationship by “making something happen where nothing was.” Her book is informed by a deep engagement to North Africa and is as interesting to ethnographers and scholars of performance as it is to students of literature and culture.

DOI: 10.1017/S0020743806383171


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This edited volume contains sixteen papers originally presented at the “Middle East and North African Immigrants in Europe” conference held at the Maison Française/St. Anthony’s College, Oxford, in May 2002. It is coedited by Richard Lawless, emeritus reader in Middle Eastern studies at the University of Durham and research associate at the Refugee Studies Centre at the University of Oxford, and Ahmed al-Shahi, research fellow at St. Anthony’s College, Oxford.

As the introduction states, the conference was organized in response to the increasingly heated debates in Europe on the subject of immigration. Since the attacks of 11 September 2001, a wide array of issues—Islam, terrorism, asylum and immigration policies, integration and assimilation trajectories, immigrant-identity politics and homeland politics, nationalism and multiculturalism, crime and urban decay—has been increasingly presented in a negative relation to Middle Eastern and North African immigrants. In response, this volume sets out to assess many of these same themes. This wide scope covered by the book is commendable, yet at the same time such an approach runs the risk of leaving the reader with research findings, approaches, and topics as scattered and fragmented as their subjects of inquiry, the immigrants. Although this is inevitable with so many contributing authors presenting original
research, one cannot but wonder what fruitful exchanges ensued between these researchers at the conference while discussing their findings. Inclusion in the book of some thematic considerations across divergent European contexts would have struck a balance with the more detailed country studies, would have contributed to our comparative understanding of the dynamics of immigration in Europe, and would have drawn attention to the way the issue of migration and immigrants is defined and politicized in the European context.

Somewhat elusive in this book, the European context has since become a rapidly changing field of contention. Since the conference in May 2002, Europe has seen devastating bomb attacks in Madrid (March 2004) and London (July 2005) by homegrown Islamist groups, the assassination in The Netherlands of a leading politician (May 2002) and a critical filmmaker (November 2004) because of their anti-immigrant stance, the coming into force of Germany’s new immigration law (January 2005), and weeks of rioting by immigrant youths in French cities (November 2005). These events have changed the social and political landscape in which immigrants find and define themselves.

The volume provides a presentation of European immigration demographics in a long introduction by the coeditors: migration histories of France, Germany, Britain, and the Netherlands; the legal status of migrants in Germany and Britain; political and policy dilemmas of the host state; the introduction, development, and organization of migrant associations in France and the institutionalization of Islam in Italy, Greece, and Austria; social and political responses by host societies; minorities within immigrant groups; transatlantic bonds and identities of asylum seekers; theoretical debates about market-driven multiculturalism and market-driven integration through ethnic entrepreneurship; and a look at human trafficking across Europe.

Some chapters deserve a longer mention. Stefano Allievi, in his chapter on Muslim migration to Italy, traces the development of binary positions from “Islam or Europe” to “Islam and Europe” to a de facto “Islam in Europe.” He suggests an “Islam of Europe” could better be thought of, by Muslims and other Europeans alike, as the Islam of Mecca before the hijra, as this Islamic experience resembles the minority situation of European Muslims much more than an orientation toward the “big,” established Islam of Medina. In a more theoretical essay, Antoine Pécoud discusses the impact of self-employment on integration, an issue that has been hotly debated in the literature on ethnic economies. He suggests that the reasons behind these strongly diverging interpretations may be found in the intermediary nature of trade, an activity that may connect people from different backgrounds but has only a limited impact on their social relations.

In a perceptive analysis of French national identity, Sophie Duchesne reminds us that the way immigrants are received in a country depends not only on legal procedures but on people’s perceptions and conceptions of foreigners. Her qualitative research leads her to distinguish two models by which the French perceive citizenship, “citizenship by inheritance” and “citizenship with reservations,” yet she concludes that most French blend together liberal and communitarian elements in ways unanticipated by political theorists. Because the fate of democracy in the face of migration rests on a balance between cohesion and inclusion, she argues both notions of national identity strengthen democracy.

Taking a look at the immigrant side of society in her research on three voluntary associations, Camille Hamidi asks whether migrant voluntary associations are schools of democracy. Surprisingly, her answer is no. What is more, she registers an evaporation of politics within these associations. Romain Garbaye, in a bird’s-eye perspective of Britain’s immigration experience, highlights the important roles played by local government and the Labour Party, both phenomena unseen in continental Europe. These differences account for a vastly different discourse on “race relations” and multiculturalism in Britain today, as evidenced recently by London’s responses to the July 2005 attacks.
Inevitably in an edited volume with a wide scope, several themes are absent or under-represented. Issues central to the current situation of immigrants but hardly discussed in this volume include the specific cultural background of immigrants; their cultural integration and/or socioeconomic marginalization; travails of the second generation; development of new, European “Islams”; the threat of radicalization and political Islam; and the social and political climate in Europe caused by terrorism and international politics. To the credit of the authors, the essays in this volume do refer to wider academic debates that border on the issues discussed, such as the debate on communitarianism and liberalism or debates about ethnic enclaves and assimilation and about constitutional differences between key European states. Many articles are well suited to be suggested to students as further reading and detailed case studies.

DOI: 10.1017/S0020743806383183

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Morocco’s public image has undergone numerous transformations in recent years. An enduring portrait formed under the tutelage of the late King Hassan II (1961–1999) was that of an absolute monarchy whose external persona was benign enough but whose internal modus operandi was particularly brutal, including the use of torture, the imprisonment of thousands of political dissidents, and the application of a system of fear and intimidation intended to keep opponents in line. This more seamy side of the country was often minimized or camouflaged in the name of promoting a pro-Western image that included a “moderate” foreign policy sympathetic to Western regional ambitions. As part of this latter effort, Rabat willingly established a variety of diplomatic and intelligence contacts with Israel as a way to curry favor with European and American business, political, and military interests. That Morocco has also been for decades the desired destination for millions of Western tourists who have found the country, people, and culture hospitable and inviting has created a complex if not conflictual portrait of the Arab world’s most geographically western nation.

The ascendancy to the throne in 1999 of Mohamed VI has added another layer of complexity to this already multifaceted political landscape as he has encouraged positive political change that has seen the release of scores of political prisoners and has liberalized important aspects of social policy, including a radical revision of the mudawwana, the personal status code. However, the country remains depressingly poor, with gross domestic product per capita well under $2,000. Despite government-sponsored eradication efforts, slums continue to encircle large cities and unemployment remains exceptionally high, with estimates ranging as high as 40 percent. Most ominous has been the involvement of Moroccans both at home and abroad in a wide range of terrorist attacks, including the suicide bombings in Casablanca on 16 May 2003, and in Madrid on 11 March 2004.

What then is one to make of these contrasting positive and negative images that today define Morocco? Marvine Howe makes an exceptionally successful effort in balancing context and content, allowing the reader to see where the country has been, where it is today, and what its future may look like. As a former New York Times reporter whose ties to the country and its leading personalities extend from the preindependence period (March 1956) until today, Howe is well positioned to provide both historical perspective and contemporary insight unmatched by few other observers of the country.
The book is divided into four parts, thirteen chapters plus an epilogue. Using a mixture of personal encounters, journalistic reports, and academic writings, the author weaves an organizationally coherent account of Morocco’s principle identifying features beginning with a “tour du Maroc.” In succinct yet historically accurate manner, Howe provides a fair-minded overview of the preindependence period, focusing on such critical institutional actors as, inter alia, the monarchy, the nationalist political parties, and the French protectorate, along with the political motivations and activities of the relevant politicians, personalities, and players. The postindependence era is given equally balanced treatment as the author critically assesses the damaging effect on Hassan’s rule of the political assassination of the left wing nationalist leader Mekhti Ben Barka, a prominent personality who, like many other noteworthy Moroccan figures, Howe knew personally. Although she presents no new or revealing information regarding the two failed assassination attempts directed against Hassan in 1971 and 1972, Howe correctly observes that those aborted coups ushered in “les années de plomb,” the many years of “lead” that saw the regime use systematic and extreme brutality as a means to eradicate all forms of opposition—including the cruel imprisonment of General Mohamed Oufkir’s wife and young children in a desert encampment in retribution for their father’s involvement in the 1972 coup.

The cruelty of the Hassanian epoch, although much attenuated by the late 1990s, created the political challenges—and opportunities—that Islamism and democratic pluralism were to exploit. The book’s third and fourth parts elaborate on the Islamist challenge in both its moderate and more militant manifestations. Howe reveals her consistently fair-minded approach as she deconstructs Islamist discourse as provided by various spokespeople, including the rising new star of Moroccan Islamist politics, Nadia Yassine, the daughter of Shaykh Abdessalam Yassine, the aging but still charismatic leader of the Justice and Welfare Association. Although brief and at times somewhat superficial, Howe manages to give a relatively accurate picture of the full expanse of Islamist alternatives, including the most radical, the Salafiya Jihadia.

Subsequent chapters cover such important themes as the changing status of women, including the opportunities that the revised family code will provide for the large majority of otherwise marginalized poor women living in the countryside. Howe taps into a wide range of feminist thinking through her numerous interviews with both established scholars such as Fatema Mernissi and younger political activists such as Yasmina Baddou. This facet of Moroccan social existence is further contextualized within the broader changes and challenges that Morocco is experiencing today, including the impact of the Internet, the high expectations of the rising class of young professionals trained and socialized in the West, the corrosive consequences on state and society of the yet-unresolved western Saharan conflict, and the expansive influence of a revived Islamist social consciousness that permeates virtually every strata of Moroccan society and from which Islamist politics finds political sustenance.

Howe’s bold confrontation with the regime’s “democratic façade” serves both as the book’s penultimate topic of discussion as well as the broader template to help predict the country’s future. One cannot help but agree with the author’s insistence that pseudodemocracy, as now practiced by the regime, is a formula for disaster not only for the Moroccan people themselves but also for many outside its borders. The Casablanca and Madrid bombings can serve either as the opportunity to launch “a new vision and profound structural changes” (p. 354) from which an embedded democracy will emerge that can ensure a more secure future or simply as an excuse to reactivate the “lead years” under the cover of “Islamic terrorism.” In this exceptionally well-written and sensitively interpreted account, Marvine Howe genuinely hopes for the former but, like many of her interlocutors, is fearful of the latter.
Dawisha’s central theoretical contribution inheres in a terminological intervention that purports to carry substantive implications for the study of Arab nationalism. He takes issue with the term *Pan-Arabism*—the idea of Arab political unity and the movement toward its realization. Against a broad scholarly consensus, Dawisha substitutes for it the term *Arab nationalism*. In a welcome, unusual gesture, one of the cues determining this definition of his subject is the Arabic language itself. As he observes, the term corresponding to Pan-Arabism (*al-urūba al-shāmilīyya*) has appeared in Arabic discourses seldom. The reason for this finding, he suggests, is that the *Pan* element—prospective political amalgamation—inhered in the simultaneously cultural and political understanding of nationalism so powerful in the Arab Middle East of the 20th century. Dawisha defines Arabism, by contrast, as the “linguistic, religious, historical, and emotional bonds” linking Arabic speakers (p. 13). He defines Arab nationalism (*al-qawmiyya al-`arabiyya*) as Arabism plus the desire for territorial and political unity. Dawisha stipulates that the desire and sometimes the demand for political unity—referred to by others as Pan-Arabism—inheres in Arab nationalism.

However, if the value of Arab unity started out as “self-evident” (p. 11) or otherwise “natural,” it rapidly became not only forced but utterly anathema to state-centric nationalists. One of the fine contributions of the book is the portrayal of Syrian societal and governmental reticence to relinquish their sovereignty to Egypt, the dominant partner in the United Arab Republic (the only full-fledged experiment in Arab nationalism thus defined). The Arab nationalists whom Dawisha sets as the subject of his study more often than not seek a separation—not only from those people and states that are not Arab, but from each other, even as they speak in reverent tones about the ideal of Arab unity. If actual behaviors are to be the measure, Dawisha by his own lights should regard them as proponents of Arabism, rather than as Arab nationalists.

A further ambiguity persists in the Anglophone literature on Arab nationalism. As Dawisha shows, the ultimately decisive competitor of Arab nationalism was itself a variety of nationalism, namely *al-wataniyya*—those nationalisms in the Arab world predicated on the creation and maintenance of distinct sovereign states, such as those of the kingdoms of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and, most consequentially for the fate of *al-qawmiyya*, Iraq. The governments of each of these states resisted Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s pursuit of the ideal of political unification, regarding it as a menacing irredentism. The crosscutting if not contradictory logics of *al-qawmiyya* and *al-wataniyya* that Dawisha’s historiography ably demonstrates suggest that the proponents of state-centric nationalisms may (and in fact did) espouse Arabism but that they were not Arab nationalists—they were Jordanian, Iraqi, Egyptian, etc., nationalists. The common parlance referring to these nationalisms as “Arab nationalism” obfuscates this distinction.

The standard narrative of Pan-Arabism, which Dawisha repeatedly, as the narrative of Arab nationalism, as an ascent to triumph and a decline into despair, frames Arab nationalism as a single discrete phenomenon, an ideology that experienced a rise and a fall, like a person who grows to maturity before experiencing enfeeblement and eventual death. However, what the standard narrative and Dawisha’s wistful assessment of Arab nationalism obscure is that this process may be described best as a transformation rather than as a demise.
The standard narrative risks understating the consequences and continuities of Arab nationalism and the nationalisms of the Arab majority societies of the modern Middle East. It downplays the extent to which Arab nationalism was a condition and a dynamic causal element in the emergence of the plurality of nationalisms in the Arab Middle East, in essence representing its intellectual and political foil. Arguably, neither Egypt nor Syria would be what they are today without that brief period of uneasy union in the United Arab Republic. The Ba’th, and the fate of Michel Aflaq’s system of thought, that the book treats in a thoughtful manner provides another source of insight into Ba’thist Syria and Iraq.

When Dawisha and others state that Arab nationalism “failed,” it is important to recognize that they are adopting the same standards by which its partisans themselves did—or would have—to measure the outcomes of their campaign. However, that metric may or may not be the most appropriate one for an analyst or observer to apply. If the biographical model, as it were, of ideologies were to be held in abeyance, it is not obvious why those standards of success or failure, immortality or death, are the right ones by which to describe or measure ideologies or movements, nor that summary normative assessments (whatever judgment they may render) are informative from either a historical or a social scientific perspective.

The real value of the book rests not in Dawisha’s theoretical intervention but in the soundness of his historical research, the conclusions of which he displays in an accessible and engaging format. This book demonstrates how expertise properly exercised can invite and teach the inquiring nonexpert, even as it can satisfy specialists with the solid command of sources that it displays. With a subject as vast and complicated as Arab nationalism, there is no substitute for the kind of scholarly authority that Dawisha projects. With his judicious selectivity of sources and his carefully calibrated mix of the ideational and the material, the political and the social, he produces a study that will be read with profit by students and scholars alike.

DOI: 10.1017/S0020743806383201


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Onn Winckler’s Arab Political Demography is a detailed account of the links between political contexts, population dynamics, and macroeconomic conditions in the Arab world. Winckler argues that socioeconomic inequality among Arab countries today is partly a function of the varied approaches that states have taken to confront rapid population growth during the 20th century. Winckler addresses this argument with a critical regional account of (1) the collection, quality, and dissemination of demographic data; (2) demographic trends and especially rapid population growth in the 20th century; (3) the emergence of high rates of unemployment; and (4) shifting population policies in response to emerging macroeconomic and demographic conditions. Winckler argues that the failure of many Arab states to confront high rates of population growth have created a demographic, economic, and political Catch 22 in which historically high rates of population growth have impeded the economic gains that ultimately would have led to slower rates of population growth in the region. The strength of this book lies in its detailed account of macroeconomic, demographic, and policy trends and their ecological linkages in the region. However, I finished the book wanting more conceptual synthesis of the wealth of statistics that are presented. I also finished the book wondering if it might more accurately be titled The Political Economy of Arab Demography.
Chapter 1, although isolated from the other chapters, is an important contribution to understanding the structural conditions that affect the production of national demographic data. Compared with other (often humdrum) texts about the sources of demographic data, Winckler persuasively discusses the ways in which political and economic conditions in the Arab world have affected (and often hampered) the collection, quality, and dissemination of such data. Winckler exposes the sensitivities of collecting and disseminating data on the ethnic and religious compositions of many Arab populations and reveals the economic and political conditions that have lead to distortions of national estimates of labor migration, unemployment, and underemployment in several Arab countries. His use of country case studies in this chapter illustrates the common and distinct features of national political histories that have affected the production of demographic data.

Indeed, Winckler’s discussion seems so convincing that his brief concluding remark that “it is [still] possible to describe and analyze the major socio-demographic developments of the Arab countries . . .” (p. 31) seems unsubstantiated. A welcome addition to this chapter would have been more discussion of the ways in which demographers have overcome some of the data limitations that Winckler artfully describes. What roles, for example, have various national demographic and health surveys played in the monitoring of demographic trends for national and international bodies? What roles have anthropological and microdemographic studies on the formal and informal economies played in exposing potential deficiencies in national estimates of employment and per capita income? Because Winckler later draws from other sources, a more nuanced comparison of the more and less problematic demographic databases in the region would have strengthened the final remarks in this chapter.

In chapters 2–4, Winckler links the history of Arab demographic change—from high rates of fertility and population growth before the mid-1980s to falling rates of fertility and population growth since the mid-1980s—to a complex of national and global social, economic, and political conditions. Winckler superficially attributes high rates of population growth before the mid-1980s to socioeconomic conditions that other regions have faced in their pretransition periods, including the demand for children as sources of family labor and social security, women’s low status, early universal marriage, and religious and cultural mores opposing contraception. The more interesting piece of Winckler’s explanation for relatively high rates of Arab fertility relates to structural conditions in the region. Winckler argues that many Arab states delayed implementing family planning programs fundamentally because the “illusion” of Pan-Arabism and the 1970s oil boom obviated the needs to limit economic étatism and to institute direct population policies. Thus, direct or tacit pronatalism survived because of historically specific, regional demands for labor. In turn, Winckler attributes the adoption of direct family planning policies and programs in many Arab states to interrelated declines in the price of oil, inter-Arab labor migration, grants from the Arab oil states to the nonoil states, and work opportunities for the large pool of (often well-educated) youth. These conditions arose in a context of global pressure to implement direct family planning programs. Thus, Winckler argues that the short-term economic loophole provided by the 1970s oil boom enabled many Arab states to delay the implementation of macroeconomic reforms and population policies that would have fostered long-term economic growth in the Arab world. Winckler concludes with a grim picture of the future of many Arab populations, which he argues are “trapped” by continued population growth, limited work opportunities, and insufficient economic growth to accommodate large numbers of youth.

Although Winckler’s conclusion does not address directly other implications of this “trap,” he cites earlier a statement by King Abdullah of Jordan that for “young people, who . . . see themselves and their societies held back by poverty . . . and more . . . Is it any surprise that these communities can become recruiting grounds for extremist ideologies?” (p. 109). This circuitous link between population growth and Islamic extremism is curious, especially
when general concerns about population growth have declined and specific concerns that it fosters political instability waned with the end of the Cold War. In the words of another demographer, S. W. Sinding, the relative “latecomers” to family planning may benefit from historical experience (“The Great Population Debates: How Relevant Are They for the 21st Century?” American Journal of Public Health 90 [2000]: 1841–45).

DOI: 10.1017/S0020743806383213


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The interpretive key to Colonial Effects is located in its first paragraph, where Joseph Massad tells us that writing the book helped him “understand how I became a Palestinian Jordanian” (p. xi). He then shares his hope that Colonial Effects will “explain the process through which the Jordanian people came to see ‘ourselves’ the way ‘we’ do” (p. xi). As a Palestinian Jordanian commentary on “the making of national identity in Jordan,” Colonial Effects is impressive. As a commentary on the “we” Jordanian identity might stand for, the book is vexed by the gap (rarely acknowledged by Massad) between identity as an artifact of law and identification as a structure of feeling. Massad is alert to the legal apparatus that underlies Jordanian identity; his historical analysis of it is careful and insightful. On matters of Jordanian identification, however, there is much he cannot see. The ideological cohesiveness of Massad’s work, its recognizable place within the field of Jordanian identity politics, is both its strength and, rather predictably, its weakness.

Colonial Effects revisits themes familiar to students of Jordanian history. Using a complex array of sources, Massad argues that (1) Jordanian national identity is a product of colonial and postcolonial institutions; (2) its national symbols—ranging from food to dress to dialect—are invented features or strategically manipulated “effects” of these post/colonial institutions; (3) Jordanian nationalism is marked by two competing strains, one Pan-Arab and anticolonial, the other Hashemite, localizing, and reliant on Western patronage; and (4) Jordanian nationalism since 1948 increasingly has been defined in opposition to an internal, Palestinian Other. Massad’s analysis conforms nicely to standard, post-Hobsbawmian views of nationalism. His critical apparatus, which draws heavily on the work of poststructuralist and postcolonial superstars, also conforms to a (by now) fairly distinct genre: Foucault mixed with Gramsci, with genuflections to Althusser, Mitchell, Fabian, Bhabha, Said, Chatterjee, and others. The theoretical pyrotechnics are, at times, excessive, but the historiographical infrastructure on which Massad builds his analysis will be of use to a broad range of scholars. His account is meticulously documented throughout—with over 1,000 footnotes—and his tight focus on two colonial institutions (the military and the law) gives his analysis the same “repressive” and “productive” qualities he attributes (à la Foucault) to the institutions he dissects.

Massad’s principal claim is that military and legal structures have played a dominant role in the making of Jordanian identity. Much ink is given to asserting the novelty of this claim, yet it is hard to imagine a nation state, post/colonial or otherwise, in which legal conventions are not essential to the task of defining membership—and harder still to imagine a modern state whose national sovereignty is not expressed, and protected, by police and military forces. If few books about nationalism focus exclusively on these institutions, it
is because mass media, popular culture, education, civil society, political movements, and indigenous, prenational structures of authority often have more peculiar, and less obvious, effects on the social construction of nation states. Massad’s attraction to the military and the law is actually a byproduct of his tendency to see Jordan—in its formative encounters with Palestinians and Palestine—as a bedouin-dominated army commanded by an English officer who valorized bedouin custom and specialized in codifying and enforcing tribal law.

John Bagot Glubb ("Glubb Basha," general of the Arab Legion from 1939 to 1956) is the animating force behind Colonial Effects. Massad’s critical engagement with Glubb is riveting, largely because the stakes for Massad are so high. He has turned Glubb Basha into a compressed symbol of the colonial project, the creative genius behind Jordanian identity. It was Glubb, after all, who designed the red kaffiyeh Jordanians wear so proudly, brought bagpipes and massed bands to Jordan, and made official the bedouin fetishism that now passes for “Jordanian heritage.” Apparently, he is even responsible for the fact that millions of Jordanians believe mansaf is their national dish. Although he discerns in Glubb the failings one would expect of a British general, mid-20th century—he was an exhibitionist, racist, Orientalist, imperialist, old-fashioned Victorian struggling with his own (a)sexuality—Massad obviously has immense respect for the man. Glubb is both his champion (for constructing a faux tribal/bedouin national identity Massad can now deconstruct) and the perfect foil (who proves Massad is wise to Glubb’s tricks in ways ordinary Jordanians, alas, are not). Rarely have character assassination and hagiography been so artfully combined, with the odd result that Glubb emerges as the only well-rounded character, the only “actor,” in Massad’s book. All others, even Hashemite royals, seem reactionary by comparison. If the virtue of Foucauldian analysis is its ability to find power everywhere, emanating from above and below, then the vice of Massad’s analysis is his ability to find power, transformative power, only in Glubb and the nationalizing agendas he set in motion.

Massad is committed to the idea that Jordanian identity is a kind of ersatz replacement culture devised by British colonial officers and then imposed on a subject population who unwittingly accepted it as the real thing. The assumptions underlying this model are dismissive of the creative and ideological effort Jordanians have given to making their own national culture by articulating older identities with newer ones. It is strange that Massad has almost nothing to say about the substance of tribal law, given his focus on law. Tribes, likewise, he presents as fodder for Glubb’s army, not as active forms of identification that predated and now intermingle with the Jordanian nation state. Massad’s approach, in effect, disconnects Jordanian nationalism from local forms of identification, unless those forms are anti-Palestinian. Ironically, many scholars of Palestinian nationalism, Massad included, have abandoned as retrograde a prior tendency to depict Palestinian identity as merely a reaction to Zionism and British colonial policy. This shift was accomplished by engaging seriously with local models of history and identity that made later forms of Palestinian identification possible. The benefits of this approach are absent from Colonial Effects. Instead, Massad concludes that Jordanian identity, as it exists today, is an elaborate display of false consciousness, a “proof of colonialism’s perpetual victory over the colonized” (p. 278). The conclusion is grim; it reproduces a political discourse in which Palestinian and Jordanian identities develop at each other’s expense, rejecting each other’s claims on the past, accentuating in each other the illegitimating powers of foreignness. If Jordan’s “exclusivist nationalists” attempt to marginalize the kingdom’s Palestinians by saying you were not here in the beginning, Massad’s response to them, beneath its fine intellectual veneer, is no less simplistic: neither were you.

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In Jordanian Jerusalem: Holy Places and National Spaces, Kimberly Katz undertakes a topic that has received little scholarly attention. This is the issue of the role of Jerusalem in the Jordanian government’s construction of national identity and pursuit of legitimacy between 1948 and 1967. It is not the urban geography or demographic character of the city on which the author focuses, but the Jordanian government’s representations of the city in shifting circumstances of domestic, inter-Arab, and international politics.

The author devotes particular attention to changing representations of Jerusalem on Jordanian and Transjordanian banknotes and postage stamps. While still under British control, Amir –Abdullah’s administration endeavored to attain the accoutrements of sovereignty by issuing postal and revenue stamps. The images depicted upon them suggested continuity of the new dynasty with the country’s distant past. Katz relates that, after gaining formal independence in 1946, the Transjordanian government represented itself as a champion of the Palestinian cause and issued stamps depicting Palestinian holy places, including Jerusalem’s Dome of the Rock. However, after Transjordan annexed East Jerusalem and part of central Palestine in 1950, the new Jordanian administration suddenly dropped all official references to those areas as Palestine. In addition to designating central Palestine as the West Bank, Jordanian officials recast Jerusalem as a Jordanian holy city and one of several of the country’s historical sites, which were represented on postal stamps and currency.

The book explores the Jordanian government’s efforts to assert and gain international recognition of its sovereignty over East Jerusalem by initiating changes in the city’s administration, despite that the United Nations Palestine partition resolution of 1947 had designated the city a corpus separatum under international trusteeship. The reader, thus, learns that King –Abdullah signaled his new authority in the city in 1950 by making an appointment to the office of Custodian of the Holy Places and by challenging the privileges of foreign consuls in the city. Similarly, King Hussein redistricted the city and its environs, appointing new officials, despite the concerned attention of the consular corps. By 1955, Katz tells us, the foreign consuls had accepted Jordan’s de facto control of the city. The Jordanian government further demonstrated its authority in Jerusalem by intervening in the succession of patriarchs of the Armenian and Greek Orthodox churches, by taking responsibility for renovation of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, and by extending Jordanian education law to foreign Christian schools, which were predominately located in Jerusalem. By promoting the city as a place of pilgrimage and tourism, the Jordanian government used the image of Jerusalem to identify Jordan before the international community as the Holy Land.

Katz also details how Jordan signaled to the Arab and Muslim worlds that Jerusalem was a Jordanian city. Thus, Jordan took responsibility for the restoration of the Dome of the Rock and, in 1964, hosted heads of Arab and Islamic states at the celebration of the completion of the project’s first stage. The Jordanian government likewise converted the commemoration of the Prophet’s Night Journey into a national celebration and an occasion to bring together Arab and Muslim leaders at Jerusalem’s al-Haram al-Sharif. The author also briefly addresses the founding of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Jerusalem in 1964.

Katz makes some fascinating observations, especially about the relations of the European states to the Hashemite dynasty and Jerusalem. One learns, for example, that British advisers
in 1916 prevented the Hijazi government from issuing postage stamps bearing the image of Sharif Husayn, because the advisers considered representations of humans as alien to Arab art. The author also reveals that, only a year before the 1956 Suez Crisis, the French government still attempted to preserve its rights in Jerusalem as a Great Power and Catholic power under the terms of the 1878 Treaty of Berlin.

Although the book has its share of keen insights, it has several shortcomings as well. First, its sources are thin. One can certainly sympathize with the author’s predicament, because the Jordanian government has hardly thrown its archives open to research into such sensitive topics. Katz does use Jordanian government publications and British Foreign Office documents to good effect, but she does not use archival sources of the United States or France. Given that she characterizes the French consul as “the doyen of the consular corps” in Jerusalem, the lack of official French sources is conspicuous. Of more concern is the limited extent to which the author exploits the press of Jordan and other Arab states.

This last issue is directly related to a second limitation of the book. Although the author proposes pursuing a “relational approach” (p. 3) to her topic by taking into account the histories of other Arab states and the Palestinians, one learns little about either Palestinians in Jordan or about the question of Jerusalem in inter-Arab relations. The limited discussion of both matters is particularly evident in chapter 6, which is an account of the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1964. The author mentions that King Hussein sought at the time to improve tense relations with Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, but there is no discussion in the chapter of the Syrian and Iraqi Ba’thist coups in 1963, of the Cairo negotiations on Arab unity the same year, or of the fact that Jordan then suppressed mass demonstrations by its citizens in support of Arab unity. Scarcely seven pages long, chapter 6 should have either been more thoroughly developed, or its material incorporated into another chapter. Finally, the book would have benefited by a conclusion.

In summary, Jordanian Jerusalem adds to our knowledge of the modern history of Jerusalem and Jordan. Although less than fully executed, the book is well conceived, and it represents a point of departure for future research on its topic.

DOI: 10.1017/S0020743806383237


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The contents of this work are more diverse than its title indicates. Beyond its primary discussion of “neutralist” tendencies, both ideological and political, in Syria from the eve of independence during World War II to the collapse of the Syrian–Egyptian union in 1961 (the conclusion deals more briefly with the post-1961 years), the study contains sections analyzing the evolving structure of neutralist policies over the same period in other Arab states, in particular Egypt and later the United Arab Republic (UAR). It also gives considerable attention to the global development of neutralist thought, to the contributions of Nehru of India and of Tito of Yugoslavia, and to the international conferences (Colombo, 1954; Bandung, 1955; Belgrade, 1961) at which the nonaligned bloc took shape. The latter dimension of the study is made possible by the impressive range of sources consulted by the author. In addition to a wide array of published Arabic works as well as materials from the British and American archives, the author has used Russian, Polish, and (most intensively and fruitfully) Indian archival materials.
The result is a work of originality and value. Its detailed discussion of the initial Arab opening to the USSR during World War II, when both Egypt and Syria established formal diplomatic relations with the USSR, as well as its analysis of neutralist tendencies in both Syria and Egypt in the late 1940s and early 1950s, adds historical depth to the understanding of a phenomenon generally viewed as commencing only in the mid-1950s. The substance and contribution of various political tendencies within Syria, the Ba’th Party in particular, to the country’s increasingly neutralist trajectory is closely analyzed, as is the distinction made by most Syrian ideologues between the nonalignment in international alliances that they were advocating and their rejection of Soviet-style communism as a socioeconomic system.

The study gives great emphasis to identifying the different shades or nuances of neutralism espoused in the Arab world at different points in time: for example, initially a “calculative-pragmatic nationalist neutralism” aimed at using Great Power rivalries to achieve local nationalist goals, somewhat later the “anti-Western neutralism” fueled particularly by Arab resentment over Western policy in regard to Palestine, and later the “positive neutralism” of the UAR that attempted to use the Cold War to Arab advantage. The sections on India’s seminal role in the emergence of post World War II neutralism and in the Afro–Asian nonaligned movement, based as they are on a rich assemblage of Indian primary materials, are extremely valuable in their situating Arab neutralist tendencies in the wider global context in which they emerged and by which they were influenced. These and other strengths make the work an important contribution and a worthwhile read for all those interested in post World War II Arab politics.

However, the wealth of new material found in the study is sometimes poorly organized and digested. Overall, the text is somewhat disjointed; juggling Syrian politics, Egyptian politics, and global neutralist trends makes for chapters containing sections on radically different subjects. As is the case with almost all Western academic studies of modern Arab politics that, due to political constraints, are not able to draw on Arab archival materials, the study is stronger on rhetoric and public positions than on illuminating the internal process of Arab governments’ policymaking. Especially in the later chapters, the reports cited from the Indian and Polish archives are sometimes insufficiently analyzed and critiqued, their contents reported and cited at length without evaluation of the accuracy of their specifics or the value of their overall interpretations.

The study is also substantively imbalanced. It gives far more attention to Syrian attitudes toward and relations with the USSR than to the corresponding evolution of Syrian thought and policies in regard to the opposite pole of the Cold War rivalry, the Western powers. Several major memoirs and studies dealing with Syria’s troubled relations with the Western powers in the 1950s have apparently not been consulted; they are unmentioned either in the notes or in the bibliography. This finding leads to significant gaps in the discussion of Syria’s relationship with the West from the later 1950s onward. In particular, the discussion of the “Syrian crisis” of late 1957 is incomplete, not fully evaluating the pressure the United States and its Middle Eastern associates mounted against Syria in 1957 or adequately explaining the eventual resolution of the crisis at the United Nations.

The sections of the study dealing with neutralist policies in Egypt and the UAR also present problems of coverage and interpretation. The text needed some discussion of Egypt’s initial flirting with Cold War “neutralism” as a ploy in its relations with Great Britain and the United States in 1953–54 (pp. 16–18) to provide a fuller picture of the evolution of Egyptian foreign policy under the Nasserist regime. Similarly, the brief discussion of the Lebanese civil war of 1958 and of U.S. intervention in the same (pp. 207–8) makes no mention of the involved UAR–U.S. negotiations that preceded U.S. intervention. The text’s account of the road to Egyptian–Syrian union in late 1957 to early 1958 is both incomplete and misleading: to
credit Nasser with having “orchestrated” the union “through his Ba’athist allies” (pp. 194–95) misrepresents the convoluted dance in which the Syrian military, not the Ba’th, inaugurated the drive for unity and an initially reluctant Nasser agreed to full Syrian–Egyptian union—to the dismay of Ba’thist leaders when brought face to face with the practical consequences of their rhetoric. For all its strengths of range and sources, the study’s goal of explaining the ideological basis and political evolution of neutralism in Syria, Egypt, the UAR, and the international arena is only partially realized.

DOI: 10.1017/S0020743806383249


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The authors of this survey of contemporary Sudan maintain that the repeated failures of national governments (whether civilian or military) to articulate and implement a broadly acceptable democratic political system; to untangle the Gordian knot of contentious issues rooted in regionalism, particularly those pitting the south against the north; and to address with competence recurrent economic crises of staggering proportions have driven the country to an acute state of instability. This is, of course, neither a groundbreaking nor a controversial thesis, as suggested by the subtitle of a quite similar study written fifteen years ago by Peter Woodward (Sudan, 1898–1989: The Unstable State). However, in reprising the woes of independent Sudan and carrying the narrative forward to include the policies and practices of the military regime in power since 1989, Sidahmed and Sidahmed underscore the pervasiveness and intractability of national problems deeply rooted in a political culture of uncertainty.

After an opening chapter surveying key developments in the area that became Sudan from antiquity to the termination of the Anglo–Egyptian Condominium in 1956, a second traces the tortured political history of the subsequent fifty years. Three chapters focused on foreign relations, the economy, and linkages between state and society outline the path Sudan has traveled in recent years. In an admirable attempt to make the volume as timely as possible, a brief postscript describes the situation in the autumn of 2004. Even that account, however, was overtaken by events—most notably the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement—by the time the book appeared a few months later.

The series of which this book is a part appears to place a premium on brevity, perhaps in keeping with the goal of finding readers both among specialists and general audiences. Accordingly, Sidahmed and Sidahmed have packed a wealth of information into just over 150 pages of text. Their synthesis of the scholarly literature and their mining of the American, British, and Arab press result in a thorough, if occasionally somewhat tedious, account that is much stronger on the presentation of data than on its analysis. The extensive bibliography will help readers wishing to probe issues more deeply, but a disproportionate number of bibliographical entries cover the period before independence (at least in comparison to the space allocated to those years in the book). No doubt this distribution reflects the difficulties of undertaking research on topics certain to be viewed as sensitive in the volatile environment that the authors describe.

In the end, however, the utility of this book is compromised by a fatal and inexcusable flaw. It is so riddled with errors of every kind—in spelling, grammar, and syntax; in the stating
of facts; and as a result of careless oversights—that the book’s final draft must never have been proofread nor received the attention of an editor. In these respects, extensive portions of the book are written at a level unacceptable in an undergraduate essay. No purpose is served by—nor does space allow for—a full cataloging of these shortcomings, but consider only a sampling of the errors that mar a than twenty-page segment of the text. . . . The Islamist movement concentrated its efforts on the student body . . . by the mid-1070s” (p. 54); “. . . the Bush administration was persuaded to waiver a law . . .” (p. 57); “. . . no political force in government or opposition, northern or southern, will be able to retract on it” [the south’s right to self-determination] (p. 62). On page 68, the spelling of Sudan’s military ruler between 1958 and 1964 is given as “Abbud” and “Abboud” within the space of three lines (a criticism raised on the grounds of consistency, not of rigorous transliteration), and an assertion that three internal developments had had an impact on foreign policy is followed by the enumeration and discussion of four such developments. In a survey such as this, an accurate geographical context is important and particularly beneficial for nonspecialist readers. However, in the introductory section of the book, Sudan is said to stretch “between the savannah and the equator” (p. vi), thus excluding the desert regions of the northern and western parts of the country, whereas the sole map in the book (p. xxviii) includes much of the neighboring country of Ethiopia but does not show Eritrea, despite that the text refers to that country frequently and that it has been an independent state since 1993. At best, all of these findings bespeak a lackadaisical attitude on the part of the series editor and the publisher, both of whom should be embarrassed to attach their imprimatur to so slovenly a product. Nor is it understandable why the authors would permit such cavalier treatment of a work in which they appear to have invested considerable effort.

This book contains much useful information, but other studies cover much the same ground. Purchasing this volume rewards the flaunting of basic professional standards. Why would we put in our personal or institutional libraries what we would return to our undergraduates for rewriting?

DOI: 10.1017/S0020743806383250

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In the wake of World War I, the Arab lands were detached from the Ottoman Empire and distributed, like spoils, among the victors. Fierce resistance to this European colonization forced a process of decolonization starting as early as the 1920s. As a result, the area was converted into many countries, which form the bulk of today’s Middle East. One of such new additions to the world map was Iraq, which the Ottomans ruled as three separate provinces, each of which was called a vilâyat: Musol, Baghdad, and Basra. Hence, many scholars of the region have come to the conclusion that Iraq is an “artificial state” with no natural bond to keep it united.

The Future of Iraq is one of the recent works that advances this argument. The book calls for a three-way partition of the country if peace and prosperity are to prevail because Iraq is “a state which should not have been formed in the first place . . . [and] there simply is no other way to ensure [its] territorial integrity” other than partition or rule by violence and dictatorship (p. 182). Among the many flaws of this argument, two are very glaring. First,
there are no clear points of territorial partitioning. There are more than a million Kurds in the
Arab territories, hundreds of thousands of Shi’a in Sunni cities, and comparable numbers of
Sunnis living among the Shi’a. The second flaw stems from the assumption that violence is
the only way to keep Iraq together. It remains to be seen that the untried option of political,
cultural, and social justice cannot deliver better results.

Nonetheless, the book provides a first-rate concise history of Iraq since British involvement.
Often historical events are connected through brilliant analyses, demonstrating the authors’
deep knowledge and solid understanding of the complexities of these events. It is also im-
portant to note that the book was written in 2003—with an epilogue completed just before
June 2004 and an afterward in 2005. The authors insisted on their predictions despite recent
events, which point at a direction different from those that the book’s argument tends to
lead the reader. Being extremely partisan for their original argument, the authors brushed off
any adverse evidence that might undermine their theory of the inevitability of a “managed
partition.”

The authors divide The Future of Iraq into three parts. The first part surveys Iraq’s history
from 1920 to the present, divided by regime types. The Hashemite monarchy, along with its
British patrons, is discussed in the first chapter, which concludes correctly that this era set the
stage for the injurious political process of the next eight decades because of the appointing
of Sunnis as Iraq’s overlords, despite their being a numerical minority. Maintaining this status
could not be achieved by any means other than the worst forms of coercion. The monarchy
was toppled by a military coup and a republic was declared in Iraq in 1958, setting the stage
ten years of disarray and instability. Although acknowledging the difference between
the rule of Brigadier Qassim (1958–63) and the regime of the Arif brothers (1963–68), the
authors fail to highlight the natural link of the Arif era with the following regime, thereby
missing an opportunity to better analyze the events of the 1970s to the present. The 1963
coup, after all, was planned and carried out primarily by the Ba’th Party and its nationalist
allies.

Ba’th rule is discussed in two chapters divided at the point of the end of the Iran–Iraq War
in 1988. Choosing “The Destruction of Iraq” as a title for the chapter concerning the events
of post-1988 strikes the informed reader as an arbitrary judgment by the authors, as if eight
years of World War I type conflict that crippled Iraq both financially and socially was not
bad enough to signal the beginning of Iraq’s destruction. Nonetheless, these two chapters do
provide a fair analysis of the Ba’th regime and its catastrophic policies, leading up to the

The second part consists of three chapters dedicated to the Shi’a, the Sunnis, and the Kurds.
Each chapter presents many details on the movements within each group and the sociopolitical
dynamics that govern relations between the group and the rest of Iraq’s population—and, of
course, with the political regimes. Highlighted in all of these chapters are the events and
indicators that these groups are not meant to coexist in one state because they are incapable
of forming a national identity bridging their ethnic and sectarian differences, hence leading to
the main argument the authors wish to advance: namely, partition is the only viable solution
for the Iraq question.

The final part is based on Fukuyama’s model for a successful democracy. According to
this model, there are four levels of democratic consolidation, starting with the “normative
commitment to the idea of democracy” among the people, then establishment of institutions,
followed by the existence of a vibrant civil society, and finally the embeddedness of democracy
in the political culture (pp. 190–91). Applying this model to Iraq, the authors conclude that it
is unlikely that this process can fully materialize; therefore, the authors advocate a “managed
partition of Iraq” as the least-bad option.
No one who reads this brief but vigorous polemic can have any doubt about the author’s sentiments concerning the House of Saud and its dominion over Saudi Arabia. “It is a government that should be overthrown,” As‘ad AbuKhalil writes, “A brutal dictatorship wed to an ideology of religious fanaticism should not be allowed to continue in this century” (p. 23).

That is the prism through which AbuKhalil examines the entire history of the kingdom, from its origins in the 18th century through the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. He regards the Saudi regime as an illegitimate and corrupt lackey of Western—mostly American—imperialism and depicts the kings and princes as semiliterate brutes who hold their subjects in thrall by buying them off when possible and jailing or exiling them when not. In his view, all the well-established forums by which the people of Saudi Arabia interact with the rulers and make their views known, such as the traditional majlis and the Consultative Assembly created a decade ago, are shams, and the only permitted form of behavior is unquestioning submission.

This approach is not surprising, considering that the author, a Lebanese-born academic who teaches at California State University, Stanislaus, is the self-styled “Angry Arab” who fills his blog with tirades and cynicism. His language evokes the left-wing rhetoric of the nationalists—he calls them “progressives” (p. 103)—who dominated Arab politics a generation ago. He writes that Saudi Arabia “certainly succeeded in fighting a promising movement that emerged from the left” (p. 23), and even now Nasser is his hero—which inevitably means the House of Saud is the enemy.

It is, of course, perfectly legitimate to criticize the Saudi regime. The corruption, human rights abuses, bigotry, and manipulation of Islam that have characterized the House of Saud’s rule for decades are well known. AbuKhalil, to his credit, covers this ground in clear, robust prose that is often persuasive. The least that can be said for his book is that it is much more credible than a similar screed from 1994 by Said K. Aburish, The Rise, Corruption and Coming Fall of the House of Saud (St. Martin’s Press).

Saudi Arabia provides abundant material for its critics to work with, and AbuKhalil makes good use of a lot of it. The concentration of power in royal hands, the discrimination against the Shi‘ite minority, the venality of some senior princes, the arbitrary cruelty of Saudi justice—all are reviewed in outrage. The author’s scornful analysis of the “Basic Law of Government” promulgated by King Fahd in 1992 points out, correctly, that it lists at length the duties of the citizenry, including obedience to the king, but mentions no duties required of the monarch. AbuKhalil rightly dismisses as “bogus” the claim in the law’s Article 7 that the Saudi government “derives power from the Holy Qur‘an and the Prophet’s tradition” (p. 127). Nowhere, he argues, “does the Qur‘an urge believers to obey and submit to the king—any king” (p. 127).

Many of the issues raised by AbuKhalil are old news, but he does offer some new material from Arab archives. Especially interesting is his brief account of the Saudi Communist Party and other indigenous leftist groups, which are barely mentioned in standard histories of the kingdom. He is especially good in explaining how and why Saudi Arabia became the wellspring of extremism throughout the Muslim world.

Yet the passion of AbuKhalil’s writing is also the weakness of his book: its onesidedness diminishes its credibility. He gives the Saudi rulers no credit for anything and ignores that the people of Saudi Arabia are incomparably better off today in terms of housing, education,
medical care, and economic opportunity than they were when King Abdul Aziz created the
kingdom in 1932. That Saudi Arabia has largely avoided the violence that has plagued other
Arab countries he attributes to unrelenting repression by the House of Saud, not to adroit
maneuvering in the treacherous waters of Arab politics. There is no indication that AbuKhalil
has ever visited Saudi Arabia and seen its people enjoying themselves in the comfort that oil
money has brought them.

In fact, AbuKhalil’s antipathy to the House of Saud repeatedly leads him into error. He
asserts, for example, that Saudi Arabia created the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to “co-
ordinate Gulf security arrangements with the American protector,” (p. 115) but the GCC was
never intended to be a security organization, as its charter makes clear. Its mission is eco-
nomic and regulatory only. He says King Faisal and his “American protectors,” in their zeal to
stymie Nasser, created “the international Islamic fundamentalist movement” (p. 99), a claim
that ignores the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood many years earlier. Contrary to his assertion
here, there is no evidence that any princes watched pornographic movies aboard the Amer-
ican destroyer ferrying Abdul Aziz to his famous meeting with President Roosevelt (p. 95).
In addition, it is untrue that Ahmed Zaki Yamani, as oil minister, undertook to “eradicate
any thoughts of pro-Arab nationalism in the energy policy of the kingdom” (p. 192). Yamani
orchestrated the Arab oil embargo of 1973–74, of which the United States was the primary
target, and forced the American owners of Aramco to accept nationalization of the company.

In sum, readers who want a brief assessment of the political, social, and religious situation
in Saudi Arabia will find this book useful, but they should be wary of accepting the author’s
arguments at face value.

DOI: 10.1017/S0020743806383274
YESIM ARAT, Rethinking Islam and Liberal Democracy: Islamist Women in Turkish Poli-
cloth.

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Through the study of the “Ladies’ Commissions” of Turkey’s Refah Party, the main Islamist
political party of the 1990s, Arat examines the ways in which the role and status of Islam
in the secular, liberal-democratic system in Turkey is negotiated and transformed. She argues
that, despite the polarization and antagonism between Islamists and secularist circles, there
is nevertheless a tight interconnection that serves as the potential basis upon which a mutual
accommodation of differences and a possibility for reconciliation may emerge. According to
Arat, the Islamist women activists of the Refah Party are transforming secularism as well as
Islam in Turkey by successfully merging liberalism and Islamism.

Even though several books have appeared on the issue of Islam, its public visibility, and
its relation to women in Turkey—including those by Nilufer Gole, Meyda Yegenoglu, Alev
Cinar, and partially by Yael Navaro-Yashin—this book is unique in that it provides an insight
into the discourse and self-conceptualizations of a unique group of Islamist political activists
gathered around the Ladies’ Commissions of the Refah Party. Based on interviews and case
studies, Arat provides a firsthand account of the lives, thoughts, and views of these women
that goes far beyond the superficial and quite biased image that is attributed to them popularly
by the secular media.

After providing a brief account of the significance of women in public life and politics in
Turkey, Arat outlines the terms of the debate that erupted over the Islamic headcovering in
Turkey in the 1980s, particularly from the perspective of women. She illustrates that, while secularist circles, especially feminists, accused Islamist women of upholding traditionalist, patriarchal values that serve to subordinate women, Islamist women in turn accused secularist feminists of being elitist, alienated toward women’s actual conditions and lives in Turkey. Islamist women seem to have a point when we consider that no secular–feminist group has been nearly as successful as these Islamist activists in mobilizing women at the grassroots level in such mass numbers.

As Arat demonstrates later in the book, the success of the activist women of the Refah Party in rallying votes from among women in large cities, particularly during the 1994 local elections—a success that was acknowledged equally by secularist and Islamist circles—was to a large extent due to their ability to reach and communicate with a large group of women in lower income sections of cities at the grassroots level. Arat illustrates that the success of the Ladies’ Commissions in mobilizing women was due to their visiting a large number of women in their homes; listening to their needs and problems, which were mostly material and economic; communicating these concerns to the party; and conveying to the women that the Refah Party was willing and prepared to meet these demands. Arat argues that the women activists of the Refah Party became the intermediaries for women at the grassroots level who otherwise had no way of having their concerns heard in the public and political spheres.

In support of her argument that these Islamist women activists are successfully merging Islam with liberalism, Arat shows how they consistently upheld and appealed to a discourse of liberalism and individualism in defending their position as Islamist women and in justifying their activity among the ranks of the Refah Party, rather than appealing to Islamic justifications and Qur’anic stipulations. In another example that Arat gives, however, it is possible to see how Islam still maintains its presence in this quite liberal discourse of the women of the Refah Party. She notes that, in the meetings of the Ladies’ Commissions, guidelines, policies, and plans are read in a messianic tone and that their meetings have a rather ritualistic quality, suggesting that, even though the content of their discourse does not make any Islamic references, the unique ways it is presented and articulated convey a sense of a holy mission, as if serving Allah and serving the party’s interests converge. Unfortunately, Arat does not elaborate on the significance of these observations in relation to the ways in which Islam is reinserted in quite subtle ways into public discourse and political activity embedded within a seemingly liberalist discourse.

Arat concludes that “in the context of Turkish secularism, liberalism infiltrated Islam” and Islam in turn “expanded the reach of liberalism and deepened its practice” (pp. 113–14). In other words, according to Arat, this unique presence of Islamist women in the public sphere is changing (liberalizing) Islam from within, thereby serving to negotiate a space wherein a possibility for reconciliation between Islamism and secularism may emerge, thus contributing to the expansion of liberal democracy. However, such an important argument deserves further elaboration and clarification, which Arat does not provide to show exactly how the Islamist discourse is liberalized and the secularist discourse transformed.

As Arat herself mentions, the demands of these women activists of the Refah Party for active positions in the administrative ranks of the party were rejected. Indeed, none of these activists was given a post in the administrative body of the party, even though the party recruited several women from among secular circles who did not wear headcoverings. This finding suggests that the party has resisted the change that these women activists might have brought about in party ideology and programs. Arat’s work would have been more complete (and presented in a lengthier book) had she offered a more thorough observation and analysis of the ways in which the party’s ideology has indeed been transformed by the activities of the Ladies’ Commissions. In addition, Arat’s claim that secularism is also transformed by such activities remains insufficiently developed as well. Even though I have no doubt that
this claim is correct, it would have been much better founded had Arat illustrated the exact ways in which the secularist discourse of liberal democracy in Turkey has been transformed to make it possible for an Islam-based political party to function effectively in politics, as in the case of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), which came to power in 2002 as a majority government.

DOI: 10.1017/S0020743806383286


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Given the scope of Iranian history, Gene Garthwaite took on no small task in drafting The Persians as the fifth volume of Blackwell’s “Peoples of Asia Series.” Challenged to author a complete and concise origins to present history geared toward nonspecialists and general readers, Garthwaite has competently crafted a 2,500-year survey spanning the Achaemenian era through the present.

As a succinct survey, The Persians offers a straightforward, chronological, and nearly comprehensive presentation of rulers, dynasties, and major political developments, yet with precious little nuance and detail. Considering the mandate of the series and the vast historical terrain to cover, perhaps it is to be expected that the text at times reads like an extended encyclopedia entry, although Garthwaite’s emphasis on political elites and the lack of a central unifying thesis contribute to this character. Whereas the book is successful as a general introduction to Iranian political history through the fall of the Safavids—constituting approximately two-thirds of the work—the limitations of such a brief overview become evident in the breakneck ninety-page treatment of the Qajar Era, the Pahlavi period, and the Islamic Republic.

Following an introductory chapter that offers essential background on Iranian geography, ethnic diversity, political culture, historiography, and basic terminology (such as “Iran/Iranian” vs. “Persia/Persian”), the book’s seven subsequent chapters are broken down by successive governments or groupings thereof. The bulk of the work is drawn from secondary sources in English, which are lightly footnoted throughout the text, and described in an annotated bibliography. In addition, the author interweaves his own interpretations of several primary sources for the Achaemenian through Pahlavi periods with those of other specialists. Liberally interspersed throughout the work are excellent black-and-white photographs and images—the majority taken by Garthwaite himself or derived from his collection of artifacts and memorabilia—depicting a vast array of subject matter spanning Iranian political history.

Although no overarching thesis binds the entire work, one theme that is pursued explicitly in the first six chapters is the evolution of elite representations of authority and successive efforts to establish and maintain political legitimacy. Garthwaite demonstrates how Iranian rulers from the Achaemenians to the Safavids used authenticating titles, language, and symbols to locate themselves in a lineage of rulership and to legitimate their rule in relation to previous dynasts, whether such a lineage or continuity existed—and especially when it did not. Garthwaite draws on Pamela Crossley’s concept of “simultaneous rulership” or multiple legitimacies to help explain the ways in which different representations or personae of the ruler—whether Persian, Islamic, Turko–Mongolian, or all of the above—were used to create legitimacy and enable rule over an ethnically and geographically diverse terrain. Illustrating with analyses of primary texts, inscriptions, and reliefs, and at a brisk but manageable pace, The Persians
shines as an introductory survey in its first six chapters, and Garthwaite’s passion for the material is palpable.

Some specialists of ancient through early modern Iranian history may lament the absence of certain features, institutions, or findings of recent research. For example, there is no mention of *qanats*, the craft guilds, or recent research on conversion during the 10th and 11th centuries. Nevertheless, the target audience will learn general information about irrigation, craft production, and conversion to Islam in Iran, and be introduced to many other significant features, institutions, and historical interpretations.

It is when we arrive at the modern period in chapters 7 and 8 that the continually accelerating pace of the text becomes problematic, and the challenges posed by the necessity for severe summarization and generalization are brought into sharp relief. That the multitude of cultural and social developments across diverse elements of Iranian society since the late 18th century could not possibly be covered with depth or complexity in less than 100 pages is a given, especially in a survey primarily focused on political elites. However even the political narrative loses cohesion in this sprint through the history of the Qajars, Pahlavis, and the Islamic Republic, which suffers from two interrelated problems. First is the lack of sufficient specific detail and interpretation essential to a comprehensible and nuanced account of pivotal events and political developments. The second problem is various observations and analogies that—in their brevity and lacking additional detail and explication—may confuse and/or mislead the nonspecialist reader.

For example, after stating that the formation of the Cossack Brigade in 1878 ended Qajar reliance on tribal levies, the brigade disappears from the narrative until 1920–21, when it appears suddenly to reassert governmental control in Tabriz and assist Reza Khan and Sayyid Zia in their coup d’etat. Without a few words regarding the structure, purpose, and uses of the brigade (that it was despised by many Iranian nationalists and constitutionalists as a blatant instrument and symbol of imperialism; its position during the Constitutional Revolution; and especially its role in 1909 when it was used to bombard the *majlis*, to arrest parliament members, assert martial law, and ultimately to engage the forces of nationalism marching on Tehran in battle before their defeat), the nonspecialist reader misses out on important dynamics of domestic and foreign policy during the late Qajar era and one of the basic problematics of Pahlavi legitimacy. The question, therefore, arises as to the efficacy of such a skeletal narrative and its utility as assigned reading on modern Iran. Moreover, Garthwaite’s rather unorthodox analogies between Ataturk and Khomeini, or Reza Shah and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani potentially might be entertaining and challenging for seasoned students of Iran and the Middle East to ponder and debate, but such associations will be confusing to readers who are just beginning to grasp the root ideologies and legacies of these seminal figures.

Similarly, in the twenty-two pages devoted to the Islamic Republic, Garthwaite lacks the time to describe the nature and extent of United States support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–88 or to mention related events such as Operation Praying Mantis (the largest U.S. naval operation since World War II, in which half the Iranian navy was sunk in a 24-hour period), the Downing of Iran Air flight 655 by the USS *Vincennes*, and the Iran–Contra scandal. Crucial aspects of Iran–U.S. relations and Iranian foreign policy subsequent to the war, and details regarding the Islamic Republic’s relations with Hezbollah and Israel, are also neglected. Without such critical background, it is difficult to explain the sense of anger many Iranians feel as a result of past U.S. actions and policies and the nationalist sentiments that they generate. The uninitiated will likely be unable to draw the link between the history of ancient Iran and the evolution of Iranian identity that Garthwaite eloquently describes in earlier chapters to the essences of anti-imperialism and independence that pervade contemporary Iranian nationalism. Without such detail, it is doubtful that the passing mention
of Iran’s “extreme ‘Great Satan’ rhetoric,” “support for terrorism,” and its inclusion in Bush’s “axis of evil” will be illuminating or meaningful.

The Persians could serve well as a core textbook for a ten- or fifteen-week survey of Iranian history. Gaps in coverage can become the subject of alternative readings and/or addressed in lectures and discussion. Selected chapters would also work very well as supplementary reading in courses on premodern Iran and ancient world civilizations. Although not comprehensive regarding the most recent scholarship, the annotated bibliography and suggestions for further reading are useful, and the maps, tables, and images cover many important rudiments of Iranian history.

DOI: 10.1017/S0020743806383298

LOIS BECK AND GUITI NASHAT, EDS., Women in Iran from 1800 to the Islamic Republic (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 2004). Pp. 301. $20.00 paper.

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The aim of this book is to shed light on Iranian women’s status and condition through a glance at their lives and activities from the 19th century to the present. It is a collection of ten essays and also contains a chronology and an introduction.

Guity Nashat analyzes the institution of marriage under the Qajars, arguing that religion, not the state, played the official role. The most common type of marriage, she argues, was the consanguineous one encouraged by the law of inheritance. The author affirms that, for poor families, marriage was the best survival strategy for their daughters. She also argues that some upper class women, especially those of the harem, managed to influence their powerful husbands. Shireen Mahdavi writes about the encounter between European women travelers and Iranian women under the Qajars. She underlines Europeans’ erroneous perceptions of Iranian women, who are often portrayed as passive and subordinated in travelers’ accounts. She argues that these accounts are marred by value judgments and that some women, especially in the court, were powerful while some others, who had a romantic vision of the West and had a Western model in mind, struggled for women’s literacy and emancipation.

Mansoureh Ettehadieh analyzes the emergence of the women’s movement during the Constitutional Revolution, arguing that women’s high illiteracy, their financial dependence on men, and the ambiguity of Islamic laws were among the factors impeding the expansion of the movement. Under Reza Shah, the women’s movement was placed under the control of the state. This finding, along with the politicization of women’s issues under the modernizing Pahlavi states, became the main obstacles to the movement’s development. This argument, however, is challenged by Mahnaz Afkhami, who praises the national and international activities of the official Women’s Organization of Iran (WOI), created in 1966 and led by Princess Ashraf, the Shah’s twin sister. Afkhami, who was the WOI general secretary between 1970 and 1978, mostly relies on her personal experience and information to describe the organization’s interactions with the royal court, the government, and the clergy. She thus presents WOI’s state feminism as the crystallization of the women’s movement in Iran and qualifies its leaders as the movement’s leaders. Despite the rich information provided, the contribution suffers from lack of critical arguments and often exaggerates the extent of WOI’s activities and popularity among ordinary women. Likewise, Haleh Esfandiari praises the progress of the women’s movement under the Pahlavis and the undertakings of women members of the Parliament and the Senate to improve the legal status of women. She also briefly discusses women members of the Islamic Parliament during the Iran–Iraq War and concludes that it
was thanks to women’s achievements in the 1960s and the 1970s that they could resist the regressions imposed by the Islamic republic, which wanted to send women back to domesticity.

Ziba Mir-Hosseini divides the current religious discourses on women into three categories: traditionalist, neotraditionalist, and modernist. Although gender equality and women’s rights are absent from the first discourse, the second is sensitive to gender debates and to secular and religious women’s criticisms of the shari’a’s patriarchal prejudice. The modernists, the author argues, advocate gender equality.

Two contributions deal with women’s participation in the labor force. Fatemeh Etemad Moghadam argues that, despite the increase in women’s education, for ideological reasons the Islamic regime recognizes their employment primarily in activities derived from female sexuality and reproductive labor, such as child raising and household labor. For Amir Mehryar, Gholamali Farjadi, and Mohammad Tabibian, the share of women in the labor force remained steady, with a slight rise in the three decades before the revolution, but declined in the 1980s, especially in rural areas, before rising again in the 1990s. Contrary to Etamad Moghadam, who stresses the Islamic regime’s segregation policies, these authors highlight cultural impediments toward middle class women’s participation in some sectors of the economy—considered by their families as unsuitable for women—to explain women’s low labor-force participation activity rate. They further argue that gender segregation policies in the aftermath of the revolution boosted women’s employment in the public sector. According to the authors, higher numbers of female university graduates will increase unemployment rates in the coming years, and to find employment, women must change their perceptions of suitable jobs.

The last two contributions concern rural and tribal women, who are much less studied than their urban counterparts. Erika Friedl and Lois Beck both write about changes and continuities in rural and tribal women’s perceptions. Government-launched literacy and birth-control campaigns, along with a market-oriented economy, have had important consequences in the lives of younger women, inspiring hope for women’s better future, despite persisting hardships.

Overall, the book lacks originality because most of the essays are revised versions of previously published materials. Moreover, the book does not provide a balanced and coherent picture of women’s lives, experiences, and struggles during the past two centuries as evidenced by the uncritical essays that deal with Mohammad Reza Shah’s period. Finally, it is not clear why two essays, often overlapping, are devoted to women’s low labor-force participation while the book contains no specific contribution that treats social and cultural spheres in which women’s presence is quite high. Despite these shortcomings and although this collection cannot be considered an original contribution to the field, it still is likely to be of interest to nonspecialists.

DOI: 10.1017/S0020743806383304


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When do we judge a revolution? At the moment of liberation, when one regime is toppled? With the foundation of the first new government, so often a hopeful but unstable effort? During the period when the former opposition consolidates its new role as state authority with the
tempting monopoly of state force? A generation later, when a new leadership and often a new regime have usurped the leadership role? During a period of reaction, or a period of renewal? After a week, a month, a year, one generation or several, or centuries? These are not idle questions for the student of revolution, as distinct from anticolonial liberation movements (no matter how inspiring or disappointing, whether American or Algerian) or political coups or popular overthrows of government, no matter how violent or benign. Revolutions, social and political movements that cohere a national population and challenge both the state and the naturalized order of society, do not happen often, and they are significant far beyond their national borders. Can we now judge the French Revolution a success or the Russian a failure? At what point did they definitively succeed or fail? At what point did we decide that we could adequately judge?

These questions are inextricable from Janet Afary and Kevin Anderson’s new book on *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution*. The authors take it as a given that the Iranian Revolution was not only a failure but a disaster, and they, therefore, are appalled that Michel Foucault wrote excitedly about it while it occurred, during 1978 and early 1979. The book is basically organized into two sections: the authors’ interpretive writings on Foucault’s work and an appendix that includes the first English-language collection of Foucault’s writings on the Iranian Revolution, along with a selection of his contemporary interlocutors and critics. For this appendix alone, the book is invaluable. Most of Foucault’s observations on events in Iran were originally published in the Italian newspaper *Corriere della Sera* and have been available in French in the collection *Dits et Écrits*, Vol. III, 1976–79 (Paris: Gallimard, 1994). However, this is the first effort to make them widely available in English.

Written as short, journalistic accounts of immediate events, the articles have a freshness and urgency that remains fascinating. Foucault himself believed he was observing the concrete manifestation of the “political myth” of revolutionary “collective will,” and he acknowledges that it is a shocking experience. “I thought that the collective will was like God, like the soul, something one would never encounter . . . Well, you have to salute it; it doesn’t happen every day” (p. 253). Foucault is overgeneralizing; even in 1978, there was factionalism and dissidence within the Iranian revolutionary movement. He has a point, though. Like the French and Russian Revolutions, the Iranian Revolution made manifest the success of a new radical ideology in forging national consensus to uproot an internal regime while challenging the existing social order. Like those other two great, tragic revolutions, the Iranian Revolution made widely relevant the hope and threat of its radical ideology, in this case political Islam. If the Iranian Revolution was doomed to fail its utopian promise, it also provided for a new form of revolutionary possibility. In this sense, events in Iran were fundamentally different from events in Nicaragua or Poland, the two national examples with which Afary and Anderson wish to make comparison. Foucault was right: the brief utopian incandescence of a new revolutionary movement does not happen every day.

Revolutions are miserable to live through, particularly once the glorious moment of popular liberation has been achieved and the revolutionaries must set themselves the task of both consolidating and dividing state power. This is Hannah Arendt’s theory of revolution: that the successful revolution must encompass both liberation and foundation and that foundation is actually the more difficult project. A social and political revolution must reconstitute effective governmental structures and social values, and the most dangerous temptation is always toward the limitless proof of pure revolutionary zeal. Thanks to Arendt’s analysis, we can recognize Foucault’s enthusiasm for the liberationist potential of the first stage of the Iranian Revolution during 1978 and also identify the extent to which the darkening tone of his writings during 1979 coincides with the failures of the second, state-founding stage, when the national coherence of the collective will began to give way to authoritarian internal repression sponsored by a faction of the clerical elite.
In their own analytical essays (which make up nearly two thirds of the book), Afary and Anderson are hugely critical of Foucault, not only for his Iran writings but for his poststructural theories in general. Characterizing him as a romantic antimodernist with orientalizing tendencies, they link Foucault’s sympathy for the mass popular uprising that overthrew the autocratic regime in Iran with his analysis of the intersections of sexual and political culture in the Athenian polis, first published in France in 1984 and then in English as *The Use of Pleasure, Volume 2 of The History of Sexuality* (New York: Vintage, 1985). Inexplicably, the authors get the title wrong (they add an extra s), but their interpretation is disconcerting in other ways as well. Afary and Anderson describe Foucault as endorsing the rigidly hierarchical nature of Athenian sexual relations while ignoring the problem of inequality and suggest that nostalgia for premodern forms of (sexual) authority carried over into enthusiasm for Iran’s new form of (theocratic) oriental despotism. This is an odd misreading of Foucault’s argument. *The Use of Pleasure* is a deconstruction of political subjectivity, sexual objectification, and democratic citizenship—an analysis of the process through which the structured inequality of Athenian male same-sex erotic relations was intended to transform itself into *philia*, the bonded mutual friendship of democratic equals. This two-stage evolution was especially difficult for the objectified partner, and like the two-part dynamic of revolution itself, it was a process that did not always succeed. Foucault does understand this as a fraught process, as evidenced even in his chapter titles. Yet, Afary and Anderson insist on a static reading, whether of Athenian sexual politics (trapped in inequality) or of the Iranian Revolution (fixed as a failed model of Islamic repression). Other readers can find that the same material offers critical insights into the dynamics of informal forms of power, whether on the street or in more intimate, private spaces.

It is a testament to the profundity of both the Iranian Revolution and Foucault’s social theory that they are open to emphatically different interpretations. Afary and Anderson have done an important service to the scholarly community by publishing this book. Foucault’s essays on the Iranian Revolution are critical reading for anyone interested in Foucault’s politics, the general question of revolution, or the specific subject of Iran. Despite our differences of interpretation, I welcome Afary and Anderson’s important contribution to the debates on these subjects, which will continue for some time to come.

DOI: 10.1017/S0020743806383316


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This invaluable analysis of al-Qa’ida and its milieu, termed the “global Salafi jihad” (p. 61), claims the unique distinction of being an interdisciplinary study written by a retired Central Intelligence Agency case officer, a political sociologist, and a forensic psychiatrist, all of whom happen to be the same individual. On the strength of this research, Marc Sageman has already become a familiar presence at Washington, D.C., policy conferences. Even so, his work shows more commitment to the search for understanding than the marketing of ideas and, accordingly, has left little impression on public debate. The dense text lacks flair.

Sageman distinguishes Salafi jihad from “traditional” defensive jihad against outsiders. The Salafi version involves a violent struggle to replace a government within the Muslim world with a utopian Islamic regime. The global Salafi jihad in turn transfers this war to the “far enemy,” the ostensibly all-powerful non-Muslim ally and patron of the domestic “near enemy” (p. 44). This distinction bounds the work. Out of the biographies of individual mujahedin
involved in terrorist attacks against Western powers such as the United States and France, Sageman builds up a pointillist portrait of the global Salafi jihad.

From these points and their connecting lines emerge novel and potent findings. Individuals rarely if ever join the jihad singly or in response to a recruiter’s appeal but typically start by forming a clique of like-minded individuals who are not mujahedin. This “bunch of guys” usually comes together outside of its members’ countries of origin and progressively develops into an alienated, “disembedded” microsociety with its own norms and values (pp. 101, 147). Frequenting a radical mosque (and, we gather, consuming Internet propaganda) helps to instill a new group identity based on a vicarious “common bond of victimhood based on Islam” (p. 116). Only then, if they happen to meet a well-connected person, may the members of the small group travel abroad to a training camp in hopes of joining the elite team. Should the group pass muster, its members pledge their loyalty and depart as a fully fledged terrorist cell.

The loss of Afghanistan’s camps after 2001 left new cells to mobilize themselves and launch attacks within countries such as Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Indonesia, which had until then been sanctuaries. A mention of the Casablanca bombings of May 2003 as a sign of things to come appears prescient in light of subsequent multiple bomb attacks in Saudi Arabia, Spain, Egypt, and Britain. So, too, does a warning that Britain, long a terrorist sanctuary, is “at great risk of terrorist attacks now that access to other targets is denied” (p. 176).

Joining is, therefore, gradual and starts not with uncontained hatred but with dislocation, loneliness, disappointment, and the desire to belong. The insight goes a long way toward explaining how expatriates, university students, and members of France’s excluded Muslim minority have come to be so heavily represented in the jihad. Sageman identifies a handful of earlier studies documenting analogous patterns of joining cult and terrorist groups. Another echo also comes to mind: Norman Cohn’s classic 1957 study, *The Pursuit of the Millennium,* which describes multiple outbursts of messianic violence in late medieval Europe among groups of peasants displaced from their original social context in the countryside to the margins of cities.

Sageman’s first chapter traces the ideological course of the Salafi jihad through the written works of Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam al-Faraj, Osama bin Laden, and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Chapter 2 reconstructs the history of the movement in Egypt and its subsequent development into the global Salafi jihad while its leaders were exiled to Sudan and Afghanistan during the 1990s. Here, the author emphasizes the predominantly Egyptian leadership of the movement.

Chapter 3 profiles the 172 mujahedin of whom something could be known at the time of publication: their origins, socioeconomic standing, education, religiosity as youth, and marital status. These traits vary across the different regions of the network, which breaks down into four clusters, each almost entirely independent of the others and all originating in distinct places and times from the late 1980s through the 1990s. (War and exile are recurring circumstances.) We are also introduced to the above-described conditions of social isolation under which a large majority of the individuals under study joined the jihad. To Sageman’s discomfort, much of this information arises from the pages of the *New York Times, Le Monde,* and *Der Spiegel.* Notwithstanding the author’s disclaimer that reporters’ fascination with leaders and unusual cases may have slanted the evidentiary base, the study stands as something of a monument to the value of investigative journalism.

Chapter 4 explores the three typical stages of joining the jihad through social clique, mosque, and training camp, and illustrates the process with two case studies, one of which is also described in the 9/11 Commission Report. The reader may nevertheless be surprised to re-discover as a group many figures already familiar as individuals. Chapter 5 offers a theoretical perspective on the topology of the jihad network, identifying some important differences between the relatively fragile Southeast Asian cluster and the other, stronger three clusters.
Some conclusions follow on how intelligence and law enforcement can most effectively disrupt the system at its weak points, particularly the “human bridges” that connect incipient cells to the larger network (p. 178).

The volume is written straightforwardly and without excessive jargon. Advanced undergraduates should find it accessible. More aggressive editing might have proven beneficial in places, especially where Sageman dwells on correcting the record in matters related to his experiences in government or psychiatry.

A major shortcoming in the book as published is the absence of the data set that underpins its conclusions. An appendix provides the names, aliases, and dates and places of birth of the 172 terrorists, but not where and when each of the future mujahedin joined a clique, what mosques they attended, whom they knew, and where and when they went to join the jihad. A visual depiction of the network is printed too small to label the nodes (i.e., the individuals). This information ought to appear in any future edition, or at the publisher’s Website.

DOI: 10.1017/S0020743806383328

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The author argues that the transnational Islamic terrorist organization al-Qa’ida set up its base in Bosnia–Herzegovina during the war there (1992–95) and afterward used it to infiltrate the Western world and carry out terrorist attacks. In Kohlmann’s view, Bosnia was extremely important for al-Qa’ida’s activities in the West.

One can divide the book into two parts, which together make a coherent whole. In the first part (chapters 1–7), Kohlmann stresses that Bosnia provided (1) safe haven for the Arabs who in the 1980s had fought Soviet troops in Afghanistan and who later, as members of al-Qa’ida, strove to overthrow “non-Islamic” regimes in their countries of origin and were consequently persecuted by those regimes; and (2) a place for military training and indoctrination of new recruits of al-Qa’ida coming from Western Europe (Muslim immigrants and native converts to Islam), who were extremely irritated due to Serbian massacres of their Bosnian coreligionists and inaction of the West. Both groups of Muslims effectively fought on the Bosnian government’s (predominantly Muslim) side.

In the second part (chapters 8 and 9), the author emphasizes that, after the war, al-Qa’ida used Bosnia to bridge the land gap between the Middle East and the Western world and spread its sleeper-cell terrorist network across the latter. Finally, the author points out that, despite American warnings, for a long time the Bosnian authorities tolerated the postwar presence of foreign Islamic fighters.

Kohlmann provides enough evidence to prove that, during the war, there was a strong presence of foreign Islamic fighters in Bosnia. However, he underestimates a possibility that at least a part of the Arab–Afghans became extremely hostile to the West and, therefore, eager to retaliate due to the scandalous policy of Western countries. Namely, he is consistently stressing their fanaticism and somehow irrational hatred of the West. In addition, one can hardly ascertain the approximate number of foreign Islamic fighters as the author mentions (explicitly or implicitly) considerably different numbers, ranging from 800 to 5,000.

As the author carefully follows postwar activities of a considerable number of al-Qa’ida’s members and traces their connections to Bosnia, it seems that the foreign Islamists’ network in Bosnia provided a logistical base for terrorist activities in the West, at least to a certain
extent. Moreover, Kohlmann persuasively points out the importance of the Bosnian War for al-Qa’ida’s recruitment because he proves that, due to the conflict, radical Islamic ideologues have been able to persuade many of the world’s Muslims to follow their instructions. On the contrary, it seems that the author excessively argues ad hominem when he puts almost all the blame for tolerance of the postwar presence of foreign Islamists in Bosnia on the late Bosnian president Izetbegovic; most Bosnian Muslims appreciated the wartime help of their foreign Islamic allies.

As for sources, Kohlmann is relying almost exclusively on radical Islamists’ publications, journalistic articles, and official documents regarding prosecution of terrorists in the West. Given the nature of his research topic, this is appropriate. The book improves our knowledge of foreign Islamic activities in Bosnia as it definitely rejects the quite often expressed view (e.g., in Yossef Bodansky’s *Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America*) that, during and after the Bosnian War, intelligence and terrorism operations in the country were under control of Iranian agents. The author plausibly asserts that the game was led by the Arab Sunni radicals who were probably hostile to Shi’i Muslims.

More importantly, Kohlmann’s work should be regarded as a major contribution to the ongoing discussion concerning measures that ought to be taken with regard to the acute problem of Islamic terrorism. It tells us that the best way to deal with militant Islam is the political one, as Bosnia is proof that radical Islam has been decisively fed by the regional conflicts involving unjust treatment of Muslims. As the author stresses, al-Qa’ida was allowed (and indeed, invited) to come to Bosnia due to the failure of the West to prevent genocide against the Bosnian Muslims. (It seems contradictory that Kohlmann criticizes the Clinton administration’s tacit approval of Islamic shipments of weapons to Bosnia aimed at helping the Bosnian Muslims.) Therefore, the book is strongly recommended to the world’s statesmen to inform them that they should solve the protracted conflicts in Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir, and Xinjiang in a just way. Of course, specialists in Islamic terrorism should read the book, too.

However, the book can benefit from some additional doctrinal clarifications. For example, Kohlmann emphasizes that the foreign Islamists operating in Bosnia “dedicated their lives to the reestablishment of the *khalifah* (‘Muslim empire’) lost by the Ottomans” (p. 137). Thus, he is implicitly warning a reader (at least a less-informed one) that the Islamists pursued aggressive territorial and political aims. However, from the 18th century on, the Ottoman sultans regarded themselves as caliphs merely in terms of spiritual leadership of the Muslims, thereby trying to promote the ideal of Pan-Islamic unity.

Finally, mention should be made of the fact that there are numerous factual errors in the book. For example, Kohlmann consistently refers to the Bosnian conflict as “civil war,” although according to international law, it has been established that there was (also) aggression of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as Croatia against Bosnia–Herzegovina. Furthermore, there are some errors concerning events (e.g., the Washington Accord) and names (Franco Tudjman, Novni Travnik).

DOI: 10.1017/S002074380638333X


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Only three years ago, hardly anyone outside the circles of Middle East specialists and spook agencies had heard of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Then America’s mishandling of the aftermath
of its “victory” over Saddam Hussein catapulted al-Zarqawi to the top of the most-wanted list of the world’s most dangerous villains and terror masters.

Al-Zarqawi made his way to the front pages by brutally beheading, with his own sword, Western as well as Muslim hostages taken in Iraq. His gruesome actions over the past two years were captured on videotapes by jihadists boasting about their terror, footage that proved to be popular either on the Al Jazeera satellite network or on CDs sold openly in street markets in Iraq and neighboring countries.

Little was known about the new guru of terror who adopted the name of Abu Musab, a 7th-century Islamic warrior who became the patron saint of jihadists and suicide bombers. His published profiles were incomplete, and the analysis was inaccurate or based on fanciful assumptions, rumors, and isolated intelligence and police reports. Thus, when Jean-Charles Brisard and his research partner, Damien Martinez, began to trace the roots of al-Zarqawi and his transformation from a local, petty criminal in Jordan into America’s number-one enemy in Iraq, they ended with a most comprehensive study, not only of the notorious terrorist but also of the complex phenomenon of a still-evolving Arab/Islamic terror network affiliated to al-Qa’ida.

Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaeda is perhaps the most researched and valuable reference on al-Zarqawi existing today. It provides a unique glimpse into the spiderweb world of al-Qa’ida and explicates how fundamentalist Wahhabi evangelist priests can brainwash desperate young men into the path of jihadists’ violence.

The authors manage to outdo others in examining a set of complex factors that collectively helped to create one of the deadliest threats facing the civilized world today—factors far more complicated than the oversimplifications offered by apologists for Islamic fundamentalism (i.e., the injustice done to the Palestinians and ill treatment of Muslims) or by anti-American leftist intellectuals (i.e., economic and social deprivation and American backing of undemocratic regimes).

The book accurately traces the birth, childhood environment, family origins, and tribal links of Ahmad Fadil al-Khalailah (also listing other used names). Born in Zarqa, Jordan, he underwent a transformation while in prison, making it into his little empire, and then went to Afghanistan, where Osama Bin Laden and his dangerous ideologue, Ayman al-Zawahiri, were pulling the jihadists’ strings. Throughout, the book gives an insightful analysis of how the splinter network of terror came to being.

Despite its dry language and lack of color, the book benefits from a factual narration style that is based on documents, interviews, and eyewitness accounts and testimonies. Hence, this scholarly work provides specialists and journalists with immeasurable help in explaining to nonspecialist readers how the hardened terrorist, who does not bat an eyelid as he cuts off men’s heads, is a devout Muslim with his own intellectual, although slanted, understanding of the Qur’an. Putting testimonies into context is extremely useful for journalists and academics explaining to readers, viewers, and students how and why al-Zarqawi, as well as his spiritual guides and followers, is more threatening to nonfundamentalist Muslims than he is to Westerners.

Ironically, it was America’s own blunders in post-Saddam Iraq that gave al-Zarqawi the chance to turn his decade-old fantasies of fighting his own crusade (and overtaking al-Qa’ida) into practical reality. When al-Zarqawi completed his spiritual, physical, and intellectual transformation from a disturbed teenager into an Islamic fundamentalist seeking conquest by the sword, the book reveals, he arrived in Afghanistan rather late. The Soviet army had already pulled out and the mujahedin had established an Islamic regime, depriving him of the taste of a real fight and keeping him insignificant compared with bin Laden. Only when the Americans made their daft decision to disband the Iraqi army did al-Zarqawi get his chance to establish a deadly network in Iraq. Furthermore, the rise to power of Shi’a groups, a worse enemy than
America and Israel in al-Zarqawi’s belief system, enabled him to recruit angry Sunni men to the cause. The detailed pages on al-Zarqawi’s leadership qualities and recruiting skills while in Jordanian prisons provide a useful magnifying lens to understand his easy success in post-Saddam Iraq. The book also documents follies committed not just by the Bush administration but by other governments as well. One case in point is King Abdullah’s ill-advised pardoning of prisoners, including al-Zarqawi, as a generous gesture to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Although the book is an essential reference for academics, journalists, and even security analysts (the index provides a “who’s who” of Islamist terrorists), it lacks color or gripping story lines to be enjoyed by the general public. Furthermore, I found grouping all footnotes at the end of the book (just before the index) tiresome and irritating. Journalists and commentators prefer footnotes on the same page for easy access and integrating them as references or quotes in their reports. Still, the book is the most valuable read I have come across on the subject in years. What I find fascinating, after finishing the book, is how accurately the preface stated: “Zarqawi is neither a tool of Saddam Hussein, as the Americans have claimed, nor the henchman of Osama Bin Laden, but an extremist exceptionally favored by circumstances” (p. xiv).