BOOK REVIEWS


REVIEWED BY AMANEY JAMAL, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

*Islamic Politics in Palestine* charts the evolution of political Islam’s responses to the changing political environment in Palestine from the 1920s through the mid 1990s. Through extensive fieldwork based on oral evidence, ethnographic interviews, and an impressive compilation of primary source material, Milton-Edwards provides her readers with perhaps the most detailed, comprehensive, and informative account of Palestinian Islamic politics in recent years.

There are four popular suppositions about the current wave of Islamism that the author seeks to refute or modify. The first is that the Islamic movement in Palestine is essentially “fundamentalist” and terrorist; second, that politically active Muslims in Palestine belong to one monolithic group; third, that the decline of Arab secularism triggered the rise of political Islam; and fourth, “that the strategy of the contemporary Islamist groups in Palestine has been solely dedicated to armed struggle as the means to achieve its political objectives.” Milton-Edwards attempts to debunk these four widely held assumptions about political Islam as she examines a common question throughout her book: “how does political Islam in Palestine respond to new and changing political developments?” She also examines existing explanations of political Islam’s mounting success in Palestine and concludes that current formulations do not fully explain its rise and waning. She points to existing hypotheses, such as the “post-1967 crisis of identity” explanation, that may explain the surge in support for Islamic politics in Palestine. Her primary emphasis, however, is on “resurgence theory,” which contends that the recent wave of Islamism is a response to the impact of Western colonialism and capitalism in the region. She argues that the theory is applicable in some cases, but not in all.

The book begins with an examination of Palestinian political resistance under British rule in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The author explores how Islam influenced political discourse and activity against Zionism and colonialism during the revolt of 1936–39, and how Islam was used as a symbol of national unity. Resistance activity based on Islamic convictions was championed by Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, who ultimately treated the Palestinian national struggle as an Islamic religious one. This is in contrast to how al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni viewed the national struggle at the time. Al-Husayni had developed strong relations with the British colonial apparatus, and in fact it was through their consent that he was named mufti of Jerusalem. The visions of al-Qassam and al-Husayni, in terms of the Islamic nature of resistance, were somewhat different: al-Qassam utilized political Islam as part of his platform of resistance and opposition, whereas al-Husayni drew on Islam as a means of legitimizing his rule.

The book then examines the political events following the 1948 war. Milton-Edwards argues that because the Jordanian regime was more inclusive in its tactics vis-à-vis the Ikhwan, the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank was less “politically radical” than its counterpart in Gaza. The Islamists in Gaza adopted a more reactionary stance against secular politics because of the Egyptian regime’s intolerance of Islamic politics. Although the Islamic movements in
both Gaza and the West Bank were influenced by an Islamic vision of resistance, they adopted different strategies and ideologies. In this way, Milton-Edwards successfully refutes the assumption that Islamic revival is characterized in all cases by the same ideologies and strategies. Milton-Edwards then details the events leading to the Palestinian Intifada and the role the Islamists played. With great precision, she charts the evolution of the Ikwan in Gaza from a socio-political movement to its formation of Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement. For years, the Ikwan in Gaza gained widespread popularity through its social policies advanced through the Mujama, the Islamic Congress, headed by Shaykh Ahmad Yassin. During the Intifada, and with the birth of Hamas and its military wing, the 'Izz ad-Din al-Qassam brigade, Hamas became a notable force with which both Israel and the PLO had to contend. Threatened by Hamas’s widespread popularity during the Intifada, Israel and the PLO opted to reach a preliminary peace agreement that resulted in the Oslo Peace Accords, signed in 1993. With much of its energy behind its military tactics, Hamas was unable to deal with the new political realities facing the future of Palestine. On the one hand, Hamas was committed to its opposition of Israeli occupation over all of Palestine. On the other, Hamas sought to remain a viable political and social force within Palestinian society. Hamas’s ability to retain its popular position depended on its willingness to run in the Palestinian elections of 1996. Milton-Edwards explains that had Hamas run in the elections, it would have gained popular legitimacy as an opposition movement. Participation in the elections, however, would also have meant de facto recognition of the Oslo Accords, which Hamas vehemently opposed. Ultimately, Hamas did not run in the Palestinian elections and, as a result, lost much of the popular support it had enjoyed during the Intifada.

Although Islamic Politics in Palestine adds empirically to our understanding of political Islam, it does not engage relevant social-science literature. This is unfortunate, because this would could have contributed to our theoretical understanding of such phenomena as political parties, civil society, social movements, revolutions, and mass mobilization. In addition, the book lacks analytical rigor. The four major assumptions about political Islam that Milton-Edwards sets out to refute in the beginning of her book are less explicitly addressed in the body of the book. The book does not systematically answer her concerns about the applicability of resurgence theory to the study of political Islam in Palestine. The book also fails to provide systematic support for some of the points the author raises. For example, Milton-Edwards does not adequately explain her argument that political Islam is not a response to the failure of the “isms”: socialism, Pan-Arabism, nationalism, and secularism. She makes a strong case that political Islam existed prior to the “isms.” However, here again the evidence is not systematically presented, so the reader can come away still believing that a strong inverse correlation exists between the success of secularism and that of political Islam.

Placing these concerns aside, Milton-Edwards does shed important light on the study of political Islam and Palestinian politics more generally. Her work is admirably researched and provides a wealth of information on political Islam in Palestine. It is an important book for any student examining political Islam in Palestine.


REVIEWED BY KATHRYN CAMP, Department of History, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

In The Fortress of Faith: The Attitudes Towards Muslims in Fifteenth Century Spain, Ana Echevarría presents a study of four mid-15th-century texts and argues that their polemical tone
toward the Muslim world was inspired by contemporary historical events and revealed a Christian Spain preparing itself to end Muslim rule on the Iberian Peninsula. She argues that the events of 1450–70 are key to understanding Fernando and Isabel’s renewed march against Granada in 1474 and that ecclesiastical literature of this time—as a manifestation of a “frontier church”—can provide a glimpse of the ideas common at court and among the clergy. At the center of her book are the works of three theologians (Juan de Segovia, Alonso de Espina, and Juan de Torquemada) and one layman (the Aragonese Pedro de Cavallería)—all written between 1450 and 1461—and Echevarría juxtaposes these texts with a wide selection of similar treatises written in Spain and elsewhere since the Muslim invasion of Iberia in 711. For each of her four primary texts, she provides the historical context of the author’s life as well as an analysis of each work’s style, sources, symbolism, and mode of argumentation against Islam (which, in general, involved allegations about the illegitimacy of the Muslim Prophet, holy text, or tenets). She then compares the views of these authors with the legal norms governing interactions among Muslims, Christians, and Jews in 15th-century Spain and concludes that both reveal an “evolution towards intolerance and violence which was common to the society and its rulers” and that impelled the eventually successful conquest of Granada.

In this revision of her doctoral thesis, Echevarría contributes to the growing literature that seeks to elucidate the nature and origin of intolerance in medieval Europe and to explain the institutional embrace of such intolerance in medieval and early modern Spain (i.e., the Inquisition, royal expulsions of religious minorities, etc.). Her analysis provides several possible approaches to this problem. First, she points out that periods of political crisis can deepen pre-existing social and religious rifts. The mid-15th century saw the end of the division within the papacy (the conciliarist controversy), the beginning of strife in Spain between the nobles and the crown, and the worrying fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans in the east. As a result, Echevarría argues, this period was characterized not only by religious polemic but also by incidents of violence against Jews and Muslims throughout the third quarter of the century, perhaps as different parties sought scapegoats and tensions rose throughout Spain. Second, two of her four authors are of *converso* (converted Jewish) origin, and their critiques of Islam and Judaism raise questions about the ways in which their polemical views were, in fact, attempts to protect their own marginal position. Third, the weakening of Muslim political and territorial power in the Spanish peninsula after the 13th century meant reduced Christian engagement with Muslims as intellectual adversaries and a heightening of religious rhetoric. Her authors write about Islam almost exclusively to an educated Christian audience of the court and upper clergy in order to convince them to engage in crusade against Islam or to shore up their own Christian faith in the face of external (Muslim or Jewish) threats. They often employed military imagery and metaphor—for example, Alonso de Espina entitled his work “The Fortress of Faith” and described Christian virtues as protective armor—to drive home their arguments. Echevarría suggests that such imagery, as well as their complete refusal to attribute any degree of legitimacy to Islam, was only appropriate for their clearly partisan audience and indicated a lack of intellectual engagement with any practicing Muslims.

Echevarría ably illustrates these authors’ intolerance toward Islam and the uncompromising quality of their stance against it, but its connection with the war on Granada is not immediately as clear. Such passion and prejudice did not characterize all the writing of 15th century Spain—for example, the historical and literary ballads of the frontier produced during the Spanish Reconquest. Though these frontier romances clearly embrace a belligerent ideal, they reveal (according to Maria Soledad Carrasco Urgoiti and Angus MacKay) a willingness both to view events from a Muslim standpoint and to see Muslim actions as praiseworthy within a chivalric context. They do not celebrate political or religious tolerance, but they do contain elements of open-mindedness that are missing entirely from—and perhaps unavailable to—Echevarría’s theological writers. She points out that it is unlikely that Castilian nobles, who urged Enrique
IV and his successors Fernando and Isabel to make war on Granada, were reading these theologians. However, they certainly read (or heard) the less hostile frontier ballads describing the clash of equals in chivalric conflict, and this suggests that intolerance was not necessarily a prerequisite to their willingness to fight the Nasrids of Granada.

Echevarría also addresses the practice of intolerance, embodied in the law, which she argues mirrored the theologians’ theorizing and reveals a “new view of the Christian–Muslim relationship,” one notably more negative than that of earlier centuries. Using the Siete Partidas (Alfonso X’s 13th-century legal compilation), she describes the ways Iberian law segregated Jews and mudejares (subject Muslims) and made them second-class citizens (for example, they were forbidden to testify against Christians and required to wear identifying clothing). The provisions of the Siete Partidas were unevenly enforced, but Echevarría describes the reissue in 1412 of the laws affecting religious minorities (by the young Juan II’s regent) followed by aristocratic demands in 1465 that Enrique IV enforce these laws.

Her interpretation seems to be vindicated by the instances of violence toward Muslims and Jews in the mid-15th century (in Toledo, Cordoba, and Valencia) and the various local ordinances mandating special dress for these groups or denying them specific occupations (such as tax collector), but her claims for the rise of a new and general intolerance may in fact be too broad. David Nirenberg, in his study of inter-ethnic violence in 14th century Aragon and France, has suggested that both intolerant and tolerant discourses about minority groups co-exist within any community and are subject to constant negotiation by local inhabitants according to specific historical circumstances. The existence of these restrictive laws against Jews and Muslims reveal an intolerant discourse. But the fact that they consistently fell into disuse—for example, the Cortes of Ocaña complained in 1469 that the provisions of 1465 still were not being enforced—suggests the presence of a countervailing and more tolerant attitude. To determine the experiences of the mudejares in the towns of mid-15th-century Spain requires the examination of local sources. Mary Halavais, in her dissertation about 15th and 16th century Teruel (in Aragon), finds a strong pattern of social and economic interdependence between Muslims and Christians in the 15th century. She suggests that Muslims felt confident enough of fair treatment by local justices that they usually turned to them for relief in disputes rather than appealing to the crown, and that in fact local authorities later worked to protect some Muslims and Jews from the Inquisition. This may or may not have been the case in other parts of Spain, but only the examination of local sources—an ongoing project—can reveal the continually negotiated balance between tolerance and intolerance.

Despite these issues, this book, with its broadly ranging apprehension of medieval polemical treatises, provides a suggestive analysis of the intellectual mood on the peninsula prior to the final conquest of Granada and of the course of intolerance in 15th-century Spain. It is nicely presented, though it could have done with a little more copyediting attention than it received. For example, the reader should be aware that references to the appendixes are misnumbered in the text.


REVIEWED BY MARK N. KATZ, Department of Public and International Affairs, George Mason University, Fairfax, Va.

Over the past several decades, many scholars have attempted to develop a general theory explaining the causes and consequences of revolution. Some of the most notable of these scholars
are Crane Brinton, Barrington Moore, Theda Skocpol, and Jack Goldstone. Their theories—as well as those of others—continue to be actively debated even though they were published many years, or even decades, ago.

One of the characteristics of these “classic” studies is that they base their theories on the “great” revolutions—usually the French, Russian, and Chinese, plus a handful of others. The problem with this, as many have pointed out, is that theories based on these earlier revolutions in relatively large countries do not adequately explain the causes and consequences of more contemporary revolutions in the countries of the developing world. In recent years, several scholars, including John Foran, Jeff Paige, Jeff Goodwin, and (in his most recent work) Jack Goldstone, have developed theories seeking to explain modern revolutions in the developing world through an examination of them and not the “great” revolutions of the past.

Misagh Parsa is very much a member of this newer school of thought. His theory of revolution is based on relatively recent instances of it in three developing countries: Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines. The questions that Parsa seeks to answer in this book are: why did “social” revolution, which completely overturned the existing order, occur in Iran and Nicaragua, while only “political” revolution, in which the elite retained control, take place in the Philippines?

Basically, Parsa sees both the occurrence of revolution and its outcome as the result of the relations of four groups—students, clergy, workers, and capitalists—with one another and with the state. Parsa views university students in the developing world as “relentless revolutionaries” who want to transform their societies completely, but who cannot do so on their own.

He views the clergy as “actors with relative impunity” who control a space—whether it be mosque or church—that even authoritarian governments in the developing world have been loath to infringe upon. If they choose, the clergy can greatly facilitate mobilization against the regime by allowing the opposition access to this space. Doing this (or not) can also put the clergy in a strong position to determine which group actually comes to power if the old regime is overthrown.

Parsa sees workers as “rebels with dual targets” because they have both political and economic goals. They seek satisfaction of their political goals from the state and of their economic goals from their employers. In countries where the state plays little more than a regulative role in the economy, the principal employers are private capitalists. But in countries where the state controls much of the economy (as did the Shah’s government due to its ownership of Iran’s vast oil wealth and pursuit of ambitious state-sponsored development projects), the principal employer is the state. In the latter case, then, worker opposition to the state is much more intense than in the former.

Parsa views the fourth group, capitalists, as “reluctant rebels.” Their participation in an opposition coalition is crucial for determining whether a revolution will succeed. The capitalists will not join a revolution if they fear that the regime’s other opponents (such as students and workers) are extremely radical and opposed not just to the regime, but also to the capitalists. Parsa argues that the capitalists are more likely to join the opposition when the regime controls much of the economy, thereby thwarting this class’s aspirations.

Like other theories of revolution, Parsa’s is open to challenge. To begin with, even assuming that Parsa’s theory explains the causes and consequences of revolution in the three cases he examines, is his theory valid for other revolutions? It is impossible to answer this question definitively until someone attempts to apply Parsa’s theory to other cases. There is, however, an alternative theory that may explain the outcomes of the three cases he does examine.

Parsa’s two cases of “social” revolution occurred in 1979, while his one case of “political” revolution occurred in 1986. The Carter administration was in office in the United States in 1979, while the Reagan administration was in office in 1986. The Carter administration did little or nothing to assist the moderate opposition in Iran and Nicaragua, while the Reagan administration intervened decisively on behalf of the moderates in the Philippines. It is change
in American foreign policy, then, and not the relations of Parsa’s four groups with one another and the old regime, that may better explain the outcomes of these three revolutions.

Whether this alternative theory has superior explanatory power than Parsa’s would require a lengthy study to examine—which may or may not prove conclusive. But Parsa himself appears to cast doubt on the validity of his own theory. After devoting the bulk of the book to examining the role played by students, the clergy, workers, and capitalists in his three revolutions, he suggests at the end that other factors played a decisive role in determining their outcomes. These include “the effectiveness of the military and the solidarity structures of the armed forces (p. 277); “external forces” (pp. 277–78); whether free elections were held (pp. 284–85); and “the leadership of revolutionary challengers” (p. 289).

If these other factors are so important, then they should have been given as much—or perhaps more—attention in Parsa’s theory than the ones on which he based his analysis. All this said, however, it must be emphasized that Parsa has put forward an important new theory of revolution—one that is important enough to be extended, tested, debated, criticized, and, most of all, taken into account by others.


REVIEWED BY ARTHUR BUEHLER, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge

This edited volume, the outcome of a conference held in 1996 in Istanbul, consists of seventeen articles, sixteen of which concern ‘Ali-oriented communities in the Middle East. Ten of the articles are focused on Alevis in Turkey, and the others discuss Ahl-i Haqq studies, the Druze, and the Alawites of Syria. The reader is immediately drawn to the gorgeous, vividly colorful artwork on both covers and the high-quality glossy paper used in this volume, both of which are rare in academic books published in the West. This book will be of interest mainly to Islamicists who are interested in ‘Ali-oriented religions, even though Tord Olsson’s brief Epilogue is methodologically encompassing for a wider history of religions audience. Libraries should have it in their collections.

Ire`ne Me´likoff, the doyenne of Bektashi studies, introduces the volume with an article that nuances the differences between Bektashis, who have tended to be settled, and the Kızılbash, who have led nomadic lifestyles. As she points out, the Bektashis and Alevis have the same origin and both continue to worship Hajji Bektash Wali, even though Bektashis were influenced by the Balkan cultures and the Alevis have been influenced by the cultures of eastern Anatolia.

Karin Vorhoff has provided a splendid overview of Alevi–Bektashi publications, a useful synopsis of the current state of research, and a detailed bibliography. Her article provides an excellent guide to the boom in Alevi publications in Turkey, a driving force behind the “Alevi revival.” A common thrust of her article, that of David Shankland (“Anthropology and Ethnicity: The Place of Ethnography in the New Alevi Movement”), and Olsson’s Epilogue is that Alevi publications should not be judged on academic or Sunni intellectual standards. Instead, their unique value in communicating the evolution of modern Alevism in all its diversity should be appreciated. In the Epilogue, Olsson initiates a stimulating discussion concerning the Alevi “scripturalization process.”

Fuat Bozkurt clarifies the problems Alevis are facing as they migrate from rural areas to urban centers. The modifications that Alevism is forced to undergo, predominantly in its ritual practices, he argues, is contributing to an erosion of Alevism as it becomes “absorbed into
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Sunni doctrine” (p. 93). He suggests that compulsory religious education in government schools and the construction of mosques in Alevi villages be stopped so that the “erosion of Alevism” (p. 92) can be minimized. Faruk Bıˆlıˆcıˆ and Rus¸en C¸ akir both contextualize Alevi–Bektashis in the larger Sunni Islamist milieu of modern Turkey. These two articles seek to demonstrate the contours of minority Alevi political struggles (roughly 20% of the population in Turkey).

The second part of the book brings together ‘‘Ali-oriented religions outside Turkey. İlber Ortaylı briefly discusses the Dönme, the Muslim followers of Sabbetai Zevi (although this is not an ‘‘Ali-oriented group). It is difficult to understand how one could write on this subject without at least mentioning, if not incorporating, the seminal insights contained in the magisterial work of Gershom Scholem (Sabbetai Zevi). Jean During, the well-known French ethnomusicologist, provides a brief overview of Ahl-i Haqq studies. He reviews the canonical texts of the tradition and Iranian scholarship before discussing more recent Ahl-i Haqq perceptions of themselves in the context of mainstream Islam. There is a short discussion of “original” Ahl-i Haqq doctrines. Particularly appreciated is his critical appraisal and review of Ahl-i Haqq scholarship until 1990. Since that time, a few noteworthy books have appeared (Abu Ishaq Firuzabadi, al-Ishara ila madhhab Ahl-I haqq [Cairo: Wizarat al-Awqaf, 1999]; Muhammad ‘Ali Sultan, Qiyam wa-nuzhat-i ‘alawiyan-i Zagrus [Kirmanshah: Nashr-i Suha, 1997]; and a major compendium of poetry in Persian and Kurdish, Siddiq Safizadah Burahkah, Danishnamah-i namavar-i Yaristan [Tehran: Hirmand, 1997]). His idiosyncratic use of hyper-Shi‘i, perhaps appropriate in French, is counterproductive (in terms of his stated goal of political correctness) in American English.

Jakob Skovgaard-Peterson and Aharon Layish discuss the Druze in Lebanon and Israel, respectively. The Lebanese Druze have declared themselves officially in the fold of Islam. Layish’s article describes the legal status of the Druze in modern Israel and the workings of the Druze Religious Council. A translation of Amin Tarif’s (d. 1985) will (Tarif is the late leader of the Israeli Druze community) is appended to the article. Marianne Aringberg-Laanatza describes a quasi-comparative history of the Alevi in Turkey and the Alawites in Syria, with their respective Kurdish, Turkish, or Arab ethnic affiliations. One of her conclusions is that modern Alevi and Alawites do not recognize a connection between their groups. Instead, they identify with the nationalist parties of their respective countries. Olsson, who did anthropological work with the Syrian Alawites (12% of the Syrian population) in the 1980s, smoothly translates from Arabic, Persian, and Turkish sources to show how ‘‘Ali is identified with divine reality. Given his history of religions analysis in the Epilogue, one wonders how he can blithely use the term “gnostic religions” (p. 178) as if this were a clear-cut category. Oddly, in a discussion of the Alawite divinity, Khudr (p. 181), the reader is not informed of any relationship, or lack thereof, with the well-known Khidr/Khadir.

Although this volume has a beautiful exterior and many worthwhile articles, it could have benefited considerably from responsible editorial work. Misspellings are rampant, cross-referencing of articles is almost non-existent, and, most astonishing, there is no index.


REVIEWED BY LINDA HERRERA, St. Antony’s College, Oxford University

“Modernization,” or processes of modern socio-political development, and identity formation have been among the most recurrent and pertinent themes of scholarly studies undertaken on 19th- and 20th-century Egypt. Works on intellectual thought; economic, political, and social
history; folk culture; and gender implicitly and explicitly grapple with the issue of the country’s transition to, maintenance of, struggle with, or rejection of modernity. Modernization has often been understood through a hegemonic nationalist discourse—that is, through governmental rhetoric, the writings of establishment intellectuals, and uncritical examinations of state institutions. Alternative and counter-hegemonic manifestations and representations of modernity have been largely overlooked, which makes Walter Armbrust’s anthropological inquiry into Egyptian mass culture an absolutely vital contribution to the study of modern Egypt.

Armbrust is careful not to conflate modernization with an unambiguous social progression toward Westernization. Indeed, one of the book’s greatest strengths is that it traces and provides a critique of how Egyptian modernity has been typified in the hegemonic nationalist narrative by a duality: Westernization—that is, Western enlightenment principles of social progress and rationality—has coexisted with ideals of Egyptian cultural authenticity (asala). Armbrust argues that “while Egyptians allow for European influence on their modernism, they also insist strongly that the roots of their transition to modernity lie in their own culture, and that the essence of Egyptian modernism is to maintain an unbroken link with their own tradition” (p. 41). By highlighting the distinctive features of Egyptian modernism and showing a counter-trend that has emerged in popular culture, Armbrust provides insight into how to approach the study of modernity in other post-colonial contexts.

Armbrust compellingly shows how popular mass culture—as distinct from folk culture, the more standard fare of anthropologists of the Middle East (although media studies is a fast growing sub-field within anthropology)—has served as a venue through which alternative conceptions of modernity have emerged. Breaking again with traditional anthropology, Armbrust’s concern is not with the peasantry or urban poor but with the educated middle classes who, he forcefully demonstrates, represent an increasingly disfranchised and discontented mass sector of the population. By examining a range of media, including television, music, film, radio, print journalism, and colloquial poetry dating from the 19th century to the present, Armbrust explains why the orthodox version of modernism has been contested in popular culture.

The main symbolic realm through which conflicting articulations of Egyptian modernity are expressed has been the Arabic language, and popular culture has been the stage on which language battles are waged. The state has attempted to use schooling and mass media to nurture in the masses an affinity to literary Arabic that is associated with refined cultural taste. Much of contemporary popular culture, however, with its lower linguistic standards, which critics label “vulgar” (habit), serves as a competing force. As Armbrust notes, “[P]opular culture has been linguistically important in Egypt because it has historically been a qualitatively different vehicle for establishing national identity than official discourse” (p. 8).

Critics of the growing vulgarization of language and culture through popular culture often evoke a golden era dating to the 1920s and 1930s. At that time, Egyptian modernism was exemplified in the songs, film characters, and media persona of the popular icon Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab. His Arabic speech and song lyrics were of an educated modern standard, eloquent without being antiquated, and in terms of personality type Abd al-Wahhab blended qualities of a modest Egyptian man of the people (ibn al-balad) with European sensibilities, making him an exemplary middle-class Egyptian. In his film The White Rose (1933) his character reveals a man who possesses a “fine discrimination of how far one could go in [Westernized] behavior and remain truly Egyptian” (p. 84). Ultimately, the image that was being promoted is one of “radical conservative,” which evokes “both an image of progress and a grounding in tradition” (p. 109).

Although Armbrust astutely locates Abd al-Wahhab (who occupies two of the book’s seven chapters) in a larger modernist project, there is a fundamental shortcoming in his treatment of the material that reflects a larger limitation of the book—namely, it unselfconsciously depicts an inherently gendered, or masculine, modernism. Abd al-Wahhab represents an Egyptian mid-
dle-class man, and Armbrust neither calls attention to nor problematizes this fairly obvious point. The modern Egyptian woman is shrouded in ambiguity and conflict, indicating that modernism for Egyptian women has remained unresolved. The one example of a female protagonist is that of Zuzu, a repentant belly dancer turned popular university student in the 1972 film *Pay Attention to Zuzu*. However, this example is fraught with gender dilemmas that need the kind of rigorous analysis given to the heroic and sympathetic male characters. What does it mean that the possibility of prostitution looms over Zuzu; that she accepts being slapped in the face by her handsome, aristocratic professor at her home; that her morality is publicly debated at a meeting at the university? We get, in other words, a full theoretical treatment of the *ibn al-balad*, but the treatment of the female version, or *bint al-balad*, is tentative, at best.

It is also worth noting that Zuzu aside, all the female characters from film and television that Armbrust treats are depicted in largely derogatory terms: they have weak moral characters, are opportunistic, disloyal, irrationally jealous, flagrantly corrupt, and greedy. They resort to sly machinations and pursue men solely for their money. It is not clear whether pejorative representations of female characters are common to most, all, or just some films and serials, for Armbrust does not adequately locate his cases in a larger context of film and television characters and themes. With the book recently translated into Arabic (trans. Mohammad al-Sharkawi [Cairo: Supreme Council for Culture, 2000]), an Arab audience well versed in Egypt’s rich media culture will undoubtedly raise questions about the choices and representativeness of the various media personalities and products with which Armbrust engages.

Where the book holds relevance for both men and women of Egypt is in its outstanding discussion of “education gone wrong,” or the failure of education to fulfill its promise of providing social advancement for all who play by the rules. While the nationalist modernist rhetoric would have one believe that education constitutes a meritocracy with fair rules and social rewards, quite a different picture emerges in the popular mass media. Due to a complex set of factors having partly to do with the economic Open Door (*infitah*) policies in the post-1970 period, education, that “orthodox route to modernity” (p. 39) and the “machinery of cultural transformation” (p. 20), has been a point of contention and tremendous satire in mass culture. In the pre-*infitah* period, the notion of a meritocracy in which a “certain relationship between success in the modern school system and worldly success” (p. 133) prevails, whereas the post-*infitah* period reflects “an increasingly unwieldy vision of modernity” (p. 171).

The audience for the so-called vulgar arts, as Armbrust points out, consists largely of university students and educated youth, the very members of society who, by virtue of their modern educations, are supposed to be attracted to more refined Arabic art forms. Indeed, Armbrust’s principal informants are university students and recent university graduates whose disillusionment and largely cynical attitudes toward education are juxtaposed with characters, plots, and scenes from television, theater, and film.

The theme of the highly popular 1989 television serial *The White Flag*, for example, is precisely the failure of education. The characters mirror Armbrust’s informants and presumably scores of middle-class Egyptians who, as educated individuals, are “ripe for middle-class success” but are nevertheless “depressed and constantly threatened with defeat” (p. 23). Similarly, the 1970s play *School of Troublemakers* has remained popular with Egyptian youth for more than two decades because of its comic portrayal of authority figures in a modern school, “the institution portrayed for decades in literature and films as the solution to all problems of the modern world” (p. 170). By mocking figures of power and symbols of modernity, the popular media strikes a chord with the public.

Although some products of popular culture, particularly music cassettes, spread via an underground black market, popular “vulgar” arts for the most part are located within the state-regulated media. If much of mass culture stands in opposition to national modernist objectives and rhetoric, why does it pass state censors and get disseminated through largely state-con-
trolled channels? Armbrust remarks that the “state . . . has never been able completely to mo-
nopolize popular culture” (p. 196), but, unfortunately, he does not tackle the thornier issues
having to do with the mechanisms through which the state disseminates, restricts, and censors
popular culture. How, in other words, do the state’s cultural machinery, government ministries,
and numerous media organs operate and influence what the public sees, hears, and reads?
Through what processes are alternative discourses aired? To date, there has been no in-depth
critical investigation of Egypt’s cultural machinery, a subject that could make for a fascinating
and valuable study.

Despite these shortcomings, Armbrust convincingly argues that post-1970s media resonate
with educated middle-class audiences because they address the “humiliation of the common
man and the failure, corruption, or simple nonexistence of modernist institutions that are sup-
posed to prevent it” (p. 217). Armbrust characterizes the new media as being “antimodernist”
(p. 217), however one might consider them more as advocating a counter-nationalist, darker,
and more disparaging version of modernity. While modernity may have gone wrong, while it
may not have yielded the culture, affinities, and social promises it intended, it is still modernity.

In addition to contributing to our understanding of complex processes of modernization and
documenting changes in the terrain of Egyptian middle classes and mass culture, the book is a
testament to the legendary role that language and humor play in Egyptian society. The sting-
ingly witty dialogue and scenarios Armbrust documents illustrate how Egyptians, even when
faced with direly demoralizing circumstances, can turn to satire and evoke lyrics of popular
songs and poetry that allow them to vent frustration and discontent, an act that many find
preferable to the alternative, which might be to break down in tears.

cloth.

REVIEWED BY BRUCE MADDY-WEITZMAN, Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Stud-
ies, Tel Aviv University

For more than a decade, scholars and writers of various stripes have been revisiting the events
surrounding the first Arab–Israeli war of 1948, whose outcome heavily shaped subsequent
Middle East politics. Basing their work primarily on newly available Israeli, British, and Ameri-
can archival materials, they have shed considerable light and generated much heat regarding
the origins, consequences, and degrees of responsibility for the events surrounding the birth of
the State of Israel, the uprooting of two-thirds of the Palestinian Arab community, and the
defeat of neighboring Arab armies.

As is so often the case in controversies about the past, the debate over 1948 was, and re-
 mains, one that is fueled by contemporary agendas, both scholarly and political. A large per-
centage of those involved are Israeli or former Israeli historians, augmented by Israeli scholars
from other disciplines, such as sociology, literature, and political philosophy, as well as a variety
of “public” intellectuals and commentators. Some Arab and Palestinian scholars also have
joined the fray. As the Oslo process proceeded haltingly toward final status issues, the debate
surrounding 1948 took on added significance.

The charter members of the “new historians” club (Benny Morris, Avi Shlaim, Ilan Pappe)
assign preponderant responsibility to Israel, and its acts of commision and omission, for the
1948 Palestinian nakha (catastrophe) and the accompanying failure to conclude peace treaties
between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Many of those Israelis who joined the debate (e.g.,
Itamar Rabinovich, Avraham Sela, Anita Shapira) agreed with portions of their critiques while
pointing to some of their methodological and substantive shortcomings—for example, the absence of Arabic archival material, which all too often resulted in a representation of the Arab actors as static and one-dimensional, particularly when compared with the Israeli side, and the frequent tendency to read the history of 1948 through the distorted lenses of a post-1967, militarily dominant Israel. Others, such as Shabtai Teveth and Efraim Karsh, have been far more polemical, and caustic in their critiques.

Milstein’s projected twelve-volume series, “Israel’s War of Independence,” of which four volumes have appeared thus far in Hebrew (with the first three translated into English), belongs to a different genre. Milstein’s training is in the social sciences; his writings are primarily in the field of military history. But he is not, as he once wrote, a historian but, rather, a “philosopher who researches the atmosphere and culture of war and the military as a model for understanding man and contemporary civilization” (Ha’aretz, 25 October 1995). In this case, at least, it seems a bit presumptuous to speak about philosophy. Rather, this series is an occasionally fascinating and revealing, but more often numbing and ultimately unsatisfying, descent into the micro-details of the first Arab–Israeli war.

The author’s “sole pretension,” he writes in the Foreword to Volume 1 (1996), “was to uncover the truth, so far as possible, and to tell it without embellishment.” To that end, he conducted hundreds of interviews with Israeli veterans of the 1948 battles, both commanders and rank-and-file soldiers, and consulted numerous Israeli archives, published diaries, and memoirs. He seeks to tell the story of the “grunts,” as well as to analyze the mostly faulty (in his view) conduct of the Zionist–Israeli leadership. Apart from the occasional document from the Arab side that fell into his hands, he uses almost no Arab sources, primary or secondary. This is not surprising, for while the author is keenly interested in highlighting the numerous shortcomings, errors, and mistakes in the Jewish side’s conduct of the war, his choice of material reflects the fact that for him, the 1948 war was an heroic epic. Ironically, he has since concluded that the roots of Israel’s contemporary crisis are to be found in the shortcomings and failures of the Zionist–Israeli leadership in 1948 to mobilize its society’s resources and potential properly and to achieve a more decisive triumph.

No less glaring is the lack of reference to any of the works of the past decade that have generated so much controversy. This is understandable, on one level, since the original Hebrew-language volumes were published at the end of the 1980s, when the first serious scholarly studies were just appearing. But simply to translate these volumes into English without comment or revision does the author and the reader little service. How does Milstein view the historical controversies that have arisen? Does he have no opinion of what others have since written? Is it intellectual arrogance that leads him to refrain from addressing these matters? Or simply laziness?

In his effort, von Ranke-like, to “tell it like it like it really was,” the author speaks from the ground up, in encyclopedic fashion. The numerous twists and turns of incidents and battles are viewed primarily from the point of view of the Jewish fighters and their immediate commanders. One struggles, usually in vain, to discover broader themes and underlying theses. Still, the account is not without merit. One does obtain a real feeling for the time and place, at least on the Jewish side of the line—the fears, incompetence, battle fog, and plain luck that are all integral parts of war. Individuals, one is reminded, are crucial in deciding the outcomes of battles, and even wars. Balance sheets that simply total the number of persons and weapons on each side are not sufficient for understanding the course of a conflict, particularly such intimate, inter-communal ones. Indeed, Milstein reinforces the view that the outcome of the 1948 war was by no means a foregone conclusion, as some revisionist historians have implied. In correcting the tendency to view all Israeli military action through the prism of a post-1967 regional superpower, he reminds us that the 1948 war was a bitter, no-holds-barred struggle viewed by both communities as an existential fight for survival.
Volume 1 gives some background and concludes with the United Nations’ partition resolution of 29 November 1947. Volume 2 continues into the first month of subsequent fighting. Volume 3 covers the period from mid-January to early April 1948. Unfortunately, it includes no introduction, nor does it make any effort to provide context, assuming that the reader has already read the previous two volumes. An equally serious flaw is the absence of maps, an absolute requirement for any account that details the ebbs and flows of violent conflict. The absence of a bibliography completes the picture of lack of attention to detail and planning of the volume.

Volume 4, which has not yet appeared in English, covers some of Milstein’s most controversial depictions: his utterly revisionist, and hotly contested, version of the conquest of the village of Dayr Yasin and his withering, tendentious description of Yitzhak Rabin’s actions as a military commander. His subsequent obsession with attacking every aspect of Rabin’s long career cannot but raise questions about Milstein’s judgments in other areas. In any case, his work does provide further raw material for the well-crafted work of historical synthesis of the first Arab–Israeli war that has yet to be written, and that is so sorely needed.


Reviewed by Lama Abu-Odeh, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C.

Uri Davis has written a valuable book in which he advances a very progressive project indeed. Davis is first and foremost committed to human rights. Whereas he acknowledges that liberalism, the ideological narrative of Western universalism, informs this discourse, Davis dismisses the critique of human rights as mere cultural imperialism from the West. Human rights, according to Davis, are spared what may otherwise be a justifiable critique of liberalism by virtue of their incorporation into the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In other words, this declaration is universal law, and state membership in the United Nations necessarily implies respect for it.

Davis marshals the resources of human rights to launch a critique of the contemporary citizenship laws in Israel and in the Arab countries of Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. His interpretation of the “right to citizenship” is expansive. It incorporates not only civil and political rights but also, more important, economic rights. Citizenship, according to Davis, involves access by the citizen to various state resources. Contrast this with “nationality,” which is restricted to the “right to self-determination” and is translated as mere access to an “imaginary community.”

As he reads the citizenship laws of the countries he studies, Davis notes discrimination in those laws whenever he sees it. The notion of discrimination for him, in one instance after another, translates into what can be termed “formal inequality.” When Israel in its various laws, whether those of the state or of the various Jewish agencies incorporated according to Israeli law, makes a distinction between Jews and non-Jews, Davis sees those laws as discriminatory. Likewise, whenever the citizenship laws of Syria or Lebanon explicitly exclude Palestinians from citizenship or some of the rights implied in this legal status, Davis directs the charge of discrimination against them. And when Jordan excludes Jews from the benefits of Jordanian citizenship, the State of Jordan is likewise discriminatory.

For Davis, the formal inequality embedded in these laws violates the basic principle of the universality of the law. Indeed, the state that seems most vulnerable to this critique, due to the explicit legalized and concentrated investment of state resources to the benefit of one particular ethnicity (Jews) at the expense of another (non-Jews), is Israel. Davis presents his reader with a very impressive array of legislation dealing with social and economic aspects of citizenship, varying from immigration (right of return) to distribution of land and water resources, to emer-
gency laws that highlight the double project of the Zionist state. Reading the laws, one cannot escape the conclusion that the policy of the State of Israel consisted both of emptying historic Palestine of its original Palestinian population and of marshaling the appropriated state resources (from absentee Palestinians) to the benefit only of (mostly immigrant) Jews. Davis’s critique of Israel is devastating. For him it is nothing short of legalized apartheid. To end this state of apartheid, according to Davis, Israel will have to abolish all discriminatory legislation that privileges Jews and offer Palestinians the option of Israeli citizenship (embedded in a right of return), thereby allowing them the various benefits of Israeli citizenship.

But the use of the critique of formal inequality (the expression is mine, not Davis’s) when examining citizenship laws has serious limits. On the one hand, inequality survives even after all formally unequal laws have been abolished. Indeed “formal inequality” is often required to address a structurally unequal state of affairs to achieve more substantive equality. For example, it seems obvious that the Palestinians of Israel will remain in a structurally disadvantageous position vis-à-vis Jewish Israelis even after all forms of legalized discrimination against them have been abolished. In order to make them equal to Jews, much more is needed. This would include, I suspect, targeted transfers not only of state resources to their communities, including land and water, but also of budgetary resources specifically designed to improve their social and economic status in relation to Jews. Such targeting operations would necessarily involve, it would seem, not only treating Palestinians as “equal to Jews,” but privileging them over Jews. Such forms of “belated” privilege would be designed to assist them in overcoming the chronic disadvantage they find themselves in today, the result of Israel’s historic discriminatory laws and policies.

The other problem with Davis’s critique is that, if formal inequality were the problem and if it were manifested only in state laws, then the history of inequality would be relatively short. In the case of the Palestinians, their grievance against inequality could then be dated back only to the creation of the State of Israel (1948) and the passage of its discriminatory legislation. However, in such a framework, the history of the substantive inequality between Palestinians and European immigrant Jews preceding during the Mandate period, through the organized and concentrated work of various Zionist organizations, would be missed. Consistent with his approach of treating (formally unequal) state laws as what really matter, Davis treats the privileging of the Jew in the internal regulations and terms of incorporation of these organizations whose work predated (though also survived) the creation of the State of Israel as simply analogous to the work of other religious organizations. It is only, according to Davis, when these privileging practices are adopted as state law that the problem begins. Through this formalist and legalist severing of the story of the Palestinians, Davis seems to provide only a partial protest against inequality, and a large segment of history ends up escaping the bite of his protest.

That said, Davis’s book is an excellent study. I highly recommend it to all those concerned with questions of citizenship and human rights.


REVIEWED BY REŞAT KASABA, Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, Seattle

Ever since Max Weber posited the ideal-typical distinction between Oriental and Occidental cities in his essays on the economic history of Europe, many historians of the Middle East have
grappled with his model. The debate about the existence of the “Oriental” or, more specifically, the “Islamic” city and the validity of Weber’s construct have led to the growth of a sizable body of literature on the topic. In this collection of their essays, Masters, Goffman, and Eldem approach this question from a different angle. They ask not so much whether the “Islamic City” exists, but whether there was such a thing as an Ottoman city. Based on their work on Aleppo, Izmir, and Istanbul in the 17th and 18th centuries, they come up with an answer that can be described as a qualified no.

Their answer is qualified because their research shows that directly or indirectly, the presence and power of the Ottoman Empire, especially in this period of its “mature stability,” made significant differences in the histories of these cities. It was the Pax Ottomanaica that secured and strengthened Aleppo’s importance in the caravan trade, propelled Izmir to a paramount position in the Aegean basin, and transformed Constantinople, which had become a shell of its former self in the late Byzantine period, into a first-class world city. Also, to varying degrees, the arrival of Ottoman administrators introduced a new layer of elites and complicated the politics of the three cities. Yet the answer is still “no” because, they argue, being a part of the Ottoman Empire did not stamp the histories of Aleppo, Izmir, and Istanbul with a set of common characteristics that would justify their being lumped together as a subset of a prototype eastern, Oriental, Islamic, or Ottoman city. Ultimately, the different histories of these cities were shaped more by local and “distinctly unique” factors and their separate ties to the outside world, not exclusively by the forces that were related to Ottoman imperial structures or those that were related to the capitalist world economy.

It is hard to disagree with the proposition that historians need to spend more time examining the multi-layered and distinct local histories of places such as Aleppo, Izmir, and Istanbul. In the case of the three essays that are included in this book and other writings of these authors, such a reorientation has produced a wealth of material and a series of original interpretations that seriously undermine the generalizing arguments one finds in much of the urban history of the Middle East. For example, Aleppo contained a deeply rooted pre-Ottoman Islamic–Arabic elite who had to cope with the arrival of a new Ottoman–Turkish elite after the incorporation of the city into the Ottoman Empire. The addition of this new layer in the social hierarchy of the city did not weaken but strengthened Aleppo’s importance in the caravan trade, propelled Izmir to a paramount position in the Aegean basin, and transformed Constantinople, which had become a shell of its former self in the late Byzantine period, into a first-class world city. Also, to varying degrees, the arrival of Ottoman administrators introduced a new layer of elites and complicated the politics of the three cities. Yet the answer is still “no” because, they argue, being a part of the Ottoman Empire did not stamp the histories of Aleppo, Izmir, and Istanbul with a set of common characteristics that would justify their being lumped together as a subset of a prototype eastern, Oriental, Islamic, or Ottoman city. Ultimately, the different histories of these cities were shaped more by local and “distinctly unique” factors and their separate ties to the outside world, not exclusively by the forces that were related to Ottoman imperial structures or those that were related to the capitalist world economy.

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the other cities in the Ottoman Empire. The question that continues to haunt the social historians of Izmir is why these integrated social structures unraveled so swiftly and violently during the first two decades of the 20th century. Goffman does not address this question directly, except to mention the 1922 fire as a symbol of this destruction. His explanation is that the global conditions of the late 19th century made the survival of such cosmopolitan networks impossible.

In the case of Istanbul, it is, of course, impossible to ignore the central government. The presence of the imperial bureaucracy, army, and the other adjuncts of central administration made this a uniquely consuming city—so much so that its growth forced a reorientation of regional trade networks in the Balkans. Such unique characteristics of Istanbul notwithstanding, the city still shared some of the features of Aleppo and Izmir. For example, like the other two cities, Istanbul benefited from the activities of foreign residents. The status of the foreign community started from an Aleppo-like situation in which they were highly segregated and ended with conditions that were more similar to that in Izmir, where the boundaries were more fluid and the communities were more integrated—so much so that even the district of Galata, which is usually imagined as being an almost exclusive foreign enclave, had come to contain a sizable (perhaps even a majority) Muslim population. As was the case with the other two cities, Istanbul also suffered from the nationalist turn of histories in the Near East in the early 20th century, whereby it lost the multifarious links that had made it, together with Aleppo and Izmir, a prosperous and dynamic center.

The introductory chapter suggests that one of the authors’ goals in putting together this collection was to challenge the Weberian distinction between the Oriental and the Occidental city. These essays do a fine job in highlighting the differences among these three cities and hence demonstrating the difficulties involved in putting them under one rubric, be it Ottoman, Oriental, or Islamic. However, on the question of whether there was a civic identity characterizing each of these cities, the authors are somewhat reticent. We read that in Aleppo “the Muslim elite remained divided against itself” (p. 52); in Izmir, “we do not know whether [a civic culture] existed” (p. 84); and that Istanbul contained “a mosaic far more complex than any equivalent in western Europe . . . with no unifying concept of identity” (p. 154). Yet for Weber, it was precisely here that the Occidental city differed substantively from its Oriental counterpart and the Occidental civic culture gave the Western urban form its privileged and determining role in the development of market society in Europe. The next phase of urban social history of the Middle East should tackle this question and ask why the integrated social structures of such cities did not generate enough civic pride to resist the nationalist pressures of the early 20th century, even though these pressures were so obviously detrimental to the interests of these urban centers.

By including three radically different Ottoman cities that are usually studied separately, this fine volume goes a long way toward breaking down the barriers that divide (sub)specializations in Ottoman history. The authors also do a valuable service by engaging, every step of the way, Ottoman urban historiography. This makes their study not just a monograph but part of an ongoing, lively conversation. Masters, Goffman, and Eldem should be commended for their imaginative approach to a very important topic.


Reviewed by Sarah Shields, Department of History, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

The Other Kurds: Yazidis in Colonial Iraq offers an ambitious effort to reinterpret communal identities in Iraq during the British Mandate. Although this work focuses explicitly on Yazidis,
Fuccaro engages the ongoing debate about the process of group identity formation in non-national states. In this monograph, Fuccaro argues that changing Yazidi communal identities are constructed within a broader context of government centralization, national identity formation, and British Mandatory rule. She shows that this context is crucial in understanding the reconstruction of Yazidi collective self-definitions.

Although the Yazidis have been presented as a group whose identity is based on unchanging faith, “primordial” connection, and intentional exclusivity, Fuccaro shows that the period of state consolidation exacerbated internal contests for power that eventually extended into even the most sacred of Yazidi rituals. *The Other Kurds* begins in the late Ottoman period, allowing the author to trace the development of competing collective identities as they were redefined over a period of political transition. The first three chapters define the Yazidis and their economic, geographic, political, social, and religious milieu in elaborate detail. The last two chapters make the author’s argument, and the final chapter is important not only to the specialist reader but also to anyone curious about the manner in which historical context redefines collective identity.

Fuccaro’s last chapter brings together the problems of group coherence in the context of the development of Iraqi state power, the interests of the British during the last years of the Mandate, and the concern over “minorities” espoused by the League of Nations. The Yazidis occupied contested territory, land claimed in the north by both Turkey and Iraq and in the west by Iraq and Syria. The dispute over control had two relevant consequences. First, state competition over territory allowed “outlaws” to take refuge in adjoining areas. Those preying on Yazidi flocks or committing other depredations could flee to French-controlled Syria, compromising the Iraqi officials’ efforts to prove their ability to enforce public security. Yazidis challenging government prerogatives could migrate to Turkey, out of reach of Iraqi jurisdiction. Second, in determining the state to which these territories would ultimately belong, the League of Nations sought to take into account the proclivities of the population. Britain and the government of Iraq sought to placate the Yazidi population during the investigations of the league in order to retain both Shaykhan and Jabal Sinjar within the new boundaries of Iraq.

Iraqi and British efforts to gain Yazidi support for their inclusion in the Iraqi state exacerbated the divisions forming within the community, as two major Yazidi factions competed for control of the titles, revenues, and loyalties that came with official recognition. While the factions reflected earlier breaches in Yazidi solidarity, the eventual rupture played out in the context of great-power rivalry and boundary delineation. The British Mandatory authorities encouraged the government of Iraq to make promises to both factions in order to prevent outright demonstrations against Iraqi rule while the League of Nations’ commissioners were deliberating.

The League of Nations’ role continued to loom large in the definition of Yazidi identity. The league’s definition of “minority” encouraged the Yazidis to develop a new self-definition, as they gradually moved from an undefined and anomalous position as tolerated heretics under the Ottomans to a protected and delineated minority in the new nation-state. Sharing that status with other non-Arab and non-Muslim groups, the Yazidis were gradually drawn into the orbit of the 1930s Iraq Minorities (non-Muslim) Rescue Committee. They were newly defined as belonging with the Christian communities, even reframed as originally “Assyrian,” and included as members of a proposed autonomous non-Muslim enclave in northern Iraq.

The author has done extensive work in British and the French archives, drawing on diplomatic, military, and church records. *The Other Kurds* suffers from the unavailability of local sources, an absence inevitable during a period in which international politics prevents access to both the written and verbal past. Despite this challenge, the monograph offers a wealth of detail for historians. The current work will probably be restricted to specialists, because organizational problems will make it inaccessible to general readers. Notwithstanding its problems, however, *The Other Kurds* is an important contribution because it complicates accepted ver-
sions of the Yazidis in particular and challenges standard portrayals of identity politics, patron-
age networks, and communal solidarity in the inter-war Middle East.


REVIEWED BY ABDALLA M. BATTAH, Department of Political Science, Minnesota State University, Mankato

Like a mega-earthquake, the end of the Cold War sent lasting shockwaves throughout the international system. Outside the former communist bloc, the epicenter of this earthquake, nowhere else were those tremors more dramatic in their impact than in the Middle East—a region of long-standing geo-strategic standing and a legacy of incessant foreign conquest and intervention. The end of the Cold War exposed clearly the structural weaknesses of the region and drastically reduced its system immunities. As at previous turning points, the Middle East faced formidable constraints as well as luring opportunities. *Middle East at the Crossroads* is a collection of articles addressing the contours of this new environment and its challenges for both Middle Eastern states and the major powers. It is a welcome addition and an important contribution to Middle Eastern studies.

The volume is a collaborative product of ten area specialists. In his contributions, Dorraj sketches out the dynamics of the new strategic context. He maintains that the end of the Cold War left United States in a supreme position in the region. This, however, did not constitute a perfect Pax Americana. The United States, he argues, fell short of its enunciated objectives (p. 17). The challenge for the United States is to divest itself of an exaggerated view of regional threats and to contribute constructively to the solution of regional problems.

Two chapters address human-rights conditions in the region. Monshipouri’s chapter covers a wide range of areas, including women’s status, refugees, minorities, reforms, civil society, democratization, and the role of religion. He maintains that Muslim states traditionally had a bias against civil and political rights. But, he notes, this began to change in recent years, as a number of states have finally signed and ratified major international human-rights conventions, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Monshipouri paints a gloomy, but realistic, picture of the human-rights conditions in the region. Overall, the Arab states have been the worst offenders, especially with respect to women’s participation in the political process (p. 57). These states have, however, made remarkable progress in women’s literacy in the past twenty years. “Any improvement in the region’s human rights conditions,” Monshipouri concludes, “hinges not only upon the actions of the rational and reasonable agents from within but also upon genuine support for these actions by external forces” (p. 77). Moghadam’s chapter focuses on the rise of women’s organizations. She creates a topology to help the reader understand the scope of activities covered by these organizations. She argues that such organizations play an important role in state–society relations. But women’s feminist organizations continue to face formidable constraints. She uses the case of the Algerian Women’s Movement to illustrate the magnitude of these constraints.

The remaining six chapters address foreign policies of the Arab states, Israel, the United States, Russia, the European Union, and Japan and China. In his chapter on Arab states’ foreign policies, Abukhalil provides an analysis of the role of ideology in foreign–policy-making. He argues that Western scholars have exaggerated the role of ideology, particularly Islam, in Arab foreign–policy-making. Ideology, he argues, is no more a factor in Arab foreign policies than it is in other states’ foreign policies. Foreign-policy managers use ideology instrumentally, for propaganda or domestic considerations.
Israeli foreign policy, according to Zunes, is largely driven by internal dynamics, especially public opinion, regardless of whether the Likud or Labor is in power. A Jewish history marred by exile, persecution, and genocide at the hands of others created a political culture whose salient characteristics are fear and mistrust of non-Jews and of international institutions. Consequently, Israeli leaders and demagogues are able to manipulate public opinion in foreign-policy areas. The 1996 electoral victory of the hawkish Netanyahu, Israel’s strategic vulnerability doctrine, Israeli expansionism and wanton disregard of international legal norms, the disproportionate role of its military in policies, and Israel’s dependence on the United States can all be explained in light of this dynamic. The fall of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Iraq in the second Gulf War have, among other things, caused important changes in Israeli public attitudes and foreign policy. But Israeli policies must be seen in the context of a constraining Pax Americana world order. The United States, in pursuit of its own strategic interests, has underwritten Israeli expansionism and encouraged its intransigence. Israeli goals (regional legitimacy, full peace, security, normal relations, etc.) will, in Zunes’s view, remain illusive until Israel moderates its regional policies and becomes more forthcoming in the negotiations with the Palestinians.

Drake’s chapter on “dual containment” is an updated version of an article that was published in 1994 by Middle East Insight. The U.S. Clinton administration’s dual containment of Iraq and Iran, which came to light in 1993, suspiciously resembles Israel’s “eastern front” doctrine, Drake notes. This is perhaps not surprising, considering the fact that dual containment was invented by one of Israel’s staunchest allies in Washington, Martin Indyk, former director of Near East and South Asian Affairs at the National Security Council and present ambassador to Israel. Unlike Cold War containment, which was based on deterrence, dual containment pursues compulsion. It represents an aggressive and misguided policy. The adverse implications of the policy are clear. “Rather than pointing the Middle East to a brighter and more peaceful future, [dual containment] may instead facilitate an illusory peace based on nothing more profound than ‘might makes right,’ not only in the Arab–Israeli arena but also in the Gulf” (pp. 203–204).

Katz’s chapter on post-Soviet Russian policy incorporates “Muslim regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia” in the definition of the Middle East. Katz provides a historical background that covers the period since the late 18th century. Czarist policy focused on the Caucasus and was primarily concerned with British influence in the Northern Tier areas (Turkey, Afghanistan, Iran). It paid little attention to, and correspondingly achieved little influence in, the Arab lands. Soviet leaders likewise focused on the Caucuses and Northern Tier countries. Intensification of Arab nationalism gave Khrushchev the opportunity to exert Soviet influence in the region. Following the Arab defeat in 1967, Brezhnev succeeded greatly in expanding the Soviet role. Soviet influence began to decline in early 1970s, as Egypt gradually moved into the U.S. camp. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan eroded Soviet influence and credibility further. From Brezhnev forward, Soviet policy was constrained by détente. Gorbachev and Yeltsin were, in addition, preoccupied with domestic priorities. In spite of the breakup of the Soviet Union and the economic difficulties in Russia, Russia maintains dominance in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. It has effectively neutralized potential challenges to its role in these areas from Iran and Turkey by aligning itself with the former and skillfully balancing the latter.

Ehteshami examines European Union–Middle East post-Cold War relations. These relations, which take place in the context of the European Union’s competition with the U.S. and Asian economic powers, have been shaped by several factors: intra-European Union developments (e.g., 1995 membership expansion), disintegration of the Eastern bloc, and regional developments (e.g., Gulf War, Arab–Israel relations). Geo-strategic and economic interests have motivated the European Union, which has been the main trading partner with countries in the region. In spite of initiatives aimed at expanding ties with Middle Eastern countries, however, the European Union will continue to be hampered by its unwillingness to grant membership to countries of the region.
In the last chapter, Noroozi focuses on “regional determinants” to explain the foreign-policy reorientations of Japan and China. He argues that Japan’s reassertion of its influence in the Middle East is constrained by its sensitivities for and commitments to American global strategy. China, which aspires to global leadership, has pursued a global policy of interdependence that is characterized by expediency rather than Third World solidarity. China, however, has been less susceptible to American pressure than Japan. China’s and Japan’s reorientations are evident in their enhanced relations with Israel, firm stance against Iraq in the Gulf War, and cautious relations with Iran.

The reader will find much value in the volume. It is refreshing to see that the section on great-power foreign policy includes chapters on the European Union and Japan and China. The excellent chapter by Zunes is full of insights on the dynamics of Israel–U.S. relations. The same can be said for Drake’s “dual containment” chapter. In fact, the two chapters are complementary—which, in my view, makes their separation by the chapter on women’s organization unjustifiable.

There are some noteworthy problems to point out. The human-rights chapter by Monshipouri attempts to cover too many areas. It is unrealistic to detail an adequate empirical analysis of these matters in twenty-six pages. This, for example, is evident in the superficial discussions accompanying the tables in the chapter. Some glaring omissions include lack of attention to the Arab minority in Israel and Israeli human-rights abuses. Moghadam’s chapter provides a valuable contribution by focusing on the traditionally neglected arena of women’s organization, but it contains unsettling generalizations and imprecise terminology. For example, in her discussion of Algeria, she writes, “Islamist violence has forced the women’s groups underground or in exile” (p. 165). The fact that only a small fraction of “Islamists” engage in such violence, and the Algerian military’s role in creating the general atmosphere of terror, should warrant caution and precision on the part of an analysis that is presented as a scholarly, objective study.

I suggest that future revision of the volume include a final chapter that summarizes and pulls together the themes covered. The structure of the volume is a clear weakness. I suggest that the pieces by Monshipouri (chap. 3) and Moghadam (chap. 6) be joined in one section, as they both deal almost exclusively with human rights in the region. Also, this section could be strengthened by expanding the discussion of internal dynamics to include ideology (chap. 4) and other aspects (e.g., political economy) that are now absent from the volume. Finally, I suggest that the volume undergo thorough copyediting. Without being systematic, I encountered no fewer than forty errors of grammar, diction, and spelling or typing. This is really inexcusable for an otherwise sophisticated scholarly work.


REVIEWED BY NADER ENTESSAR, Department of Political Science, Spring Hill College, Mobile, Ala.

The Kurdish question has remained one of the most destabilizing issues for modern Turkey. Despite decades of military campaigns in the southeast and the existence of a continuing state of emergency in that region of Turkey for more than a decade, various Turkish governments have yet to resolve their Kurdish dilemma in a satisfactory way. According to the Turkish Association for Human Rights, some 3 million Kurds have been driven from their villages by the Turkish army, and some 3,000 Kurdish villages have been evacuated (ethnically cleansed) over the past fourteen years. In addition to military campaigns in Turkey’s southeast, disappearances, summary trials, and other forms of political repression have turned the region into a permanent war zone.
This book, written by two Western experts on Turkey, goes a long way toward explaining the genesis and development of the “Kurdish problem” in Turkey. As part of a series of books written under the auspices of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, the book seeks to provide a policy-focused approach to elucidating various dimensions of the Kurdish question in Turkey. For this reason, the authors are concerned with how the Kurdish issue will affect the stability and well-being of Turkey as a key American ally. The authors also seek to offer solutions to deal with Turkey’s Kurdish problem in the context of a unified, strong, and pro-Western Turkey. They rely on myriad Western and Turkish sources and write in an accessible style that can be beneficial to scholars and the interested public alike. The book’s central thesis is that the Kurdish problem is a complex, transnational issue that does not lend itself to an easy military solution, and that bold, imaginative, and workable solutions must be sought if Turkey is finally to address its Kurdish problem in a satisfactory fashion.

The book contains seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides a brief overview of the roots of Kurdish nationalism and the emergence of Turkish–Kurdish conflict in the aftermath of the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of modern Turkey. The other chapters focus on contemporary problems. In Chapters 2 and 3, the authors trace the roots of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in the 1970s and its emergence as a revolutionary organization in quest of Kurdish independence. As the authors point out, the PKK itself has gone through stages of change in its ideology, tactics, and goals. Under the leadership of its founder, Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK initially espoused Marxist–Leninist lines and was adamantly in favor of creating an independent Kurdish state. In later years, the party gradually shifted its stance and began to favor autonomy for the Kurds, albeit without specifying the nature and contours of this autonomy. Beginning in the late 1980s, the PKK also shed its Marxist–Leninist ideology and began to portray itself as a nationalist organization. In the same vein, the PKK also moved away from its anti-Islamic orientation in the 1990s and instead invited the Islamic Party of Kurdistan (PIK) to join forces with it in the pro-PKK Kurdish Parliament-in-exile.

Notwithstanding its change of orientation in recent years, the PKK faces formidable problems in confronting the Turkish state. As the recent capture of Ocalan demonstrates, Turkey has spent a great deal of political and military resources to destroy the PKK and portray it not as a nationalist organization but as a terrorist one responsible for the death of thousands of Kurds and Turks. Turkey has also managed to curtail logistical sources of support for the PKK as it has forced Syria to expel Ocalan from its territory, close down the PKK’s bases, and terminate financial support for the organization. In Europe, Turkey has had some success in confronting its Kurdish opponents since the mid-1990s. For example, the all-important Med-TV, the PKK-dominated Kurdish-language television station, was forced to close down its satellite-transmission unit in the United Kingdom, thus cutting off a major channel of communication between the PKK and the Kurds in Turkey and elsewhere.

The Kurdish Parliament-in-exile, another important PKK-influenced institution in Europe, has likewise experienced strong pressure from both European governments and other Kurdish parties. The two major Kurdish parties in Iraq, as well as the other Kurdish movements in the Middle East and in exile, have generally eschewed participation in the Parliament-in-exile on the grounds that the PKK has monopolized it. Moreover, the Parliament-in-exile is not recognized by any government or governmental organizations in the world.

In addition to political and strategic factors that have hampered the functioning of the PKK, there are a number of cultural factors that have impeded the construction of Kurdish national consciousness. For example, linguistic diversity reflected in Kurmanji, Surani, and Zaza speakers have made inter-Kurdish communication problematic. Religious division among the Kurds has further complicated intra-Kurdish relations in Turkey. Conflict between the Sunnis and the Alevi in Turkey has spilled over into the Kurdish community, as well. Violent Sunni–Alevi clashes have pitted Kurd against Kurd and redefined the significance of political and ethnic
boundaries in today’s Turkey. Because nearly 30 percent of Turkey’s Kurds are Alevi, religious conflict in Turkey can further split the Kurdish community.

In Chapters 4 and 5, the authors explain Turkish public opinion on Kurdish issues and explore Turkey’s policies in the southeast. They review the perceptions of various political parties and the media regarding the Kurdish question in the country. In general, the more nationalist and right-wing political parties have tended to oppose any meaningful measures of Kurdish autonomy while the Turkish left and Islamists have been sympathetic to the Kurds. Of course, the so-called nationalist left, with its strong Kemalist ideology and its intellectual supporters, has been an ardent supporter of the military option for dealing with the Kurdish issue.

The formulation of Turkey’s Kurdish policy resides in several key state institutions, with the National Security Council playing a significant role in this process. The implementation of the policy is within the purview of various military forces, including the armed forces’ National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and the gendarmerie. Of particular interest is the role played by the so-called village guards who are recruited by the Turkish government in Kurdish villages throughout the southeast. Approximately 65,000 Kurdish village guards serve as agents of the Turkish government and military and thus control Kurdish nationalist activities in the region.

Chapter 6 places the Kurdish conflict in an international context. The authors identify Kurdish factors that have affected Turkey’s foreign policy toward Russia, Syria, Iran, Greece, the United States, Western Europe, and other international and regional actors. This is indeed an increasingly important issue and should have been given greater coverage in the book. As the capture of the PKK’s Ocalan demonstrated, Turkey’s growing ties with Israel, particularly in security and military matters, constitute important areas of concern that need to be analyzed in detail. The omission of this link is perhaps the book’s major shortcoming. No serious analysis of Turkey’s foreign policy and the role of the Kurdish question can afford to ignore the regional impact of Turkish–Israeli relations.

Finally, in Chapter 7, the authors offer a spectrum of potential solutions to Turkey’s Kurdish dilemma. These solutions range from repression and enforced assimilation to cultural concessions to Kurdish demands for legalization of Kurdish political parties and finally to full independence and creation of a Pan-Kurdish state. The authors find the last option (independence) both unrealistic and undesirable because they claim it does not “reflect the preferred outcome of Kurds in Turkey” (p. 204) and because no Kurdish party advocates the establishment of a Pan-Kurdish state at this time. The pros and cons of the options are discussed. As the discussion in this chapter demonstrates, the resolution of Turkey’s Kurdish question does not lend itself to easy solutions.

Scholars, journalists, and policy-makers, as well as those interested in the field of conflict resolution or prevention, will find this well-written, cogently argued, and perceptive book very useful.


REVIEWED BY MONTE PALMER, Center for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies, American University of Beirut

The objective of Scott Pegg’s book is to examine the role of the de facto state in the international system. The book begins with a description of quasi-states, entities defined as ineffective states that possess internationally recognized sovereignty as indicated by membership in the United Nations. The de facto state, by contrast, is a political movement that possesses substantial control over a specified territory and population but lacks recognition of its sovereignty by
the international community. As expressed by Pegg, “The quasi-state is legitimate no matter how ineffective it is. . . . The de facto state, on the other hand, is a functioning reality that is denied legitimacy by the rest of international society” (p. 5).

The book provides a brief examination of four de facto states: Eritrea before independence; the Tamil-controlled areas of Sri Lanka; the Republic of Somaliland; and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. These brief case studies are followed by an analysis of the macro and micro factors that led to the birth of de facto states. At the macro level, the author finds the de facto state to be a function of a changing international system that no longer recognizes conquest as the basis of sovereignty over a territory. By and large, states that have been admitted to the United Nations are inviolable regardless of the frailty of their political system or the covetousness of their more powerful neighbors. Ethnic movements such as the Kurds and the Tamils are accordingly forced into the status of de facto states because they are precluded by the international system from attaining the sovereignty that would have been available to them during an earlier era. Much the same is true of the Turkish enclave in Cyprus.

At the micro level, de facto states are viewed as a function of the ineffective and ethnocentric policies pursued by many regimes in the Third World, situations that invite the creation of de facto states. Some foreign powers have also supported the creation of de facto states as an alternative to direct colonization—Northern Cyprus being a case in point. This accomplished, the book next examines the role of the de facto state in the international system as well as potential scenarios for the transformation of de facto states and the role of the de facto state in international-relations theory. These chapters are largely speculative and suffer from an insufficient number of cases to address the various contingencies surveyed. The four cases examined also turn out to be quite diverse and make generalization difficult. This is not the fault of the author; it reflects the nature of his material. I would, however, take issue with the implicit assumption that de facto states are more effective than the states from which they are attempting to secede. Effectiveness in opposition is a poor guide to future performance.

The book is well organized and well researched, and the scholarship is well balanced. I would have preferred more in-depth case studies, but the focus of the book is international-relations theory rather than comparative politics. The author has raised an important issue, and his work clearly adds a dimension to the study of Third World societies. The book also contains a useful bibliography. The book is very relevant to students of Kurdistan and parallel movements in the Middle East, but it is unlikely to be of much interest to other readers of IJMES.


REVIEWED BY MARIA EVA SUBTELNY, Department of Near and Middle Eastern Civilizations, University of Toronto

First published in 1976 under the same title by Bibliotheca Islamica (Minneapolis and Chicago) but with the additional subtitle, “A Study in 15th/9th Century Turko–Iranian Politics,” this book is a revised and expanded version of the author’s revised doctoral dissertation (Princeton University, 1974).

The author’s stated goals in the work are to establish an accurate chronology of political events in the history of the Aqquyunlu dynasty and to demonstrate the major trends in the political history of Anatolia–Iran during the 15th century, which the author views as an age of transition from the later Middle to the Early Modern period of Islamic history.

Specifically, the work traces the evolution of the Turkmen dynasty known as the Aqquyunlu from its Bayandur clan origins to the formation of the Aqquyunlu tribal confederation in the mid-14th century through to the creation of an empire, until its destruction by the Safavid Qizilbash at the beginning of the 16th century.
The time span covered is roughly 150 years, and it is divided into two major phases of Aqquyunlu history. The first phase, to use the author’s terminology, is that of the Principality, which lasted until 1467 and is further subdivided into three periods: the First Principality to the death of Qara 'Usman in 1435; the Great Civil War; and the Second Principality (1457–67) of Uzun Hasan. The second phase is that of the empire from 1467 to 1508, which is divided into the Great Conquests culminating in the foundation of the empire under Uzun Hasan (d. 1478); political stagnation coupled with cultural efflorescence during the time of Ya'qub (d. 1490); and the Confederate Clan Wars leading up to the Safavid Succession in 1508.

While the basic theses and conclusions remain the same, the reworking represents a conceptually more sophisticated and stylistically more refined version of the original published work. The first and last chapters have been rewritten, although not as thoroughly as the author would claim, since the basic structure and in some cases even the sequence of paragraphs remain the same. The original first chapter, “Themes and Sources,” has been replaced by one entitled, “Themes and Structures,” with the discussion of sources moved to an appendix at the end of the book. The original short last chapter, “The Safavid Succession,” has been replaced with a somewhat longer chapter entitled, “Devolution and the New Dispensation,” of which “The Safavid Succession” forms a subsection. The titles of the remaining four chapters are the same as those in the original version and logically and systematically follow the historical narrative from “Clan to Principality” to “The Great Civil War” to “Principality to Empire” and, finally, “Statis and Decline.”

The scholarship demonstrated in this book is thorough and meticulous. The description of Aqquyunlu sources in Appendix D attests to the wide variety of sources consulted, which include documentary, numismatic, and archaeological evidence in addition to narrative sources such as chronicles and travel accounts. All references to published texts and citations of manuscripts have been updated from the original edition, and new references have been added.

Woods is unequivocal in stating that he intends to focus on the outline of Aqquyunlu tribal history and chronology, and he sets this forth in exhaustive detail. One of the most valuable aspects of his research is his reconstruction and compilation of the genealogies of the Aqquyunlu clan. These are graphically presented throughout the book and supplement the discussion of what he refers to as the various “dispensations” that were initiated in each generation by charismatic leaders who emerged from among the male members of the royal house. This reviewer had hoped to find a definitive explanation for the enigmatic “White Sheep” (Aqquyunlu) moniker, but several plausible suggestions were proffered instead based on current research trends and findings in Turkic tribal history.

The complexity of the political situation in 14th–15th-century Iran and Anatolia is daunting, so it is no wonder that the sheer mass of fact and event is often too much to absorb. This is not a book that can be read fruitfully in one sitting. Its dense narrative and terse style demand the perseverance of the specialist reader. The technical apparatus alone, including appendixes, notes, bibliography, and indexes, represents fully half the book. The four appendixes on Aqquyunlu genealogy, the confederate clans, and sources for Aqquyunlu history elicit admiration and appreciation for their clarity and reliability. Useful maps supplement the various stages of evolution of the Aqquyunlu polity.

In many ways, this book is rather conventional in its approach and method. While references are made from time to time to the socio-economic and socio-religious contexts, the focus is clearly on the reconstruction of tribal and political history and on their analysis within an ideological framework. In this respect, Woods is a worthy successor to such illustrious predecessors in the field as Vladimir Minorsky, if not to Jean Aubin. However, in his presentation and application of the various bases of authority that were operative in Iran–Anatolia during the 14th and 15th centuries—and, in particular, of the Turko-Mongolian concepts of charismatic authority, corporate clan succession, and the appanage system—Woods has expanded on the pioneering research of his teacher, Martin Dickson, and it is here that this reviewer found
the real conceptual value of the work to lie. It is somewhat surprising, though, that there is reference at all to Max Weber’s model of charismatic authority.

The intertwining of Turko-Mongolian customary law (Yasa) with Sunni-Jama’i, Sufi, and Shi’i bases of authority is a fascinating but often confusing aspect of medieval Iranian–Anatolian–Central Asian political culture. Woods does an admirable job of disentangling and identifying the various strands and showing the ways in which they were adapted or synthesized by Aqquyunlu leaders, particularly those who wished to project their imperial Islamic ambitions. Uzun Hasan, for example, whose entourage maintained Turko-Mongolian practices, was referred to as the “renewer (mujaddid) of the practices of the Hanafi religion and faith, reviver of the achievements of the ‘Abbasid state, promised one of the 15th/9th century” (p. 105). At the time he was known for his patronage of popular religious figures of dubious orthodoxy who fit the shamanistic mold more closely than did members of established Sufi orders, such as the “Sunni” Kubraviyya and Naqshbandiyya or even the Safaviyya—all of whom, incidentally, were also patronized by him.

It is difficult to imagine how this book could be superceded with respect to the goals the author set for himself. It can be built on further, however, by researchers working in the areas of socio-economic, socio-religious, and socio-cultural history, and it will serve as a reliable resource for some time for those studying not only Aqquyunlu history but also the history of the Mamluks, Timurids, Ottomans, and Safavids.


REVIEWS BY WARREN C. SCHULTZ, Department of History, DePaul University

The importance of Qutb al-Din Musa al-Yunini’s (d. 726/1326) Dhayl Mir’at al-Zaman has long been recognized by historians of the medieval Islamic world. In this book, Li Guo places this author and his work in the context of early 14th-century Mamluk Syrian intellectual developments and provides both a translation (vol. 1) and an edition of the Arabic text (vol. 2) for the five-year period 1297–1302. The result is a valuable work of historiography and philology.

The challenges facing Guo in this work were daunting. Al-Yunini, of course, intended the Dhayl to be a supplement of the Mir’at al-Zaman of Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi (d. 1256). This work covered events from the creation to its author’s death. The Dhayl as it survives seems to have covered events from 1256 to 1311. (Previous editions of the work are seriously flawed and have covered only the years 654–690.) To say the manuscript tradition of the Dhayl is complicated is an understatement. Al-Yunini also wrote a summary (mukhtasar) of the Mir’at al-Zaman, and later scribes apparently often combined the summary and the supplement. Some twenty-three manuscripts containing (at least) portions of the Dhayl are thus listed and described by Guo, featuring the usual problems of inconsistent titling, lacunae, scribal errors and idiosyncrasies, strange additions, and so on. Furthermore, there are complicated relationships to be wrestled with between the works of al-Yunini and those of his contemporaries al-Jazari (d. 1339) and al-Birzali (d. 1339). As Guo puts it, “[T]he complexity of the situation lies in the fact that here we are not dealing with manuscripts of one single complete monograph but a host of manuscripts that represent various volumes of lengthy text compiled and revised over a long period” (p. 29).

Guo’s deft analysis of this morass of manuscripts results in the following conclusions. First, two major recensions exist of the Dhayl. “Version 1,” Guo asserts, was probably a draft (mus-waddah) and, among other things, concentrates on the author’s home town of Ba’labakk. “Version 2” shows signs of significant editing by al-Yunini, as it differs from Version 1 in several ways, not the least of which is that it is more focused on Damascus. Second, the Dhayl itself
falls into two different parts. The first part, those accounts up to the year 1256, are based primarily on al-Yunini’s own sources. However, after that date, al-Yunini’s *Dhayl* relies heavily on the *Hawadith al-Zaman* of al-Jazari. While the two works are “clearly independent” prior to 1257, after that date they are “fundamentally similar” (p. 42). Guo thus writes of a Jazari-Yunini tradition. And third, Al-Birzali served as source, editor, and transmitter for both the *Dhayl* and the *Hawadith*.

All this is found in the first three chapters of Volume 1. In the fourth chapter, Guo places al-Yunini and his work in the wider world of Mamluk-era historical writing. He provides some underpinnings for the long-asserted existence of a Syrian school of historical writing in the Mamluk era, as opposed to what was produced in Cairo. This “Syrian model” is marked by three characteristics: the inclusion of large number of *wafāyat* with the *hawaḍith*, with these obituaries heavily skewed toward hadith scholars; a marked tendency to include many excerpts of poetry; and the increasing use of colloquial language.

The edition of the Arabic text occupies all of Volume 2. It is based primarily on the Yale manuscript (Landberg 139), with gaps filled in by the Istanbul manuscript (Topkapi Saray/Ahmet III 2907). The edition is thorough and meticulous in its apparatus. The reader should take note of three editorial decisions. First, there is both an upper and lower footnote system, with the top layer devoted to issues of the “Jazari-Yunini” tradition, and the lower devoted to the al-Yunini text. Second, Guo has chosen to correct grammatical mistakes in his edited version of the text, relegating the original manuscript versions to the apparatus. Third, the edition contains mainly the *hawaḍith* sections, with most of the *wafāyat* (and the poetry found within) excluded. I find this last choice a curious one, given the central role obituaries and poetry played in the emerging Syrian school of historiography so carefully identified and discussed in the first volume.

As mentioned, the years covered are 1297 to 1302. While never explicitly highlighted, the choice of this period is based on more than the simple fact that this interval is what is found in these two important manuscripts. In terms of the “Jazari–Yunini” tradition, this interval is clearly in the period during which al-Yunini was very dependent on al-Jazari. As is well known, the extant manuscript of the *Hawadith* ends in early 1300. Thus for the years after the beginning of 1300, al-Yunini’s *Dhayl* gives us access to more of Jazari’s work. The content of this section is also significant. In terms of events, this period spans the end of the reign of the Sultan Lajin (1297–99) and the beginning of the second reign of al-Nasir Muhammad (1299–1309). Arguably, the most important series of events in this interval is the campaign by the Il-Khanid ruler Ghazan in Syria, which culminated in the occupation of Damascus. For those teaching undergraduate courses on the medieval Islamic world, the translated accounts of these events will be a welcome primary-source reading for the classroom.

Li Guo has produced a useful and important aid for future research. This five-year period from the *Dhayl* is edited to the highest standards. It is also, unfortunately, the only section of the *Dhayl* to date for which that can be said. Let us hope that this book stimulates more such work on the text of al-Yunini.


**REVIE...
first eight chapters of the book discuss the beginnings of the tradition, early figures, gradual institutionalization, poetical and metaphysical expressions, and the foundations of the great tariqahs. Chapter 9 provides an overview of the later history of the tariqahs on a regional basis, in most cases coming into the 20th century. Chapter 10 discusses major concepts and practices. Given Knysh's keen awareness that the Sufi tradition cannot be isolated from the Islamic tradition as a whole, surprisingly little attention is paid to the roots of Sufism in the Qur'an and the hadith. Then again, the survey is necessarily selective and aims only to highlight major figures and movements. Any serious attempt to be comprehensive would have given us a multi-volume study. Every specialist will be disappointed at the failure to discuss or at least mention certain figures, movements, themes, or topics.

Knysh's book is now the best historical survey of the Sufi tradition in English, while Anne-marie Schimmel's *Mystical Dimensions of Islam* remains the best survey of themes and literature. Knysh provides little new research, but few scholars would have been able to manage the synthetic and balanced overviews of such diverse material (nor is there any of the quirkiness that mars Julian Baldick's much shorter historical survey, *Mystical Islam*). One of Knysh's original contributions, especially interesting because of his thorough familiarity with Russian scholarship, is a section on the methodological problems that have plagued historians' attempts to explain the Naqshbandi opposition to the Russians led by Shamil in the 19th century (pp. 294–300). The book should become a basic first reference for anyone trying to situate Sufi teachers and movements within broader historical issues. It has a good bibliography of secondary literature, a general index, an index of book titles, and an index of technical terms with brief definitions.

Knysh's purpose in writing this survey, as comes out clearly in his Introduction and in his short “General Conclusion,” is to situate Sufism in the “historical and socio-political contexts within which it developed” (p. 3). He notes that even this cursory and incomplete survey of Sufism has shown that it “has been inextricably intertwined with the overall development of Islamic devotional practices, theological ideas, esthetics, and religious and social institutions.” He has discussed an “astounding diversity of religious and intellectual attitudes that fall under the blanket category of Sufism” and shown that the Sufi tradition as a whole has “contained vastly disparate if not diametrically opposed views and principles.” Attempts to discuss it outside the broad historical context “result in serious distortions” (pp. 326–27; in a footnote, Knysh cites a few examples of the studies he has in mind).

On several occasions, Knysh defends explicitly or implicitly his use of the word “mysticism” to designate the object of his study, though he avoids the word more and more in the course of the book. Early on, he usually pairs it with “asceticism,” thereby suggesting its inadequacy, but he fails in his attempts to make it a coherent category and to identify it with “Sufism.” On occasion he also essentializes Sufism—much like those whom he criticizes—by offering judgments about the classical positions (as, for example, on p. 129, where he tells us that the “Sufi credentials” of most of the figures mentioned in Abu Nu‘aym’s *Hilyat al-awliya‘* are “rather slim”). He points out that the “diverse ascetical and mystical trends in Islam may appear much more monolithic and unchangeable than historical evidence shows them to be” (p. 326), but his own study has just shown us that to speak of Sufism as “mystical and ascetical trends” is itself misleading. Such terms, like the popular studies and the classical exponents, suggest a “uniform and harmonious Sufi tradition.” At least the word “Sufism” has a pedigree that can justify its use, even though it is simply the least unsatisfactory of the various possibilities.

I do not mean to imply that I agree completely with Knysh on Sufism’s indefinability. There remains the issue of what it is that allows historians to find a family resemblance among diverse phenomena and what it is that is seen by both the classical and the modern authors who voice an essentialist view. Here perhaps we step into domains that stand outside the expertise of historians. As Knysh puts it, “[A]ttempts to posit an immutable essence of Sufism can hardly
be treated as a serious academic exercise” (p. 326). True enough if philosophy, theology, and metaphysics are not serious academic exercises.

The book is well written and has few printing mistakes that I noticed (in my admittedly quick reading of the text). Despite the plethora of Islamic names, I saw only four transliteration errors (the most important being Lawāqih instead of Lawā’ih as the name of the classic work of Jami). Most of the fifteen or so typos that caught my attention are obvious (two, on pp. 13 and 248, involve transposed or repeated words). Only specialists will notice, however, that the contemporary Iranian scholar and editor of Sayf al-Din Bakharzi’s work, Iraj Afshar, has been elevated, along with Bakharzi, to saintly stature as one of several important disciples of Najm al-Din Kubra (p. 235).