
Except for historians of gender, mainstream labor history has neglected reproduction, the cluster of processes by which workers are born, recruited, raised, and educated. The central goal of this landmark collection is to restore the balance between production and reproduction in the study of class formation and collective action. Opening and concluding essays by Marcel van der Linden provide a focus for an outstanding collection of essays.

Van der Linden’s introduction looks at why workers protest. He links participation in protest to household strategies and to household membership in workers’ organizations. He identifies three types of workers’ organizations: household-centered organizations such as mutual aid societies, enterprise-centered organizations such as trade unions, and state-centered organizations such as political parties. He argues that households participate in different societies according to the organizations’ financial risk, liability to repression, and ability to confer benefits on members.

Taking up Van der Linden’s distinctions, essays by Eileen Janes Yeo, Christina van Hodenberg, and Bruce Scates explore the conditions producing worker organization. In Britain between 1820 and 1850, Yeo demonstrates that households joined mutual aid societies, co-operatives, trade unions and Chartist organizations to defend themselves against new forms of factory organization. By demanding respectable funerals, joining societies to read the books of their choosing, and providing their own popular entertainment, workers and their families asserted their dignity and autonomy. More than later socialists, Chartists organized celebrations that came within the budget of impoverished worker households and, in so doing, extended the boundaries of class.

Unlike English workers, the protesting Silesian weavers studied by von Hodenberg did not join workers’ organizations because they did not consider themselves workers. In 1844, Silesian village communities bound by ties of kinship and neighborhood mobilized protestors. The chief grievance of the relatively secure cotton weavers was the growing power of merchants-wholesalers who sought to treat them as wage laborers and threatened their proud claim to be independent producers. In contrast, the working-class women in late nineteenth-century Melbourne examined by Scates were really too poor to join any workers’ organizations and their protests occupied the margins of working-class collective action.

Essays by Justin Byrne, Theresa Moriarity and Bonnie Stepenoff reveal how workers organizations used family and kinship ties to mobilize workers. Byrnes’s investigation of bricklayers in turn-of-the nineteenth-century Madrid
shows that kinship ties were an important element in the migratory chain; young bricklayers often first entered Madrid by boarding in the houses of brothers and cousins and were there recruited to the union. Once a union was formed these ties served to strengthen solidarity. In an accident-prone occupation, the union increased its appeal to families by providing insurance benefits for injured members. Appeals to defend a threatened masculinity were also important to trade-union propaganda. An aggressive trade unionism was stoked by assertions of bricklayers’ masculinity and shorter hours were demanded so that they could fulfill their responsibilities as patriarchal family heads.

Family issues possessed enormous capacity to mobilize workers but also, as Moriarity shows, to demobilize them. During the great Dublin lockout of 1913, union organizers adopted a new tactic recently used by American and continental workers. Both to illustrate the workers’ plight and to lessen the burden on the strikers, they sent workers’ children to stay with unionists in the United Kingdom. After considerable initial success, religious scruples were invoked to defeat the scheme. Catholic prelates claimed that the children’s religious beliefs might be threatened by British proselytizers. Workers’ attempts to use familial symbols were ably counteracted by employer-sponsored appeals to family religious values. Stepenoff’s essay on the silk workers of western Pennsylvania also illustrates the double-edged danger of familial demands. As the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) unionized silk workers in cities such as Patterson, New Jersey, less skilled silk working factories employing young women were established in western Pennsylvania. Many of these young women were the daughters of miners belonging to the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA). Arguing that factories posed a grave danger to their daughters’ physical and moral health, union organizers appealed to fathers to encourage their daughters’ unionization. Although initially successful, such methods did not really build an independent trade union movement among women workers and unions collapsed when the UMWA and the more radical IWW quarreled.

Essays by Henk Wals, Rosanne Ruten and Mark Pittaway analyze how familial ties influenced the forms of workers’ mobilization. Wals argues that insurance services offered by trade unions were an important incentive to the organization of construction workers in early twentieth-century Amsterdam. Working-class households sought respectability underpinned by regular income and union-sponsored insurance funds could insure a regular income through periods of sickness and unemployment. The most remarkable essay in this section is Ruten’s 1992 re-analysis of the Philippine rebels in the pseudonymous Hacienda Milagros whose rise she studied in 1977–1978. Ruten shows both the strengths and the limits of efforts to study collective action within a familial perspective. In the 1970s Philippine Maoist revolutionaries organized in the New People’s Army (NPA) employed familial appeals to the hacienda workers that they organized and were very sensitive to the familial needs of local organizers. The situation was very different though with regard to those activists that the NPA sought to develop as full-time cadres. These were systematically encouraged to break with their families and become professional revolutionaries. As
long as the movement was expanding, many activists followed this new career path despite its dangers. Once the movement fell into decline, familial impulses reasserted themselves and many workers dropped out of politics to care for their children. Pittaway’s essay on working-class protest in post-World War II Hungary shows how under the repressive conditions of Stalinist rule, workers abandoned organization as vehicles of reform and turned to private efforts within household or community to better their lot. Establishing their own little gardens, selling their services on the black market, or doing their own hunting, fishing and baking, were more effective means of contributing to household welfare than protesting.

The essays in this collection address an important and seriously neglected area of labor history from a variety of perspectives. This collection deserves the widest possible attention.

Michael Hanagan
Vassar College


The Italian Communist Party (PCI) after 1943, writes Stephen Gundle, managed to construct “the last great left-wing subculture in Western Europe” (7). Given the unusual interest in “culture” in the broadest sense of the term exhibited by Palmiro Togliatti, the undisputed key figure in post-war Italian Communist politics, an English-language study of the PCI’s cultural policies is thus highly welcome and long overdue. Stephen Gundle manages to present an informative and authoritative account, which is highly recommended for anyone interested in the politics of culture and the culture of politics within the European Left.

In Gundle’s narrative, it was Togliatti who signed responsible for the investiture of Antonio Gramsci as cultural icon of the Italian (and eventually European) Left. More importantly, Togliatti understood how to assemble a vast array of leading Italian intellectuals within the orbit of the PCI. And, despite repeated setbacks, such as “1956,” the PCI successfully managed to draw successive generations of writers, painters, filmmakers and others into the inner circle and the periphery of the largest Communist party west of the Iron Curtain. No other party of the European Left, let alone a Communist party, came close to such achievements at any point between the collapse of fascism and the crumbling of the Berlin Wall.

Yet, Gundle convincingly argues, such victories on the “high culture” front came at a price. Gundle points out repeatedly how such recruitment of Italian intellectuals was more than counterbalanced by PCI failures on the “mass culture” front. Indeed, Gundle makes clear that the PCI, and here above all Togliatti himself, for the most part exhibited a consistently narrow and exclusionary
definition of “culture,” which paid next to no attention to most forms of popular culture. Most Italian high-ranking Communists positively loathed most forms of modern mass culture, above all (but not only) when imported from America.

Replicating bourgeois models of “high culture,” regarded as qualitatively distinct from “low culture,” Gundle writes, Togliatti was stuck in a mental mold appropriate to an earlier age when intellectuals produced individual works of art and indeed dominated the world of culture by “stressing the rational, cognitive aspect of cultural experience” (39). Togliatti—and with him much of the cultural establishment of the PCI—was “trapped in an old, pre-technical cultural model,” (41) “unable to grasp the industrial forms of culture that were undergoing rapid development;” (88) in short, in a day and age when ivory tower intellectuals were no longer “organizing hegemony,” (105) contemporary forms of culture largely bypassed the PCI.

What concrete forms did this cultural conservatism of PCI culture czars take? PCI press organs for a long time flat-out rejected television, radio and cinema and generally displayed a puritan anti-consumerism. Any cultural worker who showed an interest in the “new fashions, sounds, and tastes associated with America and the mass media” (67) thereby invited negative comments from PCI critics. The PCI regularly displayed “a prejudicial hostility toward new and visual forms of communication that offered an immediate and predominantly emotional sensation of aesthetic pleasure” (39). The PCI, for instance, only developed an interest in Italian neorealist films when leading filmmakers of this school began to show an interest in the PCI.

But, if this were all that Gundle does, this volume would be important but not particularly noteworthy. What transforms this study into a stimulating work is Gundle’s successful recovery of various and repeated attempts on the part of PCI activists and, indeed, intellectuals to break out from this constricting mindset. For, again and again, Italian Communism showcased “sufficient dynamism” (35) to produce a series of stimulating cultural experiments which proved that popular culture did not necessarily have to remain alien to the realities and aspirations of the European Left.

One of the earliest such phenomena was called “mass theater,” aiming “to raise awareness of the problems facing ordinary people with plays that represented the conflicts that stemmed from daily life” (58). Enormously popular at the grassroots level, these attempts to create a “folklore of protest” (59) offered “for the first time a vision of what a cultural policy might look like that was posed from the point of view of the common people” (61). By the late 1950s, PCI cultural workers produced a series of “progressive photoromances,” aiming to utilize a popular new medium in the service of an older cause. Both experiments grew out of specific local developments in Modena and Palermo, respectively.

By the early 1960s, the PCI’s Italian Recreational and Cultural Association (ARCI), founded in 1957, proved that culture, politics and leisure activities could be fruitfully combined even and especially under the conditions of late industrial modernity. Rather than creating a marginal subculture, ARCI, by putting “questions arising in everyday work and leisure on the political agenda,”
“helped the left’s recreational network [to] supersede the fortress mentality that took shape in response to the repressive atmosphere of the early 1950s” (103). “A RCI circles contributed to the revitalization of grassroots culture by offering a rich program of films, musical events, debates, and lectures” (127). And, “through A RCI the labor movement began in some small way to occupy a critical place in the changing texture of social and cultural life” (104). The ticket to success lay in the conscious construction of “an ‘alternative’ cultural approach” (127), and A RCI, Gundle contends, managed to add “a distinctive antagonistic edge” (128) to cultural productions, unlike any other major initiatives the PCI had produced at any time in the first fifteen years after liberation.

But the trouble with all these creative attempts to create a popular culture of the Italian Left was the persistent reluctance of PCI luminaries to adopt such innovations for the party as a whole. To the PCI’s credit, such experiments were usually tolerated for some time, but “the party leadership only partially grasped the overall sense of the phase of transition through which the country was passing, with the result that incremental adjustments were often late and neither coordinated nor translated into political innovations” (104). Unlike some western European sister parties, such as the French Communist Party, the PCI exhibited a high tolerance level for diverse experiences at the grassroots level, but none of these efforts managed to persuade the party hierarchy to change their course.

The most that the PCI was prepared to do was to utilize innovative practices in culture, media and communications for its “actual practice of politics” (95). PCI puritanism could clearly not be indefinitely sustained given the popularity of new media and American culture at the level of the party’s rank-and-file. Non-political hit singers from the prestigious mainstream San Remo song festivals were employed as key attractions at the annual PCI open-air festivals from the mid-1950s onwards. Some PCI youth groups organized some of the very first discotheques in the 1950s in several cities in Italy’s industrial north. When Italian state television lifted the cordon sanitaire from PCI politicians in the early 1960s, some PCI functionaries emerged as skillful TV-personalities. In the late 1970s, PCI culture czars in the city of Rome created new forms of entertainment—“Roman Summers”—in ways wholly unprecedented in Italy and, indeed, in most other European cities. “The whole of central Rome was revitalized with evening events including open-air theatrical performances, dance areas, rock concerts, and even large-screen television showings” (183).

But, critics were quick to comment, such reversals of earlier “orthodox” positions constituted all-too-often merely the other side of the identical coin. Whereas, earlier on, the PCI neglected new forms of cultural production and concentrated on ideological criticism of cultural products, now PCI cultural policy makers paid close attention to the management of culture at the expense of its content. If, earlier on, the PCI abstained from active engagement with most forms of popular and/or mass culture, now PCI policy makers merely celebrated existing forms of non-political culture. In the end, the PCI cultural model “was a niche within the existing order rather than an opposition to it” (193).

Precisely at this point of Gundle’s critique, however, it is useful to draw at-
tention to a key weakness in the author’s argumentation. In the last analysis, the ultimate explanation of the trajectory of PCI cultural policy lies in the profound transformation of PCI politics from radical reformism to the (differentiated) acceptance of the status quo. This evolution is nowhere made clear in Gundle’s study. Gundle’s admiration for Enrico Berlinguer’s politics of austerity in the 1980s can thus ill-afford to provide a satisfactory explanation for the watershed experience of 1977: “For the first time a social movement developed that regarded the PCI not as an ally but as an enemy” (161). The PCI’s ideological heritage and political moderation go a long way towards explaining why some of the most important experiments in radical popular culture within the European left were consistently unable to turn the ship around.

In sum, Gundle provides a most stimulating reconstruction of cultural debates on the Italian left that should become mandatory reading for anyone interested in the cultural politics of the left. But he tends to portray the encounter between Italian Communism and the challenges of mass culture above all as a series of missed opportunities rather than a project that was likely to fail. Gundle repeatedly suggests that, above all else, only the effective application of a radical alternative strategy in the cultural field could possibly lead to political success. But he never clearly explicates why a system-transforming marriage of high and low culture, utilizing the latest techniques developed by the communications industry, did not and indeed could not result in a “new general culture of the masses” (59) within the confines of the PCI. Such a genuinely oppositional, antagonistic popular culture industry proved to be impossible to obtain within the parameters of an organization evolving from Stalinism to “third way” social liberalism.

Gerd-Rainer Horn
University of Warwick


This is a very useful bibliographical tool produced by the efforts of the International Association of Labour History Institutions (IALHI). This association comprises more than one hundred archives, libraries and research centers all over the world, though the vast majority are located in Europe, and not all of them have the same importance, reflecting the geographical and political unevenness of socialism’s history. This particular volume aims to list all the publications of the social-democratic internationals after 1914, i.e. from the time of the political split due to the support for World War I by most social-democratic parties. This means that the left-wing, beginning with the Kienthal-Zimmerwald movement during the war and leading to the “Communist International” from 1919 on, is not represented here. But also left-wing splits from social democrati-
cy in later years, as in the 1930s with the “London Bureau” of left-wing socialist parties (and also the Bureau’s predecessors) are excluded here, as they openly campaigned against social democracy. Also, a few international workers’ institutions (mainly in the cultural field) that had been founded before 1914, but tried to maintain their independence after 1914 faced with the political split, are therefore not listed as well.

In this way, the Second International and its two followers after 1919 constitute the “axis” of this bibliography, the mainstream International led by the British Labour Party and the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland (SPD) and the more left-wing branch of the International, the so-called Vienna Union, both branches reuniting in 1923 into the Labour and Socialist International (LSI). After the interruption of World War II, the LSI is now called the Socialist International. In addition, all the “auxiliary internationals” of the social-democratic family have been added: Those which comprised the organizations for youth, for women, for doctors and other professions, not forgetting the whole range of cultural and educational organizations tied to it. Finally, especially after World War II, a series of regional “sub-internationals” were organized and are duly represented here. All in all, thirty-nine internationals are listed here, of which twelve are still in existence.

The entries for each international are organized along the same scheme. First, the basic data such as year of foundation and dissolution, etc., are given, together with information about surviving archival records. This can also include personal collections, but, as can be expected, especially among the small prewar internationals, unfortunately nothing survives. This is followed by publications, mainly but not exclusively minutes and other documents of congresses and similar meetings, all arranged chronologically. But this section also contains publications by individual authors, as a rule by leading members of such an international. Though usually these can be regarded as official statements, sometimes they would also express minority positions.

The entries finish with the periodicals of a given international. For all these titles, the libraries have been mentioned where they may be consulted. A appendices lists material presented to these internationals by their member organizations, such as memoranda for congresses, etc. Finally, a list of the libraries with contact addresses rounds off this bibliography.

The bibliographical information is not limited to the original publications. Whenever there are reprints or microfilms, especially of the most important periodicals, their existence is mentioned, though no location beyond the IALHI libraries is given. But these can easily be tracked down in many general research libraries.

Even though this is essentially a tool for further research, two conclusions can nevertheless be drawn from simply browsing through its pages. First, social democracy still remains a mainly European undertaking, even though quite a few extensions into the “Third World” were attempted and many organizations joined, starting in the 1950s. But the organizational presence and force, not the least expressed in its leaders, is shown by the parties and their regroupments in
the European Union (and its antecedents), while all the other regional organizations usually never showed much sign of life. Second, social democracy is now nearly exclusively a political manifestation, or limited to the presence of an “electoral machine” for professional politicians. The vast range of cultural internationals representing a social-democratic Lebenswelt has dried up since the 1950s, after a brief revival in the aftermath of World War II. This, of course, reflects the restructuring of the labor force, especially the decline of the industrial working class. While this has been the subject of many analytical works, even by consulting such a bibliography one gets an idea of the changes brought about in the nature of social democracy.

Obviously such a bibliography cannot be complete, though an enormous effort was made in its preparation. Certainly the publication of this bibliography will stimulate further searches among specialists in the field. Therefore, as a next step, a database will be developed to include all the additions. It will be made available on the website of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Bonn, one of the biggest IALHI members (http://library.fes.de/library/english/si.html).

All in all, the compiler, Gerd Callesen of Copenhagen’s labor history archive, and his many collaborators who have been given their due credit in his introduction (something frequently forgotten in such endeavors), must be thanked for such a useful work. In his introduction, Callesen also provides a brief explanation of the “methodology” for the preparation and the use of this bibliography, and he gives a quick rundown of the Socialist International’s history.

I will end with a suggestion. The internationals under consideration here can essentially be defined as political and cultural ones. However, what is much less documented are the trade union internationals in their different forms: the international trade secretariats, based on the same profession, and above all the international of the national trade union federations (until World War II, the International Federation of Trade Unions and subsequently the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions). Perhaps the initiative of the IALHI to provide an essential bibliographical tool for researchers can be extended to this field?

Reiner Tosstorff
Johannes-Gutenberg Universität, Mainz


From 1954 to 1985, Inge Lammel was the director of the Arbeiterliedarchiev (Labour and Working-Class Songs) at the Academy of the Arts in Berlin. Throughout its life, the Archive remained a small institution with few resources, but in the course of the thirty-five years leading up to 1990, it had collected considerable volumes of printed and unprinted material, scores, songbooks, mem-
oirs, (long before “oral history” had been recognised as a special type of material), gramophone records, tapes, etc.—an effort led by Inge Lammel from the time when the Archive was first established. In 1990, the Archive was more or less closed down, despite the fact that at the time it was the centre of vigorous research activities, not just in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), but also in the Federal Republic of Germany. This component of research into labor and working-class evolution has now largely been discontinued; one of the aims behind this publication is to provide any emerging renewed interest with a point of departure.

From the outset, Lammel had realised the importance of making the material come alive, to contribute towards the recreation of a musical culture which had been brutally uprooted by the Nazi regime in 1933–1945. In principle, this notion was given a warm welcome in the GDR, historian Günter Benser (elected as director in 1990 of the former Institute of Marxism-Leninism) emphasizes in his thought-provoking and self-critical introduction; but attempts to translate official good-will into the creation of a living tradition came up against a wall of indifference among the leading social groups. They displayed their reverence for a gloriously heroic past, but had no political use for it, and, therefore, many of the cultural forms of expression congealed—labour songs became pure bel canto. Benser finds that this duality is characteristic of many phenomena in the GDR.

In the present volume, it is only hinted at here and there that the Archive took an interest in collecting songs of protest from Western Europe and the USA, and that Lammel knew something of developments there (she had been in exile in the United Kingdom during the Nazi years). There is no effort to analyze the question of whether there was any connection at all between, on the one hand, western songs of protest, which can surely be seen as a continuation of the working-class song, and, on the other, the evolution of the culture of songs in the Free German Youth (FDJ) the GDR youth organisation, which for a long time did have the function of being an organ of protest songs. This is not tantamount to saying that Lammel has not studied these matters, but only that they have not been included in this selection, which in principle does not go further than the first 100 years of labor music, that is until 1945. For instance, the lyrics booklet accompanying Unser Leben im Lied. 30 Jahre DDR, from 1979 includes an overview of the working-class music movement from its start up to, and including the FDJ choral groups. In other articles, too, Lammel has analysed the adaptation carried out by the FDJ choral groups of the Socialist traditions, and for this reason it is regrettable that the bibliography does not include all her articles.

The fifteen articles, all of which, with the exception of an article on the revolutionary songs of 1848 (Number 11), date back to the time of the GDR, are characterized by strong inner coherence (a fact that is underlined by the cross-references between the individual articles). There are few repetitions, and as a whole the articles provide a good overview of the evolution of this tradition until 1945. The introductory article is a sort of inventory of the development of the Archive during its first decade, an inventory that is carried forward to other ar-
articles on the proletarian song as an expression of working-class perceptions of life, and of the importance and meaning of songs in the concentration camps (Numbers 8 and 9). In the article, Zum Verhältnis von Arbeiterlied und Volkslied (Number 2), an attempt is made to categorize these two types of songs, a categorization which has an impact on several subsequent contributions. The difference between the two types will seemingly tend to disappear again under certain circumstances, for example, in the concentration camps and in the resistance movement (Numbers 9 and 10). In this article, as well as the one discussing the proletarian song, the working class is perceived fundamentally monolithically (44, 152). The worker is always described in the singular, an approach that does not recur in other articles in which the internal divergences in the working class—especially those of a political nature—are stressed.

Dialectical unity between working-class songs, labor movement, and political struggle emerges very clearly in the articles dealing with working-class songs and the role of the working-class choirs in the early decades of the labor movement (it is, for example, in these texts that parallels to developments in other countries can be established, and which lends relevance to the volume beyond a specific relevance for the German labor movement). In these articles (Numbers 3–6), Lammel examines those choirs that cooperated in the Deutscher-Arbeiter-Sängerbund (German Working-Class Choral Association), and the conflicts that arose already before World War I in this great association, between the politically active members and those who were, in the main, interested in cultural matters. Conflicts peaked in the interwar years during the ultra-left period of the Communist Party of Germany (the time of the “Class-Against-Class” slogan), but apparently the discussion is pursued to the same high degree in the parts of the working-class choral movement dominated by the Social-Democratic party. However, an essential part of the innovative contributions to the repertoire was generated in the Communist movement, and Hanns Eisler in particular played a prominent role. Apart from a separate article analyzing his role (Number 7), he is referred to in many places in the collection of articles.

Three songs are given their own separate analysis: Brüder seht die rote Fahne (the German version of Hold the Fort), Dem Morgenrot entgegen and The International (Number 12–14). Article 11 analyses the revolutionary songs of 1848 and includes an update from 1975, and article 15 deals with the German labor movement’s reception of French revolutionary songs. The article does not go beyond 1920, and thus fails to take on board new trends especially as regards their impact on events in the German Federal Republic in the 1960s.

Finally, the volume publishes an extensive documentation on the international, revolutionary music movement in the years 1932–36. Internationales Musikbüro (IMB) (International Music Bureau) with Hanns Eisler as one of the leading personalities did not survive for long, Stalinism is cited as the reasons for this, and its activities were limited. The influence enjoyed by the IMB outside of the Soviet Union was not considerable. Despite the fact that in the USA there was a comprehensive popular working-class choral tradition, the IMB affiliate, Workers’ Music League only had limited contacts with this movement (242–
The IMB had a certain amount of influence in the German speaking regions in France and Czechoslovakia where, in 1935, two large-scale anti-Fascist choral festivals were successfully held under the aegis of the Popular Front. In addition to its directly political effect, the Popular Front period had another more long-term effect: the transformation of independent working-class music movements into general music associations (280, 282). It would have been rewarding to have further light shed on this problem, something which is, for example, the case for the relationship of intellectuals, artists, and politicians with the Soviet Union during the inter-war years (307, note 190). In connection with the first festival, reference is made to the newspaper *Neue Welt* in Strasbourg (262–63), which was then already being financed by the Third Reich, but was, nevertheless, still expressing working-class views; the paper was originally a Communist publication. There were contacts in other countries but plans to develop a revolutionary movement largely remained just that, plans. However, it is important that by means of this article such efforts have been documented for the first time. Eisler’s activities in the IMB were important and have an impact on his biography.

Some of the central issues in this collection of articles are questions in relation to the development of working-class songs and workers’ choirs. Had they in general been capable of innovating either in form or in content? Was it a tradition that was worthwhile pursuing? Or was it linked to a particular period in history (the nineteenth century), and was it already moribund in the interwar years? Workers’ choirs in today’s Western countries do not seem to have any role to play in the development of working-class culture— in this context, bel canto seems to be the order of the day. Benser touches upon the question in his introduction by referring to the dissolution of the working-class environments in the 1920s, when new forms of mass and leisure time activities began to make themselves felt (and—you might add—the 1950s and 1960s, when many workers moved away from their old neighborhoods and to new surroundings, a fact that also contributed to the dissolution of working-class environments, a type of experience which might not have been so general in the GDR).

These are questions that Lammel raises in several articles and in her documentation of the IMB. Workers’ choirs had an important role to play in the early phase of the movement, they constituted a form of agitation which had an immediate appeal, and which contributed to strengthening a sense of solidarity in the emerging labor movement. The problem consisted in finding suitable lyrics and tunes for the workers’ choirs so that they could fulfill a function in the labor movement beyond this early phase despite the changing circumstances. Lammel puts this into the context of workers’ education, i.e., politically relevant workers’ education. Thus, she touches upon the entire evolution of the labor movement and the split, which arose within the movement between the revolutionaries and the reformists. The problem was considerable, because in developing its own cultural position, the labor movement had to base itself, partly, on the best elements in the culture that were handed down (it was, as Lammel explains in the articles on the Beethoven and Händel reception, not a problem), and part-
ly, had to develop new elements and forms reflecting the movement's own political and cultural stance. At least in the field of music, this proved to be quite difficult. One of the very early working-class composers, Gustav Uthman, insisted that choirs were an integral part of the movement and produced choral works with a political content. However, they did not have much artistic merit, but they were much loved by the choristers, as documented by Lammel, because of the political substance.

During the interwar years, the schism between the political Kampflied or Tendenzlied and artistic merit became more pronounced; only to some extent was this schism coincidental with the split between Social Democrats and Communists. The opposition in the Arbeiter Sängerbund consisted of Social-Democrats as well as Communists. Communist choirs only constituted a minority among the opposition, and were, as Lammel points out, affected by revolutionary impatience. However, she fails to explain the reasons for the revolutionary choristers' impatience, i.e., she does not touch upon the politico-theoretical development of the Communist Party of Germany or the Comintern during the ultra-left years, and subsequently during the Popular Front years when new types of flawed assessments saw the light of day. However, no clear explanation is provided of the way in which the Communist-inspired chorister opposition acted during the ultra-left period. The guidelines of the opposition rejected a split of the Arbeiter Sängerbund, something that is in stark contrast to what happened in the trade-union field (300, note 107).

The main lines in the Arbeiter Sängerbund and the apolitical artistic choral tradition definitely coincided. It is true that the main line was Social-Democratic politically speaking, but it took no interest in acting politically — this state of affairs became very obvious in the years after World War II when German working-class choirs broke all ties with the rest of the labor movement (and, similar to what happened to the working-class sports movement, relinquished its independence). This lack of functionality, which was characteristic of the artistic and apolitical line, has certainly contributed to the decline of working-class choirs: if people wanted to sing, they might as well join a non-political, bourgeois choir. Working-class culture is only emancipatory if it is political. Examples of this can be seen in many countries.

In the GDR, too, such lack of functionality was the destiny of working-class choral singing to the point that it became purely bel canto, as indicated above. The articles do not reveal this, so this is a subject still open for discussion. This is true of a number of other problems — Lammel's articles constitute an important point of departure for allowing this discussion to be pursued while, at the same time, being a central source of inspiration for understanding the meaning and role of working-class choral activities before 1945. The volume can be read in parallel with another of Lammel's publications, Arbeitermusikkultur in Deutschland 1844–1945. Bilder und Dokumente, (Leipzig 1984).

Gerd Callesen
Arbejderbevaegelsens Bibliotek og Arkiv, Copenhagen
Even the most casual student of the French Revolution cannot fail to be struck by the variety and sheer quantity of political imagery produced during that era. Despite the revolutionaries' explicit distrust of visual images, which they associated with the idolatry of the Old Regime, politically inspired pictorial caricature, satire, and allegory poured forth from the presses, reaching ever-wider audiences, both literate and illiterate. Until twenty years ago, historians tended to dismiss this visual record as a holdover from the era of absolutist monarchy, focusing instead on the "foundational role of language and political discourse in accounting for the demise of the Old Regime" (6). Many of the revolutionary period's most prominent scholars, including Keith Michael Baker, François Furet, and Jürgen Habermas, have, as Joan Landes points out, effectively defined culture as "the sum of so many printed words on a page" (6). Landes does not exempt herself from this critique, confessing that in her earlier work, she too, "described the decisive historical passage from French absolutism to bourgeois society as an opposition between the iconic spectacularity of the Old Regime and the textual and legal order of the bourgeois public sphere" (6). In Visualizing the Nation, Landes now follows in the path of scholars such as Antoine de Baecque, Lynn Hunt, Michel Vovelle, Madelyn Gutwirth, and Mona Ozouf in arguing for the importance of "images as vehicles for the exchange of ideas and the making of political arguments" (3).

Landes' primary concern here is not with the cultural function of visual representation in general but rather with the significance of the striking profusion of images of women. At the center of Landes' study lies a historical contradiction: While the visual record of the revolutionary period is dominated by female imagery (including the ubiquitous female allegories of the Republic and Liberty), republicans consistently denied real women access to full citizenship rights and explicitly confined their political role to that of mothers of future French citizens. If women had such a limited role to play in the Revolution, Landes asks, then why were "women's bodies everywhere to be found in public imagery?" (6). In more politically abstract terms, how can we account for "the surprising feminine face of the aggressively masculine version of revolutionary French nationalism?" (18). The predominance of feminine imagery is made all the more striking, she notes, in the context of revolutionaries' incessant condemnation of "the excessively feminized and feminizing dimension of the old body politic," (73) a campaign documented most graphically in the torrent of pornographic images of Marie Antoinette. In Visualizing the Nation, Landes seeks to explain both "the power of gendered imagery in helping (negatively) to destroy the icons and symbols of Old Regime state and society and (affirmatively) to create a new citizen body within a republican nation-state" (3).

On the most pragmatic level, the embodiment of the republic as abstract female enabled revolutionaries to draw a graphic distinction between the revo-
olutionary nation and the absolutist state represented by the body of the king. The female form, in this interpretation, was made to embody the people's sovereignty as a replacement for the male body that was too closely associated with the Old Régime. More importantly, however, the abstract women of republican iconography amounted to a reclaiming, a redemption, of the corrupted female body of the Old Régime. In the female-embodied republic, Landes maintains, “the sinful female body ( . . . ) is made over into a virtuous (and virginal) republican body” (73). This redemption served the dual function of excising the old (male) gendered political allegory and setting up a new one in which the female nation “seems almost to call out for the protection of virile republican men” (73). The iconic feminine figure of La République thus at once banished the corrupted symbols of the Old Régime and offered a new embodiment of the nation for the masculine citizenry.

Landes’ explanation for the paradox of feminine revolutionary iconography goes beyond the political benefits garnered by Republicans by breaking with the past. Like Lynn Hunt, whose work she liberally credits, Landes argues that the apparent contradiction between women's symbolic and actual political roles was not a contradiction at all but rather a crucial source of the female images' political effectiveness. “The exclusion of women from the practice of revolution and their inclusion in representation,” Landes insists, “reaffirmed the masquerade of equality within the masculine republic” (22). The perpetuation of this “myth of full equality” in turn “facilitated, as much as it exposed, the denial to women of the full exercise of equal rights within the democratic republic,” (22) thus closing the circle of logic. The very denial of political rights to women freed female images to serve the abstract political purpose of embodying popular sovereignty and the abstract nation. It is ironic but hardly inexplicable that “the more women were deprived of an individual presence in the public arena, the more likely those faceless women could stand in for a range of political values or positions” (127).

Landes’ most original contribution to the burgeoning literature on revolutionary images comes in her final chapter where she considers “the female body of France” as a “sexualized body” rather than simply an abstract symbol (145). Pointing to numerous images of a voluptuous République, often coyly semi-clothed with exposed breasts, Landes argues that patriotic passion and sexual passion are closely linked in several ways. On the one hand, the sexualized figure of La Patrie or La République, “invites the embrace of her male suitors,” the citizenry of the nation (153). On the other hand, the female-bodied nation invokes the mother and wife whom the citizen “pledged to protect and honor, under the aegis of the nation” (137). One need not accept Landes’ Freudian proposal that “by yoking man’s repressed love for his mother to the abstract nation, men are bound together as citizen-subjects,” (165) to appreciate the overtly sexualized meaning behind the numerous images of the virile rescue of virginal France.

Landes begins and ends her book with a plea for the multivalent potential of images, an instability of meaning that troubled revolutionaries as much as it
stimulates modern historians. “Images,” Landes asserts, “disrupt as well as secure desired identifications” (1). Did the female images of France, the Republic, or Liberty have their makers’ desired effect of binding men to the nation and women to the home? Or was that interpretation “subverted in a resistant reading” (171) that perceived the “real social and political inequality” so artfully disguised by “women’s lofty place in the order of representation?” (82). Landes provides no answers to these important, but perhaps unanswerable questions. Still, in Visualizing the Nation Landes offers readers a useful synthesis of the rich literature on revolutionary images, bringing to the subject a sharp eye for visual analysis and an unflinching insistence that the gendered forms that they assumed were neither accidental nor innocent. Building on her seminal work in Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution (1988), Landes demonstrates convincingly that gender lay at the very heart of the revolutionary political order.

Katrin Schultheiss
University of Illinois at Chicago


Christian Chevandier’s Cheminots en Greve is a social, political, and institutional history of railroad workers in France from 1848 to 2001. It is told from the standpoint of the role of strikes in forming the occupational identity of these workers, known in France as cheminots (Chevandier finds the earliest use of the expression dating back to 1898; by the 1930s the Academie Francaise officially recognized it as a French word). Cheminots belong to various crafts and trades. They drive the trains, repair locomotives and rolling stock in shops and factories, sell tickets in stations and collect them in trains. Although the book is largely structured around a chronological account of railway strikes, Chevandier looks beyond the strike for sources of cheminot identity. These include the evolving structure of the French railroad system from private companies to state ownership, the role of skill and technological change, and especially union strategies, structures, and above all divisions. Along the way he revisits earlier treatments of French labor and railworker history, and takes up old historiographical controversies debating, confirming, and refuting well-known scholars from Annie Kriegel to historians of a younger generation like George Ribeill and A tsushi Fukasawa.

Cheminots have a reputation in France as militant workers and Chevandier offers iconographical evidence to this reputation, including discussions of films like La Bete Humaine featuring Jean Gabin as a steam locomotive engineer, La Bataille du Rail, and the more recent Nadia et les Hippotames. However, the reader gets little sense of how they compared in strike behavior to other French workers. Although a reference to Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly’s
Strikes in France, 1830–1968 (1974) is the first of the book’s hundreds of footnotes, the author missed an opportunity to place the cheminots in a broader context by systematically drawing from this or other quantitative studies of French strikes. Nonetheless, Chevandier draws from a vast amount of primary and secondary sources and the results are impressive.

Chevandier, who teaches at the University of Paris, Sorbonne, is well positioned to write such an ambitious book. He is the author of numerous articles on railway workers, a contributor to the vast Jean Maitron biographical collection of French worker activists, and author of Cheminots en usine, a book based on his 1025-page dissertation on workers in the Paris-Lyon-Mediterranean (PLM) locomotive shops in Oullins, an industrial suburb of Lyon. There too, Chevandier focused on identity. The Oullins workers worked in a factory at traditional metal working trades. Nevertheless, their employment in a PLM shop helped foster a corporative identity as railway workers.

In this latest, nationwide look at cheminots, Chevandier sees the source of cheminot identity as a mélange of cultures including those of skilled worker, public sector worker, and part of a corporation seen as vital to the nation. All of this came together in strikes. By the beginning of the Third Republic the cheminots have the “consciousness of belonging to a distinct social group even when they work in factories” and other industrial sites (40).

The first general rail strike is in 1910. The frightened government of Aristide Briand considered it a “purely insurrectional” strike and took the extraordinary step of militarizing the lines, thus putting the cheminots under military authority and discipline. Although no more than a third of the workforce of any rail line actually struck, Chevandier considers this strike of the utmost importance for the formation of cheminot identity. Indeed he calls it the first cheminot strike because, “beyond craft particularities, the proletarian world of the workers in the depots and shops and the skilled world of conductors and engineers ( . . . ) united in one sole corporation in struggle” (77).

Chevandier offers a sustained discussion of the fateful 1920 rail strike. That strike was brutally crushed by a conservative government fearing the Russian-style revolutionary situation that seemed to be developing from Italy to Seattle. Some union leaders were jailed while hundreds of others were fired and blacklisted for years. The experience chilled cheminot protest impulses to such a degree that no significant strike occurred on French railroads throughout the 1920s and 1930s, including the May-June 1936 strikes—France’s largest ever until 1968. It is also been an ongoing source of debate amongst historians and labor militants ever since.

The strike was at the center of Annie Kriegel’s famous dissertation and later book Aux origines du Communisme Français whose main thesis is that communism was foreign to the traditions of the French labor movement and was artificially grafted onto it. Chevandier credits Kriegel with developing pioneering quantitative research methods of analyzing strikes (which were based on archival evidence since destroyed during the renovation of the Gare de Lyon) but sees methodological problems flowing from her short-term vision of the
strike (strange in Chevandier’s eyes, as Kriegel wrote her dissertation under the direction of Ernest Labrousse, a proponent of the “longue duree”). He also sees the conditions and period under which she wrote Aux origines to have had a detrimental effect on her analyses. When Kriegel began her dissertation in 1955 she was a full-time Parti Communiste Français (PCF) official. The next year she left the party in protest of the Soviet invasion of Hungary. By the time she published an updated version of the portions of her work dealing with the strike of 1920 against the background of the 1986 transportation strikes, she had become a journalist for the conservative daily, Le Figaro. Chevandier finds these vantage points problematic because they prevented her from grasping the “emancipatory” antihierarchical sentiments of the cheminots expressed “from below.”

A central theme of this book is the divisions within the French labor movement and their effects on the trade unions. Division in the French labor movement was often directly a reflection of the clash of the political forces allied with each union confederation.

Early divisions included struggles between “revolutionaries” and “reformists,” centralizers and federalists, anarchists who insisted on strict working-class independence from all politicians and socialists like Jules Guesde who viewed unions as subordinate to working-class political parties. Later, many revolutionary syndicalists joined forces with the pro-PCF split off from the Confederation Génerale du Travail (CGT) in 1921, the CGTU. But many of those later left. In the 1930s the CGT and CGTU fused into a larger, PCF-controlled CGT. By 1938 seventy percent of all railworkers were CGT members. But in later years the CGT had to compete with other union federations like the CFDT, CFTC, and FO.

Communist trade unionists benefited at times from the prestige that the Soviet Union enjoyed in the eyes of many workers in France in the 1920s and 1930s. But at other times these same connections put Communist union officials in impossible positions. For example, while the Stalin-Hitler pact was widely denounced as a betrayal in labor circles, PCF trade unionists defended it. Such support led immediately to the end of Pierre Semard’s leadership of the CGT rail union. In 1947 the PCF and CGT opposed popular strikes because the PCF was in the government. In fact, they even initiated a Stakhanovist-like productivist program by which the PCF and the CGT encouraged increased production and discouraged strikes. The appointment of PCF leader Charles Fiterman as transportation minister under Mitterrand in the 1980s led to the same contradictions. CGT and PCF support for the crackdown against Solidarnosc in Poland in 1981 was also difficult to explain. In each of these circumstances, union membership declined.

After 1968 new phenomena began to emerge in the French labor movement. While earlier tensions led to the replacement of one set of leaders by another and the occasional formation of rival unions, all established union structures were now under attack. By the 1980s strike committees and coordinations were formed outside of what was perceived as the antidemocratic, bureaucratic leadership of the main unions. Chevandier explains these developments in
French labor in part as the delayed effects of the May 1968 strikes and student demonstrations as well as the increasing educational levels of French workers. In spite of the efforts of union bureaucrats to isolate Trotskyists and Maoist revolutionaries from young workers in May 1968, these workers did come into contact with and imbibe some of the militant, antibureaucratic values these political currents incarnated. During the postal and rail strikes in these sectors in the mid-1990s these workers founded new, more militant and democratic unions in the rail and postal sectors called the SU D.

The author concludes his book by characterizing a century and a half of cheminot strikes as continuity within change. Christian Chevandier has indeed made the case that while the forms of the debates within rail unions and nationwide debates on the character of public service at the dawn of the twenty-first century may look original, most do have deep roots. Plus ça change ( . . .).

Keith Mann
Cardinal Stritch University


In the last decade Donna R. Gabaccia has spearheaded American efforts to compare and theorize about Italian emigrant workers in the Americas and Europe. In the 1980s she published two monographs that followed village-outward methods to examine the culture and politics of Sicilians in the United States. Her two books under review here, one edited with Fraser Ottanelli, are bursting with insightful comparisons and reflections upon Italy’s “many diasporas.” They illuminate Italians’ diverse roles in nation-building processes, how international and national commitments mingled, reinforced, or qualified one another, and how emigration shaped the history of modern Italy. Italian Workers of the World, the fruit of a well-coordinated international research project about the Italian working class on three continents, brings together essays that speak to one another across historiographical and linguistic traditions thanks to Gabaccia’s and Ottanelli’s editorial discipline. Italy’s Many Diasporas showcases Gabaccia’s gifts as a synthesizer of literature from many languages, and as a careful and concise historiographer. Both books are timely contributions that add empirical weight and measured theorizing to studies of transnationalism and international history.

Gabaccia and Ottanelli divide their collaborators’ essays, originally presented at a conference in Tampa, Florida in 1996, into three chronological parts. Gabaccia and Fernando Devoto investigate the role of elite political migrants
whose efforts to cultivate national solidarity before and during the wars of Italian unification (1830–1870) brought Italian laborers in Europe and South America into the revolutionary camp more quickly than their counterparts on the Italian peninsula. Gabaccia stresses the importance of Italian regions and cities as reference points for Italians-in-the-making abroad before the Risorgimento culminated in the proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy in 1861. Devoto shows how, in Argentina, diplomatic agents of the Kingdom of Sardinia loyal to the House of Savoy helped convert republican supporters of Mazzini and Garibaldi into followers of King Victor Emmanuel and his leading minister, Camillo Benso di Cavour.

The five essays in part two address class, nation, and internationalism in the Americas during the mass proletarian migration from the 1880s to World War I. If republican or national ideologies had limited success transcending class boundaries among emigrants before the Risorgimento, the reworking of those ideologies by the 1880s severely limited ethnic solidarity as class factors took on increased importance in both rural and urban environments. Carina Frid de Silberstein's analysis of rural militants in the Argentine Pampas demonstrates the limits of Italianità when the Federación Agraria Argentina, founded in 1912, eventually lost the support of the elite Italian reformists and reworked more radical symbols from Argentine civic life to reach other radical agriculturalists and not middle-class ethnic Italians. Similarly, Michael Miller Topp, in his exploration of the Lawrence strike of 1912, acknowledges that ethnic solidarity could be used to foster class solidarity. But cathartic moments when middle-class prominenti might support Italian mill workers were exceptionally rare. Topp explains how gender, class, and divergent notions of the Italian nation divided the ethnic community. In both Argentina and the United States radical ethnic brokers constructed conflicting visions of the meaning of the Italian nation and the true significance of the host society. While Carlo Tresca, for instance, left Lawrence with an intensified connection to a multiethnic North American working class, Edmondo Rossoni considered support for the Wobblies (Industrial Workers of the World) and for an imagined, radicalized America mutually exclusive.

The four essays in part three of Italian Workers of the World analyze how working-class leaders and movements in the Americas and France forged an international antifascism during the interwar years. In Argentina and France national labor movements had encouraged multiethnic mingling in pursuit of universalist ideals and Italians in those nations melted into unhyphenated Argentines and Frenchmen, respectively. In the United States, however, a xenophobic mainstream labor movement committed to moderate reform had already consolidated workers into segmented labor organizations separated by race and ethnicity. Because antifascism linked Italian workers to Italy and to the countries where they worked, national and international solidarity were not in opposition. Pietro Rinaldo Fanelli explains how Italian antifascists in Latin America employed the Garibaldi tradition to both contest the legitimacy of fascism in Italy and ease their transition as new citizens of Italian origin. Ottanelli, like most of
the authors in this volume, tracks leaders and activists. His essay on Italian American antifascism demonstrates how their class-conscious struggle against fascism renewed Italian American workers’ sense of ethnic identity as it offered “a vehicle through which they were incorporated into U.S. society” (179). Antonio Bechelloni takes up the important problem of sorting out types of antifascists in France, and he illuminates the vague boundaries between political and economic migrants from Italy.

Unlike previous edited volumes that bring together essays on Italians outside of Italy, Gabaccia and Ottanelli have more or less successfully nudged their contributors to engage common questions and themes, and their rich introduction helps the reader draw comparative conclusions. Thus, even though some of the authors synthesize work from already published books—such as Elizabetta Vezzosi on Italian American socialists, Topp on Italian syndicalists in the United States, and Nadia Venturini on Italians and African Americans in Harlem during the Ethiopia War—the volume successfully asks and answers difficult comparative questions about class, nationalism, and the position of labor movements in nation building.

Gabaccia’s concise historiographical essay, *Italy’s Many Diasporas*, written for the *Global Diasporas* Series edited by Robin Cohen, synthesizes a vast array of material into a readable and accessible analytic narrative. Attune to the diverse uses of terms such as “dialect” and “transnational” in different social scientific contexts, Gabaccia herself is not quite convinced that the dispersion of people from the lands that would become modern Italy in 1861 constitutes a single diaspora. In addition, she is adverse to employing “Italy” or “Italian” as a stable and meaningful ascription of the people within the Italian state. After “hedging the terms ‘Italian’ and ‘diaspora’ with many qualifications,” Gabaccia explains, she “nevertheless believe[s] it heuristically helpful to imagine the possibility of a single Italian diaspora” (9).

Reaching back into the late medieval period, Gabaccia quietly aligns herself with historians who see continuities between early modern migrations and the monumental century of mass migrations that began in post-Napoleonic Europe. She investigates how elite early modern Italian artists, traders, and missionaries exported civiltà italiana as representatives of the cultural center of European civilization. Even as sixteenth and seventeenth-century Italy declined as an economic and political force when the center of power and commerce shifted toward the Atlantic from the Mediterranean world, migrants from Italy’s many patrie, such as Venice, Rome, or Genova, exported civiltà italiana long before the mass proletarian migration of the nineteenth century. This civiltà italiana, however, was not a sturdy foundation for modern nationalism constructed by elites struggling to unify a politically fragmented peninsula into a modern state in the nineteenth century.

Chapters that follow investigate modern Italian nationalism during and after the proclamation of the Italian kingdom in 1861, and follow similar themes explored in the essays of *Italian Workers of the World*. Gabaccia argues that “neither Italy’s creation nor the movement to define a new nation of Italians can be
understood apart from the country’s migrations and many diasporas” (35). Her synthesis of scholarship on the exodus of Italian workers after 1880, their transnational way of life, the mingling of national and international sensibilities among those workers of the world, the international struggle between fascism and antifascism in the interwar years, and Italy’s postwar character as a receiving nation, reads primarily like the work of a labor historian discussing the relationship of class to nationalism. Gabaccia only offers passing notice to the presence of the hostile Vatican in Rome, its territorial claims to sovereignty over central Italy, and its exhaustive diplomatic efforts to weaken and unravel the Italian kingdom, activities that constituted the greatest threat to the new state before 1890. This “Roman Question” deeply conditioned Italian foreign policy and approaches to emigration. Italy’s Many Diasporas does not do full justice to the problem of a revitalized and militant antimodern Catholicism in Italy and the many states receiving Italian emigrants. Furthermore, while I would agree that Italian distrust and even hostility toward the state was terribly important, I wonder whether Gabaccia makes too much of it when it comes to the diasporas where consulates often became significant players in “colonial” politics, and authentic symbols of the nation. These qualifications reflect, in part, the still underdeveloped state of scholarship on political Catholicism and migration, and on the role of consuls in Italy’s diasporas.

Notwithstanding these reservations, Italy’s Many Diasporas offers the best analytic survey of any single national group of emigrants viewed over the longue durée and framed within a global context.

Peter R. D’Agostino
University of Illinois at Chicago


Scholars in both the US and Germany have studied the American occupation of Germany extensively. Until recently, however, much of that work focused on the emerging Cold War rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union to explain the rapid shift from an occupation intended to punish the Germans to one that increasingly included West Germans as partners and allies. While not dismissing the importance of the Cold War struggle in shaping US foreign policy, John Willoughby suggests that a more comprehensive understanding of how American power was projected during the Cold War is only possible if attention is shifted from the policy makers in Washington to the players on the ground. By exploring how the American military government dealt with the chaotic social and economic conditions within Germany, the widespread disciplinary problems of American GIs, and the pervasive racism within the military, Willoughby makes a compelling argument that US foreign policy and the “institutions of occupation” were transformed by the “more mundane problems of social
control and organizational capability” (3). The American objectives in Germany changed, not because of the Cold War, but because financial pressures, personnel shortages, and economic disarray forced military authorities to hand over power to the Germans much sooner than envisioned by Washington. While Willoughby—by his own admission—does not provide new material to the professional historian of the era, his book nonetheless offers a fresh interpretation that draws on social and cultural history while also paying attention to race and gender.

One of the biggest challenges facing the American military in the closing months of the war, and for two years after cessation of hostilities, was not a restless and resentful German population but the lawless behavior and insubordination of American troops. American occupation soldiers attacked German civilians, “requisitioned” their cameras, and used hand grenades to go “fishing” in local ponds (28). Soldiers also looted American military supplies to make a fast buck, and the GIs’ monthly cigarette and liquor rations fuelled the thriving black market. As Willoughby shows, in July 1945, American soldiers stationed in Berlin were paid one million dollars, but sent home four million (21). Military discipline also suffered because American officers and enlisted men, despite a strict non-fraternization order, fraternized extensively with German women. Many GIs fell in love, but plenty others took advantage of the utter misery in Germany’s bombed-out cities to trade food and protection for sex and domestic services. This unflattering view of America’s occupation of Germany is largely forgotten in popular memory, but in the immediate postwar years, American newspapers regularly informed the reading public that the GIs’ behavior undermined the American mission in Germany. Billy Wilder’s 1947 comedy, A Foreign Affair (surprisingly not mentioned by Willoughby), brought the pervasiveness of the problem to a larger US audience when it showed a United States congressional delegation arriving in the ruins of Berlin to investigate the “moral malaria” infecting American occupation troops. The military commander awaiting the delegation informed his troops that Washington assumed that the military occupation was “one great picnic” and that soldiers were “swinging in hammocks with blond Fräuleins, swapping cigarettes for castles on the Rhine and soaking their feet in sparkling Moselle.” He implored his soldiers to be on their best behavior while also assuring them that the army was not a “boy scout camp” and that “you can’t pin sergeant stripes on an archangel.”

As Willoughby shows, turning the army into a boy-scout camp was exactly what needed be done if the US hoped to establish a working relationship with its German “collaborators” (74). A fearsome and all-white constabulary force was to reign in the disciplinary problems of the GIs, while an extensive benefits program was created to offer the soldiers movies, libraries, travel, and educational opportunities. Wives and children were allowed to join their husbands in Germany, “Little American” bases were created to separate the soldiers from the German population, and by December 1946, German women were allowed to marry American soldiers and join the American “military family.” This domestication of the “Conquering Heroes,” Willoughby argues, made possible the
reassertion of German male authority in gender relations, which was a crucial precondition for the easy acceptance of the American military buildup in Germany in the 1950s. At the same time, the newly “domesticated” army reconciled American public opinion to the extensive military base system that projected US power during the Cold War.

Integrating African Americans into the Cold War military family proved much more daunting given the military’s entrenched segregationist views, and Willoughby mercilessly reveals the occupation authorities’ racism. While not ignoring the impact of the Korean War in shifting segregationist attitudes within the military, Willoughby also credits the “quiet efforts” of military commanders in Germany after 1947. The rigorous military training and education set in place by the military to better control all of its troops also significantly improved the morale and performance of African American GIs, convincing many a commander that “racial differences in behavior were not immutable” (133). Thus, when integration finally came during the Korean War, Willoughby argues, the American military in Germany was well prepared to implement it.

Scholars of the American military and America’s postwar empire will be grateful for Willoughby’s thoughtful and novel reading of the occupation years. However, for scholars interested in German history and German-American relations, Willoughby’s heavy reliance on secondary sources and his refusal to engage with the rich scholarship of the last two decades will come as a disappointment. Willoughby, an economic historian by training, is the first to acknowledge that he could have consulted more archives and more current historical contributions, but he was convinced that he had the “story right” (xi). Much of the story is right, but not all of Willoughby’s conclusions are on target. Making African American GIs part of the “military family” was hardly the easy process described by Willoughby. When integration finally came between 1952 and 1954 it happened largely because the Soviets and East Germans were making the continuing segregation of the American military a battle cry in their Cold War propaganda. Without enormous pressure from the State Department, military commanders in Germany would have stuck to their belief that integration could only come in another one hundred years. The inclusion of German women into the Cold War military family—a crucial component in normalizing German-American relations according to Willoughby—was also not as unproblematic as he suggests. Although the marriage ban was lifted in December 1946, GIs were only allowed to marry German women four months before their end of duty in Germany. This policy was in place until November 1954 and was to ensure that German women could not become members of the American “military family.” Furthermore, despite extensive leisure and educational programs, the GIs hardly became the boy-scout army officials had hoped for. Because the military did not pay travel and housing expenses for military personnel below the rank of E-5, the “domestication” of the military was not as thorough as described by Willoughby. A large proportion of GIs in Germany were young, single and lower ranking grunts and throughout the 1950s, cycles of GI misbehavior troubled the German-American alliance. Rising discontent over the Vietnam War and
black GIs’ frustrations with the slow pace of the Civil Rights movement in the US brought another wave of GI violence in the 1960s and 1970s.

With this slim volume of just 151 pages, Willoughby makes a convincing argument that the “experience of the occupation army shaped US policy toward Germany and thus changed the parameters of the Cold War” (xi). Anyone interested in how the “disarray” and “venality” (5) of the first two years of the occupation were turned into the celebration of the American century during the Eisenhower years will be well advised to read it.

Maria Höhn
Vassar College


A persistent rumor has it that the Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis/International Institute for Social History (IISG) in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, does not intend to continue publishing its series of documentation of central elements of its archives. Editions of this kind are extremely work-intensive and time-consuming, and the institution can no longer afford to finance them. This is what is at the core of the rumor: the IISG has to find money from outside funds in order to finance these editions, but entertains no plans to discontinue the publication of these central sources. If this rumor were true, however, it would be highly deplorable, something which the present volume amply substantiates.

This volume is number three of four planned volumes of the correspondence between Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky and covers a total of 1000 items. The first two volumes will cover the exchange of letters between the two men during the years 1879 to 1891 and 1891 to 1895, respectively, i.e., items 1-296 and 297-496; the volume under review covers the years 1895 to 1905 with items 497-804; the last volume is to cover items 805-962 for the years 1912-1933—as Bernstein died in December 1932. The logic of the latter year does not spring to mind, but perhaps Kautsky wrote an obituary? The edition is a joint project between Bremen University and the IISG and has been underway since 1974, and now the first of the four volumes has been published; volume 1 is said to be in preparation. It is to be hoped that the two remaining volumes will, in fact, see the light of day.

It is slightly misleading to have this volume cover the period up to 1905, as between May 1900 and January 1905 only four short letters exist, and the correspondence as such is only really resumed in 1912 without, however, achieving the degree of intensity that characterizes the years 1895 to 1900.

Bernstein’s and Kautsky’s discussions are, of course, historically relevant as they were at the centre of the emerging “revisionism debate.” But they are cer-
tainly not uninteresting when it comes to assessing present-day theoretical discussions. They discuss such subjects as democracy and socialism and materialist versus ethical arguments in favor of socialism, subjects that will remain important for as long as there is a socialist (labor) movement. The present review, however, focuses on the historic aspects.

In addition to the introduction (vii–liv) and the documents themselves (3–998), the volume includes about sixty pages of various registers. The editor has found it necessary to make each letter capable of being read in isolation, and has therefore provided each individual letter with copious annotations, which does, of course, mean that many of the notes are repeated. There are arguments in favor of this page-consuming method, as the assumption that many of the letters are going to be read out of context is probably correct, so even if there are cross references the comprehensive annotations seem justified.

Kautsky’s development and politico-scholarly position have been made the subject of many fairly recent studies and analyses. These works tend to assess him in a differentiated light compared to the party line criticism that was the predominant element during the period in which Kautsky was of immediate political relevance. This period lasted well into the 1970s when the above-mentioned more recent analyses began to see the light of day. Only to a limited extent was Bernstein the subject of similar studies; considering how important his contribution to Social-Democratic thought was he has been very much overlooked. One noteworthy exception is Bo G ustafsson’s doctoral thesis, Marxism och revisionism, about Bernstein (German edition Frankfurt/M. 1972). The way in which he distanced himself from any Marxist basis was much too obvious to leave him any role in post-war theoretical debates. Only from the late 1970s are attempts made by theoretically inclined Social-Democrats to take his position onboard in political discussions. Before that, he had only been made use of as a political bogeyman by all non-Social-Democratic parties and groups on the Left. Compared to Kautsky, the volume of research involving Bernstein remains modest, but 1997 saw— and till now this is the most recent attempt—a scholarly biography by M anfred B. Steiger, The Quest for Evolutionary Socialism: Eduard Bernstein and Social Democracy, (Cambridge U niversity Press). Steiger apparently claims that Bernstein’s brand of ethical reformism was capable of changing, “the entire Gestalt of Marxist socialism” (4). Steiger seems not to have grasped that socialism based on ethics has generally very little kinship with Marxism.

In 1895, Bernstein and Kautsky had been collaborating for fifteen years and had developed a close personal friendship; in lengthy letters they told each other of everything that affected them. In addition to this, they were the preferred collaborators of Friedrich Engels and took part in preparing Marx’s manuscripts for posthumous publication. For many years, they had both been representatives of the Marxist line within the German Social-Democratic Party (the SPD) — not as its only, but certainly as some of its most prominent spokesmen: Bernstein as the editor of the party’s underground weekly the Der Sozialdemokrat (until 1890), and Kautsky since 1883 as the editor of the theoretical periodical, the Die
neue Zeit, which by 1895 had developed into the leading international periodical for socialist discussion. After Engels’ death in 1895, their position as the most prominent theoreticians had been strengthened despite the fact that as a consequence of a personal conflict with Kautsky, Engels had removed him from his will as responsible for the manuscripts left behind by Marx as well as himself. Marx’s two surviving daughters—Eleanor Marx-Aveling and Laura Lafargue—had certain rights over these manuscripts, but in the main, editorial work was to be effected by Bernstein and August Bebel, the president of the SPD. In real terms, this meant that it was Bernstein on his own, as Bebel did not have the time necessary to handle this job on top of everything else, who would handle this task. During the early years, Bernstein and Kautsky seem to have taken charge of this task more or less between them in that Kautsky made the Die neue Zeit available for first-time publications and reprints of shorter texts—very often with an introduction provided by Bernstein. Furthermore, Kautsky was in the process of publishing Marx’s Theories of Surplus Value, from time to time referred to in the correspondence as the fourth volume of Capital. This work was published in the years 1905 to 1910. Thus, the correspondence under review here, took place between the two most prominent theoreticians in the international labor movement.

The correspondence clearly shows that the two men certainly did not underestimate themselves, but possibly to some extent the members of the SPD. They frequently complained about the moderate interest taken in their theoretical efforts and the shortfall in support provided by the party (64). While Engels had also seen it as a problem that so few had the opportunity to work with theoretical issues, he had at the same time perceived the actual movement as the most important force for learning (education of the educators). Bernstein and Kautsky apparently did not see this aspect as being especially important, although both of them had been in a position to observe Engels’ reaction to the party opposition in 1890 which, initially, he welcomed because it dissolved a number of rigid structures. Schelz-Brandenburg discusses the considerations concerning the position of the party and its relationship with theoretical work as the problem appeared between the two men (xi–xiv). Most likely, it was a problem especially for Bernstein following the autumn of 1890 when the SPD had become a lawful political party and the underground weekly of the party was no longer published. Bernstein could not return from his exile in London to Germany as he and a few others were wanted by the police—it was not until 1900 that a general amnesty was issued for all of them. Nor was Kautsky deeply rooted in the German organization—formally he was an Austrian national, and for this reason he could not take an active part in the German party activities.

Light is shed on the relationship between theoretical work and practical political activity in this correspondence, furthermore, it was necessary to continue to develop Marxist theory and it had to be adjusted to actual developments. Among some of the old party members, and especially in Wilhelm Liebknecht, there was a tendency to take Marx’ words literally, to stick to earlier conclusions and positions rather than giving priority to the Marxist method, something which
was to have an impact on the SPD’s international policy, a field in which Liebknecht had the predominant influence. However, Bernstein and Kautsky saw the necessity of further developing the theory, in addition to their new assessments of international matters (xxvii–xxxiii). This was particularly reflected in two important fields: one was agricultural policy, which was discussed at the SPD congress in 1895 and which led to a dogmatic approach to the problem being adopted—here Kautsky was chiefly responsible. To be sure, he had wanted to see a postponement of a decision, because he wanted to have a complete analysis of the set of problems relating to agricultural policy. The SPD’s failure to analyse the situation prevented the party from establishing an alliance with the farmers and their political representatives—which, in turn, made it impossible for the party to establish a presence in the rural areas (note 55, xxiv). This was one of the reasons why the SPD could not carry out agitation in the countryside and thus the party did not find broad support among agricultural laborers. The second field was the more general issue of the relationship between the immediate objectives of the movement and the end goal, the issue that was to be known as the “revisionism debate.” Bernstein’s famous statement about the final goal and the movement is quoted in note 33 (xviii), (here translated into English): “I openly admit that I take very little interest in and don’t find much sense in what is normally referred to as the ‘final goal of socialism’. This goal, whatever it may be, means nothing to me— the movement means everything.”

Bernstein opened the public debate in a long series of articles in the Die neue Zeit (Probleme des Sozialismus) and wrote himself further and further away from the immediate political objectives of the party, its economic analysis, its programmatic platform, and the materialist approach to history. In his opinion this was not tantamount to distancing himself from Marxism: originally his series of articles was seen as a break with obsolete positions so that it would be possible to stick with the method. Kautsky agreed with Bernstein, and the correspondence includes much evidence of this. But as Bernstein’s assessments developed, and as other SPD Marxists, Parvus, Luxemburg and others—as well as representatives of other Social-Democratic parties, for instance Plekhanov—aimed their criticism against Bernstein, Kautsky was also forced to develop his own criticism, one point of which was that he blamed Bernstein for his lack of faith in the democratic possibilities of the proletariat (550, however, compare 559f). Kautsky himself maintained that the proletariat constituted the moving force for progress. Similarly, Bernstein’s rejection of revolution and, in this context, the impossibility of transferring property over the means of production to public ownership became a bone of contention between them. Kautsky rejected any kind of revolutionary romanticism and would fight it, but faced with Bernstein’s ahistorical rejection of the possibility of a revolution, he insisted that it would not be the working class who would provoke such a revolution, but that the ruling classes would force the working class into a struggle that might lead to a revolution. From February to October 1898 the conflicts between the two grew, they managed to get rid of all the misunderstandings—although with great difficulty—and had to face the fact that they were moving in opposite directions.
Kautsky made this clear in his intervention at the SPD congress in Stuttgart 1898, and soon after their personal friendship began to crumble.

Already before this, Bernstein had attempted to clarify what “Marxism” was in the time after Engels’ death. His assumption was that it was necessary to take a critical stance vis-à-vis Marx and Engels, he wanted to pursue work on the basis of the method and he was entitled to distance himself from individual findings and conclusions (453). Bernstein explained the problems he saw in the “absolute dialectics” as applied by Marx and Engels. His statements about the third volume of *Capital* are interesting; he had arrived at the conviction that Marx had not wanted to, or been able to, bring the volume to a successful conclusion (464). He wondered at the fact that central chapters had not been completed and explained this circumstance by assuming that Marx had not been able to overcome the theoretical problems and had, therefore, given up. At this time (August 1897) Kautsky was thinking along the same lines, or at least he still thought that they were both thinking along similar lines (457). His speech delivered to the party congress one year later constituted a public signal that he was no longer on the same path as Bernstein.

Kautsky had asked Bernstein to prepare his criticism in book form, and this book was published in 1899 by the party’s publishing house (Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgabe der Sozialdemokratie), of which, during the same year, Kautsky wrote an in-depth critique which Bernstein found to be biased and personal (962).

Revision of Marx is the central theme in this volume, but other themes are important, too, or they are at least of interest in other connections: for instance, Bernstein’s crusade against Edward Aveling, whom he accused of having provoked Eleanor Marx-Aveling’s suicide. Whether this accusation is reasonable or not has never really been clarified; for quite some time, Bernstein had had a tense relationship with Aveling, whom he considered a money-gabbing fraud, who took advantage of Eleanor Marx in the most nefarious way—an assessment that seems to be quite accurate. Moreover, the various considerations concerning the Polish question, which Rosa Luxemburg had taken up, or the colonial question concerning which Bernstein insisted upon the rights of the more advanced cultures over the less advanced, are also significant. Unfortunately, the correspondence does not deal with these issues in detail, but in the registers there are lists of the articles written during the relevant years by both men, so that it is possible to find more information about their respective positions.

The registers consist of a list of the reference works used, of the articles by Bernstein and Kautsky quoted—and here the Bernstein list is indeed valuable because of the fact that no Bernstein bibliography exists, while Kautsky’s is available. Furthermore, there is a list of the writings of other contemporaries quoted, a list of newspapers and periodicals mentioned, an annotated register of persons and a register of places. Together with the introduction the registers allow the interested reader to find the subjects and problems that he or she would look for in this volume.

Schelz-Brandenburg criticizes Kautsky for being untrustworthy because
only very late did he admit to Bernstein that he had not recognized what it was that Bernstein was trying to do (xx)—this criticism does not seem particularly justified. It is certainly possible that Kautsky did not wish to admit to himself where Bernstein was going.

Of course, the publication of personal letters will always entail the problem that internal information passed between good friends is not intended for public consumption. This is also true of the present volume, which is not tantamount to saying that the book contains any embarrassing revelations. On the contrary, it is a valuable source collection, annotated and prepared in a sound manner, so that it is possible to carry out scholarly work in this field on a much improved basis; it is to be hoped that it will not be too long before the other volumes are published.

Gerd Callesen
Arbejderbevegelsens Bibliotek og Arkiv, Copenhagen


Claire Culleton's study of working-class women in First World War Britain is an ambitious project that aims at a “comprehensive analysis of the complexities that conspired to link women's lives, their work, and their writings” (8). The book is positioned as a study that redresses what Culleton views as the marginalization of working-class women's experience in historical and literary studies of the period. She attempts, therefore, to write a history “from below” that provides both historical analysis of the experience of working-class women who labored in Britain's wartime industries, and an analysis of their culture, as revealed through the 1970s oral history testimonies of the Imperial War Museum and the literature they produced for factory newspapers. She states that she will tie this experience and its “costs” to changes in British society that “no longer permit[ed] sentimentality of hearth and home ( . . . )” (2). Culleton notes that the book is aimed at specialists on the subject and general readers. The analysis presented in the book, however, falls short of the author's stated goals and adds little to the existing scholarship on working-class women in First World War Britain.

The first three chapters of the book provide an overview of working conditions and negative public reactions to women's factory labor. Culleton's analysis relies on the scholarship of Gail Braybon, Angela Woollacott, Gareth Griffths, and Jane Lewis. Culleton views factory work during the First World War as marking the beginning of working-class women's “social and cultural autonomy” (22), and she therefore attempts to examine why women wanted to work in wartime industries and to stay in their jobs after 1918. The content of these chapters, however, does not reveal this concept of women's autonomy. Furthermore, she attempts to deal with numerous topics, such as women's political ap-
athy, unionization, women’s training for skilled work, male worker hostility, and
dangerous working conditions in such a brief space that it does not permit her
to fully develop the historical contextualization of such issues or to fully answer
the questions she poses. With regard to why women wanted to remain in their
jobs after 1918, she cites the skills women learned through their “mass entry into
skilled work” (33). This statement is problematic, since the majority of women
working in munitions industries were employed in unskilled jobs as a result of
the process of dilution, a facet of the wartime labor force examined by Braybon
and Woollacott. Her examination of women’s work experience in these chapters
also needs to make differentiations among women new to the workforce and
those for whom war work was just another kind of labor outside the home. Cul-
leton’s conclusion concerning the impact of wartime labor on working-class
women, that they derived a “sense of achievement and agency outside the con-
finess of the home” (32), is a conclusion arrived at as well by other authors on the
subject.

Although Culleton’s presentation of wartime working conditions and the
public disapproval of their work and spending habits breaks no new ground for
those familiar with the subject, she does offer an interesting line of inquiry with
regard to her brief discussion of Irish women’s labor in British factories. Here,
Culleton seeks to describe the difficult position of Irish working-class women,
who were perceived as unruly and dirty by their British co-workers. Culleton
calls attention to this neglected area of research, and poses fruitful lines of in-
quiry for analyzing the conjunction of ethnicity, class, and gender in war and for
making important distinctions with regard to women’s wartime experiences.

Culleton, a professor of English, also reveals an interest in revising scholar-
ship on the literary culture of the First World War, and she attempts to do so
by “revising [Paul] Fussell’s portrait of a literary landscape dominated by men”
and by “moving the frame away from middle-class women” (7). This interest in
literary analysis is represented in chapter four, which presents the most original
analysis in the book. Culleton conducts a textual analysis of factory newspapers
and magazines produced by working-class women. She argues that these writ-
ings were “political manifestos” (102) because through their literary production,
the women writers criticized their working conditions, lamented the loss of co-
workers, spoke out against injustice in the workplace, and communicated their
frustrations with the war effort. Written in response to male soldiers’ trench
newspapers, the women’s newspapers and magazines represented literary mod-
ernism. Culleton focuses on versions of “The Walrus and the Carpenter” and
Kipling’s “If.” The women’s versions demonstrate women’s appropriation of this
literary form to express their wartime experience in a way parallel to, yet dis-
tinct from, that of male soldiers at the front.

The remaining chapters of the book provide limited discussion of the De-
fense of the Realm Act (D.O.R.A.), the links between women’s factory work and
pronatalism as it emerged during the war, and postwar demobilization. With re-
gard to the virulent pronatalism that developed as a reaction to mass slaughter
on the battlefield, Culleton tries to show the connection between the social con-
struction of women’s factory labor as a maternal and sexualized activity, and the subsequent attempt to urge women to “no longer fill the wombs of shells but to fill their own wombs instead” (149) in order to make way for returning soldiers. Her analysis here is not particular to working-class women, for she offers evidence that this kind of pronatalist rhetoric applied to middle class women in the factories as well. Women’s work was constructed as sexual intercourse, with women “mastering” large machinery and working with phallic objects, all as part of a “perverted and deviant maternal act” (161). Such rhetoric facilitated demands to remove women from the workforce when the war was over.

The tone of Culleton’s writing is often indignant. She expresses a sense of moral outrage at the treatment of working-class women in the workplace, particularly with regard to the lack of attention they received for their work-related ailments, such as TNT poisoning. For instance, in concluding her chapter on the often dangerous working conditions existing in wartime factories, she declares that “had more attention been paid to these issues, instead of focusing on what the women work, purchased, or drank, literally hundreds, maybe even thousands, of women’s lives might have been saved ( . . . )” (73). She also decries the lack of proper scholarly attention to the issue of why working-class women’s maternal morality rates rose, and rather dismisses the findings of J. M. Winter, who attributes the rise to the influenza epidemic of 1918. Culleton instead speculates that “a scandalous area of neglect,” (164) meaning the lack of attention to women’s working conditions and the dangers thereof, is rather to blame. Unfortunately, such assertions serve to work against her goal, as stated in her conclusion, that she wishes to move beyond the “new mythology” (170) of women portrayed primarily as victims of war.

Culleton strongly champions the cause of these working-class women in this project. The book does point to areas of women’s agency, such as the factory newspapers, that deserve greater scholarly attention. A more in depth analysis of those sources would have been welcomed, as would a more developed discussion of the complexities of ethnicity as represented by the case of Irish working women. In those two aspects, Culleton is able to make a contribution to our understanding of working women’s experience during the First World War. Overall, however, the book lies uneasily between literary text analysis and a fully contextualized and dispassionate historical study.

Kay McAdams
York College of Pennsylvania


In For Home, Country, and Race, Stephen Heathorn sets out to explain the “how” of English nationalism at the turn of the twentieth century. Rejecting the
imperial propagandist theme, Heathorn argues that nationalist agendas in English schools were the product of educators. Accordingly, Heathorn’s research focuses on the classroom as the site of nationalist education. Heathorn argues that through educational activities, especially school readers, middle-class educators brought the English working class into their nationalist hegemony. As the book’s title suggests, this hegemonic view also promoted class and gender subordination. As Heathorn concludes, the proof of the working class’s acceptance of this nationalist hegemony is found in their willingness “to sacrifice their lives and loved ones” in the “cataclysmic clash of rival nationalisms that erupted in 1914” (218).

Heathorn begins with an examination of the educators to explain the reasons for changes in educational agendas and content. By the later part of the nineteenth century, educators—like other professionals—experienced a move toward greater professionalism, which resulted in a demand for academically accredited authors for educational readers, the source of much of the nationalist message absorbed by working-class students. The educators also redirected the agenda of education from the creation of moral individuals to development of good citizens. While many of the working class would not have the right to actively participate in politics through the act of voting, middle-class educators understood the need to ensure working-class loyalty by inculcating their working-class students in the nationalist hegemony. Educators, especially authors of school readers, introduced a middle-class specific vision of nationalism, premised on their values of good citizenship: “duty, discipline, reserve, obedience to superiors” (26). A good working-class citizen would see themselves first and foremost as English, rather than working class.

While giving some consideration to teaching logs, Heathorn’s source for determining what was taught is his comprehensive examination of school readers. Heathorn contends that readers can demonstrate what the majority of working-class students were exposed to. While history was not a primary subject, Heathorn’s study of readers illustrates that positivist historical stories were common in readers and infused with nationalist messages. These stories promoted military heroes whose good citizenship found expression as “active defenders of the nation” rather than linked to participation in politics, which most working-class students would never enjoy (54). The overriding message of historical lessons centered on loyalty to the nation instead of political parties or factions.

Inherent in the historical lessons found in the readers were a conflagration of nationalism and race. As Heathorn argues, “the boundaries between race, ethnicity, culture, and national identities were cloudy and ambiguous” (94). However, race was now understood as biological, rather than simply cultural. The glorified race was English rather than British, which became relegated to Empire. Also absent from the nationalist-racial construction were the Celtic minorities. Instead, middle-class educators found the roots of Englishness in the Anglo-Saxons, whose values they proclaimed as the basis of English racial traits. Having centered the Anglo-Saxon English as the most advanced race, the authors of readers developed a concentric circle of racial hierarchy with non-Eu-
Europeans occupying the outer circles, those reserved for the least evolved/advanced.

It was through the oppositional “Other,” according to Heathorn, that the English defined their evolutionary success as a nation. The superiority of the English became a “naturalized” part of the nationalist hegemony. Heathorn argues that the radicalized nationalist identity worked to minimize differences within English society, especially class differences (118–119). Heathorn points to the widespread use of geography lessons in readers to convey the message of the racial and cultural inferiority of the “Other”. These selections promoted racial explanations of cultural development, or the lack of them in the non-European world. Correspondingly, the readers implied that the English had the right to colonize the unmanly non-Europeans, or, as in the case of the Australian Aborigines, to remove them to allow for the expansion of English civilization (140).

Nationalist constructions also worked to reinforce class and gender inequality in England. Authors of school readers modeled English society on the family, a social unit familiar to students. In the patriarchal family, all members were not equal, instead each had their “own special places, roles, responsibilities, and duties” (143). Class divisions were naturalized, as the obedience of subordinates was necessary to promote the good of the family and society as well. The analogy was continued through the metaphor of England as home; the love of home being described as a uniquely English value. The readers also reinforced female inequality within the family, but stressed the vital role women played in the family as good mothers. Women contributed to the national well being by producing healthy Englishmen who in turn would be productive workers and soldiers. Educators promoted gendered visions of citizenship with working-class men expressing their nationalism through their active defense of and duty to the nation, while working-class women were conceived in terms of biological and maternal importance. Instead of promoting equality, the nationalist agenda of educators worked to reinforce class and gender inequities already present in English society.

In addition to the nationalist themes promoted through school readers, Heathorn argues educators used symbolic messages to bring their working-class students into the nationalist hegemony. Throughout the educational process, the naval heroes were celebrated as symbols of English superiority. Through stories in readers and Empire Day activities, educators used the British flag to remind students of English nationalist superiority, core values, and sense of community. Educators also used physical activity, especially military drill, to instill in students the belief that national duty required them to be healthy citizens. Heathorn argues that these symbolic representations reinforced the nationalist messages found in basic educational activities.

In his conclusion, Heathorn argues that educators not only wanted to teach students “their letters” but also to produce “good Englishmen” and “good English wives” (200). The nationalist agenda in education was primarily the work of educators, and not the sole product of imperial elite propagandists. Nationalist agendas bubbled from the middle instead of trickling down from above. But Heathorn cautions that the actions of middle-class educators were not designed
to bring about social control, but rather reflected their values (211). Heathorn further argues that through the classroom experience these values were accepted by the working class. Decrying a paucity of sources that illustrate real working-class views of nationalism, Heathorn concludes that their willing participation at the outbreak of World War One demonstrated their acceptance of the nationalist hegemony (218).

What Heathorn has produced is a well-researched study of the nationalistic agenda of middle-class educators in England at the turn of the twentieth century. His broad examination of the content of the readers used by working-class students, as well as surviving teaching logs, demonstrates that a nationalist agenda existed in English classrooms. He also shows that educators themselves controlled the content of what was taught. Less convincing is how much of this was accepted by working-class students. The link between what was taught and what was accepted merits further exploration. As Heathorn argues, hegemonic beliefs involve the negotiation and active consent of the subordinated (212). Yet, Heathorn’s model illustrates only middle-class agency. Absent from the negotiation are working-class agents such as families, neighbors, and co-workers, all of whom had an influence on working-class children. Aiso ignored are any forms of working-class counter-hegemony, especially regarding class subordination. Despite this issue, Stephen Heathorn provides a solid look at how middle-class educators envisioned English nationalism, and how they actively worked to bring their working-class students into their vision of what it meant to be English.

Jeffrey Glasco
Millikin University


The postcommunist transformation of the former countries of “real socialism” has become an intriguing topic for economists and political scientists. The Soviet bloc did not just collapse; it collapsed unexpectedly. There are various consequences for the world as a result of this event, which in many ways resemble a gun that is cocked and loaded, but which has not yet fired.

The newly published book by Anders Aslund, Building Capitalism: The Transformation of the Former Soviet Bloc, is an example of the “generalizing” approach to the topic. The author, currently a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C., served as an economic advisor to the Russian and Ukrainian governments in the 1990s, and later,
since 1998, he has advised the Kyrgyz President, Askar Akaev. Aslund considers his book an attempt to, “( . . . ) tell a comprehensive story of post-communist economic transitions” and “( . . . ) to clarify the key facts about the transitions because so much clouds the picture” (1). He sees postcommunist transition as a struggle between “valiant liberal reformers” and “gradualists;” and correspondingly, as a struggle between advocates of the free market economy, and “self-dealing rent seekers,” influential groups interested in revenues to invest in maintaining their privileged status. What does the choice of economic strategy depend on? A slund stresses the significance of free markets and civil society as two major political factors at work. However, and this is the starting point of his reasoning, “distant history seems less salient than the development of democracy, civil society, and thinking in the two years before the collapse of communism” (67). The book is basically an attempt to prove this statement using various materials. A slund divides the postcommunist countries into three groups depending on political course and economic priorities. In Central Europe, the Baltic, Russia, and Kyrgyzstan, the governments “wanted a transition to market economy” and are supposed to have been “reasonably democratic.” Armenia and Georgia are considered countries close to this group, but where economic reforms failed due to political turmoil.

The second group, represented by Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, and the Ukraine, includes countries where the old Communist elites stayed in power, which predetermined a more conservative and state-oriented economic strategy, but where the governments turned out to be “reasonably democratic” enough to still start the reforms. As for countries belonging to the third group (Belarus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan), A slund characterizes them, as those “where the old communist elite just continued to rule.”

All these differences are believed to be due only to decisions made within the most recent decade—here is the major thesis A slund attempts to prove. Although his “groups of countries” almost completely correlate with certain cultural regions (Roman-Catholic and Protestant Central Europe and the Baltic, with their old traditions of free marketeering and certain elements of Western style parliamentarianism; predominantly Orthodox, agrarian and traditionally monarchist Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, etc.), he emphasizes the insignificance of historical factors. To demonstrate that the burden of the past does not matter, A slund appeals to the experience of Kyrgyzstan as an example of a successful Western style reform experience in a country without any tradition of market economy or parliamentarianism. The former advisor to the Kyrgyz president contrasts the country with neighboring Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan where the Communist elite “just continued to rule.”

A slund’s characterization of Kyrgyzstan’s neighbors is very realistic, although Kyrgyzstan itself is another story. According to numerous data, there are no fundamental differences between Kyrgyzstan and other countries of former Soviet Central Asia—in its economy or in its experience of state building. Except one thing: the weakness of the Kyrgyz economy and its growing dependence
on Kazakhstan (including the rapidly increasing Kyrgyz immigration to Kazakhstan).

To avoid “statistical aberrations,” one should put the Aslund scheme in historical context. There is a link between economic strategy and, thus, the fate of the reforms, on the one hand, and the role local communist nomenklatura played as a governing class (or continue to play) in the society. Why do they feel strong and safe enough to launch reforms and conduct them in a fashion they prefer?

To make sense of these options, one must go back to the epoch of Communist takeovers in Eastern Europe. There were big differences among Communist movements in terms of their popularity and social influence. If in Poland or in Hungary they could never have come to power without Soviet bayonets, in Yugoslavia they did it on their own. While some Eastern European countries were governed by Moscow-controlled puppet regimes, some had their own, national, communism. It was under puppet regimes (German Democratic Republic [GDR], Hungary, Poland) that the first attempts of anti-Stalinist and anticommunist revolution occurred. And it was there that Communist governments had to yield in everything except the Moscow-controlled foreign policy (decollectivization in Poland in 1956, large-scale reforms in Hungary in the 1960s and 70s, etc.) and tolerate powerful non- and even anticommunist institutions (the Roman Catholic Church, Western oriented intellectual elites, etc.). Such a coexistence of weak Communist bureaucracy with strong and predominantly non-communist society created a favorable background for far-reaching reforms.

The national Communist dictatorships had many more options to maintain their own interests. Deeply rooted in their societies, they were frequently perceived not as Moscow’s appointees but as protectors of national sovereignty from Russian imperialism. Remarkably, sometimes a Moscow-oriented puppet regime could gradually evolve into a national Communist system, as took place in the countries belonging, according to Aslund’s scheme, to the “second group.” Unlike Tito’s supporters in Yugoslavia, the small Romanian Communist Party could not have established a one-party dictatorship without support from the USSR. Nevertheless, having started as a Soviet satellite, socialist Romania under Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Nicolae Ceausescu (as well as, to some extent, Bulgaria under Todor Zhivkov) became a stronghold of national communism, keeping a distance from Moscow without displaying the slightest bit of liberalism. The only problem for local Communists was the foreign character of their doctrine; having removed this obstacle, the nomenklatura no longer had any serious rivals (comparable, for example, to the Roman Catholic Church with its political experience).

The Russian socioeconomic system in pre-Soviet, Soviet, and post-Soviet times is the topic of Alexander Chubarov’s monograph, Russia’s Bitter Path to Modernity: A History of the Soviet and Post-Soviet Eras. Chubarov is a Senior Lecturer in Russian Studies at the School of International Studies and Law, Coventry University. Unlike Aslund, Chubarov is interested in demonstrating Russia’s specificity and explaining its roots in the past.

The book contains a good survey of attempts to modernize the Russian
economy and political system from Peter I to the Communist experiment. Chubarov’s view on the precommunist attempts at modernization seems rather traditional: he characterizes them as despotic in means while “Western capitalist” in content. (Numerous attempts to reform agrarian economies around the world demonstrate, however, that such ambivalence is by no means a Russian specificity.) Bureaucratic centralization, commonly believed to be the major feature of the Russian economic and political system, has—according to Chubarov—always been due to the predominantly noneconomic methods of “mobilization of the resources at times of military emergency,” in contrast with Western countries where “social progress was achieved mainly through the natural development of economic relations.” To illustrate this thesis, Chubarov appeals to the practices of Czar Alexis and his famous son, Peter the Great. The background of the Russian administrative system had, however, been laid down long before the Romanov dynasty came to power—during the rise of Moscow under the Mongols, when Russian authorities were concerned with establishing good relations with their masters rather than gathering resources for resistance.

Following the history of the Soviet nomenklatura, Chubarov poses the question of its evolution. The book includes, in particular, a good description of the exchange of resources (administrative market) and relations among various bureaucratic “interest groups” under Brezhnev (152). Analyzing factors that contributed to the disintegration of the system in the 1980s–90s, Chubarov recalls the reformist activities of such academic centers as the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), the influence of dissidents, and ethnic conflicts. He completely overlooks, however, the central factor—the growing influence of local party secretaries and the formation of their unofficial hierarchy, a place that depended not on relations with the center but on the resources of the secretary’s region. Both Mikhail Gorbachev’s coming to power in 1985 and his retirement in 1991, as well as the “nomenklatura privatization” under Gorbachev preceding the “voucher-privatization” under Yeltsin can barely be understood without taking this factor into account.

Examining the development of Russian “crony capitalism,” Chubarov inevitably comes to the role of Vladimir Putin and his course of “controlled democracy.” How can the latter coexist with “human rights, democracy, and media freedom?” “Does he (Putin) understand that technological innovation, advanced telecommunications, and venture capital (…) can thrive only in open and free societies?” (275). It seems, however, that, like many Western observers, Chubarov keeps asking questions, the answer to which have already been given. Both economically and politically, Putin’s Russia is in transition to a new style of authoritarianism that, while different from the Communist system, still has little in common with the Western democracies.

Alexei Pimenov
University of Maryland
This is a powerful book that documents and examines the horrible exploitation of labor in contemporary China, particularly the vulnerable migrant workers from rural areas. The bulk of the book is the compilation of more than twenty investigative stories that Chan selects from the Chinese language newspapers and journals published in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. All the investigative stories were written by Chinese reporters—some took great risks to do it—and translated into English by Chan and her collaborators. For each case Chan provides a short introduction and “comment” to help the reader comprehend the materials in context and to clarify certain references. In several cases Chan also gives follow-ups to the stories.

The book has nine chapters. In addition to the introduction and conclusion, there are seven chapters each covering a particular subject: forced labor and violations of shop-floor labor standards, corporal punishment and physical assaults, violations of occupational safety and health, violations of the right to work, violations of the right to organize and collective action, indentured labor abroad, and workers’ resistance. Twenty-three cases are presented, and together they constitute a horrible picture of the brutal labor abuses that took place in China in the last decade of the twentieth century, when China was rapidly transforming itself from a planned economy to a market economy in the process of accelerating globalization. Reading through these stories, one can see that the availability of millions of young rural migrant workers desperate for jobs, the profit-crazed foreign investors (many are actually from Taiwan and Hong Kong) seeking the best and cheapest labor, officials at different levels of the Chinese bureaucracy competing with each other to lure foreign investment to their own region—so much so that they were willing to compromise even the basic labor standards: all these elements constitute the context in which Chinese laborers became vulnerable to various violations of their basic rights.

The brutal realities of labor abuses revealed by the investigative stories are horrifying, and some cruelties are so extreme that they are beyond belief. In one case, the manager of a Taiwanese shoe factory locked a female Chinese migrant worker in a dog cage with two wolfhounds. The Chinese worker, who was suspected of stealing a roll of sticky tape, was “. . . shaking from head to foot, her face ashen white” (65). In another case, a group of Chinese seafarers, who had won support of the dock workers at the port of Ravenna, Italy, for their fight against their abusive European bosses, found their basic rights denied and their money confiscated by the Chinese authorities when they returned to their motherland. Moreover, the group leaders were detained for two years without trial, and eventually prosecuted under the Chinese legal system for “leaking state secrets” (that is, telling the truth about their low wages)! They were found not guilty only after several pro-labor Chinese agencies became outraged and intervened, and the International Labor Organization took
the case seriously and brought pressure upon the Chinese government (174–185).

How could foreign investors treat these Chinese workers in such cruel ways? One article from the Taiwan Footwear Industry Bulletin (a magazine for Taiwanese footwear manufacturers) that Chan includes in the book provides some hints at their logic and justifications. The article, published in 1997 in response to the exposure of the inhumane treatment of Chinese workers, admits that “various violations of the Labor Law ( . . . ) are very common among foreign-invested enterprises in China, in particular in the more labor-intensive manufacturing industries” (52). But it complains against the Labor Law in mainland China, seeing it as “a hindrance for capital to increase production efficiency,” and it reports that “One Taiwanese businessman says that commending workers in order to induce self-respect in them is not a useful means to increase productivity. It seems that the more direct and primitive the method, the more effective it is” (53).

Then why does the Chinese government not do more to protect the workers? The stories in the book suggest, as also pointed out by Chan in her introduction, that the Chinese state is not monolithic—some agencies are pro-labor and try to provide protection for workers, while others ignore violations of labor rights. In some cases, the labor-capital disputes became an issue of national pride and eventually settled according to law and regulations, after they were reported in the media and got the attention of government agencies. But in many cases, particularly at the lower levels—the counties, townships, and villages—the local authorities connive with management to exploit labor. To lure foreign investment, the local authorities are eager to modify the labor standards, to deregulate factories’ internal security forces, and to arrange police protection and cooperation for foreign investors. Their obsession with growth rate and profit come ahead of their concern for Chinese workers’ basic human dignity.

In her conclusion, Chan briefly reviews the historical relationship between the “five core labor rights” and non-core rights in the international labor movement and makes some suggestions for strategies to help the Chinese workers—particularly the very vulnerable migrant workers. According to Chan, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the international labor movement began by fighting for basic labor rights such as “a living wage, limited work hours, and a right to rest,” (227) nowadays seen as “non-core rights” in the developed countries. After World War II, however, the international trade union movement has been championing five “core labor rights”: freedom of association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, a minimum age of employment, no forced or slave labor, and a prohibition against discrimination. In recent years, Chan contends, international organizations concerned with Chinese labor have focused on the core rights, and mainly on the first two. “References to Chinese labor rights over the past two decades have generally been restricted to complaints about barriers to forming trade unions, the imprisonment of specific labor activists, or prison labor” (229). Chan argues that this may not be a realistic way to help the tens of millions of Chinese workers who are suffering various
forms of exploitation and abuse, and she calls for an understanding of the reality in China, and for a realistic and practical strategy. She argues:

For migrant workers in China, for instance, what rights are the most concrete and most urgent to them? They want to be paid regularly, on time, and to be paid at least US $2 a day (not $2 an hour) rather than $1.50 a day. Workers want to retain their human dignity, to have some leisure time (not the luxury of paid vacations as stipulated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), to be free of occupational hazards that threaten their lives and limbs, and to be free from fear of being put into detention centers for not having the right residential (hukou) papers.

As this review goes to print, reports abound in both the Chinese and foreign press that, as the Chinese Lunar New Year begins on February 1, millions of Chinese migrant workers—particularly the construction workers in big cities—are engaged in protests because they have not been paid for months and as a result are unable to go home for New Year family reunions. Without unions, without contract, these workers have little chance to redress their grievances through official channels. Nevertheless, it is reported that the Ministry of Construction is aware of the seriousness of this issue and it has ordered payment of wages due to the workers. The ministry also suggests that responsibility to pay workers on time be included in workers’ contracts with their contractors. These reports seem to support Anita Chan’s argument that exploitation of labor is indeed an urgent issue in China and that protection of the very basic labor rights should be the priority of organizations desiring to help Chinese workers. If these organizations developed realistic and pragmatic strategies based on a clear understanding of the realities in China, as Chan tries to do in her book, they may be able to offer an effective help to improve conditions for Chinese workers.

Renqiu Yu
Purchase College, State University of New York


During the early 1990s, Argentina’s Peronist Party accomplished a political magic trick: under the leadership of President Carlos Menem, Peronism turned away from its traditional commitment to social justice and an activist state, embraced the free market and neoliberal reform, and yet maintained the electoral support of the majority of the poor. For many Argentine intellectuals, this trick was easy enough to explain. According to the conventional wisdom, poor people remained loyal to Peronism, despite their rapidly declining standard of living, either because they remained under the hypnotic spell of Juan and Evita or be-
cause they were bought off by clientelist politicians offering handouts. Javier Auyero's ethnography of Peronist politics in an impoverished shantytown on the outskirts of Buenos Aires challenges these simplistic explanations. This timely and important book reconceptualizes political clientelism, a crucial phenomenon within scholarship on Latin America and beyond, while making visible and intelligible a population that has been relegated to marginality both by socioeconomic realities and by academic discourse.

Auyero's central criticism of the voluminous literature on clientelism is that by describing the phenomenon as a simple exchange of favors for votes, it neglects the larger relationships and cultural meanings within which these transactions occur. As Auyero puts it, "[t]his point of view assumes—wrongly—that ( . . . ) votes and support come because of goods, services, and particular favors" (23). Instead of assuming any particular causal mechanism, his account explores the way the residents of Villa Paraíso (not its real name) experience and understand clientelist practices. These practices, he argues, ought to be thought of as "personalized political mediation," a technique through which many shantytown residents solve their everyday survival needs. The most valuable contribution of Poor People's Politics is its detailed description of these practices. Quoting extensively from interviews with brokers, clients and other residents, Auyero provides a fine-grained account of the day-to-day experience of politics in the shantytown.

The book's first two chapters contextualize Auyero's ethnography by recounting Argentina's recent economic history and by providing a brief history of the particular shantytown under study. Beginning in the 1970s but particularly during the neoliberal heyday of the 1990s, Argentina experienced a rapid process of deindustrialization, accompanied by sharply increasing levels of unemployment, poverty and inequality. These trends have had a catastrophic impact on places like Villa Paraíso. Built in the 1930s as a temporary home for migrant workers seeking jobs in Buenos Aires' expanding manufacturing sector, the neighborhood has a long history of collective action and political mobilization. But the brutality of the military dictatorship of 1976–83, the steady erosion of employment during the 1980s and 1990s, and the implementation of draconian neoliberalism has resulted in deproletarianization and the dismantling of neighborhood organizations. Residents who once participated in collective movements to improve their community now struggle merely to survive.

In this context, many residents of Villa Paraíso solve their everyday problems through one of the only effective means available to them: the local Peronist patronage networks. Auyero provides a careful structural analysis of these networks, through which goods and favors circulate from the Governor of Buenos Aires Province and the Mayor of the municipality down through Peronist brokers to groups of residents in Villa Paraíso. Thanks to their privileged access to the state, brokers control resources, such as medicine or construction materials, and information, such as the date and time of the municipality's monthly distribution of free food. In exchange for these favors, "clients" are expected to attend Peronist rallies. The number of people a broker can mobilize
for such events determines the extent of his or her access to resources. Each broker has an “inner circle” of followers who participate actively in the broker’s day-to-day operations and who have received or hope to receive a public sector job in return for their loyalty. Interestingly, Auyero reveals that several of the most powerful Peronist brokers are women, whose success derives in large part from their ability to “perform E.vita.” From their bleached blonde hair to their pose as the mothers of the poor, they deliberately evoke memories of the beloved Eva Perón. In so doing, these brokers personalize the goods they distribute and legitimize their own role in the process, even as they reinforce a gendered politics, in which policy-making remains a male domain, while administering assistance to the poor is essentially feminine.

Auyero pays close attention to the discourses mobilized by Peronist brokers as well as to the reception of those discourses by residents. The brokers depict their own actions as motivated not by self interest but by a passion to help the needy, and they strive both rhetorically and in practice to erase the social distance between them and the poor. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Auyero finds that the brokers’ inner circles accept these representations, while those who benefit less from the Peronist networks are more critical. A broker’s loyal followers typically consider her to be individually responsible for every good that has come to their family or to the shantytown as a whole. Moreover, their memory of Peronism’s golden age emphasizes the “distributional” account favored by the brokers, rather than what Auyero, following historian Daniel James, describes as the “heretical” meaning of Peronism. In other words, brokers and their most privileged clients locate the central meaning of Peronism in the distribution of goods to the poor, not in the commitment to social justice and the assault on the oligarchy. Their memories of the Peronist past are thus shaped by their experience of Peronism in the present.

Auyero’s arguments, while always provocative, are occasionally less than satisfying. One problem is that he focuses a great deal of his analysis on the small “inner circles,” at the expense of the bulk of the shantytown population. He convincingly dissects the complex relationship and shared cultural perspective that tie these loyal clients to their individual brokers. Yet he argues that the electoral effectiveness of clientelism is exaggerated, since the large majority of the population remains outside the hegemonic grasp of Peronist brokers. But what about this majority? One wonders if some residents are able to engage with clientelism opportunistically, without swallowing its political messages. Auyero emphasizes the way the present shapes people’s memories of the past, but he tends to downplay the influence of the past on the present. If people who benefit from Peronist patronage remember Peronism as “distributional,” might it not also be the case that a more “heretical” memory of Peronism enables others to see through the manipulations of Peronist brokers? Auyero’s story is, in a sense, about the declining significance of class as a marker of identity for the urban poor. While that story is no doubt shaped by deproletarianization and the neoliberal assault on unions, it must also be the product of a longer history. By deemphasizing that historical process, Auyero presents the death of “heretical” Peronism and the
unmaking of the Argentine working class as more definitive than they might actually be.

Despite these shortcomings, Auyero’s book represents a major contribution to the study of clientelism and politics among the poor in Latin America as well as a much-needed guide to contemporary Peronism. The severe economic and political crisis that has beset Argentina since the publication of Poor People’s Politics makes its subject even more urgent. Both the meaning of Peronism and the future of democracy itself are very much up for grabs right now, and yet most observers have described the crisis as primarily a middle-class affair. This book should awaken scholars to the political relevance of the shantytowns.

Matthew B. Karush
George Mason University


Racial Revolutions comes at a crucial time for indigenist policy in Brazil. Newly elected president Luís Inácio Lula da Silva takes over with several orders for the permanent protection of Indian reserves on his desk, completed but left unsigned by outgoing president Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Lula’s party, the Workers Party, has a strongly progressive social platform on issues of racial discrimination but no track record or firm positions on Indian issues. Fundamental changes in Brazilian Indian law have been proposed and may come before Congress early this year. Three fatal attacks on Indians occurred in January 2003, the first month of Lula’s presidency. One of these cases, the murder by youths of a seventy-seven year-old Indian man in Porto Alegre, recalls the fatal 1997 immolation of a visiting Pataxó leader while sleeping at a bus stop in Brasília, a well-publicized case with which Jonathan Warren opens his book. Finally, anthropologists who work with Indians in Brazil are still dealing with the repercussions of serious ethical charges involving research among the Yanomami Indians raised against senior Amazonianists by journalist Patrick Tierney in his book Darkness in El Dorado (2000).

Warren’s provocative ethnography of newly resurgent Indians in Brazil’s Northeast region, based on his 1997 doctoral dissertation in sociology at the University of California, Berkeley, goes straight to the heart of these issues: the semiotics of indigenous identity; discourses on indigeneity among the Brazilian public at large; and efforts by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), the federal Indian agency (FUNAI), and Brazilian courts to define “Indian” and adjudicate legal claims. The focus of Warren’s book is the unexpected rise over the last several decades in the number of self-identified Indians, defying longstanding predictions of Brazilian intellectuals, including even many sympathetic anthropologists. The best-known cases of indigenous movements are in the A ma-
zon basin, involving culturally distinct and often well-known tribes. Many of these have become better organized and have recently won legal victories over ranchers, state police forces, and even the Brazilian military. Warren’s research is with the most improbable and interesting cases of this demographic trend: Indians in the states of Minas Gerais, Bahia, and Espírito Santo in eastern Brazil. They constitute communities considered “assimilated” for many decades, phenotypically and often culturally indistinguishable from the mixed-race rural caboclo masses. These groups include the Canoeira, Kaxixó, Krenak, Maxakali, Pankararu, Pataxó, and Tupinikim tribes.

Despite loss of language and cultural practices that would distinguish them from their non-Indian neighbors, memories of genealogies and common oppression have lingered on and, with the encouragement and material assistance of Church-based NGOs, been translated into assertion—so far with mixed results—of legal rights to land under the progressive 1988 Constitution. Horrific massacres of Indians at the hands of miners, ranchers, local police, and—as in some of the recent cases—bored upper-class youth still occur, but the federal government offers more protection than it used to, and public attitudes have generally shifted to widespread condemnation of violence against Indians. Warren argues that long-suppressed Indian identities are tentatively reemerging as the dangers of such self-identification diminish. Even more important for this unlikely resurgence, in Warren’s view, is the fact that the bureaucratic gatekeepers of indigeneity have finally begun to catch up with the great sea change of thinking about ethnicity that swept through anthropology and sociology in the 1960s. Gone are checklists of genetic and cultural markers, replaced by the flexible criteria of self-identification and recognition of distinctiveness by others. Many of these new, “post-traditional” Indians, as Warren calls them, have borrowed languages from neighboring groups and (re)invented religious rituals without thus automatically disqualifying themselves from legal recognition.

Warren’s book is at its best when he lets his post-traditional Indian informants speak for themselves about these matters. The book is structured around a defense of their rights against those who claim they have cynically adopted Indian identities as a way of gaining access to the resources such recognition offers. The chance to carve out communal lands from the vast, fiercely defended private fiefdoms of the Brazilian interior is obviously very attractive, and Warren admits to the significance of this opportunity as a factor in the resurgence. Indian rights granted by the 1988 Constitution theoretically make the return of certified lands to indigenous communities uncontestable, but an apparently contradictory 1997 decree signed by former President Cardoso has in fact opened each indigenous land claim to charges of “racial hucksterism,” in Warren’s words, and years of debilitating litigation. Warren’s case is convincing, not least because his informants speak eloquently of their collective memories of expulsion and impoverishment, as both Indians and rural landless Brazilians.

The strength of his argument is marred somewhat by confusing jumps to North American material, unhelpful and misleading neologisms (“state exorcism,” “Indianing”), and errors of Portuguese. The major weakness of the book
lies, however, in the title and the secondary argument of the book, which is that the renascent forms of Indian identity represent an important and overlooked force in the struggle against “white supremacy” in Brazil. Warren fails to acknowledge, even minimally, that the fight over “racial politics” in Brazil centers on the question of whether there are indeed racial politics in Brazil. The last ten years have seen Brazilianist social science caught up in a polemical debate about the meaning of “racial democracy.”

On one side are political scientists, sociologists, and—recently—some cultural anthropologists who argue that the “myth” of racial democracy is an iron-fisted ideological formation that has allowed whites to exclude blacks from the middle and upper classes all the while denying that they are racist and enjoying the hegemonic complicity of the racial “subalterns,” in the current lingo adopted by Warren (see, for example, Hanchard [1999], Sheriff [2001], Twine [1998]). The mixed-race categories that so markedly distinguish Latin American social formations from the North American model are seen as mystifications and instruments of oppression. The failure, by and large, of political movements aimed at fostering non-white ethnic and political solidarity, is attributed to a pervasive racial false consciousness.

The other side, argued principally by historians and anthropologists (see, for example, Fry 1996, 2000; Norvell 2001; Maggie 1991; Sansone 2003), builds on ethnographic and sociological research from the 1950s that emphasizes the fluid and transitory nature of racial identification in Brazil, overall low rates of social mobility in an economy historically built on personal networks, and pernicious “social” discrimination based on a complex blend of markers of social class, including education, grammar, regional background, and an aesthetics of skin color and other putatively “racial” features. They argue that Brazilians of all hues and social classes are being basically honest and accurate when they say that they enact or experience discrimination along nonracial lines, even though sociometric data, when forced through the crude numerical sieve of the federal census, manifest aggregate effects that seem “racially” structured.

In labeling Brazil’s social formation “white supremacy,” Warren and his wife, France Winddance Twine (with whom he carried out parts of his fieldwork and whose work on racial identification [Twine 1998] he frequently cites), have pushed the first position to an extreme. That Warren does not even hint at this larger debate and his position with respect to it is a serious flaw, especially considering its crucial and obvious implications for the future of “race” as a category of comparative analysis.

Putting to the side this polemic in the arena of white/Afro-Brazilian relations, the attempt to pull the politics of indigeneity into the politics of “race” is doubly problematic. Despite his persuasive analysis of these new forms of Indian identity in the terms of ethnicity laid out by the “Barthian break” (215), Warren argues that race—defined as “phenotype/genotype” (241)—is a fundamental element of Indianness, despite strong evidence to the contrary in the words of his own informants. He ends up hastily dismissing the statements of many anthropologists and indigenist activists on this point. A worrisome re-essentializa-
tion of race is epidemic in the Brazilian “race relations” field, and there are hints of it in Warren’s book as well.

John M. Norvell
Cornell University


The Tribute of Blood has already earned an audience among historians of nineteenth and twentieth-century Brazil, who have found in Peter M. Beattie’s analysis of military recruitment and enlisted service an innovative and often compelling exploration of a neglected facet of Brazilian history. But the book deserves a wider audience, not least because of Beattie’s stated ambition of providing the first book-length study, “that explicitly focuses on impressment and conscription as transatlantic tribute labor systems intricately linked to other labor practices and relations in broader society” (14). Prospective members of such an audience not only stand to learn a great deal about Brazil (indeed, the novice might read The Tribute of Blood as an introduction to the socio-cultural history of Brazil during a “long nineteenth century” of its own). They also might be forced to rethink some of their own assumptions regarding military service in particular and institutional modernization more generally, and draw inspiration from Beattie’s impressive command of a wide range of Brazilian sources and his willingness to extend comparisons to and borrow approaches from fields situated at some remove—geographic and otherwise—from his own.

Briefly, The Tribute of Blood can be described as a history of the institutional reform of enlisted military service in Brazil. Between the middle of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century, the Brazilian Army gradually adopted a system of conscription in order to fill its ranks, ending a long-standing reliance on impressment that had its roots in Portuguese imperial practices. While the distinction between impressment and conscription may seem slight or even meaningless to those unfamiliar with either process, Beattie correctly distinguishes between the two: impressment is “coercive recruitment performed by police or press gangs [who] most often targeted men without property, including vagrants and lawbreakers,” while conscription is the “enrollment of mostly law-abiding ( . . . ) youths from which recruits would be selected for service on the basis of a lottery” (xxi). The transition from impressment to conscription in Brazil demanded and, in turn, fed off of larger changes in the treatment of enlisted men and in the ways enlisted service was depicted and understood. The status of the enlisted man (the praça) had to be improved and the barracks had to be made an honorable social space, akin to the “house,” rather than a dishonorable and potentially dangerous place associated with the “street.” Along the way, the army had to withdraw from its role as Brazil’s primary penal institution (as an
auxiliary to local law enforcement institutions, as a jailor responsible for the over-
sight of civilian convicts, and, most importantly, as the primary institutional reservoir for vagrants, non-homicidal criminal offenders, abandoned boys, and other undesirables), while debates over the proper way to fill the enlisted ranks fed into larger, anxiety-ridden discussions of the Brazilian nation, its racially mixed population, and the latter's relationship with the state.

As even this brief description makes clear, Beattie draws upon a range of concepts and approaches in framing the history of enlisted service and military recruitment in Brazil. The idea of a cultural dialectic between the safe, orderly, and honorable “house” and its opposite, the “street,” explored masterfully by anthropologist Roberto DaMatta, is chief among the Brazilian borrowings that figure in *The Tribute of Blood* (and, as both DaMatta and Beattie have indicated, it is one that can be extended to similarly patrimonial societies across the globe). At the same time, Beattie shows himself to be conversant with various aspects of the English-language historiography on military service the world over, which allows him to extend comparisons as far afield as Russia, Germany, and Japan, putting the lie to the durable assumption, here quoted from Barrington Moore, that the “political problems” of countries like Brazil “are not really comparable to those of larger countries” (although one would of course hasten to add scare quotes around the word “larger” when making comparisons between Brazil and even the largest of European nation-states). Beattie also seeks to contribute to more general discussions of institutional modernization, suggesting, for example, that historians of other societies undertake similar studies of “the sequencing and depth of institutional reform” and thus make possible “a more rigorous comparative history of State building” (151). (See also 14, 267, 270, 272, 284).

International connections are important for Beattie’s work in other respects as well. Indeed, such connections are crucial, as nearly all of the reforms that he discusses were of foreign provenance: they did not emerge in response to local needs, (in fact, in the case of the Brazilian Army’s withdrawal from its role as a penal institution, military reformers turned their backs on local needs); rather they were inspired from abroad. Seen in this light, one Brazilian officer’s declaration that developments in Europe were “eloquently demonstrating to us what the destiny of weak peoples will be” (225) can be read as a self-fulfilling prophecy, albeit one laden with unintended irony.

This point tempts one to draw a further conclusion from *The Tribute of Blood*. The degree to which conscription came to Brazil as the result of international vogue illustrates the need to privilege cultural factors (and I include all manner of intellectual inspiration under the rubric of the “cultural”) vis-à-vis the political (in the sense of international power politics) and the socioeconomic (including both global and regional political economy) in writing the history of sociopolitical arrangements throughout what one might call, to add still another euphemism to an already crowded field, the “under-dominant world.” A lingering attachment to a more narrowly materialistic view of history may have prevented Beattie from making this point more emphatically (the project from
which this book emerged was, after all, originally conceived as a “social history of common Brazilian soldiers” [xv]). But the point remains: the cultural orientation of Brazilian elites, more than any other single factor, determined that Brazil would ultimately adopt conscription (although one cannot add quickly enough, as Beattie would, that the shape and timing of the resulting system owed a great deal to the often-fractious actions and understandings of ordinary men and women of all socioeconomic classes).

The Tribute of Blood is not without its faults. Brazil specialists are sure to take issue with some of Beattie’s interpretations and certain readers may choose to pick over other infelicities. But the Brazil specialist might also recognize something interesting—perhaps even something characteristically Brazilian—in Beattie’s cannibalistic assimilation of techniques, traditions, and approaches from Brazil, the United States, and elsewhere. It is this borrowing from some of the best of what is around in order to make something new, that should prove of great and lasting interest to the specialist and non-specialist alike.

James P. Woodard
Brown University


This work provides a treasury of information relating to a short pamphlet, twenty-four pages in length and published in London and Glasgow in June 1837. It remains the only existing slave narrative which uses Creole or dialect as the main form of expression. The pamphlet, entitled A Narrative of Events, since the First of August, 1834, by James Williams, an Apprenticed Labourer in Jamaica, played a pivotal role in the abolition of the apprenticeship system. The book, edited by Diana Paton, a history lecturer at the University of Newcastle in Britain, illuminates the argument that historical forces which shaped Jamaica’s past were unique, yet similar to those existing in other Caribbean colonies.

Publication of A Narrative of Events, in 1837, had a profound impact throughout England. During December 1837 to March 1838, more than 130 public meetings, denouncing apprenticeship, occurred in Ireland, Scotland, Wales and England. Such gatherings drew thousands of anti-apprenticeship supporters seeking an immediate end to the labor scheme that replaced slavery.

Without detracting from the work’s merits, it would be a grave historical error to attribute the publication of this pamphlet as the sole catalyst that led to the demise of apprenticeship. The impact of Williams’ work cannot be seen in isolation but should be juxtaposed with the plethora of sermons, tracts, petitions, meetings and newspaper articles that reinforced the anti-apprenticeship campaign and hastened the demise of an inhumane and exploitative system in the British West Indies.
A distinct quality of Williams's *A Narrative of Events* is that it explores the relationship between state representatives and labor. This contrasts to other slave narratives of the broad African diasporic tradition such as Mary Prince and Olaudah Equiano. The thought-provoking and controversial chapter, “A Report of Evidence Taken at Brown's Town and St. Ann's Bay” provides a graphic account of the brutal punishment and injustices endured by blacks in Jamaica.

Indeed, *A Narrative of Events* is a judiciously edited work that vividly demonstrates the manner in which certain records could be marginalized, overlooked and misinterpreted. An obvious contribution of the publication is its emphasis on two lesser-known figures and their monumental contributions; first, the author of the pamphlet (James Williams) and secondly, Joseph Sturge who was the leader of the anti-apprenticeship movement. Paton's appropriate inclusion of a final chapter entitled “Additional Documents” provides insight into the personalities of the period. This concluding piece includes letters from Joseph Sturge, and also correspondence of persons who sought to undermine the credibility of James Williams. A noteworthy strength of the pamphlet, produced by Williams, is the accurate depiction of events, thus his detractors would have considerable difficulty in presenting contradictory evidence.

The book’s editor admits to the shortcoming that the particular pamphlet is silent. Additionally, the recently added explanatory endnotes of each chapter serve to elucidate readers who are unfamiliar with the linguistic terrain in which the pamphlet is crafted. The objective of illuminating readers is expertly achieved without diminishing the work’s originality.

Undoubtedly, the testimonial narratives of Caribbean slaves will be a valuable primary source for both scholars and students seeking compact yet detailed information on the resistance of apprentices to this new system of control, conditions at the St. Ann’s Bay House of Correction and differences among magistrates, planters and apprentices. In retrospect, *A Narrative of Events* will prove to be an invaluable asset in understanding the experiences of Jamaican apprentices and the evolution of the transatlantic anti-apprenticeship campaign.

Jerome Teelucksingh
University of the West Indies, Trinidad


Ecuadorianists have long awaited a book on the country’s banana industry, and Steve Striffler has made an excellent beginning with this prize-winning research on the United Fruit (UF) company’s Tenguel estate. He wanted his study of the workers’ struggle for better wages and land to go beyond previous works that tended to focus on leading capitalistic actors. Casting his work in Marxian terms,
Striffler finds that worker power—at Tenguel, at other banana producing regions in Ecuador, and across Latin America—played a decisive role in undermining foreign-owned enclaves. Striffler argues that “class struggle” best explains the emergence of the “contract farming” system that transformed agrarian landscapes. Although Ecuadorian worker efforts did not ultimately improve their lives, Striffler finds that struggles at least provided a base for subsequent popular organizations.

Part I follows the entrance and subsequent decline of United Fruit’s Tenguel estate. Part II explores “agrarian restructuring,” decisive changes in the banana industry forced upon capitalists in Ecuador and abroad by “local struggles” (8). Striffler based his study upon multiple interviews with former Tenguel workers, the work and theories of Quiteño historians, the archives of a worker’s organization in Cuenca, and a few United Fruit papers found in the US National Archives. In fluent prose, Striffler recalls United Fruit’s attempt to organize the Tenguel plantation for efficient production and as a paradise for workers. Panama Disease devastated plantings leading to hundreds of unemployed. In spite of UF’s attempt to do everything right, it left in the 1960s beset, according to Striffler’s interpretation, by militant Spanish-Catholic worker organizers and land invaders. Land reform laws under the “shadow of state” proved inadequate, leaving most workers landless. Striffler continues that, thanks to the local struggles of labor, other multinationals dismantled their enclaves and left Ecuador soon after.

Striffler’s work on the United Fruit workers is laudable, although his broad conclusions, based as they are upon this one case study of coastal Ecuador, raise concerns. Striffler writes that the human face of capitalism must be included, but he actually provides very sparse coverage of it. How would coastal agriculturists, exporters, the multinationals, and coastal historians interpret these events? As Julio Estrada Ycaza—the dean of all historians of coastal Ecuador—once advised, researchers must keep in mind that antagonistic attitudes separate the two principal regions of Ecuador—the coast and the Sierra—and that accounts from the Sierra tend to offer interpretations shaped by geoeconomic conditions that prevail there. Had Striffler commenced his work in Guayaquil rather than Quito would he have adopted the Marxist framework he selected?

A different interpretation of the changes in Ecuadorian labor practices, supply to exporters, and land use is entirely possible. At the time of the Tenguel experiment Communism had been in power in the Soviet Union for over thirty years. Under the ideological wing of the Ecuadorian leftist political parties, a group of “rogue” lawyers and union organizers largely trained and funded in Cuba and funded from behind the Iron Curtain actively promoted land seizures and unionization of labor. Agriculturnists recall that the funded organizers first targeted companies and farms that offered the most benefits, paid the highest wages, and had the most workers. These included not only Tenguel, but also Anglo Petroleum, Valdez and San Carlos Plantations, and the Port Authority. Unions charged workers up to forty dollars each every time a contract was negotiated. UF left Ecuador, and Ecuadorian planters recall this as an isolated
The other plantations turned to outsourcing of labor, a reorientation of labor policies that laid the base for today's contract labor system. Administrators recall the end of Soviet funding, thanks to glasnost (transparency). This allowed them to radically diminish the time allocated to worker problems. Plantations did away with permanent employees and unions faded away. Traditional subsidies of housing, beef, and milk diminished and disappeared. Striffler wrote (194) that the lives of contemporary workers are dismal as plantation owners continue to rid themselves of permanent employees. He concluded that the “struggles” left a base for future populist organization. At present, outsourcing of labor by agriculturists, the result of struggles Striffler covered, jeopardizes future organization.

Striffler cites a broad transition of agriculture to “contract farming” (209) and concludes this was a “restructuring,” forced upon the “capitalists” by subalterns. A gain, a different interpretation was possible, and I turned to coastal agriculturists and exporters for guidance. Informants and their elders recalled that during the 1940s, at the same time that Striffler described the Tenguel labor force as docile (43), banana suppliers multiplied to meet market demand. Farms which had requisite economies of scale to make them viable commercial suppliers took shape. In the 1940s, Lucho Noboa, whose Bonita is now the largest banana exporter, was making agreements with the growing number of suppliers who supplied ninety percent of his demand. He had previously used suppliers for rice export and worked within a traditional framework. Standard Fruit (Dole) had its suppliers then as well; thus, long before worker struggles. An exporter advised that the term “contract farming” was then, and is now, unknown among shippers. Suppliers and exporters used the old handshake agreement: loose on price, based on faith and not on paper or notaries. The supplier practice dated as far back as any could remember, and is in use today by Lucho’s Ecuadorian heirs. By the 1950s the coast had displayed many big, medium, and small sized banana farms as urban Ecuadorians, shop owners, widowed heirs, and new industrialists invested. They bought land and planted. Suppliers became multimillionaires. It is difficult to agree with Striffler's interpretation that this multiplication of banana suppliers represented a fragmentation and reconfiguration of coastal Ecuador forced upon capitalists by subalterns.

Taken together, Noboa’s Bonita and the Ecuadorian Wong family’s Reybanpac dominate Ecuadorian banana production and export. Both own huge plantations, yet as in the 1940s, both depend largely upon suppliers. The histories of these “capitalistic actors,” as Striffler terms them, would be vital to theoretical conclusions about agricultural history here. Standard Fruit’s archives at Tulane University should be consulted before attempting to define its adherence to suppliers, a practice it began in the 1940s. Dole now plants but 800 hectares. A Bonita comptroller suggested, “Why should Dole buy land? It uses dependable and flexible suppliers that have no labor problems. A plantation operation in Ecuador would be expensive since it is south of the Panama Canal and political influence is difficult.” Since banana consumption fluctuates as much as fifteen percent, UF turns to Ecuadorian suppliers only in years when their opera-
tions in Central America run short. Recently, it has turned to Ecuadorian suppliers on the average of five-year intervals. United Fruit's Chiquita does not play a significant role in the Ecuadorian industry.

Conclusions concerning the relationships of actions taken by workers and actions taken by planters/exporters require more than a Marxist frame of inquiry. As valuable as Striffler's work on Tenguel is to us, events there cannot be looked upon as a pluralistic or typical phenomenon replicated throughout the littoral. In a reassessment historians would probably examine the defining Latin American traditions still strong at Ecuadorian coastal plantations. Have they adapted to global economic change while maintaining their own continuity?

Lois Roberts
Naval Postgraduate School


Based on the meticulous examination of company and union records and enlightening interviews with workers, Contracting Masculinity is a successful attempt to show how “doing gender” at the provincial utility British Columbia Electric (B E) created systematic sexual inequality from the 1940s to the present. Tellingly, the first union organization at B E was formed in 1944 and the first personnel management department followed in 1945. Creese's aim is to show how the leadership of one white-collar union collaborated with company executives and personnel managers to institutionalize job evaluation (or classification) systems and collective bargaining agreements that normalized “the rights of male breadwinners to higher pay and career mobility” (107). In the process, the (white) male worker became the norm and the object of most union strategies.

Founded in 1897, the British Columbia Electric Railway Company (B E) expanded dramatically during the 1940s and became a major employer in Vancouver. Long-established customs of employment classified men as supervisor, engineers, and technical personnel. By 1949, eighty percent of all the women who worked at B E were in the first four — and lowest paid — job evaluation levels. Their jobs were defined as “non-technical” (i.e., unskilled), even though most women clerical workers at B E were high school graduates and had trained in stenography, typing and office machine use before coming to B E. A twenty percent pay differential between men’s and women’s salaries for the same work was justified by the company as a “community standard” and the necessity of meeting old protective legislation for women that required they have a rest break each day. The typical career trajectory for a male worker was to begin as a meter reader and then to move up the job evaluation ladder into supervisory work or engineering departments. Arguing that women would have to roam the streets or enter dangerous job sites to read meters, union leaders and company
officials kept women out of job opportunities that might have secured them access to promotions and higher salaries. Most women at BE worked as clerical workers for a number of years and then married. Creese does not pay much attention to the historical evolution of the marriage bar, its effects on female promotions, or how and when married women and single mothers began to work at BE in larger numbers, presumably a major factor in the rising consciousness of women workers in the 1970s.

A surge of union organizing after the Second World War, helped along by new collective bargaining legislation in Canada, resulted in the establishment of white-collar unions with thousands of members. BE’s Office Employees Association joined the US based Office Employees International Union (OEIU) in 1955. Creese is ambivalent about what she describes as “business unionism” at BE, arguing that while it did bring benefits to both male and female workers, it also reified the white male breadwinner as the average worker and downplayed “politicized forms of social unionism” (38). Creese does not discuss the historical evolution of the left’s influence in white collar organizing in Canada except to say that it had disappeared by the 1950s. Given the grave consequences of red-baiting in the US for egalitarian and progressive policies in union organizing, more attention to this factor might have been instructive.

Through a series of bargaining agreements and changes in personnel practices at BE, the twenty percent pay differential between men and women was formally done away with in the 1950s but remained embedded in what seemed to be a “scientific” job evaluation system. In 1961, BE was nationalized by the province of British Columbia, and along with the removal of most blue-collar workers and engineers into a separate subsidiary a year earlier, this development posed grave problems for future unionization efforts. Office workers at BE, now public sector workers, regrouped as the Office and Technical Workers Union (OTWU). A surge of public sector worker organizing in Canada in the 1960s strengthened the OTWU’s hand, and BE workers staged a successful walkout to oppose the implementation of a time-management study in 1972. While the OTWU’s leadership did champion higher wages for women employees and a series of individual women’s grievances, they also attempted to move most men’s office work into the technical category, claiming that male office workers should receive salaries equivalent to blue collar workers in the British Electrical Workers’ Union. Arguing that male office workers were “breadwinners” and in need of family wage salaries, male unionists created a “disembodied worker” who was “actually embodied in the white male” (135).

Women workers at BE began to critique this embodiment and to demand that attention be paid to their issues in the 1980s. They joined the union in large numbers and moved into executive positions, offering training sessions in leadership and encouraging women to run for union offices. One of their first demands was to end “personal service” tasks such as making coffee and running errands for bosses, a demand that most male unionists saw as trivial. The union Women’s Committee brought family matters into the workplace by demanding childcare, flextime, and family leave. Discussions of sexual harassment evoked
the deepest resentments among men. The results of a controversial women’s sur-
vey in 1978, however, downplayed sexual harassment. The most popular demand
was a four-day workweek, followed by career paths, on-the-job training, and ed-
ucational leave.

With massive layoffs, a rise in temporary work and privatized sub-con-
tracting, workers at BE faced a problematic future in the 1990s. These worsen-
ing conditions came along with liberal governmental attempts to institute affir-
mative action policies for aboriginals, people of color, and the disabled. At the
higher end of the pay scale and in skilled job evaluation categories, men were
affected most dramatically by restructuring, deskilling, and automation. Some
responded with charges of “reverse discrimination” and continued to frame eq-
uity demands in terms of a masculinist (and white) breadwinner ideology.

Creese’s painstaking attention to how all of this evolved over five decades
of changing job classification schemes does not always make for stimulating
reading, but is critical to the proving of her case: that “doing gender” over time
institutionalized gender inequality in a system that appeared to be based on the
rights of the individual in a neutral job evaluation system. She argues that by
paying more attention to entrenched differences, women unionists were able to
demonstrate the falsity of the premise that the system was sex neutral. In a clos-
ing chapter aimed at presenting new strategies for Canadian organizers she sug-
gests that attention to gender difference and a focus on “living wages” for all
workers should be a part of union policies in the future.

Some historians may find the sociological thrust of Contracting Masculini-
ty off-putting, but the language is nonetheless, jargon free and easy to under-
stand; wonderful quotes from workers illustrate Creese’s more abstract points
nicely. Labor historians in the US should find helpful models to apply to recent
developments in communications and energy companies and in public sector
employment. More collaborative work in all of North America might shed con-
siderable light on the gender and class issues that Creese has made salient in her
fine study.

Sharon Hartman Strom
University of Rhode Island

Paul Foos, A Short, Offhand, Killing Affair: Soldiers and Social Conflict Dur-
ing the Mexican-American War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2002. 223 pp. $49.95 cloth; $18.95 paper.

In this book, Paul Foos seeks to rescue the Mexican-American War from its sta-
tus as a forgotten war, a status it has long shared with the Korean War. His ap-
proach is in keeping with recent work on the history of war from the perspective
of the ordinary soldier, the regulars and militiamen who did the fighting at the
front, not from the perspective of the generals. He thus mines a rich and fruitful
seam of first person accounts written by soldiers themselves in the form of let-
ters and memoirs long overlooked by historians. He seeks to correct two standard interpretations of the war. One of these, in the triumphalist tradition, interprets the conflict as a limited war that reflected and unleashed American "nativism;" the other sees it as a victory for moralistic political elites who rescued the nation from the reckless expansionism of Southern extremists by limiting the acquisition of Mexican land in the final settlement. Both interpretations—and the second in particular—spotlight the leading men, insisting it was a war that the "masses" did not "understand, nor did they care" (9). Readers of this lively and eye-opening book are unlikely to put much credence in the received wisdom.

Foos pursues two objectives within his revisionist framework. He tries to show that individual soldiers differed in their perspectives on the war. He also tries to link the war to the larger context in which it played out, notably the effusive doctrine of Manifest Destiny that animated journalists and political elites, the shifting institutional arrangements of the military, and the systems of class domination in the United States and in Mexico. He is more consistently successful in achieving his first goal. The second goal is compromised somewhat by neglect of the ideological setting.

Though Manifest Destiny is no mystery, it is certainly worth a fresh look, all the more so because it is identified throughout as the decisive motivational force in politics and on the field of battle. Instead, it is assumed and referred to, not simply as a rationale for the war in the first place but more important, for the mayhem and atrocities on the ground, which became a major feature of the conflict and which Foos recounts in vivid and compelling detail. It is plausible, as he writes, that the official ideology of the war's promoters "was nakedly opportunistic and expressly promised plunder as the right of the volunteer," but this bold claim needs more support than a few scattered references (113). As for the question of class, there was an undeniable class dimension at work in the recruitment of soldiers and in the treatment of them, but Foos pushes this line of reasoning too hard, with tendentious assertions of class interest, both within the army and across national lines. Thus, we are told that had the New York authorities followed the democratic blueprint for militia organization outlined by the radical populist Mike Walsh, "American workers and Mexican peasants might have found they had much in common" (81). The text is also marred by dubious psychologizing, characteristic of a recent strand of thinking on the historiography of race. Is it possible to show that American soldiers "saw in Mexican institutions and society a corrupted version of themselves and their own institutions" (132)?

Foos is considerably more compelling when he sticks closer to the narratives embedded in his sources. He begins with revealing chapters on the workings of the military, explaining distinctions between the regular army and the volunteer units. He offers a vivid social portrait of the regular army's officer corps and an unparalleled one of its soldiers, about forty per cent of whom were foreign born and over a third illiterate—and with good reason. Though enlistment was voluntary in theory, in fact officers and the recruiting stations set up by the
national government resorted to “compulsory recruitment,” (61) impressing men from work crews and even jails to fill out regiments as they marched along. Conditions were simply horrible and the pay not much better. Discipline ranged from strict to harsh, and in either case far more overbearing than the regime of the volunteer units. Foos gives the most rounded picture of the volunteers we have through a series of case studies, which disclose how the volunteer militias quickly displaced the decrepit system of state militias sustained by universal military training and conducted on democratic principles marked by election of officers, negotiation of conditions, and so on. Governors and local officials honored traditional practices in the breech, giving local and state elites a free hand to do pretty much as they pleased, which effectively erased the distinction between the private volunteer units and the regular army. They used everything from bribery to coercion and were not above drawing on the most unruly elements, sometimes welcoming street gangs into their ranks. The heavy-handedness of an unimpressive officer core, rotten with nepotism and patronage, coupled with terrible conditions and broken promises, roiled the young recruits with at least some awareness of republican conventions. The predictable result was great desertion, which, interestingly enough, was higher on the way to the front than at the front itself. Although desertion was higher still in peacetime (thirty percent), Foos calculates that the “Mexican War had the highest rate of desertion of any American War” (25).

Such rag-tag soldiers were thrust into a land at war with itself. Central authority in Mexico, weak and battle-shy to begin with, collapsed during the war, leaving the hinterlands to an elite divided against itself and against laborers and small holders angered by heavy taxes and eager for land. The officers of the regular army, notably Winfield Scott, tried to impose discipline early on to avert atrocities, but soon gave up in frustration; their counterparts in the militias encouraged reprisal and retribution or looked the other way, as their men, motivated by a mix of nationalism, racism, and the instinct for survival, looted homes and churches and killed soldiers and civilians alike. Some felt no remorse, but others, as Foos astutely points out, were shamed and disgusted even if they felt no particular sympathy for their hapless victims in one of the darker and more shameful chapters in the history of the American military. One cannot read Foos’s account of the atrocities without a deep sense of dread, deepened by the possibility of still another US intervention abroad, as this is being written.

Nor can one consider the impact such men had on war and its aftermath without thinking about the impact of the ordinary soldier and domestic critics on the Vietnam War. One of the more arresting accounts of Vietnam attributes the American withdrawal and defeat not to opposition at home but to the collapse of the army in the field, an almost complete breakdown of discipline and control that made prosecution of the war next to impossible. Foos finds something similar at work in the Mexican War. He argues that the ordinary soldier’s rejection of authority on the field of battle blunted the more ambitious expansionist project of the Polk administration. Other historians, of course, see it differently, crediting Conscience Whigs, Libertyites, and would-be Free Soilers
with defeating Polkism. One can question Foos’s emphasis here, for we do not have to choose between these interpretations. Each is valid and together they provide a more complete picture of the forging of the peace. The same point holds for Foo’s take on the impact of the veterans on postwar politics in Massachusetts. He shrewdly argues that returning soldiers got back at their oppressors by supporting Free Soil politicians who had opposed the war. While that is true, it was also the case that Caleb Cushing, a former officer and one-time Whig turned Democrat, also shaped postwar politics but in a different way. Cushing helped rebuild the Democratic Party through policies premised on racism and white supremacy. As a state representative, he engineered the defeat of a personal liberty bill in the legislature, then as President Pierce’s Attorney General, he orchestrated the rendition from Boston of the fugitive slave Anthony Burns. Thus, it is doubtful that the forces unleashed by bitter experience on the Mexican battlefields cut in a single direction at home. Just as Foo’s soldiers did not see the war one way, they did not push political events one way, either. What is not in doubt is the debt we owe Paul Foos for raising important questions and opening up an entirely new line of thought on one of the more obscure but politically important wars this nation has ever fought.

Bruce Laurie
University of Massachusetts, Amherst


Whether in 1870 or in 2003, reformers concerned with the global logic of capitalism have dreamed of effective international labor standards, imposed through a world body that would stop the downward spiral of wages and working conditions. Here Edward Lorenz offers us a history of U.S. political debates over the International Labor Organization (ILO), founded precisely to stop that spiral. His study provides a comprehensive overview of the different big-level national interests who sought, alternately, to support, contain, or repress the ILO. It’s full of enticing research leads and fascinating tidbits about U.S. debates over the ILO. International Labor and Working-Class History (ILWCH) readers, though, will still be left frustrated in their efforts to understand U.S. involvement in the ILO and, especially, organized labor’s relationship to it.

The central drive behind the book is less a historical understanding of the ILO’s effectiveness than a political scientist’s argument about the U.S. political system. The ILO’s tripartite structure, Lorenz argues, in which government, labor, and business each have guaranteed representatives, reflects the U.S. system’s openness to incorporating civil society in the governing process. “Good societies need free institutions to speak for the outcasts and the vulnerable,” he writes, and the U.S. political system provides “a check on the corruption of public life by
The ILO, he argues, “globalized the American pluralist policy process,” bringing non-elites into politics, and it thus offers a successful export model. At the same time it confirms the virtues of the US political system at home: “The periodic success of the labor rights movement shows the US system can be made to define justice for all” (16).

The main body of his text then outlines the history of the pressures aligned for and against US involvement in the ILO. Lorenz lays out the main players and sets them in motion with a welcome ability to keep a complex story clear, as he traces efforts by the National Consumers’ League, reformist business interests, pro-labor academics, the American Federation of Labor, churches, and, as the story moves forward, New Dealers, anticommunists both within and outside the AFL-CIO, and free market economists.

The ILO was founded at the end of World War I as part of the Treaty of Versailles, which created a series of international bodies including the League of Nations, the World Court, and the ILO—all of which the United States government refused to join. A coalition of the National Consumers’ League, progressive academics in the American Association for Labor Legislation, and the American Federation of Labor (AFL) nonetheless lobbied hard for US involvement and kept pressure up for US involvement in the growing European movement for international labor standards.

Lorenz shows how that Progressive generation subsequently carried its concerns into the New Deal, in 1938 passing the Fair Labor Standards Act to harmonize labor standards across the fifty states. In 1934 they finally brought the US into the ILO. Meanwhile, certain business interests themselves started sniffing around about how international standards might be useful. One of the best nuggets in this book is the story of how New England textile manufacturers and their political allies, especially New Hampshire governor John Winant, became committed to labor standards as an answer to the textile industry’s migration, first from the US North to the South, and then to Japan.

After World War II, the US was all for global institutions, and it wanted to run them. Winant became ILO president. The ILO quickly evolved into a useful instrument in the Cold War, as the US used it to attack the Soviet bloc’s lack of “free” trade unions. For Lorenz, the best moment in the history of US involvement in the ILO was when it walked out of the organization in the 1970s in protest against labor standards in Russia and Eastern Europe. This demonstrated, he says, the democratic promise of US institutions and the effectiveness of the ILO. Lorenz ends by reflecting on the new potential of the ILO in the 1990s and the twenty-first century as a brake against unbridled free market liberalism.

Throughout, we get a strong sense of the players involved. Lorenz, to his credit, takes the church seriously as a player in the ILO debates, especially the Catholic Church, which was a steadfast lobbyist for the ILO throughout the mid-twentieth century. He also does a good job of tracing the waxing and waning influence of the National Consumers’ League over the course of the century, in particular the generation of upper-class white women who came to their full
power during the New Deal—and, he underscores, would not be replicated by a succeeding generation. They, in turn, overlapped with the academic generation that began with Progressivism and likewise peaked during the late thirties and early forties, in this case replaced, Lorenz notes, by a generation of social scientists that was narrowly focused, tightly bound by discipline, little interested in social reform, and that would eventually spawn the free market ideologues who attacked the ILO head-on beginning in the 1950s.

We also get a tantalizing, if ultimately undeveloped sense from Lorenz of the business stakes involved. More common than the textiles scenario was business interest in the ILO as a fig leaf eliding the need for actual effective labor standards. James Shotwell, a central academic proponent of the ILO, in 1930 wrote an article actually entitled: “The International Labour Organization as an Alternative to Violent Revolution” (98). Later, he dropped off copies of his work on every door in Congress. By 1944, as both the CIO and AFL swelled in power, Fortune magazine itself called the ILO “Revolution Insurance,” (126) and soon the US moved into high gear to take over the ILO. Lorenz, unfortunately, while he provides these juicy quotes dripping from the horse’s mouth, doesn’t ever quite follow up on how exactly the ILO might have helped avoid that revolution; he only lets drop near the end, almost as an aside, that, after a period in which free marketers attacked the ILO head-on, by the late twentieth century “International business came to like the ILO, a group that recommended standards but didn’t enforce them” (217).

The book’s treatment of the labor movement is entirely top-down, largely equating organized labor with Samuel Gompers, Philip Murray, and George Meany. While Lorenz lauds labor, like the church, as a body reflecting a broad grassroots membership, we don’t have a discussion of the extent to which those men did or did not reflect that membership, nor do we learn of how labor’s internal discussions of the ILO developed. His only mention of the CIO is to regret that the labor movement was divided during the 1940s, and thus spoke with a less unified voice than other sectors. Ironically, one of the most interesting parts of the book is his enthusiastic account of AFL-CIO president George Meany’s anticommunist use of the ILO in the 1960s and 70s, when Meany was so rabid he even outflanked the US Chamber of Commerce.

In the end, Lorenz is perhaps his most useful in providing evidence that the ILO worked because it didn’t work: it provided the illusion of international labor standards, but didn’t cause trouble, and it could be useful in the Cold War. As his book shows, almost every time the ILO passed effective conventions—such as those on forced labor or maternity leave—the US refused to sign. After all, as Fortune figured out, the ILO was an insurance policy, not a reformer’s dream.

Dana Frank
University of California, Santa Cruz
Richly descriptive and well documented, Steel and Steelworkers: Race and Class Struggle in Twentieth-Century Pittsburgh by John Hinshaw makes a significant contribution to the growing body of historical research on steel unionism in the twentieth century. Over the past few years, a number of new studies have broadened our understanding of unionization and work practices in the nation's steel mills, by examining in greater detail the patterns of organization in specific mills and mill towns.

Hinshaw focuses on the Pittsburgh area and follows the development and changes in steel unionism from the mid-nineteenth century through the twentieth. His study analyzes the factors that made Pittsburgh a center for world steel production, and how the industrial elite shaped the city and defined its culture. Then, with equal detail, he describes the restructuring of forces that brought about the sweeping destruction of steelmaking capacity in the region. John Hinshaw’s approach is ambitious. Framing his narrative through the urban Pittsburgh landscape, Hinshaw weaves a complex story of labor activism set against corporate power and greed. In each chapter he uses a kaleidoscope approach, so that the reader can appreciate Pittsburgh from the standpoint of industry, city politics, working-class life and union organizing.

The fate of steel and of Pittsburgh, Hinshaw argues, should be viewed as the predictable outcome of capitalism, rooted in profit and rarely driven by genuine market forces. “Deindustrialization,” he writes, “was less a failure on industrialists’ part than a strategy” (xvii). The robber barons of the nineteenth century like Andrew Carnegie, followed by the financial entrepreneurs of the Morgan-Mellon tradition, did not make steel because of a commitment to the industry. Their concern, Hinshaw notes, was always to make money. When changing demands, increased globalization, and market competition made it more profitable to invest elsewhere, that’s what steel corporations did. Pittsburgh, dominated by financial and political elites, emerged at the end of the century with a new image. The steelworkers, in contrast, would not make the transition. “‘The most livable city,’” writes Hinshaw, “rested upon a city where a third of its workers labored below the poverty line” (251).

Hinshaw does an excellent job of describing the intolerable conditions African Americans encountered as they entered the industry. From the exclusionary practices in the early years, to the pervasive segregation that characterized occupational structures in the mills throughout most of their history, Hinshaw examines black resistance and accommodation. His explanation of how seniority worked to the advantage of white workers has clarity and drama. He demystifies the different forms of seniority by unit, by department, and by classification that locked minorities into dead-end jobs in the worst departments. “The major issue confronting black steelworkers,” he explains, “was how to en-
force their seniority rights” (92). He enlivens this account with interviews and firsthand stories from mill workers.

Hinshaw discusses the intransigence of white workers and the union’s national leadership to the demands of the African American workers. Hoping to hold on to the cleaner and better-paying jobs, white workers opposed plant-wide seniority and transfer rights. Company policy had directed most black workers into the hot and dirty jobs in steelmaking; white workers maneuvered to keep them there. At the same time, union leadership took a hands-off approach to local problems around discrimination, and focused its civil rights work on federal legislation and anti-communist propaganda. Hinshaw analyzes how cold war politics blunted efforts to challenge discrimination in the union as well as in the mill. “In the USWA’s [United Steelworkers of America] civil rights crusade,” he observes, “anticommunism took precedence over all other concerns” (140).

Despite his focus on the conditions and struggles of African American workers, Hinshaw remains unclear whether he perceives race struggle and class struggle as separate or inseparable. The book’s subtitle, “Race and Class Struggle in Twentieth-Century Pittsburgh,” creates an expectation of more analysis of the relationship or intersections between race and class. Yet, in the text, Hinshaw offers no theoretical framework. He maintains a separate storyline for African American workers, although their struggle is characterized as integral to the choices and directions taken by the union.

The overall story begins in the nineteenth century with the rise and consolidation of the steel industry. Hinshaw traces organization from the craft unions from the Sons of Vulcan, to the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers. At each step toward broader unionization, the powerful steel interests were able to bust the unions and drive wedges between workers, based on skill, national origin, race, and later gender. The demand for labor during the First World War encouraged renewed attempts at unionization, culminating in the 1919 Great Steel Strike. Especially in the eastern mills around Pittsburgh, American-born workers resented the encroachments made by the foreign-born, and were among the first to cross the strike lines. African Americans were brought in as scabs, but their role was not as decisive as the strike-breaking of the native-born workers. Black workers were, however, blamed for the strike’s failure.

The narrative moves ahead to the period of industrial organizing in the thirties, with John L. Lewis’ founding of the Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO). The Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC) led the campaign in the mills. The extreme antiunionism of “Little Steel,” including Youngstown Sheet and Tube and Republic Steel, led to violent police repression in many mill towns. In contrast, Myron Taylor at US Steel, surprised the capitalists as well as many steelworkers, by signing a contract in 1937 with Lewis. Although it brought the union into many Pittsburgh area mills, it shortcircuited the grassroots organizing. Union recognition established centralized bargaining and hierarchical leadership.

Like other historians of steel, Hinshaw attributes the overall conservatism
of steel unionism to this contractually-instituted top-down authority. It is interesting how many historians have drawn the distinction between the United Steelworkers Union (USWA) and the United Auto Workers Union (UAW) on issues of rank and file militancy. Strong grassroots protest movements have transformed the steel union, from the dues protesters in the fifties, the Ad Hoc Committee of Black Steelworkers and the I.W. Abel challenge in the sixties, to Ed Sadlowski’s Fight Back in the seventies. In contrast, the UAW has been a one caucus-ruled union since the 1940s.

Descriptions of women’s experiences in the mill and union are another important feature of Steel and Steelworkers. Since so few women worked in the mill until World War II, and the majority was eliminated in the post-war period, women have remained invisible in many steel union narratives. Hinshaw, however, searched the records and found materials on women, on their efforts to get and keep jobs, and their struggles for voice in the union.

The final chapters of Steel and Steelworkers describe the difficult and fruitless efforts of the union and workers to keep the mills open. How the corporations timed and carried out the plant shut downs, kept the initiative in their hands and contributed to the divisions among workers. Faced with the inevitable dismantling of the mills, workers became embattled over tactical differences. “Big steel exerted enormous control over how workers understood deindustrialization,” concludes Hinshaw (236).

John Hinshaw’s book provides a well-constructed overview of the rise and fall of steel, its impact on Pittsburgh and on the workers who depended on that industry for a livelihood. His examination of the reinvention of Pittsburgh in the final decades of the century makes an invaluable contribution to the still quite fragmentary history of the industry and the union.

Ruth Needleman
Indiana University


Critics, fans and journalists alike, of the players’ role in the prolonged major league baseball work stoppage of 1994-1995, generally ignore two key realities of the history of the national pastime. First, at least since the founding of the National League in 1876, baseball at the highest levels has been primarily a business. Neither owners nor players played mainly for “the love of the game.” For the latter it was a way to make a living; for the former it was a way to make a profit.
Second, for about a century after the senior circuit’s emergence, owner-player (read management-labor) relations were characterized by the clubs’ domination, manipulation, exploitation, and deception of the athletes. The principal basis of that relationship was the so-called reserve clause that, as interpreted, turned a player into a virtual piece of property. He was tied to the first team with which he signed a contract until sold, traded, or released. The last rarely happened and, in the other cases, property rights merely transferred to the new team.

In his earlier award-winning study, Never Just a Game: Players, Owners and American Baseball to 1920 (1994), Burk labels the years up to 1920 as the “trade war era,” “the most representative and influential figure” of which was Albert G. Spalding, lover of baseball and quintessential capitalist (viii). During that era the worst abuses of the reserve clause were at times cushioned by the rise of new leagues trying to find a niche in the growing baseball entertainment business; the American Association, Western League, American League, Federal League all provided players an option and bargaining power. At times, even players unions—and the short-lived Players League—gained enough strength to ease temporarily the economic crunch. But every time, the competition either collapsed or was absorbed into the dominant structure and the players lost their leverage. Finally, in 1922 the US Supreme Court sanctioned management’s cartel, further limiting the players’ courses of action.

In this second volume, Burk divides the post-1920 decades into “the paternalistic era” or the age of Branch Rickey, and “the inflationary era” or the age of Marvin Miller. During the former, covering the years 1921–1965, baseball enjoyed stages of expansion and prosperity, especially in the post-World War One period. But these were followed by serious declines: the Great Depression and World War II, and the 1950s-1960s suburbanization and rise of alternate forms of entertainment that cut into baseball’s fan base. In addition, with the exception of the abortive Pacific Coast League claim of major league status and brief Mexican League challenge, both in 1946, the players had no bargaining leverage nor jumping opportunities such as had been provided by the earlier trade wars. In fact, Branch Rickey’s pioneering creation of an extensive farm system locked in more players at lower salaries. Even his oft-praised moves to bring blacks and Latinos into the major leagues can be seen as steps to enlarge the labor pool and press down wages. So, despite the publicity accorded the salaries of Babe Ruth and a few superstars, the players hardly benefited from baseball’s seasons of prosperity, including, at first, the new income from media rights. And they gradually came to realize that fact.

Consequently, by the 1960s, even the basically conservative baseball fraternity could not avoid either the reform spirit of the decade nor an awareness of their own disadvantageous position. Several events illustrate this changing situation and mark entry into Burk’s third era: Small owner concessions and creation of a pension plan in 1946, in part a reaction to the Mexican League threat; the beginnings of the Major League Baseball Players Association in 1952; the hiring of Miller in 1966; the inclusion of a grievance procedure in the 1968 Ba-
sic Agreement; the Curt Flood challenge to the reserve clause (1969–1972) and the Messersmith-McNally case that, through arbitration, effectively ended the reserve clause (1975). Under the threat of total free agency, the owners reluctantly began to negotiate with the union to set rules and to offer players long-term contracts at ever higher wages, something they could afford thanks to the cash cows of television, relocation and expansion.

Korr’s somewhat more strident book differs from Burk’s in two ways. Obviously, it covers less time, focusing on Burk’s inflationary era, the age of Marvin Miller. Second, it draws much more on Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) internal documents and personal interviews with Miller and numerous players. But in going over much of the same territory as Burk, Korr delves more deeply into the motives, methods, and reasoning of Miller and into the behind-the-scenes debates and interrelationships of the union office and members. A labor economist who had worked for the federal government and the Steelworkers Union, and an old Dodger fan from Brooklyn, Miller was often blamed by owners, writers, and fans for destroying the “Golden Age” of baseball. He did inspire confidence in the players who he believed were “the foundation of baseball” (61) but who, because they had no leverage within the “one-sided [reserve] system that was structured to allow ownership to operate without interference” (64).

Miller’s role in all of this as teacher and negotiator was undeniably crucial. But it was the players themselves who earlier “decided they had to challenge the owners in order to gain things that they thought they deserved” and then opened “the modern era of labor relations in baseball ( . . . ) with the decision to hire someone like Miller” (245). The combined impact of the MLBPA, Miller, and the law has been the end of the reserve clause, greater freedom for the players, and a remarkable increase in player salaries.

In portraying management, Korr is almost never sympathetic. Though not stupid in many areas of business, the owners did “foolish things” concerning the union, the result of “thoughtlessness and arrogance bred by years of unchecked control” (241). They stupidly tried to demonize the players whose abilities they were marketing to fans. They repeatedly misread the degree of union solidarity and the strength of labor law behind the union’s position. “They equated compromise with surrender” and refused to negotiate about the reserve clause, the players’ major concern.” A “false sense of security” made them condescending and dismissive before the players’ requests (243).

The late Stephen Jay Gould, in a 1991 review, reached similar conclusions about the owners, players, and Miller; see his posthumously published Triumph and Tragedy in Mudville: A Lifelong Passion for Baseball (2003). “Baseball owners had prevailed by bluff and force, but they also had become complacent in the absence of any effective challenge for so long” (283–284). They used reference to baseball myth to divide and conquer “mostly young and uneducated players” (280). Miller raised player consciousness by speaking softly and reasonably and by moving slowly. His successes derived from that growing player solidarity, “powerfully abetted by dependable stupidity among owners” (283). Gould also
quotes with full approval Red Barber’s assertion that, thanks to Miller and the union, “we have the entire structure of baseball changed—the entire relationship between the players and the owners” (279); hence the title of Korr’s book.

In short, the two works under review are in general agreement. Too often selfish, arrogant, exploitative of both players and the public, dishonest, overconfident, inept baseball owners and administrators brought trouble on themselves and basically deserve what perceived suffering—usually more to their egos than to their pockets—they have experienced since the 1970s. Generally they did not understand things then, and to a great degree they still do not. What they have yielded, they have yielded only under the greatest player association and legal pressure; in Korr’s words, “it was the union that forced the changes on baseball against the efforts of the owners to retain the status quo” (10). The players, made aware of this after years of being mistreated and lied to, have been most reluctant to give back anything for fear of going back to the for-them-not-so-golden old days. The players, in other words, are not driven so much by greed but by a desire to get an equitable share of what their labor produces and of retaining what they and others before them struggled so long and hard to earn. They have had a vision of the game incompatible with that of the owners. And the press, fed documents and perks by the owners, certainly has not helped the players’ cause very much.

My personal reading of that history coincides with that of Burk and Korr, so I have no fundamental argument with their conclusions. As a historian, I likewise have no quarrel with their methodology or their use of sources. We can always wish they had had more, but I find their documentation and interpretation more than adequate. I can only hope that both books will be read by more so-called experts who blame baseball’s troubles primarily on “spoiled, selfish” players.

Joseph L. Arbena
Clemson University


There are advantages to focusing a single analytical lens on a complex and multidimensional historical event. Lines of causation can be drawn clearly. Intention, action, and consequence can be isolated and explored in depth. This is what Daniel Kryder has done for federal policy toward African Americans during World War II. A political scientist, Kryder looks at African Americans in war production industries, the army, and southern agriculture in the context of two overriding imperatives of officials of the federal state: maintaining wartime production and gaining reelection. He moves to the heart of what states do in wartime. They mobilize industry and people. They suppress dissent. They con-
tain social unrest. Given these demands it is not surprising, Kryder argues, that reform of federal racial policy between 1941 and 1945 was so limited in scope, despite widespread black protest, calls for more progressive measures, and the popular “Double V” campaign. But there are also pitfalls to the single analytical lens, and Kryder encounters these in his conclusion. From one point of view, “the war contained rather than facilitated movements for black liberation” (243), as Kryder argues, but from another vantage the war told an entirely different story.

Historians will find much of this territory familiar, but Kryder makes important and often creative contributions to the literature on race in wartime. The familiar parts, especially the creation of the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) and the trouble black troops encountered in southern white communities near training facilities, Kryder handles well. But this is not a social history of black protest nor an investigation of movement politics or even a thorough examination of race as a concept. It is strictly an effort to understand the federal government’s response to the social disruptions of wartime America: African American migration to urban areas and to the North and West, the decline of black labor in southern agriculture, the drafting of thousands of black men into the military, and demands for reform made by black leaders. As such, the book adopts a “racial management” framework in which the state is seen as manipulating racial politics to serve its ultimate wartime aims.

Franklin Roosevelt, the master of political calculation, had drawn into his administration in the 1930s the so-called “Black Cabinet.” Put in place to co-opt black protest, insulate Roosevelt from criticism by vocal black leaders, and win black votes for the Democratic Party, these officials were given little leverage to enact far-reaching reform. After 1941, Roosevelt and his racial strategists found themselves caught between mounting African American dissatisfaction with Black Cabinet tokenism on the one hand and the clamoring of southern white politicians that the war not threaten segregation on the other. The Democratic Party’s efforts to navigate between these sets of demands accounts for the particular twists of federal policy during the war years. Roosevelt’s Executive Order creating the FEPC, for instance, was designed entirely to prevent A. Philip Randolph’s March on Washington and, subsequently, to deflect and contain black protest in critical war production centers. The decision to train and station virtually all African American draftees in southern states, regardless of their states of origin, was a sop to the southern military elite and their political patrons in the Democratic Party.

The last thing Roosevelt wanted was for the war to become a stage for civil rights. A thorough investigation of discrimination in railroad employment would have threatened the nation’s vital transportation industry—thus Roosevelt instructed the FEPC not to hold hearings. When William Hastie refused to back down from his insistence that Army training not be segregated, Henry Stimson wrote that “his usefulness is limited,” and Hastie resigned from the War Department with the administration’s blessing. Even very circumscribed reforms, such as desegregating army theaters, were resisted and only implement-
ed by the administration when such reforms were seen as necessary to prevent either black protest or continued low morale among black troops. In the end, Kryder notes, the government determined that the simplest way to prevent agitation for more far-reaching changes within the army was to send black troops overseas.

Circumscribed as federal policy toward African Americans in wartime industry and the army was, it nonetheless provided progressive openings at the local level. The same could not be said of the third arena Kryder investigates: southern agriculture. Here, where southern whites had the greatest economic interest and the Democratic Party the largest number of votes, Roosevelt and his racial managers did everything they could to satisfy the planters. With a rural labor shortage caused in no small part by the out-migration of tens of thousands of African Americans, southern planters, large and small, faced severe wage inflation. The administration responded by exempting farm produce from the nationwide price freeze and ceding control of farm labor to local draft boards, who would be sympathetic to landholders’ labor needs. The federal Agriculture Extension Service also expanded its corps of black agents, who were deployed into rural communities as a conservative bulwark against the spread of militant civil rights messages. The end result for rural black laborers was an intensification of supervision and exploitation by white planters and their allies.

One of the most interesting contributions of Divided Arsenal is Kryder’s sensitivity to the intent and timing of particular federal actions. The political scientist’s mind is at work here, as Kryder tracks policy initiatives designed to placate black leaders and co-opt black protest with the various election cycles between 1941 and 1945 as well as with major events in the European and Pacific theaters. What he calls “Executive and national security imperatives” drove every major policy innovation: the administration’s attention to domestic racial issues would heat up with each critical election and overseas development, while flagging at most other times. In all, this is a fascinating study of how the federal state prosecuted a different sort of propaganda campaign on the home front during World War II. Roosevelt and his staff “managed race” to ensure domestic peace—and thus white supremacy—when many in the African American community hoped the war would become a vehicle for destroying Jim Crow.

As accomplished as the book is, Divided Arsenal has some limitations. Foremost is Kryder’s overemphasis on the regressive nature of the state during the war. His exclusive focus on federal actors and high policy means that he misses what may be one of the war’s most important legacies: despite efforts by the federal government to contain and co-opt black protest, African Americans from San Francisco to Detroit, St. Louis to New York organized, pushed for change, and joined local left political coalitions and union caucuses that became enormously important both during and after the war. The state could not contain everything, and to suggest that it could represents a miscasting of an entire chapter of the modern civil rights movement. Second, he frames the book with discussions of Gunnar Myrdal’s An American Dilemma, but he does not historicize Myrdal, does not investigate Myrdal’s black critics, and does not offer a
strong connection between Myrdal and federal policy in this period. This makes the introduction and conclusion strangely divorced from the argument in between, which is entirely about politics and the state. Furthermore, the book’s structure is oddly weighted. The FEPC and other labor issues receive almost three chapters, the army two, and agriculture only one. This may reflect a prioritizing related to the demands of writing a book in political science, but it struck this historian as unbalanced. Finally, one of the central issues in the book, segregationists’ control of the Democratic Party, is not fully addressed or explored. It deserved a chapter of its own and a more systematic treatment, given its singular importance to the shape of federal policy in this period. These shortcomings aside, this is a well-researched, successfully argued, and interesting book.

Robert O. Self
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee