Intellectual practice is marked by a central asymmetry: we explain the beliefs of others with social scientific theories of causation, but do not seek similar causes for our own (self-evidently more reasonable) ideas. So the “fundamentalist” writings of martyred Egyptian intellectual Sayyid Qutb are normally analyzed as outgrowths of anti-colonial struggle, eroding economic opportunity, official corruption, and changing patterns of education and migration. But the thoughts of Daniel Bell, Hannah Arendt, and Alasdair MacIntyre are examined for their keen insights into the malaise of late modernity. The ideas of Western cultural critics, in other words, have meaning, while those of Muslim cultural critics have only function.

Euben dissects this problem with supreme skill. She argues that rationalist epistemologies cannot reveal the most important elements of fundamentalist movements—their power to engage and motivate—precisely because they do not take the arguments of fundamentalists seriously. Entering into intellectual dialogues with Qutb, Jamal al-Din, and Muhammad ‘Abduh, she shows how each dealt with “ways in which the global ascendance of Western cultural, political, and economic norms has presented a common set of dilemmas and problems to prevailing understandings of ‘Islamic tradition’” (9). This ascendance—modernity itself—emerges from the rational insistence that politics is about means rather than ends, and that the health of human communities rests primarily on correct bureaucratic process rather than transcendent moral foundations.

Conflict between rationalism and foundationalism underlies the complex interaction of Muslim and Euroamerican world views, informing debate within each tradition while acting also as the mirror in which the West perceives Islam as a distorted negation of itself. Both traditions are shaped by arguments about what it means to be modern, “So just as the West is itself a product of multiple identities and traditions, . . . fundamentalist thought is itself a culturally syncretic perspective, a complex and eclectic amalgamation of Western ideas and reinterpreted Islamic traditions” (91). Euben demonstrates the complexity and subtlety of both sides of the phantom mirror, and shows how the epistemology of American political science leads to theoretical and analytical shortcomings. In the end, she writes, “[a]n explanation of Islamic fundamentalism . . . must . . . be situated within an extensive and ongoing critique of modernity and the
processes that define it” (151), and must begin with an understanding of what anthropological culture hero Bronislaw Malinowski called “the native’s point of view” (157).

If there is any shortcoming in this brief, powerful, closely argued book, it is perhaps the choice of focussing on the legacy of the disenchanted Weber at the expense of the arch-enchanter Durkheim, who haunts the book’s final chapters like a phantom. For the initial problem of intellectual asymmetry remains unsolved if we stop with Euben’s brilliant insights into the compelling nature of foundationalist thought and the incapacity of rationalism to understand it. We are left with the issue of reflexivity, the other side of the equation: what do our ideas look like when we apply rationalist explanations to them? Durkheim’s own rationalist foundationalism was an alternate way of constructing the kind of meta-theory Euben so compellingly seeks.

———Gregory Starrett


This path-breaking book describes how the Qing state dealt with jian, a Chinese term which the author translates as “illicit sexual intercourse.” Emblazoned on the jacket of the book is the Chinese character for jian, an ideograph most commonly encountered today in the compound word “qiangjian,” or rape. The sight of this character is so shocking (and suggestive) to modern Chinese sensibilities that I had to take the jacket off while on a recent train-trip through China in order to defuse the inevitable prurient questions from fellow travelers. My ruse worked, and by the end of my journey I was rewarded with a clear, compelling analysis of how the judiciary in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century China attempted to regulate the mores of an increasingly marketized and unruly society—a story with no small relevance to the changes taking place in China today.

Sommer begins his analysis by establishing the ground-rules for the Chinese sexual order as revealed in classical legal and cultural codes. The entire purpose of marriage and sex was the production of offspring who would perform sacrificial rites to the husband’s ancestors. Jian was thus any sort of intercourse that took place outside of the bonds of ritual. Prior to the Qing, Chinese law recognized two important status-based exceptions to this sexual order: aristocratic men were granted casual sexual access to female servants, and people of debased status (particularly the yue hu, or music households of hereditary entertainers) were allowed to serve the sexual whims of others without legal reproach.

Sommer argues that there was a major change in judicial approaches to sexual regulation (and thus to definitions of personhood) during the eighteenth cen-
tury. He traces these changes through individual chapters on laws relating to rape, sodomy, widowhood, and prostitution. Previous scholarship held that Qing legal codes brought an increased sexual repression to Chinese society, a phenomenon represented by the Qing’s fanatical promotion of the cult of widow chastity. Sommer instead characterizes Qing legal reforms as a sort of democratization of virtue. By the mid-eighteenth century, Qing jurists expected people in all walks of life to adhere to uniform roles as “good” (i.e. commoner or free) men and women, a transformation which Sommer characterizes as a shift from “status performance” to “gender performance.” Sommer is careful to point out that this change did not constitute an “advance” toward modern Western ideals of individual freedom. Instead, the leveling of legal hierarchies made all people equally “privileged” to enter into the bonds of social and ritual obligation.

The latent enemy lurking behind this early modern Chinese vision of sexual order was the growing phenomenon of the “bare stick” (guan gun)—the underclass rogue male who randomly penetrated both male and female, destroying norms of gender and ruining the lives of poor women. Sommer’s extensive use of archival records from local county court cases vividly captures the fringe society in which the “bare stick,” the prostitute, the pimping husband, and the persecuted widow dwelt. One wonders to what extent the Yongzheng emperor’s vision of ritual propriety was shared by the denizens of this Hobbesian world where sex was routinely traded for basic sustenance and protection. Nevertheless, Sommer’s work provides an unparalleled view of order and disorder in early modern China. It will become a classic of non-Western legal history and required reading for anyone interested in the history of gender and human rights in Asia.

———Ruth Rogaski


What happens when an ancient city, the former capital of two world empires, becomes subject to a new wave of global flows? How does a populist third-world state negotiate transnational networks that challenge its authority, but also create new resources to control? How do heterogeneous residents of a metropolis negotiate their locality when they imagine their city in a global market?

In this edited volume about Istanbul, mostly local scholars of the old metropolis discuss recent transformations in identity politics, urban planning, clothing, music, and humor as their city is exposed to a new stream of goods, ideas, services, and people from around the world. As capital of the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires the city forged links to many parts of the world. For most of the twentieth century, however, it was cut off from its connections and lost
its importance under the nationalist Turkish Republic. By the beginning of the 1980s the city reconnected to the world economy as Turkey became globally integrated and Istanbul once again turned into a crucial nexus connecting the Middle East, Central Asia, and Europe.

Contributors to the volume demonstrate that global flows to Istanbul created some common consequences, such as increasing polarization between the rich and the poor, and a redefinition of what is local in relation to the global. Istanbul is also unique in the global world because of the high ratio of "illegal" networks that connect it to the world. The reason, Çağlar Keyder argues, is the reluctance of the populist governments to making the necessary political and legal changes to welcome globalism. As a result, Istanbul is now a major site for money laundering, the drug trade, and unrecorded exports. The predominance of illegal money, goods, and people, however, has not been enough to turn Istanbul into a global city, since it still lacks the necessary infrastructure, laws, and services. The entry of such flows into the city without the invitation of central government does not demonstrate that nation-states are becoming powerless either. Rather, it shows that third world governments still have the ability to define the legal status of transnational flows and also turn them into new resources to support their clientalist networks as they act within the shady area between the legal and the illegal.

Another valuable contribution of the volume concerns the role of Islam, which is commonly defined as the "counter-point" of globalism. In Istanbul as well, Islam became the local and populist symbol used to oppose new networks, which benefit only a small section of residents. A closer analysis of this symbolism by Ayfer Bartu, Yael Navaro-Yashin, Tanil Bora, and Jenny White, however, demonstrates that Islamist politicians in Istanbul redefine a global vision for the city in their own terms rather than negate it. Instead of emphasizing connections with the West, they present an Ottoman model for the city, which can again control the Middle East and the Balkans as it did for centuries. This insightful volume shows us once more that globalism takes unique shapes and leads to unexpected outcomes in the different locales where it is realized.

———Esra Özyürek


In the past decade, studies on the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire have taken an “archival turn.” Scholars, such as Engin Deniz Akarli, Suraiya Faroqhi, Hasan Kayali, Şevket Pamuk and Zeynep Celik, have begun reassessing the Ottoman archives in order to challenge the sweeping historical narratives of an earlier generation of scholars, like the theses about the inevitable demise of the empire or about the radical break in political culture with the emergence of the Turkish Republic. This is also the case with Selim Deringil’s The Well-
Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909, which considerably revises our understanding of Sultan Abdülhamid II’s centralization program.

Using recently opened government archives, Deringil sets out to understand the rationale and implementation of the sultan’s cultural politics: the sultan’s regime sought, on the one hand, to promote political loyalty to an autocratic dynasty among Muslim subjects by propagating an Islamic understanding of modernity, and, on the other, to showcase the Ottoman state as a multi-ethnic European power. Deringil shows this by investigating how government officials documented controversial issues, such as school curricula, conversion of heterodox Muslims to state orthodoxy, proceedings of forced conversions of Christians, foreign missionary activity, and anti-Ottoman propaganda abroad. What emerges is a fascinating account of how the considerable documentation that officials produced aimed to forge and implement a new symbolic language of polity and society, and, moreover, to convert both local and foreign critics to the Ottoman sultan’s cause. Clearly, documentation was an important strategy by which the regime legitimated its power.

Deringil’s range of references—both palace archives and memoirs—is impressive. Yet his mastery of sources would have profited from a more theoretically grounded analysis of the relation between documentary practices, canons of representation and power relations, as they have been explored by historians and anthropologists in recent decades (e.g., N. Z. Davis, N. Dirks, C. Ginzburg, J. W. Scott, A. Shryock, A. Stoler, M. R. Trouillot). That is, treating archival documents as politically and socially constituted artifacts rather than as transparent texts. By taking the latter perspective, the author ends up discussing hegemonic state tradition without sufficiently addressing how competing social and political visions among state officials affected the writing of documents. More careful attention to these issues would have added another dimension to this insightful work.

The Well-Protected Domains is a significant contribution to studies on late Ottoman society and polity. Moreover, the highly accessible, informative and stimulating discussion makes this book ideal for students interested in the sociology of the state, comparative religion, and modernity.

———Sam Kaplan


This book is a meticulous reconstruction of a little over a decade in English Medieval History. Its author, Graeme White, holds the chair of the faculty of History at University College, Chester. Yet rather than fitting comfortably within
the traditional niche of interpretation of the accomplishments of kings Stephen and Henry II, as his position might suggest, he shares the perceptions of the late W. L. Warren and of Emilie Amt that Stephen was no nincompoop, and that his successor was not the ingenious monarch once imagined. White, like Warren, does not merely make connections between reigns, he follows the processes that flow through and beyond them.

Thus, what appears a narrow topic has important comparative implications: that Stephen’s reign (1135–1154) had much in common with that of his impressive uncle, King Henry I (1100–1135). The administrative machinery established in the first quarter of the twelfth century continued to function in many areas of England, despite hostilities of civil war, to the advantage of both Stephen and his rival for the throne, Henry’s daughter Matilda. This continuity made possible the fairly rapid restoration of royal judicial and fiscal institutions by Henry II (1154–1189).

Although Henry II was strongly motivated to assert his authority, he was not often present in England to do so. His success depended on exploiting an existing machinery of government based on itinerant kingship, crown-wearings, and powerful legislation; on utilizing knowledgeable chaplains, chancellors, and curial bishops; and on following administrative procedures established in earlier reigns. Stephen’s contributions to Henry II’s success are central to White’s book, and to his argument that Henry II was not so much a reformer as a borrower. Although the scale of royal authority was reduced during most of Stephen’s reign, government was exercised on royal or rival behalf by earls, magnates, and sheriffs. “Even when due allowance is made for the difficulties posed by endemic warfare,” White maintains, “we are bound to conclude that what made the government of earls, or other magnates, less effective than that of the king was that they failed to command the same level of respect” (62).

“It is the purpose of this book to offer more rounded treatment of the period: to set Henry II’s work as King of England in the context of Stephen’s . . . ,” White explains (preface, xii). The scales are balanced in the six chapters that follow: The Political Context, The Governance of England during Stephen’s Reign, Personnel and Property, Financial Recovery, The Administration of Justice, and Conclusion. Each chapter challenges the perceptions elicited from narratives such as the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle and William of Newburgh’s *Historia Rerum Anglicanum* with numismatic and diplomatic evidence. Each is factual, numerical, and carefully if tersely written. Nonetheless, much of *Restoration and Reform* restates what is already known, even if it is cast in a wider light than before, and both Stephen and Henry II remain ambivalent characters.

Unexplained financial references and terminology may be confusing to non-specialists; but even experts will expect more analysis of data contained in Appendices 1 and 2, which invites comparisons of royal income for 1130–1165 (where possible) and 1197 in the text itself. These figures do, in fact, demon-
strate the appalling shortage of resources commanded by Stephen and by Henry II in 1154, and, in some cases, the quick recovery of revenue early in Henry II’s reign. County tax farms also indicate that Stephen was able only to enjoy about a third of the returns of his predecessor. But they also suggest that the ability of English kings to obtain moneys only occasionally exceeded that of Henry I, whose governance of medieval England would set the standard for centuries to come.

———Stephanie Mooers Christelow


What happened to the racism that flourished during the “war without mercy” after the Pacific War ended? This is the question tackled by this ambitious book. Racial prejudices and hatreds of all types persisted and even flourished, at times with a vengeance. Beneath the constructed and mutually acceptable post-war cooperative relationship that seemed to characterize United States-Japan relations, racial animosities on both sides of the Pacific festered, threatening to disrupt the official reconciliation and apparent new amity between the former belligerents.

For a variety of urgent geopolitical purposes—to construct a worldwide anti-communist united front in the emergent Cold War, to establish a stable Washington-Tokyo alliance as the anchor for American regional interests in Asia, and to rebuild a powerful post-war Japanese capitalism and a legitimized state, among others—elites on both sides carefully suppressed the vicious impulses that had transformed the Pacific War into a race war. But, as Yukiko Koshiro argues, “racism did not evaporate; it merely moved from the battlefield to the bargaining table.” (2) Even more, it became a tacit, mutually acceptable ingredient in the new relationship. So successful was the official effort at suppression that today, the author maintains, perhaps with overstatement, “a kind of amnesia” exists about the “taboo” subject in Japan. Her effort is to restore the script before full historical erasure. While she focuses on the critical occupation period, her discussion also sweeps through much of the post-war period and into the very recent past.

As Koshiro demonstrates, racial prejudices abounded in the relationship. Race permeated American interactions with Japanese from the street level to the writing of the new Constitution. Racial notions affected foreign policy as well as marriage decisions. On both sides race influenced film and other forms of popular culture. The perennially sensitive topics of immigration/emigration, inter-marriage, and mixed-race children occupied the attention of policy-makers and common folk alike.

But the story is not just about Japanese-white American relations in Japan, although this occupies most of the narrative. Race clearly complicates the en-
tire social and political post-war history of Japan. The author seeks to document a wide variety of racial relationships and notions: Japanese attitudes about themselves, about Americans of various hues, and about other Asians of different nationalities. Euro-Americans undergo similar, though less detailed, scrutiny. But most importantly, it is the trans-Pacific interactions of race-based belief and action between Japanese and Americans that occupies center stage in this impressively documented book. While racial ideas inhabit central positions in both societies, their actual form and content—measures of superiority and inferiority, of desirability and repulsion, of notions of self and a variety of “others”—varied considerably.

The author ends the complicated story on a disconcerting note. The “trade wars” between the United States and Japan of the 1980s rekindled open animosities. The geopolitical requirements that encouraged the suppression of racial disorder had eroded. Post-war history began to look like pre-war history again. The author advocates “true friendship” based on a sincere belief in “true equality” between Japanese and Americans, but if we believe that historical experience means anything for the living, the story that she presents powerfully argues that such a relationship will not soon emerge.

———Gordon H. Chang


Until recently, studies of Islamic jurisprudence usually began and ended with the texts of medieval Islam. Apart from the Islamic modernists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the reasoning and writings of jurists of the last five hundred years failed to attract interest in their own right. Colin Imber’s study of the sixteenth-century Ottoman Sheikh al-Islam, Ebu’s-Su’ud, the pre-eminent jurisconsult of the Ottoman Empire, is an illuminating and timely addition to a sparse, but growing, literature dedicated to this more proximate inheritance of the contemporary Islamic world.

The book centers on Ebu’s-Su’ud, Sultan Suleyman’s legal architect and confidant in the legislative endeavors that gained Suleyman his Islamic-world sobriquet “Kanuni,” “Lawgiver.” The account sets out a legal life, not so much of Ebu’s-Su’ud as of the Ottoman Islamic legal tradition to which Ebu’s-Su’ud devoted his forty-year career. The two are inseparable, as the book’s title suggests. Like the Islamic legal tradition as a whole, Ebu’s-Su’ud was overwhelmingly preoccupied with the tensions and contradictions between secular and shari’a imperatives. The juristic challenge facing Ebu’s-Su’ud as a Hanafi exemplar and government appointee was rendered more acute by the Ottoman state’s multiple legal heritage and its insistence on shari’a as the basis of imperial legitimacy.

Many of Ebu’s-Su’ud’s attempts at reconciling kanun and shari’a achieved
canonical status in Ottoman law, although not necessarily in Hanafi academic tradition. In his own time Ebu’s-Su’ud was especially credited with having brought Ottoman land tenure and taxation regulations into accord with Hanafi principles. His reasoning and pronouncements on these and other legal questions ensured his influence on Ottoman lawmaking even centuries later. His defense of the use of cash and movables in the establishment of charitable trusts, although controversial from the beginning, found acceptance in Ottoman practice and, more surprisingly, in Hanafi usage generally.

A major strength of the book is its reconstruction of the textual and applied contexts in which Ebu’s-Su’ud’s rulings were made and ultimately judged. Imber is unusual in having command of both the wider imperial setting and the Ottoman Hanefi legal environment. The book is organized to illuminate the connections between the two. Part I, “The Historical and Legal Background,” provides an introduction to Islamic jurisprudence and to the evolution of the Ottoman legal system as well as a brief career biography of Ebu’s-Su’ud. Part II, “The Sources of Legal Authority: The Holy Law and the Ottoman Sultan,” examines the dialogue between kanun and shari’a in relation to debates over legal sovereignty and the caliphate. Part III, “The Law in Detail,” which takes up more than half the text, in fact represents the day-to-day issues—and their myriad variations—that Ebu’s-Su’ud was most often called upon as Grand Mufti to resolve: land tenure and taxes, mortmain trusts, marriage and divorce, and crimes and torts against persons and property. It was on the basis of his ruminations on matters such as these that Ebu’s-Su’ud was revered as a guide to Islamic living by generations of men and women in Ottoman lands.

Imber’s interpretation of over 250 of Ebu’s-Su’ud’s juristic opinions, fatwas, gives local and temporal substance to Islamic jurisprudential debate and to Ottoman legal history. For these alone, the book will be of value to a number of scholarly readerships. Legal historians will take issue with a few of Imber’s broader conclusions, which are sometimes produced without much elaboration, but the book stands as a worthy and in many ways pioneering contribution to Ottoman history and legal studies.

———Madeline C. Zilfi