
This volume of essays on the history of ethnographic collecting in Melanesia should open up debates about the agency of indigenous people in the process of collecting for European museums during the height of empire. It should also add more fire to the often spirited discussions about the repatriation of objects from these institutions. Although in his introduction O’Hanlon approaches the question of repatriation gingerly, the essays in this volume have provided him with the material to critique some of the assumptions behind contemporary arguments in its favor. As O’Hanlon stresses, and Nicholas Thomas revisits in his brief epilog, so much of the scholarship produced on colonialism during the last four decades has been focused on qualifying the ways in which colonial relations were relations of dominance. This focus has become almost tautological, so that scholars and others interested in ethnographic artifacts collected during the colonial era have tended to identify them *a priori* with dispossession. This, O’Hanlon argues, has left little room for considering the agency of non-Europeans in the world-wide networks of exchange that touched Melanesia (or other places) during the age of empire. It has also radically curtailed our appreciation of the kinds of ethnographic work that can be pursued in museums. This volume is meant to correct that imbalance by throwing into question the “uni-dimensional popular stereotype of dispossession and cultural obliteration” (3) associated with collecting. It encourages us to rethink some aspects of colonial encounters, the history of metropolitan museums, the history of anthropology and, by implication, the politics of repatriation.

Each essay focuses on a different collector, expedition, or territory in Melanesia. The selection of essays gives the volume a efficacious breadth; but unfortunately, most of the essays lack the depth needed to lend power to O’Hanlon’s introductory claims. Few of the authors directly engage the burgeoning scholarship on museums, collecting, the history of anthropology, or even that of colonialism. As a result, many of the essays seem rather parochial. Young’s essay on Bronislaw Malinowski’s collection appears to gain its importance simply from its association with anthropology’s great man. Kaufmann’s essay on Felix Speizer and Knowles’ on Beatrice Blackwood suffer from a lack of contextualization. Many of the shifts Kaufmann locates in Speiser’s thought were intimately related to more general trends in German ethnology, which are never discussed. And although it goes unmentioned, the institutional hurdles faced
by Blackwood were not uncommon for anthropologists; nor were the tensions she faced between her empirical efforts with material culture and the theoretical claims of social anthropologists.

Nevertheless, these essays have much to tell us about specific collectors, the roles Islanders played in shaping European collections, the impact collecting had in Melanesia, and the ways in which studying the fate of these collections can help us rethink the colonial contexts from which they emerged. Most importantly, Gardner provides an excellent example of indigenous agency when she sketches out big-men trading objects with George Brown for Christian teachings, which in turn became a new commodity they continued to trade. Buschmann offers a sobering tale of the grim impact organized collecting had on Wuvulu and Aua. Quinnell’s narrative about the origin and fate of the Sir William MacGregor collection is a model for successful repatriation. And Welsch’s discussion of the New Guinea collections in the Chicago Field Museum is a model of museum research. There is much of merit in this volume, and O’Hanlon’s contentions deserve a worthy response.

———H. Glenn Penny


Matthew Connelly’s thoroughly researched and gracefully written volume adds an important dimension to our understanding of Algeria’s struggle for independence. While the Algerian revolution has been the subject of numerous scholarly accounts, relatively little attention has been paid to the nature and context of the diplomatic efforts that played such an important role in the outcome of the conflict. It is here that Connelly makes an important and highly original contribution.

France worked to confine the Algerian question to the arena of French politics, seeking to make it an essentially “domestic” question. Since Algeria was part of France, with roughly one million French citizens living there and sending representatives to the National Assembly in Paris, the French argued that the fate of Algeria was an internal matter. Algerian nationalists, by contrast, labored to internationalize the conflict. They sought and received support from the Arab world, particularly Egypt. They also brought their case to the United Nations, where Third World members and anti-colonial sentiment were changing the character of that organization. And they established an important dialogue with the United States.

Connelly traces this diplomatic competition, placing developments within the context of the Cold War and other factors shaping the international order of the 1950s and early 1960s. His highly readable account skillfully explains why French diplomacy failed, while that of the nationalists succeeded. The latter not
only played off the two superpowers but also exploited divisions within each Cold War alliance. France, by contrast, was too small a player in a world dominated by superpowers to exert effective political influence. Equally important, its arguments ran counter to the ideological currents emerging in the international arena, currents that broke with the pre-war status quo and emphasized decolonization and Third World development.

Connelly draws upon an impressive array of sources, which include French and, for the first time, Algerian archival material, as well as the extensive English and French-language secondary literature. His study is also informed by an analytical and interdisciplinary perspective that goes beyond power politics. This perspective considers ways in which modernization and globalization, and with them new patterns of mass communication and the movement of labor, capital, and technology, shaped the emerging international order and contributed to the success of Algerian diplomacy.

All of this comes together in a coherent and convincing narrative, which makes clear that the Algerian revolution was not fought and won solely or even primarily on the ground in Algeria and the arena of internal French politics. But while essential for an understanding of the Algerian revolution, this study is also a valuable source of insights about trends sweeping the Cold War world and shaping the contemporary era. In sum, Connelly has given us an impressive and important study, one that crosses the boundaries of both geography and discipline and which provides new insights about questions of significance not only for the Algerian war but also for politics and diplomacy during the Cold War more generally.

———Mark Tessler


In reading across disciplinary boundaries, it is always interesting to encounter a work defending what was once taken for granted in one’s “home” discipline. Lockert’s study begins with what may be a provocative statement for anthropologists but apparently is not for political scientists: “only a few contemporary students of comparative politics employ culture as a prominent explanatory variable” (ix). Lockert explains that while culture was significant to comparativist scholars in the 1950s and 1960s, a more deductive approach using rational choice theory has become increasingly popular since the 1980s. Throughout the book, Lockert seems to be in dialogue with rational choice and institutional theorists, responding to anticipated criticisms and pointing out how culturally informed theories can be more complete.

The cultural theory Lockert applies is the “grid group theory” of Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildasky. As Lockert explains, grid group theory was first con-
structed within sociology, further developed in cultural anthropology, and is now used in political science. On one axis lies the degree to which a person (or nation) possesses “increasingly strong feelings of group affiliation” and on the other is the degree to which the individual subscribes to the authority of others (6–7). The result is four ideal types: fatalism, egalitarianism, hierarchism, and individualism. Although all societies exhibit all four types, the relative emphasis of one over the other, or of a combined subtype (such as individualist-hierarchist), is used in Lockert’s analysis as an independent variable to explain why different social policies regarding the elderly were developed in the United States, Germany, the former Soviet Union, and Japan.

Overall, this book is well-written, clearly organized, and provides a compelling argument within the rather large scope of study. Lockert’s theoretical approach is laid out in part one, and then applied to the case histories of four leaders in four countries in part two. Although social policies in general are addressed, the main locus for study is the development of pension policies and how individual leaders and governments responded to economic and demographic pressures on the maintenance of these policies in the 1980s. History is addressed through explaining how “historical contingencies” (such as World War II) can provide the context for major cultural shifts.

From an anthropological perspective, Lockert’s use of culture is a bit simplistic. The problem with reducing culture to an independent variable is that culture refers to the underlying context of meaning within a population rather than individual content that can be picked out, measured, and evaluated outside of this context. This problem has also been identified in demographic research, where culture is sometimes used as a “residual category” after other variables have failed to explain the model. In other words, culture is that thing that does not really make sense universally but some people nevertheless seem to be motivated by it (along with ideology and other people’s religions).

One could argue, however, that the scope of Lockert’s project necessitates a broad-brush approach to examining the complexity of policy development in four different countries. He is not analyzing social policy as a way of revealing cultural differences but is rather using culture as a heuristic device for explaining how different policies could have resulted despite similar pressures during the same decade. As globalization increasingly pushes policy-makers to analyze on the same scale as Lockert’s research, anthropologists who dismiss the use of culture to address international questions of policy and practice will simply be left out of the larger discussion. This book is an important addition to transnational policy research, and a foretaste of the kinds of research many social scientists will find themselves doing, willingly and with reservations, in the years ahead.

——— Alexandra Crampton
On page one of his 1887 essay *Gemmeinschaft and Gessellschaft*, Ferdinand Tönnies distinguished two sorts of relationships resulting in associations conceived of as things or beings: “The relationship itself, and also the resulting association, is conceived of either as real and organic life—this is the essential characteristic of the Gemeinschaft (community); or as imaginary and mechanical structure—this is the concept of the Gessellschaft (society).” Whether Benedict Anderson was making specific reference to the passage in the title of *Imagined Communities* (1983), it is in any case a passage critical to specifying the significance of his evocative phrase. Reading Anderson through Tönnies we can see that an imagined community would not simply be a group that is not real in the conventional sense, whatever real might mean in this case. According to Tönnies’ logic, an imagined community would be a formalized abstract translocal social-system conceptualizing itself as a concrete face-to-face local group, like, say, a family. The phrase would not delineate an evolutionary phase according to the logic of classic social thought (community→society→imagined community); it would identify the figure in terms of which an “association” is conceived of as “a thing or being,” which is to say, it would identify a metaphor. One thing Anderson is apparently saying, then, is that this particular metaphor, society conceived as community, and not the concept of society alone, is of primary significance for understanding political representation, sentiment, and mobilization in late modern times.

Of course, given the volumes of literature referencing the phrase in one way or another, to so many apparent purposes, one wonders whether specifying a reading of Anderson’s *Imagined Community* is not somehow beside the point. Not unlike Arjun Appadurai’s “flows” and “scapes,” Anderson’s imagined community is apparently not so much a ‘concept’ or a ‘text’, as it is a ‘title’ or a ‘theme.’ Or so argue, in so many words, John D. Kelly and Martha Kaplan in *Represented Communities*, a devastating critique of Anderson’s book when considered as ‘concept’ or ‘text.’ *Represented Communities* is a series of essays exploring politics, time, ritual, and representation in contemporary Fijian history. The essays are impressive in the best sense of the term—they are beautifully written, conceptually clear, and thoroughly researched. Using material primarily from Fiji, each essay addresses one or more aspect of *Imagined Communities*. Since there are many aspects to Anderson’s work the critique takes Kelly and Kaplan in several directions. Their central criticism is that Anderson puts too much weight on imagination and too little on material realities like social structures. He places too much emphasis on abstract themes like horizontal solidarity and too little on the forceful imposition of American power and American “idioms” around the world.

There is a question whether *Represented Communities* represents a direct cri-
tique of Anderson’s book. Anderson is interested in the idea of the nation, the conception of the association, in Tønnies’ terms. Kelly and Kaplan are essentially interested in the nation-state. Whereas Anderson shows that nationalism as ideology (as a transformation of class ideology) is not a trifling consideration (arguing against orthodox Marxists), Kelly and Kaplan show that there is more to the life of self-styled “nations” than ideology (arguing against those who equate anthropology with culturology). Kelly and Kaplan bring a powerful combination of classic social thought (Marx and Weber), socio-cultural anthropology, post-structural anthropology, and post-colonial theory to their critique, and they are convincing. The reader is convinced that Anderson’s approach and the imagined community concept do little for an understanding of Fiji and that anthropology has much to offer the study of such macrohistorical entities as nation-states. Readers also finds themselves in a better position to appreciate Anderson’s contribution.

REFERENCES


———David Dinwoodie


Thomas Blom Hansen has in short order but with considerable deliberation published two detailed examinations of the rise of, and dynamics within, communal politics in contemporary, democratic India. Hansen assembles a variety of theoretical tools from a selection of disciplines to explore the roots of Hindu chauvinist politics and the violence it has engendered in the past few decades. Although he does not apply his analysis to consider other religious polities, both books offer reflections useful in deliberations regarding the nature of democracy and the unpredictable internal forces that are mastered by no one, yet which often master nations.

In The Saffron Wave, Hansen situates ascendant Hindu nationalism—in the form of a family of Hindu political and cultural groups, the Sangh Parivar—within public culture. He avoids reducing this movement to politics or religion alone, and argues that it derives from and seeks to shape an Indian public culture at the turbulent intersection of various democratic, demographic, consumerist, and globalizing forces. Yet, as one more element, and not a united one at that, in this tumultuous swirl of social dynamics, the Sangh finds itself being
molded by the other elements at least as much as they hope to mold them. Hansen argues that Hindu nationalists have gained momentum, in particular, from middle class anxieties regarding the social flux accompanying these forces, especially the increasing involvement of “competing populisms” based on “plebian movements.” The Sangh has successfully projected these fears onto the Muslim minority community that unwittingly serves as the scapegoat for the other displaced anxieties.

*Wages of Violence* represents a twist on this theme as it demonstrates how Hindu chauvinists in Bombay, constituting themselves as the Shiv Sena (“Army of [the god] Shiv”), created such a “plebian” political culture based on a vernacular, ethnic, and religious “Maratha” identity. If, on the one hand, the Sangh or other conservative groups often blame social disorder on “plebian” movements because of their association with lower classes and castes, the Sena demonstrates, on the other, how some Hindu militants have successfully created such a movement through appeals to just these constituencies. Hansen argues that the Sena’s success in changing the name of the city from the British colonial “Bombay” to “Mumbai” represents a political performance by regional Hindu militants attempting to create a (supposedly) self-evident and stable identity even though no identity can ever be either.

Both books express a deep reservation regarding majoritarian politics and their potential ill-effects for minority ethnic and religious groups. In both the national and urban contexts Hansen describes, Muslims are the common political losers and often pay with their lives and property, as during the riots that followed the 1992 destruction of the Babri Masjid. As such, India’s Muslims join a long line of minorities in recent global history who various nationalists have cast as “other” to define their nation. Unfortunately, despite his critique of Sangh and Sena constructions of communal identities and his awareness that individuals have multiple and overlapping identities, Hansen himself fails to describe Hindus and Muslims as such. Although the author’s historical descriptions and ethnographic accounts occasionally describe shared agendas and neighborhoods, his analysis posits divergent religious communities in wholly separate spheres of interaction. Recent scholarship has demonstrated this not to be the case in a great many historical and contemporary Indian settings.

Both books offer not only important historical descriptions of the rise and success of each of these Hindu movements, they also apply political, psychological, and postmodern theory to provide insights into the processes at work in the world’s largest democracy (although *Wages of Action* is less theoretically sophisticated and its argument more discontiguous than its companion). Hansen’s attention is ultimately fixed on the impact of democracy on society—beyond the realm of politics—that creates a cyclical “generative and destructive process, questioning hierarchies and certitudes.” Both books describe in fascinating detail the self-avowed “anti-political” efforts of Hindu militant groups that seek to question and undermine the secular claims and identifica-
tions created by earlier generations of democratic agents before they enter the political process where, on their way to political power, they become subject to the same subversive dynamics exercised by some other group or groups.

What Hansen offers to scholars seeking to understand the rise and dynamics of the Hindu nationalist movement is a new place to begin and, for political scientists, a penetrating insight into some of the less expected outcomes of democracy.

———Peter Gottshalk