Studies of national identity and nationalism have experienced a high conjuncture during the last decade, and recently Switzerland (after a typical delay) is taking its place among them. In this rich but somewhat sprawling study, Oliver Zimmer traces the shifting contours of national sentiment in Switzerland—a project that always gave historical arguments a central place in the origins of Swissness—and seeks to show how a national identity could be constrained by embedded traditions and take shape out of the very debates over meaning of “the nation.”

Switzerland is an apt case study for testing theories of national identity. Though politically fragmented, multilingual, and riven by confessional tensions even after the French Revolution, a powerful (if vaguely defined) Swiss national consciousness developed early. Tested and transformed by the crises that shook Europe after 1789, Swiss nationalism followed its own path and remains strong (and hotly debated) in the present, as shown by the Swiss electorate’s persistent refusal to move toward the European Union. Recent works by Guy Marchal, Barbara Weinmann, Sascha Buchbinder, and others have taken up aspects of Swiss national identity and the special role that historical consciousness played in it, though none as synoptically as the book under review.

The book’s introduction seeks to set Zimmer’s approach apart from currently influential theories of nationalism. Zimmer distances himself from top-down models that see nation-building as an elite project bringing a population into modernity as well as from Eric Hobsbawn’s theory that nineteenth-century nationalists used “invented traditions” to create historical genealogies for modern nation-states out of essentially arbitrary material. He also seeks to transcend the dichotomies that flourish in nationalism studies, such as that between voluntary (or “civic”) and organic (or “ethnic”) varieties of nationhood. Rather, he suggests, while all of these approaches capture important dimensions of nineteenth-century nation-building, they tend to disguise the contentious processes involved. For the Swiss case in particular, he astutely demonstrates that it was the very contestation over different ideas of “the nation” that
enabled the issue to mobilize the emotions and actions of actual Swiss citizens: “Such struggles often contributed more to producing ‘the nation’ as a focus of mass loyalty than any kind of . . . national consensus” (p. 15).

Zimmer traces his argument in five substantive chapters that follow an uneven introductory chapter on Swiss identity before nationalism. The first surveys the intellectual history of local and national patriotism in Switzerland during the eighteenth century, as both Enlightenment cosmopolitanism and “patriotic” pride began to influence the Swiss elites. The enormous legitimacy of the mythic tradition symbolized by William Tell ensured that the Confederation’s historical genealogy remained central, but organizations such as the Helvetische Gesellschaft, which cut across confessional lines, helped encourage a broader sense of national pride. Zimmer’s approach is not systematic enough to convince in this section, but his conclusion that “a fusion of civic and organic conceptions of nationhood” emerged by the 1790s plausibly sets the stage for his discussion of the Napoleonic period and its aftermath.

Chapter three turns to the Helvetic Republic (1798–1805), during which a French effort to establish a unitary Swiss nation failed miserably, while ironically strengthening the shared Swiss sense of political distinctiveness based on historical tradition. Typically for representatives of the French Revolution, the administrators sent to organize the newly established Republic sought, with some local support, to introduce universal citizenship and central institutions while abolishing corporate privilege. The resulting purges swept away the tangled historical institutions of the old Swiss Confederation, but simultaneously stimulated newfound attachment to such traditional practices as the Landsgemeinde and so-called direct democracy. Although Zimmer overestimates the actual extent of communal autonomy and popular participation before 1798, there is no doubt that French efforts at centralization lent these institutions increased legitimacy that lasted for generations, thus shaping the later trajectory of Swiss politics.

Zimmer’s chapter four skips directly to the 1840s, when the tensions inherent between “communal autonomy” and “national identity” surged again. The distinctive version of liberalism within the reconstituted Confederation that emerged during the 1830s thus receives short shrift, since he concentrates on the external pressures from the 1840s until well after the liberal and Protestant victory in the Sonderbundskrieg of 1848 that provoked a strengthened national identity. Nevertheless, as Zimmer correctly notes, the population in the humiliated Catholic cantons did not immediately adopt the new vision of a constitutional and democratic Switzerland as it emerged after the war. Even in the face of intense outside pressure, conservatives continued to see “modern nationalism as a deadly threat to the political and cultural autonomy of their cantons” (p. 148). In reaction, they drew on the same rhetoric used to resist the French in 1798—the nation as an expanded Gemeinschaft resting on the integrity of its local communities—in order to slow down the liberal project of national citizenship
in the 1850s. Since the dominant liberals were also unable to appeal to natural ethnic unity (since they depended on the votes of the liberal French- and Italian-speaking cantons), voluntarism and ethnolinguistic pluralism remained the most widely disseminated discourses of Swiss identity. It is this situation—national identity constrained by historical memory and internally and externally contested—that Zimmer analyzes sensitively in the remaining chapters.

As Zimmer notes in chapter five, the Swiss possessed an effective national state as well as a strong national identity after the constitutional revision of 1874. Unusual, however, was the ability of civil society to intervene in the political process through popular referendum and legislative veto, leading to “a conspicuously disputatious political culture and an unusually high degree of public involvement in domestic politics” (p. 172). Under these conditions, strengthening national identity was the key challenge, one that was solved by returning to the historical mythology of the old Confederation. Struggles over a national museum and public education set the stage, and the pressure from German and Italian nationalist claims reinforced belief in local exceptionalism, but it was the apotheosis of the Charter of 1291—the focal point of the national exhibition of 1891—that forged a dynamic (if still contested) sense of Swiss unity. The 1291 document, discovered quite late, challenged the traditional date for the first rebellion of the Inner Swiss, 1307. Far more than a few years was at stake, Zimmer argues: By substituting a concrete legal document for the mythic tradition of Tell, liberal historians also valorized state action over community tradition, thus tilting the scales in the direction of a voluntarist conception of the Swiss nation. That a long contentious debate ensued—one still ideologically potent in 1991!—supports Zimmer’s view that “invented traditions” are never cut from whole cloth, but rather emerge out of multiple historical visions through an often protracted process. The 1891 festival, as he shows, represented a moment of synthesis and cautious truce as much as the triumph of either “scientific history” or mythological (or invented) tradition.

The thrust of Zimmer’s argument, namely that contestation over historical memory could be constitutive of national identity, and that voluntarist and organicist images of the nation could coexist in dynamic tension, are clearly intended to apply well beyond the confines of Switzerland. He recognizes the anomalies that make Switzerland a particularly apt case for investigating the complexities of emerging nationhood, but suggests, more generally, that “the decisive question . . . concerns the nature of the interaction between the different groupings taking part in the contest over nationhood” (p. 245). Such a dynamic, process-oriented approach, he implies, might allow substantial insights when applied to other cases as well.

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In his small essay collection with the programmatic title *German Jews beyond Judaism* (Cincinnati/Bloomington, 1985), the late George L. Mosse stressed the cultural dimension of Jewish emancipation in the German context. Jews became Germans by replacing traditional Judaism with the universal and inclusive Enlightenment ideal of *Bildung*, which developed almost into a new “religion” for bourgeois German Jews. When all German Jews were finally emancipated in 1871, the large majority belonged to the *Bürgertum*, which can be loosely translated as bourgeoisie. The German term Bürgertum, however, refers not simply to the socioeconomic position but also to a very specific set of values and forms of behavior, underpinned by constant education and achievement—to Bildung. The very broad Verbürglerichung (embourgeoisement), in two to three generations, of a hitherto marginalized and destitute group is indeed remarkable in the larger European context. “The Pity of it All,” to borrow from the title of Amos Elon’s remarkable synthesis of the “German-Jewish Epoch” (New York, 2002), was that in 1933 many of the truest German Bürger still loyal to the universal Bildungsideal were German Jews. They, Mosse emphasized, “more than any other single group, preserved Germany’s better self across dictatorship, war, holocaust, and defeat.”

Simone Lässig’s substantial and extensive study on processes of Jewish embourgeoisement in the German context in the first half of the nineteenth century now provides an in-depth analysis of why and how most Jews became Bürger, in the full sense of the word, by adopting Bildung. The German title of the study translates as *Jewish Paths into the Bourgeoisie: Cultural Capital and Upward Social Mobility in the Nineteenth Century*. Lässig finds the main cause for the broad and swift embourgeoisement in the responses of Jews to the prolonged emancipation policies in the German states. She regards Verbürglerichung to a certain extent as a process forced upon Jews by state bureaucrats. In France, Britain, and the Netherlands, Jewish emancipation largely followed a laissez-faire approach, leaving Jews with a variety of individual choices, including the refusal to become modern. In the German states, emancipation was a collective project tied to a *quid pro quo*: no emancipation without education and proof of civil “improvement.” But as Lässig shows, Bildung was a path quite acceptable for the large majority of Jews, because it was broad and tied to a future-oriented, universalistic program. It was the inclusive Bildungsideal that was on offer, Lässig emphasizes, rather than the potentially exclusive concept of the nation.

*Jüdische Wege ins Bürgertum* represents a new trend in the scholarship on Jewish emancipation. It is indeed astonishing that the German Bürgertumsforschung,
which has produced a plethora of studies, has all but ignored Jewish embourgeoisement. The scholarship on Jewish emancipation, led by Jacob Katz, Reinhard Rüurup, and Jacob Toury initially focused on state policies, less upon the Jews and their responses. More recently, scholars have stressed the agency of Jews involved, most outspokenly, Ira Katznelson and Pierre Birnbaum, in the introduction of the volume *Paths of Emancipation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). But studies published in this realm tended to focus either on the period after 1871 or concentrated almost exclusively on Jews, neglecting relationships with other Germans and Jewish responses to state policies.

With more than forty tables and diagrams, ranging from the number of Jewish pupils in different schools, the subjects they studied, the circulation of German-Jewish periodicals, and the occupations of Jews to several other topics, this study offers a wealth of data to bolster the thesis. Yet Lässig goes beyond the confines of “old” social history. She relies heavily on Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of “cultural capital”; however, and this is one of the most interesting points raised in this study, Bourdieu’s argument of the conversion of economical into cultural capital was not a one-way street: The Verbürgelung of the German Jews illustrates, almost paradigmatically, that this process also worked in the opposite direction.

The focus on acquiring cultural capital helps Lässig leave behind the fruitless debate over whether the processes of Jewish emancipation can be best described as “assimilation” or “acculturation.” She discards both terms, not least because they implicitly carry the notion of a passive adaptation to a seemingly homogeneous majority society, leaving no space for diversity and Jewish agency. Indeed, Jewish responses to the state call to become *bürglich* illustrate that Jews were often trailblazers, for instance in the field of education.

Lässig’s source material includes the classic sources of Bürgertumsforschung: memoirs, diaries, and letters; bureaucratic files; numerous Jewish periodicals; the so-called *Bildungsliteratur*; and files on Jewish schools, associations, and community organizations. The sources refer, in the main, to the hitherto little-studied Jewries in Saxony and Anhalt-Dessau, especially in the capital cities Dresden and Dessau. It is also noteworthy, given the focus on the pre-1871 period, that Lässig limits herself not to *Kleindeutschland*, but also includes Bohemia. The study also relies on a wide range of sources and secondary literature pertaining to other regions, not least outside Central Europe, notably England and the United States where German-Jewish immigrants chose similar paths of high social mobility.

The organization of the study betrays its origins as a *Habilitationsschrift*. The first concise chapter describes the political and legal setting of the emancipation discourse. The somewhat overwhelming second chapter with several subchapters comprises more than half of the book. Here, the different arenas of cultural and religious Verbürgelung are vividly described and analyzed: Jewish
Reform schools, Bildung in the everyday life of Jewish families, and the emergence of a German-Jewish public sphere that was without parallel in its breadth and diversity outside the German context. But it is the Jewish Reform Movement, the process of the “invention of a bourgeois religion,” that takes center stage. In fact, here Lässig presents the hitherto little-known social history of the Reform movement, from the perspective of the Bürgertumsforschung. She looks at the role of the laity and issues of gender, and she assesses which impact the context outside the synagogue had on the Reform Movement. The concise third chapter discusses how cultural capital became a prerequisite for high social and economic mobility, a crucial thesis that extends beyond German-Jewish history as such. The valuable and extensive bibliography comprises the sources and the relevant research literature in German and English.

*Jüdische Wege ins Bürgertum* is a major contribution to the Bürgertumsforschung and at the same time to modern Jewish history, a book that will without a doubt become the standard work on processes of Jewish Verbürgelung. An English translation would be most welcome, hopefully in a slimmer volume.

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This second volume of John C. G. Röhl’s definitive biography of Kaiser Wilhelm II is a hybrid between narrative history and a documentary collection. The narration is buttressed by and interspersed with lengthy quotations from documents, especially unpublished ones from the Royal Archives in Windsor and General Count Alfred von Waldersee’s diaries, hitherto available in print only in the falsified edition by Heinrich O. Meisner. This richly detailed account rarely alludes to secondary sources; the reader without previous knowledge of German domestic and foreign policy might well be overwhelmed by the level of detail; however, Röhl’s argument is clear. He aims to restore Wilhelm in historiography as “the powerful and pernicious ruler that he actually was, a kind of missing link . . . between Bismarck and Hitler” (p. xiii). This volume succeeds in showing how Wilhelm built up and used his immense power from his accession in 1888 to the high point of personal regime from 1896 to 1900.

Personal rule was always a possibility enshrined in Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s constitution for Germany (1871). Röhl argues that the old chancellor
cynically touted the “monarchical principle” (which claimed that monarchs genuinely ruled) for “reasons of state” (p. 11). But Bismarck’s enemies, across the political spectrum, made use of it against him, and worst of all, Wilhelm “took the theory literally ... as a legitimation of his personal power” and as an obligation to rule absolutely (p. 117). Wilhelm and Bismarck clashed over this issue, and Bismarck lost. That ushered in the Caprivi chancellorship (1890–1894), which Röhl, following Waldersee, interprets as consciously transitional from the beginning. Using the “kingship mechanism” (Norbert Elias’s term for the monarch’s ability to choose among factions), his 2,000-man court, strategic personnel appointments, and divisive and contradictory policy initiatives, the Kaiser and his irresponsible advisors ultimately replaced the second chancellor with the tractable Prince Chlodwig von Hohenlohe, whose great age and financial dependence caused him to acquiesce in his own disempowerment. Röhl’s account of this process is quite convincing.

“The method of government ... was characterized by personal passion and impulse, by court intrigue, backstairs influences and interdepartmental rivalries” (pp. 691–92). But what of policy? Röhl argues that under Hohenlohe, Wilhelm “was already not only setting the general political course of the country, but also intervening, sometimes down to the smallest detail, at least in the particular areas which interested him, which included both domestic and foreign policy, military and naval matters, art, science, and not least, the economy” (p. 691). But Röhl is too scrupulous an historian to omit the many examples of inconsistency the personal ruler showed: in policy toward workers, Jews, the question of coup d’état, army reform, colonialism, his relations to parliamentarians, etc. Wilhelm’s interventions in foreign policy were equally confusing: He vacillated between love and hatred for his mother’s homeland, England, and similarly could not decide whether he wanted rapprochement with Russia and/or France, or decisive combinations against them. In the end, again echoing Waldersee, Röhl concludes that Wilhelm pursued two grand goals: “German supremacy in a monarchically structured Europe” (p. 369). That is, Germany’s domination intertwined with his own as semi-absolute ruler in a Europe set against democracy and parliamentarism.

Röhl argues strongly (against the view of Walther Rathenau and many others) that Wilhelm did not incorporate the will of the German people to power and dominance (p. 547). Instead, he emphasizes the widespread public and parliamentary criticism of the Kaiser, beginning early in his reign. Wilhelm’s anti-democratic style and propaganda harmed the widespread drive for popular participation. But some discussion of the growth and transformation of popular right-wing sentiment would be necessary to supplement Röhl’s contention.

Regarding the other goal, German supremacy, Röhl’s picture is differentiated. The three turning points in these years were the non-renewal of the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, the failure of Anglo-German rapprochement (1898,
1901), and the building of the battlefleet. Only in the latter did Wilhelm play a
decisive role, but in combination with Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, whose vision
of battleships wresting hegemony from Britain outstripped the Kaiser’s original
goal of cruisers making Germany worthy of sharing Britain’s glory. Röhl
believes that, though German expansionism was overdetermined, Wilhelm
gave German policy its “idiosyncratic,” hectic character (p. 925). Röhl’s unsur-
passed dissection of highest government shows the Kaiser’s enormous responsi-
bility for the poisonous direction of domestic policy, the thwarting of
democratic tendencies, and the reckless, uncoordinated bellicosity that swiftly
surrounded Germany by a world of enemies.

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Germany at the Fin de Siècle: Culture, Politics, and Ideas. By Suzanne
L. Marchand and David F. Lindenfeld. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State

This is a fascinating book, partly because of the excellent contributions, and partly
because of the ways in which the editors have chosen to engage the topic and
organize their volume. Marchand and Lindenfeld open the collection with a
loaded question: Was there a German fin de siècle? Did Germans, in other words,
share the kinds of reactions to modernity that have so fascinated historians of
Austria and France? Their answer is yes and no. Many German intellectuals
embraced the modernist currents Carl Schorske identified more than forty years
ago in his work on fin de siècle Vienna, reacting to the depressing problems of mod-
erization in ways similar to their Austrian counterparts. And yet much of the
German population was largely unbowed by their putatively perplexing condition.
As the editors argue, despite the worries of many an intellectual, “the later Wilhel-
mime world was characterized by enormous ambition and optimism, booming
industries and bustling new urban spaces, cultural and political activism on a new
scale, and the promise, if not the immediate realization, of a ‘place in the sun’ on
the world stage” (p. 1). That optimism is the perplexing bit, because many of us,
schooled in the dark side of Weimar culture and its intellectual antecedents, have
learned to imagine Germans at the end of the nineteenth century (or at least our
favorite representatives) as people caught up in a pessimistic, existential, Nietzschean
funk. Indeed, the editors themselves have not avoided that position entirely.

The volume is framed in an almost contradictory fashion. On the one hand,
the editors laud the efforts of so many recent historians to take Imperial
Germany on its own terms, to move past the older questions that informed the Sonderweg, past the search for precursors to the excesses and crimes of
National Socialism, and past the insistent comparative history that sought to determine if “the Germans” were as liberal, as modern, or as bourgeois as other Europeans at the turn of the century. On the other hand, the editors revel in precisely this kind of comparative history and in the kinds of binaries that inform it, organizing their volume into sections governed by such oppositions: Liberalism: Adversarial or Reformist?; Gendered Discourse: Eman-cipatory or Protofascist?; Elite Culture: Decadence or Vitality?; Popular Culture: Divisive or Integrative?; Antimodern Thought: Pathological or Prescient? Unfortunately, this emphasis on antinomies undercuts the volume’s great achievement: the recognition that all of these qualifiers apply to late Wilhelmine Germany. There were, as the editors recognize, striking crosscurrents in German culture, politics, and ideas at the turn of the century that will continue to defy historians’ attempts to place fin de siècle Germany into a tidy box labeled with a few key terms that can be harnessed for comparative analyses. Indeed, the challenge for historians is to resist that impulse. Historians should, as the editors insist, endeavor to understand, and to find ways to narrate, the coexistence of the multiple and often divergent currents in German politics and culture at the turn of the century. This book offers an excellent beginning.

In addition to the editors’ introduction, the volume includes ten essays, four of which have been published before, and many of which are examples of first-rate intellectual history. The topics turn around several of the usual sus-pects. Fritz Ringer writes on Max Weber, Robert E. Norton on Stefan George, Martin A. Ruehl on Thomas Mann, and Lindenfeld on Heidegger and Jung. Ambivalence toward modernity runs through all these essays. Ringer offers up a Weber who is more typically liberal than many might suppose, but whose critique of mass society, as the editors point out, was “compatible not only with Millean liberalism, but also with Nietzschean heroic pessimism and Social Darwinism” (p. 13). Norton’s essay, they argue, reveals in George “a strong desire on the part of the Bildungsbürgers to hold onto traditional “high-culture” symbols, even as the culture was being subverted by popularization” (p. 22). And Ruehl’s piece on Thomas Mann “shows,” they believe, “that the aestheticization of violence, so often charged to Burckhardt and Nietzsche, was by no means limited to high-cultural products, and that this theme served to break down taboos in the theater” (p. 24). I tend to agree on all three. Moreover, Lindenfeld’s own essay is a striking comparison of Heidegger and Jung. It draws out the surprising similarities in their biographies and their efforts to bridge the gap between the metaphysical and the material. It also exposes possible continuities between anti-modern attitudes at the fin de siècle and those later in the century—particularly among the student movements of a few generations ago and the more recent fascination with the postmodern. Similarly, Marchand’s essay on Arnold Böcklin is exceptional. It reminds us that “it was possible for individuals in this era to be both mourners and modernizers” (p. 132).
Romantic, classical, and particularly mythical themes could command much interest among modern audiences, and antiquity, she reminds us, had a persistent place in the modern mind.

The other essays are more cultural than intellectual history, underscoring less the uncertainty in the thought of renowned individuals than the crosscurrents in Wilhelmine society. If Richard Wetzell stresses the success of liberal prison reform in this age, and the marked shift from moral retribution to efforts at protecting society, he, too, emphasizes the ambivalences that accompanied this shift. Cautioning us to avoid the older dichotomy between the categories of the modern, progressive, and liberal emancipatory, versus the reactionary, illiberal, conservative, and antimodern, he also warns against more recent tendencies to overemphasize the dark side of modernization. Similarly, Ann Taylor Allen’s broad survey of family relations and debates among leading intellectuals ranging from Bebel to Tönnies reminds us again of the sense of crisis some of these men felt as they observed the shifting familial relations that accompanied the turn of the century. But she also notes that few feminist intellectuals shared these men’s pessimism: “to feminist intellectuals, the breakdown of the mid-century paradigms that had justified women’s subordination brought no sense of ‘incoherence,’ but instead new visions of order” which could include “the long-overdue remedy for millennia of injustice” (pp. 89–90). Such feminists were eager to embrace the future, but their positions were often ambivalent as well. As Kevin Repp illustrates, many German feminists had no problem accommodating the eugenicist consensus from the turn of the century together with their leftist cultural criticism—a sticky problem for some leftist historians. And if, as Peter Jelavich notes, the reactionary bourgeoisie initially opposed the excesses of film and theater and set out to tame the disorder of popular cinema, they also learned to enjoy it and to adapt to the antibourgeois values and modes of representation in these theaters. The fluidity of modern German culture captured even the most resistant. People’s positions shifted and changed, accommodating much more than they realized and we often suppose.

Indeed, in this volume, Wilhelmine Germany comes across as a mixing place, captured in some ways in Marline Otte’s essay on the Jargon theaters that so easily accommodated affinity and difference, making Yiddish into one of the many German dialects lampooned in these theaters, and illustrating the gradual, successful emancipations of Jews in Imperial Germany. This mixing and ambiguity was perhaps one of the chief characteristics of Wilhelmine Germany, one of the significant losses that, as Otte illustrates with her example, accompanied World War I. Historians looking to understand better the transition from Wilhelmine to Weimar Germany will find this volume of great interest.

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In the 1970s and ‘80s, scholars of religion in Central Europe would habitually claim that this topic was overlooked in histories of the modern era. On the one hand, prevailing paradigms of secularization and modernization seemed to squeeze out religion as a serious topic for analysis. On the other, old-fashioned institutional church histories, often apologetic in character, did not make religion seem like a very promising or exciting area for social and cultural historians. How things have changed. Now, confessional identity and religious culture are at the very heart of our understanding of modern Germany (and Austria). The work of Thomas Nipperdey, Margaret Lavinia Anderson, David Blackbourn, Helmut Walser Smith, Wolfgang Altgeld, and Jonathan Sperber, among many others, has revolutionized scholarship on Germany in particular and Central Europe in general. At present, it is hard to imagine serious discussions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries without some treatment of confessional issues. Many scholars would go much further and place religion and religious issues at the heart of political and intellectual developments in the modern era. Róisín Healy clearly falls into this latter camp. Her recent study, The Jesuit Specter in Imperial Germany, builds upon some of the perspectives and conclusions offered by recent scholarship and mines new ground in its portrayal of “Anti-Jesuitism” as a political and intellectual movement in Imperial Germany.

Healy’s study is even more timely than she could have imagined when she began research on the topic. With a German pope in Rome and confessional identity more and more a factor in elections and politics worldwide, a book about how religious issues were understood and manipulated in Imperial Germany should be most welcome and find a wide readership. Historians of Central Europe, in particular, will find her analysis convincing and her perspectives nuanced. Her approach to religion is comparative: Her focus is primarily on bourgeois Protestant views of Jesuits. The latter represented for a subsection of the former all that was suspect and superstitious about Catholicism in Germany. Healy is careful, however, to show that some of this anti-Jesuit sentiment was generated for political purposes and further that it could wax and wane in different historical contexts, e.g., during the Kulturkampf or in the changed circumstances of the early twentieth century or again during the First World War, when real enemies made shadow enemies seem less threatening. Her book makes clear how anti-Jesuitism was understood and spread in all of these changed circumstances. Moreover, her analysis proceeds at the political, institutional, and moral levels to show the full range of anti-Jesuitism, which has been either lost or obscured in most historical accounts of the period.
Healy is also careful not to give way to a type of revisionist Manichaeanism, whereby the central characters of her story would become easily identifiable heroes (persecuted Jesuits) and villains. Her treatment of Protestants and Catholics and their various institutions and organizations is too subtle for that type of analysis. Her focus remains upon providing an important account of a crucial element—anti-Jesuitism—of late Imperial Germany’s political culture. And she certainly succeeds at this central task.

The book also sheds some light on how anti-Jesuitism functioned in different provinces and within particular organizations, such as the Protestant League. Healy does this by showing to what extent Jesuits could be incorporated into differentiated Feindbilder, or images of the enemy, and how these images in turn were important for anti-Jesuits’ political and confessional identity. The book does an admirable job of discussing this process on the abstract level and also includes some interesting examples of how Feindbilder were disseminated to the public (Healy has a nice section of political cartoons at the end of the text, for example). She includes some treatment of the concrete and specific representations of anti-Jesuitism in pamphlets and writings throughout Imperial Germany. It would be helpful to have even more of this type of analysis as it demonstrates forcefully some of the central claims of Healy’s work about the importance of anti-Jesuitism in conditioning people’s religious and political beliefs.

This is a minor criticism of an important book, however. The considerable virtues of The Jesuit Specter in Imperial Germany—its comparative focus, its nuanced historical contexts, its multi-leveled discussions of the mix of political and religious culture—should appeal to anyone interested in Central European history. It is a valuable contribution to the substantial literature on politics and confessional identity in Central Europe and adds an important dimension to our understanding of late Imperial Germany.

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“Darwinism was a necessary, but not sufficient, cause for Nazi ideology.” This is the thesis of Richart Weikart’s important, scholarly, controversial, but narrowly conceived book. Put more strongly, but within the parameters of Weikart’s argument: No Darwin, no Hitler.

Weikart begins with an incisive question: What contributed to the devaluation of human life so that during the Third Reich “ordinary Germans” killed
whole classes of people while thinking they were contributing to a higher cause? His answer, in a word, is Darwin, and not the “descent of Darwin,” as Alfred Kelly had it, but Darwin served straight up. Darwin, Weikert claims, severed Western ethics from its mooring in Judeo-Christian morals, which assumed that humans had a soul, and that life as such was sacrosanct. Darwin also dislodged Western ethics from the Enlightenment, whose Philosophes assumed that moral sentiments were universal, and whose greatest German exponent, Immanuel Kant, argued that man should never only be a means but always also an end. Weikert places Darwin’s theory of natural selection at the center of an ethical rupture, important precisely because it offered a scientific explanation for the meaning of suffering, evil, and death.

Weikert plots Darwin’s influence in two ways. First he shows how important Darwin actually was to a whole range of German thinkers. A long and impressive list, it stretches from David Friedrich Strauss to Friedrich Nietzsche to Ernst Haeckel to August Forel (whose Die Sexuelle Frage was one of the most important works of the late Wilhelmine age), to Friedrich Ratzel (the Leipzig geographer who coined the term Lebensraum) to the pacifist Betta von Suttner, and the militarist Austrian general Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, who in 1914 urged that the Serbs be put to the wall. Second, Weikart shows how Darwinism led these people, most but not all from the progressive liberal left, to positions that involved overt racism and the stunning depreciation of human life.

Here Weikart’s work as a historian who comes to his material with a novel question is impressive. We find Ernst Haeckel arguing that “the differences between the lowest humans and the highest apes are smaller than the differences between the lowest and the highest humans” (p. 106). We find Ludwig Büchner, an important Darwinist popularizer, claiming Europeans, Asians, and Africans as different species. And we find advocates for abortion, infanticide, and euthanasia appropriating Darwinist arguments that unwanted births would diminish the racial stock. Perhaps the most jarring section of the book contains the many turn-of-the-twentieth-century proclamations on the value of the life of lesser peoples. “In the next century,” Georges Vacher de Lapouge argued in an 1887 essay, “people will be slaughtered by the millions for the sake of one or two degrees on the cephalic index” (p. 196). The cephalic index, as many readers will know, was used for cranial measurements.

Striking, here, is the brutality of the language, as if indeed Judeo-Christian and Enlightenment ethics had been tossed to the wind. Striking, also, is the widespread appeal of the language of extermination, which Weikert argues belonged to almost ordinary political talk. By the end of the nineteenth century, many educated Germans thought the extermination of lesser peoples to be an inevitable, if unfortunate, by-product of progress. This assumption
even reached into the pacifist camp. Helene Stöcker, for example, was not alone in arguing against World War I because it endangered “the domination of the white race in relation to the yellow and black races” (p. 202).

What is surely controversial about Weikart’s work is his seamless lacing together of progressive thinkers who supported sexual reform and abortion with bloody-minded imperialists ready to wipe whole peoples from the face of the earth. However unsettling, the connections he makes are not fortuitous, and on this point, his book ought to make an important scholarly impact. So, too, should his argument about the pervasiveness of extermination discourse among the world of German Academia in the two decades before World War I. But whether this widespread Darwinian discourse was a *sine qua non* for Hitler’s *Weltanschauung* or for later Nazi developments is a more speculative argument. The more careful formulation that Darwinism lent scientific legitimacy to Nazi atrocity is certainly defensible, and while not new, certainly important.

But for the larger argument, the book remains too narrowly conceived. Weikert’s analysis is largely confined to an intellectual milieu of the late Wilhelmine period, and he rarely strays out of that milieu to address, for example, the position of conservatives or Catholics or Jews on these matters. To generalize from intellectual circles, many outside the mainstream, is always dangerous business. With rare exception, Weickart also does not take up the question of how the Darwinist discourse became imbricated with other kinds of discourse that also depreciated the value of the lives of others. Nationalism and anti-Semitism make cameo appearances, for example, but their power is hardly gauged. Surprisingly, we also learn little about the specific context of nineteenth-century imperialism. In fact, there is very little in this work that suggests how Darwinian ideas are grounded in society and politics. Consequently, Darwinism remains a discourse in the air, and *From Darwin to Hitler* a thesis on a tight rope, convincing as long as one does not look down.

**Helmut Walser Smith**

**Vanderbilt University**


Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, scholarly interest in the inter-war Russian emigration has increased significantly, and numerous works on émigré life, culture, and politics have been published. Given the limited influence that émigrés had on the world around them, much of this work has inevitably been rather introspective, of little interest to scholars outside this
narrow field. Michael Kellogg’s new book, *The Russian Roots of Nazism*, is rather different. He argues that one group of White Russian exiles had a decisive influence on the development of the Nazi Party and its leader Adolf Hitler in the early 1920s. His account makes an important contribution not only to the history of the Russian emigration, but also to that of German politics.

The subject of Kellogg’s book is a German/White Russian émigré organisation known as *Aufbau* (Reconstruction). Prior to now, the story of Aufbau and its influence on the early Nazis had never been investigated in depth. Kellogg therefore fills an important gap in the literature. He traces the development of relations between the German and Russian extreme right from the Russian Civil War in Ukraine and the Baltic region up to Hitler’s abortive putsch in November 1923. The leading members of Aufbau first established links with one another during the period of Russian–German cooperation in the Civil War, then carried those links forward after the Whites’ final defeat at the hands of the Bolsheviks. According to Kellogg, White members of Aufbau in exile in Germany “contributed extensively to the rise and development of National Socialism in Germany” (p. 17), by introducing Hitler and others to *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, “by adding White émigré conspiratorial-apocalyptic anti-Semitism to existing völkisch-redemptive notions of Germanic spiritual and racial superiority,” and by providing substantial financial and organisational support to the early National Socialist movement. Kellogg rejects the idea of a *Sonderweg* (a uniquely German path towards Nazism), pointing out that German anti-Semitism acquired many of its more extreme features from Russian émigrés. National Socialism, he concludes, “developed primarily as a synthesis of radical right German and Russian movements and ideas” (p. 6).

Kellogg marshals an impressive volume of material to support this thesis. His book is based on extensive archival research in Germany and Russia, and there is no doubt that it marks an original and important contribution to the ongoing debate about the origins of Nazism.

If there is a weakness in his book, it is on the Russian side. It is noticeable that the great majority of Kellogg’s sources are German in origin, and there is very little reference to secondary literature about the Russian Civil War and emigration. It is surprising, for instance, that the author makes no reference to Peter Kenez’s work on anti-Semitism and the White Movement in Southern Russia. Although admittedly Kenez writes about a different group of Whites to those discussed by Kellogg, the parallels are sufficiently clear to be worthy of mention. In addition, it appears that Kellogg has a weak understanding of the ins and outs of early 1920s émigré politics. For instance, he writes that, “Those who knew Vrangel personally verified that he held staunchly monarchial and pro-German views” (p. 117). In fact, Vrangel loathed the Germans.
Kellogg also describes Vrangel as head in 1921 of the émigré military organisation ROVS, but ROVS was not founded until 1924. Nor was Aleksandr von Lampe a “former Tsarist general” (p. 151), as he only gained his generalship in 1921. The Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, far from losing influence and support to the Grand Duke Kirill in 1923 (p. 161), was at that time coming under increasing popular pressure to take the leadership of the emigration. And it is stretching matters to claim that “no military intervention” took place against the Soviet Union in 1923 because of the “intense discord” between Aufbau and the rival Supreme Monarchist Council (pp. 164 and 175). Even if the two organisations had agreed on everything, intervention would still have been out of the question, since the Entente powers had lost all will to support it. True, émigré politics were hard to follow at the best of times, but one senses that Kellogg has taken the claims of contemporary German observers and Aufbau members a little too uncritically, an error that could have been avoided by a deeper study of the context in which they were operating.

This flaw leads the reader to question whether the White émigrés were really as influential as Kellogg claims. As he actually notes, the Aufbau concept of Russo-German cooperation against Jewish Bolshevism did not survive long: Hitler eventually decided to target Russians as well as Jews. Pro-German Russian émigrés like General Biskupskii were disappointed in their hopes that the Germans would liberate Russia. Far from seeking their support in his war against the Soviet Union, Hitler banished them to the sidelines. So either something happened to make Aufbau’s influence very short-lived, or it was never as great as is claimed. Either way, further explanation seems to be needed.

That reservation noted, there is no doubt that this book opens up a new and important area of research, and it is bound to provoke lively responses. For this, Michael Kellogg is to be congratulated.

PAUL ROBINSON
UNIVERSITY OF HULL


Norman LaPorte’s The German Communist Party in Saxony, 1924-1933 contributes new and important material to the major debates on the history of German Communism during the Weimar Republic. Laporte distinguishes between an older historiography, which focused on the top-down imposition of a Stalinist model, with a post-1960s revisionist “history from below.” The revisionist historians explained Communist behavior “as a response to a range
of social and economic conditions that influenced the mentality of party members and the choices of the party leadership” (p. 22). LaPorte sees his own work as a step beyond both schools. Following Weber, he argues that policy was indeed formulated from above, and he suggests that the revisionists have downplayed the significance of the “top-down system of control” in the KPD. At the same time, the party leaderships’ directives were interpreted and responded to in specific political contexts. The rank-and-file could not be easily forced to carry out policies that “failed to account for the realities of their own specific political environment,” and the attempt of the party leadership to impose ideological uniformity, Laporte argues, “destabilized” the relationship between the party and its membership. Hence, he views his work as an attempt to fuse history “from above and below” (p. 31).

Saxony provides an interesting case study inasmuch as the state was the focal point for the Communist “stillborn Revolution” of 1923, when the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD) entered into a coalition with the Saxon Sozialistische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) and attempted to use Saxony (and neighboring Thuringia) as a base from which to launch a revolutionary overthrow of the Weimar Republic. The Communist decision to enter the government was only possible because of the strength of the Saxon SPD’s left-wing, which was amenable to cooperation with the KPD. At least in some districts of the state (notably Erzgebirge-Vogtland), the political coalition was accompanied by a great deal of grass-roots cooperation as well.

LaPorte argues that, after the failed “German October,” many of the party membership continued to be sympathetic to a united front policy, particularly given the leftist orientation of Saxon Social Democracy. Where the Communist Party promoted a unity campaign to expropriate the former German princes in 1926 with the intent of winning over the Socialist rank and file, the campaign led—to the frustration of the KPD leadership—to the cooperation of local Social Democratic and Communist militants on a non-partisan basis in Saxony’s industrialized countryside. To be sure, the “ever compliant functionary core” could be trusted to follow every twist and turn of the KPD leadership, but the result in Saxony was that the “membership’s ties to the party were weakened.” In the early 1930s, when the KPD leadership was insisting that the SPD was the “main enemy,” “the dominant political pulse in the membership continued to be for cooperation with the local SPD to prevent the rise of Hitler to power” (p. 360). Party members, Laporte writes, “had no input in policy making, and many activists refused to speak at party meetings for fear of being accused of holding views which ‘deviated’ from the party line” (p. 231). Thus, in striking contrast to the Saxon SPD with a membership strongly rooted in a Socialist party culture, the membership of the Saxon KPD proved extraordinarily unstable. The conflicts between a communist rank-and-file rooted in local conditions and a party leadership disassociated
from those conditions and following Moscow’s dictates led to “factionalism, fratricide, and political failure” (p. 18).

Since most of the publications dealing with the Saxon labor movement during the Weimar Republic have focused on the Social Democratic Party, this book is a welcome addition to the literature. To be sure, there are some notable weaknesses. Laporte’s stated ambition, to fuse history “from above and below,” is severely limited by his source material, which is drawn, above all, from internal party reports of the KPD. The reader would gain a greater sense of the actual dynamics of grassroots sentiment had the author drawn from a broader variety of source material, such as police reports or the Social Democratic press. Furthermore, while Laporte carefully distinguishes between the internal political dynamics of communist strategies in the various Saxon districts, the relation between Saxon politics as a whole and the strategies of the party remain unclear, at least to this reader. Finally, the book assumes a fairly good knowledge of the intricacies of communist politics in the Weimar Republic. Nevertheless, Laporte makes an important contribution to our knowledge of the history of left politics in a region known as a stronghold of the labor movement which, tragically, became an important center of Nazi support. That such a shift could occur was due at least in part to the myopic and rigid policies of the leadership of the Communist Party in Saxony.

BENJAMIN LAPP
MONTCLAIR STATE UNIVERSITY


In 1997, Peter Hayes was approached by the German chemical firm Degussa to research and write a detailed report about its activities in Nazi Germany. As the author of a well-received volume on the history of IG Farben in the Third Reich and a respected professor of German history and Holocaust studies at Northwestern University, Hayes was a logical and solid choice to undertake such a task. The judicious and careful volume under review is the final product of his effort.

While Degussa, which is an acronym for the German Gold and Silver Separation Institute, is not exactly a household name in most countries, it became one of Germany’s most infamous institutions during the Third Reich. Rising from the status of a firm of modest size in the 1920s to that of Germany’s second or third most important chemical company by the middle of the war years, Degussa eventually established numerous plants and subsidiaries
all over Germany and Nazi-occupied Europe, and many of its leading managers
and directors ended up playing important roles in helping direct the German
economy as officials in the Nazi government. While building its infrastructure
and profitability during the Nazi years, Degussa also became directly involved
in some of the most nefarious and criminal activities of the Third Reich,
such as the “Aryanization” (dispossession) of Jewish property, the exploitation
of slave labor, and the production of Zyklon B gas that was used to asphyxiate
one million people in concentration camps like Auschwitz and Majdanek.

Hayes tackles each of these issues one at a time in a volume that is organized
into nine chapters, is carefully researched and heavily footnoted, and contains
numerous appendices with additional statistical and other information that
runs for nearly forty pages at the back of the book. Although Hayes tells us in
his preface that his book was “designed not as an all-embracing history of the
firm under Nazism, but rather as a report on the most sensitive aspects of that
history” (p. xvi), one might indeed wonder after reading the book
what Hayes would have taken on had he set out to have written such an
“all-embracing history,” for the book sometimes goes into such depth of
detail that the reader would appreciate a little more liveliness as well as
brevity. But in that the book was indeed designed as a report, one would
want to give Hayes more latitude than usual in permitting him to make his
in-depth forays into the record of Degussa’s questionable activities since that
was precisely what he was asked to do in the first place.

Nevertheless, even if it was designed originally as a report and not as a
book, it does provide a rather comprehensive investigation into Degussa’s
affairs and management during the Nazi period. After a brief introduction
detailing the growth and development of the firm from its beginnings in
Frankfurt in the late nineteenth century as a company specializing in precious
metals to a huge company with far-flung interests and installations in the Nazi
era, Hayes’ second chapter analyzes the ever stronger relationship the
company developed during the 1930s and 1940s with the Nazi regime. If the
company at first had something of a checkered reputation in the view of Nazi
officials, especially because a few of its managers had Jewish backgrounds,
Degussa moved in a determined fashion during the thirties to improve its
reputation by forcing its Jewish personnel out of the firm and by establishing
ever closer links between itself and the Nazi state apparatus. Evidence of its
success in this endeavor is that by 1944, thirty-two of Degussa’s senior managers
and directors were working for the German government at least some of the
time.

After this beginning, the next six chapters of the book investigate in turn the
most “sensitive aspects” of Degussa’s history in the Third Reich. In the first of
these chapters, Hayes analyzes the firm’s involvement in the takeover of Jewish
property, particularly in its takeover of a number of large Jewish enterprises,
which, as he demonstrates carefully through several detailed case studies, contributed considerably to Degussa’s wealth and success and was done in an increasingly questionable manner but not always with the anti-Semitic zeal some might expect. Following this, Hayes takes on the firm’s role in armaments production (in which it made a lot of money producing gas masks, explosives, disinfectants, and many other military-related products); its activities as the leading refinery of precious metals for the Reich, which led to Degussa’s involvement in the looting of Jewish gold and silver both inside and outside concentration camps, even if most of the metals it received came from other sources scattered across Nazi-occupied territory; its exploitation of Jewish and foreign forced laborers (which in some of Degussa’s plants amounted to more than fifty percent of its workforce in the later years of the war and which was a higher percentage than was typical of most German industrial firms); and, finally, perhaps Degussa’s greatest contribution to the Holocaust through its production of Zyklon B gas.

To Hayes’s credit, he tries consistently throughout this chapter and throughout his book in general to be evenhanded. Sometimes, however, he seems to try so hard to be fair-minded as to almost bend over backward to put the best light on Degussa’s activities. In the chapter on Zyklon B, for example, he poses the question, “Did Degussa’s leaders know that Zyklon B was being used after September 1941 not only to kill lice, but also to kill human beings whom the Nazi regime regarded as such?” (p. 295). Although he suggests that some of Degussa’s leading figures probably did know, he basically concludes that whatever the case might have been, even if they had indeed found out about it and then decided not to produce it anymore, this would have had no significant effect in the end, for they would simply have been replaced, and others either inside or outside Degussa would have produced the gas anyway. Some might also think that Hayes goes a bit easy on Degussa in this chapter by struggling with the statistical evidence to point out that Degussa did not seem to profit really from the production of the Zyklon B gas: “Shocking as it is to say, the idea that Degussa made a fortune by providing the means to murder the European Jews is fatuous” (p. 297). Of course, some might want to point out that even if this were true in a direct sense, by complying with this dirtiest of all Nazi tasks, Degussa received other considerations and profited mightily because of this in an indirect sense.

Indeed, one of Hayes’s central arguments in the book is that Degussa profited greatly from its growing collaboration with the Nazi regime but often surprisingly little in a direct fashion from its participation in the Third Reich’s worst crimes. This may be something of a consolation for Degussa and for those who served it and their Nazi leaders voluntarily during the Third Reich, but, on the whole, Hayes’s careful research paints a very unflattering portrait of a company that put profits ahead of humanity and profited greatly through its
widespread and direct complicity with a criminal and murderous regime to the bitter end. And, lastly, at several important points in his book, Hayes informs the reader that crucial and often sensitive documents are missing as they were destroyed at the war’s end or even after that. Had these documents not been missing, Hayes’s portrait of Degussa’s activities might have been yet harsher.

ERIC A. JOHNSON
CENTRAL MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY


At first glance, Andrew Bergerson’s Ordinary Germans in Extraordinary Times appears to be another local study about the rise and legitimation of Nazism, one more addition to an already impressive list of similar undertakings. What distinguishes this work is the author’s effort, through ethnography and oral history, to link the everyday neighborly practices of ordinary Germans in the Hannoverian town of Hildesheim to Nazi criminality. The result is an insightful and often provocative analysis of informal and unexceptional social behavior that paradoxically masked the more formal commitments of class, religion, and ideology in the name of civility, while simultaneously deepening those very same divisions.

Central to Bergerson’s approach are the rituals of “conviviality,” such as exchanging greetings, doffing one’s hat, cleaning common streets and courtyards, as well as decorating homes and bodies, through which Hildesheimers negotiated the boundaries between public and private, while laying the foundations for the more complicated relationships of “sociability, exchange, and politics” (p. 4). Accordingly, Hildesheimers routinely traversed formidable social divisions, however tentatively, thus complicating the recent scholarly emphasis on the seemingly impermeable social-political milieux that weakened the Weimar Republic. Indeed, Hildesheim mirrored the social and economic composition of the Weimar Republic in its distribution of men and women, Catholics and Protestants, Jews and Gentiles, the working and middle classes, and the diversity of its economy, yet its neighborhoods commonly mixed classes and confessions. The nascent mass culture and mass consumption in the 1920s, which unsettled older identities and values, added to Hildesheim’s paradigmatic stature. In addition to his extensive use of local and federal archives, Bergerson’s interviews with aged Hildesheimers exposes their carefully constructed recollections of the past and through those, their moments of resistance
against social and gender hierarchies (Eigensinn), and their attempts to win power and status in competition with others (Herrschaft).

For Hildesheimers, conviviality provided “normalcy,” which Bergerson defines first as the everyday exchanges that lubricated acquaintanceships across social boundaries, and second as the mechanism by which townspeople escaped personal responsibility for the larger historical events that shaped their lives. Thus, Hildesheimers recalled that preexisting physical boundaries defined their closest relationships, when in fact “self cultivation,” mixed with class and religious prejudice, predetermined their friendships. To wit, the friends of Theodora Algermissen’s family consisted only of property owners despite the diversity of their neighborhood. Lise Peters compensated for her family’s modest social station by exploiting her father’s position as sexton in the local Protestant church. His proximity to the pastor, in turn, conferred status on Lise while encouraging her to distance herself from Catholic neighbors, who could not, by virtue of their confession, recognize her special position. A neighbor of Ulrich Gerke reminded anyone who would listen of the loss of her son in the Great War to compensate for the absence of the soldier whose uniform conferred vicarious prestige. In so doing, Bergerson’s “interview partners” revealed deep social divisions, but also the competition for social advancement evident during the interwar period. Moreover, although conviviality allowed Hildesheimers to avoid nasty political disputes with their neighbors, the manner in which they chose their friendships and acquaintances reinforced the Republic’s cleavages, even as Hildesheimers denied responsibility for them.

The Nazi “revolution” simultaneously exploited and redefined conviviality. In the elections that followed Hitler’s ascendance, SA men successfully mobilized supporters of National Socialism because as Hildesheimers, they had divined their neighbors’ politics through the subtle, if less confrontational, means by which they expressed them. Hildesheimers now flew the black, white, and red flag with swastika as a sign of “community” because the Nazi regime gave them free rein to express their deep-seated unease with the competing symbols of Weimar and their desire to recover the imaginary unity of the Great War, in the process excluding Jews especially, whom the Nuremberg Laws prohibited from flying the national colors. By replacing previous greetings defined by age, confession, and class, the Hitler greeting encouraged a self-imposed uniformity among Aryans that further marginalized the regime’s political and racial opponents. More insidiously still, the Nazis used the popularity of the stroll through Hildesheim’s commercial districts, in which young people especially once asserted their freedom from parental control, to inflame the latent anti-Semitism of Hildesheimers, who associated the unsettling characteristics of commercialism and consumerism with the Jews who owned shops there. The Kristallnacht purges, which cleansed commercial districts of Jews, exploited the everyday practice of street and outhouse cleansing. Especially
because anti-Jewish actions often took place anonymously, they shielded Aryans from facing their persecuted neighbors. In fact, ordinary Hildesheimers like Heinrich Weber, who claimed to Bergerson that no one did Jews any harm, inadvertently admitted that he crossed the street to avoid Jews he knew. In this case, the abandonment of conviviality rather than its modification paved the way for more violent acts of anti-Semitism.

Bergerson deftly unravels the meanings of ordinary cultural practices, sensitively exposing the ironies inherent in the politicization of behavior that once masked political rancor. To the extent that conviviality survived in its original meaning, it persisted among the regime’s leftist opponents especially, whose political allegiances arose from prior neighborly relationships. To be sure, recent scholarship on popular opinion in the Third Reich has underscored that the Nazi regime could not have achieved legitimacy without conforming to popular norms and expectations. Yet Bergerson probes beyond the usual institutions and structures of scholarly analysis to highlight the corrosive self-aggrandizement of everyday practices that both challenged and reinforced older identities. The destruction of Hildesheim’s civil society resulted.

Finally, Bergerson is effective in emphasizing the tragedy that befell the regime’s victims. Because conviviality prioritized Nazi racism as basic to human exchanges, it encouraged even the self-exclusion of the regime’s enemies, particularly Jews, as Bergerson’s interview with Dora Pröbst reveals. Rather than confront a close friend who had become a Nazi and thus expose the differences between them that ordinary pleasantries could no longer conceal, Pröbst crossed the street so as not to embarrass him, oddly mimicking the behavior of Heinrich Weber. Bergerson’s insistence on the agency of ordinary people could be clearer in recognizing gradations in popular contributions to Nazi criminality. The regime’s victims certainly had less room to maneuver than the great mass of ordinary Germans. Nonetheless, he is right to underscore the functional outcome of Pröbst’s evasions: Jewish initiatives to defend themselves gave their neighbors an excuse to encourage their persecution.

SHELLEY BARANOWSKI
UNIVERSITY OF AKRON


Clemens August Graf von Galen (1878–1946) is popularly known as the “Lion of Münster” for his resolute opposition to Nazism, notably to Hitler’s policy of euthanasia that was to cleanse Germany of the mentally retarded. Von Galen was
the Bishop of Münster in Westphalia until he became a cardinal in 1946, shortly before his death. In the summer of 1941, he delivered three powerful sermons against euthanasia and the closing of monasteries. The sermons were secretly copied and distributed and also, much to the embarrassment of the Nazi regime, dropped as leaflets by the Royal Air Force over Germany. It is thanks to these sermons that Bishop von Galen has been widely recognized and indeed celebrated as a resister against National Socialism.

The book under review has undertaken to examine critically the nature and degree of von Galen’s opposition or resistance. What exactly did he mean when he protested that “we Christians do not make revolution”? For von Galen, it certainly did not behoove a churchman to engage in politics, let alone to climb barricades. Did the Bishop thus exclude outright resistance as a possible position on Nazism? Was it political cunning that impelled him to make such a statement so as to cover fundamental reservations about the Hitler regime? If he had such reservations, what moved him to keep affirming his loyalty to the state and even to exclaim a “triple hail” to the “Führer” whom “God’s Providence” had called to his responsible place?

There cannot and should not be any question about the vigor and sincerity of the Bishop’s adamant stand against eugenics and euthanasia. This made him a powerful antagonist of Nazi philosophy and politics. Yet on important issues, his views concurred with those of the Nazis, and these Beth A. Griech-Polelle takes pains to explore and expose. In her critical stance on von Galen’s public personality, she goes much further than Joachim Kuropka’s edited book *Clemens August Graf von Galen* (Munich, 1992).

Von Galen was an old-time unregenerate German nationalist. He subscribed stubbornly to the stab-in-the-back legend that blamed the collapse of the supposedly undefeated German armies in the First World War on “defeatist” elements on the home front. Moreover, concerning the Second World War, he went so far as to identify himself with the Germanization policy of the Nazis in Eastern Europe. Even after the war, he complained about the fate of ethnic Germans, expelled from the “newly created” territories in Poland.

To the end, von Galen maintained an unyielding condemnation of the “Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy.” He lumped together Bolshevism, Marxism, atheism, liberalism, and indeed Judaism as symptoms of decadence. In a pastoral letter of April 1940, he insisted in recalling, as he put it, the “decadent Jewry” of the time of the Apostles. Until his death, he persisted in characterizing the Jews as “degenerate,” “rejected,” and “lost.” He certainly did not help to shield Jews when they were mercilessly persecuted in his fatherland.

The tone of this book is understandably and justifiably polemical and accusatory on the issue of the flaws in Cardinal von Galen’s stature. With the evidence before us, we can no longer speak of resistance on his part. His dissent was
limited to two issues: euthanasia and the closing of monasteries. He offered an opposition that was limited to safeguarding the prerogatives of the institutional structures of the Church. He did not address himself to the ultimate questions of love and human dignity that one would expect from a Prince of a Christian Church.

I have some major reservations about this volume, mainly concerning the limitations of the author’s general grasp of history. Too many passages in the book are outright trite, if not misleading. It simply cannot be said that in medieval times “Germany ruled the Holy Roman Empire” (p. 10). Must it be emphasized that Pope Pius XII “was not living directly under the National Socialist government” (p. 139)? Such statements detract from the quality of a monograph that otherwise has considerable merit in throwing critical light on the place of Cardinal von Galen in modern history.

KLEMENS VON KLEMPERER
SMITH COLLEGE


This absorbing and well-researched book presents the story of Berlin’s Catholic Church during the Nazi era from the perspective of a deeply committed believer. Professor Kevin Spicer is also Father Kevin Spicer. As such, it offers critics a chance to test their arguments against a serious voice from within the Church. But it also affords more neutral observers a chance to ponder the assumptions behind debates on the churches in the Third Reich, in particular, what acts can be considered oppositional and what drove certain religious believers into resistance.

Newcomers may wonder why Catholic resistance is a subject for historical research at all. After all, the Nazi state proclaimed that it would not tolerate the clergy’s political involvement, and the clergy overwhelmingly pledged to keep out of politics. Especially in the early years of the Third Reich, that kind of abstinence was not difficult. Priests tended to be fervent German nationalists, eager and ready to support the Nazi campaign to regain the Saar, or its war against Bolshevism, or measures aimed at limiting “corrupting Jewish influence.” Nevertheless, dozens of Catholic priests found themselves victims of Gestapo terror. In the Berlin area alone, Spicer reckons that seventy-nine of 260 priests endured state harassment, ranging from interrogation to arrest to execution. He does not say this, but surely Catholic clergy must figure among the most persecuted groups in the German population.
Clergy came into conflict with the state because the state decided what was political, and it successively constricted the public space within which the Church could operate. In the “night of the long knives” (June 29-30, 1934), Gestapo agents shot to death Erich Klausener, the leader of Catholic Action in Berlin, thus greatly encouraging the traditional Church posture of self-preservation. Increasingly, clergy turned “a blind eye to injustices and human rights violations that did not affect the Catholic Church directly” (p. 39). But as it turned inward, the Church was pursued at each step by watchful state agents, who forced a reduction of youth work to the “purely religious,” and even restricted the priest’s core function of dispensing the sacraments. A half-dozen Berlin clergy were sent to concentration camps for failing to eject Poles from church services.

The one Berlin-area priest to stand up to the Nazis for their persecution of Jews, Bernhard Lichtenberg, died as a result of Nazi incarceration. A small cadre of committed individuals, like Margarete Sommer, dedicated themselves to the welfare of so-called “non-Aryan Christians.” Otherwise, clergy in Berlin did nothing publicly to intercede for the Jews in their midst who were being carried off to death camps. Spicer does not excuse such behavior, but he does note that “speaking out for Jews’ civil rights or against the persecution of Jews would be viewed as stepping into the political realm” (p. 133).

If the Church failed to condemn persecution of Jews, it did regularly release statements critical of Nazi racism, as for example in 1931, when Bishop Christian Schreiber instructed the faithful to reject Nazi teachings that placed “race higher than religion” (p. 124), or in 1942, when Bishop Konrad von Preysing reminded his listeners that no one should be excluded from Christian charity, even those who “speak another language or are of foreign blood” (p. 130).

In these matters, Spicer presents indisputable facts, though perhaps the facts don’t speak the entire record. There are still important counterfactual questions. Had the Catholic clergy—indeed, the Catholic faithful—been possessed of an elemental concern for their Jewish fellow citizens, then their protest would have been irrepressible in the literal sense. From surviving records we know that the higher clergy could have risked far more. Spicer notes how carefully leading Nazis weighed the consequences of arresting a bishop or cardinal. After Preysing’s emphatic defense of “innocent life,” Joseph Goebbels wrote that the bishop spoke a language that “if it were spoken by a normal mortal, would make him a candidate for prison or the death penalty” (p. 67).

The number of German priests who openly cast their lot with the Nazis is unknown, but was certainly very small, probably less than one percent. In the Berlin diocese, the half-dozen or so priests in the NSDAP found themselves at odds with the diocesan leadership, including the anti-Nazi Preysing and his head of chancery, who happened to be Monsignor Lichtenberg. Several of
these Nazi priests were marginalized and forced into retirement. One—the notorious racist Josef Roth—turned his back on the Church because he felt it could not be liberated from Jewish influences. Spicer attributes these priests’ allegiance to Nazism to “adamant anti-Semitism and the belief that Nazism would solve the perceived ills that plagued Germany” (p. 154).

More troubling perhaps is Karl Adam, a Catholic priest and theologian who did not join the party, but who sought to build bridges to the Nazis from Catholicism, and openly endorsed Nazi racism. In 1940, Bernhard Lichtenberg wrote Adam and insisted upon the superiority of Christian teaching to the Nazi Wirtschaft. Adam was not impressed. During the war, he declared in a recognized Catholic theological journal that the mother of Jesus could not have been racially Jewish.

Spicer may be a partisan, but he is not an apologist. He also notes the troubling pages in the history of Bernhard Lichtenberg, who at times wrote in the anti-Semitic idiom common among Catholics. In his view, Jews were “blind.” Whoever imagines that essential opposition to racism formed an impenetrable barrier between Adam and Lichtenberg will also be disappointed. Before 1933, Lichtenberg expressed concerns that the “white race” might become outnumbered by the “colored race” and “disappear from the earth” (p. 164). This concern grew out of his opposition to contraception: It would reduce the strength of a Völk and make it “a slave to foreign Voelker” (p. 164). Whatever else he was, Lichtenberg was conservative in matters of faith and morals. He also was not a theologian, and thus unlike Adam, not so committed to ideology as to be insensitive to the human suffering in his midst. From Kristallnacht to his arrest by the Gestapo in October 1941, he prayed publicly for Jews.

Spicer posits the incompatibility of Nazism and Christianity, arguing that Nazi teachings contradicted “Christ’s mandate of love” (p. 140). Priests who became Nazis were thus alienated “from their own faith tradition ... they no longer saw their church ... as the sole means of salvation” (pp. 158-59). In these views, he appears motivated by a postwar sensibility, however. Nazi priests may have been marginal, but elements of Nazi ideology—including its racist anti-Semitism—entered deeply into the minds of many in the Catholic milieu, including a number of respected theologians. Adam remained a revered figure, and to his own surprise, was invited to the deliberations preceding the Second Vatican Council.

In terms of this book’s overall contribution, this criticism is a minor one, however. Spicer’s Catholicism may grow out of a post-Vatican II sensibility, but his eyes are fully open to the shortcomings of the Church in the period he studies. He seeks to understand behavior in terms of that time, without making excuses, but also without the “moral reckoning” that is easy to indulge in from the comfort of American academia. Anyone interested in this
Andrey Angrick’s definitive work on Einsatzgruppe D is more than a history of the mobile killing unit, for the latter did not operate in a vacuum, but cooperated with the German military authorities to realize Nazi occupation policy in the south Ukraine and the Caucasus. In Angrick’s words, Einsatzgruppe D was the “first and most radical instrument for the formation of the to-be-conquered Lebensraum” (p. 732). German determination to recast the ethnic composition of the U.S.S.R. was no “desk fantasy,” as reflected in the priority placed on settlement planning, which required the disappearance of Soviet Jews. Unlike Jewish communities in the western U.S.S.R., where survival of some was guaranteed by the need for labor, survivors in areas “worked” by Einsatzgruppe D were “minutely few” (p. 733). Angrick notes that his work is “perpetrator history”: his perpetrators permitted few victims to survive; and those who did were primarily peasants and Red Army soldiers whose stories were not told after the war. Nevertheless, postwar statements of the perpetrators assist the historian to “reconstruct … the internal history of the unit, down to the individual,” although cautions about judicial and historical “truth” should be well taken.

The author makes four contributions to the history of the German occupation of the U.S.S.R. First, he depicts the complex relationship between Einsatzgruppe D and Romanian security authorities in occupied Ukraine. Astutely linking tension between the two to SD support of the abortive Legionnaire attempt to overthrow the Antonescu regime in January 1941, he outlines divergent population policies: In Bukovina, the Romanians prioritized ethnic cleansing of the Ukrainian population over the elimination of Jews, obstructing efforts of German policymakers to deploy Ukrainian collaborators in the latter task. Second, Angrick analyzes how the Einsatzgruppe operated on the Black Sea coast, annihilating the small Jewish communities of the Crimea and the Caucasus, and killing Gypsies, institutionalized persons with illnesses or disabilities, and Soviet communist functionaries. He discusses the debate over the “racial” status of the Karaims and the Krymchaks within the broader context of a population policy laid down on October 10, 1941, by
the commander of the 11th Army, urging troops to “set aside” the laws of war and to “annihilate all parts of the indigenous population who oppose the new rulers or even who bide their time [to see what happens]” (p. 337). Interesting here was a foray of a small Einsatzgruppe detachment onto the Black Sea island Dsharylgach to “cleanse” it of partisans and Jews: Instead of defenseless civilians, the killers encountered an armed and equipped Soviet naval unit and had to retreat, taking combat casualties for the first time. Third, Angrick follows the relationship between the Einsatzgruppe and the 11th Army command as it matured from initial mistrust toward mutual respect and collaboration, both in mass murder and in constructive engagement of that part of the population deemed suitable to serve the occupation authorities. While the outlines of this effort and its failure are well known, Angrick’s analysis of the recruitment of Tatar and Cossack auxiliaries within the framework of German intentions of bringing Turkey into the war is new and refreshing. The 11th Army supervised deployment of auxiliaries; the Einsatzgruppe was tasked with their recruitment, training, and formation. Ironic here was Einsatzgruppe commander Bierkamp’s conclusion, based on personal experience of their hospitality, that a small Jewish ethnic group in the Caucasian mountains had, other than common religious practice, nothing to do with Jewishness and should not be killed (p. 616). Finally, Angrick offers an instructive analysis of both the social background and mentality of the Einsatzgruppe personnel, examining officers and enlisted men, SS men and non-SS men. He focuses on exceptional events or statements as benchmarks to explore the general composition and mood in the unit, providing a “collective biography” based on sample individual careers (p. 388). He finds authentic the postwar self-perception of Order Police personnel in the Einsatzgruppe as mere recipients of orders, even as victims, who resented privileged Security Police detectives and SD intellectuals. The SD commanders had already committed themselves to realizing the aims of the regime and had generally detailed to the U.S.S.R. from regional Security Police and SD command positions. The second-rank officers, the “intellectual backbone” of the unit, derived their efficiency and success from the long-term collaboration of technically skilled police veterans with more educated and more ideologically engaged SD men.

Einsatzgruppe D never experienced individual “public refusal” to obey orders to murder based on physical, psychological, or even legal reasons. While police-reservists occasionally could avoid shooting, they still had to facilitate murder on the cordon line: “Internal refusal” of orders later claimed by enlisted men was but “self-deception” (p. 433). Some of the killers viewed their participation as dramatic theater that required sacrifice of psychological well-being for the nation’s future, and believed that God or history would absolve them of guilt. Regardless of how they later defined themselves—“as intelligence gatherers, political functionaries, security commissioners, or ideological soldiers
protecting the state”—they remained “first and foremost murderers” (p. 731). Although U.S. authorities convicted and executed four Einsatzgruppe D leaders, and several lower-ranking personnel became defendants in West Germany during the 1960s and 1970s, the overwhelming majority of perpetrators escaped the legal consequences to disappear comfortably into postwar German society.

Though hardly a page fails to hold the specialist’s interest, this book could have been profitably shortened. Lengthy digressions into well-known areas (e.g., strategic planning for the German invasion, Nazi influence in the Wehrmacht) and distracting if fascinating discussions of related, but not always directly relevant topics (e.g., Sonderkommando R, which worked the ethnic German regions of Romanian-occupied Ukraine; development of gas vans; and Crimean and Caucasian military operations) might test the focused reader’s patience. Another minor drawback, given extensive reference to local geography, is the relative dearth of maps. Nevertheless, this work is an impressive and interesting compendium and analysis of the available source material and will take its place among the classic works dealing with the German occupation of the Soviet Union.

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The opinions expressed herein are exclusively those of the author and are not to be viewed as official statements of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum.


Reading Karel C. Berkhoff’s Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule reaps reward but also some disappointment. For the general public unfamiliar with the historical issues and intricacies of the Nazi occupation of the Soviet Union, this book contains far more reward as a montage of vivid depictions of everyday life under German domination in the occupied East. But conversely, for those with a more advanced, research-level familiarity with the subject, the results are reversed.

Having compared Berkhoff’s declared intentions with the actual content, this reviewer concludes that his title is somewhat misleading. The main title, Harvest of Despair, is apropos, since the term “Harvest” draws a metaphorical link with Robert Conquest’s classic on the 1930s rural famine in the Ukraine, The Harvest of Sorrow—both works graphically portray the Ukraine suffering through two of
its most tragic historical experiences. As for “Despair,” the term aptly characterizes the product of living “under Nazi rule,” and indeed was used by Alfred Rosenberg, whose realm in the conquered East included the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, in admonishing those who “proclaim measures which in the last analysis might drive the conquered population to despair.” This quote comes from Alexander Dallin’s authoritative opus on the subject, German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945: A Study of Occupation Policies (New York: St. Martin’s, 1957) (p. 133). Dallin, whose work still sets the standard for this subject, titles a chapter “The SS: From Dread to Despair” and perceives an “atmosphere of despair” among the subject Ukrainians (p. 657). Berkhoff would agree with Dallin that “Nazi” or “German” rule—respectively—in the Ukraine can be summarized as a ruthless, inhumane occupation transforming a population that initially welcomed German troops with “bread and salt” into a hostile and “despairing” enemy.

The subtitle, Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule, advertises a bit more than Berkhoff delivers. He artfully addresses the “Life and Death” theme—one of the “rewards” for readers at all levels—but falls short on his declared scope, “Ukraine under Nazi Rule.” Berkhoff describes his work as a “narrative history of everyday life in Nazi Germany’s largest colony and an assessment of the effect of Nazi rule on a territory that had known Soviet rule for more than two decades: The Reichskommissariat Ukraine, founded in 1941 and ultimately dissolved in 1944.” This narrow definition of the Ukraine, as the territories of the German administrative entity, Reichskommissariat Ukraine, excludes historically and ethnically Ukrainian lands, such as western Galicia and other fringe areas. As for the time frame of “Nazi Rule,” Berkhoff begins his narrative with the launching of Operation Barbarossa in June 1941, but abruptly ends it in the fall of 1943 with the Red Army’s crossing of the Dnieper River and the withdrawal of German civilian administrators, leaving this reader’s expectations unfulfilled. After all, the war continued for another year and a half, and although the Ukraine was mostly “German-free” by 1944, it remained politically as well as militarily important into 1945. It was in 1943, about the time Berkhoff ends his tale, that the issue of raising Ukrainian armed units to fight on the German side became topical, and the rehabilitation and utilization of the Melnyk and Bandera factions, in conjunction with the Vlasov movement, resurfaced as vital issues. The wartime experience of Ukrainians and “Life and Death” in the Ukraine did not end in 1943, as does Berkhoff’s narrative.

Besides not meeting expectations in setting its scope—although the author reserves the right to define his own parameters—this work might disappoint readers with more scholarly interests in another respect. Berkhoff never explains the historiography of his work, its place within the literature and research on the subject. Failing to discuss the relevant literature, sources, and his research, it is apparent only to those with advanced knowledge of the field that Berkhoff’s
major achievement in producing this work is his utilization of sources inaccessible to most pre-1990s scholars studying the Ukraine. This becomes evident as one peruses the copious citations, which include an embedded bibliography—one that economizes on printing costs, but is annoyingly inconvenient when looking for research leads.

Berkhoff also claims that he has written the first history of the everyday life of the people of the Reichskommissariat, which is not entirely correct, since Alexander Dallin’s aforementioned study deals with many of the same topics. What differentiates the two works, which Berkhoff does not elucidate, is his reliance on archival materials not available to Dallin and others writing prior to the 1990s. Berkhoff’s strength and the reader’s “reward” lie in his presentation of new materials extracted from the archives in Kiev and elsewhere. But the sheer volume of evidence presents a dilemma: fulfilling his commitment to what he deems the “first commandment” of historians, “to present all of the relevant information that is found to be true.” As a result, the reader must sort through an array of what at times seems to be conflicting evidence—which the author felt impelled to include—in order to draw one’s own generalizations. The author does, however, end every chapter by cautiously offering conclusions that hardly differ from existing, established interpretations. One would hope for bolder observations and more innovative interpretations from an explorer of the “new archives.” Perhaps these archival collections hold little that would radically alter our current understanding of these issues.

Berkhoff organizes his narrative thematically, presenting in chapter form topics including the Holocaust of the Jews and Roma, Prisoners of War, Life in the Countryside, Conditions in the Cities, Famine in Kiev, Popular Culture, Ethnic Identity and Political Loyalties, and Deportations and Forced Migrations. He is most enlightening and original when applying the recently uncovered materials to illustrate lesser known aspects of the German occupation, such as the German intent to starve the population of Kiev and the deportations of Ukrainians as slave labor to the Reich, actions instrumental in turning the Ukrainians into “despairing” enemies. Berkhoff contributes less to familiar and more studied subjects such as the Holocaust. Although he masterfully crafts vivid scenes of the murdering of Jews, including the infamous atrocities at Babi Yar, except for reinforcing and illuminating commonly held images of terror and inhumanity, Berkhoff adds little toward understanding the Holocaust. For instance, he addresses the intriguing question of Ukrainian participation in these pogrom-like actions only in passing and fails to examine in any depth the interaction of Germans and Ukrainians in this nefarious endeavor. Although noting their complicity, he offers few fresh insights into the backgrounds and motives of Ukrainian accomplices, such as the Schuma. He also declines to place his study in a historical context, such as the scholarly discourse between the “functionalists” and “intentionalists” on the origins of
the Holocaust. One could reasonably expect that Berkhoff’s digging through these local, “everyday” sources would shed more light on controversial questions such as those raised by Götz Aly—the idea of local exigencies of war assuming a dynamic of their own in fueling the Holocaust—but he does not elevate his discussion to that level of historical analysis.

In sum, Berkhoff’s animated depiction of everyday life in the Ukraine enhances and vivifies existing images and perceptions of this land and people under “Nazi rule,” but it leaves this reviewer with few new or deeper insights into the subject. For the general readership, however, this work should provide a rewarding read, and after all, that should be the purpose of historical literature.

Valdis O. Lumans
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The Berlin Republic of the twenty-first century, writes W. R. Smyser, is destined to be unlike all previous German states. A status quo power and a stable democracy, it is neither the battleground of others nor dominant over them, neither reticent like Bonn nor arrogant like the Berlin of the late Hohenzollerns. The Cold War was “the essential incubator” of this “new Germany” (p. 402). It provided Germany with the tools of change—a role through which to overcome its past, and time to overcome old wounds. Aiding the incubation were contradictory Communist policies, astute Western statesmanship, and bravely pursued Eastern popular aspirations. Two Germans and two Americans, Smyser avers, stand at the heart of the eventual Communist defeat: East German leader Walter Ulbricht, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, President Ronald Reagan, and Smyser’s onetime mentor, General Lucius Clay. Mighty assists go to British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, Soviet leaders Joseph Stalin and Mikhail Gorbachev, and the inspirational Polish Pope. Further down this idiosyncratic hierarchy stand Chancellors Adenauer and Kohl and U.S. President George H. W. Bush.

Smyser crisply formulates a number of major themes. The American strategic vision in Europe, he asserts, was the product of the tutelage of Bevin. Stalin did not desire, yet largely provoked, the division of Germany. He “wanted and even needed a united Germany” (p. 32), whose economic assets he coveted. But Ulbricht, whose “only priority” (p. 40) was the Soviet occupation zone, “undermined” him (p. 39); he was “more autonomous and more pernicious” (p. 2) than was previously realized. In 1961, insists Smyser, President Kennedy could have
shredded Berlin’s new barbed-wire fence with impunity before it became the Wall. Nikita Khrushchev’s purpose in putting missiles in Cuba was to seize Berlin. Although Kennedy eventually stopped offering diplomatic concessions on Berlin, he also cut off support for Adenauer’s unification stance. The Germans then had to find a new way to defend their interests themselves.

After Adenauer tried Gaullism, Brandt’s answer was his new Ostpolitik. Persuaded (like Ulbricht) that détente would “erode the Soviet empire” (p. 259), Brandt made unification possible “in the long run by giving it up in the short run” (p. 271). His emotion-laden Eastern visit to Erfurt in 1970 showed East Germans “that he understood them better than their own government” and demonstrated that “he spoke for all Germans.” Sensing the danger, Ulbricht’s successor Erich Honecker—defying the Soviets—placed the spy Günter Guillaume close to Brandt, not only risking, but deliberately engineering Brandt’s fall. Unilaterally deploying intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INFs) in a bid for hegemony in Europe, Moscow then drove a reluctant post-Wall West Germany back into reliance upon Washington. The Soviets had bet the ranch on the Western peace movement; instead, they destroyed détente. In so doing, they wrecked their best opportunity since 1945 to extend Soviet influence throughout Europe.

Supported by Kohl, Reagan’s resultant military buildup bankrupted the Soviet Union and forced Gorbachev to try to trade Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe for a scaled-down version of continent-wide influence. Seizing the opening, the Eastern population unrelentingly asserted its own aspirations, preventing the retreating Soviets from resisting Western terms. Astutely gauging the opportunity and the pitfalls, Kohl and Bush saw to it that the outcome was a unified democratic Germany both moored in NATO and reconciled beneficially with Russia. For the first time in its modern history, the European country with the most neighbors (Germany) has no enemies and seeks constancy instead of change. Still, “Gorbachev’s . . . heritage,” a united Europe, will strain NATO more than did the policies of Gorbachev’s predecessors (p. 414). While reluctant to act alone, Germany will be readier to demur from American positions.

Even before the Iraqi War had underscored the last point, there was much in this telling to affirm. Whether the Cold War was “essential” to democratic development, to examine its role as “incubator” is just to spotlight real processes and outcomes as opposed to counterfactuals. Smyser sensibly asserts that the Cold War’s exigencies fostered greater West German sensitivity to the interests of its neighbors. He sees Adenauer’s famous preoccupation with the fine points of East-West diplomacy as astute rather than rigid and curmudgeonly. Yet, he also credits Brandt for understanding that, in the new context after Cuba, “even flawed accords” might ultimately “transform” East Germany (p. 214). Smyser offers a moving tribute to Brandt, whose skill and humanity gained
influence for his defeated country, and whose refusal to let Germans wallow in recrimination strengthened democracy. By showing “the East German people that they were not forgotten” (p. 271), Brandt compelled Moscow to glimpse that its European interests could not be mortgaged to the hardliners in East Berlin.

Smyser offers a similarly pithy narrative of the post-détente period. As the Soviets began to overplay their hand, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt pleaded with them to understand that the INFs posed an existential threat to his country. Soviet Marshal Dmitri Ustinov smugly replied, “that is correct” (p. 291). The ensuing Western counterdeployments transformed the situation: “For the first time, a missile fired from a non-nuclear country in Europe could destroy the capital of a superpower” (p. 301). Inheriting this catastrophe, Gorbachev “conducted a reversal of alliances” (p. 316), choosing West German economic aid over his imperial forward base in East Germany. Smyser elucidates the subsequent diplomatic frenzy from multiple perspectives, yet also remembers what unification ultimately owed to the civic courage of the East German population.

More problematic is Smyser’s tendency, from Ulbricht to Guillaume, to overstate German Communist agency. He too readily accepts the thesis of Wilfried Loth that Ulbricht “sabotaged” (p. 98) the Soviet policy of keeping Germany unified. As Norman Naimark has shown, Stalin’s policy was an attempt to keep options open by exploiting the Soviet occupation zone while simultaneously fending off partition and working to dominate the whole country. Seen thus, the problem was not that Ulbricht contradicted Stalin’s goals, but that Stalin’s goals were contradictory. Ulbricht’s role is perhaps best characterized as having contributed a practical momentum toward the resolution of the conflicted Soviet choice between partition and wider influence in Germany.

Regarding Berlin, Smyser, citing Clay, rightly argues the primacy of morale over strict strategic considerations. While evacuating Berlin in 1948 would have produced more easily defensible boundaries, it would have been disastrous psychologically. The subsequent civic courage of the Berliners permanently rendered any pullout too costly to contemplate. For Kennedy thirteen years later, West Berlin was an indispensable strategic liability. But because Berliners retained a sense of the wholeness of their city, the price of Kennedy’s forsaking the wholeness might well have proved far higher than just the remnants of Eastern freedom and German indivisibility. That West German confidence and freedom did not also unravel was due, says Smyser, not to a Wall-induced stabilization of two Germanys but to the swift American recovery from the Wall-induced misperception that Eastern goals were limited. The subsequent standoff of Soviet and American tanks at Checkpoint Charlie was due to Clay. To Smyser, this was the real turning point of the entire crisis. It ended Ulbricht’s
bid to neutralize West Berlin by unilateral Eastern action, taught Kennedy the stakes in Berlin, and prevented the mistakes of the Wall affair from being aggravated in the ensuing Cuban crisis. From Clay, Kennedy learned the value of making one’s opponent sweat. He learned, too, that the Berliners’ attitude made the city an asset and not just a hazard. Kennedy’s subsequent commitment—“Ich bin ein Berliner”—showed that Clay’s lessons had been learned. But if those lessons included not underestimating the scale as well as the tool (Berlin) of Khrushchev’s German ambitions, then attributing Soviet policy to the pernicious influence of Ulbricht would again seem overdone.

Smyser does not work out the contradiction between his assessment that détente subverted the Eastern bloc and his assessment that the Soviets’ destruction of détente frittered away their best opportunity to spread their influence. “Reversing the trends . . . toward a fully divided Germany,” Ostpolitik, he is quite sure, “forced the German question open again” (p. 270). He pays less attention to the phenomenon whereby the modus vivendi tended to calcify into a sense of settled separateness. Smyser grants that the loans negotiated by Franz Joseph Strauss in 1983 may have saved Communist Germany from collapse. But as to whether Easterners might have been better served by an alternative to Bonn’s long-term policy of engagement, Smyser writes only that “there is no clear answer” (p. 324).

Usually sensible, sometimes infuriating, Smyser combines conventional wisdom with a subversive, probing iconoclasm. Efficiently synthesizing much recent research, his book—with proper professorial guidance—offers plenty of material for discussion in college courses on divided Germany. The book is a model of how a seemingly familiar story can be told freshly and intriguingly without sacrificing lucidity or resorting to a textbook’s stylistic conventions. But only monographic studies that closely engage the sources will permit the more controversial formulations of Smyser’s master narrative to be tested.

NOEL D. CARY
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Astrid Eckert undertook a daunting task when she began to research and write Kampf um die Akten. The field of post-war German history has become increasingly crowded in recent years with many excellent books on politics, diplomacy, economics, culture, and memory. One might have wondered how well an exhaustive study on the fate of captured German documents would fare in
such an environment. Yet precisely for this reason, Eckert’s achievement with this book is all the more impressive. This is a study of profound importance to the historiography on twentieth-century Germany.

In *Kampf um die Akten*, Eckert relays the saga of captured German records after World War II. She argues that the possession and use of such documents, by American and British officials and historians, “were the precondition for intense international research into German history” (p. 465). In 1945, British and American troops captured the bulk of Germany’s diplomatic, military, and Nazi party records. The Allies wished to comb through the records for evidence of war crimes and for material of relevance to intelligence services. But they also wished to prevent the Germans from doing what many Anglo-American historians accused them of having done after World War I with the celebrated documentary collection, *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*: using selective documentation to obscure Germany’s historical responsibility for war in 1914. To that end, the Allies commissioned their own documentary project, *Documents on German Foreign Policy* (DGFP), that would make Nazi Germany’s aggressive policies known to the world. By the early 1950s, the new West German government began to demand the return of files necessary to the proper functioning of a modern *Auswärtiges Amt* and the creation of a new West German army. German historians joined the call, however, by arguing that only native German historians could properly understand the recent German past. This generation of German historians, Eckert argues, feared that the Anglo-American historians using the German records would undermine the then-dominant view within Germany that Hitler and Nazism had represented an aberration in German history. The Allies did indeed return most of these records, the files of the Berlin Document Center being the major exception until 1994, gradually between 1951 and 1958. Yet by the late 1950s, Eckert argues, German history had become an international affair, laying the groundwork for the more critical version of German history that began to take shape within West Germany during the early 1960s.

Eckert’s great strength in this book lies in her ability to embed the relatively mundane subjects of government records and archival developments within the crucial issue of “overcoming the past” (*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*) in post-war Germany. Indeed, Eckert situates her analysis of *Vergangenheitspolitik* within an international, multi-layered framework. She demonstrates thereby the complex relationship between vested interest and deeply held historiographical and ideological beliefs. In general, British and American officials and professional historians believed that the *Grosse Politik* had obscured German guilt for the outbreak of war in 1914. Such a view, however, did not preclude a liberal attitude toward returning German files to the new West German government by the early 1950s. Indeed, both the State
Department and the Foreign Office were very much in favor of accommodating the West Germans. Yet those officials in Washington and London who wished to delay the transfer of important documents, be they intelligence officials or government historians engaged in producing the DGFP, understood very well how to mobilize the wider historical community against the Germans with the fear that the transfer of documents would lead to distorted historical interpretations of Germany’s responsibility for war in 1939. Thus, as Eckert skillfully demonstrates, vested interests intersected with deeply, and sometimes bitterly, held historiographical beliefs to delay the return of many records until the later 1950s.

A similar process was at work in West Germany. The Auswärtiges Amt and the new Bundeswehr required pre-1945 records for administrative purposes, indeed, to have the ability to prevent former Nazis from returning to work. But the newly created West German archival system, led by the principal Bundesarchiv in Koblenz, had an obvious concrete interest in obtaining the German files. The leadership of the Bundesarchiv, particularly Georg Winter, and the leading German historians, especially Gerhard Ritter, complained bitterly about the inability of German scholars to conduct research into the recent past and complained openly about the danger of allowing the Anglo-Americans to develop the standard account of twentieth-century German history. Indeed, the new Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich, predisposed to a friendlier attitude toward the western Allies than older historians like Ritter and Meinecke, caught it at both ends as it tried to publish what it had in the Hitlers Tischgeschpräche, leading to charges of propaganda from historians in the Anglo-American world.

This book is quite an accomplishment. In the wake of Nicolas Berg’s hard-hitting criticism of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in his book on West German historians and the Holocaust, Eckert has offered a truly international and judicious approach to Vergangenheitspolitik in post-war Germany. Her use of German, British, and American files (including the files of my office at the Department of State, the Historical Office!), is exhaustive. She writes in an engaging style that is especially welcome in a 465-page book ostensibly on the development of German archives. This is truly a remarkable achievement. One may only hope that Eckert’s work gets the widespread attention it deserves. This is one of the best books I have read in the past few years.

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*The views expressed in this review are his own and do not necessarily represent the views of either the Department of State or the Central Intelligence Agency.
Among forced population transfers in the twentieth century, the expulsion of the German population from East Central Europe at the end of World War II was remarkable. More than twelve million Germans were expelled from the eastern parts of the German Reich and some eastern European states. These refugees arrived in a defeated, occupied, destroyed, and divided country. Initially, the percentage of expelled persons in the Soviet Occupation Zone was much higher than in the western zones. With almost 4.5 million individuals, the expellees made up twenty-four percent of the total population in the Soviet Occupation Zone in 1949. By contrast, western Germany had eight million expellees, who comprised roughly sixteen percent of the total population.

It was no easy matter to address the consequences of such a large influx of expellees. At first, the expellee policy in eastern and western Germany, which was mainly determined by the occupying powers, showed clear (assimilatory) parallels. But with the onset of the Cold War and the division of Germany, expellee policy in the two German states headed in opposing directions. This can be seen in the terminology used to describe these refugees. In the Soviet Occupation Zone, the term “resettler” (Umsiedler) was stipulated by Soviet authorities and then it was prohibited after the founding of the GDR. In the FRG, terms like “expellee” and “refugee” (Vertriebener, Heimatvertriebener, Flüchtling) were fixed by law. This terminology reflected policy differences. From 1952/53 onwards, there was still a resettlement problem in the GDR, but no special “resettlement policy.” By contrast, the basis for West German expellee policy that still remains in effect was laid out in the “Sharing of Burdens Act” (Lastenausgleichsgesetz) and the “Expellee Act” (Bundesvertriebenengesetz).

East and West Germany also saw very different research agendas as concerned the expellees. In contrast to the FRG’s flourishing “refugee research,” research on expellees was forbidden in the GDR. With German reunification, however, this has completely changed. Research on expellee integration in the Soviet Occupation Zone and in the GDR has flourished since 1990. It even appears that research on the GDR has progressed beyond that of the relevant research on West Germany. Michael Schwartz’s volume is a good example of this phenomenon.

This voluminous political and social history of expellee policy pursues two aims. Schwartz investigates the resettler problem in the Soviet Occupation
Zone/GDR by focusing on the consequences that this forcible population movement had on East German society. In addition, the study goes beyond the empirical story suggested by the title. Schwartz pursues an “intranational German-German line of comparison” rather than an explicit German-German comparison. Usually, historians have focused on the West German story and then looked east. Here, however, the starting point for an all-German perspective is the east. The study thus not only contributes to the history of the expellee problem in the GDR and the FRG, but also relates the fragmentation of German contemporary histories after 1945.

The book’s two main parts convincingly depict the “resettler policy” and its consequences for the Soviet Occupation Zone/GDR. Using a wide array of sources, Schwartz details the institutional structures and personal networks that shaped “resettler policy” in the Soviet zone. The SED could only gradually make good its claim to control resettlement policy. German and Soviet decision-makers often differed on policy. Expellee organizations attempted to thwart SED aims. Well after 1950, there was still a resettlement policy, but it was not emphasized since government authorities wished to pursue an assimilation policy. In this regard, Schwartz is able to correct previous assumptions. In the second part, for example, he explores what social consequences agrarian reform and the supply of household equipment had on resettler integration. It turns out that both were less significant than was once thought. They did not bring on more social equality, but rather accentuated the far-reaching social differentiation (not least between old inhabitants and new refugees) already prevalent in the Soviet Occupation Zone/GDR.

While Schwartz expertly analyzes the expellee problem in the Soviet Occupation Zone, his attempt at an all-German perspective is restricted to a “line of comparison.” Given the conceptualization of his book, Schwartz is not able to explore the comparison more fully. Some of his insights, however, are pioneering for future research on the expellee issue. Schwartz, for example, points to the asymmetrical contradictoriness of expellee policy in the two German states. With its resettlers, the GDR strove for an assimilation policy, but consistently pursued this only in foreign policy. In the domestic arena, its resettlement policy was repressive; the GDR remained socio-politically ambivalent and stopped specific policies for resettlers altogether in the mid-1950s. West Germany chose a very different strategy, pursuing a well-calculated social policy that was directed specifically at expellees; in turn, this policy actually had an assimilatory effect. In the arena of foreign policy, however, the FRG left open the issue until German unification.

This study stands out with its extravagant wealth of detail. The central theme is never completely lost, but some passages lose sight of the forest for the trees. Unfortunately, there is no place or subject index. Given the handbook character of the volume, this is a shortcoming. The book is also no “easy” read. But the
Since the mid-1990s, a number of books have appeared that examine the tumultuous early years of the Federal Republic of Germany through the lens of the former Wehrmacht officer corps. How this elite group, so closely tied to the aims and institutions of the National Socialist regime, managed the transition to democracy is critical to understanding the ultimate success of the Federal Republic in establishing legitimacy and avoiding the fate of its Weimar ancestor.

Bert-Oliver Manig claims that earlier work on the subject, my own included, took for granted that the process of integrating and rehabilitating this potentially radical group would succeed. As a result, prior work has ignored the limits and the significant costs, political, financial, and even ethical, of the Federal Republic’s campaign to embrace and de-radicalize the officer corps of “Hitler’s Army.” Manig promises to focus the reader’s attention on the indispensable political process through which respectable citizens of the Federal Republic were made out of an admired National Socialist elite. While other historians have treated the political system as a mere given, an immovable frame in which integration takes place, Manig claims that he makes the system itself the object of complex negotiations that resulted in the officers’ integration into respectable society.

Though Manig’s charges against the existing historiography miss the mark in some respects, his work delivers on that promise. Using a variety of sources, Manig has done an excellent job of illuminating the often cryptic process of backroom negotiation, public posturing, and personal connections. Manig mines the usual federal archives for the papers of the major actors and agencies and also exploits the archives of both the Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Social Democrats (SPD). Because of the concentration and strength of former officers in certain regions, Manig found it useful to tap the city archives of both Düsseldorf and Hannover as well as certain records of the British occupation centered on Schleswig-Holstein.

Though it is difficult to charge a book this long (an immodest 603 pages) with being “narrow,” Manig’s focus is very strictly political. The reader is intimately acquainted with the strategies of the various political parties (especially the CDU
and to a lesser extent the SPD) as they courted former officers and other nationalists. Veterans’ organizations, government agencies, parties and their affiliates, and even churches are all depicted as purely political machines: tallying support, raising funds, lobbying for policies. Manig’s efforts to broaden his scope beyond the narrowly political are commendable but ultimately less satisfying. His attempt to provide a social history of the former officer corps, to discuss their social standing, employment, and educational possibilities is very thin on evidence. Despite the potentially rich cultural material surrounding the concept of “honor” that was so central to former officers, Manig’s attention remains fixed on politics. Curiously, given the title of the work, Manig never clearly defines “honor” or does so second-hand. Only in a footnote does Manig offer a kind of definition, seemingly seconding a British officer’s impression that Germans “identify [honor] with the prestige and power associated with the officer caste. Any word or act by anyone outside the caste, which reflects upon or tends to damage [sic!] or reduce this prestige and power, is an attack upon the ‘honour’ of the caste . . . .” (note 2, p. 46). Manig similarly diminishes honor to little more than a political tool, useful for bludgeoning one’s opponents and unifying one’s constituents.

For all of Manig’s excellent research and attention to detail, much of the story he tells is familiar. The early efforts of officers, in particular Gottfried Hansen, to organize former officers in “mutual aid societies,” the struggles to regain their pensions, the creation of the Verband Deutscher Soldaten (VDS), and the travails of its first president, Johannes Frießner—these are stories that have been told elsewhere, though rarely in such detail.

But Manig does keep the reader’s attention on the political process, and the results are illuminating. For example, he makes a truly original contribution by drawing attention to the activities of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Demokratischer Kreise (ADK). This section is crucial to Manig’s argument because it is the ADK, he argues, that finally “sucks the air” out of the radical right and consummates the marriage of many potential radicals (former officers, party members, and others) to the mainstream democratic parties, particularly the CDU. Though he uses the unfortunate metaphor of a “black box” inside which radicals are transformed into democrats to describe the activities of the ADK, he really goes much further than that. It was the personal contacts, the symposia, and most significantly, the financial resources of the ADK that did the transformative work. I wish Manig had done more to emphasize the work of the ADK, if not by providing more detail, then by shortening the rest of the work for balance, because he has clearly identified one of the crucial motors of the transition from dictatorship to democracy.

Manig correctly describes the process of rehabilitation and integration of former officers as one of learning, mishaps, and a certain measure of good fortune. He is concerned to highlight the limits and the costs of restoring
former officers to “respectability.” While the rehabilitation of former Wehrmacht officers was virtually complete, certain clear limits were established in the process. Officers were forced to keep their overwhelmingly negative opinions on the July 20 attempt to assassinate Hitler strictly to themselves. Soldiers of the Waffen-SS, though quietly integrated into pension systems and only in rare cases prosecuted for crimes, never achieved the measure of respectability accorded members of the Wehrmacht. In exchange for respectability, officers had to abandon hopes of returning to the generous provisions of pre-war pension arrangements. Though he unjustifiably claims to be unique in his focus on the costs of the rehabilitation process, Manig does make clear the price the young democracy paid to absorb these potentially militant radicals. The Federal Republic saw a significant revival in nationalism and a virtual collapse of Allied efforts to “demilitarize” Germany during the late 1940s and early 1950s. More obviously, the rehabilitation of Wehrmacht officers contributed powerfully to the myth of the “clean” Wehrmacht that fought only in defense of the Fatherland and never on behalf of genocidal National Socialist war aims.

With a 600-page book on my lap, I could only chuckle when I read in the introduction that Manig was forced by space considerations to remove two large sections of the work on the admission of former officers to universities and on the Manstein trial and its resonance. I look forward to those shorter works appearing in print on the assumption that we can expect the same lucid analysis that characterizes this one.

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In this useful and informative study, Matthew Hockenos examines German Protestants’ confrontations with the Nazi past in the early postwar period. Following an entire series of recent studies on postwar memory, Hockenos, too, disproves the long-held assumption that postwar Germans simply repressed the past. Instead, Hockenos unearths a comprehensive and often controversial Protestant discourse about the Nazi past. To be sure, Protestant memory, as this study makes clear, did not entail an “honest, open postwar discussion of the church’s complacency and complicity in the face of Nazis’ illegal, inhumane, and unchristian policies” (p. 10). Yet the significance of this book does not primarily consist of exposing rather unsurprising deficiencies of Protestant memories. More importantly, it reveals the considerable internal disagreements
of a “divided Church” about the Nazi past, and it demonstrates the crucial significance of long-standing theological and doctrinal differences for shaping Protestant responses to the Nazi past.

Protestant confrontations with the Nazi past were rooted in divergent interpretations of the 1934 Barmen declaration—the key document with which the anti-Nazi confessing church sought to preserve its autonomy against the pro-Nazi “German Christians.” A more radical wing under the influence of the Swiss theologian Karl Barth and the Berlin pastor Martin Niemöller advocated a more comprehensive confrontation with the Nazi past that was to be grounded in a reform of central tenets of Lutheran orthodoxy. By contrast, conservative church officials, such as the Bishops Meiser and Wurm, embraced a highly abstract, religious conception of guilt that was ultimately rooted in man’s sinful nature, not in specific historical actions. They also propagated the myth of church resistance to Nazism and hence saw little need for organizational or doctrinal reforms in the postwar period.

The formation of the Council of the Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD) at the first postwar conference of the Protestant church at Treysa in 1945 and the EKD’s Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt a few months later could not completely conceal these internal rifts. Despite its highly abstract nature and the complete omission of the persecution of the Jews, the Stuttgart declaration also provoked vehement protests from Protestant laypersons who resented any confession of German guilt. By contrast, church officials’ vehement denunciations of “the guilt of others,” especially of Allied occupation authorities, gained considerable popular approval. By contrasting diverging popular responses to official statements, the author demonstrates effectively that the limitations of Protestant memory not only derived from theological conservatism but also from popular pressure “from below.” Consequently, the Darmstadt declaration of August 1947 by the Dahlem-wing of the Confessing church represented the outer limits of Protestant confrontations with the Nazi past. Based on the strong influence of Karl Barth, the Darmstadt declaration castigated the traditional Lutheran doctrine of the “two kingdoms” as responsible for the church’s failed resistance to Nazism. It denounced all forms of nationalism and advocated a stronger concern with social and economic issues, including Marxist-inspired ideas. In the context of the emerging Cold War, these statements represented a distinct minority position, yet nevertheless inspired the oppositional activities by Niemöller and others to the policies of the Adenauer government.

The two last chapters on Protestant-Jewish relations in the immediate postwar period constitute perhaps the most interesting part of this study. The author reveals stunning evidence for the continuation of traditional Protestant anti-Judaism in the wake of the Holocaust. These attitudes manifested themselves in both a neglect of the special needs of Jewish victims of Nazism as well as in
a continuation of Jewish missions, which drew on the traditional doctrine of supersessionism according to which the Christian church had replaced the Jews as God’s chosen people. Even the reform-oriented brethren council of the Confessing Church defended traditional Christian anti-Judaism while simultaneously denouncing racial anti-Semitism in its 1948 “Message Concerning the Jewish Question.” Protestant anti-Judaism declined only gradually as the result of the initiatives of a few individual church officials, who sponsored a series of Jewish-Protestant conversations. Shocked by a series of desecrations of Jewish cemeteries, the Berlin Weissensee synod in April 1950 not only issued Protestant confession of guilt for Nazi anti-Semitism but also rejected the theory of supersessionism as the central tenet of Christian anti-Judaism.

This is a coherent, straightforward, and well-written study that will allow readers to orient themselves in the complex and often confusing strands of Protestant thinking about the Nazi past after 1945. An appendix with English translations of the most important documents will prove especially useful for teaching purposes. Most importantly, the author demonstrates convincingly that the recent interest in religion as a category of historical analysis also necessitates a basic familiarity with important theological and doctrinal traditions. Some smaller errors and omissions should be noted as well: At times, the author succumbs to his protagonists’ assertion of an Allied collective guilt thesis, which, in fact, never existed. And even though the author explicitly excludes a discussion of Catholic confrontations with the Nazi past, a comparative reference to Catholic conceptions of guilt might have sharpened his analysis of specifically Protestant memories. Finally, the analytic focus of this study on the origins, content, and (to a somewhat lesser extent) reception of official Protestant statements about the German past accounts for its coherence and readability. At the same time, this approach also prevents the author from linking his many important insights to the larger historiography on postwar reconstruction and to the role of the Protestant church within it. While this book cannot offer a complete history of the Protestant Church in the postwar period, it would have been interesting to know how interpretations of the Nazi past shaped Protestant responses to some of the big questions of postwar reconstruction (the Cold War, the economic miracle, gender relations, youth cultures) as they have been extensively analyzed in the recent historiography. Still, this study should be valued for what it achieves, not criticized for what it leaves out. It offers the most concise and readable synthesis on Protestant memories of the Nazi past in the English language. As such, it will be an indispensable starting point for the larger task of integrating institutionalized religion into our narrative of postwar Germany.

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The Wayward Flock: Catholic Youth in Postwar West Germany offers readers an elegantly written analysis of German Catholic subculture, or “milieu.” Ruff examines how it once successfully operated in the mid-nineteenth century and then explores why the same strategies failed to win the continued support of young Catholics in the postwar era of the Federal Republic. Ruff modifies the standard interpretation of the 1950s as a static time in German history, examines the impact of consumer culture on the Catholic subculture, and offers his own contribution to the theories of secularization.

Chapter one, beginning with the end of World War II, shows the Catholic community of West Germany attempting to draw itself back into its own tattered milieu. While some Catholic leaders believed in resurrecting pre-existing clubs and organizations that had disappeared in the Hitlerzeit, still others wished to begin anew. Ruff emphasizes how this was a typical, long-standing debate within German Catholic circles since the nineteenth century: Should the Church and its organizations remain insulated, in a self-imposed “ghetto,” or should it embrace modern society and work within it? With regard to youth organizations, the leading figure who sought to answer such a question was Ludwig Wolker. Wolker, a charismatic priest from a middle-class Bavarian family, dedicated his life to organizing Catholic youth into a coherent, unified movement. Not only did Wolker struggle to unify the countless Catholic Vereine and Bünde, he sought to give the youth movement a unifying purpose: “The kingdom of God, the kingdom of youth, and the German kingdom” (p. 22). In the immediate postwar world, Wolker believed that it was an absolute necessity to rebuild German society along Christian beliefs, traditions, and values. Rebuilding the Catholic youth organization, in Wolker’s opinion, would transmit Catholic values to the hearts and minds of all Germans, thus restoring Christian values to postwar society.

Chapters two and three address the problem of gender in Catholic youth circles. Chapter two addresses the overwhelmingly male tradition of the Catholic youth organizations. Ruff contrasts the appeal of the old style of the youth movement with its banners, medals, prayers, summer camping trips, and hikes through the woods, to the modern allure of dance halls, movie theaters, sporting events, and vacations abroad of the postwar era. There emerged a struggle to adopt some of the outward trappings of modernity, yet these efforts often fell short in attracting large numbers of young men. Ruff traces the internal debates on film, music, and dance. What emerges is a picture of Catholic youth leaders realizing that they must end their traditional hostility to mass culture or
else they risked losing their young men to the temptations of the “outside world.” Despite the youth leaders’ best intentions, Ruff documents the inability of the Church to compete effectively with the seemingly unlimited resources and glamour of mass culture. In addition, Ruff argues that by encouraging young men to think critically about the modern world and its trappings, the lid to Pandora’s box was opened and could not be shut again. This picture re-emerges in chapter three where Ruff examines the role of church organizations for young females. By revealing a series of conflicts in the 1950s between church leaders and young women, Ruff shows the changing nature of discussions of gender, morality, and behavior. Male church leaders were at a loss to define the “modern” woman—was she the age-old Eve, tempting and sinful, or could she be like Mary, pure and redeeming? Not truly able to resolve this dilemma, the male leadership vacillated on what to do with the female organizations, worrying constantly that the separate spheres of the male and female worlds should not collide. Debates over the issues of women and makeup, the length and style of dresses, women in the workforce, and flight from rural areas to urban environments tended to drive many young women away from church youth groups as the Church moved too slowly to embrace modern ways.

Chapter four deals with the decline of Catholic subculture in urban environments, specifically in the Archdiocese of Cologne. Here, Ruff analyzes the youth leaders’ inability to emulate the success of the nineteenth century, where city parishes served as the center of Catholic neighborhood life. What he shows us instead is a crumbling Catholic environment in twentieth-century urban Cologne, arguing that since the Catholic milieu had already dis-integrated, it was virtually impossible to attract Catholic youths back to their organizations. Chapter five leaves the city to examine the success story of religious revival (at least in the 1950s and early 1960s) in the soil of Lower Franconia. Ruff argues that in cases where daily life patterns continued as before, among artisans and farmers, the Church had a better chance of successfully keeping young men and young women loyal to religious institutions.

Chapter six explores a fifteen-year-long battle within Church circles over the issue of sports clubs. While at first this might sound ridiculous, Ruff admirably points out that at the heart of this terribly acrimonious argument were critical issues such as the theology of the human body, the extent to which women could participate in public sporting events, and interaction between Catholics and other members of society (p. 168). In the end, attempts to keep Catholic young men and young women away from nondenominational sports clubs failed mainly due to the fact that young people craved high-quality sporting equipment and facilities, short commutes to games and facilities, and plain fun. Those Catholic youth groups that sought to instill traditional Catholic values found that they lost members while the groups that offered a
watered-down version of Catholicism found they were “forced to dilute their own core of beliefs or risk losing their influence and credibility altogether” (p. 186).

Ruff’s work continually asks: Why did the long-standing institutions of the Catholic Church lose the support of a fair portion of young Catholic men and women? His answers shed light on a much overlooked area of historical research, that of the postwar German Catholic community. Ruff, amassing enormous amounts of primary source material, concludes, “Church leaders found themselves in a catch-22: They could remain true to their religious heritage and lose members, or they could adapt to the modern world and find their own identity diluted in the process” (p. 194). As Ruff’s beautifully written and compellingly argued work shows, Catholic subculture in Germany eroded as traditional moral teachings were made indistinguishable from surrounding postwar society. As a result, many young people sought out new communities and identities.

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“We have all suffered,” remarked the Austrian chancellor Leopold Figl in 1946, looking back at Austria during the Nazi period (p. 34). This blanket affirmation of Austrian victimhood became the ideological basis of the postwar Austrian state and mandated an inability or refusal to recognize that some Austrians had suffered rather more than others, while some Austrians had actively contributed to the suffering of others by their participation in the Nazi regime. This Austrian victim myth was left largely intact for forty years until the controversy that erupted around the election to the presidency in 1986 of Kurt Waldheim, whose convenient suppression of his own Nazi past was emblematic of Austria’s more general national amnesia.

Matti Bunzl, in his book Jews and Queers: Symptoms of Modernity in Late-Twentieth-Century Vienna, analyzes the centrality of the victim myth for permitting, and even encouraging, the postwar prevalence of the “twin discourses of anti-Semitism and homophobia,” as fundamental to Austria’s national identity (p. 216). Far from recognizing the particular suffering of Jews and homosexuals during the Nazi period, postwar Austria, in law, politics, and culture, perpetuated oppression by other means, particularly by purposeful exclusion from the
national community and the public sphere. “Austria’s Jews faced a state apparatus that systematically excluded them from the national imaginary,” argues Bunzl. “That imaginary was no longer predicated on the Jews’ genocidal removal, but it still presupposed their foundational absence from the public sphere” (p. 30). Likewise, Bunzl observes, “postwar Austria was characterized by the virulent exclusion of homosexuals from the nation’s imagined community” (p. 61).

*Jews and Queers* brings together the disciplines of anthropology, cultural criticism, and contemporary history, and the book constitutes a fascinating and important comparative contribution to the interdisciplinary analysis of Austria during the half century since the end of World War II. Bunzl considers such issues as postwar compensation based on the *Opferfursorgegesetz* in Austria, where the principle of universal suffering made it problematic for both Jews and homosexuals to bring claims based on their particular suffering during the Nazi period. Gay sex was still illegal in Austria after the war, according to the *Totalverbot*, and, even after that ban was repealed in 1971—Bunzl notes—other legal inequities remained, such as different ages of consent for gay and straight sex, and a legal ban against “propaganda” encouraging homosexuality. Bunzl offers careful analyses of negative representations of Jews and homosexuals in the Austrian media, such as the series on “The Jews in Austria” in the *Neue Kronen Zeitung* in 1974—“Jewish reports of over six million dead were clearly exaggerated”—and “The Homosexuals in Austria” in *Profil* in 1976, with sensational attention to fistfucking (pp. 42–43, 72–73). Bunzl also conducted anthropological fieldwork in which he interviewed members of the Austrian Jewish and gay communities, and he quotes individuals who indicate they did not feel comfortable being public about their identities.

The case of Bruno Kreisky, the Austrian chancellor of Jewish origin, is analyzed by Bunzl in relation to general Jewish “subordination,” since Kreisky considered himself an assimilated Austrian, discounted his own Jewishness, and denounced Nazi-hunter Simon Wiesenthal as an enemy of Austria. Bunzl concludes that “the constitutive exclusion of Jewish experience from the symbolic economy of postwar Austrian nationness was embodied in paradigmatic fashion by Bruno Kreisky” (pp. 39–40).

Bunzl suggests that postwar “subordination” and “exclusion” were followed by a transitional period of Jewish and gay resistance that led in the 1990s to a remarkable sort of emancipation in which the Jewish and gay communities were actually welcomed into Austrian public life in the spirit of “Europe’s post-national pluralism” (p. 215). He persuasively argues that this outcome was related to both national and international developments, citing in particular the election of Waldheim in 1986, which focused critical attention on Austria’s victim myth, and the end of the Cold War in 1989, which rendered the myth irrelevant along with Austria’s Cold War neutrality. In the 1990s, Austria’s
identification with Europe and entrance into the European Union in 1995 meant that Austria faced some European pressure to transform its cultural politics, while a new generation of Austrians reimagined the public sphere. In the *Regenbogen* Parade, gay Austrians not only paraded publicly, but took over the Ringstrasse with all its public monuments, and then appropriated Johann Strauss’s Blue Danube Waltz, dancing publicly in same-sex couples. Also in the 1990s, Vienna’s Jewish Museum became an important part of the city’s cultural life, and a National Fund for the Victims of National Socialism was established. The chancellor Franz Vranitzky acknowledged that “many Austrians welcomed the *Anschluss*” and “backed the National Socialist regime”; the president Thomas Klestil encouraged Austrians to confront the past as “collective therapy” (p. 177). Bunzl sees this Austrian transformation as part of a broader historical transition from modernity to postmodernity: “This postmodernity was characterized by a constitutive pluralism. As symptoms of modernity, Jews and homosexuals had been subordinated in the interests of national homogenization. By the late twentieth century, however, this exclusionary project had outlived its usefulness. On the contrary, Jews and queers were now celebrated as markers of an affirmatively diversified polity” (p. 216).

This is a theoretically and analytically challenging book that will certainly provoke discussion and perhaps controversy in several scholarly fields and probably among Austrians. Some readers may hesitate over the strong continuities that Bunzl posits between the Nazi and the postwar periods in Austrian history. “Jews were no longer murdered, of course,” writes Bunzl of postwar Austria, “but since the public sphere was still policed in the interest of national purification, they were forced into a diffident posture” (p. 47). Some may feel that there was rather less, than more, continuity in the transition from genocide to diffidence. “Much like the Nazi state, postwar Austria persecuted lesbians and gay men,” writes Bunzl. “Much like the Third Reich, its population responded by adopting, transporting, and enforcing the dominant ideology.” But how much like?

Some scholars may be interested in posing the comparative question of how special the case of Austria actually was with regard to Jews, homosexuals, and the Nazi past. While Austria’s victim myth certainly contributed to a postwar Austrian climate that was particularly uncomfortable for Austrian Jews, Austria was by no means the only country in Europe that failed to come to terms with its wartime complicity: how about France? It is also true that Jews found it difficult to assume a public identity as Jews in such postwar communist states as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, let alone the Soviet Union. Does the special case of Austria call for broader comparative analysis? Bunzl notes that the gay baths in postwar Vienna were “spaces where same-sex sexuality could be localized in seclusion from the public sphere” (p. 75). But where else in the world, even in Habermas’s most abstruse theoretical reflections, did gay baths form part of
the public sphere? Concerning the Viennese gay bar, the Alte Lampe, Bunzl notes that “the darkened windows obscured the goings-on inside,” and he concludes that such bars “reproduced the hegemonic logic of homosexual exclusion” (p. 76). Castro Street was different, of course—but darkened windows were not a uniquely Austrian feature of gay bars. Some readers who remember Vienna a few decades back may also wonder whether exclusions from the public sphere were conditioned by a climate of more general stuffiness. In an urban scene that sometimes seemed to be “hegemonically” dominated by elderly ladies walking fastidiously groomed little dogs, it was possible to feel awkwardly out of place in public merely by virtue of being young.

Inevitably, readers will reflect upon Bunzl’s dual subject in Jews and Queers, and may question whether anti-Semitism and homophobia did in fact constitute “twin discourses” in close and essential relation to one another. Bunzl argues that “[Jews and homosexuals functioned as the constitutive Others of a nationalist imaginary that sought to fix its subject through coarticulated fictions of ethnic and sexual purity]” (p. 214), and therefore they “share a common genealogy of cultural abjection, anchored in late-nineteenth-century Central European modernity” (p. 12). Yet, this thesis, theoretically articulated in the introduction and conclusion, receives more modest support from the intervening body of the book, which tends to segregate Jews and homosexuals strictly in alternating chapters with a minimum of comparative analysis.

In the conclusion, Bunzl notes that the xenophobia of Jörg Haider and the Freedom Party has tended, in recent years, to overlook Jews and homosexuals in order to focus resentment on “a new set of Others,” immigrants from Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, and notably Slavs and Turks (p. 221). This, Bunzl suggests, is the “postmodern” xenophobia of postnational Europe. Yet, Slavs and Turks are not postmodern newcomers to the Austrian consciousness. The Ottoman Turks, who besieged Vienna in 1683, still shared a difficult frontier with Habsburg Austria in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the Slavs, an enormous presence within the Habsburg monarchy, were historically crucial to the development of German nationalism in nineteenth-century Austria—as “constitutive Others,” like Jews and homosexuals. The representation of Slavs and Turks in the conclusion as simply “postmodern” Austrian preoccupations suggests that a certain amount of historical streamlining was involved in focusing Jews and Queers on its dual subject, to the exclusion of other Others. All of these questions will surely lead to further academic discussion and research. Raising such issues in such a stimulating, provocative, and interdisciplinary fashion, Bunzl’s book makes an important contribution to Austrian and European studies.

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