BOOK REVIEWS


One of Rosamond McKitterick’s laudable contributions to medieval studies has been the attention she has focused on the importance of manuscript evidence as a fundamental and fruitful source for doing history. Another has been the imagination, creativity, and enthusiasm she has brought to that evidence, most famously in her provocative work on literacy. In this manifesto, McKitterick turns her interest to another topic that has received much attention in the last decade and a half, memory, and joined it to the larger issue of the writing and reading of history in Carolingian times. Here again we see McKitterick daring to get behind the critical editions by going to the manuscripts themselves and thus introducing us to the vibrancy of Carolingian historical culture too often cloaked by the published sources. It is her underlying contention that the particular Carolingian emphasis on chronology, as the means by which Christian, Frankish, Roman, and local histories were united and brought into a synthesis, contributed fundamentally to the development of a European identity.

The twelve chapters of this book fall into four broad clusters: Chapters one through three deal with Carolingian historical texts, chapters four through six examine the (royal) politics of Carolingian histories, chapters seven and eight investigate the “social memories” manifest in cartularies and the libri vitae, and chapters nine through twelve explore the Frankish conception of a deeper past linked to the history of the church. The approach throughout is to raise an historiographical problem or cluster of related issues, and then to draw illuminating, sometimes revisionary, conclusions about the meaning and


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purpose of particular works by combining an examination of internal content with a stimulating analysis of the codicology, provenance, and dissemination of the extant manuscripts.

The first chapter introduces, with an examination of the *Liber historiae franconum* (*LHF*), many of the themes and approaches of the book: the particular emphasis on group identities embedded in historical texts, and then the scrutiny of the manuscript evidence to demonstrate the variety, reach, and altered meanings of particular works to elucidate readership, audience, and purpose. The *LHF*, she argues, attempted both to integrate the “Judeo-Greco-Roman past” and to define within that tradition a coherent Frankish identity. While that conclusion might not be unforeseen, the manuscript tradition reveals that the *LHF* and compressed portions of the *Continuations of Fredegar*, were used in one version (ca. 830) to introduce the *Annales regni francorum* and thus testify to the unfolding of Frankish identity, give off the impression of royal continuity, and, naturally, offer a prelude to Carolingian triumphs. McKitterick’s analysis offers a welcome antidote to those who have wanted to see the *LHF* as sentimentally Merovingian. If it was, that didn’t prevent the Carolingian court, which may have been responsible for some of the manuscripts and the dissemination of others, from co-opting it.

Chapter two surveys the wide distribution of Roman, Biblical, Jewish, Christian, and “barbarian” histories, and then shows how combinations of these texts were copied into historical miscellanies that attempted to establish a chronological and legitimate succession of ruling peoples, or to elaborate on conceptions of empire and rulership. Chapter three brings the focus to Paul the Deacon’s *Historia langobardorum*. Essentially, McKitterick argues that Paul wrote his history after Charlemagne’s conquest of the Lombards in 774 to reconcile Lombardic to Frankish history and to promote Carolingian rule. To buttress the argument, McKitterick points to the manuscript evidence, which was distributed first in northern Italy and then widely north of the Alps, and surmises that the work probably was connected to the court of Charlemagne’s son, Pippin of Italy.

These early chapters do introduce some persistent conceptual tensions and reveal lingering lacunae in the extant manuscript evidence. The study does not always make clear whose group identity was being expressed. Doubtless the *LHF* “constructs a specific past for a particular group of people” (p. 9); however, the next two sentences vaguely refer to this group as “them,” and the ensuing discussion offers little clarification. McKitterick is aware of the problem, asking “who might have read” the manuscripts, “who was responsible” for them, and “how effective was the dissemination of the texts” (p. 19), but then concedes that problems in the manuscript evidence preclude any obvious answers. The issue recurs in chapter two (p. 50), and notably in the discussion of Paul’s *Historia*, whose vexed manuscript tradition
McKitterick admits only “uncovers the possibility that it was originally produced in northern Italy, possibly in association with the court of Pippin of Italy.”

The next three chapters offer an exhilarating analysis of the manuscript tradition of the *Annales regni francorum* (*ARF*) and associated texts. Chapter four outlines the chronological conception, composition, dissemination, and message of the *ARF*: The pulsating chronological precision of Carolingian annals, which McKitterick asserts represent a distinctive innovation in historical record keeping, reinforces the general thrust of the *ARF*, which reiterates the common identity of the *gens francorum* and affiliated conquered peoples. The codicology of particular manuscripts, which points to the *ARF* as a base narrative for various collections of historical works, and the wide distribution and use of these texts reveal that this consensus version of Frankish history was so successfully disseminated that it has shaped subsequent views of Carolingian history ever since. Chapter five turns to the more explicit political dimensions and examines the deployment of texts in particular codices. The St. Amand codex, for example, which was produced under Charles the Bald, foregrounds the *ARF* with an assortment of eighth-century historical texts that attest to the legitimacy of the Carolingian accession. Chapter six pursues the issue of legitimacy with respect to the succession of 751. After a discussion of the principle narratives of the events of that year, and an examination of the manuscripts of the *Liber pontificalis* and the *ARF*, McKitterick concludes that the alleged anointment of Pippin in 751 and the asserted cooperation of Pope Zacharias were inferred by the annalist of the *ARF* in the late eighth century and disseminated as collective memory about the origins of Carolingian kingship in the next century. This discussion is a tad unnerving, since it throws into relief the instability of a source that otherwise would be considered, by virtue of its relative nearness to events, reliable. On the other hand, McKitterick demonstrates that careful analysis of the manuscript evidence can be an innovative and precise tool for working out solutions.

Chapter seven turns to the social memories embedded in cartularies and the *libri vitae*, and situates both within the larger Carolingian “perceptions of time and history”; while chapter eight focuses the discussion on Bavaria and the *Liber vitae* of Salzburg and uncovers a tapestry of local, regional, and Frankish memories. These kinds of sources stand at the intersection of literacy, collective memory, sense of place, and shared history, and thus provide a context for Carolingian-era efforts—to fold local and Frankish history into the sweeping history of Christianity. The ramifications of the material in these two chapters could have been digested more thoroughly into a study that runs more easily from chapter six to nine. The problem may be the nature of memorial sources
that seem to be ad hoc expressions of community (which admittedly implicate memory and the past) rather than history. The sudden declaration that the *Liber memorialis* of Remiremont is “a history book” (p. 171) needed more exegesis in a book that otherwise wants to emphasize a Frankish preoccupation with historical texts in the more conventional sense.

Chapter nine surveys the range of history books in monastic inventories, which accumulated ecclesiastical, biblical, and relevant pagan histories. Chapter ten examines how late-antique ecclesiastical histories “constructed the Christian past in terms of books and authors” (p. 226). Chapter eleven explores the codicology of canon law and ecclesiastical histories to demonstrate how this sensibility about texts was taken up and elaborated during the Carolingian period. In chapter twelve, McKitterick ponders the historical mindedness, the range of historical sources, and devotion to chronology that set the Franks off from Byzantium, Anglo-Saxon England, and the Islamic world; and reflects on the Carolingian enterprise to unite Frankish history with the Roman, Jewish, barbarian, and Christian past and to reconcile community identities to salvific history.

Martin Claussen’s study, which appears in the Cambridge medieval series edited by McKitterick, applies many of these themes—the possibilities in manuscript evidence, and the reconciliation of local tradition to a wider Romano-Frankish Christian consciousness—to a particular work and area, Chrodegang’s eighth-century *Regula canonicorum* for the diocese of Metz. Claussen essentially argues that Chrodegang reformed his diocese by adopting patristic, late-antique, and Roman ideals of ecclesiastical order and community, and modifying them to fit the local situation at Metz. In this way, Chrodegang hoped “to create . . . a new community, one based on ideas of hierarchy and equality, love, and unanimity” (p. 5).

After a brisk introduction, Claussen surveys the life and career of Chrodegang, a pivotal figure in the burst of reform activities during the second third of the eighth century and harbinger of subsequent Carolingian renewal. As a bishop close to the Carolingians, Chrodegang participated in a series of councils that attempted to impose late-antique norms of discipline on the episcopate and the laity, and thus fashion a unified *gens christiana* out of the hitherto atomized and putatively disorganized Frankish churches.

The themes of antique tradition and concern for the laity expressed in these councils set the table for the next three chapters, which plunge the reader into an exhaustive and learned analysis of Chrodegang’s *Regula canonicorum*. Chapter two examines the *Rule* itself, which lays out an expansive vision of community that incorporated the wider world of Metz. The effort to organize the laity and religious into a godly community distinguishes Chrodegang’s efforts from the imperatives of monastic rules. The next chapter takes up Chrodegang’s debts to Benedict’s *Rule* and demonstrates, by careful line-by-line comparison, that
Chrodegang’s was not as thoughtlessly dependent upon Benedict as commonly believed. Here Claussen pitches Chrodegang’s originality in stark relief, although he does this at times by stereotyping Carolingian monasticism as more closed than it actually was. This is most evident in Claussen’s illuminating discussion of usufructuary property, for which Chrodegang made explicit provisions. Benedict might not have spoken to the issue, but monasteries were granting out precarial property to lay and religious alike before and after Chrodegang. One may wonder whether Chrodegang “offers a new attitude toward property for the religious” (p. 96) or whether he simply wanted to regulate a practice that had become common. The latter would fit with Claussen’s overall view of Chrodegang as a reconciler of Frankish traditions to antique principles.

In addition to Benedict, Chrodegang adapted other late-antique authorities to his own purposes and tailored them to eighth-century Metz. These other sources, and their deployment by means of what Claussen calls “intertextuality,” form the subject of chapter four. Essentially, Claussen argues that Chrodegang assumed his audience’s familiarity with textual authorities whose more discursive treatments of particular issues readers would reflexively recall and use to gloss Chrodegang’s terser directives. While provocative, this foray into intertextuality sometimes strains credulity when the intertext contradicts Chrodegang. Claussen asserts that Chrodegang inserted “limiting clauses” that restrict what the reader was supposed to take from the intertext, but the argument begins to feel forced. We also discover that Chrodegang himself wrongly identifies one of his sources, leaving one to wonder at the precision of the method. The author might have distinguished more clearly here the task of identifying Chrodegang’s sources from the meanings that any reader might have imputed to the Rule.

The final two chapters examine topics raised in the second chapter, namely the mechanics of community, both its hierarchical and horizontal aspects, and the effort to transform the wider world of Metz into a “hagiopolis,” a topographical manifestation of Chrodegang’s outward-looking vision of community. Overall, these chapters offer an admirable evocation of Chrodegang’s practical aims and the attempt to translate them into reality.

These two superb studies demonstrate the exciting work that can be and has yet to be done in early medieval studies. Although a close study of manuscripts evidence will never resolve some problems, and will likely raise a host of new ones, a return to the manuscripts should—as McKitterick’s scintillating florilegium of insights makes clear—open up new vistas of research and keep early medievalists busy for a long time to come.

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Bruce Moran's new book forms part of Harvard University Press's series “New Histories of Science, Technology, and Medicine.” The series is aimed at a general readership rather than a specialized academic market, although its volumes can also serve as basic introductions to scholars in other specialties who need a quick entrée into their fields. In the present instance, however, the location of the precise problematic that the book addresses is historiographically rather complex for such a task.

Moran’s subject is alchemy/chemistry in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; he focuses primarily on German, English, and French practitioners of what the chief revisionists in the field, William Newman and Lawrence Principe, call “chymistry.” This is, to be sure, a fascinating topic, especially in light of recent new understandings of its meaning and significance that emphasize the lack of categorical distinction between the terms “chemistry” and “alchemy” in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—hence “chymistry.” But as Moran’s title indicates, there is more to his self-imposed task than the elucidation of an alien knowledge-category in early-modern Europe: He also wishes to place it within the context of the Scientific Revolution, itself a problematic historiographical label in European history. Consequently, a difficulty exists for the novice who is not already familiar with the standard accounts of that larger theme, since the present book gives only a one-sentence explanation of what “the Scientific Revolution” refers to. (This potential problem seems to have been exacerbated by an over-indulged copy editor: While “the Scientific Revolution,” in its specific and capitalized form, is the most common rendition in this book, there are several occasions when one reads of “scientific revolution,” as if it were a general conceptual category, when the sentence suggests otherwise.)

In fact, Moran’s larger purpose is to make the case for interpreting the Scientific Revolution as more than just a revolution in ideas, as it has traditionally been understood. Instead, Moran wishes to present it as an amalgam of “action and reflection” (p.12). In part, his story is about the historical recuperation and upward reevaluation of artisanal knowledge, and, as such, has something in common both with classic Marxist interpretations (Edgar Zilsel being perhaps the most relevant reference here) and with more recent historians such as Paolo Rossi and, very recently, Pamela Smith’s The Body of the Artisan (Chicago, 2004), which also deals with German materials from this period. All this is very much to the good. Of course, since “the Scientific Revolution” is an historiographical construct rather than something that can “really” be one
thing or another, perhaps the point is moot. But Moran captures an important theme and completely justifies the central importance of chymistry in his tale through his insistence on understanding the development of early-modern European knowledge of nature (regardless of the label) as a cultural, social, and intellectual complex, of which know-how was as important a part as natural philosophy.

For the non-specialist reader, however, the book may present some problems of understanding. Apart from the historiographical framing, a persistent difficulty remains: In discussing alchemy, Moran does not always entirely succeed in characterizing that subject in a clear fashion. Of course, a large part of that difficulty lies in the obscurity (at several levels) of alchemy itself; but for pedagogical purposes, some initial, wanton oversimplifications might have helped the tyro find a more comfortable way into the material before things then become complexified. It seems that alchemy as a label was not, in fact, an unequivocal designator, and over time, or in different contexts, could point to several different goals, procedures, and ideas. Moran warns early on that it was not simply about making gold, although at various points, the general goal of transmutation, whether of minerals or of the human body, is suggested as alchemy's fundamental characteristic. Unfortunately, examples of particular alchemical procedures are not always entirely perspicuous: a recipe of Roger Bacon's is explicated apparently in relation to the transmutation of metals (one of the ingredients is a calx made by heating “the metal one wanted to transmute”), but the outcome of the detailed procedure is an elixir that could also prolong life and “dispel corruption” (pp. 22-23), presumably independent of any particular metallic component. Moran never really explains what could and could not be “transmutation” in any given circumstance; of course, if practically any kind of change counted as transmutation, then the specificity of alchemy would disappear.

The book discusses the principal medieval alchemical texts, by (inter alia) John of Rupescissa, Roger Bacon, and writings attributed to Ramón Lull, and subsequently proceeds to the work and followers of Paracelsus in the sixteenth century. Throughout, Moran is concerned to stress the way in which procedures recognized as alchemical (chief among them distillation) were also used by artisans to make such things as pigments for painting and by apothecaries to make medicines (especially, following Paracelsus’s stress on them, of chemical rather than just botanical provenance). The focus on Paracelsus and his seventeenth-century successor Van Helmont serves to integrate into the story such alchemical figures as that of the “chemical wedding,” an important element of alchemical writings in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries about which this book has comparatively little to say, as is also the case with alchemy’s religious and mystical dimensions more generally.
Moran also addresses the role of alchemy in early-modern polities, particularly the potential advantages offered by alchemical projectors to princes in search of new sources of wealth. But the book finishes up with names well-known to historians of science, such as Boyle, Newton, Lemery, and Geoffroy, so as to illustrate the degree of continuity between alchemy and the chemistry of the eighteenth century—the century of Lavoisier’s famous “chemical revolution.” Moran’s overall message in the book, that experimental activity itself counts as a form of knowing, and that “processes and practices” count as scientific developments just as much as do discoveries and theories, is certainly carried well by the kinds of materials he describes, although it seems likely that the general reader would need less persuasion on the point than a philosophically committed scholar.

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“Christianity has emptied Walhalla, felled the sacred groves, extirpated the national imagery as a shameful superstition, as a devilish poison, and given us instead the imagery of a nation whose climate, laws, culture, and interests are strange to us and whose history has no connection whatever with our own” (p. 72). The young Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel voiced this lament in 1796, while working as a private tutor in Berne.

Two years earlier, across the Rhine, Maximilien Robespierre and his fellow leaders of the Jacobin Terror had culminated their own campaign against Christianity, replacing Catholicism with a new French state religion, the “Cult of the Supreme Being.” Yet Hegel and Robespierre articulated starkly contrasting attitudes toward history. Whereas the French revolutionary had invented a deistic cult as a means of clearing away the underbrush of Old Regime culture, the German idealist was obsessed with rediscovering and revivifying lost traditions.

George S. Williamson’s study presents a compelling account of the “longing for myth” in nineteenth-century Germany. He demonstrates that Wagner’s *Ring des Nibelungen* and Nietzsche’s *Zarathustra* were far more than ornamental outliers of German culture in the age of Bismarck. Williamson traces the evolution of “‘mythical’ narratives that attempted to explain the historical relationships of old or new mythologies to modern society,” which he depicts as a central
preoccupation of German educated elites throughout the era from the French Revolution to the eve of World War I.

Much recent scholarship has examined the rise of new forms of historical consciousness in nineteenth-century Central Europe. Historians, including Suzanne Marchand, James Sheehan, Susan Crane, Theodore Zvi Zuckowski, and John Toews, have examined how educated Germans of this era came to perceive a new sense of the relevance of Germany’s connections to the Nordic and classical past.

Williamson’s study offers two significant contributions to this line of inquiry. First, he insists on the specifically modern character of the German intelligentsia’s efforts to “replace the Old Testament with a pagan mythical substrate grounded in ancient Greece, Germany, or the Orient” (p. 11). For Williamson, this quest for common myths reflected “the persistence of confessional and theological modes of thought in the modern era”; indeed, the practice of myth-making was part and parcel of “the emergence of the public sphere, national identity, and the formation of collective memory” in modern Germany (p. 7). The second key aspect of the book’s argument is the breadth of its scope. Rather than focusing on a narrowly circumscribed disciplinary community, such as philologists, historians, or museum professionals, Williamson traces his themes through the writings of a wide range of intellectuals—including poets, theologians, philosophers, and composers—from Johann Gottfried Herder to Friedrich Nietzsche. By casting his net so widely, he makes a persuasive case that the obsession with national myths represented a deep and lasting current in nineteenth-century German culture.

One of the most striking themes of Williamson’s book is the anti-Christian sentiment articulated by a wide range of German intellectuals during this era. For Herder, writing during the French revolutionary conquests of the 1790s, Christianity was the “state machine of foreign peoples” that “mutilates [the] unique character” of nations (p. 110). Williamson unearths deep ambivalence or outright hostility toward Christian doctrine and ritual in the writings of authors, including G. W. F. Hegel, Friedrich Schelling, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Joseph Görres, Jacob Grimm, and many others. But rather than abandoning Christianity altogether, these authors strove to create a new “national mythology” that “was framed within a narrative that built on, transformed, or inverted traditional Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish self-understandings” (pp. 16, 17). Borrowing a phrase from Anthony LaVopa, Williamson depicts this cultural transformation not as “secularization” but as a “reformulation of the sacred within a desacralized discourse.”

The subtlety and range of Williamson’s study makes it essential reading for cultural historians of modern Germany. The book provides a fascinating context not just for the works of Wagner and Nietzsche, but also a host of other issues: e.g., historical criticism of the Bible from the early Romantics through David Friedrich Strauss’s Life of Jesus, the origins and significance of the Kulturkampf, as well as the transformation of anti-Semitism and the rise of völkisch racial theology during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
At the heart of this work lies a tantalizing question that Williamson answers only incompletely: What accounts for the German intelligentsia’s obsession with rediscovering old myths and creating new ones? Williamson rejects the crude Sonderweg interpretation depicting nineteenth-century Germany as mired in archaic customs; he also denies that this phenomenon stemmed from the bourgeoisie’s “political impotence or compensation for something not achieved in the realm of government or legislation.” Instead, he argues, the “longing for myth” reflected the pervasive experience of “dislocation and dis-orientation” caused by industrialization, free-market capitalism, and political upheaval, compounded by the fragmentation of German society “along confessional, social, and territorial lines” (p. 298). The splintering of traditional social and cultural bonds, he argues, gave rise to the desire for an “aesthetic-religious imagery” that would “unite modern society just as Greek mythology had supposedly once united the polis” (p. 299).

As the above observations suggest, the title of Williamson’s book is imprecise. The subjects of his study expressed not so much a “longing for myth” as a longing for what they conceived as the fruits of myth—namely, a sense of belonging to an organic and authentic community. But Williamson does not explain why this longing should have been more intense in Germany than elsewhere in nineteenth-century Europe. Germany’s economic transformation, at least until mid-century, was no more abrupt than that of England or various countries of continental Europe. Nor was Germany the only part of Europe confronting confessional or class divisions.

One might suggest two possible explanations for the intensity of German longing. First, despite Williamson’s protestations to the contrary, Germans’ myth-making may indeed have reflected their sense of political “impotence” over the lack of a unified nation state before 1871. The history of nineteenth-century Germany differed from that of its Western European counterparts far more profoundly in its political than in its socioeconomic aspects—and the creation of national myths is, at heart, a political act. Alternatively, one might postulate that the quest for common myths has played an equally prominent role in other nations’ transition to an individualistic capitalist order. Peter Fritzsche’s fascinating new book Stranded in the Present takes this approach, arguing that nostalgia for an imagined past became a pervasive cultural phenomenon throughout Europe in the aftermath of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. After all, Robespierre lost his head on the guillotine just months after attempting to extirpate Catholic traditions from France by creating the Cult of the Supreme Being. Perhaps the restless quest to rediscover age-old communities is an integral element of the rootless experience of modernity.

MATTHEW LEVINGER
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308 BOOK REVIEWS
In 1953, Karl W. Deutsch published one of the most powerful works in the history of the study of nations and nationalism. The book was entitled *Nationalism and Social Communication*, and it hypothesized that a nation was not the expression of the essence of a people, as nationalists had argued, but of networks of communication. These networks ran along the rails and with the postal service, and were the “steel sinews,” as Bismarck once maintained, of a community that shared and exchanged a common culture. The cultural turn in the study of nationalism, most prominently represented by Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities*, did not so much refute Deutsch as shift the analytical terrain from an analysis of the infrastructure of commonality to an interpretation of the style in which nations were imagined. Many of Deutsch’s insights remained the unspoken assumptions of the historiography of nations.

It is in this context that one reads Siegfried Weichlein’s *Nation und Region: Integrationsprozesse im Bismarckreich*, a work of fundamental importance and considerable revisionist import. Weichlein argues that the construction of a national infrastructure—in railways, postal service, legal statutes, and schooling—did as much, if not more, to cement regional consciousness, and that nation, far from superseding region, developed alongside the region. That nation and region are not opposites is not new to German historians—not, at any rate, after Blackbourn, Applegate, Retallack, and Confino, to name only the main English-language contributions to this literature. But whereas these authors considered politics and culture, Weichlein delves deep into the world of infrastructure and the politics around it. He focuses on Saxony and Bavaria, but he has a good deal to say about Prussia as well. Indeed, one of the strengths of this work is the conceptual ease with which the author moves from the literature on nation-building to the kind of local politics we associate with Ludwig Thoma’s fictional character Josef Filser.

The case is strongest for the railroads. In painstaking detail, Weichlein shows how the railroads did not create a national network but most importantly a regional network. The argument is wonderfully illustrated on the inside cover of the book, where a map shows the development of rail lines in Saxony between 1837 and 1888. Most railways, either owned by the state of Saxony or privately owned, operated within Saxony, and it was scarcely possible to travel with them outside the state. Bavaria illustrates a similar phenomenon. There were only eleven border crossings with the rails, and seven went into Habsburg lands. Far from tying the provinces to the metropolitan center, the
railway system rather connected the provinces, if at all, with each other. Weichlein supports his insight with statistics on the number of people who traveled and how far they traveled. Increasing individual mobility, he conclusively shows, meant first increasing mobility within one’s own province.

The mail was a more complicated matter, but Weichlein moves masterfully through thickets of long-ignored details to show how the post office, more than railways, sewed together the nation-state. Here we learn of the “postal Königgratz,” which put Austria outside domestic mail space, and of the nation-building force of unified postal prices (where before there had been a plethora of rates) and of unified postal stamps. We learn about the institutional centralization of the Reichspost and of the way in which the architecture of post offices was meant to articulate values of the new nation-state. Yet for all its nation-building élan, which Weichlein both concedes and conceptualizes, the vast majority of mail, which increased dramatically in this period, nevertheless remained local and provincial. The paper sinews, to amend Bismarck’s image, brought together the nation, but even more the region.

The third major area that Weichlein considers is the unification of law—for him a more central aspect of nation-building than the general feeling of national solidarity. In the second third of the nineteenth century, especially in the period of liberal predominance, a veritable flood of new laws came over the subjects of German states. In the German middle states, for example, there were 47,635 new ordinances and regulations, while 20,000 were stricken from the books. Weichlein argues that this constituted a near revolution, one that penetrated deep into the fabric of local life. He focuses especially on ordinances concerning poor relief and marriage, as these are areas of law particularly important in periods of heightened mobilization. But here again, it was the individual states that also profited from this frenetic activity, as new regulations often brought subjects into contact not with Berlin but with regional centers and their officials.

Schools, too, have long been seen as a principle motor of national sentiment—teaching children a patriotic script from an early age. And there is no doubt that German schools served this function. Yet Weichlein also shows how schoolteachers imparted to nationalistic education a regional inflection. In South German schoolbooks, emphasis was not just placed on the victory at Sedan, but also on military engagements in which local troops played a decisive role—the Bavarians at Weissenburg in Alsace, for example.

Weichlein’s overwhelming evidence points to the double track: nation-building and region-building. They are not opposites, and the one does not succeed the other; instead, they are spurs for complementary development. By setting the two concepts in relation, Weichlein has succeeded in illuminating both. His answers will be of tremendous interest to scholars who work in regional history, for they will see much more clearly how nations make
regions. But his answers will also allow us to rethink the history of the national state. Weichlein offers a series of illuminating insights about the way in which, if not social communication, then at least political communication was nationalized in the first decade after unification. It was nationalized, he shows, when the nation and the state tried to exclude political parties, mainly the Center and the Social Democrats, and members of both parties reacted by developing inter-state organizational forms coordinated at the national level. In this way, central conflicts did not divide the nation, as historians often assume, but encouraged the national organization of politics and the creation of national elites. But history has a way of being cunning, and the attempt to exclude—by dint of the Kulturkampf and the Anti-Socialist Laws—also had the unintended consequence of recasting local politics along national lines.

Siegfried Weichlein’s *Nation und Region* is one of the most important books to appear on Bismarck’s Germany in a decade. As a fundamental contribution to the history of society and politics in the first decades of the Second German Empire, it belongs on a common shelf with Margaret L. Anderson’s *Practicing Democracy* and Thomas Kuhne’s *Dreiklassenwahlrecht und Wahlkultur in Preußen*. It is also an essential contribution to the literature of nation-building and the first book in a long while to grapple empirically with the pathbreaking insights of Karl Deutsch. As such, it is a book that no historian of the complicated way in which Germany became a nation can ignore.

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In recent years, a growing literature on nationalism has highlighted cultural and gender topics. At the same time, religion, most prominently Catholicism, has attracted the intellectual energy of more and more scholars. To date, however, the relationship between nationalism and religion has been undervalued. Helmut Walser Smith’s study *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict* was one of the first to relate religious conflict to the character of German nationalism. Michael B. Gross now analyzes the relationship between German liberalism and religion.

In *The War Against Catholicism*, Gross argues that liberalism not only opposed the growing pious energy and the successful associational mobilization of the
Catholic Church, but he also believes that liberal anti-Catholicism stood at the center, not at the periphery of liberalism. The liberal vision of the individual, public space, gender roles, and the rational state and its politics all derived from anti-Catholicism. Gross sees anti-Catholicism as the cornerstone of liberal politics, the German empire, and its capitalist economy. Liberals saw the public order threatened by ultramontane Catholicism that, in their view, blurred the lines between the private and public spheres. Gross gives a detailed account of the liberal “syllabus errorum,” perfectly matching that of Pius IX, only with the anathema left out. In contradicting the ultramontane Catholic Church on nearly every matter, liberal anti-Catholicism came close to the 1845 dictum of Polish philosopher Bronislaw Trentowski: “Religion is the politics of heaven, and politics is the religion of the earth.” Liberals were very earthly people.

Gross proves his argument in five chapters. First, he outlines the success of the Catholic missions during and after the revolution of 1848. These Jesuit and Redemptorist missions were extraordinarily successful in terms of attendance and devotional energy. Gross also stresses the often over-looked importance of the Catholic revival for the Protestant revival that was taking place at the same time. On the one hand, the general upsurge of conservative Protestantism and Catholicism ran against the trend toward secularization. On the other hand, the Catholic missions deepened the divide between parish priests and the regular clergy that held these missions. The former were often at odds with the Jesuits, who pushed them into the background, for example, into the confessional, while the Jesuits took to the pulpit. Gross points out that for many Catholics, the repietization of their lives and the pursuit of their often unreligious everyday moral conduct did not seem contradictory. Instead, these contradicted bourgeois liberal notions. Although the missions served as a role model for many conservative Protestants in their own religious revival, liberals viewed them as outright bigotry and an irrational waste of time.

In his second chapter, Gross interprets the liberal reaction on two levels: On the one hand, anti-Catholicism drew on the stereotype of medieval and irrational Catholicism, the perfect backdrop against which the liberal sun of progress could shine only all the brighter. On the other hand, it was the result of a “deeply traumatized self-image.” Liberals projected both their feelings of inferiority and their defeat in 1848 and thereafter onto Catholicism. Stories of nuns languishing in dungeons for twenty years and then being rescued served as a metaphor for liberalism finally coming out of the closet twenty years after the unsuccessful revolution. Here, Gross sees gender issues at work: “Liberals claimed a masculine identity. If liberalism was a public persona of rationalism, independence, and civic sense, then Catholicism once again by contrast exhibited all the attributes, Kulturkämpfer believed, of the feminine sex: irrationalism, fanaticism, subservience, and the ability to manipulate men emotionally. If in liberal discourse Catholicism was a woman, then it followed logically enough
that anti-Catholicism was misogyny” (p. 297). Gross reads the Kulturkampf explicitly from a gender perspective. Both the women’s movement and Catholicism posed a threat to the existing moral, political, sexual, and social order.

In chapters three and four, Gross gives an account of liberal anti-monasticism and anti-feminism. The liberal vision of the monastery comes down to the usual suspects: anti-Jesuitism and outright rejection of every form of “unproductive” and “wasteful” monastic life. In chapter three, Gross repeats many of the prejudices so familiar from German national-liberal historiography. He is more innovative in chapter four, where he focuses on liberal anti-feminism. He gives great weight to reports of nuns’ abuse, particularly the story of the nun Barbara Ubryk. In 1869, the Austrian police found her locked up in a female Carmelite monastery in Cracow. This story could capture the liberal imagination because it ran against the liberal credo of the man caring successfully for his wife and family. The sexual, social, and moral order was therefore at stake. The Ubryk scandal energized the liberal anti-Catholic imagination—and sometimes even crossed a thin line into pornography.

Gross generally tends to follow the liberal self-interpretation and interpret the antagonism between liberalism and Catholicism in gender terms. He even employs the liberal terminology of war and warfare. Liberals saw themselves as armored knights at war with the Catholic masses. In his last chapter, Gross interprets the Kulturkampf as a result of the liberal anti-Catholic phobia that stood at the center of nineteenth-century liberalism. Anti-Jesuitism, anti-monasticism, and anti-feminism were not just mere expressions of something else. They essentially constituted liberalism and thereby the liberal politics shaping the German empire. This study shows in great detail the cognitive world of liberals regarding Catholicism. Catchwords like “anti-Catholicism” and “anti-Jesuitism” are filled with life and agency.

Gross wants to reinterpret not only the Kulturkampf as an historical event in the 1870s but also German liberalism as a whole up until the Bismarck era. Is he successful? Yes and no. He provides abundant proof for the liberal hysterical phobia toward Catholicism. But what do we learn about liberalism when we take its anti-Catholicism as seriously as Gross does? Interpreting anti-Catholicism with no reference to the first Vatican council (not even mentioned in the index) misrepresents the history of ultramontanism. Gross also does not raise the issue of papal infallibility, a particularly male component of Catholicism (and also not mentioned in the index). Papal infallibility was a slap in the face to liberal positivism. But Gross’ focus on female convents anticipates the result of liberal anti-feminism. The “nun in the dungeon,” however, was neither the only nor the most decisive scandal. The liberal “culture of progress” (David Blackbourn) was challenged effectively by the dogma of papal infallibility on July 18, 1870. The next day, war broke out between Germany and France.
The anti-feminine liberal rhetoric should not obfuscate the social dilemma that liberalism faced. For the liberal “Honoratiorenparteien,” Catholicism was the enemy because it, just like the rising socialist party, had a broader appeal to the masses than the liberals could ever hope to attain. Presenting gender issues at the heart of liberalism meant buying liberal rhetoric at face value and forgetting about the dilemma that liberals faced: They were now exposed to a democratic franchise in the new nation-state. Although liberals shaped the legislation of the North German Confederation and then of the empire, they were on the defensive after February 12, 1867, when the first elections in the North German Confederation took place. In the German Empire, liberals were under attack from many sides: from Catholics, socialists, conservatives, and Bismarck. Reducing this wide range of political adversaries to a bipolar gender perspective perhaps misses the complex political dilemma of liberalism. Nevertheless, Michael B. Gross deserves credit for his thorough analysis of the cultural construction of the anti-Catholic liberal imagination. Liberal anti-Catholicism has found its historian.

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The growth of research on religious topics from different conceptual perspectives in the past several years represents what one scholar has now called the “religious turn” in modern German historical study. With Catholicism, Popular Culture, and the Arts in Germany, Margaret Steig Dalton has made another important contribution to this historiography with a study of Catholic cultural criticism from the Wilhelmine period through the Weimar Republic. Her focus is on what she calls the “Catholic cultural movement,” and by cultural movement she means production in the arts broadly understood from literature to film and radio.

The first three chapters lay out the central themes that underlay and informed Catholic cultural activity from 1890 to 1933. As she explains, the book is not a study of German Catholic literature, music, drama, or cinema, but rather an examination of the debates and organizations that shaped this cultural production. Such cultural activity was seated in a milieu that by the late nineteenth-century was based on values and patterns of life that both unified Catholics and separated them from other populations. In an age increasingly
shaped by materialism, consumerism, relativism, and technological development—the hallmarks of modern culture—Catholic leaders became concerned about the preservation in cultural activity of traditional Catholic morality and faith.

The following chapters focus individually on literature; reading; art and art organizations; music; theater, film, and radio; and, finally, censorship. Clerics and Catholic intellectuals recognized that, on the one hand, literature written by and for Catholics and stamped with Catholic ideals could be used to promote the authoritarianism of the church and communitarianism of Catholicism. On the other hand, Catholic critics condemned modern novels for spoiling good Catholics with their subjectivity, decadence, and sexuality. If discussions about high literature had a remote aspect, debates about what most Catholics were really reading were more intense. Library associations tried to inculcate better reading habits, i.e., those that promoted a Catholic moral and spiritual life. Librarians and critics were, however, frustrated in their best efforts by the low-brow, cheap, and ever popular Schundliteratur (trash literature).

At the same time, Catholic leaders overwhelmingly condemned modern art—which Dalton understands as the visual arts, primarily painting—as an attack on the soul of Catholicism. Modern art was, according to Catholic critics, materialistic, decadent, and revolutionary. Art, at least that acceptable to Catholics, had to be, Dalton argues, true, beautiful, representational, and spiritually satisfying. Ultimately art was considered only a means to an end: Its purpose was to serve God and the church. Many educated Catholics, however, did not share the hostility of their church to modern art. Germania, the leading Catholic newspaper, covered modern art exhibits and appreciated Picasso, Franz Marc, and the Bauhaus. Debates concerning the accommodation of changes in music paralleled that of the visual arts: Innovation in almost any form was largely condemned. Wagner was denounced for his anarchy and Schönberg for Musikbolschewismus. Meanwhile, Catholic critics complained that popular music polluted “true” music. The solution, cultural leaders believed, was a program intended to cultivate traditional sacred music and parish choirs.

In the dramatic arts, the Catholic-dominated Bühnenvolksbund and amateur theaters could not compete with professional modern theater productions. The new cinema presented another challenge. Like everyone else, Catholics flocked to the movies in hordes, and it was this that trained the focus of Catholic leaders. Believing that the rampant commercialism of film threatened the authority of the church, Catholic committees responded with lists of unacceptable films. By the 1920s, some critics could, nevertheless, recognize the achievements of Fritz Lang, Der Blaue Engel, and even the Battleship Potemkin. Catholic leaders merely applied to radio broadcasting the same proscriptive attitudes and agenda they applied to film. Meanwhile, most Catholics, according to
Dalton, took for granted that state and church censorship of cultural activity was needed to protect themselves (and others) from the temptation of evil in the world.

When compared to its goals, Dalton concludes, the accomplishments of the Catholic cultural movement were meager. It did not succeed in creating an alternative to the increasingly secular and commercial dominant culture. Catholic leaders did little to develop a viable concept of Catholic aesthetics, how Catholics were to experience, judge, and produce art. At the same time, Catholic leaders compromised cultural development for the sake of Catholic morality and faith. For these reasons, Catholics slipped outside or rejected the Catholic cultural movement for mainstream culture. “Catholic culture was,” according to Dalton, “too Catholic even for most Catholics” (p. 233). It was not the Nazi state that finally defeated the Catholic cultural movement but its own inherent weakness, Dalton argues.

This is a solid if traditional rendering of research: The method is largely anecdotal and synthetic, and the focus is on high intellectuals and organizations. Some readers may find problematical the uncircumspect characterization of Schundliteratur as opposed to “true literature” and kitsch as distinct from “true art” as simply self-evident. At the same time, though it is not wholly absent, there is little political, social, or economic contextualization. The author’s examination remains, therefore, largely an internal account of elite debates, policies, and intentions. There is no sense of how the Catholics’ preoccupation with their cultural production of identity was impacted by or perhaps even contributed to the larger turmoil, social and economic, that recreated politics during the Weimar period. There is also a tendency to skirt potentially illuminating issues: For example, given the film’s advocacy of outright revolution, the reader would like to know not only that Germania praised the Battleship Potemkin but also why. Though Enrica von Handel-Mazzetti is described as perhaps the most important Catholic novelist, the reader does not learn why her work was successful or even what made it particularly Catholic. Finally, it is unfortunate for other researchers that a list of archived materials and newspapers and journals that were consulted is not provided in the bibliography.

These are meant not as criticisms but considerations that should not detract from the virtues of this book. Dalton has recreated meticulously the debates that shaped Catholic artistic attitudes and activity and the cultural policies that helped to preserve identity at a time when the Catholic Church was losing ground to modern rationalism, secularism, and materialism. In doing so, she offers considerable and welcome insight into the aversion of Catholics for the very age in which they lived. This book will be of interest to historians of religion, the arts, culture, and identity.

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Ladislas Löb’s superb translation of Otto Weininger’s highly controversial but enormously influential book is a most welcome contribution to understanding Vienna circa 1900 for readers who, for whatever reason, must approach Weininger via an English edition. It replaces what Wittgenstein termed a “beastly” anonymous translation published by Heinemann in England and G. P. Putnam’s Sons in 1906 in the United States; the latter was reissued in 1975 by AMS Press and again as recently as 2003 by Howard Fertig. Approaching Weininger from that translation, one has the sense of being confronted with the work of a madman, who spins thoughts off the top of his head in a way that can only be described as absurd, so absurd that their very implausibility and contrariness have a way of making it into a fascinosum. To be sure, there is enough in Weininger’s original to encourage that impression. It also helps to explain his appeal to half-educated fanatics like Dietrich Eckhart. Such a seriously defective edition, expurgated, bereft of one hundred thirty-five pages of notes and references and notoriously inaccurate, made it even more difficult than it otherwise might have been to understand how Weininger attracted the attention of brilliant thinkers and writers like Karl Kraus, Elias Canetti, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and even James Joyce (whose Ulysses, improbable as it seems, is deeply indebted to Weininger). In his Translator’s Note, Löb provides numerous examples of absolutely grotesque mistranslations—in one place “es ist klar” is rendered as “it does not follow”—which more than corroborate the judgment Wittgenstein passed on the 1906 English edition. Löb neglects to mention, however, that English prudery seems to have dictated that all explicit references to orgasm be deleted. The expurgated version gives the impression of being a kind of misogynistic, anti-Semitic version of Peter Pan. Only a naïve, sensitive “boy genius” could have written such nonsense. In the end, camps formed on both sides about whether the author was a genius or a madman. Nobody, however, paid much attention to the argument—or the state of the text itself. This state of affairs has persisted until recently. Only in 1982 did it become known that there were two slightly different German editions of the work, and this only became widely known in the mid-1990s thanks to the assiduous research of Waltraud Hirsch (who is currently preparing an electronic critical edition of Weininger’s complete works that should finally clear up the matter of the authoritative German text). Little wonder that there has been so much confusion surrounding Weininger.
The whole story is not without irony. An edition of Geschlecht und Charakter with an interlinear translation by Robert Willis appeared from Lulu, which described itself as early as 2004 as an independent Web publishing marketplace. So after a century without an integral English translation of Sex and Character, we suddenly have two complete ones. Yet, there should be no confusing them: Ladislas Löb’s translation is in every respect superior. There are hints of the inadequacies of Willis’s translation even in his (one-page!) glossary, where, for example, “der Satz vom Grunde” is rendered “the proposition of rationale, the assumption that there is a . . .” instead of the “Principle of Sufficient Reason” as it has been known since Leibniz’s day. Rendering the German “immanent” as “immanent” in English is not problematic, but is it necessary? In any case, we can see the clear superiority of Löb’s version if we look to the rendering of a particularly difficult and important passage at the end of chapter seven in part two: “Nicht die Sinnlosigkeit einer Welt ‘von ohngefähr’ ist ihm Pflicht, sondern seine Pflicht ist ihm der Sinn des Weltalls. Ja sagen zu dieser Einsamkeit, das ist das ‘Dionysische’ Kantens; das erst ist Sittlichkeit.” Willis renders it, “Not the meaninglessness of a world of ‘no-decidedness’ [or by chance, implying powerlessness, a pun of Nietzsche possibly involving the words “ohnmächtig” and “ungefähr”] is duty to him, but rather to him his duty is the meaning of the cosmos. To say yes to this loneliness, that is the ‘Dionysian’ of Kant; that is, for the first time morality.” Löb’s version runs, “He does not derive his duty from the meaninglessness of an ‘accidental’ world, but his duty, to him, is the meaning of the universe. To say yes to this loneliness is the ‘Dionysian’ element in Kant; that and nothing less, is morality.” Apart from Willis’s interpolated speculations about a pun of Nietzsche possibly involving the words “ohnmächtig” and “ungefähr”] is duty to him, but rather to him his duty is the meaning of the cosmos. To say yes to this loneliness, that is the ‘Dionysian’ of Kant; that is, for the first time morality.” Löb’s version runs, “He does not derive his duty from the meaninglessness of an ‘accidental’ world, but his duty, to him, is the meaning of the universe. To say yes to this loneliness is the ‘Dionysian’ element in Kant; that and nothing less, is morality.” Apart from Willis’s interpolated speculations about a pun of Nietzsche (there is such a pun in Zarathustra III, p. 48, but it is on the “von” as indicating an aristocratic proper name Herr von Chance or Lord Chance as it were, not the adjectival pastiche Willis suggests), the awkwardness in his version contrasts sharply with Löb’s smooth rendition.

Not the least of the virtues of the new version under review lies in the way Löb presents the notes and references. These one hundred thirty-five pages are crucial to understanding Weininger since there he documents his sources scrupulously. That documentation permits a fairly exact historical reconstruction of his reasoning. Above all, it facilitates identifying what is original to Weininger and what he has taken in terms of assumptions, facts, and principles from other scientists, philosophers, and social critics (his practice of citing contrary opinions in the notes was certainly a factor in winning the qualified admiration of Sir Karl Popper). Löb’s meticulous scholarship shows itself nowhere more trenchantly than in the fact that he has gone to the great effort of supplying publication data for all of the (from today’s perspective highly obscure) works cited by Weininger that have been published in English. In fact, Weininger’s copious notes and references are food and drink to anyone
with the slightest sense of the history of ideas. They should help to stimulate a far
deeper reception of Weininger by English-speaking readers than has previously
been imaginable. Thus, scholars who do not work with the original are now able
not simply to read the text but also to examine Weininger’s sources and to form a
critical estimate of how he uses them.

Daniel Steuer’s learned introduction to the volume seems overly ambitious. It
provides a brief account of Weininger’s life, delves selectively into the early
reception of the book, its relation to the better-known of Weininger’s posthu-
mous texts (recently published in English as On Last Things by the Edwin Mellen
Press) and the inevitable discussion of Weininger’s anti-Semitism. For the most
part, it will be difficult for the neophyte and superfluous to the illuminati. In fact,
the very idea of an introduction to a reprint is problematic. In re-editions of lit-
erary works in German, the standard philological practice is to place editorial
commentary at the end rather than the beginning of books. Roberto Calasso,
for example, followed this procedure in producing the Matthes and Seitz
reprint of the original German edition of 1980. There is much to be said for
that practice: It puts nothing between the reader and the text that might surrep-
titiously insinuate an interpretation to the reader—something that is extremely
easy to do in the case of Weininger. The editors of this volume would have been
wise to follow Calasso’s example despite Anglo-Saxon practice. A book,
however bizarre, has to stand on its own feet. As it is, there is all too little in
the introduction about Weininger’s problems, methods, and the structure of
arguments, such as they are, which is what the reader really needs for
orientation.

This is perhaps the place to call attention to a general problem that has
developed along with the Web. Nowadays, there is a literature available on
the Internet that partly overlaps with academic scholarship and, as is the case
with Weininger, an amateur literature on the Web propagated by enthusiasts,
which in effect competes with it (although it is often of a certain interest to
conventional research). The question of how this literature is to be integrated
into scholarly work is more than deserving of attention. (People interested in
Weininger on the Web can begin by searching for Kevin Solway’s Web site,
“Weininger on the Internet.”)

There is a huge gap, of course, between scholars and enthusiasts, especially in
the case of a figure like Weininger, whose appeal is largely based upon the
esoteric character of his asceticism or the appeal that a superficial reading of
his works still has for racist and misogynist fanatics in places like France and
Italy today. So it is necessary to close with a reminder that there is little or
nothing in Weininger that has not been better said by the likes of C. G. Jung
with respect to human bisexuality, Soren Kierkegaard with respect to the dialec-
tics of eroticism and morality, or Leo Tolstoi with respect to chastity. The aim of
scholarship is not to rehabilitate Weininger but to re-contextualize his ideas with
a view to obtaining a genuinely critical handle on them. Löb’s translation is
certainly a welcome step in the right direction.

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Artists for the Reich: Culture and Race from Weimar to Nazi Germany.
x + 182. $74.95 (cloth); $24.95 (paper). ISBN 1-84520-200-7.

The law of diminishing returns can arguably be applied to historical research as
well as larger economic enterprises. What had previously been described in a
few paragraphs and notes of such standard works as those by Paul O. Rave
and Hildegard Brenner has now been brought to the light of day in a full mono-
graphic treatment of Bettina Feistel-Rohmender and the Deutsche Kunstgesellschaft
(German Art Society). For those attracted by the majestic sweep of Joan
Clinefelter’s book title, however, a more accurate (if still overstated) description
is found in the title of her 1995 Indiana University doctoral dissertation, “The
German Art Society and the Battle for ‘Pure German’ Art, 1920–1945.”

If the German Art Society (DKG) seems somewhat unfamiliar, it may be
because it “fell apart” immediately after its founding in 1920, as Clinefelter
readily admits, “exist[ing] only in the minds of its supporters” until (re)incarn-
ated in the late 1920s (p. 30). It then claimed all of sixty-five individual
members in 1928 and one hundred by 1929, plus the “institutional members”
affiliated with it as a new front organization (with indispensable financial
support) of the völkisch movement, and later used at arm’s length by the
NSDAP (Table 6.1, p. 112).

Before discussing the improved fate of this tiny and—by even the most chari-
table stretch—rather unsuccessful Weimar arts society before the Nazi accession
to power, one must pose a central question: Was it really an organization of
artists? Most of its support, including its ability to produce a small journal and
typed press releases noticed chiefly by the Nazi and völkisch press, came from
non-artists and members of the welter of feuding right-wing splinter groups.
A few dozen real artists did belong to it, even a handful of art academy teachers,
but it would be more accurate to characterize it as a popgun in the ideological
culture wars of the Weimar Republic than an organization representative in any
significant way of professional artists in Germany. The most important national
association of visual artists before 1933, the Reichsverband bildender Künstler
Deutschlands, had by way of comparison about 10,000 members.
If it did not represent professional artists, did it at least represent women artists? Although not a biography, this study does use the scant available details of the life and career of the woman artist who founded the DKG to make some good points about female artists who did not fit the stereotype of “liberated” or “avant-garde” women in the Weimar artistic scene. Names such as Modersohn-Becker and Kollwitz pop up in this book, but few of other productive and prize-winning women artists, such as the sculptress René Sintenis, scion of an old Prussian Huguenot line of judges and popular with the public. Such women artists were more likely to be active in the professional Reichsverband, Gesellschaft deutscher und österreichischer Künstlerinnen (GEDOK), or regional organizations such as the Verein Berliner Künstlerinnen (which maintained its own women’s art school, training the vast majority of women artists in Prussia on the eve of World War I and later emerging as a purely professional organization in the Helene Lange “maternalist” mold during the 1920s). Feistel-Rohmeder (already privately trained as a painter, married, and a mother before the turn of the twentieth century) might be said to stand on the racialist branch of this “maternalist” tradition, but one suspects her motives had more to do with her worship of her völkisch activist father, Wilhelm Rohmeder, a Bavarian schoolteacher and anti-Semite, than sympathy for her sister artists.

Clearly the DKG did reflect a strong and widespread traditionalism among both professional artists and the art public, wedded to a Wilhelmine concept of nationalist, “uplifting,” and heroic representational art. What made it special was its insistence (without very specific prescriptions for how to achieve it) that “German” art be also consonant with völkisch racial “purity.” Its relative failure to attract even many traditional representational artists before the bandwagon effect of the Nazi seizure of power (and even after it) arguably reflects the perceived lack of need for a racialist interpretation of art: After all, denouncing “French” or simply “alien” modernist art as un-German was the dominant motif of all sorts of underemployed artists from Munich to Worpswede even before World War I. By hammering at the alleged “Jewish” connections of modernism (her bête noire was Max Liebermann), Feistel-Rohmeder—and of course, not she alone—merely gave an anti-Semitic twist to widespread resentment of the relatively huge prices fetched by the followers of French Postimpressionism and other modernists at home and abroad.

How successful was the DKG? Even major national professional organizations failed lamentably to make a dent in the economic misery of most German artists during the Weimar Republic, but at least they could book some successes. The DKG’s only Weimar-era exhibitions (1929 and 1933) were both put together with great effort but could not even have opened without willingness to accept sideline status at a völkisch convention or a free provincial exhibit.
space (and that alone! no guaranteed purchases) by an early Nazi state culture minister. Both shows, like two later ones during the Third Reich, evidently fell short of their purpose of demonstrating a “German” style guaranteed by the “racial purity” of the accepted painters, and there is little evidence of quality, consistency, or even sales, despite patronage by such wealthy individuals as Emil Kirdorf. Despite reaching a level of 400 individual members by 1940, the Society’s founder felt shunted aside by the Nazi cultural hierarchy. Perhaps sensing which way the wind was blowing, individual members declined to a paltry fifty by 1944 (p. 112). If the DKG was not actually shut down, but co-opted for a few years by Goebbels’ Reichskulturkammer, one can certainly agree with part of Clinefelter’s coolly understated conclusion, that it “was never entrusted with the kind of authority it anticipated” (p. 124). It is more difficult to share the conclusion that it “helped to shape art in the Third Reich from below” (p. 124).

This very short monograph (one hundred twenty-four pages of text, including a few monochrome illustrations) is well researched in primary sources if thinly grounded in many broader contexts such as the social history of art, for which readers will have to resort to other works. It is a welcome contribution at the least for specialists in völkisch movements, even if its modest scope falls far short of the promise of its title.

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Seeking a general theory of fascism is a bit like the attempt to gather all of modern physics into a single unified field theory. It is a necessary exercise that can stimulate reflection, even in failure. Michael Mann, a historical sociologist at UCLA, provides an intriguing survey and theory of European fascism. While he does not really break significant new ground, he does raise questions that will eventually advance the state of our knowledge.

Mann first provides a general “sociology of fascist movements,” where he gives his definition of fascism and a sketch of his basic theory of fascism’s appeal and social base. The second chapter similarly summarizes the historical and economic conditions that led to the rise of a whole spectrum of authoritarian regimes in Europe in the inter-war period, including, but not limited to, fascism. Six national case studies follow: Italy, Germany (with two chapters), Austria, Hungary, Romania, and Spain. A concluding chapter repeats the main arguments, and briefly takes up (and rejects) the prospect of a return of
fascism. The fascism that Mann presents is deliberately limited to Europe between 1918 and 1945. He defines fascism through five key characteristics: nationalism, statism, transcendence (meaning transcendence of class divisions), cleansing (in either a moral or ethnic sense), and paramilitarism.

Mann offers a two-part explanation for fascism. First, he describes a general “surge” of a broad spectrum of “authoritarian rightist” movements and parties that were a response to what Mann identifies as a four-fold political, ideological, economic, and military crisis in European society after WWI. Fascism was just one part of this surge, and not the largest. One strength of Mann’s analysis is his stress that fascism was greatly affected by the strength and stability of what he calls “old regime conservatism,” and that only in those states where both liberal democracy and traditional conservatism were weak did fascism manage to come to power or even represent a serious political alternative. In these cases, Mann is clear that both the First World War (in encouraging paramilitarism) and electoral politics gave fascist movements the space to develop organizationally, but that both were preconditions for fascist expansion, but not sufficient explanations of it. He further asserts that fascists “were not mere ‘reactionaries’ nor ‘stooges’ of capitalism or anyone else” (p. 364), but instead represented a genuine attempt to offer solutions to the crises of modern society. He specifically sees fascism as a modernizing movement, and even goes so far as to state, “Fascists were and remain part of the dark side of modernity.” The concept of “modernity” and “modernization” are not, however, defined or problematized at any length. In the second part of his explanation for fascism, Mann looks at the social basis of fascist parties and their values, both as parties and, insofar as he can determine them, as individuals. He seeks (with mixed success) to go beyond class-based theories of fascism, and instead, identifies a specific fascist “social constituency” in favor of nation-statism, transcendence of class divisions, and paramilitarism.

Mann’s greatest contribution in this book is in his definition of fascism as believing in a “paramilitary, transcendent, and cleansing nation-statism” (p. 358), and his corresponding narrowing of the social support for fascism to a “core constituency” that supported these values. Thus, no particular class is to blame for fascism, but only those parts of society for which nation-statism, paramilitarism, and class transcendence held particular appeal. For the first, nation-statism, these are largely white-collar workers and bureaucrats, but also often blue-collar workers in state enterprises, and also people living in ethnically contested border regions or refugees. For the second, paramilitarism, Mann identifies young, male veterans, students, cadets, and “working-class roughnecks” (p. 359), and compares fascist paramilitaries to gangs. Finally, the constituency most interested in transcendence is identified as members of the middle and working classes, but who were on the “margins of class conflict,” and not on its “front lines.”

This notion of a specific nation-statist constituency linked to the rise of fascist movements, as opposed to a particular social class, bears further research and is as
intriguing as it is unproven. Rather too neatly, Mann looks at the available social statistics about party membership and voting, and in each of his national case studies duly discovers a specific social constituency for just these three key values. The problem is that these three concepts are rather elastic and imprecise, and Mann often assigns social groups to them with very little actual empirical data. Furthermore, these concepts often seem to be simply a restatement of commonly accepted and long-accepted facts, presented as new discoveries. Imagine, for example, the surprise of German historians when Mann informs them that the distinctive social constituency for Nazism was actually largely Protestant, with a large number of civil servants, white-collar or blue collar workers in state enterprises and, particularly in the SA and SS, young and male. In practice, Mann’s notion of a “social constituency” seems quite close to the older class-based theories he criticizes.

Mann spends a great deal of time attacking existing theories of fascism, but mainly in order to advance his own theories. Thus, even in his summary of existing ideas, he is more impressionistic than rigorous. For example, there is no clear statement of the classic definition of fascism by the Third International (Dimitrov). Mann’s arguments against a simplistic class explanation of fascism are quite well taken and will be particularly valuable to graduate students and other novices wrestling with the different theories of fascism, but in the end, he either constructs a straw man or simply misconstrues nearly half a century of work by historians and other scholars, and gives little sense of how our understanding of fascism has evolved over time. Current scholarship has long ago abandoned the kinds of simplistic class-based theories Mann attacks. To be fair, Mann does provide a very slightly more nuanced summary of his arguments in his conclusion, but unfortunately, this nuance is not reflected in his introduction or in the national case studies that make up the bulk of the book. In addition, many of his arguments against earlier class-based theories in the national case studies are naive or superficial. Despite his disdain for these theories, he is forced both in general and in each case study to admit that there is indeed a link between fascism and certain social classes, even though this link is generally not simple. It does not help that the statistical tables he provides in his appendix and that underpin his social analyses combine very disparate and non-uniform samples of various social subgroups culled from existing scholarship, which simply do not support the kind of even very general comparisons to which Mann subjects them.

Mann also makes a great deal about how his work is unique in that he “listens to the fascists” instead of just dismissing them. Unfortunately, aside from the fact that he is hardly unique in this regard, his “letting the fascists speak for themselves” often reduces to simply taking them at their word, a much more dangerous proposition. Mann then compounds this problem by over-determining and over-interpreting very limited and nonhomogeneous data. Moreover, when he listens to the fascists, Mann seems to hear only what he wants to hear in the
context of his other theories. He also does not incorporate much, if any, of the considerable scholarship on intellectual, cultural, or even gender history and theory, so that when he listens, it is only with an ear attuned to a very limited range of sound.

Mann is articulate if not always well organized, and his description of European conditions is, on the whole, lively and stimulating. He has done little to no primary research of his own, and his reading, though wide, is impressionistic and not always thorough. Certainly, a number of recent major works by authors such as Karin Orth, Ulrich Herbert, Gerhard Paul, Klaus-Michael Mallmann, and (most telling of all) Michael Wildt are absent from the section on Germany. (The two chapters on Germany also contain some grave factual mistakes and numerous generalizations so broad and unsupported as to be misleading.) A related and major problem is that he often either fails to provide the source of the information he cites, or else does so in a way that is not sufficiently clear. This leaves Mann free to make sweeping generalizations based on very thin or non-existent data, or even pure speculation, and to show a remarkably cavalier lack of critical evaluation of information that might tend to weaken his thesis. Such lack of scholarly sophistication alternates with long passages stuffed with a grab bag of facts and information, which then end without any analysis or interpretation of the information provided. The book thus vacillates between historical narrative and theoretical interpretation, with neither being fully satisfactory. All too frequent references to a forthcoming book in which Mann intends to tie up the loose ends of this analysis further detract from this book’s usefulness.

Mann’s book is a valuable contribution to the literature on fascism despite its many weaknesses. His first two chapters and conclusion provide an articulate and engaging set of theories, which will be particularly valuable for those who are already in the process of absorbing modern scholarship on fascism and seek an intellectually challenging set of arguments to test their current understanding. On the other hand, the national case studies, which make up the majority of the book, are unsatisfying and provide neither a thorough summary of current scholarship nor an adequate historical narrative of events.

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Between the two world wars, Germany was on the move. The slowdown of the Great Depression notwithstanding, more and more Germans took vacations and
enjoyed weekend adventures, and when they traveled, they did so to destinations farther and farther away from home. Along the way, they filled up trains, hotels, and youth hostels. And it was very much Germany that Germans wanted to explore, following as they did quite explicit itineraries of the idealized nation. “Seeing Germany,” as Kristin Semmens puts it, was a way of possessing and occupying Germany. This was quite deliberately the case for the hundreds of thousands of visitors who took special trains to Stahlhelm marches, Reichsbanner demonstrations, and, later in the 1930s, the Nuremberg party rallies, for which more than 700 special trains were pressed into service in 1938. “Seeing Germany” was also at the heart of the new tourist practices the Nazis created: the camp experiences of the Hitler Youth and the rural outposts of the Reich Labor Service. Patriotism required an overnight stay.

Unfortunately, little of this mobilization is evident in Semmens’ study, Seeing Hitler’s Germany. The big picture is not really assembled; readers get no evidence of expanding tourist habits, growing Reichsbahn ridership, or the increasing number of vacation days. The Autobahns are not mentioned at all. It would have been interesting to link in a comprehensive way Germans’ political mobilization with Germans on the move and to reflect on the wider meaning of the overnight trip away from home. In any case, Semmens makes clear that the National Socialists valued tourism both for the economic stimulus it provided and the political familiarity it created. It was important for Germany’s disparate “tribes” to “get to know, understand, and treasure each other and so become a united German people,” as one official put it in 1936. Just how particularism was undercut, however, is not explained, and Semmens does not engage Rudy Koshar’s thesis about the decontextualization and despecification of Germany’s heritage that was also carried out in the name of national unity. Semmens plausibly argues that 1933 did not basically transform tourist formats, but changed their effect so that tourism created the idea of normalcy and thereby legitimated the new regime. Much of the rustic appeal of Bavaria or the Black Forest was consistent with the racial stereotypes the Nazis fashioned. Classic national shrines such as the Goethe House in Weimar did not change at all. Yet for a study that promises an examination of sights and sightlines, there is too little analysis of local landscapes and the ways in which town and country created national ensembles. In the end, a book on tourism needs to take readers on the train, to the hotels, and up the mountains.

Sennems convincingly compares tourism with the light entertainment found on the radio and in the movies. It created a semblance of normality, the light-hearted background noise of daily life. But it also created common experiences and common trivia that tightened the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. It formed the “we” from which so many “non-Aryan” Germans were excluded. It is worth asking whether tourism facilitated the experience of being “unter uns,”
of being with one’s own kind, which might provide the beginning of an expla-
nation of why Germany’s resorts were so promiscuously anti-Semitic well before
1933. The desire to travel persisted during the war; the tourist trade in the
summer of 1940 was one of the busiest on record. But “normal” tourism also
made way for an explicitly “Nazi tourist culture.” Semmens locates the new
tourist destinations on the map of the Third Reich: the Obersalzberg near
Berchtesgaden; Munich, the so-called “City of the Movement,” with the
Feldherrnhalle and the House of German Art; and Berlin, one of the most
popular destinations, it turns out, in the Nazi “Strength through Joy” travel
program, not least because of the regime’s new monuments. Goebbels noted
the thousands of curious onlookers who came every day to see the new chan-
cellery on Vossstrasse, but Semmens does not join them, and so readers’
impressions of the throngs remain superficial.

It is ultimately the lack of detail in this study that is most frustrating. Semmens
points out the tour just on ahead but does not step up front to guide it. Very
interesting topics from the Nazis’ humorless allergy to kitsch, the appeal of
group travel in the Strength through Joy trips, and the popularity of photogra-
phy to the touristic gaze of German soldiers go unexplored. The plentiful
descriptions written up by foreign guests are not utilized at all, although Nazi
Germany was as fascinating especially to British tourists after 1936 as Napoleon’s
Empire had been after the Peace of Amiens in 1802. In the end, readers will not
discover what it was that tourists saw when they traveled in the Third Reich.

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Sexuality and German Fascism. Edited by Dagmar Herzog. New York:
Berghahn Books. 2005. Pp. 352. $25.00 (paper), $75.00 (cloth).

Sex After Fascism: Memory and Morality in Twentieth-Century

Dagmar Herzog opens her introduction to Sexuality and German Fascism with a
simple question: “What is the relationship between sexual and other kinds of
politics?” The essays printed here offer a thought-provoking and sometimes sur-
prising set of approaches to that question. Like most recent research in the
history of sexuality, they focus on “deviant” sexualities—homosexual, com-
mercial, interracial, public—and its policing. They are, however, informed also by
an awareness of the productive and positive, as well as the prohibitive and repressive functions of the societal regulation of sex.

Herzog’s introduction sets the tone for the volume as a whole, observing that it reveals the “interrelationships of stimulus and control, and of normality and exception” (p. 2). The body of her essay examines the relationship between the Nazis’ early claims to be the champions and restorers of sexual discipline and moral order and their later advocacy of pre- and extra-marital sex. Far from being merely sexually repressive and obsessed with reproduction, in some respects National Socialism pursued a “perpetuation, expansion, and intensification of preexisting liberalizing trends,” which they sought to harness to their own “racist, elitist, and homophobic agenda” (p. 4). Their vehement denunciations of Weimar-era pornography, nudity, prostitution, and extra-marital sex as “Jewish” and degenerate masked their own “advocacy of those same things” (p. 12); and their “sacralization of love” (p. 15), the mobilization of young people in Nazi organizations such as the Hitler Youth and the Reich Labor Service, and the social upheaval brought about by the war all rapidly eroded the conservative sexual order. In a kind of second introduction to the volume, Elizabeth Heinemann surveys the literature on sexuality and Nazism and comes to similar conclusions. All in all, she finds, Nazism created new “sexual opportunity as well as sexual repression” (p. 31) and sought to reject both “prudery” and “degeneracy” in favor of a “‘clean’ but distinctly sexual life” (p. 32).

The essays that follow explore particular aspects of the politics of sexuality under National Socialism in greater detail. Two particularly convincing essays, by Julia Roos and Annette Timm, treat the regulation of prostitution, laying out with admirable clarity the continuities and discontinuities in policy in this area between 1920 and 1945. Stefan Micheler’s and Geoffrey Giles’ detailed and thoughtful essays underline the centrality of homophobia to Nazi sexual politics. Patricia Szobar and Birthe Kundrus discuss the enforcement of laws against “race defilement,” treating in fascinating detail the ways in which a contradictory tangle of stereotypes and attitudes shaped policy implementation. Atina Grossmann’s quite moving essay treats the “baby boom” among Jewish survivors in Germany after 1945, which she interprets as a response to catastrophe and death. Erik Jensen discusses the place of the memory of Nazi persecution of homosexual men in the politics of the homosexual rights movements in both Germany and the United States from the 1950s through the 1990s. Finally, in a contribution that offers particularly valuable theoretical insights, Terri J. Gordon discusses the survival into the Nazi period of erotically charged cabaret revues in a new, militarized, and propagandistic form and on the active cultivation of “natural” and “racially healthy” attitudes toward nudity in various forms of regime-sponsored dance and movement programs.
Individually, the stories these essays tell will not be entirely new to most informed readers. For one thing, these essays were first published in the Journal of the History of Sexuality in 2002, and have, for the most part, been only lightly edited here; for another—and not surprisingly, given the furious pace of scholarly production on all things Nazi—frequently these essays build, expand, and comment on publications by the authors themselves or by other scholars. Nevertheless, by bringing together the threads of an ongoing scholarly discussion and placing that discussion in a fresh interpretive framework, this volume does offer a new perspective on National Socialism and sexuality. Taken together, these authors describe a totalitarian regime struggling to accommodate and instrumentalize some forms or expressions of modern sexual “subjectivity” (or selfhood), while repressing or annihilating others. As Gordon puts it, National Socialism sought to mobilize ‘sexuality in a straight-jacket, to release but simultaneously restrain desire, to ‘inhibit’ and inhabit . . . pleasure’ (p. 184). The regime used some forms of sex as a reward, and regarded some kinds of desire as—so to speak—desirable and worthy of an unprecedented level of official support, both discursive (in the case of the defense of a more permissive sexual morality in, for example, SS publications) and policy-political (in the case, for example, of the organization of brothels, or the reform of divorce law). Other forms it ferreted out and punished with unprecedented energy and ferocity.

The questions this perspective raises are under-theorized in the individual contributions. Modernity and modernization, Foucauldian discourse theory and the literature on “biopolitics,” the therapeutic state and society, “cumulative radicalization,” and structuralism and intentionalism, for example, are mentioned in passing in a few of these essays; but there is no sustained effort to use individual research contributions to illuminate these broader interpretive questions (or vice versa). The volume does not give the reader a clear sense, for example, of whether the Nazis’ odd amalgam of incitement and repression was coherent, organic, and stable, or artificial, contradictory, and subject to self-defeating cumulative radicalization. Was this a viable modern form of sexual politics that was (at least partially) demolished by military defeat? Or was its disintegration an integral part of the broader self-destruction of National Socialism?

But, of course, in pointing to such questions, one is not criticizing, but rather appreciating a book like this. These are compelling and important questions, and posing them is precisely what such a collection should accomplish—to reveal the current state of research and to suggest broader issues and questions that need to be addressed. Taken as a whole, this book makes an exciting contribution to our understanding of the sexual politics of National Socialism and the connections between sexual politics and “politics” more traditionally defined.
Herzog opens *Sex After Fascism: Memory and Morality in Twentieth-Century Germany* with a question rather different from that with which she introduced *Sexuality and German Fascism*: “What is the relationship between sexual morality and mass murder and its aftermath?” This is a book less concerned with the politics of sexuality, and more concerned, as Herzog puts it, with “recurrent reconstructions of the memory and meaning of Nazism” (p. 5)—in short, as the subtitle suggests, with memory. Fundamentally, Herzog sees the sexual politics of West Germany after 1945 as having been driven, above all, by feelings of guilt. All parties to the debates over sexual behavior sought to differentiate themselves from the Nazis; all were motivated by profound shame regarding National Socialism and the Holocaust. For this reason, she holds, the debates over sexual politics in West Germany between the 1950s and the 1980s were, in comparative perspective, more vehement than similar debates in other societies in the same period.

Thus, for Herzog, the intense sexual conservatism of the Christian Democratic founders of the Federal Republic of Germany was essentially a diversionary strategy. Aware of the sexual permissiveness, in many areas, of the Nazi regime (and the first chapter of this book recapitulates and expands on Herzog’s argument in her introduction to *Sexuality and German Fascism*), they seized upon sexual morality as a way to distinguish themselves from the Nazi regime—a regime that many of them had, in fact, welcomed with enthusiasm and then supported, out of patriotic conviction, even after it became apparent how divergent their own and the Nazi’s values were. An important part of the “reconstruction of a domesticated heterosexuality” (p. 88) in the 1950s was, in fact, the discursive construction of a connection between the Nazis’ lax sexual morality and their crimes against humanity. Sexual conservatism thus became a “means for Germans to manage the legacy of guilt and shame over the Holocaust” (p. 96). In fact, she holds that Christian Democrats pursued an aggressively conservative sexual politics partly to support “self-exculpatory narratives about the Christian churches’ relationship to Nazism” (p. 75); there was a “dynamic whereby the moral crisis engendered by Nazism was resolved via enforcement of sexual conservatism” (p. 104).

Similarly, the sexual revolution of the 1960s and 1970s was, for Herzog, essentially “about” Nazism and its crimes. Whereas Christian conservatives argued that the Nazis’ sexual permissiveness had been part of a broader moral collapse that led in the end to Auschwitz, the New Left held that the cruelty and madness of the Nazi period had been the product of sexual repression. The crimes of the Nazis were the result of the frustration and “accumulated aggressions” (p. 134) of a sexually deprived population. In this discourse, it was sexually conservative Christians, not libertines, who were tainted with “fascistic” tendencies. Despite some ambivalence about its commercial aspects, therefore, the New Left fundamentally embraced the “sex wave” (the preoccupation with sex in the media,
advertising, popular psychology, and the social sciences) in the 1960s. Funda-
mentally, they seem to have believed that if people made love, they would not
make war—or engage in other aggressive behaviors, such as the accumulation
of capital through the economic exploitation of others. While ostensibly
about Nazism and revolution, however, the sexual politics of the New Left
was actually driven by a need to resolve their conflicted feelings about their
parents. Their Freudian-Marxist intellectual antics were evidence of the
“unconscious wish . . . that the 68ers’ own parents could be killed” (p. 174) in
expiation, and at the same time, of a desire to “exonerate” them, to “rescue
their parents’ honor and innocence” (p. 178)—since, obviously, if capitalism
was responsible for National Socialism, people were not. In the last sentence
in the chapter, Herzog poses the rhetorical question, “what possible psychologi-
cal work in mastering the past and keeping massive depression and self-confron-
tation at bay was being done by the manic society-wide escalation of a culture of
constant sexual invitation and arousal” (p. 183). Not only the New Left’s radi-
calism, then, but the “sex wave” as a whole was driven at least in part by guilt.

Herzog uses East Germany as a kind of foil or counterexample for her story of
the sexual politics of West Germany, devoting one chapter—chapter five—to
the subject. While similar in outline (conservative 1950s, more permissive
1960s and 1970s), the sexual politics of real existing socialism was quite different
in tone. The founders of the GDR did not need to use sexual conservatism to
establish a break with the Nazi past, since “the East secured its antifascist status
above all by emphasizing its anticapitalism” (p. 194). In the 1950s, the GDR
adopted a relatively conservative official sexual culture (for example, recriminal-
izing abortion), but it essentially abandoned the persecution of homosexual
men after 1957, accepted premarital sex as normal and natural as long as it
was motivated by genuine feelings, and encouraged women’s participation in
the labor force and administration—including in leadership positions. As a
consequence, in the 1960s, East Germany passed through a “sexual evolution”
(p. 192) rather than an upheaval like that going on across the border; and since
sexual roles were less rigid and sexual culture more egalitarian, in the 1970s,
many of the demands of feminists were not as relevant or revolutionary as in
the West.

The final chapter of the book briefly recounts the sexual politics of West
Germany since about 1972. Essentially, Herzog argues that, sexually, in the
later 1970s and 1980s, both the New Left and West German society as a
whole lost their way. The New Left imploded not least because women in
the movement called the revolutionary machismo (and sexual practices) of
men in the movement into question. In the ensuing debate, women proposed
that National Socialism be understood as the product of masculine arrogance,
while men proposed that it had been the product of female hysteria. Meanwhile,
the popular culture of sexuality in West German society as a whole fell victim to
the “pharmacologization of sex . . . incessant voyeurism . . ., narcissistic self-display,” and a general “‘onanization’” of sex (p. 253). Therefore, the “disappearing sexual ethos of the GDR quickly became an especially important site for Ostalgie” (p. 218) after 1989, but nostalgia does not represent an alternative to growing sexual boredom.

In some cases, Herzog seems to overstate her case in this book. This is particularly true in her discussion of sexual conservatism. It may be that the “majority of the population experienced the Third Reich not as a sexually conservative time but rather as one in which the general processes of liberalization of heteroerosexual mores that had been ongoing since the beginning of the twentieth century were perceived as progressing further and as escalating” (p. 19); but this popular perception surely offers us only a very partial insight into the sexual politics of National Socialism, as described for example in Sexuality and German Fascism. On a whole range of issues—contraception, abortion, prostitution, homosexual acts—the Nazis broke and reversed (in law and/or police practice) the powerful liberalizing trends of the 1920s. Herzog herself remarks at one point that the history of sexual politics in these decades is characterized by a “complicated combination of rupture and continuity” (p. 107); but her focus on the extent to which the Nazis encouraged all sorts of heterosexual sex between “Aryans” tends to obscure that complexity. Similarly, Herzog suggests that the Nazi period shows us that there is “no necessary link between sexual conservatism and political conservatism” (p. 263); but, of course, the Nazis were not politically conservative. And Herzog’s assertion that the sexual conservatism of Christian Democrats in the 1950s was a diversionary strategy is not completely convincing, since the perception that there was a crisis of sexual morality was central to Christian conservative political thought (and legislative agendas) by the 1890s at the latest. On the other hand, the idea that there was a connection between progressive politics and sexual liberalization, which so appealed to the New Left, also derived from a tradition reaching back at least to August Bebel’s Woman Under Socialism; neither it nor the quite astonishing legal liberalization of the 1960s and 1970s (which enacted parts of a legislative agenda developed in the 1920s) were invented as a response either to Nazism or to post-fascist conservatism. Finally, some readers may find Herzog’s depiction of East German gender relations rather too rosy, since it only briefly addresses the earlier discussion of the double burden of paid and unpaid domestic work performed by women in the GDR.

Again, however, while one may take issue with some interpretations here, doing so is not so much a criticism as a tribute to the scope and brilliance of Herzog’s inquiry. This is a conceptually “big,” enormously ambitious, and stimulating book, one that tackles head-on a whole range of complex, interesting, and important questions and offers a wealth of convincing and exciting insights. Herzog’s discussion of the sexual politics both of National Socialism and of the
New Left is superb. Her treatment of the New Left is sufficiently dense and insightful to make her analysis of the psychodynamics of sexual and political radicalism—normally dangerous ground for the historian—quite convincing. And her reconstruction of the vagaries of the historical memory of National Socialism, of the deployment of divergent retrospective models of the relationship between sexuality and politics, is magnificent, a challenging and exciting contribution to our understanding of the history both of sexuality and of “memory.” All in all, whether historians agree or disagree with particular aspects of Herzog’s account, this book is a bold contribution, one that will be fruitful not only because it offers readers important and original insights, but also because it will generate important questions, shaping scholarly discussion and research on the history of sexuality in modern Germany for years to come.

These two books are not quite a matched pair, since the one focuses more on policy and practice, and the other on ideas and the construction of meaning. Taken together, however, they give us a coherent account of the trajectory of German sexual politics over a period of more than a half-century, and effectively reorient our chronological and conceptual framework in this field. They pose fundamental questions, and, implicitly, establish a rich and exciting research agenda for historians not only of sexuality but of politics generally (and not only in Germany). Both books should arguably be essential readings for the historian of twentieth-century Germany.

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During the Second World War, Germans fought a “two-front war.” A “community of fate” bound together Germans at home and Germans in uniform who carried the war beyond Germany’s borders. “Between 1939 and 1945, there
was no doubt that civilians were no longer excluded from the fighting; they found themselves right in the middle of it—as actors, as observers, and as those who bore the suffering” (part 1, p. 2) of the war. The Nazi leadership knew this from the start, and only days after the Nazi invasion of Poland, Hermann Göring was exhorting a factory workforce to remember: “We are now all fighters at the front!” (part 1, p. 8). Jörg Echternkamp reminds us of this in his introduction to this massive two-part volume, the latest installment in the history of *Germany in the Second World War* that has occupied historians of the Military History Research Office (Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, or MGFA) for the last twenty-five years. Echternkamp is the editor, and he deserves enormous credit for pulling together a collection of twenty essays—some of which could easily stand on their own as monographs, all of which are grounded in staggering amounts of original research—that not only summarize what we know about the impact of the war on the homefront in Germany, but also add considerably to that knowledge. Previous volumes in the MGFA series (seven of which are available from Oxford University Press in English translation) have focused primarily on the military planning, the war at the front, and the organization of the war economy at home. In the more than 2,000 pages of this two-part volume, contributors turn their attention to the impact of the war on German society. The results are extremely impressive, and what Echternkamp has brought together will be the starting point for anyone who wants to understand the war at home in Germany.

In his introduction, Echternkamp provides not only a succinct, comprehensive overview of the major themes that will be taken up by his co-authors, but he also describes big questions that frame the collaborative project. These “leitmotifs” include 1) the concept of “total war” as the mobilization of the entire society and as the state’s attempt to exert total control over all aspects of public and private life; 2) the importance of comparisons of experiences in the First and Second World War, what distinguished them, and the ways in which the first twentieth-century war affected planning and expectations for the second; and 3) the ways in which Germans experienced the violence of the war, both as perpetrators and victims, and the reciprocal effect between violence at the front and violence within Germany. “The state certainly organized the war and violence, but the society nonetheless pushed both forward,” concludes Echternkamp (part 1, p. 84). Particularly important is the commitment to understanding how the “genocidal conduct of war in the East influenced the war against the domestic enemy, reaching a high point in the industrial mass murder of European Jews” (part 1, p. 86).

The accounts of life on the homefront provided here illuminate the effects of a conflict that was definitively “not just Hitler’s war” and challenge post-1945 collective memories, sometimes echoed in historical accounts, according to which a fanatical handful of Nazis started a war that all Germans lost. Individual
contributions also reflect methodological approaches that seek to illuminate those points at which cultural, political, and social history intersect. The volume thus also contributes to an expanded understanding of military history that moves well beyond the story of troop formations, strategy, and battle plans to include not only a history of everyday life but also analyses of collective mentalities and emotions. Contributors draw on archival sources generated by the state, but they also look at letters, newspapers, broadsides, posters, films, photographs, postwar interrogations, memoirs, and eyewitness accounts penned after the fact, and they complement national with regional and local archival sources, illuminating how the same event could look quite different when viewed from the parish pump or Berlin. Thus, the volumes add not only significantly to our knowledge of Germany in the Second World War, but they also raise key questions about how best to write a history of any war. Echternkamp has assembled an impressive group of contributors—twenty-three in all, women and men, mainly from Germany but with a leavening from other countries. And (at least in the German academic context), they are relatively young; only six have birthdates before 1960. The authors are thus not rehashing past scholarly triumphs; rather, they are presenting the results of cutting-edge work that, read together, is redefining how we think about (and who gets to write) military history. There is much that distinguishes this volume from other histories of the Second World War.

I’ve already exhausted about a third of the words granted me to review the volume, which means less than a word per page to summarize the rest of this monumental work. I will attempt only to outline the staggering range of topics that Echternkamp has pulled together between four hardcovers. The volume is divided into four parts. “Rule, Destruction, Survival” begins with Armin Nolzen’s analysis of the ways in which the Nazi party organized German society during the war, not in opposition to the general population, but rather with its overwhelming support. Karola Fings examines the branches (Aussenlager) created in German cities by larger concentration camps. These housed the prisoners who played an increasingly important part in clearing away the undetonated bombs, dead bodies, and rubble as the Allied bombing campaign leveled urban areas. Her analysis raises pointed questions about postwar Germans’ claims that they remained completely ignorant about the violence of the concentration camp system. The relation of the war to Nazi policies toward the Jews is the subject of Tobias Jersak’s contribution. He argues that there was a direct relation between the goals of “Final Victory” and “Final Solution” and presents evidence of multiples sources from which many Germans could know of the mass murder of European Jews. These treatments of Germans’ violence against others is complemented by Ralf Blank’s discussion of the consequences of the Allied bombing war—the most widely shared experience of the violence of others against Germans, interpreted by Nazi propagandists as yet another manifestation of the manipulative power of world Jewry.
In part two, “A Uniformed Society/Society in Uniform?,” the military takes center stage. This is, however, not a military history of troop movements and battle strategy, but rather one that looks in detail at the ideological training of men in uniform, described by Jürgen Förster in an analysis that carefully examines how the experience of the First World War influenced “spiritual” preparation for the Second. In his meticulous study of one infantry division, Christoph Rass documents the transition from years of relative stability in division membership in 1941 and 1942 to the accelerating dissolution of social and institutional structures particularly in the last six months of the war. And in his panoramic review of military leaders who bore responsibility for the triumph of the Nazis but over time came to oppose them, Winfried Heinemann traces a progression from dismay over Hitler’s prosecution of the war to disgust over the criminal nature of the war. This part of German society in uniform by no means shared uniform beliefs.

In part three, authors turn their attention to how Germans made sense of the war and the events surrounding them. Sven Oliver Müller analyzes the ways in which a language of nationalism—based on conceptions of a Völksgemeinschaft from which the “other” had been excluded—was effectively used by the Nazis to tie together those on the homefront with soldiers at the front, unifying different social classes and regions. “The cultural conduct of war,” “total entertainment” for a total war, and Goebbels’ use of film, radio, and theater to communicate propaganda—and allow Germans to laugh and relax, believing that cultural productions were free from politics—is the subject of Birthe Kundrus’ contribution. The propaganda analyzed by Jeffrey Herf is Goebbels’ presentation of the war as a struggle against “international Jewry,” closely linked to Bolshevism, but also capable of pulling strings behind the scenes in the United States and Great Britain. Aristotle A. Kallis critically examines the limits of propaganda to convince the German public once things began to go from bad to worse in 1942 and 1943. As the gulf widened between the regime’s claims and what Germans knew of how the war was progressing, Goebbels’ ministry could no longer exercise a “monopoly over the truth.” Growing disbelief in the regime’s claims also registers clearly in the letters from the front analyzed by Katrin Kilian, who takes these personal testimonies as a measure of the limits to the regime’s success at indoctrination. A different sort of personal testimony interests Rafael Zagovec, who offers a riveting analysis of the interrogations of German prisoners of war by western Allied intelligence forces who quickly determined that there was no one “German mind” and that soldiers gave many different answers to the question, “What have you been fighting for?” Industrial managers are the last social group discussed in this survey of how Germans lived through the war, and Georg Wagner-Kyora investigates the ways in which Nazi concepts of “leadership of men” and the “community of the firm” translated into practice at the level of the factory with very
different consequences for German workers and the concentration-camp prisoners who labored under the same roof.

By late 1944, fully one-fourth of the labor force in Germany consisted of forced laborers—foreign workers, POWs, and concentration-camp victims. Of the nearly thirteen-and-a-half million forced laborers who worked in Germany between 1939 and 1945, close to two-and-a-half million were dead by the war’s end. Of concentration camp prisoners forced to work in Germany, only thirty-one percent survived. Essays that examine the experience of these “others” and the ways in which they were perceived by the German population bring the volume to a close. Mark Spoerer looks at the complex legal codification of the hierarchy among different sorts of slave workers according to nationality and ethnicity and their status as prisoners of war or prisoners of concentration camps, a stunning example of the legal pretense of a thoroughly criminal regime. Rüdiger Overmans offers a similar analysis of the codification of the status of prisoners of war. On the basis of a comprehensive survey of the treatment of POWs bearing different national colors, he concludes that the Nazis calculated that fair treatment of the POWs of the western Allies would prompt fair treatment of Germans who fell into Allied hands. No such concerns informed treatment of Soviet soldiers; of the more than three million taken captive, most died. Soviets were on the lowest rung of the Nazis’ “hierarchical ladder of nations” (part 2, p. 811). In the co-authored contribution of Ela Hornung, Ernst Langthaler, and Sabine Schweitzer, the focus is on the use of forced labor in the countryside. Although Nazi imperialist visions included a future in which Germans would live off harvests from a subjugated Eastern Europe, by the war’s end, it was increasingly eastern Europeans working on German farms who fed the Reich. Sometimes working, sometimes eating and sleeping in close quarters with their employers, they embodied another way in which the consequences of the Nazi’s war of aggression came home to Germany. Foreign workers in industry had a very different experience. This becomes clear in Oliver Rathkolb’s study of foreign workers in heavy industrial and manufacturing factories, a workforce on which industrialists relied to ensure increasing production levels and profits. Bernhard Chiari uses Paul Célan, a Romanian Jew who lived through occupation by the Soviets, then the Nazis, as a symbol of the complexity of ethnic politics in Eastern Europe to open the volume’s final substantive contribution, a careful look at Nazi occupation policies and relations between Nazis and indigenous populations in the occupied parts of the Soviet Union. Chiari’s sweeping survey offers an excellent overview of nationality politics in eastern Europe since 1918, the range of forms of Nazi occupation policies, insights into the limits to collaboration between the Germans and those they “liberated” from the Soviets, and evidence of the willingness of many of those oppressed by communism to oppress—and participate in the murder of—those who shared Célan’s faith. In his concluding remarks,
Hans-Ulrich Thamer asks whether the accelerated process of Gleichschaltung during the war and the dissolution of traditional forms of politics and social relations leveled the ground for a process of “forcible modernization” that rested on an “antidemocratic and anti-human ideology” (part 2, p. 992). A bibliography of nearly one hundred tightly printed pages brings up the rear.

Like any good editor, Echternkamp is at pains to admit what the volume does not do. There is more to say about the history of political semantics and discourse, conceptions of masculinity and femininity, relations between the sexes, and religion. Specifying the peculiarity of the German experience will require a more systematic comparison with other national cases, and the diachronic comparisons offered by some authors might be pursued by others. The topic of military justice, assigned to Manfred Messerschmidt, took on such big dimensions that it has appeared as a separate monograph (Manfred Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmachtführung 1933-1945 [Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, 2005]). And the story of the war’s last year—including the expulsion of Germans from Eastern Europe and the war on German soil—will be the stuff of the final tenth volume in the series. But 2,000 pages later, what lingers is not what is missing but how much this book accomplishes. It really deserves not one, but twenty reviews, one for each of the contributions. Against the background of commemorative events surrounding the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War in which all too often, Germans appeared as a “Wir” with a unified past, this volume presents a war-time Germany that included many ethnicities, nationalities, classes, and two genders, people in cities and in the countryside, those who owned factories and farms, those who were their employees—some working for wages, others for food and a chance at survival, those who opposed the regime, those who found modes of accommodation, and those who enthusiastically embraced it. This range of experiences is brought together here under one roof, a multi-perspectival approach that affirms that any history of Germany in the Second World War must include the multiple histories of those who lived through it. This is the whole, much bigger than the sum of its parts, that emerges from this very important book.

ROBERT G. MOELLER
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To date, debates about the identity and motives of perpetrators of German extermination policies have focused on the Einsatzgruppen (mobile squads of the
Security Police and the Security Service), concentration camp personnel, and the Order Police. Martin Cu¨ppers now presents the first systematic study of one of the best documented, yet least publicized set of units that participated in the murder of European Jews. He explores three Waffen-SS brigades and some smaller units under the Kommandostab Reichsfu¨hrer-SS. In some respects, the book’s title is misleading. It does not cover the military wing of the SS as a whole and, if anything, it demonstrates that the Kommandostab was of minor importance since it was never really in command of anything. Serving as a transmitter of information and as an organizational tool, it further declined in importance after early 1942. In addition, just as with other perpetrator units, the Waffen-SS brigades did not murder only Jews; the book does deal with the brigades’ other victims though the book title does not suggest it.

Most men and officers in these units had a middle-class background. Unsurprisingly, the majority were Nazis (unlike in the Order Police and Army); two-thirds belonged to other Nazi organizations. Perhaps every fifth man was an ethnic German, usually from the Balkans. The officers in the SS brigades were, on average, highly educated and had been professionally quite successful before they joined the Waffen-SS. Cu¨ppers describes the members of the SS brigades as conscious and devoted Nazis who regularly underwent ideological education.

Formed in April 1941, the Kommandostab and the Waffen-SS brigades carried out “pacification” operations in the rear-occupied Soviet territories. Earlier, units from which the brigades were formed had participated in violence in Poland from 1939 onwards. They had massacred civilians, Jews, and the Christian intelligentsia. They had also engaged in anti-Semitic terror, including expulsions, ghettoization, and the organization of forced labor (pp. 33–60). After the attack on the Soviet Union, the SS Cavalry Regiments and the 1st SS Infantry Brigade were among the first units to start gradually with the total extermination not only of Soviet Jewish men but also women and children when they combed remote areas in Southern Belarus and Northern Ukraine in August 1941. Cu¨ppers provides a much more complete picture of these previously known events and argues that the brigades played a “crucial role” in the genesis of the Holocaust (p. 271, cf. pp. 176–77). He estimates that the brigades murdered more than 50,000 Jews in 1941. The 1st SS Infantry Brigade and smaller units under the Kommandostab continued to slaughter Byelorussian and Polish Jews in 1942 and 1943. By contrast, the 2nd SS Infantry Brigade committed strikingly few atrocities.

In covering the activities of the SS brigades in anti-partisan warfare in the German-occupied Soviet territories from 1941 to 1943, the study breaks little new ground (pp. 215–33 and 239–70). Most of the tens of thousands of victims of these operations were unarmed, non-Jewish civilians: “non-residents” (Ortsfremde) and refugees in 1941, and peasants near guerilla bases
after mid-1942. Furthermore, two brigades were responsible for Soviet POW camps in late 1941 where they tortured, killed, and starved to death many Soviet citizens. Cüppers thus exposes the murder of some 25,000 people, an extermination policy against POWs that was possibly even more cruel than that carried out by the German Army units otherwise in charge of POW camps. This topic, however, deserves more than just six pages of coverage (pp. 233–39).

The material in this book is intense, frightening, and, at times, hardly bearable. Martin Cüppers writes like a passionate state prosecutor: He is factually meticulous, reluctant in his language, yet very dense in his descriptions. Immensely diligent, he has used all directly related primary and most of the relevant secondary sources. One learns everything one would possibly ever want to know about the genesis, recruitment, commanders, deployment, assignments, and movements of the SS units in question. Numerous biographical paragraphs are sprinkled over the text. The detailed coverage of individual operations, however, is sometimes overly descriptive.

This book makes it seem as if the Waffen-SS brigades operated almost in a vacuum. Relevant records on occupation policies from the Eastern Ministry or the General Governor of Poland were not consulted, military records only used selectively. In this way, neatly stripped of much of their context, the misdeeds of the SS brigades are presented as merely ideological, with motives at most complemented by personal greed and occasionally sexual perversion. Many of the officers in charge, however, were highly educated and socially well established. Is it not possible that they were also motivated by rather pragmatic imperialist aims—to secure territory, to engage in economic exploitation, and to keep the local populace under control? Cüppers does not really examine this possibility. In addition, he downplays the influence of the Army on the assignments of the SS brigades and ignores that of the civil administrations, except for a hint that the brigades were sometimes “called to action by the various institutions of the German occupation apparatus” (p. 54; yes, that vague!). But for whom did the brigades round up forced labor, spare workers from executions, seize agricultural products, and secure harvests and farming areas? Cüppers’ limited understanding begins with the deficient interpretation of the origins of the brigades; in fact, the army had initially called for more SS and police units in order to secure rear Soviet territories (pp. 63–64). In addition, with regard to ideological motives, Cüppers focuses one-sidedly on anti-Semitism and, in the process, marginalizes anti-Slavism, anti-communism, racial biology, social politics, and the political education of the men. He also neglects other victim groups (pp. 97–106, 122, 141, and 202–03). The infamous mass execution witnessed by Himmler in Minsk on August 15, 1941—where the victims included both Jews and gentiles—consequently mutates into a massacre “of Jews” (p. 183).
The volume contributes relatively little to general research problems. In addition to narrowing possible perpetrator motivations, it does not add much new about decision-making concerning the extermination of Soviet Jews in 1941. Contrary to his claim, the author can only partially challenge the myth of the Waffen-SS as having been “ordinary soldiers” because the Waffen-SS brigades were special units created for operations in rear areas. Likewise, it was known before that more than thirty Waffen-SS divisions killed non-combatants and that about 50,000 of their personnel served as concentration camp guards (a comprehensive picture is still missing; Cüppers provides only episodes, pp. 339–47). It remains a big question whether these Waffen-SS divisions systematically committed atrocities during front operations—their main business—and whether they thus fought differently from the ordinary German military. To answer this question, Cüppers would have needed to research more fully the periods in which the brigades were deployed at the front.

This study nonetheless closes an important gap in our knowledge and will do future researchers a great service. Its dense description is impressive, even if it provides few new impulses to scholarship beyond the factual level.

CHRISTIAN GERLACH
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH


This concise study of the German army’s anti-partisan campaigns on the Eastern Front in World War II provides added detail and nuance to historical understanding of the “war of devastation” launched by the Nazi leadership. While titanic armies clashed on the battlefields, German campaigns in the occupied territories behind the front also took a devastating toll, with “the destruction of more than 5,000 villages and the killing of up to 300,000 mainly civilian Soviet citizens” (p. 27). This brutal treatment was meted out not only by the indoctrinated killers of the SS units, but also by units of the German army (contrary to the idealized depictions of a “fundamentally decent” regular army circulated after 1945). Shepherd aims to reveal the mix of “personal influences and particular conditions” (p. 33) and their interplay in causing the brutalization of the German army, the Wehrmacht. Shepherd states, “the Wehrmacht was the single institution that, more than any other, shaped the lives and actions of ordinary Germans between 1933 and 1945” (p. 28), with eleven million men serving in its ranks in this period.
To deliver “a nuanced, differentiated view” (p. 28), this study delves below the level of the highest ranks of command to examine mid-level army officers, the “ordinary men” enacting policies on the ground. Shepherd’s special focus rests on one grouping, the 221st Security Division, operating in present-day Belarus, then the rear area of Army Group Center. Its campaigns from 1941 to 1943 are examined in detail and compared against records of other units. In the process, Shepherd uncovers a diversity of responses and approaches, dependent both upon the orientations of particular officers and the immediate press of circumstances confronting the troops. Yet the author repeatedly stresses that this does not in any way excuse the realities, which in any case were marked by a “continuum of brutality” (p. 217). Shepherd discusses the prehistory shaping the backgrounds and motivations of the mid-level officers. He usefully identifies three generational groups of Wehrmacht officers, often in tension with one another, and the crucial rise of the figure of the military technocrat, an expert practitioner of the new industrialized violence. After 1933, the brutal ideology of the National Socialist state combined with other, earlier preconceptions and prejudices against Jews and Slavs, united to anti-Bolshevism. The result was a potent affinity for Nazism, although the brutalization that resulted was not inevitable or universal. In practice, Shepherd argues, the nazification of the Wehrmacht was thus, in fact, a “self-imposed process” (p. 15). In addition, Shepherd concludes that officers coming from the eastern parts of Germany, often with prior experience with and antipathies toward Slavic populations, would later figure prominently in the brutalization behind the Eastern Front. These prior factors and orientations would come into play in particular circumstances and conditions of antiguerrilla warfare.

The author usefully sets the ultimately self-destructive approach to antiguerrilla warfare practiced by the Germans in World War II against a more general background of European history as well. While effective approaches to antiguerrilla warfare combine engagement, pacification, and exploitation of the territory, Prussian military tradition had a long-standing aversion to what it considered an irregular, denatured warfare, producing a “remarkable propensity for brutality in antiguerrilla warfare” (p. 45). As a result, from 1941, “The Eastern Army’s antipartisan campaign thus responded to a burgeoning and increasingly effective partisan movement with a confused and ultimately self-defeating mix of terror and cultivation” (p. 33). To begin with, in tandem with the invasion of the Soviet Union, a series of three directives known as the “criminal orders” were issued to the three million German troops massed for the attack, ideologically endorsing brutal conduct toward enemy prisoners and civilians. In the late summer and fall of 1941, as the invasion dragged on without the expected lightning victory, terror was deliberately used, even while no partisan movement was present, to forestall any resistance. “The hardening effects of frustration and fear” (p. 75) combined with ideology and focused
on a composite image of the enemy, where, allegedly, “Jew equaled Bolshevik equaled partisan” (p. 88). In 1942, the dynamics changed, as an increasingly effective partisan movement, in fact, emerged and the civilian population’s mood turned against the German occupiers. Attempts at a more conciliatory approach to the civilian population ultimately failed because of the overall thrust of Nazi ambitions for the region, and in particular because of failed promises of agricultural reform and the press-ganging of civilians into forced labor as “eastern workers.” The circle could not be squared, as “the population must be cultivated [but] could not be trusted” (p. 126). Yet these pragmatic attempts at moderation were not the result of some moral conversion on the part of the officers earlier capable of atrocities: They grew out of the desperate circumstances and changing balance of forces (growing partisan numbers and the declining quality of manpower and equipment in overstretched German forces), and though the formula of “more sugar, less whip” (p. 143) was invoked, conduct remained harsh overall. As their situation grew increasingly desperate, the German forces shifted again to a more brutal policy of “dead zones” in 1943, laying waste to suspect areas. In the Soviet advance of 1944, the weakened German security forces were wiped out. Shepherd concludes, concerning the balance of factors shaping their brutal record, that “ideology provided the real concrete” (p. 224) and thus “conditions, then, were not the root cause of German brutality, but at all . . . stages of the campaign, they played a pivotal role in either intensifying or moderating it” (p. 230). This study’s sources include military reports, orders, and soldiers’ letters. One might only wish that the author had filled out the picture further by devoting some space to discussing how the experience of this anti-partisan warfare was later encoded or distorted in popular memory in postwar Germany. Yet the contribution of the study is clear: “The overall balance sheet of terror and rapacity” yields “a singularly damning picture overall” (p. 27), and consequently, understanding how this process functioned, in all of its complexities and diversities, is all the more urgent.

VEJAS GABRIEL LIULEVICIUS
UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE


Weinberg pursues a simple question: What “visions” of the postwar world did the principal leaders of the major belligerent powers develop during the war?
Weinberg's unsurpassed mastery of World War II as a global war allows him to pen eight compelling portraits of Hitler, Mussolini, Tojo, Chiang, Stalin, Churchill, de Gaulle, and Roosevelt and their ideas for the future positions of their country. Each essay constitutes a minor masterpiece of concision and erudition in and of itself. My only quibble is that Weinberg exclusively concentrates on the top leadership and ignores the lower working levels of postwar planning—there may have been less “vision” there but most of the “grunt” work was done by those planners. Much information in these portraits is known to specialists, but there are some surprising insights, too.

Not surprisingly, Hitler's plans for mastery and a new racial order in Europe, as well as a colonial empire in Africa and Asia, come across as most wildly ambitious. Astoundingly, his territorial plans for Central Asia stretched beyond the Urals and the Caucasus, and he pushed his ally Japan into the war against the United States by promising a division of spheres along the line of the seventieth degree longitude (map on p. xxiv). Hitler was the only leader with a program “to bring about a total demographic and racial reordering of the globe” (p. 18). This included a killing program by way of “euthanasia” of handicapped people, along with wounded veterans of both World War I and II; the sterilization of German women who were expected to give birth to defective babies in order “to eliminate the imagined danger of racial degeneration” (p. 21); mass sterilization of Slavs along with kidnapping of Polish babies that looked like Aryans; and, of course, wholesale annihilation of Jews, as well as Roma and Sinti. The Nazis' New Order envisioned “the most horrendous experiments” for Poland (p. 32), harsh regimes for France and Great Britain. Had I been born in the “Donau- and Alpengaue” after the war, a mandatory twelve-year military service would have awaited me instead of the eight months I served in the Austrian army.

Weinberg is firmly in the camp that argues that Mussolini was a rabid expansionist with his visions of “Roman” grandeur in the Mediterranean and North Africa, where he wanted to redirect Italian emigration. But the indigenous population would “continue to live in the Italian empire, unlike the Slavic people of eastern Europe” under Hitler (p. 49). Weinberg’s conclusion: Mussolini wanted to change the world, not transform it. The same could not be said of Tojo, whose exact vision is the least known. He envisioned a Japanese Empire as vast as Hitler’s, with the conquered territories of East Asia to be ruled as puppets in the fashion of Manchukuo; the same would happen with Australia-New Zealand, Alaska, and the entire West Coasts of the Americas after their conquest. Like Mussolini, Tojo had no plans to exterminate indigenous peoples, but neither did he have vast Japanese colonization schemes for the conquered territories.

China’s Chiang Kai-Shek’s position as a world leader was vastly elevated by the war. Chiang pushed an anti-colonial agenda like Roosevelt and did not want to see the return of the European imperialists. The U.S. granted him the return of Manchuria and Taiwan, and a trusteeship in Korea; he also had
territorial ambitions in Outer Mongolia. President Roosevelt pushed him as one of “four policemen” against Stalin and Churchill’s wills, which eventually netted him a permanent seat for China on the United Nation’s Security Council. His greatest breakthrough came with the ending of all Western extraterritorial rights in China.

Only Stalin’s territorial ambitions matched those of Hitler’s and Tojo’s; they opportunistically grew with the war’s military successes rather than being well developed from the beginning such as Hitler’s. His control of much of Eastern Europe—essentially “exchanging German with Soviet domination” (p. 129)—emerged early in the war. He aimed at weakening Germany through dismemberment, disarmament, and huge reparations. He was determined to establish his control over Poland with the expulsion of its German inhabitants. He was hostile vis-à-vis the U.S. and full of suspicions over FDR’s anti-colonial agenda. Stalin had extreme visions of grandeur for Moscow like Hitler did for “Germania”—the future German capital.

The Western leaders’ visions and ambitions are more predictable. The imperialists Churchill and de Gaulle wanted to reestablish their prewar empires. Roosevelt’s dictum on Churchill’s refusal to retreat from empire seems valid: He “was running things on an 1890 set of ideas” (p. 262, n. 42). Like de Gaulle, Churchill wanted to weaken Germany by dismembering it. With his idea of a “fat but impotent” Germany (p. 150), Churchill initially supported Morgenthau’s scheme to ruralize Germany permanently, yet maintain a high standard of living. But once Poland was moved westward and the German population would be expelled from the rural areas of these borderlands, a “Morgenthau plan” for an agrarian Germany was no longer feasible (pp. 151, 154, 170). Weinberg’s stress on the changing dynamics behind Morgenthau’s Plan may be the most surprising insight of this book.

Franklin Roosevelt, the reluctant wartime planner, clearly is Weinberg’s hero. Roosevelt did not like German dismemberment in theory but allowed it in practice. He strongly supported demilitarization (“no aircraft, no uniforms, no marching,” p. 182) and punishing the Nazi war criminals. Roosevelt had a “raw deal” for Germany and a “new deal” for Japan in mind (p. 204). He worked hard for the United Nations, his new, world organization. He was the arch anti-imperialist, and Weinberg sees the postwar decolonization of the world as FDR’s ultimate triumph. In a concluding chapter, Weinberg surveys which of these postwar visions was implemented: Churchill reluctantly presided over the retreat from empire, while de Gaulle reversed himself and eventually let the French colonies go. Hitler’s extreme vision was least attained, while the American president achieved most of his goals and thus shaped the “American century” like no one else.

GÜNTHER BISCHOF
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In his examination of the Nuremberg Medical Trial conducted by the American Military Tribunal in 1946, Horst H. Freyhofer has not, in fact, written a book about an important war crimes trial; this is rather a book that ponders whether we can “comprehend” the crimes of Nazi doctors engaged in some of the most heinous medical experiments in history. This is a short volume that tries to cover too much: the Hippocratic oath; the history of human experimentation by doctors; the ethical implications of medical crimes from the beginning of “Western Civilization” to the present; and a theoretical analysis of medical ethics from Goldhagen, to Socrates, to Darwin, to Nietzsche, to Hegel. Freyhofer fails to provide a contextual examination of the medical trial or of Nazi trials in general. The book would have benefited greatly from an examination of the important literature on war crimes trials (Gary Bass, Belinda Cooper, Ian Buruma, Lawrence Douglas, Jörg Friedrich, Michael Marrus, and Mark Osiel, to name but a few). These scholars address key questions about the trope of the trial as a forum for the teaching of history lessons, as a political event, and for its success and failure in seeking justice in cases of mass atrocity. Freyhofer does not explore any of these avenues. Instead, the author’s main thesis is that the trial “symbolizes a break, not so much with the image physicians have of themselves, but with the image patients have of themselves” (p. 11). Freyhofer argues that the trial made patients conscious—for the first time—that doctors did not always have their best interests at heart. While this is an interesting observation, it does not suffice to keep the reader engaged in the history of the trial.

Organized into three chapters, The Nuremberg Medical Trial begins with an examination of medicine and experimentation on humans. Although Freyhofer does point out that experimentation was widespread throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, he focuses his study on German medicine and especially the ideological fusion of biology and state in the Nazi period. He is especially interested in the laws leading to sterilization and euthanasia under Hitler; however, here, too, he neglects some of the most important scholarship in the field (Henry Friedlander’s work on T4—the Nazi euphemism for their euthanasia program—is central to any understanding of Nazi medicine). This chapter ends with a discussion about the ethical dilemmas surrounding the use of data from Nazi experiments. In the next chapter, the weakest in the book, Freyhofer provides an analysis of the trial through the law. His own position, however, is difficult to ascertain, and there are many errors. In describing the four criminal charges created by the IMT, which constituted Control Council Law #10, Freyhofer does not mention or define the Allied Control
Council and how these charges were created; he also does not explain that the four criminal charges used at Nuremberg could only be applied in conjunction with the waging of aggressive war. Adding this stipulation to the charges meant that only Germany (as the aggressor) was subject to the trials and the Allies could not be held accountable for their own possible war crimes. But the aggressive war clause also made it difficult for the Allies to try the Nazis with any crimes committed before the war on their own population, such as euthanasia—a crime central to the medical trial. Freyhofer does not address this problem. In describing the charges (war crimes, conspiracy to commit war crimes, crimes against peace, crimes against humanity), Freyhofer fails to address controversial trial methods, such as the use of witnesses, which was a large step away from the first Nuremberg trial of the Major War Criminals that was conducted almost entirely using documents. He also assumes that the charges laid at the Medical trial—war crimes and crimes against humanity—were designed to bring to light the genocidal nature of the crimes. In 1946, genocide as an atrocity was just beginning to be defined, and the term was not applied in the indictment or in the courtroom. In casually using the term genocide, Freyhofer misses another relevant discussion.

Particularly baffling is Freyhofer’s subsection entitled “How fair, How just, How competent?” According to Freyhofer’s logic, criticism of the trial can easily be silenced by the fact that there were acquittals, which “bore testimony to the trial’s judicial fairness” (p. 87). He goes on to argue that by default, the acquittals “seemed to confirm the justness of the verdicts passed on those who were not acquitted.” Surely acquittals are not an accurate measure of fairness, but such important factors as the evidence gathering process, corroboration, the impartiality of the prosecutors and judges, the applicability of the charges used, the right to defense, and the accuracy of witness testimony. Freyhofer does not examine the many other features that come into play in a trial’s judicial evenhandedness. Finally, Freyhofer mistakenly assumes that “Control Council Law #10 became a part of the German legal system and led to the indictment and conviction of many more perpetrators in later years” (p. 89). In fact, the international criminal charges were never adopted in Germany, and it was precisely the decision not to assume these charges that led to many acquittals and perversely mild sentences for Nazi perpetrators in postwar West German courts.

Freyhofer’s study is beset by vagueness and lack of context. In his final chapter, he attempts an ethical analysis of the trial, but offers instead an ethical analysis of the crimes themselves and an attempted examination of perpetrator psychology. He does introduce some of the most important work on Nazi doctors, such as Robert Lifton’s seminal work, but he does not back his findings up with the extraordinarily rich literature on perpetrator mentality (Browning, Milgram, Zimbardo, etc.). The materials here have much potential for further research, and Freyhofer makes an astute observation that there is a curious lack of
serious bioethical examination of Nazi medical experiments. Freyhofer hopes to fill that gap with this book; unfortunately, he does not succeed.

**REBECCA WITTMANN**
**UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO**


In *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, Hannah Arendt used elements of Israeli interrogations and portions of the Jerusalem trial to reconstruct Eichmann’s career, his role in the Final Solution, and, in sketchy strokes, the Final Solution itself. She did not cover the trial in detail: In his memoirs, Raul Hilberg even suggested that she did not personally attend Eichmann’s testimony. A philosopher by training, she also did not conduct primary source research. She simply read deeply into Eichmann’s own version of events, accepting much, questioning some, creating a plausible and readable story that included scenes from the trial.

The West German trial of various Auschwitz officials and guards in 1963–65 closely followed the Israeli trial of Eichmann. Rebecca Wittmann’s carefully researched study of the Auschwitz trial, however, is almost the polar opposite of Arendt’s book. Wittmann wisely eschewed the attempt to describe the huge Auschwitz camp complex through trial evidence and proceedings. In the first place, expert West German historians had already attempted, on the basis of information available in the early 1960s, to survey the “SS-State” and Auschwitz’s place within it—this study was part of the pretrial investigation and was used, to a limited extent, at the trial itself. But an even more important reason for avoiding a broad focus on the Auschwitz camps was the relative low standing of many of the defendants. One simply could not get at the essence of Auschwitz through examination of the activities or the motives of a motley group of twenty defendants, only three of whom were major figures in the camp hierarchy—Richard Baer, the camp commander from May 1944 to January 1945; Baer’s adjutant Karl Höcker; and Rudolf Höss’s adjutant, Robert Karl Mulka.

Drawing heavily upon pretrial investigations and an accidentally saved audiotape of trial proceedings, Wittmann narrates a history of the trial itself. Her highlights are chief prosecutor Fritz Bauer’s hope not only to obtain convictions, but also to educate West Germans about the Holocaust; the decision to use existing German penal law, rather than the Nuremberg
precedents, to try Holocaust perpetrators; the thorny legal issue of who was a perpetrator, rather than an accomplice; and what was seen as the scope of individual responsibility at Auschwitz.

The prosecutors clearly suffered from the penal code’s requirement that murder must be accomplished by someone with base motives. Although the West German high court precedents allowed for anti-Semitic ideology to be included among such motives, the evidence often did not suffice to demonstrate that it was a driving force behind particular defendants or particular killings. Those who simply carried out ordinary responsibilities that involved killing or bringing about death were not necessarily murderers by the exacting West German legal standard.

The ironic result of such legal constraints was that prosecutors and even survivor witnesses were forced to concentrate on defendants’ excesses of behavior—behavior that went beyond the normal standard at the camp or beyond Nazi regulations. (Only those who carried out “unauthorized” shootings at the camp were convicted of murder.) Emphasis on the sadism and bloodlust of six or seven defendants fed the sensationalist press and made it easier for West German readers to convince themselves that this trial had little or nothing to do with them. In that sense, Fritz Bauer’s original hope that this trial would help West Germans come to terms with their past fell flat. Those defendants who did not fit the model of the excess criminal or against whom there was little good evidence of excess either received lighter sentences or acquittals—three were acquitted.

This book has a number of flaws of execution. The author complains too many times in too many different places about the strictures of the German penal code. Somewhat after a long discussion of the legal distinction between murderer and accomplice, Wittmann quotes Fritz Bauer’s response to the question of in which category the defendants belong: “... the perpetrators were largely people who were at that time convinced that they were doing the right thing, namely pursuing their National Socialist worldview to victory. In my eyes, those men are simply perpetrators, together with Hitler, committed with Hitler to the ‘Final Solution of the Jewish Question,’ that they believed to be right ... For me, they are all accomplices” (p. 66). In this context, the last line negates the first two sentences, but Wittmann fails to explain the discrepancy.

Readers get a great deal of information about German law, a good amount of attention to the prosecution and survivor-witnesses, and substantial coverage of some individual defendants—all to the good. But tighter organization and writing might have permitted more coverage of what options were available to the judges. For those considered accomplices, could the judges not have cumulated sentences for multiple acts to arrive at heavy sentences? Sometimes there are ways to maneuver around even serious legal problems.
Wittmann almost argues that the law itself brought about a kind of failure: “The distorted consequences of the trial both legally and in its public representation derived not from the inadequacies of eyewitness testimony but rather from the requirements of the German penal code and the kind of testimony needed to secure convictions” (p. 159). But were not the prosecutors fully aware of the legal constraints they faced from the beginning?

A worthy start of detailed research on the most famous West German Holocaust trial, Wittmann’s book may stimulate others with different predispositions or priorities. One can imagine an alternative history in which the prosecutors are judged successful because they obtained a high conviction rate, the judges harshly criticized because of their narrowness and leniency, and West German society judged simply not ready in the mid-1960s for a serious confrontation with the worst elements of its past.

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The impetus among Germany’s cultural elite to mark the end of World War II as a “zero hour” has been analyzed mainly as a German phenomenon, with considerably less attention to the role of the occupying forces in fostering that mentality. Settling Scores offers a long-awaited analysis of the American Military Government’s precarious navigation in the music world, one of the most sensitive cultural areas for both the conquerors and the conquered. Most histories of twentieth-century German music and culture suffer from a basic misunderstanding of this tumultuous time and uncritically accept many of the prejudices it engendered. As this study demonstrates, the notion of a musical “zero hour” is one such misconception, for the imperfect projects of denazification and reeducation left the musical world of the post-war period largely indistinguishable from its pre-war existence. Based on thorough archival research, interviews with eyewitnesses, and a wide range of literature, this highly readable and engaging history reveals in detail the successes and failures of the Military Government’s ambitious agenda to root out the musical “Fuhrers” of the Third Reich and to transform music from a tool of nationalist aggression to one of democratic tolerance.

The book chronologically maps the metamorphosis of the American occupation’s musical bureaucracy and traces the peaks and valleys of American influence in steering German musical life. Chapter one looks at wartime goals
of targeting classical music in order to strike at the heart of German arrogance as well as dispel assumptions about Americans’ cultural inferiority. When authority over musical affairs moved from the civilian Psychological Warfare Division to the military Information Control Division in August 1945, tasks were divided between the Intelligence Section, devoted mainly to an aggressive policy of denazification, and the Music Branch, aiming to normalize musical life by exposing German audiences to a wider range of repertoire and decentralizing German governmental control over musical institutions. These two divisions adopted radically different approaches and often worked at cross-purposes, and these tensions become the central theme of the book.

Chapters two and three investigate the peak of American influence in 1945 and 1946, looking first at the numerous miscalculations in the Intelligence Section’s approach to denazification and then at the Music Branch’s equally misguided attempts to regulate public music institutions and promote American art music. Chapter four outlines the dilution of denazification between 1946 and 1950, focusing on the highly publicized case of Wilhelm Furtwängler, which came in the midst of handing over authority to the Germans and led to the indiscriminate exoneration of many others. Chapter five looks at the effects of the currency reform and the overall withdrawal of American influence in musical affairs during the same period, and in chapter six, Monod examines later efforts to promote American music and musicians and the obstacles imposed by both American authorities and skeptical German audiences. In his conclusion, Monod uses the regeneration of the Bayreuth Festival as a springboard for reexamining the “zero hour” myth.

This study fills an important gap by paying attention not only to a neglected subject, but also to the centrality of German musical legacy, the international significance of which was both flaunted by the Germans and, ironically, undisputed by Germany’s enemies. The position of German music as a powerful weapon informs Monod’s analysis of German-American negotiations and of the rivalry among the Allies in manipulating musical personnel and institutions to win the confidence of German citizens. The Americans, in the end, reveal themselves as the most idealistic and the most naive. Their clumsy attempts to cleanse the German music profession and instill democratic ideals in musical taste managed only to break down the political cronyism in making musical appointments, but they failed to achieve their more ambitious objectives.

If there is one problem with this book, it is tangential but nevertheless worth mentioning. The author, at times, seems to accept the same monolithic conception of Nazi-era musical life that most of his subjects had constructed and internalized. In his sketch of Nazi musical life as a highly integrated party-state collaboration in which musicians were compelled to comply (p. 27), it is not clear whether he is speaking for himself or for the Americans in 1945 who regarded the Nazi state primarily as a “bureaucratic behemoth.” He then
refers to musicians’ general adherence to “Nazi ideological preferences” that excluded works “by those modern composers whom party officials deemed ‘degenerate’” (p. 29) but later acknowledges that the “Americans seriously misunderstood the recent history of modern music in Germany” and were wrongly “convinced that Nazi Germany had been a cultural desert,” for a wide variety of modern music had, in fact, been heard in Hitler’s Germany (p. 125). On the final page, however, he accuses the Americans “for not taking sufficiently seriously the fascists’ contamination of the arts and for allowing musicians with shameful pasts to quietly and collectively rehabilitate themselves” (p. 263). Constructing a more nuanced understanding of Nazi musical life is clearly not Monod’s goal, yet the resulting inconsistency detracts somewhat from his otherwise detached critical analysis of contemporary motives and events.

Beyond that, however, this work raises a plethora of stimulating questions regarding the nature of the occupation, its lasting impact on German-American cultural relations, and the role of music, in general, in times of war and occupation. Monod opens the book with musings on the essential differences between the American occupation in Germany and the current occupation in Iraq, prompting the reader to ponder far-reaching questions. Why was music given such importance in this particular situation? What does this tell us about how America views its enemies then and now, as well as the fundamental changes in the military over the last half century? These and many more questions, while not explicitly articulated, nevertheless seem to jump off the page. We can be grateful to David Monod for making us think about these issues by providing such a readable, thought-provoking, and critical survey of this important chapter of American and German history.

PAMELA M. POTTER
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For Ludwig Erhard, West Germany’s “legendary” Minister of Economics, mass consumption played a vital role in the country’s postwar recovery. Consumer goods, as he stated in 1949, were the “very foundation of our entire economic, social, and national being” (p. 183). In The Authority of Everyday Objects, Paul Betts explores the centrality of mass consumption to West Germany’s postwar history, analyzing how industrial design was called upon to create a sense of national identity following the war. Works from several scholars—Erica
Carter, Michael Wildt, Kathy Pence, Uta Poiger, Jonathan Wiesen, and others—have explored the centrality of the national economy and mass consumption to postwar reconstruction. To these works, Betts adds a specific emphasis on design. As he states at the start of his study, consumer goods were to have a particular look, and design was given a powerful place in West German society. It became the chosen terrain for creating a revived sense of national identity following the disasters of dictatorship, war, and genocide. In the postwar period, an “elective affinity” was forged between “industrial design and the rehabilitation of the ‘good German’” (p. 1), he writes. In six chapters, he explores in absorbing detail how industrial design, with its single-minded mission to turn “mere” commodities into “cultural objects” (Kulturgüter), was invested with political meaning in postwar West Germany. The new world of consumer goods, supported by official discourses on the social importance of “good design,” both rehabilitated West Germany’s image internationally and exhibited a desirable vision of consumer citizenship to domestic audiences.

Yet bringing the history of design into an analysis of West Germany’s postwar recovery does more than add a new area for exploration. The question immediately arises: why design? Why was it so important in West Germany? How could it play a central role in the rehabilitation of a state and the rebuilding of its economy? Betts answers this question in two ways. The book concentrates primarily on the period from 1947 to 1965–68, from the refounding of the German Werkbund to the closing of the Ulm School of Design, the so-called “neues Bauhaus,” founded by Inge Scholl, sister of “White Rose” members Hans and Sophie Scholl. Betts argues that the creation of a postfascist culture was centered in the Werkbund’s revival of the ethics of functionalism; through exhibitions, catalogs, journals, and the founding of schools and institutes, in the 1950s, “good design” in West Germany was morally and ethically charged. Echoing Uta Poiger’s analysis of how jazz became respectable in postwar West Germany, Betts argues that postfascist culture defined itself against a troika of adversaries: the National Socialist past, American consumerism, and Soviet realism. Design, particularly the meaning invested in the Werkbund’s ethics of form, offered an avenue through which the German past could be approached and pieces of it appropriated. While central to the revival of the economy, design was more than an economic phenomenon. It was a way to negotiate past and present both culturally and politically.

Most of the book tells this story in a straightforward fashion. Paying particular attention to the social and political context of rebuilding in the 1950s and 1960s, Betts explores a series of campaigns that attempted to domesticate a tradition of modernist design in order to define it as straightforwardly progressive and politically unproblematic. From the founding of the German Design Council (1951) inside the West German Ministry of Economics to the creation of the
Ulm Institute of Design in 1955, the book traces a social history of design, analyzing its institutions, organizations, and policies. Betts gives a clear sense of public debates, state policies, and popular responses, particularly the overwhelming popularity of “organic” Nierentisch design, as consumers reacted against the sanctioned austerities of Werkbund functionalism. The book does more than tell this story, however. The questions it asks about the place of design in modern German history are broader and deeper.

The power of Betts’s original study emerges in the second story he tells. This focuses on modernism and its flawed, incomplete, and politically loaded histories. It is both a wonderful irony and an important historical question of why modernist design—which struck deep roots in the National Socialist period as well as in its Weimar and Wilhelmine predecessors—was called upon to negotiate the terms of West German national identity. In the postwar period, it was to represent new beginnings and new prosperity, but, as Betts shows, modernist design itself made the drawing of a clear line between past and present difficult.

The 1951 Triennale exhibition highlighted the complex state of things, as modernist furnishings and domestic objects on display “were precisely the same ones showcased by the Nazis at the 1940 Triennale” (p. 186). As Betts writes, “The 1951 West German Triennale contribution thus hardly represented the desired break from the past. . . . it unwittingly emphasized a marked continuity with Nazi culture in spite of its best efforts to suppress the connection. The problem, of course, lay in the contradictory nature of Nazi culture itself, which embraced both premodern völkisch culture and Weimar technological modernism” (pp. 186-187); however, “this complex cultural story” he writes, “was taboo during the Cold War” (p. 187). Rather, rigid readings of Nazi culture as “essentially ‘blood and soil’ pastoralism and romantic antimodernism” attempted to submerge knowledge of the modernist sides of the movement. Modernism, as it was said, was what the Federal Republic and the Weimar Republic had in common, and both had to be distanced from the National Socialist past. “In order to help draw the Weimar Republic and the Federal Republic into the same elective liberal lineage,” Betts writes, “it was therefore necessary to create an image of the Nazis as thoroughly antimodern. The delicate question of continuity was thus neatly sidestepped in this postwar invention of a pristine Weimar Modernism as the Federal Republic’s true cultural patrimony” (pp. 187-188).

The example of the 1951 Triennale brings out the complexities that Betts’ book highlights so well. While telling the history of postwar design, he also historicizes what Konrad Jarausch and Michael Geyer have called the “vindication of a functional and rational technocratic modernity” (Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Histories, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 7), which was the cultural counterpart to the Sonderweg. Industrial design was central to a
narrative of cultural progress and national regeneration, and Betts shows how this particular history of modernism was fashioned on the terrain of the late 1940s and early 1950s. The book is not without its flaws (there is some repetition, one wishes to know more about the periods before 1933 and the levels of social history, and the historicizing of modernism need to be better integrated), but it opens up fascinating terrain. There is a big book to be written about modernist culture in Germany—it’s political histories and social imaginaries, as well as the ways in which these histories have been severed, denied, and forgotten—and this book shows what the larger lines of such a study might look like.

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Kristina Spohr Readman’s book, *Germany and the Baltic Problem after the Cold War*, serves as a fine example of what historians can achieve in the field of contemporary history. Her study provides a detailed account of the political process of German unification and its consequences for its neighbors. By drawing on archival sources that have, for various reasons, become available before the usual closure period has expired, along with interviews, memoirs, and published documents, she has provided a painstaking, scholarly analysis of the manifold transitions in European relations that took place in the wake of the unexpected events of 1989.

The title is somewhat misleading, because the scope of the study is actually broader than it suggests. The author considers not only Baltic but also English, French, and Russian involvement in and reaction to German reunification. She draws on sources in all of the relevant national collections, along with American archives. Her detailed account presents a narrative of how the post-Cold War transitional events were variously encouraged, resisted, and actively opposed by most of the major European leaders of the day. Her larger goal, however, is to explore what the narrative suggests about the nature of contemporary German power.

In particular, she seeks to explain how Germany has chosen to use its renewed “great-power status” in post-Cold War European politics (p. 1). To do so, she first provides an initial review of the events of German unification. Spohr Readman then steps back in time and provides a useful chapter-length summary of the debate about Germany’s position in Europe, or the *Sonderweg*
debate. She focuses particularly on questions of unity, identity, and civic culture (p. 65), as she returns to these concepts in the conclusion. Her work then examines in detail the way in which Germany’s fellow European states, particularly but not limited to the Baltics, adjusted to the re-emergence of this question in the wake of unification.

Some of this story of German unification is already known (for example, in the work of the German scholar Hans-Hermann Hertle), but Spohr Readman takes an unusually broad, international approach to her subject that makes her study a welcome addition to the literature. She also gives due weight to a variety of factors, looking at not only political decisions, but also economic realities, such as the way that Moscow’s need for financial support from Germany helped to grease the wheels of the unification process.

In her conclusion, entitled “One Answer to the German Question,” Spohr Readman argues that the manner in which unification unfolded had the fortuitous effect of settling some of the open issues about German power. As she points out, because “German unity was not preceded by any expansionist German nationalism, either in the East or the West” (p. 208), it emerged in a tolerable form not only for the Baltics but also for Germany’s other neighbors. Since the former West German chancellor, Helmut Kohl, began advocating unification only after a revolution from below in favor of it was well advanced, it was more acceptable than would have been the case if the situation had been reversed.

The advantage to writing contemporary history is that the story carries a sense of immediacy; the disadvantage is obviously the lack of a longer-term perspective for the kind of overall assessment that Spohr Readman hopes to provide. The conclusions of a work on such a recent time period are unavoidably preliminary, and Spohr Readman herself admits this. As a result, the real strength of this book lies not in its conclusions but elsewhere: first, in the detailed narrative that her study provides, and secondly, in the survey of available research materials on the subject. The list of sources, both primary and secondary, represents a very useful resource to any scholar interested in these crucial years of European politics. A particularly helpful postscript (pp. 214–233) guides readers through the variety of materials currently available. It assesses their relative merits, thereby providing useful guidance for any scholar contemplating archival visits of his or her own.

In summary, this is a carefully constructed study that will help specialists in their ongoing endeavors to understand the nature and consequences of the process of German unification.

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