fluid, with conflicts in, say, the Great Lakes and Horn, and central and southern Africa, impacting on each other over time (p. 82).

Several contributions also present an interesting set of comments about nonstate actors, primarily NGOs, derived from different regions; regrettably, companies, unions, even media hardly appear here. Khadiagala treats NGOs appropriately: They “have emerged on the margins of Southern African Development Community (SADC) as alternative purveyors of norms and policies that have a regional reach” (p. 150). In contrast, Adibe cautions that “the unregulated operation of diverse NGOs and transnational organizations is worrisome in West African diplomacy and nation-building processes” (p. 35).

Coeditor Gilbert Khadiagala laments that SADC has lost direction postapartheid, indicating that now “the foreign policy choices of southern African states are constrained by weak state structures, economic despair, and social dislocations” (p. 131). He outlines interregime disagreements over treaties about free trade, security, etc., in the region while noting the resilience of nonstate actors such as NGOs, think tanks, and trade unions: “Weak states furnish fragile bases for regionalism … SADC is incapable of meeting problems of internal implosion and civil wars, and its role in building values and norms has been equally problematic” (p. 149).

Reinforcing attention to the southern subcontinent, Denis Venter offers the only case study of a single country rather than a region: the regional center of South Africa, which, postapartheid, is “clearly suffering an identity crisis in its external relations” (p. 177). Change for it is compounded by the combination of democratization and globalization along with unrealistic expectations at home and abroad, especially in the region. Venter points to the broad range of state and nonstate actors in its foreign policy nexus, cautioning about the danger of NGO cooptation through consultation, though he favors more open and representative decision making. The Mbeki regime has attempted to balance interests and resources by articulating a range of ambitions around the notion of an “African renaissance” (p. 170).

In short, if you want more critical approaches see Peter Vale, Larry A. Swatuk, and Bertil Oden (eds.) _Theory, Change & Southern Africa’s Future_ (2001), and if you want more comparative perspectives see Philip Nel and Patrick J. McGown (eds.) _Power, Wealth and Global Order: An International Relations Textbook for Africa_ (revised second edition, 1999), even if both of these concentrate on southern Africa. As the coeditors belatedly recognize in their final paragraph, “With the multiplicity of actors, amorphous targets, and uncertain outcomes, African foreign policy has entered uncharted territory” (p. 21).


Patrick Ireland, _Georgia Institute of Technology_

Every scholar likes to think that what he or she studies is of capital importance. For that reason alone, this ambitious book would have to please immigration specialists. “Demography is destiny” is Rey Kosloski’s thesis, boiled down, and in his view it is almost impossible to overrate migration’s impact on international politics. While guilty of overreach in a few spots and failing to appreciate the role of politics in quite a few more, he makes a compelling case overall. His bold work both brings a stimulating perspective to a multidisciplinary area of study that is still seeking its center of gravity and serves to remind the field of international relations (IR) that migration deserves its full attention.

The author has a two-pronged objective. At the theoretical level he hopes to advance understanding of contemporary global politics. Advanced through the “thought experiments,” secondary data analysis, and historical evidence characteristic of the IR field, his argument poses a challenge to prevailing international relations and democratic theories. Throwing into doubt the notion of nation-state sovereignty, migration belies the assumption current in much of the literature on democracy of a bounded collection of citizens comprising the demos. Nor does it fit the dichotomy between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy that underpins realism or always act as a force for international cooperation as neoliberalism holds. Kosloski sees the nation-state as a transitory, atypical social construct, forged within a unique set of demographic circumstances. Since 1945, changes in that context have transformed domestic politics and, in turn, the international system.

Mass migration has most clearly begun to flush out the problems latent in modern national political institutions in Europe, and at a more substantive level the author’s goal is to retell the European migration story. The book takes an expansive historical sweep, which should be eye-opening to social scientists not well versed in migratory movements with regard to the continent before the Second World War. In fact, it is easy for anyone caught up in trying to understand contemporary immigration to forget the essentially nomadic nature of human existence (chapter 3) and the historical sources of the distinctions between nationality and citizenship (chapter 4). There are a couple of surprising omissions in the literature reviewed—Lars Olsson’s work on immigration as a cause of World War I, for instance, would only bolster the author’s argument—and few revolutionary insights are offered. Nevertheless, the material is packaged and pointed in a novel way that promises to stir useful discussion among immigration scholars.

The central thesis, certainly, will fuel debate: Long marked by polyethnicity, Europe constructed nation-states in response to unprecedented population growth and emigration in the midnineteenth century. Recent demographic changes have heralded a shift back to polyethnicty and have thus created a “mismatch” between resident populations and political institutions (p. 8). The presence of durable immigrant-origin communities, the emergence of an EU labor mobility regime, the negative effects of unilateral national actions, the (domestically driven) proliferation of individual rights and their acquisition by noncitizens (most notable in the spread of dual nationality)—the challenges to nation-state sovereignty in Europe have been relentless. They have also tended to act at cross-purposes, as migration has stirred up a titanic clash among democracy, citizenship based on bloodline (jus sanguinis), and federalism (pp. 133–34). In this light European Citizenship signals a toleration of complexity that might result in new institutional setups. They would mean no less than a reconfiguration of democracy and the international system.

A robust contention, to say the least. In fact, the author’s mission to put forward demography as an all-purpose explanation occasionally takes him too far. Neoliberal institutionalism may well err in relegating migration to the status of a garden-variety regime issue (p. 17); yet surely transport, communication, capital flows, and the like have played a more considerable role in undermining nation-state sovereignty than this study would allow. Not surprisingly, there are several approving references to Hedley Bull’s “new medievalism” idea. European authorities and loyalties do seem to have been returning to the functional differentiation of the past. Even as patterns of labor market segmentation by ethnic origin and gender emerge, however, capitalism itself has become more globally integrated. With the economists’ push–pull model still at the heart of many immigration
studies, it will be a tough sell to convince most specialists that no first-order relationship exists between the global economy and the multiple identities exhibited by immigrants.

Even more likely to raise eyebrows is the near-absence of domestic political struggle here. Demography pushes all before it, and the progression from polyethnictiy to ethnically heterogeneous societies (and nation-states) and then back to polyethnictiy appears as natural as the swing of a pendulum or the ebb and flow of the tides. Whenever the causal link between population movements and actual policies is at issue, the vague, passive language of constructivism crops up. Thus, for example, we learn that our “thinking about politics” has been “reified in the reproduction of practices that make possible territory as an institution” (p. 23) and that the European migration regime has been “influenced by the agenda setting of dueling epistemic communities” (p. 161).

Similar caginess attends the discussion of citizenship laws. Thus as nation-states developed into “containers” for political institutions, they apparently had no choice regarding their nationality laws, as demography ruled out alternative outcomes (pp. 25–27). With politics bled out of the story, the truism that the distinction between jus soli and jus sanguinis would have no import in a world without migration becomes evidence of demography’s explanatory force (p. 80). Part of the problem here may be an over-reliance (on the European side) on scholarship from Germany, whose political class obsesses over formal citizenship and jus sanguinis. In that country alone, though, tens of thousands of resident noncitizens have not applied for naturalization, despite their eligibility and official efforts encouraging them to do so. Nor, as the author admits but underplays, have naturalization rates proved significantly higher where dual nationality is permitted (p. 190). In short, one should guard against assuming that “demographically determined” legal restrictions are the only impediments to inclusion.

“We easily forget that people make political institutions happen,” the author rightly reminds us (p. 186). He himself tends to lose sight of the trees for the forest, however. Immigrants matter not merely because their collective presence sparks a spontaneous policy response. It would hardly detract from demography’s causal power to stress its impact on the size, composition, and resources available to various groups, who then engage in a political battle over policy. The impressive array of rights enjoyed by resident noncitizens in Europe did not appear automatically. Trade unions, social movements, and immigrants themselves fought hard to win them. It is necessary to consider immigrant integration, which is an unavoidably political process involving far more than just citizenship laws and formal rights. The EC Commission recognized as much in its Communication on a Community Immigration Policy in November 2000. Even if demography loads the dice, the conflicts and small victories of daily co-existence on Europe’s increasingly mean streets affect policy outcomes. Then neighborhood is the spatial site in which the contradictions so eloquently presented in this book are finding their resolution.

So, this book overshoots and lapses into demographic determinism at times. That said, perhaps such overkill is justifiable when trying to effect a correction in a field of political science that has for too long neglected the consequences of population movements. It is hard to read this book and not be convinced that Grotius has finally triumphed over Hobbes and that those of us who study immigration really are onto something. Maybe it is our destiny.


Mary Durfee, Michigan Technological University

Thucydides, one of the intellectual fathers of international relations (IR), wrote a postmortem of a great war. In the process he also served as a general and was banished from Athens when he arrived too late to save a battle. Fortunately for us, the banishment improved his data and his analysis. Such are the delicate complications of analysis, theory, and practice. Being in the world of action provides crucial questions; distancing oneself from that world provides insight into the questions. This volume edited by Miroslav Nincic and Joseph Lepgold explores the variety of problems and prospects associated with linking theory and practice in international affairs. They do not argue that theory should be rejected for praxis. Rather they and their contributors argue that the isolation of the two unnecessarily oversimplifies the political world. The world of academic IR theory can benefit from closer contact with the world of policy and the world of policy will do better if it relies more theory.

After a foreword by Alexander George, the collection begins with a chapter by Nincic that addresses whether contact with the policy world makes for bad science. While neither this chapter nor the entire book put together would convince those most dedicated to the proposition that science and relevance are antithetical, it does lay out a landscape of theory and practice with identifiable landmarks. As a result, those actually interested in engaging the issue will be able to navigate the issue more readily. The basic argument is developed by Arthur Stein, who makes the strongest case against policy relevance. He succeeds in showing, however, that if IR can help distinguish quackery from serious “medical” advice, both worlds will be better off. Lepgold refines the discussion further by suggesting a continuum from “pure” or general IR theory, to issue-oriented puzzles, to case-oriented scholarship, to policymaking. He notes that policymakers are unlikely to be able to use general theory directly (and vice versa) but that interactions between the parts of continuum can improve all the forms of scholarship as well as policymaking. Moreover, seen this way, the chasm between pure theory and policy is less daunting, because it can be bridged in stages.

Section two of the volume offers chapters by individuals who have been, as Bruce Jentleson puts it, “professors in government” and seen successes and failures in using IR theory in policy. Next, the book moves to chapters on how better characterization of the domestic setting can improve the understanding of foreign policy. As real decision makers look at both the domestic and the international scenes in making choices, this was a useful decision by the editors. The remaining two parts of the book take up specialized approaches to issues and the particular intersection of rational choice with policy relevance, respectively. Each chapter in the volume ends with notes and a strong bibliography, thus readily allowing for additional research into the issues presented in the chapter. There was a modest effort at indexing the book, but the index will prove less useful than the chapter endnotes and bibliographies.

The editors reiterate Alexander George’s insight that policy-relevant theory is contingent proposition-based, which is another way of saying that it is process-oriented. Process shows up throughout the volume. Yet the editors make too little of that commonality in the volume. Policy-relevant theory is process theory first and causal theory second. This suggests that IR scholars with theoretical bents might do well to think about what movement in theory might look like and how
best to model it. The need for process theory is presented most forcefully by Emily Goldman in her chapter on the diffusion of military technology and by Steven Brams and Jeffrey Togman in their application of the theory of moves. But it appears in the work of the professors in government (Jentleson and Ernest Wilson) and in Donald Rothschild's discussion of ethnic conflict as well, when they talk about linking knowledge and action and explicating consequences of different choices. Even the rational choice perspective of A. F. K. Organski, writing about the status of Jerusalem negotiations, presents the model over time.

More thought about process questions as they relate to the central problematic of political science—how inside and outsiders of polities become linked—might have afforded a better home to the chapters on the domestic setting. As it is, the two chapters on the domestic setting, one by Robert Lieber, on the Madisonian features of the U.S. system, and the other by Eric Larson, exploring different theories of public opinion relative to Bosnia, are interesting on their own but seem out of place in the volume. It was also hard to know what to do with Donna Nincic’s geopolitics chapter, in part because it does not apparently fit the general pattern of process theory.

General Patton once remarked that the perfect plan is the enemy of the merely good one in hand. Their next volume should pursue theories of process; in the meantime, Nincic and Leopold have given us a good start for exploring the ties between IR theory and practice in our teaching and research. The diligent among us who hope to court the Prince will learn how to communicate better by considering the range of things policymakers want to know at different points in policymaking. For those of us devoted to life in the academy, the book clearly shows that theories connected to empirical referents will get better and better over time. Most important, the book reminds us that IR has room for all kinds of scholars and the variety of journals that goes with that diversity.


Mark Gibney, University of North Carolina—Asheville

I approached this book with the dreadfully sensible that the subject matter of extradition would not hold my interest for very long, certainly not a hefty book of this size, and doubting the connection with human rights advertised in the title. I was decidedly wrong on both counts. Perhaps the first prejudice can be excused on the grounds that scholarship on this subject has indeed been “relentlessly academic,” as Christopher Pyle himself acknowledges. This book, however, is anything but this. Instead, it not only has very impressive scholarship and is certainly pertinent to world events (especially after September 11), but also is a wonderful read.

With respect to human rights, Pyle immediately and convincingly shows the manner in which extradition is centered around issues of individual liberty, due process of law, and humanitarian concerns. In short, extradition is—or at least should be—all about human rights. Yet what Pyle catalogs in this historical account is the manner in which extradition principles have come to be degraded. In essence, we have moved away from justice all in the name of pursuing justice.

For the so-called “rusty” reader, extradition is the process by which one state surrenders to a requesting state persons accused (or convicted) of crimes against the laws of the requesting state for prosecution (or punishment). Extradition was viewed with a jaundiced eye by the new American republic for the simple reason that the world’s first democracy felt a deep concern for returning even the most notorious criminals and political offenders to the unjust and undemocratic regimes of Europe. In addition to this, because of the British policy of impressing American seamen, there was a deep concern for protecting those who were taken to other lands against their will. And, finally, at the time of this country’s founding, extradition was generally treated as a legal, not a political, process. And for this reason, extradition was naturally viewed as the preserve of judges and not political actors.

Given the obscurity to which nearly all extradition cases have now been relegated, it was surprising to learn that many of the earliest extradition cases, most notably those involving Thomas Nash, Jonathan Robbins, and the revolting slaves on the Amistad, captured both national and international attention. And what springs to life in these pages is the manner in which extradition brought together a veritable Who’s Who of American statesmen—Washington, Jefferson, Adams, Lincoln, and Webster—with the not so famous, even the infamous. But the larger point is that, at one time in American history, extradition was taken very seriously. And the reason for this is that extradition represented certain American values.

Extradition still reflects American values, but these values are different from those that existed earlier in this country’s history. One of the great ironies at work here is that those who have been so quick to invoke the founding fathers are invariably those who have done so much to corrupt the principle of extradition that the founders sought to establish. What we have at present is the business of extradition. And like its economic counterpart, the United States will do business with just about any state, which means that the U.S. government has willfully ignored the brutality and corrupt nature of any number of states in the name of pursuing “justice.”

The prime reason for this callousness is the hope that these states will reciprocate, as they have. But as Pyle so effectively documents, under such a system the rights of individuals have come to be completely submerged to larger political ends.

Another reason for this cavalier approach is that we assume that extradition only affects “others.” However, anywhere between 10 and 20% of those extradited by the U.S. government are American citizens. And yet the manner in which we have treated our people (as well as “others”) has at times been nothing less than criminal, best personified by the efforts of certain segments of the U.S. government (the Office of Special Investigation in the Department of Justice, in particular) essentially to frame John Demjanjuk as Ivan the Terrible. Given the failures of American justice, the only thing that saved Demjanjuk’s life was a courageous Israeli Supreme Court that withstood tremendous public pressure and held that the extraordinarily weak (and incomplete) evidence that was relied upon to extradite Demjanjuk was really no evidence at all.

From the opposite end, the U.S. government has steadily expanded the extraterritorial reach of American law. What has not followed, however, is any of our constitutional protections. Because of this, the manner in which an individual has come into custody in a foreign land has been treated, somehow, as being irrelevant. This has led to all sorts of human rights abuses, including torture and kidnapping (by foreign and American officials alike), and yet our judiciary reasons that violations in other lands are different in kind from violations committed within the United States. And the business of extraditing and prosecuting continues apace.

Pyle presents a number of proposals for reforming extradition, and given the litany of abuses that he presents, one would be hard pressed to disagree with any one of these. All of these are premised on the idea that we are speaking of
individuals who possess certain legal rights that need to be protected. One problem that Pyle glides over is that he wants to reestablish extradition as a legal process and to remove political considerations. Yet the judicial heroes whom he invokes are, for the most part, several centuries removed from the present, which is also to say that in matters of extradition the judicial branch has come to align itself solidly with the political branches. Pyle states at the outset that his focus will be squarely on United States law and not international law. However, what is one to do when there are so few (if any) checks and balances in the domestic realm? Given the fact that extradition is, by definition, justice beyond our national borders, perhaps it only makes sense to look to international solutions and mechanisms. This, however, is not the approach that Pyle would adopt.

Pyle’s book is, at bottom, a plea to take extradition as seriously as it was taken at the time of the creation of the United States. This will not be easy, especially given the mood and the need for “justice” following the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11. In fact, things are likely to get much worse before they ever become better. Yet if there is a book that will make us sit up and take notice of how lawless and inhumane our actions have been in this realm, it is this book.


Brian M. Pollins, The Ohio State University

To date, the main body of research on the economic dimensions of foreign policy has focused on narrow, tactical considerations alone. Are sanctions effective tools of diplomacy? Do governments try to sway the nation’s trade away from enemies and toward allies due to relative gains concerns? Does foreign aid win compliance? Lars Skålnes’s new book refocuses the attention of the field greatly by asking us to consider foreign economic policy as a core component of great-power grand strategy. The purposeful manipulation of foreign economic ties by national leaders, he argues, is not merely an ancillary instrument in the diplomatic kit of foreign policy elites. Indeed there may be times in which it is the central tool used by powers to secure their strategic objectives. Moreover, Skålnes’s framework seeks to identify the specific political–strategic conditions that make it more likely or less likely that great powers will build their grand strategies around such policy. This idea should not seem strange to us when we recall initiatives over the past 30 years such as Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, Henry Kissinger’s notion of détente with the Soviet Union, and current American attempts to moderate Chinese behavior by integrating that emerging power more fully into the global economy. While these examples are not treated in the book (Skålnes examines German, French, British, and American cases over different years between 1879 and 1967), they stand as additional instances that might be understood in new ways. Politics, Markets, and Grand Strategy makes a persuasive argument for permanently removing the “low politics” label from foreign economic policy and viewing it instead as coequal with military strategy in the realm of “high politics.”

The book’s central argument is stated clearly and succinctly in the introductory chapter. It builds directly upon Joanne Gowa’s (1994) Allies and Adversaries, in which we learned how great powers will quite purposely structure foreign commercial policy in ways that channel the gains from trade away from adversaries and toward allies. The puzzle, Skålnes tells us, is that careful examination of cases reveals great variation in such policy; i.e., there are times when great powers behave just as Gowa tells us and other times when military and economic policies are divorced from one another and the latter is treated more as a “low politics” tactical tool or is ignored altogether. The author contends that the switching mechanism between these two conditions is the “strategic need” of the country in question. If leaders believe that the nation needs no help in resisting their adversaries, they will not offer favorable economic terms (i.e., access to their own markets in the form of tariff or other concessions) to their allies. If they believe that allies are needed to accomplish their larger objectives, they will select the kinds of policies described by Gowa. Indeed, Skålnes predicts such policies will then become central to their grand strategy.

The author examines the cases of German–Austro-Hungarian relations and French–Russian ties during the decades preceding the World War I; Britain’s relations with its Dominions, the United States, France, and Germany during the interwar period; and U.S. relations with Europe and Japan from the end of the World War II until 1967. Alex George’s method of structured, focused comparison and George and McKeown’s process tracing are employed to test hypotheses derived from the author’s central claim. The cases were selected to gain ample variance, both within and between cases, on the independent and dependent variables (strategic need and commercial policy, respectively). Skålnes also provides clear, reproducible, and operational definitions of his key variables (p. 39)—a vital component of good empirical work found all too rarely in case studies. The detailed case material itself is written clearly and well. Skålnes sticks to the point and allows the reader to see when the evidence does and does not fit his main claims. Far too many case studies tell us that “the model fits the data perfectly” (a feat typically accomplished by fuzzy definition of key concepts or selective ransacking of historical materials), but Skålnes’s design and careful presentation allows us to learn from his model’s failures as well as its successes.

The book’s limitations derive from its near-exclusive focus on great-power alliance relations. Aforementioned examples beyond this study—Ostpolitik, détente, and U.S. policy toward China concerning Most Favored Nation status and World Trade Organization accession—all pertain to the use of foreign economic policy toward rivals and adversaries, not allies. Skålnes touches on relations with adversaries when he examines British policy toward Germany in the 1930s (chapter 5) and briefly describes U.S. economic overtures toward the Soviet Union in the immediate postwar years (pp. 156–160). But his twists on the British–German case to make it fit his model are awkward and unworthy of the overall study, and treatment of the U.S.–Soviet case is unsystematic. Regarding economic policy toward adversaries, many readers will conclude that the predictions made by Skålnes’s model are simply wrong (Table 1, p. 3). It would also be interesting to contemplate whether the degree of strategic need correlates with the extent of concessions (as the logic of the argument would suggest). The importance of this point is raised when we see that some of the “concessions” identified by Skålnes in certain cases appear quite marginal even though the strategic need was clear (viz., French–Russian relations described in chapter 4.) More consideration of relations between great and small powers would also have been interesting. During the Cold War, for example, one would expect by Skålnes’s own criteria that both the United States and the Soviet Union experienced high strategic need. Yet U.S. concessions toward Third World nations were virtually nonexistent, while Soviet subsidization of its small-power, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance partners was very high. Nazi Germany’s economic
penetration of Hungary and the Balkans, detailed in A. O. Hirschman’s classic study (1945), also comes to mind. While I am again pointing to cases outside the scope of this study, consideration of instances like these—perhaps in the concluding chapter—could have prefigured the expansion of Skålnes’s framework beyond the limited confines of great-power alliances.

Limitations notwithstanding, Politics, Markets, and Grand Strategy is a solid effort. Skålnes rightly calls for recognition of foreign economic policy as a grand strategic instrument, at times equally if not more important than military plans and programs. As we contemplate the present struggle against global terrorism, one could argue, the United States finds itself in great strategic need of allies—among small and middle powers, recent rivals, and its historic, great-power partners alike. It will be interesting to see whether the United States formulates a new grand strategy that makes meaningful, long-term economic concessions in trade, aid, investment, and technology transfer—especially toward poor nations now on the front lines of this conflict. Skålnes’s model, in my reading of it, would predict that the United States will indeed move in that direction. We can all hope that he has it right.


Lawrence J. LeBlanc, Marquette University

The Helsinki Final Act was adopted by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975. Among the basic principles for relations among states that were affirmed in the document were the apparently contradictory principles of nonintervention in the internal affairs of states and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Should a collision between these two principles occur, which one would prevail? It was widely assumed at the time, of course, that the principle of nonintervention would win out. The Soviets and their bloc members apparently had no intention of complying with the human rights principles enshrined in the Final Act, and even Western statesmen such as Henry Kissinger downplayed their importance.

There were actually good reasons for skepticism and even cynicism regarding future compliance with the human rights principles of the Helsinki Final Act. After all, by 1975 the international community had adopted numerous human rights instruments of global and regional scope going back to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Although it would be an exaggeration to say that nothing had been achieved by those efforts at norm creation, the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of states remained a very powerful one and was, in any case, more often than not invoked by authoritarian and totalitarian governments with great effect to ward off “intervention” in their internal affairs in the name of human rights.

Yet only 15 years after Helsinki, by the end of the decade of the 1980s, communist regimes in Eastern Europe and even in the Soviet Union itself were crumbling and the end of the Cold War was in sight. Realist explanations of these developments looked to economic and military factors and trends—the inability of the Soviet system to deliver basic goods and services and/or to compete in an arms race with the United States. In The Helsinki Effect, Daniel Thomas provides a powerful and compelling argument to the effect that the human rights norms of the Helsinki Final Act set the stage for the demise of communism. He draws on a large body of literature and interviews with many important governmental and nongovernmental actors in the United States and Europe to take us through a comprehensive analysis of the evolution, framing, and effects of the human rights norms of the Helsinki Final Act. This analysis is set in the context of an assessment of the explanatory power of Liberal and Constructivist theories of international relations.

The theoretical sophistication of this book is one of its main strengths. There is no effort here to marshal evidence in such a way as to demolish one theory and to argue that another provides the only plausible explanations. On the contrary, the analysis is balanced, though Thomas concludes that Constructivist theory is a more powerful explanatory tool overall. Still, at first glance, Liberal theory, which sees actors as choosing “behaviors that appear most likely to satisfy their preexisting interests within an interdependent international environment” (p. 10), would seem to have provided the best explanation as regards the evolution, framing, and effects of the human rights norms of the Final Act. As far as the evolution of the norms was concerned, throughout most of the CSCE negotiations the Soviet Union and the West European states, as one might have expected in view of their historic positions on such matters, stood at opposite poles regarding incorporating human rights norms in the Final Act. In the end, however, the Soviet Union accepted the norms, and the EC states seemed not to expect much to come of them.

How does one explain a radically different situation only a few years later, one in which the human rights norms had become very important and even set the stage for the collapse of communism? Thomas argues that the Soviets were, in effect, “trapped” into compliance with the human rights norms. This outcome was surely not intended, but it occurred nonetheless. At the end of the day, the norms mattered. Among other things, they had stimulated the growth of, and given credibility to, dissident groups within the Soviet orbit and provided a basis for external criticism of their human rights policies as well. These developments are best explained in terms of Constructivist theory, which sees actors behaving “in accordance with norms relevant to their identities” (p. 13) and which emphasizes “the intrinsic value that states place on recognition and legitimation by international society” (p. 264). The Soviets wanted legitimacy, and a price they had to pay was compliance with the Helsinki human rights norms.

In the excellent concluding chapter, Thomas summarizes the relative strengths and weaknesses of Liberal and Constructivist theories in explaining the evolution, framing, and effects of the human rights norms of the Helsinki Final Act, and he provides a broad assessment of the implications of his findings. It seems to me that some developments, not mentioned by Thomas, actually make more sense in light of his analysis. Examples include Mikhail Gorbachev’s address to the United Nations General Assembly in 1988, in which he called for a strengthening of respect for international law and institutions, thus revamping the traditional Soviet “theory” of international law that stressed national sovereignty and nonintervention in the internal affairs of states; the fundamentally different nature of the debates over human rights issues, at least along East/West lines, that have occurred in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights since the late 1980s; and the much greater willingness of the Soviet Union and then the Russian Federation to accept, and react to, external criticisms of their human rights policies. These developments, too, are arguably part of the Helsinki “effect.”

Books of such high quality as this one are relatively rare, and Thomas should be commended for executing it so well. The scholarship is superb. The book is theoretically sophisticated and substantively sound. It is systematically organized and very well written throughout. Indeed,
Thomas has an engaging writing style and gets his points across clearly and concisely. It was a pleasure to read this book.

The book will be of interest to a large group of scholars, not only those interested in human rights, but also those concerned with international relations theory, the process of international organization, the development and growth of international regimes, and the impact of norms and social movements in international relations. Historians and others interested in post-Soviet politics will find Thomas’s discussion of the breakdown of the communist one-party states fascinating. International lawyers could see in this book the value of interdisciplinary cooperation in understanding how international norms are created and take hold. The book is surely to be required reading in graduate seminars on international action on human rights and many core seminars in international politics. And, because of its excellent coverage of governmental as well as nongovernmental actors in the norm creation process, it would be a very good addition to required reading lists for advanced undergraduates interested in international organizations.


Jeffrey D. Berejikian, University of Georgia

While there are numerous examples of transaction cost analysis in the literature on international cooperation, little of this scholarship concentrates on military collaboration. Indeed, studies like Weber’s that explain the varying density of military agreements are rare under any rubric. Weber’s offering thus begins to fill an important void in the scholarship on military cooperation.

Weber’s main contention is that while traditional realism can explain the distribution of preferences for military cooperation by level of external threat, such arguments cannot predict or explain variation in the level of commitment embodied in final agreements. The existence of an external threat is therefore a necessary condition for military agreements, however, threat alone is not sufficient to explain when and why states agree to curtail significantly their sovereignty in response security challenges. Instead, we understand variation in cooperative forms only when realist insights about threats are integrated into an analysis that also examines the transaction costs unique to military cooperation.

After a brief introduction and overview, chapters 1 and 2 articulate the main argument. The presentation here is concise and logical. Beginning with the assumption that states covet independence, Webber highlights an often underdeveloped distinction between military alliance and confederation. A confederation demands more integration and coordination between partners and, thus, impinges more heavily upon state sovereignty. Then, drawing upon economic arguments regarding the role of transaction costs in cooperation between economic agents, Weber derives an analogous set of costs for states considering military cooperation. These include, uncertainty, asset specificity, technological development, and level of heterogeneity between states. For a given level of security threat, the density of cooperation between states increases as the transaction costs of collaboration rise. Thus, “the higher the level of transaction costs, the greater the likelihood a country will prefer a more binding arrangement” (p. 19).

Importantly, the analysis produces some counterintuitive results. For example, given symmetrical external threat perceptions, binding and dense cooperation (confederation) is more likely between heterogeneous states. The transaction costs between such states are greater because they lack a “similar degree of trust” compared to states that share common cultural or sociological roots (p. 27). Such partners therefore “favor structurally binding security arrangements” as a hedge against opportunism (p. 26). This argument runs counter to much cultural and constructivist scholarship arguing that common identities pave the way to deeper cooperation.

Weber further develops this framework in four empirical chapters. Chapters 3 and 4 examine agreements during and subsequent to the Napoleonic wars. Chapter 5 examines the founding of NATO, while chapter 6 focuses upon the attempt to form a European Defense Community (EDC).

Of these, chapter 3 is the weakest. Webber claims that the cooperation among Austria, Prussia, and Russia—in response to the immediate threat posed by Nepolaonic France—took the form of alliance rather than confederation because of the moderate to low level of transaction costs between partners. While the empirical discussion documenting the transaction costs is well done, the alliances of this period were forged during crisis. Such an immediate threat precludes the possibility of more extensive confederation agreements that would have taken considerably longer to complete. We are then left with a counterfactual case. Webber acknowledges the problem, for example, in the discussion of the Quadruple Alliance, when asking, “Would the allies have sought greater commitments, that is, chosen to confederate” if they had the luxury of more time? Perhaps, but with a counterfactual argument we can only speculate.

The remaining empirical work is stronger. Chapter 4 explains the German and Swiss confederations following the Napoleonic wars in a convincing way. Chapter 5 focuses upon the formation of NATO. The alliance was a compromise between Europe and the United States and is a nice example of the subtly possible under Weber’s framework. Both sides agreed on the need for increased military cooperation, however, Europe desired greater formalization to restrain American autonomy. These asymmetric preferences are traced to asymmetric transaction costs. France, for example, faced the highest transaction costs and was most forceful in demanding “ironclad” assurances about U.S. protection (p. 87).

The final empirical chapter examines the attempt to form a European Defense Community. Webber nicely traces the positions of the various participants back to their exposure to transaction costs. However, the EDC seems a curious case from which to derive conclusions about the nature of cooperation given that it failed under French objections. Further, realism alone is the simplest explanation for French obstinacy. The failure of the EDC rests largely in the perception by French leaders that the threat posed by the Soviet Union had diminished. The French government, after downgrading the immediacy of the Soviet threat, concluded that “the costs of a binding security arrangement like the EDC…clearly outweighed the benefits” (p. 106).

As a result, while the theoretical edifice is strong, the empirical work is uneven. Ultimately, the attempt to integrate transaction cost analysis into realism represents important progress, but this potential is often unrealized. The problem here is case selection. The exigencies of the Nepolonic conflict precluded confederation, so no real test is possible, and the EDC failed under French objection.

Still, as an initial attempt to develop an argument about the transaction costs inherent to military cooperation, this
is an important and needed contribution that alone justifies the book. The analysis also raises several new issues worthy of further investigation. For example, what role do changing transaction costs play in the evolution and/or devolution of institutions? What are the mechanisms by which they become perceptible to decision makers? How do leaders weight each type of cost? and How do they resolve competing assessments about the nature of such costs? *Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy* lays important groundwork for a fruitful examination of such questions.