

Autocratic Regimes Code Book

Version 1.2

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Autocratic regimes

1.1 Definitions

Autocratic regime: a set of formal and/or informal rules for choosing leaders and policies; there can be multiple regimes within an autocratic spell

Autocratic regime duration: consecutive years in which the same autocratic regime has been in power in a particular country up to time t

Autocratic spell: consecutive calendar years in which an autocratic regime ruled the country; autocratic spell may be interrupted by years in which a democracy, foreign occupier, or failed state controlled the majority of the territory

Calendar time: the observation calendar year

CGV: Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010); **ACLP:** Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, and Przeworski (2000)

Country-year: data format for observations; most autocratic regimes span multiple years

Duration time: a counter variable that marks the number of years the regime has been in power, up to and including the observation year; duration = 0 in the calendar year the regime took power; duration = 1 in the calendar year for the first calendar year in which the regime holds power on January 1. Duration time includes years the regime held power prior to 1946 for independent countries.

GWF: Geddes, Wright, Frantz (2012)

Regime start: the calendar year for the first January 1 in which the regime holds power

Regime failure: the calendar year in which the regime failure occurs

Regime failure event: the historical event for which we code regime failure

Regime failure type: nominal categories which group similar failure events together (e.g. ouster by election or coup; whether subsequent regime is a democracy or another autocratic regime)

Regime type: nominal categories or typologies which group similar regimes together (time invariant across regime spell); examples include: military, party, personalist, and monarchy.

Illustrative examples

When using the data to model autocratic regime survival, the unit of analysis is the **autocratic regime**, not the autocratic spell or the autocratic regime type.

Algeria

- 1962-1992: FLN/military ruled a *< party – military >* regime
- 1992-2010: military ruled a *< military >* regime

The **autocratic spell** lasts from 1962 to 2010 and is right-censored. Each of bullet points lists a distinct **autocratic regime**. These two regimes happen to be different **regime types** (party-military, military). **Regime failure** occurs in 1992. Only one **regime failure event** occurs during the **autocratic spell**: the January 11 1992 military coup that ousts Benjedid. The **autocratic regime** from 1992-2010 is right-censored because it has not failed as of December 31 2010.

Chile

- 1973-1989: Pinochet rules a *< military – personal >* regime

The **autocratic spell** lasts from 1973 to 1989; it is *not* right-censored. The bullet point list one **autocratic regime**. Chile's **regime type** is *< military – personal >*. **Regime failure** and **autocratic spell failure** occur in 1989. The **regime failure type** is transition to democracy. Only one **regime failure event** occurs during the **autocratic spell**: the December 14 1989 election that leads to democracy the following year.

Congo/DRC/Zaire

- 1960-1997: Mobutu rules a *< personal >* regime
- 1997-2010: Kabila (father and son) rule a *< personal >* regime

The **autocratic spell** lasts from 1960 to 2010 and is right-censored. Each of the bullet points lists a distinct **autocratic regime**. These two regimes happen to be the same **regime type** (personal). **Regime failure** occurs in 1997. The **regime failure type** for this failure is a transition to a subsequent autocratic regime. Only one **regime failure event** occurs during the **autocratic spell**: May 17 1997 when L. Kabila's force take Kinshasa. The **autocratic regime** from 1997-2010 is right-censored because it has not failed as of December 31 2010.

Thailand

- 1944-1947: Pridi *< personal >*
- 1947-1957: Phibun *< military – personal >*
- 1957-1973: Sarit, Thanom and the military *< military – personal >*
- 1976-1988: Prem Tinsulanonda and the military *< military – personal >*
- 1991-1992: *< military >*
- 2006-2007: *< military >*

There are four **autocratic spells**; none are right-censored. Each bullet point lists a distinct **autocratic regime**. The first three **autocratic regimes** (1944-1947, 1947-1957 and 1957-1973) ruled consecutively, uninterrupted by a non-autocratic regime, and thus constitute one **autocratic spell**: 1944-1973. The other three **autocratic regimes** (1976-1988, 1991-1992, and 2006-2007) each ended in democracy and thus constitute separate **autocratic spells**. The 1947 and 1957 **regime failure type** is a transition to a subsequent autocratic regime. All the other **regime failure types** are transitions to democracy. Note that two consecutive **autocratic regimes** (1947-1957 and 1957-1973) that constitute part of an **autocratic spell** (1944-1973) are coded as the same **autocratic regime type**: *< military – personal >*.

1.2 Coding rules for universe of autocratic regime cases

Country-years with autocratic governments 1946-2010 in independent countries with more than one million inhabitants in 2009.

- Date of Coding: January 1. This means that the date for ‘regime start’ is (January 1 of) the calendar year after its actual start date. The reason for using this rule rather than following the convention¹ of coding on December 31st is to allow institutional information to be coded for the year of regime collapse.
- Definition of Regime: A regime is a set of formal and/or informal rules for choosing leaders and policies. An important element of this set of rules is the identity of the group from which leaders can be chosen (e.g., in a professionalized military regime, the group from which leaders can be chosen is officers of very high rank).

Country-year excluded from data set if:

- Country is democratic (defined as not autocratic, using the criteria for defining autocratic below)
- Country has a provisional government charged with conducting elections as part of a transition to democracy, and if the elections actually take place and if the candidate and party elected are allowed to take office

To be considered transitional, the majority of top leaders cannot have been ruling members of the prior regime.

If instead of holding elections, the provisional government converts itself into the ‘permanent’ government, it is coded as autocratic.

If elections are held but elected leaders are not permitted to take office, coding depends on who prevents them from taking office and who governs instead.

- If actors from the old regime prevent those who won elections from taking office and return to power themselves, the provisional government and the one that succeeds it are coded as a continuation of the autocratic regime that preceded the provisional government.
- If actors from the old regime prevent those who won the elections from taking office but replace them with a government drawn from a different group than the one that ruled before (e.g., the military that used to rule replaces elected civilians with a civilian technocrat whose base of support lies partly outside the military), we code the new government as a new autocratic regime.
- If actors from the old regime prevent those who won the elections from taking office but the old regime is replaced by a government that uses different rules for choosing leaders and policies, we code the new government as a new autocratic regime.

¹ For example, Przeworski et al. (2000) and Cheibub et al. (2010).

- Country is not independent
- Foreign troops occupy the country, and the occupier governs it or has major influence on how it is governed, but not if a foreign power influences the government but allows it to make most decisions.
- Country has no government or has multiple governments, no one of which controls most of the resources of the state.

The existence of civil war is not a reason to exclude a case if a government still controls significant territory

1.3 Coding rules for autocratic regime starts and failures

Autocratic regime starts when any one of the following occurs:

- An executive achieves power through undemocratic means and, with his inner circle establishes new rules for choosing leaders and policies. ‘Undemocratic’ is defined as any means other than a direct, reasonably fair competitive election in which at least ten percent of the total population (equivalent to about 40 percent of the adult male population) was eligible to vote; or indirect election by a body at least 60 percent of which was elected in direct, reasonably fair competitive elections; or constitutional succession to a democratically elected executive.

Elections are not considered reasonably competitive if one or more large party is not allowed to participate; and/or if there are widespread reports of violence, jailing, and/or intimidation of opposition leaders or supporters; and/or if there are credible reports of vote fraud widespread enough to change election outcome (especially if reported by international observers); and/or if the incumbent so dominates political resources and the media that observers do not consider elections fair.

The start date for monarchies is Jan 1 of the year after a new dynasty achieves office because different dynasties identify different groups from whom regime leaders can be chosen.

Regimes are not coded autocratic if an elected executive is ousted by the military, non-constitutional legislative action, or popular pressure, but is succeeded by a constitutionally mandated successor and the successor behaves in accordance with the constitution. (Such governments may be unconstitutional, but they are not autocratic regimes because they continue to follow the democratic rules concerning succession, length of term, and means of choosing the next executive.)

- The government achieves power through competitive elections as described above, but subsequently changed the formal or informal rules such that competition in subsequent elections was limited.

Events and rule changes that should be coded as causing a transition from democracy to autocracy in electoral regimes:

1. Opposition parties representing more than 20 percent of voters banned.
2. Most opposition parties forced to merge with ruling party.
3. Legislature closed unconstitutionally.
4. Reports of beating, jailing, or killing opposition leaders and/or widespread intimidation of opposition supporters.
5. Credible reports of vote fraud widespread enough to change election outcome (especially if reported by international observers).
6. Annulment of election results.

Start of autocracy dated from January 1 after: change in rules; date of campaign in which violence first reported; election in which fraud reported; or annulment occurred

The following irregularities should not be coded as autocratic:

1. Reports of vote buying (because it is very common in democracies)
 2. Scattered reports of fraud
 3. Fraud complaints by the opposition without other support
 4. Opposition boycott of election in the absence of other evidence of unfairness.
- Competitive elections are held to choose the government, but the military either prevents one or more parties that substantial numbers of citizens would be expected to vote for from competing, or dictates policy choice in important policy areas (e.g., basic economic strategy or foreign policy in the Middle East). We label such regimes indirect military rule.

Autocratic regime fails when any one of the following occurs:

- A competitive election for the executive, or for the body that chooses the executive, occurs and is won by a person other than the incumbent or someone allied with the incumbent; and the individual or party elected is allowed to take office. The end date is the election, but the case is only counted if the candidate or party elected is allowed to take power.

If a country has both a popularly elected president and a PM chosen by the elected legislature, and it is not clear which has most political power, loss of either office by the incumbent party indicates the end of autocratic rule.

In cases of indirect military rule, the incumbent leader is the top military officer. If leaders of an indirect military regime change the rules such that all major parties and population groups are permitted to compete in fair elections, and the civilian winner is allowed to take office and to make policy in areas previously reserved for the military, we code this change as regime change because the regime leader is replaced by the elected executive

- The government is ousted by a coup, popular uprising, rebellion, civil war, invasion, or other violent means, and replaced by a different regime (defined as above, as a government that follows different rules for choosing leaders and policies).

Regimes should be coded as ending if:

1. Civil war, invasion, popular uprising, or rebellion brings to power individuals from regions, religions, ethnicities, or tribes different from those who ruled before (i.e., the group from which leaders can be chosen has changed)
2. A coup (defined as overthrow of the incumbent leader by members of the military of the regime being ousted) replaces the government with one supported by different regions, religions, ethnicities, or tribes; or soldiers with the rank of major or below replace incumbents with the rank of general or colonel. If a coup simply replaces an incumbent general from one military faction with a general

from another without changing the group from which leaders are selected, code this as a leader change, not a regime change.

3. Assassinations are treated like coups, i.e., if the assassinated incumbent is replaced by someone else from within the same ruling group, we do not code it as a regime ending. If the assassinated incumbent is replaced by someone from a different group, as described above, we count the assassination as a regime end.
- The ruling group markedly changes the rules for choosing leaders and policies such that the identity of the group from which leaders can be chosen or the group that can choose major policies changes. Examples of regime changes implemented by leaders of the incumbent regime include:
 1. The new regime leader after a regular autocratic succession (e.g., the dictator dies and is succeeded by his constitutional successor) replaces the most important members of the ruling group with individuals drawn from a different region or ethnicity and changes other basic rules of how the regime functions.
 2. Transitions to indirect military rule, which occur when military regime leaders allow the election of a civilian government that has some of the powers of a democratic government, but military leaders maintain substantial control over leader and policy choice, either by preventing parties that large numbers of citizens would be expected to vote for from competing or directly controlling the selection of important cabinet posts and policies. Indirect military regimes are coded as distinct from the prior military-led regime because many in the leadership are chosen through fair elections, and these elected officials control important aspects of policy; they are not simply puppets. Transitions to indirect military rule are coded January after the date of the election of the civilian government.
 3. Transitions from indirect military rule to other forms of autocracy occur when the elected civilian junior partner of an indirect military regime is removed from office by the senior military partner some other armed force. These changes usually occur via coup.

1.4 Coding rules for autocratic regime failure events

Type of Subsequent Regime (Subs Reg)

- Coded 0 if the regime has not ended by 2010.
- Coded 1 if the regime that follows the last year of the regime being coded is democratic.

Democratic is defined as a regime in which the executive achieved power through a direct competitive election in which at least ten percent of the total population (equivalent to about 40 percent of the adult male population) was eligible to vote, all major parties were permitted to compete, and neither fraud nor violence determined the election outcome; or indirect election by a body at least 60 percent of which was elected in direct competitive elections (defined in the same way as for directly elected executives).

Provisional governments (defined as above) charged with conducting elections as part of a transition to democracy are coded democratic if the elections actually take place and if the candidate and party elected are allowed to take office. This sometimes takes more than a year.

If a provisional government (defined as above) is following the rules agreed to with regard to power sharing and preparing for a fair election, and it lasts through Jan 1 of the year following its creation or longer, but is later ousted by a group different from the incumbent group that preceded it, code it as democratic during the time it governed.

Reconvening a legislature or constituent assembly previously elected in a competitive election for the purpose of managing a transition to democracy is coded as democratic if the transition is carried out.

- Coded 2 if the regime in the year following the last year of the regime being coded is autocratic, that is, included in our autocratic data set.
- Coded 3 if the regime is followed by a period that is neither autocratic nor democratic. These include:

Periods when the country has no government or has multiple governments, no one of which controls most of the resources of the state.

Periods when foreign troops occupy the country and the occupying power governs it, or exercises major influence over how it is governed

Failures that occur when a country ceases to exist because it has been incorporated into another (e.g., East Germany, South Yemen)

How Did the Autocratic Regime End? (How End)

- Coded 0 if the regime had not ended by 2010.
- Coded 1 if regime insiders changed the rules for choosing leaders and policies, or the executive was removed by elite actors other than the military, ending the period of time in which one set of formal and informal rules remained in force.

Use this code for cases in which regime insiders changed the formal or informal rules under which elections were held such that, for example, all parties could participate or suffrage was extended to most of the population, thus changing the identity of the actors who could influence policy. Examples might include transitions from indirect military rule to democracy and transitions from oligarchy to democracy.

- Coded 2 if the incumbent, or a party, coalition, or candidate supported by the incumbent, lost an election and allowed the candidate or party that won to take office.
- Coded 3 if a regime held a competitive election in which no major candidate or party supported by the incumbent ran, as a means of choosing the next government, and allowed the winner of the election to take office.

Also use this code if the incumbent group handed power to a transitional government for the purpose of holding an election to determine the next government - even if the transitional election did not ultimately occur - as long as democratization was not prevented by the current incumbent.

- Coded 4 if the regime was ousted by popular uprising.

Popular uprising defined as widespread, mostly unarmed demonstrations, riots, and/or strikes

- Coded 5 if the regime was overthrown by military coup (defined as ouster by the military of the regime in power).

Overthrows by insurgencies led by ex-officers are coded as insurgencies not coups.

Handovers to the military in the context of popular uprisings, where the military acts as a facilitator of regime change, are coded as popular uprisings not coups.

Transitions from direct to indirect military rule are coded as coups because they are made by the military of the regime in power.

- Coded 6 if regime is ousted by insurgents, revolutionaries, or combatants fighting a civil war.

Insurgency, revolution, or civil war defined as involving organized armed conflict

- Coded 7 if regime changed through foreign imposition or invasion
- Coded 8 if a new leader chosen in a regular autocratic succession changed the formal and informal rules defining the regime after his accession to power while himself remaining in power.

If the regime's formal and informal rules were changed sufficiently to code it as a new regime, it will appear in the list of cases as a separate entry.

Regular autocratic successions defined as: the retirement, illness, or death of the original leader and his replacement by someone who previously occupied the formal position of successor, or was selected by the retiring leader, or was chosen by a group of regime insiders such as the party executive committee, high level officers, or a combination of the two.

Regular autocratic successions also include original leaders who leave office because of term limits and are succeeded by a leader chosen by the retiring leader; or a group of regime insiders such as the party executive committee, high level officers, or a combination of the two.

- Coded 9 if regime ends because the state's existence ends or the government's control of most of its territory ends

Was the Autocratic Regime End Violent? (Violent)

Coding is based on the number of deaths during the transition. Deaths should include participants and non-participants killed by both sides.

Count only those deaths that occurred during the actions linked to the ouster of the government, not deaths that occurred as part of demonstrations weeks prior to the ouster and not deaths associated with government repression of opponents in the months leading up to the ouster.

Use the coding of the previous variable (How Did the Regime End?) to help make judgments: If the regime ended via election (coded 1 or 2 above), include up to three weeks before the election and up to one week afterward if the violence seems directly related to the election.

If ouster was caused by popular uprising, code only deaths that occurred during the period of demonstrations, riots, and strikes leading up to the ouster.

If the regime was overthrown by a coup, code only deaths that occurred during the coup and the immediate period of establishing control of the capital.

If the regime was overthrown by insurgency, revolution, or civil war, count the deaths that occurred during the active period of insurgency leading up to the ouster. Do not count all the deaths that have occurred over many years during off-again, on-again insurgencies. Only count those that occurred during the last active period of insurgency before the ouster.

If the regime was overthrown by foreign invasion or imposition, count deaths that occurred during the invasion of the country and the ouster of government, but not deaths caused by subsequent insurgency against the occupier.

- Coded 0 if the regime had not ended by 2010.
- Coded 1 if non-violent, defined as involving no deaths.
- Coded 2 if a few deaths occurred during the transition. If numbers are available, 'a few' means 1-25.
- Coded 3 if many deaths occurred during the transition. If numbers are available, 'many' means more than 25 but less than 1000.
- Coded 4 if more than 1000 deaths occurred. (These should be included in Fearon & Laitin.)

1.5 Autocratic regime cases

In the data set and the list of regimes cases, the case name contains the first calendar year in which the regime comes to power and the last calendar year when the regime leaves power. In most cases, the first calendar year when a regime takes power is also the same year in which the previous regime fails. Note that *begin* year marks the calendar year after the regime comes to power. Duration dependence equals 0 for the first calendar year in power and 1 for the *begin* year. In the country-year (TSCS) data set, we do not code the calendar year in which duration dependence equals zero for a particular regime. The first calendar year observation coded for a particular regime is when duration dependence equals 1, which is the first calendar year in which the regime holds power on January 1.

Collapsing autocratic regime type categories

One convention for collapsing the regime type categories is the following:

Party-based regimes: party-based, party-military, party-personal, party-personal-military, oligarchy, Iran 1979-2010

Military regimes: indirect military, military, military-personal

Personalist regimes: personal

Monarchical regimes: monarchy

The TSCS data set uses this convention to create the following binary variables:

`geddes_party`

`geddes_military`

`geddes_personal`

`geddes_monarchy`

Table 1.1 *Autocratic regime case list*

Regime	Start	End	Type	Regime	Start	End	Type
Afghanistan 29-73	1930	1973	monarchy	Congo-Brz 60-63	1961	1963	personal
Afghanistan 73-78	1974	1978	personal	Congo-Brz 63-68	1964	1968	party-personal
Afghanistan 78-92	1979	1992	party-personal	Congo-Brz 68-91	1969	1991	party-military
Afghanistan 96-01	1997	2001	party-based	Congo-Brz 97-NA	1998		personal
Afghanistan 09-NA	2010		personal	Congo/Zaire 60-97	1961	1997	personal
Albania 44-91	1945	1991	party-based	Congo/Zaire 97-NA	1998		personal
Algeria 62-92	1963	1992	party-military	Costa Rica 48-49	1949	1949	personal
Algeria 92-NA	1993		military	Cuba 52-59	1953	1959	personal
Angola 75-NA	1976		party-based	Cuba 59-NA	1960		party-personal
Argentina 43-46	1944	1946	military	Czechoslovakia 48-89	1949	1989	party-based
Argentina 51-55	1952	1955	personal	Dominican Rep 30-62	1931	1962	personal
Argentina 55-58	1956	1958	military	Dominican Rep 63-65	1964	1965	military
Argentina 58-66	1959	1966	indirect military	Dominican Rep 66-78	1967	1978	personal
Argentina 66-73	1967	1973	military	Ecuador 44-47	1945	1947	personal
Argentina 76-83	1977	1983	military	Ecuador 63-66	1964	1966	military
Armenia 94-98	1995	1998	personal	Ecuador 70-72	1971	1972	personal
Armenia 98-NA	1999		personal	Ecuador 72-79	1973	1979	military
Azerbaijan 91-92	1992	1992	personal	Egypt 22-52	1923	1952	monarchy
Azerbaijan 93-NA	1994		personal	Egypt 52-NA	1953		party-personal-military
Bangladesh 71-75	1972	1975	party-personal	El Salvador 31-48	1932	1948	military-personal
Bangladesh 75-82	1976	1982	personal	El Salvador 48-82	1949	1982	party-military
Bangladesh 82-90	1983	1990	personal	El Salvador 82-94	1983	1994	indirect military
Bangladesh 07-08	2008	2008	military	Eritrea 93-NA	1994		party-personal
Belarus 91-94	1992	1994	party-based	Ethiopia 89-74	1890	1974	monarchy
Belarus 94-NA	1995		personal	Ethiopia 74-91	1975	1991	military-personal
Benin 60-63	1961	1963	personal	Ethiopia 91-NA	1992		party-based
Benin 63-65	1964	1965	personal	Gabon 60-NA	1961		party-personal
Benin 65-67	1966	1967	military	Gambia 65-94	1966	1994	party-based
Benin 67-69	1968	1969	military	Gambia 94-NA	1995		personal
Benin 69-70	1970	1970	military	Georgia 91-92	1992	1992	personal
Benin 72-90	1973	1990	personal	Georgia 92-03	1993	2003	personal
Bolivia 43-46	1944	1946	party-military	Germany East 49-90	1950	1990	party-based
Bolivia 46-51	1947	1951	oligarchy	Ghana 60-66	1961	1966	party-personal
Bolivia 51-52	1952	1952	military	Ghana 66-69	1967	1969	military
Bolivia 52-64	1953	1964	party-based	Ghana 72-79	1973	1979	military
Bolivia 64-69	1965	1969	personal	Ghana 81-00	1982	2000	personal
Bolivia 69-71	1970	1971	military	Greece 67-74	1968	1974	military
Bolivia 71-79	1972	1979	military-personal	Guatemala 54-58	1955	1958	personal
Bolivia 80-82	1981	1982	military	Guatemala 58-63	1959	1963	personal
Botswana 66-NA	1967		party-based	Guatemala 63-66	1964	1966	military
Brazil 64-85	1965	1985	military	Guatemala 66-70	1967	1970	indirect military
Bulgaria 44-90	1945	1990	party-based	Guatemala 70-85	1971	1985	military
Burkina Faso 60-66	1961	1966	personal	Guatemala 85-95	1986	1995	indirect military
Burkina Faso 66-80	1967	1980	personal	Guinea 58-84	1959	1984	party-based
Burkina Faso 80-82	1981	1982	military	Guinea 84-08	1985	2008	personal
Burkina Faso 82-87	1983	1987	personal	Guinea 08-10	2009	2010	personal
Burkina Faso 87-NA	1988		personal	Guinea Bissau 74-80	1975	1980	party-based
Burundi 62-66	1963	1966	monarchy	Guinea Bissau 80-99	1981	1999	personal
Burundi 66-87	1967	1987	party-military	Guinea Bissau 02-03	2003	2003	personal
Burundi 87-93	1988	1993	military	Haiti 41-46	1942	1946	personal
Burundi 96-03	1997	2003	military-personal	Haiti 50-56	1951	1956	personal
Cambodia 53-70	1954	1970	monarchy	Haiti 57-86	1958	1986	personal
Cambodia 70-75	1971	1975	personal	Haiti 86-88	1987	1988	military
Cambodia 75-79	1976	1979	party-based	Haiti 88-90	1989	1990	military-personal
Cambodia 79-NA	1980		party-based	Haiti 91-94	1992	1994	military
Cameroon 60-83	1961	1983	party-personal	Haiti 99-04	2000	2004	personal
Cameroon 83-NA	1984		personal	Honduras 33-56	1934	1956	party-personal
Cen African Rep 60-65	1961	1965	personal	Honduras 63-71	1964	1971	party-military
Cen African Rep 66-79	1966	1979	personal	Honduras 72-81	1973	1981	military
Cen African Rep 79-81	1980	1981	personal	Hungary 47-90	1948	1990	party-based
Cen African Rep 81-93	1982	1993	military-personal	Indonesia 49-66	1950	1966	personal
Cen African Rep 03-NA	2004		personal	Indonesia 66-99	1967	1999	party-personal-military
Chad 60-75	1961	1975	party-personal	Iran 25-79	1926	1979	monarchy
Chad 75-79	1976	1979	military	Iran 79-NA	1980		
Chad 82-90	1983	1990	personal	Iraq 32-58	1933	1958	monarchy
Chad 90-NA	1991		personal	Iraq 58-63	1959	1963	personal
Chile 73-89	1974	1989	military-personal	Iraq 63-68	1964	1968	personal
China 49-NA	1950		party-based	Iraq 68-79	1969	1979	party-personal
Colombia 49-53	1950	1953	party-based	Iraq 79-03	1980	2003	personal
Colombia 53-58	1954	1958	military-personal	Ivory Coast 60-99	1961	1999	party-based

NA \equiv Right-censored cases still in power December 31, 2010.

Table 1.2 *Autocratic regime case list, continued*

Regime	Start	End	Type	Regime	Start	End	Type
Ivory Coast 99-00	2000	2000	personal	Poland 44-89	1945	1989	party-based
Ivory Coast 00-NA	2001		personal	Portugal 26-74	1927	1974	personal
Jordan 46-NA	1947		monarchy	Romania 45-89	1946	1989	party-personal
Kazakhstan 91-NA	1992		personal	Russia 93-NA	1994		personal
Kenya 63-02	1964	2002	party-based	Rwanda 62-73	1963	1973	party-based
Korea North 48-NA	1949		party-personal	Rwanda 73-94	1974	1994	military-personal
Korea South 48-60	1949	1960	personal	Rwanda 94-NA	1995		party-military
Korea South 61-87	1962	1987	military	Saudi Arabia 27-NA	1928		monarchy
Kuwait 61-NA	1962		monarchy	Senegal 60-00	1961	2000	party-based
Kyrgyzstan 91-05	1992	2005	personal	Serbia 91-00	1992	2000	party-personal
Kyrgyzstan 05-10	2006	2010	personal	Sierra Leone 67-68	1968	1968	military
Laos 59-60	1960	1960	personal	Sierra Leone 68-92	1969	1992	party-based
Laos 60-62	1961	1962	personal	Sierra Leone 92-96	1993	1996	military-personal
Laos 75-NA	1976		party-based	Sierra Leone 97-98	1998	1998	personal
Lesotho 70-86	1971	1986	party-based	Singapore 65-NA	1966		party-based
Lesotho 86-93	1987	1993	military	Somalia 69-91	1970	1991	personal
Liberia 44-80	1945	1980	party-personal	South Africa 10-94	1911	1994	oligarchy
Liberia 80-90	1981	1990	personal	Soviet Union 17-91	1918	1991	party-based
Liberia 97-03	1998	2003	personal	Spain 39-76	1940	1976	personal
Libya 51-69	1952	1969	monarchy	Sri Lanka 78-94	1979	1994	party-based
Libya 69-NA	1970		personal	Sudan 58-64	1959	1964	military
Madagascar 60-72	1961	1972	party-based	Sudan 69-85	1970	1985	personal
Madagascar 72-75	1973	1975	military	Sudan 85-86	1986	1986	military
Madagascar 75-93	1976	1993	personal	Sudan 89-NA	1990		personal
Madagascar 09-NA	2010		personal	Swaziland 68-NA	1969		monarchy
Malawi 64-94	1965	1994	personal	Syria 46-47	1947	1947	oligarchy
Malaysia 57-NA	1958		party-based	Syria 49-51	1950	1951	indirect military
Mali 60-68	1961	1968	party-based	Syria 51-54	1952	1954	military
Mali 68-91	1969	1991	personal	Syria 57-58	1958	1958	personal
Mauritania 60-78	1961	1978	personal	Syria 62-63	1963	1963	indirect military
Mauritania 78-05	1979	2005	personal	Syria 63-NA	1964		party-personal-military
Mauritania 05-07	2006	2007	military	Taiwan 49-00	1950	2000	party-based
Mauritania 08-NA	2009		personal	Tajikistan 91-NA	1992		personal
Mexico 15-00	1916	2000	party-based	Tanzania 64-NA	1965		party-based
Mongolia 21-93	1922	1993	party-based	Thailand 44-47	1945	1947	personal
Morocco 56-NA	1957		monarchy	Thailand 47-57	1948	1957	military-personal
Mozambique 75-NA	1976		party-based	Thailand 57-73	1958	1973	military-personal
Myanmar 58-60	1959	1960	military	Thailand 76-88	1977	1988	military-personal
Myanmar 62-88	1963	1988	military-personal	Thailand 91-92	1992	1992	military
Myanmar 88-NA	1989		military	Thailand 06-07	2007	2007	military
Namibia 90-NA	1991		party-based	Togo 60-63	1961	1963	personal
Nepal 46-51	1847	1951	monarchy	Togo 63-NA	1964		personal
Nepal 51-91	1952	1991	monarchy	Tunisia 56-NA	1957		party-based
Nepal 02-06	2003	2006	monarchy	Turkey 23-50	1924	1950	party-based
Nicaragua 36-79	1937	1979	personal	Turkey 57-60	1958	1960	party-based
Nicaragua 79-90	1980	1990	party-based	Turkey 60-61	1961	1961	military
Niger 60-74	1961	1974	party-based	Turkey 80-83	1981	1983	military
Niger 74-91	1975	1991	military-personal	Turkmenistan 91-NA	1992		party-personal
Niger 96-99	1997	1999	personal	Uganda 66-71	1967	1971	personal
Nigeria 66-79	1967	1979	military	Uganda 71-79	1972	1979	personal
Nigeria 83-93	1984	1993	military	Uganda 80-85	1981	1985	personal
Nigeria 93-99	1994	1999	military-personal	Uganda 86-NA	1987		personal
Oman 41-NA	1742		monarchy	United Arab Emirates 71-NA	1972		monarchy
Pakistan 47-58	1948	1958	oligarchy	Uruguay 73-84	1974	1984	military
Pakistan 58-71	1959	1971	military-personal	Uzbekistan 91-NA	1992		party-personal
Pakistan 75-77	1976	1977	personal	Venezuela 48-58	1949	1958	military-personal
Pakistan 77-88	1978	1988	military-personal	Venezuela 05-NA	2006		personal
Pakistan 99-08	2000	2008	military-personal	Vietnam 54-NA	1955		party-based
Panama 49-51	1950	1951	personal	Vietnam South 54-63	1955	1963	personal
Panama 53-55	1954	1955	personal	Vietnam South 63-75	1964	1975	military
Panama 68-82	1969	1982	military-personal	Yemen 18-62	1919	1962	monarchy
Panama 82-89	1983	1989	military-personal	Yemen 62-67	1963	1967	military
Paraguay 39-48	1940	1948	personal	Yemen 67-74	1968	1974	personal
Paraguay 48-54	1949	1954	party-based	Yemen 74-78	1975	1978	military
Paraguay 54-93	1955	1993	party-personal-military	Yemen 78-NA	1979		personal
Peru 48-56	1949	1956	military-personal	Yemen South 67-90	1968	1990	party-based
Peru 62-63	1963	1963	military	Yugoslavia 45-90	1946	1990	party-based
Peru 68-80	1969	1980	military	Zambia 67-91	1968	1991	party-based
Peru 92-00	1993	2000	personal	Zambia 96-NA	1997		party-based
Philippines 72-86	1973	1986	personal	Zimbabwe 80-NA	1981		party-based

NA \equiv Right-censored cases still in power December 31, 2010.

1.6 Variable list for Autocratic Regimes Data Set (TSCS data set)

cow: Correlates of War (CoW) country code

year: Calendar year

gwf_country: Country name

gwf_casename: Autocratic regime case name (country name and years); these are the units of observation for duration analysis

gwf_startdate: Day-Month-Year for the calendar date of the autocratic regime start event (31-12-2010 for right-censored autocratic regimes)

gwf_enddate: Day-Month-Year for the calendar date of the autocratic regime failure event (31-12-2010 for right-censored autocratic regimes)

gwf_spell: Time-invariant duration of autocratic regime

gwf_duration: Time-varying duration of autocratic regime up to time t

gwf_failure: Binary indicator of autocratic regime failure

gwf_fail_subs: Categorical variable marking the subsequent regime type

- 1: subsequent regime is democracy
- 2: subsequent regime is autocratic
- 3: subsequent regime is *warlord*, *foreign-occupied* or ceases to exist
- 0: no regime failure at duration time t ; and regime still in power December 31, 2010

gwf_fail_type: Categorical variable marking how the autocratic regime ends

- 1: regime insiders change rules of regime
- 2: incumbent loses elections
- 3: no incumbent runs in competitive election won by opponent
- 4: popular uprising
- 5: military coup
- 6: insurgents, revolutionaries, or combatants fighting a civil war
- 7: foreign imposition or invasion
- 8: new autocratic leader selected, changes rules, and remains in power
- 9: state ceases to exist ends or government fails to control most of the country's territory
- 0: regime still in power on December 31, 2010

gwf_fail_violent: Categorical variable marking the level of violence during the autocratic regime failure event

- 1: no deaths
- 2: 1-25 deaths
- 3: 26-1000 deaths
- 4: >1000
- 0: regime still in power on December 31, 2010

`gwf_regimetype`: Autocratic regime type

- *monarchy*
- *personal*
- *military*
- *party*
- *party-personal*
- *party-military*
- *military-personal*
- *party-personal-military*
- *oligarchy*
- *indirect military*

`gwf_party`: Binary indicator of *party* regime type (groups party-based, party-personal, party-military, party-personal-military, oligarchy, and Iran 1979-2010)

`gwf_personal`: Binary indicator of *personalist* regime type

`gwf_military`: Binary indicator of *military* regime type (groups military, military-personal, indirect military)

`gwf_monarchy`: Binary indicator of *monarchy* regime type

2

Autocratic regimes and non-democracies

The primary data set (“GWF Autocratic Regimes.xls”, “GWFcases.dta”, “GWFtscs.dta”, and “GWFtscs.txt”) is time series-cross section data that contains the Start and End dates of the autocratic regimes as well as the regime type and variables that code different dimensions of how autocratic regimes fail (subsequent regime, level of violence, and type of failure event). In addition to this data set, we provide a list of global regimes that cover all independent countries, including autocracies, democracies, and non-autocracies, with over 1 million population (“GWF Global Case List.xls”, “GWFglobal.dta”, and “GWFglobal.txt”). We describe the latter data set in this section of the code book. This data set was first released in November 2011.

2.1 GWF autocratic regimes and ACLP/CGV non-democracies

There are a number of country-year observations that Cheibub et al. (2010) (CGV) code as non-democratic that are not included in the Geddes et al. (2012) data (GWF). Table 2.1 lists these observations, along with the CGV coding for the type of the leader in power (civilian, military, monarch), and the coding rule by which the GWF data excludes these observations. We categorize these observations by the criteria we use to exclude them from the GWF data. Thus if users want a universe of observations that includes all country from 1946, they can combine the GWF data with these observations and still use the categories we provide. For example, in studies of war initiation, some researchers have employed regimes data and then used another data source to categorize other types of observations, such as democracies, mixed non-democracies or non-democratic interregna (e.g. Weeks 2008). To capture all possible observations from 1946-2008/10, in principle a researcher could use the regimes data, add the observations in Table 2.1 and then code every other observation in the world as *democracy*. This residual category of democracies includes those observations that the GWF regimes data and the ACLP/CGV data agree are democracies.

There are six distinct coding criteria by which these observations are excluded: (1) *small*; (2) *not independent*; (3) *foreign-occupied*; (4) *warlord*, used as shorthand for no gov-

ernment controls most of the territory; (5) *provisional*; and (6) *democratic*.¹ The first two criteria for exclusion are easily verifiable and simply reflect the choice of the coders for circumscribing the universe of cases.

The third criterion for exclusion (*foreign-occupied*) comes from the coding rule which stipulates that countries occupied by a foreign military do not constitute autocratic regimes as we define them here. A classic case of long-term foreign military occupation is Syria's presence in Lebanon from 1976 to 2005. More recent cases include the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan (2001 to 2009²) and Iraq (2003 to 2005).

The fourth criterion stipulates that the central (autocratic) government control most of the territory (*warlord*). We exclude country-years in which the government controls the capital city but does not exert control over the majority of the territory and country-years in which multiple groups control different parts of the country but no one group predominates. Examples include Somalia after rebels ousted Siad Barre's regime from Mogadishu in January 1991 and Liberia after rebels took Monrovia and killed Doe in September 1990 until the July 1997 election after which Taylor took control of the central government.

The fifth reason for exclusion (*provisional*) often does not reflect disagreement over the start of democracy. Rather, the ACLP/CGV coding rules start with democracy as the core concept and code all other observations that do not fit these criteria as non-democracies. Thus non-democracy is a residual category. The GWF data take the opposite approach; here the core concept is an autocratic regime. Provisional country-years are coded as non-autocracies because the regime failure event precedes the event that marks the transition to democracy. In some cases the regime failure event and the transition to democracy event are the same. This is most often the case when an incumbent loses power via an election. Examples of regime failures that ACLP/CGV also code as a transition to democracy include Malawi 1994, Mexico 2000, Nigeria 1999, and Senegal 2000.

In other cases, however, the regime failure event precedes the formal transition event. In some cases, regime failure occurs and a provisional government takes power preceding an event such as an election (formal changing of leaders) which is then coded as a transition to democracy by ACLP/CGV. For example, we code the end of Mathieu Kérékou's regime in Benin when a National Conference stripped him of power in February 1990 and set up a transition government to oversee fair elections (Decalo 1997, 54-55). Elections were held in February 1991. The opposition candidate won, marking a transition to democracy. We code regime failure in Burundi in 2003 when an opposition leader assumed power in the transition

¹ See coding rules above for more detailed criteria for assigning country-years to these categories.

² The August 2009 election was deeply flawed and the U.S. was the main foreign occupation military force. The U.S. (and allies) pressed Karzai to accept election monitors' assessment that Karzai won less than the 50% of the first round vote necessary to avoid a run-off election. Rather than seek a second-round election, U.S. pressured Karzai to join a power-sharing agreement with the main opponent. While Karzai eventually accepted the election monitors' assessment and acquiesced to a run-off election, this ballot was canceled and Karzai was declared the winner despite the fact that the U.S. preferred his main opponent. Thus the leader stayed in power against the wishes of the main occupying force. From these events, we conclude that the U.S. no longer determines the rules for choosing leaders and policies, and the Karzai regime after the 2009 election fits the coding criteria for inclusion in the data set.

government. Even though a transition government had been agreed upon in 2001, incumbent President Pierre Buyoya remained in power until May 2003 when Domitien Ndayizeye assumed the Presidency. Voters approved a new constitution and held multiparty elections in 2005, which is marked as the date of the transition to democracy.

Finally, the sixth coding criterion is *democratic*. We code some country-years as democratic that CGV code as autocratic. One apparent difference is that we code newly independent countries as democracies if pre-independence elections were fair and free with multiple parties, and the governments elected in those elections ruled at independence. For example, observers noted no fraud or rigging in pre-independence Ghanian multiparty elections in 1954 and 1956 (Austin 1967, 543), making it a democracy upon independence in 1957. After independence the Nkrumah government initiated a series of changes in rules that gradually increased disadvantages for the opposition. We code the cumulation of these changes as sufficient to amount to ‘autocraticization’ after Nkrumah’s 1960 uncompetitive election to the presidency. Further concentration of power occurred after 1960. Second, we code as democratic (January 1) country-years in which an inauguration takes place in a year following a democratic election. For example, the December 1989 election in Chile was a fair and free election in which a Christian Democratic candidate won. We code the election as regime failure. However, the new President, Patricio Aylwin, was sworn in on March 11, 1990, which is the democratic transition event. Last, we also code as democratic the first years in office of elected leaders who later changed rules to reduce or end the opposition’s ability to compete in fair elections. For example, we code the Philippines under Marcos, who was originally elected in a competitive election, as democratic until he declared martial law in 1972. Similarly, Peru under Fujimori is coded democratic until he closed the legislature in 1992.

For all cases excluded by criteria (3)-(6),³ we list the case and a brief description of the coding decision in Appendix B.

2.2 A global data set of political regimes from an autocratic perspective

To facilitate use of the autocratic regimes data set with cross-national research that address dictatorships and democracies, we provide a global data set. This data set includes all the information on autocratic regime type, autocratic regime failure, and autocratic regime duration, as well as information on country-year observations included in Table 2.1 (except small countries). Further, this global data set of all regimes includes country-year observations that both the GWF data and the CGV data agree are democratic (e.g. on January 1: Chile 1946-1973, 1991-2008 and India 1948-2008) as well as country-year observations in 2009-2010 that GWF code as democracies. This data set only includes information on regime types, regime duration, and regime failures.

³ We code Syria 1959-1961 as *not independent* because it merged with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic. This is the only case for criterion (2) that is listed in Appendix B.

2.3 Variable list for Global Regimes Data Set

cow: Correlates of War (CoW) country code

year: Calendar year

gwf_country: Country name

gwf_case: Regime case name which contains information on country and years

gwf_regime: Regime type

- *not independent*
- *foreign-occupied*
- *warlord*
- *democracy*
- *provisional*
- *monarchy*
- *personalist*
- *military*
- *party*
- *party-personalist*
- *party-military*
- *military-personalist*
- *party-military-personalist*

gwf_duration: Duration of regime up to time t

gwf_failure: Binary indicator for regime failure

disagree: Binary indicator for country-year observations where GWF coding of democracy differs from CGV coding of democracy

2.4 GWF autocratic regimes and CGV democracies

There are also country-years we code as autocratic that CGV code as democratic. Most of these are years in which despite an election deemed free and fair by some observers, the dictator or dominant party of past years continues to rule. Our coding rules require the loss of power by the incumbent before we code a transition to democracy as having taken place. For example, the Sandinistas retained power in Nicaragua from 1984-1990 after the 1984 election which many observers deemed fair (Williams 1990). Thus we code the end of the Sandinista regime when they actually lost power, in 1990, not in 1984. There are also a small number of country-years in which our judgment about events or our criteria for coding countries as democratic differ. For example, we code country-years as autocratic when competitive elections are held but the military prevents parties that would have been expected to attract substantial popular support from competing, as in Argentina 1958-1962 when the Peronist party was banned. Years we code as autocratic but CGV code as democratic are listed in Table 2.2. Note that these observations are coded for January 1 for each calendar year under the assumption that the ACLP/CGV coding for a country on December 31 of year t is the same as the regime on January 1 of year $t+1$. Also included in this list is South Vietnam, which is not coded in the CGV data set.

Table 2.1 *CGV non-democracies not coded as GFW autocratic regimes*

Country	Year	CGV regime	Coding Criteria	Country	Year	CGV regime	Coding Criteria
Afghanistan	1993 - 1996	3	warlord	Lesotho	1994 - 2008	3	democratic
Afghanistan	2002 - 2008	3	foreign-occupied	Liberia	1991 - 1997	3	warlord
Bahrain	1971 - 2008	5	small	Liberia	2004 - 2006	3	provisional
Benin	1971	3	provisional	Maldives	1965 - 2008	5	small
Benin	1991	4	provisional	Mali	1992	4	provisional
Bhutan	1946 - 2008	5	small	Montenegro	2007 - 2008	3	democratic
Bosnia and Herz.	1991	3	not independent	Nepal	2007 - 2008	5	democratic
Bosnia and Herz.	1992 - 1995	3	warlord	Niger	1992 - 1993	4	provisional
Bosnia and Herz.	1996 - 2008	3	foreign-occupied	Niger	2000	4	democratic
Brunei Darussalam	1984 - 2008	5	small	Pakistan	1972	3	democratic
Burundi	2004 - 2005	3	provisional	Panama	1946 - 1949	3	democratic
Chad	1980 - 1982	3	warlord	Panama	1952	4	provisional
Chile	1990	4	democratic	Peru	1991 - 1992	3	democratic
China	1946 - 1949	4	warlord	Peru	2001	3	provisional
Comoros	1975 - 2008	3	small	Philippines	1966 - 1972	3	democratic
Congo Br.	1992	4	provisional	Portugal	1975 - 1976	4	provisional
Cyprus	1960 - 2008	3	small	Qatar	1971 - 2008	5	small
Czechoslovakia	1947-1948	3	democratic	Romania	1990	3	provisional
Djibouti	1977 - 2008	3	small	Russia	1992 -1993	3	democratic
Ecuador	1948	4	provisional	Samoa	1962 - 2008	5	small
Ecuador	1967 - 1968	3	provisional	São Tomé	1975 - 1991	3	small
Ecuador	1969	3	democratic	Seychelles	1976 - 2008	3	small
Ecuador	2001 - 2002	3	democratic	Somalia	1992 - 2008	3	warlord
Equatorial Guinea	1968 - 2008	3	small	South Africa	1995 - 2008	3	democratic
Fiji	1970 - 2008	3	small	South Korea	1988	4	democratic
Georgia	2004	3	provisional	Spain	1977	3	provisional
Ghana	1957 - 1960	3	democratic	Sudan	1965	3	provisional
Grenada	1980 - 1984	3	small	Suriname	1981 - 1988	4	small
Guinea-Bissau	2000	4	provisional	Suriname	1991	4	small
Guinea-Bissau	2004	3	provisional	Syria	1948 - 1949	3	democratic
Guyana	1966 - 2008	3	small	Syria	1955 - 1956	4	democratic
Haiti	1947 - 1950	3	democratic	Syria	1959 - 1961	3	foreign-occupied
Haiti	1995 - 1999	3	democratic	Tanzania	1961 - 1964	3	democratic
Haiti	2005 - 2006	3	provisional	Thailand	1974-1975	3	provisional
Haiti	2007-2008	3	democratic	Thailand	1976	3	democratic
Honduras	1957	4	provisional	Thailand	2008	4	democratic
Honduras	1982	4	democratic	Tonga	1970 - 2008	5	small
Hungary	1946 -1947	3	democratic	Turkey	1951 - 1957	3	democratic
Iraq	2004 - 2005	4	foreign-occupied	Uganda	1963 - 1966	3	democratic
Laos	1963 - 1973	3	warlord	Uruguay	1985	4	democratic
Laos	1974 - 1975	3	provisional	Venezuela	1959	4	democratic
Lebanon	1976 - 2005	3	foreign-occupied	Zambia	1992 - 1996	3	democratic
Lebanon	2006 - 2008	4	democratic	Zimbabwe	1965 - 1980	3	not independent
Lesotho	1966 - 1970	3	democratic				

Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) regime types: Military \equiv 3; Civilian \equiv 4; Monarchy \equiv 5.

Table 2.2 *GWF autocratic regimes coded as CGV democracies*

Country	Years	GWF Regime Type	Country	Years	GWF Regime Type
Argentina	1952 - 1954	5	Mongolia	1991 - 1993	6
Argentina	1959 - 1962	0	Nepal	1991	3
Argentina	1964 - 1966	0	Nicaragua	1985 - 1990	6
Armenia	1995 - 2009	5	Pakistan	1948 - 1958	4
Bangladesh	1987 - 1990	5	Pakistan	1976	5
Congo-Brz	1961 - 1963	5	Panama	1950	5
Dominican Rep	1967 - 1978	5	Panama	1954 - 1955	5
El Salvador	1985 - 1994	0	Paraguay	1990 - 1993	9
Ghana	1994 - 2000	5	South Vietnam*	1955 - 1963	5
Guatemala	1959 - 1963	5	South Vietnam*	1964 - 1975	1
Guatemala	1967 - 1970	0	Sri Lanka	1990 - 1994	6
Guatemala	1971 - 1982	1	Taiwan	1997 - 2000	6
Guatemala	1987 - 1995	0	Thailand	1980 - 1988	2
Kenya	1999 - 2002	6	Uganda	1981 - 1984	5
Kyrgyzstan	2006 - 2009	5	Venezuela	2006 - 2009	5

Types: Indirect military \equiv 0; Military \equiv 1; Military-personal \equiv 2; Monarchy \equiv 3; Oligarchy \equiv 4; Personal \equiv 5; Party \equiv 6; Party-military \equiv 7; Party-personal \equiv 8; Party-military-personal \equiv 9. *CGV do not code South Vietnam.

3

Coding details for GWF-CGV differences

3.1 GWF autocratic regimes and ACLP/CGV non-democracies

There are a number of country-year observations that Cheibub et al. (2010) (CGV) code as non-democratic that are not included in the Geddes et al. (2012) data (GWF). We categorize these observations by the criteria we use to exclude them from the GWF data. Thus if users want a universe of observations that includes all country-years from 1946 to 2010, they can use the GWF data on autocratic regime types based on the Geddes-Wright coding with the data on non-autocracies provided in the data set. For example, in studies of war initiation, some researchers have employed regimes data and then used another data source to categorize other types of observations, such as democracies, mixed non-democracies or non-democratic interregna (e.g. Weeks 2008).

There are six distinct coding criteria by which observations are excluded from GWF Autocratic Regimes data: (1) *small*;¹ (2) *not independent*; (3) *foreign-occupied*; (4) *warlord*, used as shorthand for no government controls most of the territory; (5) *provisional*; and (6) *democratic*. The first two criteria for exclusion are easily verifiable and simply reflect the choice of the coders for circumscribing the universe of cases. The third criterion for exclusion (*foreign-occupied*) comes from the coding rule which stipulates that countries occupied by a foreign military do not constitute autocratic regimes as we define them here. A classic case of long-term foreign military occupation is Syria's presence in Lebanon from 1976 to 2005. More recent cases include the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan (2001 to 2009²) and Iraq after 2003.

The fourth criterion stipulates that the central (autocratic) government control most of

¹ See footnote 2 on page 9 for a list.

² The August 2009 election was deeply flawed and the U.S. was the main foreign occupation military force. The U.S. pressed Karzai to accept election monitors' assessment that he had won less than the 50% of the first round vote necessary to avoid a run-off election. Rather than seek a second-round election, the U.S. pressured Karzai to join a power-sharing agreement with the main opponent. While Karzai eventually accepted the election monitors' assessment and acquiesced to a run-off election, this ballot was later canceled and Karzai was declared the winner despite the fact that the U.S. preferred his main opponent. Thus Karzai stayed in power against the wishes of the main occupying force. From these events, we conclude that the U.S. no longer determines the rules for choosing leaders and policies, and the Karzai regime after the 2009 election fits the coding criteria for inclusion in the data set.

the territory (*warlord*). We exclude country-years in which the government controls the capital city but does not exert control over the majority of the territory and country-years in which multiple groups control different parts of the country but no one group predominates. Examples include Somalia after rebels ousted Siad Barre's regime from Mogadishu in January 1991 and Liberia from the date when rebels took Monrovia and killed Doe in September 1990 until the July 1997 election after which Taylor took control of the central government.

The fifth reason for exclusion (*provisional*) often does not reflect disagreement over the start date of democracy. Rather, the ACLP/CGV coding rules start with democracy as the core concept and code all country-years that do not fit these criteria as non-democracies. Thus non-democracy is a residual category that includes provisional governments established to oversee competitive elections. The GWF data take the opposite approach; here the core concept is an autocratic regime. Provisional country-years are coded as non-autocracies because the regime failure event precedes the event that marks the transition to democracy. In most cases the regime failure event and the transition to democracy event are the same. This is most often the case when an incumbent loses power via an election. Examples of regime failures that ACLP/CGV also code as transitions to democracy include Malawi 1994, Argentina 1983, Nigeria 1999, and Senegal 2000.

In other cases, however, the regime failure event precedes the formal transition event. Sometimes regime failure occurs and a provisional government takes power preceding an event such as an election or inauguration (formal changing of leaders) which is then coded as a transition to democracy by ACLP/CGV. For example, we code the end of Mathieu Kérékou's regime in Benin when delegates to the National Conference that began in February 1990 stripped him of power and set up a transition government to oversee fair elections (Decalo 1997, 54-55). He acquiesced and elections were held in February 1991. Because the incumbent had lost control of decision making, we exclude the transition year from February 1990 to February 1991 from the Autocratic Regimes Data Set. The opposition candidate won the February 1991 election, completing the transition to democracy. Similarly we code autocratic regime failure in Burundi in 2003 when an opposition leader assumed power over the transition government. Even though a transition government had been agreed upon in 2001, incumbent President Buyoya remained in power until May 2003 when opposition leader Domitien Ndayizeye assumed the Presidency. Voters approved a new constitution and held multiparty elections in 2005, which is the date of the completed transition to democracy.

Finally, the sixth coding criterion is *democracy*. We code some country-years as democratic that CGV code as non-democratic. One apparent difference is that we code newly independent countries as democracies if pre-independence elections were fair and free with multiple parties, and the governments elected in those elections ruled at independence. For example, observers noted no fraud or rigging in pre-independence Ghanaian multiparty elections in 1954 and 1956 (Austin 1967, 543), making it a democracy upon independence in 1957. After independence, the Nkrumah government initiated a series of changes in rules that gradually increased disadvantages for the opposition. We code the cumulation of these

changes as sufficient to amount to ‘autocraticization’ after Nkrumah’s 1960 uncompetitive election to the presidency. Second, we code as democratic (on January 1) country-years in which an inauguration takes place in a year following a democratic election. For example, the December 1989 election in Chile was a fair and free election in which an opposition Christian Democratic candidate won. We code the election event as autocratic regime failure. However, the new President, Patricio Aylwin, was sworn in on March 11, 1990, which is the democratic transition event. Last, we also code as democratic the first years in office of elected leaders who later changed rules to reduce or end the opposition’s ability to compete in fair elections. For example, we code the Philippines under Marcos, who was originally elected in a competitive election, as democratic until he declared martial law and closed the legislature in 1972. Similarly, Peru under Fujimori is coded democratic until he closed the legislature in 1992.

For all cases excluded by criteria (2)-(6),³ we list the case and a brief description of the coding decision in the next section.

GWF non-autocracies coded as non-democracies by CGV

Coded on January 1 for each calendar year.

Afghanistan 1993-1996 *warlord*: From the fall of the Najibullah regime in April 1992 to Taliban conquest of Kabul on September 1996.

Afghanistan 2002-2009 *foreign-occupied*: U.S. occupation, from U.S. invasion in October 2001 until August 2009 election when Karzai showed independence of U.S. preferences for fair elections and remained in power.

Azerbaijan 1993 *democratic*: The June 1992 election was won by Elchibey who was not a Communist regime insider. The democratic period ends with June 1993 coup that forced Elchibey from power, ending the democratic period.

Bangladesh 2009 *democratic*: Fair and competition election on December 29, 2008, ending the autocratic period.

Benin 1971-1972 *provisional*: In May 1970, the military turned power over to an unelected civilian Presidential Council representing the three major regionally-based leaders and parties in the country. The Presidential Council was to serve as a transitional body with the presidency to rotate among the three leaders in preparation for new democratic elections (Decalo 1976, 76-77). The military did withdraw from politics, and members of the Presidential Council carried out the rules agreed to, including rotating the presidency. Democratization did not ultimately occur, but it was not prevented by the leaders of the 1969-70 regime. New regime started in October 1972 with the Kérékou coup.

Benin 1991 *provisional*: Regime failure event is the National Sovereign Conference in

³ We code Syria 1959-1961 as *not independent* because it merged with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic.

February 1990 during which the delegates declared sovereignty in opposition to Kérékou (Decalo 1997, 54-55). The transitional government was led by the opposition. An opposition politician, Nicephore Soglo, won the February 1991 election, completing the transition to democracy.

Bosnia and Herzegovina 1993-1995 *warlord*: Civil war from April 1992 to Dayton Accords in November 1995.

Bosnia and Herzegovina 1996-2009 *foreign-occupied*: Administrator appointed by an international committee has the power to overturn decisions by elected authorities.

Burundi 2004-2005 *provisional*: In April 2003 President Buyoya, a Tutsi, handed power to his Hutu VP as agreed to in the Arusha Peace Accord. The new president, FRODEBU party leader Ndayizeye, oversaw a competitive election in July 2005 as required by the Peace Accord. A different Hutu party, CND-FDD, won the election and power was transferred to them, completing a transition to democracy.

Chad 1980-1982 *warlord*: In March 1979 rebels took N'Djamena, ending the Malloum regime. The Transitional Government of National Unity led by Goukouni technically in power until June 1982 but did not control most of the territory during the civil war (Collier 1988). Habré comes to power in June 1982 coup.

Chile 1990 *democratic*: The December 1989 election ended the Pinochet regime. The non-incumbent winner was inaugurated in March 1990, completing the transition to democracy.

China 1946-1949 *warlord*: Chinese civil war. Beijing fell to the communists in January 1949. The Chinese Communist Party established the People's Republic of China in October 1949.

Congo Brazzaville 1992 *provisional*: Popular opposition forced President Sassou-Nguesso and the PCT to agree to a National Conference held February to June, 1991. The opposition was able to control the Conference, and it chose a former World Bank official to head the interim government that would oversee a transition to democracy (Clark 1997, 50-53, 68). Multiparty legislative and presidential elections were held in June 1992 and won by an opposition party, completing the transition to democracy.

Czechoslovakia 1947-1948 *democratic*: The 1946 election was considered fair; the communists won a plurality but other parties competed and won seats. Benes, the non-communist president elected before the war, returned to office. In 1947 the communists began various kinds of harassment of other parties, but the government still included multiple parties, with the assembly remaining the one elected in 1946. The autocratic regime began in February 1948 with the resignation of the non-communist ministers and Benes, and the communist takeover of what had been a coalition government.

Dominican Republic 1963 *democratic*: January 1962 coup ended the Trujillo-Balaguer regime. Provisional government oversaw fair and competitive elections in December

1962, won by the opposition (Bosch). September 1963 coup forced Bosch from power, ending this democratic period.

Dominican Republic 1966 *foreign-occupied*: U.S. occupation began in April 1965 and lasted until September 1966.

Ecuador 1948 *provisional*: In August 1947, the president (Velasco) was ousted, but the military did not take power. Instead the elected Congress elected a civilian, Arosemena, to finish the term, as constitutionally mandated. He oversaw the subsequent competitive election in June 1948 (Fitch 1977, 39).

Ecuador 1967-1968 *provisional*: The military stepped down and handed power to an interim civilian president who oversaw a Constituent Assembly and then competitive elections in 1968 (Fitch 1977, 71-72, 175).

Ecuador 1969-1970 *democratic*: Velasco Ibarra was elected in a fair competitive election in 1968. His government is coded as democratic until he closed Congress in 1970 (Fitch 1977, 175-76). At that point, we begin coding Ecuador as autocratic.

Ecuador 2001-2002 *democratic*: There was a coup supported by the indigenous in January 2000, but the junior officers who staged it were ousted by senior officers shortly afterward and power was handed to the VP, the ousted president's constitutional successor. The coding rules say that such situations (military ousts president but returns power to his constitutional successor) are not autocratic regimes because the rules under which they function are the same constitutional rules as before the ouster. The interventions themselves are undemocratic, but they do not establish autocratic regimes. The VP remained in office until the 2003 fair competitive election and handed over to his elected successor.

Georgia 2004 *provisional*: Demonstrations in November 2003 led to Shevardnadze's resignation and the transfer of power to an opposition interim president who held fair presidential elections in January 2004, which the opposition won.

Ghana 1957-1960 *democratic*: The pre-independence Ghanaian multiparty elections in 1954 and 1956 were free and fair (Austin, 1967, 543), making it a democracy upon independence in 1957. The Nkrumah government took a number of incremental steps toward autocracy beginning soon after independence. We code the 1960 uncompetitive presidential election (referendum) as the event that tipped the government over the dividing line. Further curbs on the opposition followed; Ghana became a formal one-party state in a 1964 referendum.

Guinea-Bissau 2000 *provisional*: President Viera was ousted by insurgency in May 1999. Prime Minister Manuel Saturnino da Costa was appointed president and oversaw an election which the opposition won in the second-round in January 2000, completing the transition to democracy.

Guinea-Bissau 2004 *provisional*: September 2003 coup led by Chief of Staff Correia Seabra ousted President Kumba Yalá and established a civilian-led transitional government that oversaw elections won by the opposition, second round in July 2005.

- Haiti 1947-1950** *democratic*: A competitive legislative election in 1946 was won by a Noiriste party. This was the first election strongly influenced by black and lower-class voters. There were claims from the left, which did less well than it expected, that the election was rigged, but the noiriste movement actually attracted more popular support than the leftists. The legislature elected the president, Dumarsais Estimé, as mandated by the constitution. As the end of his term neared, Estimé tried to change the rules to permit his own reelection. He tried to do a number of illegal things, but the elected Senate blocked his attempts. Because Estimé was elected in a competitive constitutional process and his efforts to change the rules were blocked by the Senate, the regime is coded democratic up to May 1950, when he unconstitutionally dissolved the Senate (Smith 2009, 80-81, 89, 146-47).
- Haiti 1957** *provisional*: Protests forced Magloire from power in December 1956, turning power over to a provisional government led by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and expected to hold competitive elections. The provisional government was ousted by a military coup in June 1957. The military first postponed and then rigged the 1957 presidential election
- Haiti 1991** *democratic*: Previous autocratic regime ended in March 1990 when the military handed power to a provisional government headed by Chief Justice of Supreme Court, Ertha Pascal-Trouillot, for the purpose of holding competitive elections.. Aristide elected in a democratic contest in December 1990. The September 1991 coup by Cédras ended this democratic period.
- Haiti 1995-1999** *democratic*: Raoul Cédras' military regime ended with the U.S. invasion, and Jean-Bertrand Aristide returned in October 1994 and resumed the presidency. Since he was originally elected in a fair election, we code his return as a resumption of democracy. The 1995 and 1997 elections were considered fair. The new autocratic regime begins in January 1999 when elected President René Préal dismissed the legislature.
- Haiti 2005-2006** *provisional*: The February 2004 rebellion and coup against Aristide ended his regime. The interim president was selected according to the Constitution, and an international peace-keeping force, led by Brazil, arrived in June 2004. Elections originally scheduled for late 2005 took place in February 2006, and were considered fair and free.
- Haiti 2007-2009** *democratic*: Elections in February 2006 were considered fair and free, completing the transition transition.
- Honduras 1957** *provisional*: The October 1956 coup installed an interim government which oversaw the September 1957 constituent assembly elections. The constituent assembly selected the President in November 1957 and became the national assembly.
- Honduras 1982** *democratic*: The November 1981 election ended military rule; January 1982 inauguration of the elected, non-incumbent president completed the transition to democracy.

- Hungary 1946-1947** *democratic*: The November 1945 elections gave majority control of a coalition government to the Independent Smallholders Party. Voters and candidates from pre-war parties were excluded from participating in the rigged August 1947 election. The Communists won, marking the start of the autocratic regime.
- Iraq 2004-2009** *foreign-occupied*: U.S. occupation began with the invasion in March 2003. March 2010 parliamentary election marks a transition to an autocratic regime due to banning candidates and election fraud. The new autocratic regime's first calendar year in power on January 1 is 2011 and thus falls outside of the scope of the current data set.
- Laos 1963-1973** *warlord*: Both sides of the civil war were controlled by foreigners, and the Royal Lao army lost control of more and more territory over time. The Laotian government disengaged from the conflict in early 1968, leaving it to the various foreigners and Hmong militias. In 1971 the Royal Lao army reentered the conflict. A transitional coalition government and peace accord were negotiated among competing Lao forces and their foreign sponsors in 1973 and the coalition took control of the government.
- Laos 1974-1975** *provisional*: A transitional coalition government and peace accord were negotiated among competing Lao forces and their foreign sponsors in 1973 and a coalition of those groups took control of the government, but the elections envisioned never occurred. From May to December 1975, the mostly peaceful transition from coalition to communist government occurred. In May 1975 massive orchestrated student and union demonstrations caused anti-communist members of the coalition and a number of top generals to resign and flee the country. The U.S. also withdrew. In November 1975, coalition PM Souvanna Phouma resigned and the king abdicated. In December 1975, the National Congress of Peoples Representatives abolished the monarchy and formed the Lao People's Democratic Republic, completing the transition to dictatorship (Stuart-Fox 1986, 35-36).
- Lebanon 1976** *democracy*: Although civil war breaks out in 1975, we do not code the end of democracy until the Syrian invasion in June 1976.
- Lebanon 1977-2005** *warlord/foreign-occupied*: Syrian occupation began with the invasion in June 1976.
- Lebanon 2006-2009** *democratic*: Syrian occupation ends in April 2005 with Syria's formal declaration to the U.N.
- Lesotho 1966-70** *democratic*: These and later years coded autocratic by CGV because the first past the post electoral rules always lead to lopsided legislative results. These rules were not imposed by the winners of the first election; they were left by the British, and they do not differ from rules considered democratic in the U.S. and Britain. We begin coding Lesotho as autocratic in January 1970 when the ruling BNP (which had won a competitive pre-independence election) lost the first post-independence

election and refused to cede power. It imprisoned leaders of the party that had won and suspended the constitution.

Lesotho 1994-2009 *democratic*: The 1993 elections were overseen by international experts and a committee on which many parties were represented. They were considered free and fair, even though one party won all the seats. International monitors said the 1998 election was fair. Under the first past the post electoral system left from the colonial period, whichever party won got almost all the seats, leading to claims of unfairness and sometimes riots – as happened in 1998. International pressure persuaded the government to reform the electoral system to add some PR seats. In 2007, the ruling party won 62/120 seats, and subsequent elections have been less lopsided.

Liberia 1991-1997 *warlord*: Samuel Doe's forces lost control of Monrovia in September 1990 and he was captured and executed, marking regime failure. Civil war until the August 1996 Abuja Accord. Taylor won the fraudulent July 1997 elections, marking the beginning of the next autocratic regime.

Liberia 2004-2005 *provisional*: Taylor resigned August 2003, which we code as regime failure. The U.N. had control until Johnson-Sirleaf won the November 2005 run-off election and was inaugurated January 2006.

Liberia 2006 *democracy*: Taylor resigned August 2003, which we code as regime failure. The U.N. had control until Johnson-Sirleaf won the November 2005 run-off election.

Mali 1992 *provisional*: The March 1991 coup marks regime failure; the military appointed a civilian transitional government, which oversaw competitive elections in April 1992; June 1992 inauguration of democratic government.

Montenegro 2007-2009 *democratic*: Democratic elections in September 2006 in which the victorious DSPS won 48% of the parliamentary vote and with a coalition partner took 41 of 100 seats in the legislature.

Nepal 2007-2008 *democratic*: King Gyanendra relinquished power and reinstated the elected 1999 parliament in April 2006; Parliament stripped the king of virtually all power; elections for a Constitutional Assembly in April 2008.

Niger 1992-1993 *provisional*: The July 1991 National Conference stripped President Saibou of power, ending the autocratic regime. An interim government was installed in November 1991 to oversee the December 1992 Constitutional Referendum and the April/May 1993 competitive elections.

Niger 2000 *democratic*: In April 1999, President Manassara was assassinated by one of his security guards. He was replaced by the head of the security guards, who established a transitional National Reconciliation Council to oversee elections. The November 1999 election was won by opposition candidate Mamadou Tandja, who was inaugurated in December 1999.

Pakistan 1972 *democratic*: The regime failure event is Yahya Kahn's resignation in December 1971. He handed power to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, leader of the party that had won the most recent parliamentary election in West Pakistan, all that remained of

Pakistan after Bangladeshi independence. In April 1972 Bhutto installed the National Assembly that had been elected in West Pakistan in December 1970 but never allowed to meet. The universal suffrage, direct election of December 1970 had been considered fair and expected to be transitional (Mook 1974, 110-111).

Panama 1946-1949 *democratic*: In June 1945 an elected Constituent Assembly elected Jiménez provisional president until the next scheduled popular presidential election, which was held in 1948.

Panama 1952 *provisional*: President Arias was impeached by Congress after a series of repressive actions declared illegal by the Supreme Court. After Arias shot a National Guard officer in cold blood, the National Guard surrounded the Palace and arrested the president. He was succeeded by his constitutional vice president. This is sometimes described as a coup, but the Assembly and the Guard seem to have acted constitutionally. The head of the National Guard did not seize power. The VP finished the president's term and oversaw the next election in 1952 (Pippin 1964, 73-76; Percy 1998, 140).

Peru 1991-1992 *democratic*: Fujimori was democratically elected in the June 1990 run-off. Autocratic regime begins with the April 1992 when he closed the legislature.

Peru 2001 *provisional*: Fujimori resigned in November 2000; his government ministers all resigned as well. Opposition congressman Valentín Paniagua was appointed interim president, and new democratic elections were held in June 2001.

Philippines 1966-1972 *democratic*: Marcos was democratically elected in December 1965. Autocratic period begins with the September 1972 declaration of martial law and closure of the Congress.

Portugal 1975-1976 *provisional*: The April 1974 military coup that ousted the Caetano government is the regime failure event. The junta and government it chose included multiple factions. The junta claimed to be establishing democracy, held a fair competitive Constituent Assembly election in April 1975 and regular elections April 1976.

Romania 1990 *provisional*: Regime failure event is the December 1989 execution of Ceaușescu and his wife. Presidential election in May 1990 completed the transition to democracy.

Russian Federation 1992-1993 *democratic*: The Soviet regime ended in December 1991 with Gorbachev's resignation and handover of power to Yeltsin, who had been elected in reasonably fair multiparty elections. Yeltsin ended the democratic period when he closed parliament in September 1993 and used the military to enforce the closure.

Somalia 1992-2009 *warlord*: Siad Barre's regime ended in January 1991 when rebels took Mogadishu. No central government has controlled the majority of the territory since then.

South Africa 1995-2009 *democratic*: Competitive, universal suffrage elections in April 1994.

South Korea 1988 *democratic*: The military agreed to democratizing constitutional changes, including direct presidential elections, in response to massive demonstrations between

April and June 1987. Regime failure event is the December 1987 election. Roh Tae-woo was inaugurated in February 1988.

Spain 1977 *provisional*: Regime failure in November 1976 when Suárez introduced important institutional changes, including universal suffrage parliamentary elections, to end the Francoist system of corporatist representation. He oversaw the fair, competitive June 1977 elections.

Sri Lanka 1978 *democratic*: The July 1977 election of Jayewardene coded as democratic even though UNP won in a landslide. The August-September 1978 change in the constitution marks the beginning of the autocratic regime period. The constitution was adopted by the National State Assembly in mid-August 1978, and went into effect on September 7, 1978.

Sudan 1965 *provisional*: Regime failure event is October 1964 strikes that led military President Abboud to dissolve the government and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Opposition strike leaders who planned the transition from military to civilian rule selected a nonpolitical senior civil servant, Sirr al Khatim al Khalifa, as prime minister to head a transitional government. Elections in April and May 1965.

Syria 1948-1949 *democratic*: In July 1947 Syria's first direct parliamentary elections were won by opposition parties and independents (Torrey 1964, 98-99). Civilian government ousted by March 1949 coup.

Syria 1955-1957 *democratic*: 1954 parliamentary elections considered competitive and fair (Torrey 1964, 244-64). Frequent military interference 1955-56, but the military had multiple factions allied with different parties and did not control the government. The democratic regime ended when the government trumped up treason charges against opposition leaders beginning in February 1957; several were found guilty, including MPs supposed to have parliamentary immunity. The May 1957 by-election was rigged by the government (Torrey 1964, 329-31, 352-53).

Syria 1959-1961 *not-independent*: Syria merged with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic. Technically, Syria ceased to exist as an independent state, but we include these country-years to facilitate use with other data sets that include these observations for Syria.

Syria 1962 *democracy*: After seceding from UAR, Syria held elections in December 1961 considered fair and free. This brief democratic period ended with the March 28 1962 coup.

Tanzania 1961-1964 *democratic*: Fair elections in pre-independence Tanganyika in 1958, 1959, and 1960. Fair multiparty election in 1962. We code the TANU government as autocratic beginning in mid 1964 when several changes occurred. In April 1964 Tanganyika was united with Zanzibar, which was ruled by an ethnically based party that had seized power by force, forming Tanzania. The autocratic ruling party of Zanzibar merged with TANU. Beginning in 1964, new army recruits were required to join TANU, civil servants and police were pressured to join it, and citizens began to

be asked to show a TANU card to receive medical services or sell their crops. From this time on, opposition was severely disadvantaged; the transition was completed in 1965 when the new Constitution made Tanzania a legal one-party state.

Thailand 1974-1975 *provisional*: In October 1973 the military government resigned. The king appointed a new civilian government to handle a transition and writing a new constitution. Fair elections were held in January 1975.

Thailand 2008 *democratic*: Regime failure event is the December 2007 multiparty elections. Elected government led by Samak Sundaravej inaugurated in January 2008.

Turkey 1951-1957 *democratic*: Multiparty elections in 1950 were won by the opposition, and multiparty elections were held on schedule after that. Beginning in 1957, what had been occasional harassment of the opposition became more systematic, leading to an unfair election in 1957. This marks the beginning of the new autocratic period.

Uganda 1963-1966 *democratic*: The April 1962 competitive elections prior to independence created a parliament with three parties. Two parties formed a coalition to choose Milton Obote as Prime Minister. the autocratic period began when Obote suspended the constitution in April 1966.

Uganda 1980 *provisional*: After Amin was ousted in April 1979, a provisional government (National Consultative Council, NCC) was established, led by Yusuf Lule and Godfrey Binaisa (Tindigarukayo 1988, 609-611). The latter established a Military Council in May 1980 which ruled until the November 1980 elections, which Obote won (Tindigarukayo 1988, 613).

Uganda 1986 *warlord*: No group controlled the territory during the period from July 17 1985 (coup that ousted Obote) to Museveni's capture of Kampala on January 15 1986.

Uruguay 1985 *democratic*: Regime failure event is the November 1984 election. President-elect Sanguinetti inaugurated in March 1985.

Venezuela 1959 *democratic*: Betancourt won fair and competitive elections in 1958, marking regime failure; he was inaugurated in February 1959.

Zambia 1965-1967 *democratic*: UNIP elected in fair competitive elections before independence (Scarritt 1973, 18). Intimidation and violence against the opposition first became widespread prior to the February 1967 by-election and worsened prior to the 1968 general election. We code the autocratic regime as beginning in early 1967.

Zambia 1992-1996 *democratic*: In the October 1991 election, opposition party leader Chiluba defeated the long-ruling dominant party leader Kaunda, marking the end of the previous regime. The new dictatorship starts in May 1996 when Chiluba passed a constitutional amendment to prevent former President Kaunda, the strongest potential opposition challenger, from running in the 1996 presidential elections.

Zimbabwe 1966-1980 *not-independent*: Although the Rhodesian Front regime proclaimed unilateral independence from the U.K. in 1965, this claim was not recognized internationally.

3.2 GWF autocratic regimes and CGV democracies

There are also some country-years we code as autocratic that CGV code as democratic. Most of these are years in which despite an election deemed free and fair by some observers, the dictator or dominant party of past years continues to rule. Our coding rules require the loss of power by the incumbent before we code a transition to democracy as having taken place. For example, the Sandinistas retained power in Nicaragua from 1984-1990 after the 1984 election, which some observers deemed fair (Williams 1990). Thus we code the end of the Sandinista regime when they actually lost power, in 1990, not in 1984. There are also a small number of country-years in which our judgment about events or our criteria for coding countries as democratic differ. For example, we code country-years as autocratic when competitive elections are held but the military prevents parties that would have been expected to attract substantial popular support from competing, as in Argentina 1958-1962, when the Peronist party was banned. Years we code as autocratic but CGV code as democratic are listed in the next section. Note that these observations are coded for January 1 for each calendar year under the assumption that the ACLP/CGV coding for a country on December 31 of year t is the same as the regime on January 1 of year $t+1$. Also included in this list is South Vietnam, which is not given a regime coding in the CGV data set.

GWF autocracies coded as CGV democracies

Numbers in parentheses correspond to **autocratic regime types**: Indirect military \equiv 0; Military \equiv 1; Military-personal \equiv 2; Monarchy \equiv 3; Oligarchy \equiv 4; Personal \equiv 5; Party \equiv 6; Party-military \equiv 7; Party-personal \equiv 8; Party-military-personal \equiv 9.

Argentina 1952 - 1955 (5) Coded autocratic in 1951 after several opposition leaders were jailed and the “internal warfare” decree was passed allowing for detention without trial.

Argentina 1959 - 1966 (0) Coded autocratic because the Peronist party, considered the most popular at the time, was not allowed to compete in elections.

Armenia 1995 - 1998 (5) Coded autocratic from December 1994 when largest opposition party was suspended and election rigging took place.

Armenia 1999 - 2009 (5) Coded autocratic from December 1994 when largest opposition party was suspended and election rigging took place.

Bangladesh 1987 - 1990 (5) Coded autocratic despite election October 1986 because Ershad, remained in power until 1990. Martial law was not lifted until after the election, and the opposition boycotted the election because of restrictions on their ability to campaign.

Congo-Brz 1961 - 1963 (5) Coded autocratic at independence because of gerrymandering and repression of opposition by the pre-independence dominant party. Party leader Youlou was the only candidate in the March 1961 presidential election.

- Dominican Rep 1967 - 1978** (5) Coded autocratic because U.S. occupation during the 1966 election disadvantaged Bosch, making the election unfair. The opposition was later repressed and civil liberties were not protected.
- Ecuador 1946 - 1947** (5) Coded autocratic because Velasco Ibarra was installed in the presidency by the military in June 1944 and remained in power until August 1947.
- El Salvador 1985 - 1994** (0) Coded autocratic despite competitive elections because left parties unable to compete.
- Ghana 1994 - 2000** (5) Coded autocratic despite multiparty elections because the incumbent remained in office.
- Guatemala 1959 - 1963** (5) Coded autocratic despite multiparty election because left parties banned.
- Guatemala 1967 - 1970** (0) Coded autocratic despite multiparty election because left parties banned, and the elected president had to agree to military control of important policy areas in order to be inaugurated.
- Guatemala 1971 - 1982** (1) Coded autocratic despite multiparty election because left parties banned.
- Guatemala 1987 - 1995** (0) Coded autocratic despite multiparty election because left parties banned.
- Guinea-Bissau 2003** (5) President Yalá suspended the legislature in November 2002, starting a new autocratic period, which ended in September 2003 with a coup led by Chief of Staff Correia Seabra. The military established a civilian-led transitional government that oversaw elections won by the opposition in July 2005.
- Kenya 1999 - 2002** (6) Coded autocratic despite multiparty elections because the incumbent remained in office.
- Kyrgyzstan 2006 - 2009** (5) Coded autocratic because the July 2005 election was rigged by the interim government.
- Mongolia 1991 - 1993** (6) Coded autocratic because government remained dominated by communists until the June 1993 presidential election.
- Nepal 1991** (3) Coded autocratic until May 1991 multiparty elections won by a pro-democracy party. Prior to the election, governments chosen by the king.
- Nicaragua 1985 - 1990** (6) Coded autocratic despite multiparty elections because the incumbent remained in office.
- Pakistan 1948 - 1958** (4) Coded autocratic because the independence government was not democratically elected. Jinnah was elected shortly before independence by a Constituent Assembly that had itself been chosen partly by the rulers of the princely states and partly by provincial legislatures elected by limited franchise (Feit 1973, 70; Gauhar 1996, 16). No subsequent parliamentary elections were held. The executive, the Governor General, continued to function under the rules of the colonial administration, which allowed him to choose and dismiss PMs without consulting the legislature and to dismiss elected provincial governments (Gauhar 1996, 25-29;

Shehab 1995, 201). A new Constituent Assembly was chosen in 1954, again mostly by provincial assemblies, some of which had been intervened by the Governor General (Feit 1973, 70).

Pakistan 1976 - 1977 (5) Coded autocratic because the main opposition party was banned and opposition leaders repressed.

Panama 1950 - 1951 (5) Coded autocratic because Arias was installed in the presidency by the military in 1949.

Panama 1954 - 1955 (5) Coded autocratic because Remon began repression of opposition parties in 1953.

Paraguay 1990 - 1993 (9) Coded autocratic because Rodriguez, who led the coup that ousted Stroessner, was a member of the innermost circle of the Stroessner regime and maintained the same electoral manipulations in place for the 1989 election that "legitimated" his seizure of the presidency (Abente Brun 1999, 93-94).

South Vietnam 1955 - 1963 (5) Coded autocratic because Diem was not initially elected and the opposition was repressed throughout. Not coded in CGV.

South Vietnam 1964 - 1975 (1) Coded autocratic because opposition was repressed, elections manipulated, and the military dominated civilian politicians. Not coded in CGV.

Sri Lanka 1990 - 1994 (6) Coded autocratic because Premadasa, elected in a violent rigged election in 1988, continued in power until late 1993, when he was assassinated and succeeded by his constitutional successor. The successor permitted a fair competitive election in 1994.

Taiwan 1997 - 2000 (6) Coded autocratic despite multiparty election because the incumbent remained in power.

Thailand 1980 - 1988 (2) Coded autocratic because PM not chosen by the largest party/coalition in parliament but through bargaining among the military, king, and parliament. Appointed members of the Senate and the rules for Senate control or veto of policy gave the military veto power over the choice of leaders and policy (Bunbongkarn 1987, 34, 40-45; Chai-anan 1987, 38-39).

Uganda 1981 - 1985 (5) Coded autocratic because 1981 election considered unfair by observers.

Venezuela 2006 - 2009 (5) Coded autocratic despite multiparty elections because of electoral manipulation and repression of opposition leaders.

4

Autocratic regime Start and End events

This section provides the narratives of the Start and End events for each regime in the data set. We code the calendar day dates for the political events that marks the Start and End of the regime. In most cases, these dates are easy to identify with little discrepancy among sources. Some regime changes, however, occur over a period of time, and we have had to make judgments about what specific day to identify as the change date. The “authoritarianization” of democratic regimes, in particular, often occurs gradually. To identify the date on which the line was crossed between democracy and autocracy in these cases, we have coded the first date on which any one of the following occurred: opposition party leaders were arrested; opposition party deputies were excluded from the legislature; the legislature was closed; a rigged election was held; or laws were passed disadvantaging or excluding the opposition. The narratives also identify other “authoritarianizing” events, so a user who prefers different criteria for assessing when the line between democracy and autocracy has been crossed can change the dates used.

The endpoints of authoritarian regimes are easier to date. In the few cases where we find discrepancies in sources or where we cannot determine the exact date of a change, we code the earliest date for which we have a reference. For example, we were unable to track down the actual date on which the National Conference in Congo-Brazzaville stripped the incumbent, President Sassou Nguesso, of power so we chose the start date of the National Conference (February 25, 1991) that deposed him because we know that the legal changes eliminating his ability to control events could not have occurred prior to this date. For regime ends, this coding rule ensures that analysts who wish to investigate the effects of possible causes of regime collapse that occur during the year of regime change, such as political protest or foreign military intervention, can be sure that such potentially causal events occurred prior to the regime change.

Afghanistan (1929–73)

Start: 10/10/1929 Tribal forces led by Nadir Khan and his brothers seized Kabul after defeating the insurgent who had ousted the previous hereditary monarch, a distant relative of Nadir. The dynasty began October 16, 1929 when Nadir Khan was crowned (Baxter 1997; Herb 1997, 284).

End: 7/17/1973 Coup deposed the monarch (Baxter 1997; Encyclopedia of World Biography 2011).

Afghanistan (1973–78)

Start: 7/17/1973 Coup led by Mohammed Daoud Khan, with support from leftist junior officers and the Parcham faction of the PDPA (Communist Party), deposed the monarchy and replaced it with a new ruling group. Parcham's influence after the coup was limited from the beginning, and they were eliminated from the ruling group by the end of 1975 (Baxter 1997).

End: 4/27/1978 Coup by a faction of the army allied with the Communists ousted Daoud (Baxter 1997).

Afghanistan (1978–92)

Start: 4/27/1978 Coup by a faction of the army allied with the PDPA (Communists), established a ruling Revolutionary Council originally of 58 members, dominated by the Khalq faction of the PDPA (Baxter 1997; Newell 1997).

End: 4/16/1992 The fall of Kabul; Najibullah government ousted by the Mujaheddin insurgency (Rais 1993, 910; Ewans 2001, 178). [Afghanistan 1993–96 is excluded from the data set because of warlordism, chaos, no effective central government.]

Afghanistan (1996–2001)

Start: 9/27/1996 Taliban capture of Kabul; they established a government over most of the country (BBC News 1996)

End: 11/13/2001 U.S. invasion began on October 7 2001, with the defeat of Taliban government in Kabul on November 13 2001 (Economist Intelligence Unit 2008a, 8; U.S. State Department 2011a).

Afghanistan (2009–)

Start: 8/20/2009 Fraudulent presidential elections are identified as the event that marked the independence of the Karzai government from U.S. influence (Tristram 2009)

End: Karzai regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Albania (1944–91)

Start: 11/29/1944 occupation of Tirane by the National Liberation Movement (later Front) forces led by Hoxha, after the defeat of anti-communist resistance forces and the withdrawal of Italian and German occupying forces. The NLM had set up a provisional government, the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation, led by Hoxha, a few months before in the territories it controlled. The occupation of Tirane marks its control of most of the country (Sudetic 1992; Pearson 2006, 221).

End: 6/1/1991 Resignation of the Communist-dominated National Assembly in response to a popular uprising. Demonstrations and strikes led to the government's resignation, the transfer of power to a coalition government to handle the transition, and Alia's loss of all but formal power. The first multiparty elections occurred in March 1991, but were won by the Party of Labor (communists) and thus aren't coded as transitional. Beginning in May 1991, hundreds of thousands of citizens participated in strikes and demonstrations to demand that the communists step down. A transitional government led by the opposition established a new electoral law in February 1992 and oversaw competitive elections in March 1992, which were won by the opposition, completing the transition (Global Nonviolent Action Database 2011; Economist Intelligence Unit 1997; Global Security 2011b).

Algeria (1962–92)

Start: 7/3/1962 Independence with the FLN, which had led the fight for independence, in control; it established a provisional government, which quickly became permanent (Toth 1994; Political Handbook of the World 2012a, 24).

End: 1/11/1992 Military coup. Benjedid was replaced by the High Council of State, and the constitution was suspended (Metz 1994; Ruedy 2005, 256,260). Although the military had been an important pillar of the pre-1992 regime, the post-1992 period is considered a different regime because for the first several years after the coup the FLN, which had been the ruling party, was excluded from influence and office (Toth 1994; Bouandel 2003, 13; Ruedy 2005, 256,260).

Algeria (1992–)

Start: 1/11/1992 Military coup ousted Benjedid, closed the Assembly, suspended the constitution, and reformed the High Council of State to become the country's ruling body (Toth 1994; Ruedy 2005, 256,260).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Angola (1975–)

Start: 11/11/1975 Independence, with Luanda and a substantial part of the country controlled by the MPLA, which had led the fight for independence; it established a government in the part of the country it controlled (Warner 1989).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Argentina (1943–1946)

Start: 6/4/1943 Coup led by Gen Ramírez ousted the oligarchic civilian government and established a military junta (Potash 1961, 573).

End: 2/24/1946 Competitive election, generally considered to be fair, ended rule by the military (Lewis 1990, 98-99).

Argentina (1951–55)

Start: 9/28/1951 This date marks declaration of internal warfare by the elected Peronist government, which suspended constitutional guarantees and allowed detention without trial. The date marks when the incremental "authoritarianization" of the

regime crossed the line to dictatorship. In the months preceding the November 1951 election, the government had pursued a strategy of harassment and manipulation against the opposition, but at the end of September, they began arresting opposition leaders and excluded opposition deputies from the legislature shortly afterward, completing the transition to dictatorship (Ilsley 1952, 229, 240; Potash 1980, 133; Brooker 1995, 175).

End: 9/16/1955 Coup ousted Perón (Potash 1961, 575; Brooker 1995, 181; Lewis 2001, 110-11).

Argentina (1955–58)

Start: 9/16/1955 Coup led by Gen Lonardi ousted the Peronist government and established a military junta (Potash 1961, 575; Lewis 2001, 110-11).

End: 2/23/1958 Election ended direct military rule. The election was competitive but the largest party, the PJ, was banned (O'Donnell 1973, 166-92; Potash 1980, 228).

Argentina (1958–66)

Start: 2/23/1958 The February election in which the largest party, the PJ, was banned marks the transition from direct to indirect military rule. A civilian was elected and occupied the presidency, but the military exercised active veto power over economic policy and the choice of ministers as well as prohibited the participation of the Peronist Party in elections (O'Donnell 1973, 166-92; Finer 1975, 153). Consequently we code the period from February 1958 to June 1966 as authoritarian and as indirect military rule.

End: 6/28/1966 Coup ousted the civilian government, ending indirect military rule, and replaced it with direct military rule (Gallo 1969, 497-98, 501).

Argentina (1966–73)

Start: 6/28/1966 Coup led by Lt-Gen Pistarini, the commander-in-chief, ousted the civilian president and replaced indirect with direct military rule (Gallo 1969, 501; Potash 1996, 160-61).

End: 3/11/1973 The March 1973 presidential election was competitive, free and fair, and the Peronist party was allowed to run and win (Arceneaux 2001, 68; Lewis 2001, 149-51).

Argentina (1976–83)

Start: 3/24/1976 Coup led by Gen Videla ousted the democratic government and established a military junta to rule (U.S. State Department 2011b).

End: 10/30/1983 October election was competitive, free and fair, marking the transition to democracy (Rock 1995, 389; Arceneaux 2001, 114-40).

Armenia (1994–98)

Start: 12/31/1994 This is the date when the elected Ter-Petrosian government crossed the line between democracy and dictatorship. In December it suspended the largest opposition party (Dashnak, HHD) to prevent its participation in the July 1995 parliamentary election, and in subsequent months it disqualified multiple other parties

and more than a third of the candidates (Bremmer and Welt 1997, 86-87; Political Handbook of the World 2012b, 66).

End: 2/4/1998 Ter-Petrosian and many other high officials of the HHS^h resigned in response to massive public protests and loss of support by important political elites, leading to the accession to power of the Kocharian government Libaridian 2006, 9-10. Kocharian's government is coded as a different regime because of a change in the identity of the group from which top leaders could be selected. Ter-Petrosian's coalition originally included nearly all non-communist Armenians, though it narrowed over time. Since the accession of Kocharian, the leadership has been dominated by individuals from Nagorno Karabakh; the HHS^h is no longer in government and scarcely exists (Middle East Journal 1998, 415-39; Usher 1999, 20).

Armenia (1998–)

Start: 2/4/1998 Accession to power by Kocharian and the Nagorno Karabakh faction after resignations by Ter-Petrosian and many other high officials of HHS^h in response to massive public protests. Kocharian's government is coded as a different regime because of a change in the identity of the group from which top leaders could be selected. Ter-Petrosian's coalition originally included nearly all non-communist Armenians; it narrowed over time but always included people from multiple regions. Since the accession of Kocharian, the leadership has been dominated by individuals from Nagorno Karabakh (Middle East Journal 1998, 415-39; Usher 1999, 20; Libaridian 2006, 9-10; Economist Intelligence Unit 2008b).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Azerbaijan (1991–92)

Start: 10/18/1991 Independence under the leadership of the Communist Party and Mutalibov (Nichol 1994; Political Handbook of the World 2012c, 90).

End: 5/15/1992 A popular uprising ousted Mutalibov, leading to control by the National Assembly, which contained about half communist successor deputies and half opposition (PFA) deputies. It scheduled a competitive election in June 1992, which was won by the PFA, completing the transition (Altstadt 1992, 107-09; Political Handbook of the World 2012c, 90).

Azerbaijan (1993–)

Start: 6/16/1993 This is the date the elected president fled the capital in the face of rebellion by a faction of the military; we code it as the date of the victory of the rebels over the elected government. The leader of the military rebellion agreed to allow a civilian, Aliyev, who had been "elected" speaker of parliament in order to facilitate a "constitutional" succession, to replace the ousted president, while the military leader became PM in the new government (Nichol 1994; Political Handbook of the World 2012c, 92).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Bangladesh (1971–75)

Start: 12/16/1971 This is the date the war of independence ended, marking the beginning of the regime. At independence Bangladesh was controlled by the Awami League led by Sheik Mujib. Although the Awami League had been an electoral party in Pakistan before its breakup, the Mujib government never allowed opposition or held fair elections (Blood 1988; Political Handbook of the World 2012d, 107-08)

End: 8/15/1975 Coup by a faction of young officers, who were themselves ousted a few months later ((Blood 1988); Political Handbook of the World 2012d, 108).

Bangladesh (1975–82)

Start: 11/6/1975 Coup led by socialist officers along with a mutiny by NCOs ousted the prior military government (that had only held power for a few days) and killed or arrested senior officers. The governments installed by previous coups on August 15, 1975 and November 3, 1975 are not included in the data set because they did not last past Jan 1, 1976 (Blood 1988).

End: 3/24/1982 Coup led by Gen. Ershad, Army Chief of Staff, ousted the BNP government that had succeeded Zia after his assassination (Blood 1988; Political Handbook of the World 2012d, 108).

Bangladesh (1982–90)

Start: 3/24/1982 Coup led by Lt Gen Ershad, army chief of staff, established a martial law government (Blood 1988; Political Handbook of the World 2012d).

End: 12/6/1990 Ershad ousted by popular protests and general strikes (Maniruzzaman 1992, 207-08). Fair, competitive elections in February 1991 completed a transition to democracy.

Bangladesh (2007–08)

Start: 1/11/2007 State of emergency declared by the civilian caretaker government, which then resigned; because the military supported the intervention and controlled events behind the scenes, this event is coded as a coup. The military installed a different, non-political civilian government (Alamgir 2009, 47; Political Handbook of the World 2012d, 109).

End: 12/29/2008 Competitive election, winning party allowed to take power (Alamgir 2009, 41; Taylor and Robb 2012; Political Handbook of the World 2012d, 110)

Belarus (1991–94)

Start: 8/25/1991 Independence under the leadership of the Supreme Soviet elected before independence in elections from which the most important opposition was excluded (Zaprudnik and Fedor 1995).

End: 7/10/1994 Competitive presidential election (second round on July 10), which was not won by the government candidate (Korosteleva 1998, 35-45).

Belarus (1994–)

Start: 7/21/1994 Authoritarianization shortly after Lukashenka (or Lukashenko) was elected in a fair and competitive election. One of his first acts was postponing parliamentary elections, leaving in office those elected to the Supreme Soviet in 1990.

Harassment of the opposition began within days of his election (Silitski 2003, 44-46).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Benin (1960–63)

Start: 12/11/1960 The 1960 election is identified as the endpoint of a series of political manipulations that resulted in the exclusion of a party representing about 30 percent of voters from representation: two out of three regionally based parties merged to exclude the third and guarantee themselves a majority; they then changed the electoral rules to winner-take-all in one national district, aiming to permanently exclude the minority party from representation and spoils. In the month before the election several opposition deputies were dismissed from parliament, and opposition party activists were harassed, further limiting their ability to compete. In April-May 1961, repression intensified. The opposition party was dissolved, and its leaders arrested (Carter 1963, 229-31; Mathews 1966, 144; Decalo 1973, 458; Ronen 1973, 27-28).

End: 10/28/1963 Massive demonstrations, general strike led army to take control and replace one civilian with another (Decalo 1973, 458-59; Decalo 1976, 52).

Benin (1963–65)

Start: 10/28/1963 Massive demonstrations and a general strike led the army to take control and appoint a new government (Decalo 1976, 52).

End: 12/22/1965 Coup led by Gen. Soglo, Army Chief of Staff, against the provisional government under the speaker of the National Assembly (Decalo 1973, 459-60; Decalo 1976, 58).

Benin (1965–67)

Start: 12/22/1965 Coup, led by Gen Soglo, army chief of staff, established military rule (Decalo 1973, 459-60; Decalo 1976, 58).

End: 12/17/1967 Coup by junior officers ousted Soglo. The post-1967 regime is considered different from the 1963-65 regime because a government of a military faction dominated by top officers mostly from the South was replaced by a government dominated by lower ranked officers, mostly from the North (Decalo 1973, 460-64; Decalo 1976, 64-66).

Benin 1967–69

Start: 12/17/1967 Coup by junior officers replaced Soglo. They created the Military Revolutionary Committee of 3 capt, 8 lieuts, and 3 NCOs, as a decision-making body, but the main decisions were made by an informal junta (Bebler 1973, 23). Coded as a different regime because the coup and subsequent purges changed the ethnic, regional, and rank composition of the group from which leaders could be chosen and who could influence policy (Bebler 1973, 20-23; Decalo 1973, 464; Decalo 1976, 55, 64-66).

End: 12/10/1969 Zinsou, the civilian president appointed by the military, proved to be less subservient than expected, and Kouandété ordered him kidnapped. The rest of the officer corps refused to support Kouandété as government leader, but replaced

Zinsou with a Military Directorate responsible to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces that included representatives of the major regions and factions. Kouandété was included but his powers were reduced; he was no longer the dominant member (Bebler 1973, 25; Decalo 1973, 469-70; Decalo 1976, 72). The post-1969 period is considered a different regime because of the exclusion of civilian allies and a change in the regional base of the military leaders (Decalo 1976, 73).

Benin (1969–70)

Start: 12/13/1969 A Military Directorate responsible to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces replaced Zinsou/Kouandété. Coded as a different regime because the regional/ethnic and rank composition of the ruling group changed. Fon officers who had been retired or arrested during the previous regime were rehabilitated and given influential roles in the new regime (Decalo 1976, 72-73).

End: 5/7/1970 The military turned power over to an un-elected civilian Presidential Council representing the three major regionally based leaders and parties in the country. The Presidential Council was to serve as a transitional body with the presidency to rotate among the three leaders in preparation for new democratic elections. The military did withdraw from politics, and members of the Presidential Council carried out the rules agreed to, including rotating the presidency (Decalo 1973, 470-76; Decalo 1976, 76-77). Democratization did not ultimately occur, but it was not prevented by the leaders of the 1969-70 regime.

[The period from May 1970 to October 1972 is excluded from the data set as a provisional government expected to lead to a planned transition to democracy.]

Benin (1972–90)

Start: 10/26/1972 Coup, led by Maj Kérékou and junior officers, ousted the civilian transitional government and replaced the entire senior military establishment; they established the Military Committee for the Revolution to rule (Decalo 1973, 476-77; Decalo 1976, 79-80).

End: 2/25/1990 We date the end of the regime from the opening of the National Conference that reduced Kérékou to a figurehead. Strikes and demonstrations from late 1989 to mid 1990 forced the Kérékou government to agree to a National Conference, which transformed itself into a transitional interim government (Soble 2007). Although Kérékou remained president, we coded the regime end in 1990 because observers describe his power as having been quite reduced, he gave up the Defense Ministry (and had previously resigned from the military), and military provincial prefects were replaced by civilians. The transitional government was led by the opposition, rewrote the constitution, and held a competitive election lost by the incumbent in two rounds of presidential elections on March 10 and March 24 1991 (Africa Contemporary Record 1991; Englebert 2004a, 67-68).

Bolivia (1943–46)

Start: 12/20/1943 Coup by nationalist junior officers organized as “secret” lodges,

allied with the MNR, brought to power a junta led by Maj Villarroel (Canberra Times 1943; Klein 1969, 368-70; Corbett 1972, 403). The MNR was excluded from the cabinet from 3/44-12/44 in response to US pressure, but remained allied with government and politically important (Klein 1969, 373).

End: 7/21/1946. Violent popular uprising, Villarroel hung from lamppost (Klein 1969, 382; Corbett 1972, 403) .

Bolivia (1946–51)

Start: 7/21/1946 Popular ouster of Villarroel led to a civilian transitional government and competitive elections in January 1947 (Klein 1969, 382). This period is coded as oligarchic, and thus authoritarian, because suffrage limitations on illiterates prevented much of the population from voting. In 1951, Klein (1969, 404) estimates 7% of population, or 28% of adult males, were able to vote.

End: 5/16/1951 Limited participation election results annulled; power handed over to military to prevent the winner of the election from taking office (Klein 1969, 399-400; Alexander 1982, 178-79).

Bolivia (1951–52)

Start: 5/16/1951 Power handed to the military under Gen Ballivián and election annulled (Klein 1969, 399-400; Alexander 1982, 178-79).

End: 4/9/1952 Armed rebellion led by the MNR defeated the military regime (Corbett 1972, 403).

Bolivia (1952–64)

Start: 4/9/1952 Armed rebellion led by the MNR defeated the military and placed Paz Estenssoro, the winner of the 1951 limited suffrage election, in the presidency. Suffrage was extended to illiterates before the next election, but this regime is not coded as democratic because of the mass exile of opposition political leaders and other MNR actions “authoritarianized” it. Initially, violence against the opposition was carried out by workers’ militias allied with the MNR and peasant land invasions not controlled by the central government, but the government itself also became more repressive as the opposition responded to violence with violence, and the government responded to them with the creation of political police and banishment of opponents to concentration camps (Malloy 1971, 124-31; Corbett 1972, 403).

End: 11/4/1964. Coup led by Gen. Barrientos ousted the MNR government (Corbett 1972, 408-10).

Bolivia (1964–69)

Start: 11/4/1964 Coup led by Gen Barrientos leading a faction of the military established a new ruling group (Corbett 1972, 408-10; Wagner 1989).

End: 9/26/1969 Coup ousted the civilian vice president who succeeded Gen. Barrientos, who died in a plane crash (Corbett 1972, 416). Although Barrientos was an officer, his government had been substantially civilianized.

Bolivia (1969–71)

Start: 9/26/1969 Coup led by Gen Ovando led to a regime controlled by the Superior Council of the Armed Forces with a rotating chair (Corbett 1972, 416-19). The post-1969 period is considered a different regime because it excluded Barrientos' civilian allies from influence on the choice of leaders and policies and included a broader array of military factions.

End: 8/21/1971 Coup led by Col. Banzer (exiled ex-officer) allied with the MNR, the FSB, and a rightist faction of the military ousted a military-led government supported by different military factions and allied with different groups of civilians (Corbett 1972, 424; Wagner 1989).

Bolivia (1971–79)

Start: 8/21/1971 Coup led by Col Banzer (exiled ex-officer) allied with the MNR, the FSB, and a rightist faction of the military established a new ruling group (Corbett 1972, 424; Wagner 1989).

End: 7/1/1979 Fair competitive election after the military's decision to return to barracks. No candidate won a majority, which required Congress to choose the president. Congress deadlocked and eventually chose the head of the Senate as interim president until a second election to be held in 1980. The military seized power again briefly in November 1979, but after 16 days of a general strike and bloodshed, negotiated stepping down on condition that Congress name a different interim president to oversee the transition. Congress chose the president of the Chamber of Deputies. New elections were held as scheduled in June 1980 (Alexander 1982, 114-16; Wagner 1989).

[The period from July 1979 to July 1980 is excluded from the data set as a provisional government overseeing a transition to democracy.]

Bolivia (1980–82)

Start: 7/17/1980 Coup led by Gen Garcia Meza established a government led by a military faction allied with the drug trade (Wagner 1989).

End: 10/10/1982 In the midst of a massive general strike, the military transferred power to the civilian government that had been democratically elected in 1980 but not allowed to take office (Wagner 1989).

Botswana (1966–)

Start: 9/30/1966 Independence under Seretse Khama and the BDP, which won 80% of the vote and 28/31 seats in a competitive election before independence (Sillery 1974, 158-59). Botswana is often considered democratic but is included in the data set because of evidence of an unequal playing field despite competitive elections. The formal and informal rules guiding politics in Botswana have effectively limited competition. The assembly includes several members appointed by the ruling party. Districts are gerrymandered, and the BDP controls the electoral commission (Africa Confidential 2008, 7). The vote for Parliament chooses the president, who is the candidate supported by a majority of MPs. Presidents then select vice presidents from

the Parliament. By tradition, when presidents are ready to retire, they step down and hand power to their vice presidents before the parliamentary election that formally chooses the next president. This norm has limited challenges to the dominant faction in the party because the new incumbent controls the resources deputies need to win the upcoming election (Sillery 1974, 186; Africa Confidential 2008, 7). The opposition had little access to media before independent newspapers began to be established in the late 1980s, and the government still maintains a substantial advantage through state-run media. The BDP has been able to monopolize appointments to the civil service and local tribal administration for Botswana's entire history, and thus to target spending to influence election outcomes (Mokopakgosi and Molomo 2000). The BDP has never held less than 2/3 of the seats in the Assembly during the more than five decades since independence. Mokopakgosi and Molomo (2000, 7) call Botswana a "defacto one-party state."

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Brazil (1964–85)

Start: 4/1/1964 Military coup ousted the elected government and established a military junta to rule (McCann 1997).

End: 1/15/1985 An electoral college, most of whom had been elected in fair, competitive elections, elected a civilian president from the opposition (New York Times 1985). A military-sponsored candidate lost the electoral college competition. The president-elect died before inauguration but was constitutionally succeeded by the civilian vice president selected along with him by the electoral college, who was allowed to take office, and the military returned to the barracks. Although the new president had been a leader of the party that supported the military regime, he was a member of a faction that defected from the regime support party during the year prior to the transition, and he governed in coalition with the party that had led the opposition to the military government (Skidmore 1988, 250-60).

Bulgaria (1944–90)

Start: 9/9/1944 The Fatherland Front made up of Social Democrats, the Agrarian Union, Zveno (a nationalist group of officers), and the Communists seized the government immediately after the Soviet invasion. The communists did not dominate the coalition numerically, but were better organized and more disciplined. They secured the Interior and Justice Ministries in the new government, which enabled them to repress opponents. Thousands were executed and thousands sent to concentration camps during the first year. The Interior Ministry also gave the communists control of local government and the 1945 elections. Although the first PM was a Social Democrat, the communists were more effective in controlling events, and the regime had become unambiguously dominated by communists by the end of 1945 (Van Dyke 1947, 358-60, 364-69; Curtis 1992; Brunnbauer 2008, 52).

End: 8/1/1990 The National Assembly, still controlled by the BSP (renamed com-

unist party), chose Zhelev, leader of the opposition UDF, as president after the communist leader Mladenov resigned. Zhelev was a compromise candidate; a non-partisan PM was chosen in November 1990 to replace the BSP PM. This marks the end of the communist regime before new elections were held in 1991 and won by the UDF, completing the transition (Curtis 1992).

Burkina Faso (1960–66)

Start: 8/5/1960 Independence under single party rule; opposition parties were banned shortly before independence (Collier 1982, 109; Englebert 1996, 34-35). In December 1960 Yameogo, the new UDV/RDA president, prevented opposition parties from competing in municipal elections, and several opposition politicians were arrested (Englebert 1996, 44).

End: 1/3/1966 The military intervened at the unions' request, rather than firing on unarmed demonstrators during a general strike (Africa Confidential 1968a, 5; Englebert 1996, 46).

Burkina Faso (1966–80)

Start: 1/3/1966 The military, led by Chief of Staff Lt Col Lamizana, intervened at unions' request, rather than firing on unarmed demonstrators during a general strike. He suspended the constitution and created a new governing body, the Superior Council of the Armed Forces, of all officers ranked above capt (Africa Confidential 1968a, 5; Englebert 1996, 46). The regime was later broadened to include civilians.

End: 11/25/1980 Coup led by Col. Zerbo overthrew General Lamizana and established the Comité Militaire de Redressement pour le Progrès National. All key posts were granted to officers (Englebert 1996, 51-2). The 1966-80 regime is considered different from the earlier period because civilians were excluded from the ruling group.

Burkina Faso (1980–82)

Start: 11/25/1980 Coup led by Col Zerbo established the Comité Militaire de Redressement pour le Progrès National, which included 5 NCOs and one soldier as well as 25 officers, as the policy making body. The constitution was suspended and parties banned (Engelbert 1998, 51-52). The period from 1980-82 is considered a different regime because Lamizana's civilian coalition partners were excluded from the ruling group.

End: 11/7/1982 Coup by junior officers and privates (Robinson 1992, 146; Englebert 1996, 53-54). The 1982-87 government is treated as a different regime because of a change in the rank of the group from which leaders could be chosen.

Burkina Faso (1982–87)

Start: 11/7/1982 Coup dominated by junior officers. Col. Somé, army commander, led the coup but was prevented from becoming president of the new regime by other armed factions led by junior officers who had participated in the coup (Englebert 1996, 53-54). The new government is treated as a different regime from Zerbo's because of a change in the rank of the group from which leaders could be chosen.

End: 10/15/1987 Assassination of Sankara by soldiers linked to Compaoré (Wilkins 1989, 375), followed by Compaoré's accession to power, and the beginning of the change in the social and organizational bases of the regime. The government that began in 1987 is treated as a new regime because Compaoré changed the identity of the groups that could influence policy and from which officials could be chosen. Leaders of the small parties that had collaborated with Sankara fled to exile, were repressed or merged into the new ruling single party, along with new parties representing some of the same political formations that had been excluded by Sankara after dominating politics in the sixties and seventies (Englebert 1996, 61-5). The CDRs were dissolved in early 1988. In short, the post-1987 regime included a much wider array of political actors but excluded some of those who had been important to Sankara's support base.

Burkina Faso (1987–)

Start: 10/15/1987 Assassination of Sankara, leading to the creation of a broader, more moderate coalition government. The CDRs were dissolved in early 1988. The small leftist parties that had collaborated with Sankara fled to exile, were repressed or merged into the new ruling single party, ODP/MT, along with new parties representing some of the same political formations that had dominated politics in the sixties and seventies. A few of Sankara's military allies were executed. By 1990, the ruling FP included seven parties besides ODP/MT and most unions, which had been excluded by Sankara (Englebert 1996, 65). In short, the regime had been broadened to include a much wider array of political and socio-economic actors, and its leftism had been muted.

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Burundi (1962–66)

Start: 7/1/1962 Independence under the traditional monarchy, supposedly constitutional, but the crown chose and dismissed governments without consulting parliament, increased its powers in various ways, and entrusted key offices to family members. Governments were balanced between Tutsis and Hutus (Lemarchand 1966, 420-23; Political Handbook of the World 2012e, 205).

End: 7/8/1966. Coup replaced the king with his youngest son, reduced the monarch's powers, and formed a government headed by one of the coup leaders, Capt. Micombero, who became PM. Although the king's son remained the monarch for a short time, the ability to control policies and appointments shifted to Micombero. (Lemarchand 1974a, 87).

Burundi (1966–87)

Start: 7/8/1966 Coup replaced the king with his youngest son, reduced the monarch's powers, and forced him to appoint the coup leader, Capt Micombero, as PM. A second coup in November 1966 by Tutsi military officers under PM Micombero resulted in the formal transition from monarchy to republic with Micombero in control and

a government dominated by Tutsi officers and politicians. Hutus were purged from officer corps in 1966, 1969, and 1972, as well as from the bureaucracy and politics (Lemarchand 1974a, 75, Lemarchand 1974b, 87).

End: 9/3/1987. Coup led by Maj. Buyoya (Europa World Yearbook 2004, 946; Political Handbook of the World 2012e, 205). Buyoya's government is considered a new regime because he initially dissolved the Tutsi ruling party and established an all-military ruling group of 31 officers, thus changing the identity of the group able to influence policy.

Burundi (1987–93)

Start: 9/3/1987 Coup led by Maj Buyoya, Tutsi, who initially established the all Tutsi Military Committee for National Salvation of 31 officers; in 10/88 the Council was reformed with half Tutsi, half Hutu members (Europa World Yearbook 2004, 946, Political Handbook of the World 2012e, 205).

End: 6/1/1993 Election won by a Hutu from the Frodebu party (Europa World Yearbook 2004, 946, Political Handbook of the World 2012e, 206).

Burundi (1996–2003)

Start: 7/25/1996 Coup led by Buyoya established a new ruling group (Economist 1996d, 42; Europa World Yearbook 2004, 948; Political Handbook of the World 2012e, 206).

End: 4/30/2003 Installation of an interim transitional government. Buyoya handed power to his Hutu VP as agreed to in the Arusha Peace Accord. The new president, Frodebu party leader Ndayizeye, oversaw a competitive election as required by the Peace Accord, which was won by a different Hutu party, CND-FDD, completing the transition (Institute for Security Studies 2005).

Cambodia (1953–70)

Start: 11/9/1953 Independence under what was supposed to be a constitutional monarchy, but Sihanouk had suspended the constitution, dissolved the assembly, assumed the post of PM, and declared martial law before independence. Sihanouk came from the traditional royal family but had been chosen by the French over other potential royal claimants (Seekins 1987; Political Handbook of the World 2012f, 216).

End: 3/18/1970. Coup by Gen. Lon Nol ousted Sihanouk. The monarchy was abolished in October 1970 (Seekins 1987; Political Handbook of the World 2012f, 216).

Cambodia (1970–75)

Start: 3/18/1970 Coup by PM General Lon Nol and Prince Sirik Matak established a new civil-military ruling group (Seekins 1987; Political Handbook of the World 2012f, 215).

End: 4/17/75 Formal surrender after the defeat of government forces by the Khmer Rouge insurgency (Seekins 1987; Political Handbook of the World 2012f, 216).

Cambodia (1975–79)

Start: 4/17/1975 Formal surrender of the government to the Khmer Rouge insurgency,

which established a new government (Seekins 1987; Political Handbook of the World 2012f, 216).

End: 1/7/1979 Phnom Penh captured by Vietnamese troops and Cambodian exiles led by Heng Samrin (Seekins 1987; Political Handbook of the World 2012f, 216).

Cambodia (1979–)

Start: 1/7/1979 Phnom Penh captured by Vietnamese troops and Cambodian exiles led by Heng Samrin, who established a civilian, party-led government (Seekins 1987).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Cameroon (1960–83)

Start: 1/1/1960 Independence under a system that was only formally democratic. One of the largest anti-colonial parties, the UPC, was outlawed both before and after independence, and repression was extensive. Ahidjo's strategy of cooptation of the remaining opposition parties changed gradually into forced merger and the arrest of peaceful opposition leaders by June 1962 (LeVine 1971, 103-5; Fearon and Laitin 2005).

End: 8/22/1983 A power struggle between former president Ahidjo, who remained leader of the sole party, and President Biya, who had succeeded Ahidjo as president the previous year, ended in Ahidjo's resignation and exile. Biya had been Ahidjo's PM and constitutional successor. He succeeded to the presidency when Ahidjo retired from the presidency in 1982. The coalition that supported Ahidjo and from which officials were drawn was multi-regional and multi-ethnic. Ahidjo was a northern Muslim and Biya a southern Christian. Soon after becoming president, Biya began replacing high officials chosen by Ahidjo with his own supporters. By late 1983, he had ousted the Muslim PM and head of the armed forces and begun narrowing the group with political influence and concentrating power in his own ethnic group. The post-1983 government is treated as a different regime because the regional and ethnic bases of policy influence changed (Wache 1991).

Cameroon (1983–)

Start: 8/22/1983 Ahidjo resigned as chair of the ruling party after losing a power struggle with Biya. The post-1983 period is coded as a different regime because of the change in the identity of the group that influenced policy and from which officials were chosen after Biya forced Ahidjo into exile. Under Ahidjo's leadership, the party was multi-ethnic, multi-regional, and included both Muslims and Christians. After Biya, who had been the southern Christian PM in the multiethnic coalition, succeeded Ahidjo, he forced Ahidjo's supporters from positions of importance and concentrated power within a small group of supporters from his own ethnic group (Wache 1991).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Central African Republic (1960–65)

Start: 8/31/1960 Independence under the rule of one faction of the party that led the independence struggle, MESAN. After its leader's death in 1959, the party split,

and one faction, led by Dacko, suppressed the other and jailed its leaders. MESAN had won all the seats in a pre-independence election (Collier 1982, 109; Decalo 1989, 205; Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa 2010).

End: 12/31/1965 Coup by Col. Bokassa, Chief of Staff and Commander of the Army, ousted the civilian government (Decalo 1989, 207; Economist Intelligence Unit 2008c, 4).

Central African Republic (1966–79)

Start: 1/1/1966 Col Bokassa proclaimed himself president, PM, and head of the sole political party, MESAN, after the December 31st coup (Decalo 1989, 207-11).

End: 9/20/1979 The Bokassa government was overthrown by an armed force of exiles led by Dacko, aided by the French, which returned the country to civilian rule (Decalo 1989, 234-35; Economist Intelligence Unit 2008c, 4).

Central African Republic (1979–81)

Start: 9/20/1979 Bokassa is overthrown by an armed force of exiles led by Dacko and aided by the French. Dacko reinstalled as president (Decalo 1989, 234-38).

End: 9/1/1981 Coup by Gen. Kolingba, Army Chief of Staff (Decalo 1989, 240; Polity IV 2008).

Central African Republic (1981–93)

Start: 9/1/1981 Coup by Gen Kolingba, army chief-of-staff, established the Military Committee for National Recovery to rule (Decalo 1989, 240-41).

End: 9/19/1993 Kolingba lost the second round of multiparty presidential elections and stepped down: second round on September 19, first round August 22 (Polity IV 2008; African Elections Database 2011m).

Central African Republic (2003–)

Start: 3/15/2003 Insurgency led by ex-army chief-of-staff Bozize seized the capital and ousted the elected government (IRIN 2003; U.S. State Department 2010).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Chad (1960–75)

Start: 8/11/1960 Independence under the PPT and PM Tombalbaye. Tombalbaye began a purge of the ruling PPT a week before independence to eliminate possible rivals and their supporters. At the same time, he began the campaign to coopt members of the opposition into the PPT that resulted in formal merger and de facto single-party rule in early 1961 (Decalo 1980, 498-99; Collier 1988).

End: 4/13/1975 Coup and assassination of Tombalbaye by junior officers in the security forces (Ali 1984, 25; Collier 1988 Boddy-Evans 2011).

Chad (1975–79)

Start: 4/13/1975 Coup and assassination of Tombalbaye by junior officers in the security forces, who released Tombalbaye's ex-chief of staff Malloum and installed him as president and head of Conseil Supérieur Militaire (Collier 1988; Boddy-Evans

2011).

End: 3/23/1979 Insurgent forces took the capital (Collier 1988).

[Chad 1979-82 is excluded from the data set because no group controlled the government. Multiple armed forces continued the civil war, and foreign intervention continued (Collier 1988).]

Chad (1982–90)

Start: 6/7/1982 Insurgents led by Habre captured the capital and installed their leader as head of state and government (Ali 1984, 29; Byrnes 1988).

End: 12/1/1990 Ex-Lt. Gen. Déby led an insurgency that ousted the Habré government (Reyna 2003, 279).

Chad (1990–)

Start: 12/1/1990 Ex-Lt Gen Deby, former commander-in-chief of Habre’s army, led an insurgency aided by the French that ousted Habre and installed himself in power (Reyna 2003, 279; Africa Confidential 2004b, 5).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Chile (1973–89)

Start: 9/11/1973 Military coup ousted the elected government (Drake 1994).

End: 12/14/1989 Fair and competitive election led to a transition to democracy (Angell and Pollack 1990, 2). [China 1946-49 is excluded from the data set because no government controlled the territory.]

China (1949–)

Start: 1/22/1949 Beijing fell to the Communists during the civil war. The People’s Republic was formally established in October 1949 (Shinn and Worden 1989; Leung 2002, xxix).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Colombia (1949–53)

Start: 11/9/1949 The elected incumbent Conservative president closed Congress (to which a Liberal majority had recently been elected), declared a state of siege, and imposed press censorship after a violent campaign in which many Liberal partisans had been killed. In response, Liberals boycotted the presidential election scheduled for November 27, 1949 leading to the election of another Conservative president (Fluharty 1957; Henderson 1985, 138-40).

End: 6/13/1953 Military coup led by Gen. Rojas Pinilla ousted the civilian government (Martz 1962, 166-67).

Colombia (1953–58)

Start: 6/13/1953 Military coup led by Gen Rojas Pinilla established a government led by himself (Martz 1962, 166-67).

End: 5/10/1958 Fair election with power sharing agreement between the traditional Conservative and Liberal parties negotiated under the National Front agreement ended Rojas Pinilla’s government (Martz 1962, 267; Hartlyn 1988, 60-65).

Congo-Brazzaville (1960–63)

Start: 8/15/1960 Independence under a UDDIA government led by Youlou. Gerrymandering and other manipulation and repression under a pre-independence Youlou government allowed the UDDIA to win 84% of the seats with 58% of the vote in the last pre-independence election and establish de facto single-party rule (Encyclopedia of World Biography 2003).

End: 8/15/1963 Popular uprising. The small army, led by mostly French officers and NCOs, withdrew support from the government and transferred power to Massamba-Débat, who had been the president of the National Assembly before President Youlou forced him to resign (Decalo 1976, 139-40, 147-48).

Congo-Brazzaville (1963–68)

Start: 8/15/1963 Massamba-Débat was installed as interim president by the military after a popular uprising (Decalo 1976, 139-40).

End: 9/4/1968 The civilian president resigned, leaving control in the hands of Capt Ngouabi, who had gradually taken control of the government and defeated paramilitary forces loyal to the president during the preceding two months (Decalo 1976, 152-55).

Congo-Brazzaville (1968–91)

Start: 9/4/1968 Civilian president resigned after Capt Ngouabi had gradually taken control of top decision-making positions (Decalo 1976, 152-55).

End: 2/25/1991 The National Conference declared itself sovereign, and Sassou-Nguesso accepted the decision. Demonstrations and widespread popular opposition forced Sassou-Nguesso and the PCT to agree to a National Conference. The opposition controlled the Conference, and it chose a former World Bank official, André Milongo, to head the interim government that would oversee a transition to democracy. Multi-party legislative and presidential elections were held in June and July 1992 and won by one of the opposition parties, completing the transition (Clark 1994, 50-53; Clark 1997, 68).

Congo-Brazzaville (1997–)

Start: 10/14/1997 Defeat of a civilian government supported by southern ethnic groups by insurgents representing northern ethnic groups led by former president Sassou-Nguesso (New York Times 1997; Bazenguissa-Ganga 1998, 37).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Congo/Zaire (1960–97)

Start: 9/14/1960 Coup led by Col Mobutu ousted PM Lumumba and installed a new ruling group (Lemarchand 1993).

End: 5/17/1997 The seizure of Kinshasa by insurgent troops led by Laurent Kabila ended Mobutu's rule (Schatzberg 1997, 70, Ascherson 2012, 69-70).

Congo/Zaire (1997–)

Start: 5/17/1997 Insurgent troops led by L. Kabila occupied the city, and Kabila

established a government (Schatzberg 1997, 70, Ascherson 2012, 69-70).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Costa Rica (1948–49)

Start: 5/8/1948 Insurgent forces led by Figueres took San Jose and installed a new ruling group (Mauceri 1989, 205-6). [The prior elected government had “authoritarianized” in March 1948 when it annulled an election won by the opposition, but it is not included in the data set because it did not last through Jan 1.]

End: 11/8/1949 Figueres, who had served as interim president since the brief civil war, handed power to Ulate, who had been elected in 2/48 but not recognized as the winner by the then-incumbent. This handover is coded as a return to constitutional, democratic government (Infocostarica; Cerdas Cruz 1990, 390).

Cuba (1952–59)

Start: 3/10/1952 Coup by junior officers led by retired general and former President Batista ousted the civilian government and returned Batista to the presidency (Suchlicki 2001; Gott 2005, 146).

End: 1/1/1959 Castro’s arrival in Havana after Batista and his cronies’ flight and the disintegration of the military in the face of insurgency (Dominguez 1998, 130-31).

Cuba (1959–)

Start: 1/1/1959 Castro’s arrival in Havana leading insurgent forces; they installed a new ruling group centered on the Castro brothers and their closest supporters (Dominguez 1998, 130-31).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Czechoslovakia (1948–89)

Start: 2/25/1948 Communist takeover of what had previously been a coalition government. In a situation of increasingly extreme communist tactics, 12 non-communist ministers resigned. The communist Interior Minister deployed police regiments and took over Prague while communist activists mobilized demonstrations, forcing President Benes to accept the ministers’ resignations. The communist PM then named communist ministers to replace them until the required election, which was controlled and won by the communists (Kohut 1987).

End: 12/4/1989 Resignation of the communist regime leadership in response to massive demonstrations and strikes (Bernhard 1993, 324-25; Friedheim 1993, 483).

Dominican Republic (1930–62)

Start: 2/23/1930 Rebellion supported by Brig Gen Trujillo installed him as regime leader (Hartlyn 1998, 85; Jimenez 2000, 147-48).

End: 1/16/1962. Coup ousted Balaguer, Trujillo’s designated successor, and initiated a transitional government to oversee competitive elections (Wiarda 1975, 263). Provisional government oversaw fair and competitive elections in December 1962, won by the opposition (Hartlyn 1998, 103).

Dominican Republic (1963–65)

Start: 9/26/1963 Coup led by Gen Wessin y Wessin ousted the elected president and installed a new ruling group (Atkins and Wilson 1998, 130).

End: 4/24/1965 The Wessin y Wessin regime was overthrown by a force that combined a faction of the military with civilian Bosch (the ousted civilian president) supporters. Both sides of the conflict were armed. The rebels defeated the faction of the military that supported the triumvirate and installed an interim government (Wiarda and Kryzaneck 1992, 42-43). Although invading U.S. forces ousted the new government after a very short time, the regime end is coded as caused by an insurgency or civil war because the 1963-65 regime was ousted by armed rebels, not the U.S.

Dominican Republic (1966–78)

Start: 6/1/1966 Election of Balaguer during U.S. occupation in an atmosphere of violence and intimidation (Campillo Pérez 1986, 251-55). Although multiparty elections were held regularly between June 1966 and May 1978, this period is considered authoritarian because elections were unfair and civil liberties unprotected (Hartlyn 1998, 108-9).

End: 5/16/1978. Election won by the opposition (Campillo Pérez 1986, 289-95; Hartlyn 1989).

Ecuador (1944–47)

Start: 5/31/1944 Coup led by junior officers supported by several leftist parties and accompanied by a popular uprising. The officers turned power over to Velasco Ibarra, a popular civilian politician (Fitch 1977, 19; Becker 2000, 1-2).

End: 8/23/1947 Coup led by the Minister of Defense ousted the president, but the rest of the military refused to support him. They returned power to the president's constitutional successor as interim president. The interim president returned the country to constitutional rule, and Congress elected a civilian to finish the president's term (Fitch 1977, 39; Becker 2000, 5; OnWar 2000b).

Ecuador (1963–66)

Start: 7/11/1963 Coup ousted the elected president and installed a military junta (Fitch 1977, 61-3; Schodt 1987, 82).

End: 3/29/1966 Mass protests caused the junta to resign. They handed power to an interim civilian president to oversee a Constituent Assembly, which elected a provisional president (Maier 1971, 506; Fitch 1977, 171-72), who oversaw competitive presidential elections in 1968 (Fitch 1977, 175; Freeman 1981).

Ecuador (1970–72)

Start: 6/22/1970 Autogolpe by the elected president: closed Congress, ruled by decree supported by the military, arrested the opposition, suspended the constitution (Fitch 1977, 175-76).

End: 2/15/1972 Coup led by Gen. Rodriguez Lara, Commander of the Army, ousted the civilian government (Fitch 1977, 179).

Ecuador (1972–79)

Start: 2/15/1972 Coup led by Gen Rodriguez Lara, commander of the army, installed a military junta (Fitch 1977, 179).

End: 4/29/1979. Second round of competitive presidential election, as part of transition to democracy (Schodt 1987, 131).

Egypt (1922–52)

Start: 2/28/1922 Independence as a formally constitutional monarchy; King Fuad violated the constitution the same year it was adopted and suspended it in 1930 (Vatikiotis 1961, 23).

End: 7/23/1952 Coup led by Col Nasser and the Free Officers, an organization of junior and mid-level officers, assumed power. The military rulers ended the monarchy in June 1953 (Haddad 1973, 11-12, 21-22; Perlmutter 1974, 49).

Egypt (1952–)

Start: 7/23/1952 Coup led by Lt Col Nasser and the Free Officers, an organization of junior and mid-level officers. They established the Revolutionary Command Council made up of members of the Free Officers' executive committee to rule (Haddad 1973, 11-12, 21-22, Brooker 1995, 148).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010. [Ousted February 2011 in response to popular uprising, power handed to the military.]

El Salvador (1931–48)

Start: 12/2/1931 Coup by junior officers ousted the elected civilian president and replaced him with Gen Hernández Martínez who had been vice president, Defense Min, and commander of the armed forces (White 1973, 99; Haggerty 1988; Stanley 1996, 48-50, 63-4).

End: 12/14/1948 Coup led by junior officers forced the retirement of all officers ranked above Lt. Col., which eliminated the Hernández Martínez faction, and initiated a Revolutionary Governing Council chosen by the whole remaining officer corps (White 1973, 105; Stanley 1996, 67). The post-1948 regime is considered different from the earlier one because of the change in ranks of those leading the regime.

El Salvador (1948–82) *Start:* 12/14/1948 Coup led by junior officers forced the retirement of all officers ranked above Lt. Col and initiated a Revolutionary Governing Council chosen by the whole remaining officer corps (White 1973, 105; Baloyra 1982, 17; Stanley 1996, 67).

End: 3/28/1982 Constituent Assembly election. Under pressure from the U.S., a civilian, Magaña, was chosen provisional president by the Constituent Assembly. He assumed office on May 2, 1982 and the junta resigned (Sharpe and Diskin 1984, 533). In May 1984, a civilian president was elected in the second round of a fair presidential election. Candidates were chosen by political parties that were not under the full control of the military, the opposition won, and the civilian president was allowed to take office, though the military retained control over key policy decisions. This marks a transition from direct to indirect military rule; it is not considered a

transition to democracy because popular parties on the left remained excluded from politics, and the military retained a veto over large areas of policy (Williams and Walter 1997, 114, 126-29).

El Salvador (1982–94)

Start: 3/28/1982 Transition from direct rule by a military junta to indirect military control of a civilian government. Under U.S. pressure, a Constituent Assembly from which the left had been excluded was elected, and it chose a civilian president acceptable to both the military and Washington. Though a presidential election was won by the permitted opposition in May 1984, the 1982-94 regime is coded as indirect military rule because continuing repression of the left prevented parties representing a substantial part of the population from participating in elections; in addition, experts judged that the military continued to dominate important aspects of policy choice, e.g., “Paradoxically, during the 1980s at the very time that a military-dominated junta was transferring formal power to a civilian president, the armed forces were successfully consolidating their presence in the state, expanding their network of control in the countryside, and maintaining their institutional autonomy” (Williams and Walter 1997, 114). Williams and Walter (1997, 127-28) describe a secret agreement between elected but not yet inaugurated President Duarte and General Vides Casanova to maintain the composition of the high command and cooperate with military policy preferences. The military “retained their right, and ability, to intervene in what they deemed undesirable situations” (Williams and Walter 1997, 129)

End: 3/20/1994 El Salvador’s ruling group allowed a fair, fully competitive presidential election in which left parties ran for the first time (McBride 1994). This marks a transition to democracy.

Eritrea (1993–)

Start: 5/24/1993 Independence under the control of Afwerki and the EPLF, one of the armed independence movements; they established a party-based government (Political Handbook of the World 2012g, 446).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Ethiopia (1889–1974)

Start: 11/3/1889 The coronation of Menelik II after the seizure of the Ethiopian throne in battle by Menelik of Shewa (then a vassal state of Ethiopia) initiated a new dynasty. Menelik unified the areas that currently form Ethiopia (Haile-Selassie 1997, 27-29, 34; Turner 1991; Mockler 2002, 89-90).

End: 9/12/1974 The emperor was deposed by the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police and Territorial Army (the Dergue) (Abate 1983, 32). This marks the endpoint of a the transition from monarchy to rule by the Dergue, which had taken control of the government during a popular uprising that began February 1974 (Haile-Selassie 1997, 121, 127).

Ethiopia (1974–91)

Start: 9/12/1974 The Dergue (Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army) deposed the emperor, suspended parliament and the constitution after taking control of government during a popular uprising/military rebellion that began February 1974 (Abate 1983, 32; Keller 1991, 187; Haile-Selassie 1997, 121, 127). Between February and September 1974, the Dergue eliminated power holders of the old regime; the removal of the emperor completed the transition from monarchy to a new form of autocracy. When the crown prince, who had been offered the throne, refused to return to Ethiopia, the Dergue proclaimed itself acting head of state and changed its name to the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) on September 13, 1974 Haile-Selassie 1997, 128. The Dergue originally included three elected representatives from each unit of the armed forces; members ranged from ordinary soldiers to colonels (Erlich 1983, 473-75; Clapham 1985, 260; Haile-Selassie 1997, 147-48).

End: 5/8/1991 Mengistu fled the country after the regime was defeated by insurgents from several different regions. Remaining officials declared a ceasefire and EPRDF forces began entering Addis Ababa on May 27, 1991 (Haile-Selassie 1997, 284-328).

Ethiopia (1991–)

Start: 5/27/1991 EPRDF forces began entering Addis Ababa after defeating the Ethiopian army along with insurgents from several different regions and set up a government (Haile-Selassie 1997, 284-328).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Gabon (1960–)

Start: 8/17/1960 Independence with M'ba already in office as Prime Minister, supported by the French. Although the political system was formally parliamentary with an elected assembly, before independence M'ba had already arrested an opposition leader and intimidated some opposition deputies into switching parties. Gerrymandering and a multimember district, plurality electoral system gave the BDG a very strong majority in the June 1960 election. In November 1960 he interned 8 opponents in his own party (Bernault 1996, 294-97).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Gambia (1965–94)

Start: 2/18/1965 Independence under single-party government led by Jawara and the PPP. The PPP won the pre-independence election in 1962. Members of other parties were coopted into the ruling party. The only important opposition party won a third of the seats in 1962, but by 10/64, seven of its 13 MPs had crossed the aisle. It won seven seats in the 1966 election, and neither it nor other opposition parties won more than seven altogether in subsequent elections. The Jawara government did not use repression against its challengers, but it did very successfully use state resources to maintain its dominant position. Although opposition parties were always allowed to run in elections, this regime is included in the data set because the ruling PPP

maintained an uneven playing field through monopolization of patronage and state resources for nearly 30 years (Hughes and Perfect 2008, l-lvii; Political Handbook of the World 2012h, 509).

End: 7/22/1994 Coup led by junior officers (Economist 1996c; Saine 1996, 97).

Gambia (1994–)

Start: 7/22/1994 Coup led by Lt Jammeh and other junior officers created the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council to rule (Economist 1996c, 44, Saine 1996, 97).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Georgia (1991–92)

Start: 9/16/1991 The arrest of the most important opposition leaders and repression of demonstrators in September 1991 identifies the date when the Gamsakhurdia government crossed the line from more-or-less democratic to autocratic (Los Angeles Times 1991; Global Security 2011e).

End: 1/6/1992 Violent overthrow of the civilian government by a faction of the militia forces that had been incorporated into the national army (Zurcher 2007, 126-27; Global Security 2011e).

Georgia (1992–2003)

Start: 1/6/1992 Violent ouster of the Gamsakhurdia government by a faction of the militia forces that had been incorporated into the new national army; the coup leaders invited Shevardnadze to return to the country and lead the government (Slider 1994; Zurcher 2007, 126-27; Global Security 2011e).

End: 11/23/2003 Demonstrations led to Shevardnadze's resignation and the transfer of power to an opposition interim president who held fair presidential elections in January 2004, won by a leader of what had been the opposition to Shevardnadze (Jones 2009, 317-34; U.S. Dept. of State 2009; Devdariani 2011, 107-108).

Germany, East (1949–1990)

Start: 10/7/1949 This date marks the establishment of a separate East German state and the Soviet transfer of power to the newly chosen governing institutions of the German Democratic Republic (Gallagher 1987)

End: 3/18/1990 Socialist Unity Party (communist) lost a competitive election which was forced on the government by massive demonstrations (Pfaff 2006, 242).

Ghana (1960–66)

Start: 4/27/1960 "Authoritarianization" due to de facto one-party rule and increasing concentration of power in Nkrumah's hands, preventive detention law used to control opposition. Post-independence authoritarianization was gradual; on this date a referendum confirmed Nkrumah as president and concentrated power in the presidency; it is identified as the point at which the threshold between democracy and autocracy was crossed (Pinkney 1972, 15-16; Finer 1975, 501; McLaughlin and Owusu-Ansah 1994; Brooker 1995, 103-10; African Elections Database 2011a).

End: 2/24/1966 Coup led by Col. Kotoka with support from the senior commander

of the police ousted the civilian government (Pinkney 1972, 70; Bebler 1973, 36-38; Brooker 1995, 111-12).

Ghana (1966–69)

Start: 2/24/1966 Coup led by Col Kotoka and Maj Afrifa, handed power to dismissed Maj Gen Ankrah and established the ruling group, National Liberation Council, of 4 military and 4 police officers (Pinkney 1972, 2, 121; Bebler 1973, 36-40).

End: 8/29/1969 Competitive election after the military agreed to return to the barracks (Bebler 1973, 54-55; Dowse 1975, 24; African Elections Database 2011a).

Ghana (1972–79)

Start: 1/13/1972 coup led by Lt Col Acheampong ousted the elected government and established the Military Redemption Council, initially 6 colonels and majors with 1 civilian, but expanded to 12 to include all services and “satisfy hierarchical propriety”; the civilian was dropped. In 1975 the MRC was replaced by a seven man Supreme Military Council composed of the heads of the services, police, border guards, and chief of the defense staff (Bebler 1973, 56-60; Bennett 1975, 308; Political Handbook of the World 2012i, 539).

End: 7/9/1979 Second round of competitive presidential elections agreed to by the military as a means of democratizing (African Elections Database 2011a).

Ghana (1981–2000)

Start: 12/31/1981 Coup led by Flight Lt Rawlings, established the Provisional National Defense Council, a mixed military and civilian ruling group (McLaughlin and Owusu-Ansah 1994).

End: 12/28/2000 The ruling NDC lost the second round of a competitive presidential election (African Elections Database 2011a).

Greece (1967–74)

Start: 4/21/1967 Coup led by Col Papadopoulos and the Holy Bond of Greek Officers (IDEA) military faction installed themselves as rulers (Feit 1973, 118-22; Brown 1974, 217; Veremis 1985, 30-32).

End: 7/23/1974 Military transfer of power to Karamanlis in preparation for competitive elections and transition to democracy (Veremis 1985, 41).

Guatemala (1954–58)

Start: 6/27/1954 A CIA-sponsored invasion by exiles supported by part of the military ousted the elected government (Gibson 1989, 172; Dunkerley 1992, 300).

End: 2/2/1958 Congress chose the plurality winner of the January 1958 election as president. Although several parties that would have been expected to attract substantial votes were excluded from participation, and thus the election is not considered democratic, it was nevertheless won by a candidate opposed by the military. The election did lead to a transition to rule by a civilian not selected by the military and thus is coded as the end of the preceding military regime (New York Times 1958; Dunkerley 1988, 439).

Guatemala (1958–63)

Start: 2/2/1958 Congress chose the next president after a competitive election in which the left was not permitted to run led to the election of a right-wing populist candidate opposed by the military. This regime is considered authoritarian because the military prohibited left and center-left parties supported by a large segment of the population from competing in the election (Dunkerley 1988, 439).

End: 3/30/1963 Coup led by Col. Peralta, Defense Minister (Dunkerley 1988, 443).

Guatemala (1963–66)

Start: 3/30/1963 Coup led by Col Peralta, Def Min established a military ruling group (Dunkerley 1988, 443).

End: 5/10/1966 Congress selected the president after the March 1966 presidential election, as required by the constitution, because the election failed to produce a majority winner. The left and several other parties were not allowed to run, but nevertheless a civilian centrist candidate, Méndez Montenegro, won a plurality of the votes in opposition to a military sponsored candidate (Weaver 1970, 68, 77-78; Calvert 1985, 83). The transition to a civilian president is coded as a regime change because the military lost direct control of the presidency, even though it maintained control over substantial areas of policy.

Guatemala (1966–70)

Start: 5/10/1966 Congressional selection of Méndez Montenegro, the plurality winner of the March 1966 election, in which the left and several other parties were prohibited from running. The regime is considered authoritarian because the election was semi-competitive and Méndez had to agree to military control of its “own” affairs and important policy areas in order to be inaugurated – not just control of the war against the insurgency, but also tax and other important domestic policies (Weaver 1970, 68, 78; Johnson 1971, 35; Calvert 1985, 83; Dunkerley 1988, 459). Therefore the regime is coded as indirect military rule. Beginning in November 1966 a state of siege further curtailed constitutional rights (Dunkerley 1988, 457).

End: 3/1/1970 Election of Col. Arana, nominated by the military, marks the end of indirect military rule and the beginning of direct military rule (Johnson 1971, 41; Dunkerley 1988, 459). This is considered a regime change because the group from which the leader could be selected narrowed to top military officers.

Guatemala (1970–85)

Start: 3/1/1970 Election of Col Arana, candidate of the military, MLN and PID, in an election in which the left and some other parties were prohibited from running (Johnson 1971, 41; Berger 1986, 563; Dunkerley 1988, 459; Montenegro Rios 2002, 122-23, 133). From this election until 1985, only military officers were permitted to win elections, so this regime is coded as a different from the previous one in which civilians shared top policy making positions with the military.

End: 12/8/85 Second round of semi-competitive presidential elections in which the

military did not run or back a candidate, won by the Christian Democrats (Nohlen 2005, 323). This is considered a regime end because the group from which leaders could be chosen expanded to include civilians, and civilians controlled many aspects of policy even though the military maintained veto power over substantial aspects of policy and prevented the left from competing in elections (Weaver 1994, 238; Dunkerley and Sieder 1996, 83; Leonard 1998, 106; Jonas 2000, 26).

Guatemala (1985–95)

Start: 12/8/1985 The second round of a fair, semi-competitive presidential election in which non-leftist parties were allowed to run was won by the Christian Democrats (Anderson 1988, 61). The military retained control of its own affairs and veto power over substantial areas of policy (Dunkerley 1988, 498-99). Regime is considered authoritarian despite competitive elections because the military continued to exclude parties on the left from electoral competition and to exercise veto power in some policy areas.

End: 11/12/1995 Fair and competitive general elections in which the left was for the first time allowed to participate marks the end of indirect military rule and a transition to democracy (Jonas 2000, 21-22). Over time between 1985 and 1995, the military reduced its areas of policy control. The 1995 change in the identity of the group from which leaders could be drawn and in the rules for selecting leaders completes the transition to democracy (Center for Democratic Performance 2011).

Guinea (1958–84)

Start: 10/2/1958 Independence under PDG single-party rule. The PDG won a fair election before independence, but the opposition merged with the PDG soon after independence. The regime is considered authoritarian because the government began suppressing opposition soon after independence (Finer 1975, 495-96; Brooker 1995, 117-18; U.S. Dept. of State 2011b).

End: 4/3/1984 Coup led by Lt Col Conte and other middle ranking officers against the PDG regime after Toure's death (Economist Intelligence Unit 2008d; U.S. Dept. of State 2011a; Political Handbook of the World 2012j).

Guinea (1984–2008)

Start: 4/3/1984 Coup led by Lt Col Conté established the Comité Militaire de Redressement National to rule (U.S. Dept. of State 2011a; Political Handbook of the World 2012j, 569).

End: 12/23/2008 Coup led by Capt. Camara against those attempting to perpetuate the Conté regime after his death (Economist 2009; U.S. Dept. of State 2011a; Political Handbook of the World 2012j).

Guinea (2008–10)

Start: 12/23/2008 Coup led by Capt Camara, established the Comité National pour le Développement et la Démocratie (National Council for Democracy and Development) to rule (U.S. Dept. of State 2011a, Political Handbook of the World 2012j, 570).

End: 1/16/2010 Agreement between Konate, Camara, and the opposition turned power over to a transitional government led by the opposition until elections (All Africa 2010). President Camara was shot in December 2009 and General Konate took over as president while Camara was in Morocco for medical treatment. Second round of competitive presidential election on November 7 2010 completed transition to democracy (Burgis 2010, 1; Political Handbook of the World 2012j).

Guinea Bissau (1974–80)

Start: 9/10/1974 Independence under the single party that had led the fight for independence, PAIGC, led by Luis Cabral (Piette 2005, 526).

End: 11/14/1980 Coup led by ex-Brig Gen Vieira ousted the civilian regime. The subsequent regime is coded as different because its ethnic base was different, despite the maintenance of the same ruling party (U.S. Dept. of State 2011c; Political Handbook of the World 2012k, 578).

Guinea Bissau (1980–99)

Start: 11/14/1980 Coup led by PM and ex-Brig Gen Vieira, recently replaced by Cabral as commander of the army. This regime is considered different from the previous one because Cabral and his closest supporters came from Cape Verde, but Vieira and his were from mainland Guinea Bissau. PAIGC led both countries until 1980, and unification was in the works. Vieira maintained the single party but replaced the National Assembly and State Council with a predominantly military nine-man Revolutionary Council. Cape Verde ended plans for unification after the coup, and most Cape Verdians left the party (Forrest 1987, 103-5; Piette 2005, 526; Political Handbook of the World 2012k, 579).

End: 5/7/1999 Vieira ousted by an insurgency led by ex-army chief of staff Brig Gen Mane (BBC News 1999a; Piette 2005, 529; Political Handbook of the World 2012k).

Guinea Bissau (2002–03)

Start: 11/16/2002 The elected president, Yala, dissolved parliament, and then repeatedly postponed new elections. We code parliament's dissolution as the point at which Yala crossed the line from democracy to autocracy. He also refused to promulgate the 2001 constitution and governed by decree, harassed the opposition and arrested opposition leaders (Piette 2005, 532-33; Freedom House 2010; Political Handbook of the World 2012k, 579).

End: 9/14/2003 Coup led by Chief of Staff and Defense Min Correia Seabra ousted Yala and established a transitional government that oversaw a transition to democracy (United Nations Information Service 2003; Political Handbook of the World 2012k, 579). Fair legislative elections were held in March 2004, and fair presidential elections in June-July 2005 completed the transition the following year (African Elections Database 2011b).

Haiti (1941–46)

Start: 6/5/1941 After the president was elected by the elected Assembly, repression of

opponents began immediately. We identify the date when the president took personal control of the Garde d'Haiti (the National Guard, Haiti's military), which was used against the opposition, as the point when the line between democracy and autocracy was crossed (Smith 2009, 43; Hatian Media 2012).

End: 1/11/1946 Violent popular uprising led to Lescot's resignation. Interim military government oversaw competitive elections May 1946 (Nohlen 1993, 389; Smith 2009, 80-81, 89; Hatian Media 2012). Although suffrage was not universal, it was broad enough to meet the coding criteria for democracy (Nohlen 1993, 379).

Haiti (1950–56)

Start: 5/10/1950 Coup led by the three commanding officers in the context of violent pro- and anti-government demonstrations and the elected president's effort to extend his term illegally (Nohlen 1993, 389; Smith 2009, 144-47).

End: 12/12/1956 Popular protests forced President Magloire to resign. He was succeeded by the head of the Supreme Court who agreed to fair competitive elections (Smith 2009, 171-72; Hall 2012, 272).

Haiti (1957–86)

Start: 6/14/1957 Coup ousted the interim government (the third since December 1956) and announced a new election date for September 1957. The military government then supervised an unfair election in which their favored candidate, F. Duvalier, was elected (Nohlen 1993, 389; Smith 2009, 177-83).

End: 2/7/1986 Jean-Claude Duvalier fled because of popular uprising and was replaced by an interim government under Lt. Gen. Namphy, Chief of Staff (Nicholls 1998, 165-66; U.S. Dept. of State 2010a).

Haiti (1986–88)

Start: 2/7/1986 The formation of what was supposed to be an interim transitional government made up of two civilians and three officers, the Conseil National de Gouvernement, led by Lt-Gen Namphy. This government is not treated as a continuation of the previous regime because it authorized legal proceedings against Duvalier allies and banned them from holding office for ten years (Payne and Sutton 1993, 80-84), thus changing the rules for choosing leaders. The first attempted election in November 1987 was canceled because of violence. The opposition boycotted the new election in January 1988, which was rigged to produce a winner acceptable to the military. In June 1988 Namphy ousted the newly elected civilian president who was expected to cooperate with the military but had tried to dismiss him (Payne and Sutton 1993, 89; Nicholls 1998, 169).

End: 9/17/1988 Coup by junior officers and non-commissioned officers ousted the government led by Lt. Gen. Henri Namphy and high ranking officers (Payne and Sutton 1993, 90).

Haiti (1988–90)

Start: 9/17/1988 Coup led by non-commissioned officers established a new ruling

group (Nohlen 1993, 390; Payne and Sutton 1993, 90).

End: 3/10/1990 The military handed power to an interim government headed by Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Ertha Pascal-Trouillot, to oversee a democratic transition (Nohlen 1993, 390; Payne and Sutton 1993, 92-94; Hall 2012, 272).

Haiti (1991–94)

Start: 9/30/1991 coup led by Brig Gen Cédras ousted the elected president and established military rule (Nohlen 1993, 390; U.S. Dept. of State 2010a).

End: 10/12/1994 Military regime led by Cédras ousted by foreign intervention, which oversaw the return of the previously elected president (Malone 2008, 133; Global Security 2011d; Hall 2012, 272).

Haiti (1999–2004)

Start: 1/12/1999 “Authoritarianization” when elected President Préval suspended the legislature and began to rule by decree after the legislature refused to confirm his third nominee for PM, amid accusations of vote rigging in legislative elections (Erickson 2004; Wucker 2004, 45).

End: 2/29/2004 Aristide fled in response to a popular uprising led by a former police chief and criminal gang leaders (Erickson 2005, 86; Hall 2012, 272).

Honduras (1933–56)

Start: 11/26/1933 Gen Carías won a fair election in October 1932, but maintained the state of siege declared by his predecessor and extended his political control to all areas of the country through the appointment of local political and military officials. Initially, Carías relied primarily on patronage and control over the distribution of state resources to coopt opposition politicians. We date “authoritarianization” to the manipulated municipal elections of November 1933. Beginning in 1935, arrests and repression of the opposition became more extensive (Stokes 1950, 219-26; Mac-Cameron 1983, 17; Haggerty and Millet 1993; Leonard 1998, 96; Dodd 2005, 62-71).

End: 10/21/1956 Coup that installed an interim government to oversee a democratic transition (Anderson 1981, 59-60; Morris 1984, 11-12, 36-38).

Honduras (1963–71)

Start: 10/3/1963 Coup led by Air Force Col and commander of the armed forces López Arellano ousted the elected government and established a military junta (Haggerty and Millet 1993, Morris 1984, 39).

End: 3/28/1971 Fair election under the auspices of a pact for power sharing between the PN and PL that led to a transition to civilian rule (Morris 1984, 43; Anderson 1988, 134).

Honduras (1972–81)

Start: 12/4/1972 Coup led by Gen López Arellano (promoted while previously in power) ousted the elected president and reestablished military rule (Morris 1984, 44).

End: 11/29/1981 Competitive election ended military rule (Pearson 1982, 439; An-

derson 1988, 155). The election was won by the party not supported by the military, and the elected president took office in January 1982, completing the transition to democracy.

Hungary (1947–90)

Start: 2/25/1947 The arrest of the Smallholders' secretary general and a number of other opposition activists on trumped up charges marks the point at which the communists' gradual takeover crossed the line to autocratic regime. Although the communists did not control the government between the fair 1945 election and the unfair election in August 1947, they controlled the Interior Ministry and the police as part of a Smallholder-led coalition, which allowed them to intimidate and arrest supporters of other parties. They intimidated the Smallholders' PM into resigning in May 1947. Despite intimidation and fraud, the communists won only a plurality (22%) of the vote in 1947, but were able to control the succeeding government through a coalition with allies in other parties. The disorganization and repression of the Smallholders' Party, which had been the largest, was completed in 1947, and the Social Democrats, the other authentic large party, were forced to merge with the communists in June 1948 (Rakosi 1952; Sudetic 1993; Nyysönen 2001, 892; Wittenberg 2006, 56-57; Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution 2012).

End: 4/8/1990 Second round of fair and competitive parliamentary elections (March 25 and April 8) won by an opposition party (Racz 1991, 112; U.S. Dept. of State 2011d). Although the communist party legalized other parties, gave up its constitutional role in leading the country, and carried out several other important reforms during 1989, it did not actually lose control of the government until the 1990 elections.

Indonesia (1949–66)

Start: 12/27/1949 Independence under Sukarno's leadership. At independence, Sukarno was unelected president. The unelected first parliament included representatives of the Dutch-created states, members of the revolutionary committee, and members appointed by Sukarno based on estimates of the various parties' strength. The first parliamentary election was not held until September 1955 (Liddle 1978, 173-74).

End: 3/11/66 "Soft" coup forced Sukarno to yield executive power to Suharto and changed the identity of the group that could influence policy and from which leaders could be chosen. Many groups of civilians were eliminated from the ruling group, which army officers dominated after 3/66. The counterattack and mass killing led by Suharto after the attempted leftist military rebellion of October 1, 1965 is not treated as the transition event because Sukarno remained in office with the balance of power between him and Suharto uncertain. The PKI (communist party) was destroyed as an important base of civilian support for Sukarno, but he maintained the support of the two largest parties, PNI and NU, most leading officers in the air force, navy, and police, and important officers in the army until March 1966. Sukarno refused to

outlaw the PKI despite military pressure, and he was able to appoint ministers and top military officers opposed by the army high command during that time (Crouch 1988, 158-78). Consequently, we code Sukarno as still in control until March 1966. The military-instigated pogrom against communists and others was largely over before the coup that changed the leadership at the top (Crouch 1988, 135-63). The March 1966 coup resulted in the transfer of day-to-day executive power to Suharto, the arrest of more than fifteen ministers, the purge of left-leaning bureaucrats, officers, and PNI party leaders, and the symbolically important outlawing of the PKI. Thus we code it as the point at which Sukarno lost control, though he retained the formal title president until March 1967 (Crouch 1988, 188-202).

Indonesia (1966–99)

Start: 3/11/1966 Transfer of the most important political and military powers to Suharto (Crouch 1988, 188-202).

End: 6/7/1999 Fair and competitive parliamentary election won by the opposition. In October 1999, the mostly elected legislature chose a new president from the opposition (Thompson 1999, 1). Suharto's resignation in response to mass demonstrations is not treated as the regime end because he transferred power to his long-time close ally Habibie, and there were no major changes in either the cabinet or the military command under Habibie (Kingsbury 2003, 162).

Iran (1925–79)

Start: 12/15/1925 This is the date the Majlis crowned Reza Khan as Reza Shah, beginning of the Pahlavi dynasty. Reza Khan, commander of the only Persian officered armed force of the Qajar dynasty, seized Teheran by armed force in February 1921. A civilian ally was appointed PM and in turn appointed Reza Khan commander of the armed forces. Reza Khan became PM in 1923 when the shah went into exile. The Majlis deposed the Qajar dynasty in October 1925 and handed the crown to Reza Khan in December 1925 (Bakhash 1987; Kechichian 1987).

End: 1/16/1979 Departure of the Shah in response to massive demonstrations (Bakhash 1989; BBC News 2008a).

Iran (1979–)

Start: 1/16/1979 Ouster of the Shah by popular uprising led to the establishment of a new ruling group led by Ayatolla Khomeini (Bakhash 1987; BBC News 2008a).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Iraq (1932–58)

Start: 10/13/1932 Independence under a monarchy established by the British; they gave the crown to King Faisal, who had been ousted from Syria by the French, as a reward for his military support against Turkey. He was a Sunni with no previous ties to Iraq (Haddad 1971, 55-57, Lewis 1988).

End: 7/14/1958 Coup murdered the royal family and ended the monarchy (Dann 1969, 19-33; Haddad 1971, 86, 91-92; Dawisha 2009, 172).

Iraq (1958–63)

Start: 7/14/1958 Coup led by Brig-Gen Qassem (or Kassem or Qasim) established military rule (Dann 1969, 19-33, Dawisha 2009, 172).

End: 2/8/1963 Coup led by lower ranking officers (Haddad 1971, 122-24; Be'eri 1982, 80). The post-1963 period is treated as a new regime because lower ranking officers supported initially by the Ba'ath party replaced higher ranking officers who had ruled from 1958-63, supported by the Communists (Haddad 1971, 115-16, 122-29).

Iraq (1963–68)

Start: 2/8/1963 Coup by a faction of middle ranking Ba'thist officers, Nasserist officers, and the Ba'thist paramilitary National Guard established the National Council of Revolutionary Command to rule. Ba'thists were ousted from the ruling group in early 1964 (Haddad 1971, 115-16, 122-29, Lewis 1988).

End: 7/17/1968 Coup replaced the previous government, which had excluded the Ba'th after a short time, with a government dominated by the Ba'th faction of the military, many of whom had been forced into retirement by the Aref government. The post-1968 regime is considered different from the 1963-68 regime because the first excluded Ba'thists and the second excluded non-Ba'thists (Haddad 1971, 138-40, 143-44, 157-64).

Iraq (1968–79)

Start: 7/17/1968 Coup led by ex-Maj Gen al-Bakr installed a regime dominated by Ba'thist military officers and ruled through the Revolutionary Command Council of the Ba'thist party's military section (Haddad 1971, 138-40, 143-44, 157-64; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 1987, 115-17, 120; Brooker 1997, 115). The post-1968 regime is considered different from the previous one because the group from which top leaders could be chosen and who could influence policy was limited to Ba'thists, who had been excluded from the earlier regime not long after the seizure of power.

End: 7/16/1979 Formal transfer of power from Field Marshal al-Bakr to Saddam Hussein marks the end of a gradual shift from a regime based mostly on Ba'thist military officers and the Ba'th party to one in which the group from which leaders could be chosen included few outside Hussein's family and home region. The post-1979 government is considered a new regime because under al-Bakr, Ba'thist officers dominated policy choice but were marginalized under Hussein (Brooker 1997, 115-16).

Iraq (1979–2003)

Start: 7/16/1979 The formal transfer of power from Field Marshal al-Bakr to Saddam Hussein completed a gradual shift from a regime based mostly on Ba'thist military officers and the Ba'th party to one in which the group from which leaders could be chosen included few outside Saddam's family and home region. Saddam had built his power base in the party and security service, not the officer corps. He exerted significant party control within the military through his control of party networks prior to al-Bakr's retirement, but he was not a career officer. After al-Bakr's retirement,

Saddam purged the party of anyone with an independent base of support and then reduced the party's power and relevance. He executed several members of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council a few days after his accession to full power. Beginning in 1980, the party was subordinated to the military and security services. The party's Regional Command was stacked with Saddam's ministerial and security service subordinates, his advisors, and his relatives (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 1987, 208-13; Brooker 1997, 115-18; Kamrava 1998, 73).

End: 4/7/2003 The fall of Baghdad to invading U.S. and coalition forces (Economist Intelligence Unit 2008e). U.S. forces took control of presidential palace on April 7 (Guardian 2003).

[The period from April 2003 to March 2010 is excluded from the data set because foreign occupied. The election of March 2010 is not considered free and fair because, among other things, nearly 500 candidates were prevented from running. March 7, 2010 thus marks a transition to autocracy, but is not included in the data set because its first year would be 2011.]

Ivory Coast (1960–99)

Start: 8/7/1960 Independence with Houphouët-Boigny as PM and the government controlled by the PDCI. The PDCI won all pre-independence elections to various offices. It ran unopposed in the 4/59 Assembly elections, giving it control of the government and electoral rules at independence (Zolberg 1964, 75-271, African Elections Database n.d.a). The party was genuinely popular and it had limited competition mainly via cooptation of rivals, but in 1959 began manipulating electoral rules to limit the ability of potential opposition groups to compete (Zolberg 1964, 188, 264-65).

End: 12/24/1999 Coup by officers and NCOs, turned power over to a junta led by ex-army Chief of Staff Gen. Guéi (Cornewell 2000).

Ivory Coast (1999–2000)

Start: 12/24/1999 Coup/mutiny by junior officers and NCOs, turned power over to a junta led by ex-army chief-of-staff Gen Guéi . He created the 9-man, all-military Comité National de Salut Publique (National Committee of Public Salvation) to rule (Cornewell 2000, Englebert 2004b, 332).

End: 10/26/2000 Popular uprising in response to Guéi's effort to steal an election (New York Times 2000b, 1; Englebert 2004b, 332; U.S. Dept. of State 2011c).

Ivory Coast (2000–)

Start: 10/26/2000 popular uprising by Gbagbo supporters, including much of the military and security forces, in response to Guéi's effort to steal an election, installed Gbagbo in power (Englebert 2004b, 332).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010. [Ousted April 11, 2011]

Jordan (1946–)

Start: 5/25/1946 Independence under a monarchy established by the British. King

Adbullah of the Hashemite family was the son of the Ottoman amir of Mecca, who claimed a hereditary right to rule in the Hijaz. He was a leader of the Arab nationalist movement against Ottoman rule and sided with the British during World Wars I and II (Lewis 1989).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Kazakhstan (1991–)

Start: 12/16/1991 Independence with Nazarbaev already president and a legislature dominated by ex-communists. Nazarbaev maintained much of the structure and personnel of the communist system (Kadyrzhanov 1999, 147; Olcott 2010, 92-93).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Kenya (1963–2002)

Start: 12/12/1963 Independence with KANU and Kenyatta in power. KANU won the May 1963 competitive pre-independence election and then coopted the leaders of the main opposition party, which dissolved itself. Defacto single-party rule was maintained mainly through the president's control over resources and patronage. When Odinga, who had led the opposition and initially agreed to the merger, resigned from KANU and attempted to form a new opposition party, the government used various manipulations and intimidation to undermine it before it was banned in 1969 (Decalo 1998, 194-95, 218-27).

End: 12/27/2002. Competitive elections lost by the ruling party (Kagwanja 2005, 51; African Elections Database 2011c).

Korea, North (1948–)

Start: 9/9/1948 Independence under the control of Kim Il Sung and the North Korean Workers' Party (Cumings 1993)

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Korea, South (1948–60)

Start: 8/13/1948 Independence under a government led by Rhee. His supporters had won the 5/48 legislative elections, which were boycotted by some important political groupings. U.S. occupation policy had eliminated most of what had been a strong left from the playing field, so the 1948 election is not coded as fully competitive (Cumings 1993)

End: 4/27/1960 Demonstrations led to Rhee's ouster and a transition to democracy (Kim 1968, 302-03).

Korea, South (1961–87)

Start: 5/16/1961 Coup by young officers led by Maj Gen Park ousted the elected government and established rule by a junta called the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (Kim 1968, 298, 303). The junta was dissolved in October 1963 when the Third Republic was established and Park was elected president (Kim 1974, 131).

End: 6/29/1987 Demonstrations led to the military's agreement to constitutional changes demanded by the opposition, including direct presidential elections that re-

sulted in the transition to democracy after the December 1987 election (Han 1988, 52; Billet 1990, 301).

Kuwait (1961–)

Start: 6/19/1961 Independence under the traditional al Sabah emirate (Crystal 1993; Political Handbook of the World 2012l, 793).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Kyrgyzstan (1991–2005)

Start: 8/31/1991 Independence, Akayev and the communist-dominated Supreme Soviet in control. The communist party was formally dissolved, but Akayev's networks remained powerful. Akayev was elected president unopposed shortly after independence (U.S. Dept. of State 2011e).

End: 3/24/2005 Massive demonstrations caused Akayev's resignation and flight, leading to an interim government controlled by the opposition and new elections (Radnitz 2006, 132; Hiro 2009, 305-07; U.S. Dept. of State 2011e).

Kyrgyzstan (2005–10)

Start: 7/10/2005 Rigged election is identified as the date on which the "authoritarianization" of the transitional government became unambiguous. Bakiyev was a leader of the opposition to Akayev and was chosen as interim president and PM after Akayev was ousted. His government was supposed to oversee a democratic election, but instead he was able to gain control of the electoral machinery and rig his own election (U.S. Dept. of State 2011e).

End: 4/8/2010 Ouster of Bakiyev in popular uprising (Economist 2010, 44).

Laos (1959–60)

Start: 12/24/1959 Coup led by Gen Phoumi, and supported by the U.S. and right-wing civilians, ousted the civilian government (Stuart-Fox 1986, 25; Stuart-Fox 1997, 109-10; Chaloemtiarana 2007a, 161).

End: 8/9/1960 Coup led by Captain, Kong Le, allied with neutralist civilian political leader Souvanna Phouma, ousted the conservative government led by Gen. Phoumi (Stuart-Fox 1986, 26; Chaloemtiarana 2007b, 161).

Laos (1960–62)

Start: 12/16/1960 Gen Phoumi's troops retook Vientiane from the neutralist government and the military faction defending it (Stuart-Fox 1986, 27; Dommen 1994; Chaloemtiarana 2007a, 162). After the December 1960 coup, Laos had two governments, one controlled by the right and the other controlled by Souvanna Phouma and Capt. Kong Le, who espoused neutral policies. The neutralist government was established in the Plain of Jars (Stuart-Fox 1986, 27). The government led by Gen Phoumi and his civilian PM seems to have been the stronger and controlled the capital, so it is the one we code.

End: 7/24/1962 Tripartite coalition was forced on Gen. Phoumi and his supporters by the U.S. (Stuart-Fox 1986, 27-28; Dommen 1994). The Declaration on the Neutrality

of Laos establishing the Tripartite government signed on July 24, 1962 (Lee 1969, 536). [Laos 1963-75 is excluded from the data set because both sides in the civil war were controlled by foreigners, and the royal Lao government lost control of much of the territory. A transitional coalition government and peace accord were negotiated in 1973, but the envisioned elections never occurred.]

Laos (1975–)

Start: 11/29/1975 The abdication by the king and resignation of the PM were the final steps in the mostly peaceful transition from coalition to communist government between May and December 1975. In May 1975 large, communist-organized student and union demonstrations against the anti-communists in the coalition government caused several non-communist ministers and a number of top generals to resign and flee the country. Continuing demonstrations in May and June caused the US to withdraw from Laos. Between July and November, most remaining high level officers and civil servants were sent, most voluntarily, for what was supposed to be a few months of political re-education. In November communist-led demonstrations demanded the resignation of the neutralist government and the end of the monarchy, and on November 29, 1975 neutral Premier Souvanna Phouma resigned and the king abdicated. On December 1-2 1975, the National Congress of People's Representatives abolished the monarchy and formed the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Stuart-Fox 1986, 33-35).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Lesotho (1970–86)

Start: 1/31/1970 The ruling BNP (which had won a competitive pre-independence election) annulled the first post-independence election when it appeared to be losing and refused to cede power. It imprisoned the leaders of the party that had won, suspended the constitution, and exiled the constitutional monarch (Matlosa 1997, 143).

End: 1/20/1986 Coup ousted the single-party BNP government (Parks 1986; Baynham and Mills 1987, 52; Machobane 2001, 52-65).

Lesotho (1986–1993)

Start: 1/20/1986 Coup led by Maj Gen Lekhanya ousted the BNP government. Executive and legislative powers were returned to the king in consultation with a Military Council under Lekhanya's leadership (Parks 1986; Machobane 2001, 52-65).

End: 3/27/1993 Competitive election considered fair by international observers (Matlosa 1997, 141, 148; African Elections Database 2011d).

Liberia (1944–80)

Start: 1/1/1944 This date is considered the regime start because the formal and informal rules governing Liberian politics changed after Tubman's inauguration as president. Prior to Tubman, citizenship and political participation were limited to Americo-Liberians, descendants of U.S. slaves who had colonized the coast of Liberia in the 19th century. Tubman granted citizenship to all Liberians and incrementally

extended political participation to indigenous Liberians. In May 1945 new suffrage laws extended the vote to all male and female citizens who owned property and paid the hut tax (African Elections Database 2011e). Tubman changed the formal rules about who could influence policy by extending suffrage, but also changed the informal rules of political decision making, reducing the influence of traditional True Whig Party institutions and procedures and personalizing decision making within his own family and patronage network, which extended into the indigenous hinterland (Lowenkopf 1972, 94-108). Rule, which had been based on Americo-Liberian family alliances, “has been greatly modified by the personal nature of Tubman’s rule,” made possible by a large increase in foreign investment and hence government revenues at the president’s disposal (Lowenkopf 1972, 99-100).

End: 4/12/1980 Coup led by Sgt. Doe ousted the Tolbert government (Global Security 2011f).

Liberia (1980–90)

Start: 4/12/1980 Coup by 17 National Guard noncoms and soldiers led by an indigenous Master Sergeant established the all military People’s Redemption Council to rule (Global Security 2011f).

End: 9/9/1990 Insurgent forces occupied Monrovia, Doe killed (New York Times 1990; U.S. Dept. of State 2011f). [1990-97 excluded from the dataset because of the civil war; no group controlled most of the country’s territory.]

Liberia (1997–2003)

Start: 7/19/1997 Election of Taylor in an atmosphere of fear and intimidation (African Elections Database 2011e; United Nations Mission in Liberia 2012). We code Taylor’s accession to power as ending the period of no effective government and as authoritarian because of an unfair election.

End: 8/11/2003 Taylor resigned in the face of insurgencies that controlled most of the country, leading to a peace accord and a neutral transitional government (United Nations Security Council 2003; U.S. Dept. of State 2011f).

Libya (1951–69)

Start: 12/24/1951 Independence under the newly created monarchy of Idris I, who had been the amir of one of the three regions grouped together to form Libya (Berry 1987).

End: 9/1/1969 Coup by a small group of officers led by Capt. Qadhafi deposed the monarch (Haddad 1973, 325-30; Anderson 1986, 260).

Libya (1969–)

Start: 9/1/1969 Coup by a small group of junior officers led by Capt Qadhafi deposed the monarch and established the Revolutionary Command Council to rule (Haddad 1973, 325-30; Anderson 1986, 260-61).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010. [Ousted by insurgency September 2011.]

Madagascar (1960–72)

Start: 6/26/1960 Independence under the leadership of Tsiranana and the PSD. According to Covell (1987, 30), French colonial administrators chose moderate, pro-French Tsiranana as party founder and first national leader. He was indirectly elected president before independence in 1959. The PSD general secretary became the Minister of the Interior and controlled “the organization (and results) of elections” (Covell 1987, 32). The “political system strongly favored the incumbent” (Schraeder 1994). For these reasons, we code the regime as authoritarian.

End: 5/18/1972 Tsiranana handed power to the military in the face of widespread demonstrations and strikes (Covell, 1987, 47-48; Marcus 2004, 1).

Madagascar (1972–75)

Start: 5/18/1972 Tsiranana handed power to the military in the face of widespread demonstrations and strikes. Gen Ramanantsoa established a military regime (Covell 1987, 47-48, Schraeder 1994).

End: 6/15/1975 The collective leadership of the military government named Naval Capt. Ratsiraka President of the Republic. Ratsiraka initiated a transition from collective leadership by top ranked military officers to a ruling coalition that included civilians organized in a new party as well as officers (Covell 1987, 57-62). The post-1975 period is treated as a new regime because the group from which officials could be chosen and who could influence policy changed from top military officers to a coalition of officers and civilian party leaders.

Madagascar (1975–93)

Start: 6/15/1975 The collective leadership of the military government named Naval Capt Ratsiraka president of the republic. He established the ruling Supreme Revolutionary Council. Ratsiraka initiated a transition from collective leadership by top ranked military officers to a ruling coalition that included civilians organized in a new party as well as officers (Covell 1987, 52-62, 103-4). The post-1975 period is treated as a new regime because the group from which officials could be chosen and who could influence policy changed from top military officers to a coalition of officers and civilian party leaders. (Covell 1987, 115) describes it as “an alliance between selected factions of the armed forces and their civilian counterparts.”

End: 2/10/1993 Second round of the presidential election won by the opposition (African Elections Database 2011f).

Madagascar (2009–)

Start: 3/17/2009 The elected president handed power to the military, which in turn handed it to the civilian leader of the opposition, in response to violent protests and a military mutiny (BBC News 2009; U.S. Dept. of State 2011g; Political Handbook of the World 2012m).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Malawi (1964–94)

Start: 7/6/1964 Independence under the control of Banda and the MCP. The MCP won a sweeping victory in the August 1961 election for African seats in the Nyasaland legislature while what would later become Malawi was still part of the federation that included Rhodesia. Banda became PM of Nyasaland in February 1963 when it was granted internal self-government. The MCP had already consolidated one-party rule before independence, and Banda had established his personal control of the party as well. Opposition groups were intimidated from nominating candidates in the 1964 elections before independence. Shortly after independence a substantial faction of the party, including several members of Banda's first cabinet, were dismissed or purged after proposing limits on Banda's personal power, and others resigned and soon fled the country (Decalo 1998, 58-68, U.S. Dept. of State 2011h).

End: 5/17/1994 Presidential election won by the opposition (Decalo 1998, 98; African Elections Database 2011g).

Malaysia (1957–)

Start: 8/31/1957 Independence. The British left power in the hands of Tunku Abdul Rahman, the leader of UMNO, a Malay ethnic party, allied with Chinese and Indian ethnic parties in the Alliance. In 1955, the Alliance had won 51 of 52 contested seats in a 98 seat legislative council in which the British controlled the other seats. At that time, it was difficult for non-Malays to become citizens, and 84% of the electorate was Malay though only 50% of inhabitants were. Thus the elected legislative council was not democratic, as defined in the coding rules, because it was less than 60% elected, and suffrage was limited by ethnic restrictions (Rabushka 1970, 346-47; Andaya and Andaya 1982; Means 1996, 103).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Mali (1960–68)

Start: 9/22/1960 Independence under the control of Keïta and US-RDA, which won the first universal suffrage election in 1957 and "had already swept away or absorbed all semblance of opposition" before independence (Vengroff and Kone 1995, 46). The country was declared a one-party state shortly after independence (Englebert 2004c, 635).

End: 11/19/1968 Coup led by a captain and lieutenant ousted the Keïta government (Bebler 1973, 87-88).

Mali (1968–91)

Start: 11/19/1968 Coup led by Capt Diakhité and Lt Traoré ousted the Keïta government and established the Comité Militaire pour la Libération Nationale (Military Committee for National Liberation) of four captains and ten lieutenants; senior officers were dismissed (Bebler 1973, 87-90).

End: 3/26/1991 Officers arrested Traoré in response to popular rioting and formed a mostly civilian transitional government within a few days. In July-August, 1991

a National Conference drafted a new constitution, and the transitional government oversaw fair competitive elections in April 1992 (U.S. Dept. of State 1993).

Mauritania (1960–78)

Start: 11/28/1960 Independence with Ould Daddah and the MRP in control. The MRP won pre-independence elections in May 1959, but Daddah had already banned some opposition parties before independence and arrested some opposition leaders (Moore 1965, 409, Warner 1988).

End: 7/10/1978 Coup ousted the Ould Daddah government (Warner 1988).

Mauritania (1978–2005)

Start: 7/10/1978 Coup by junior officers led by army commander Col Salek ousted the Daddah government and formed the Military Committee for National Recovery (CMRN) of 20 officers to rule. The regime was significantly civilianized under Col Taya, who succeeded the officer who succeeded Salek (Warner 1988).

End: 8/3/2005 Coup by members of the presidential guard and the military ousted the Taya government (N'Diaye 2006, 421; U.S. Dept. of State 2011i).

Mauritania (2005–07)

Start: 8/3/2005 coup ousted Taya and created the Military Council for Justice and Democracy led by Col Vall (U.S. Dept. of State 2011i; Political Handbook of the World 2012n, 918).

End: 3/25/2007 Competitive presidential election considered free and fair transferred power to civilians (Ojeda 2009, 2-3; U.S. Dept. of State 2011i).

Mauritania (2008–)

Start: 8/6/2008 Coup led by active duty and recently dismissed senior officers from the President's Security Battalion ousted the elected government and established the all-military High Council of State (BBC News 2008b, Political Handbook of the World 2012n, 919).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Mexico (1915–2000)

Start: 8/2/1915 Forces loyal to Carranza retook Mexico City after the defeat of several other revolutionary forces, giving them control of most of the country. In September 1915 Carranza's government was recognized by the U.S. and a number of other countries. In 1916 Carranza called the meeting at Querétaro during which the Mexican constitution established the post-revolutionary regime that lasted until 2000 (Braderman 1940, 242; Haggerty 1996; Emerson Kent 2012).

End: 7/2/2000 Competitive presidential election won by the opposition (Klesner 2000).

Mongolia (1921–93)

Start: 9/14/1921 Independence after a force made up of Mongolian People's Party partisans and Soviet military defeated the White Russian occupiers of Mongolia. The government was led by the MPP, which developed from nationalist to communist

during the 1920s under Soviet influence. Initially the MPP shared authority with the Bogdo Khan (traditional holy ruler combining leadership of government and religion), but those who supported a more traditional form of rule were eliminated and often executed after a series of factional conflicts within the party during the 1920s (Bawden 1968, 230-37; Worden 1989).

End: 6/6/1993 Competitive election of an opposition candidate in the first direct election of a president. We count this election as the regime end even though Ochirbat was the winning opposition candidate because he ran against a candidate of the ruling MPRP, and the June 1993 election marks the end of communist monopolization of the Mongolian political system (Ginsburg 1995, 462-71). Due to nonconcurrent elections, the MPRP did not lose control of the assembly until the next election in 1996 (U.S. Dept. of State 2011j).

Morocco (1956–)

Start: 3/2/1956 Independence under the rule of the traditional Sultan, Mohammed V (U.S. Dept. of State 2011k).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Mozambique (1975–)

Start: 6/25/1975 Independence when the Portuguese handed power to Frelimo, which had led the armed struggle for independence. Frelimo established a one-party state (McKenna 2011, 116-17).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Myanmar (1958–1960)

Start: 9/26/1958 In a context of conflict between two factions within the ruling party, AFPFL, Premier U Nu, with the consent of both factions, agreed to transfer power to General Ne Win and the army, which would assume a caretaker role to pacify the country and hold new elections. Parliament formally confirmed Ne Win as PM on October 28, 1958 (Trager 1959, 318; Feit 1973, 92-97; Callahan 2003, 187-89).

End: 2/6/1960 Competitive elections marked a transition from military to elected civilian rule (Bigelow 1960, 70; Butwell and von der Mehden 2008, 144-50; Feit 1973, 97; Cady 1974, 119; Callahan 2003, 197).

Myanmar (1962–88)

Start: 3/2/1962 Military coup led by Gen Ne Win ousted the civilian government and set up a mostly military Revolutionary Council to rule (Cook 1970, 259-60; Badgley 1962, 24; Cady 1974, 120; Callahan 2003, 202-8).

End: 9/18/88 Coup in response to massive demonstrations replaced the military-civilian coalition with a military junta (Bradley 1997, 21; Burma Watch International 2010). The post-September 1988 period is considered a new regime because before September 1988, top leadership was dominated by Ne Win and retired officers who ruled through a single party with extensive societal penetration. In September 1988, the military disengaged from the ruling party and abolished all the governing insti-

tutions of the single-party regime (Guyot and Badgley 1990, 187-89; Brooker 1995, 169; Callahan 2003, 210-12; Min 2008, 1018). The post-1988 regime is described by Brooker (1995) as an "old-fashioned military regime under a junta (168)" and has been controlled by active-duty officers in the military and security service. Civilians who had been part of the old ruling party were subsequently incorporated into a renamed party to support the regime, but lost much of their influence.

Myanmar (1988–)

Start: 9/18/1988 Coup in response to massive demonstrations replaced the military-civilian coalition with a military junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (Bradley 1997, 21, Burma Watch International 2010). The post post-September 1988 period is considered a new regime because before that time, top leadership was dominated by Ne Win and retired officers, who ruled through a single party with extensive societal penetration. In September 1988, the military disengaged from the ruling party, abolished all the governing institutions of the single-party regime, and forced civilian members of the BSPP to resign (Guyot and Badgley 1990, 187-89; Brooker 1995, 169, Bradley 1997, 21; Callahan 2003, 210-12; Min 2008, 1018). The post-1988 regime is described by Brooker as an "old-fashioned military regime under a junta (1995, 168)" and has been controlled by active-duty officers in the military and security service. Parties were created that incorporated some of the same civilians included in the BSPP, but they have had little influence on policy choice. In 1997 regime leaders reorganized and narrowed the junta into the State Peace and Development Council, purging and demoting a number of officers who had been in the SLORC (Callahan 2003, 217).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Namibia (1990–)

Start: 3/21/1990 Independence under the control of SWAPO, which led the armed fight for independence and won the UN-monitored Constituent Assembly election before independence, led by its president, Nujoma. SWAPO has won all subsequent elections and maintained more than two thirds of the seats in the legislature since the first post-independence election in 1994 (African Elections Database 2011h). Although elections have generally been considered fair, the ruling party has monopolized the use of state resources to influence outcomes, harassed the media, and controlled the electoral tribunal, disadvantaging the opposition. The opposition has faced intimidation and harassment (Bauer 2001, 43-51; Africa Confidential 2004a, 7). Before independence, power in SWAPO was concentrated in the hands of Nujoma and a few close allies. SWAPO's security services arrested, tortured, and executed large numbers of SWAPO members suspected of dissidence (Leys and Saul 1994, 127-40). Post-independence, Namibia has adhered to the formal rule of law and democracy, but power remained concentrated in the hands of Nujoma and his inner circle even after his retirement. Challenges to the government from dissatisfied regions in the 1990s

were met with human rights violations and government repression (Bauer 2001, 40-44, 53; Africa Confidential 2007). For these reasons, we code the SWAPO regime as authoritarian.

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Nepal (1846–1951)

Start: 9/15/1846 Jang Bahadur (later Rana) became PM, exiled the king, and began the concentration of power in his own hands that resulted in the marginalization of the royal family and the establishment of Jang Bahadur's family as hereditary prime ministers and de facto rulers of Nepal. They controlled all executive, legislative, and judicial power. By 1950 the Rana family owned three fourths of the arable land in the country and consumed about half of the state's income (Levi 1952, 185-88; Hayes 1975, 620; Heitzman 1991).

End: 2/18/1951 The Rana family, which had usurped decision-making control as hereditary prime ministers during the nineteenth century, was forced to reinstate the hereditary monarch by an insurgency, demonstrations, and Indian pressure (Levi 1952, 185-91; Heitzman 1991). King Tribhuvan returned to Katmandu on February 15 and declared a change in the rules that would govern the country on February 18 (Levi 1952, 191).

Nepal (1951–91)

Start: 2/18/1951 The Rana family, which had usurped decision-making control as hereditary prime ministers during the nineteenth century, was forced to return executive power to the king by an insurgency and demonstrations (Levi 1952, 185-91; Heitzman 1991).

End: 5/12/1991 Multiparty elections won by a pro-democracy party mark the transition to constitutional monarchy (Rahim 1991). The king agreed to constitutional changes introducing multi-partyism and limits on the monarchy in 1990, but since the king chose the interim government and could have reneged on the agreements he had made, we do not code the regime as ended until the first election initiated parliamentary rule.

Nepal (2002–06)

Start: 10/4/2002 King Gyanendra dismissed the PM, assumed executive power, and called off scheduled parliamentary elections, thus ending the previous period of constitutional monarchy (U.S. Dept. of State 2010b).

End: 4/24/2006 Massive demonstrations forced the king to reinstate the previously elected parliament on April 24. Parliament stripped the king of virtually all power in June 2006, returning the country to constitutional monarchy (Asian Human Rights Commission 2006; U.S. Dept. of State 2010b). .

Nicaragua (1936–79)

Start: 6/2/1936 coup led by Somoza García ousted the civilian president. He then "railroaded" Congress into appointing a close ally as interim president and persuaded

most of the traditional Partido Liberal, in which he had been a militant, to nominate him as their presidential candidate in the coming election. He won the presidential election, which was boycotted by the opposition, in December 1936 (Crawley 1984, 94-95).

End: 7/17/1979 Somoza Debayle resigned when his forces were defeated by the Sandinista insurgency, and a government controlled by insurgent leaders was installed a few days later (Crawley 1984, 173; Booth 1998, 148).

Nicaragua (1979–90)

Start: 7/17/1979 Somoza resigned when his forces were defeated by insurgency, and the Sandinistas established a government controlled by the nine-member National Directorate (DNC) of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front) a few days later (Gorman 1981, 139-42; Crawley 1984, 173; Booth 1998, 148).

End: 2/25/1990 Competitive election won by the opposition (Carter Center 1990; Close 1999, 37).

Niger (1960–74)

Start: 8/3/1960 Independence under single-party rule. The PPN won the December 1958 pre-independence election with help from the French. Prior to independence, the most popular rival party was outlawed and its leaders jailed. Power was centralized under Diori, who controlled ministerial appointments without parliamentary scrutiny, could appoint and dismiss civil servants and military officers, and could decree and veto laws (Higgott and Fuglestad 1975, 385; Collier 1982, 109; Ibrahim 1994, 21-24).

End: 4/15/1974 Coup led by the Army Chief of Staff ousted the civilian government (Higgott and Fuglestad 1975, 385).

Niger (1974–91)

Start: 4/15/1974 coup led by the army chief of staff Kountché ousted the civilian government and established the all-military Conseil Militaire Suprême to rule. Within a year of the coup, most members of the CMS had been killed or jailed as Kountché consolidated personal power (Higgott and Fuglestad 1975, 385, 397; Robinson 1992, 155; Ibrahim 1994, 25).

End: 7/29/1991 The National Conference that stripped Saibou of all but ceremonial powers opened. In response to widespread demonstrations and strikes, President Saibou agreed to the National Conference, which met from July 29 to November 3 1991 (Gervais 1997, 92). It immediately ruled that its decisions would be sovereign, overruling existing institutions. It dissolved the government and ordered the ministries to report directly to it, and it dismissed the army commander. The National Conference chose a transitional government led by a technocrat and a professor, who had not been part of the old regime, to manage the transition to democracy. Fair multiparty elections were held in February-March 1993, and the winners were allowed to take

power, completing a transition to democracy (Ibrahim 1994, 29-38; Gervais 1997, 96; Ibrahim and Souley 1998, 148-50; Political Handbook of the World 2012o).

Niger (1996–99)

Start: 1/27/1996 Coup led by Col Maïnassara ousted the civilian government and formed the Conseil pour le Salut National to rule (Ibrahim and Souley 1998, 164).

End: 11/24/1999 Second round of competitive presidential elections completed a transition to democracy. In April 1999, President Maïnassara was assassinated by one of his security guards. He was replaced by the head of the security guards, who established a transitional National Reconciliation Council to oversee elections and a transition to democracy. In October and November 1999, the military government oversaw competitive elections to choose a civilian government, and that government subsequently took office, completing the transition (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2000; Political Handbook of the World 2012o).

Nigeria (1966–79)

Start: 7/29/1966 Military coup led by Hausa-Fulani junior officers and NCOs ousted the government of Ibo Maj Gen Ironsi. Ironsi, the commander of the army, had taken power with the concurrence of remaining civilian leaders after the mostly Ibo perpetrators of an attempted coup assassinated many northern political leaders and most of the military's highest ranked officers in January 1966 (Luckham 1971, 43-49, 55-66, 76-79). [The Ironsi government does not appear in the data set because it did not last until January 1.] The military regime that began in July 1966 is treated as different from the earlier military government because of the difference in ethnic base and the rank of the officers involved in the two governments.

End: 8/11/1979 Competitive presidential election overseen by the outgoing military regime as a means of choosing civilian leadership of a democratic regime (Panter-Brick 1979, 317-35; African Elections Database 2011i).

Nigeria (1983–93)

Start: 12/31/1983 Coup ousted the elected government and established the Supreme Military Council to rule (Lovejoy 1991).

End: 8/26/1993 The military leader, Babangida, was forced to resign. He appointed an un-elected civilian as interim executive after annulling the results of what should have been a transitional election, leaving Gen Abacha as Defense Minister and the real leader of the succeeding regime (Lewis 1999, 144). In November 1993 the civilian resigned in favor of Abacha. Abacha purged Babangida's supporters from the highest government and military offices and changed the informal rules for choosing leaders and policies by eliminating substantial parts of the officer corps from positions of influence. He also eliminated civilian politicians who had been granted some influence as part of the aborted transition process (Associated Press 1993). Abacha relied on groups from his hometown (Economist 1996a). Because of these changes in the

identity of those who had access to top leadership roles and influence on policy, the period after August 1993 is considered different from the Buhari/Babangida regime.

Nigeria (1993–99)

Start: 8/26/1993 General Abacha and his narrow group of military allies replaced the institutionalized military regime led by Babangida. Within a month, Abacha had dismissed and forced into retirement a large number of high ranking officers and narrowed the group with influence and high office to his close military allies and individuals from his home area. He also eliminated the civilians who had cooperated with the previous regime from influence (Associated Press 1993; Economist 1996a; Economist 1996b).

End: 2/27/1999 Competitive presidential elections overseen by the military as part of a transition to democracy (Obasanjo 1993; Ihonvbere 1999, 59-62; African Elections Database 2011i).

Oman (1741–)

Start: 12/31/1741 We date the start of the Al Said dynasty to 1741. With the previous dynasty weakened by civil war over the succession and poor leadership, in 1741 Ahmed bin Said al Busaidi, governor of Sohar on the coast of what is now of Oman, led the city's defense against a Persian invasion. Although he did not become the formal leader of Oman until 1744 (probably–date of formal election is disputed) when he was named imam, Ahmed bin Said seems to have been the most powerful leader during a very chaotic time beginning in 1741. The Al Said have remained in power as traditional sultans since then (Smyth 1993; Plekhanov 2004, 50-53).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Pakistan (1947–58)

Start: 8/14/1947 At independence, control passed to a government led by Jinnah, who was elected shortly before independence by a Constituent Assembly that had itself been chosen partly by the rulers of the princely states and partly by provincial legislatures chosen in limited franchise elections (Feit 1973, 70; Gauhar 1996, 16). The Constituent Assembly, which also served as the legislature, remained in office for seven years without producing the constitution that would set the rules through which future legislatures would be elected. During that time the executive, the Governor General, continued to function under the rules of the colonial administration, which allowed him to choose and dismiss PMs without consulting the legislature and to dismiss elected provincial governments (Shehab 1995, 201; Gauhar 1996, 25-29). When in 1954 the Constituent Assembly passed a bill requiring the Governor General to choose PMs responsible to parliament, he dismissed it (Shehab 1995, 234-38; Gauhar 1996, 23-24). A new Constituent Assembly was chosen in 1954, again mostly by provincial assemblies, some of which had been intervened by the Governor General (Feit 1973, 70; Asfar 1991, 54). Because of the absence of mass suffrage direct elections for national office, 1947-58 is coded as authoritarian.

End: 10/27/1958 Coup led by Gen. Ayub Khan ousted the civilian government. On October 7, President Iskander Mirza dismissed the Prime Minister, shut down the Parliament, and declared martial law. On October 27, Ayub Khan ousted Mirza (Feit 1973, 68; Shehab 1995, 246-250).

Pakistan (1958–71)

Start: 10/27/1958 Coup led by Commander-in-Chief Gen Ayub Khan ousted the civilian government and established military rule (Feit 1973, 68; Mook 1974, 102; Shehab 1995, 248-50).

End: 12/20/1971 Yahya Khan turned power over to Bhutto, whose party had won a plurality in West Pakistan - which after December 1971 was all that remained of Pakistan - in the December 1970 parliamentary elections. These universal suffrage, direct elections were considered fair and expected to be transitional, but the Assembly had not been allowed to meet because the Awami League representing East Pakistani aspirations for greater autonomy had won a majority (Mook 1974, 110-11; Shehab 1995, 272-87). Bhutto called the previously elected Assembly into session in spring 1972, and civilian government resumed (Middle East Journal 1972).

Pakistan (1975–77)

Start: 2/9/1975 On this date, the leaders of the most important opposition party were arrested and their party banned, marking the point at which the gradual authoritarianization of the Bhutto government crossed the threshold to dictatorship (Middle East Journal 1972, Wheeler 1975, 111, 113-114).

End: 7/5/1977 The military ousted Bhutto's government and declared martial law regime under the Army Chief of Staff General Zia-ul-Huq (Richter 1971, 548; Baxter 1991, 30; Baxter 1994).

Pakistan (1977–88)

Start: 7/5/1977 Coup led by army chief of staff Gen Zia installed a new ruling group (Baxter 1991, 30, Baxter 1994).

End: 11/16/1988 Competitive parliamentary elections permitted by the military rulers who took control after Zia was killed in a plane crash, returned power to civilians. The Pakistan People's Party, led by Benazir Bhutto, whose father had been ousted by Gen Zia, won the election and took office in December 1988, completing a transition to democracy (Baxter 1995; Inter-Parliamentary Union n.d.a).

Pakistan (1999–2008)

Start: 10/12/1999 coup led by Gen Musharraf ousted the civilian government and established the seven man National Security Council, made up of the commanders of the military services, the civilian PM, and several civilian ministers, as a ruling body, though observers claimed real power lay in the hands of a few generals and heads of military intelligence agencies (Economist 1999; Economist 2000; Political Handbook of the World 2012p, 1089).

End: 8/18/2008 Resignation by Musharraf under threat of impeachment completed

the transition to democracy begun with the competitive elections held on February 18 2008 (New York Times 2008; Nelson 2009, 16-27).

Panama (1949–51)

Start: 11/24/1949 On this date, the National Guard installed Arias as President. The deposed acting president had tried to dismiss the head of the National Guard. In response, the Guard ousted him and installed Arias, who had been a candidate in the 1948 presidential election, claiming that a recount showed he had won the election (Pippin 1964, 40-57; Major 1993, 271; Percy 1998, 138-39). The results of the 1948 election had been intensely contested, with demonstrations, violence, and charges of fraud on both sides, and it is impossible to know now which candidate really won. The electoral board declared Diaz the victor, and he was inaugurated, but died in August 1949 and was succeeded by a constitutional successor who was deposed in November 1949 (Pippin 1964, 21-30). After being installed, Arias tried to change the constitution to lengthen his term, jailed hundreds of opponents, and tried to suspend the National Assembly (Pippin 1964, 69-70; Percy 1998, 138-39). So his government would be coded as authoritarian even if he won the 1948 election and had been allowed to take office immediately after it.

End: 5/10/1951 Arias was ousted by the National Guard, and replaced by his VP, who appointed a multiparty cabinet and oversaw competitive elections in 1952. Arias had been impeached by the elected National Assembly, and the impeachment had been upheld by the Supreme Court, but he refused to step down and shot the one of the officers who came to talk to him about it. After the shooting, the Guard ousted him by force (Pippin 1964, 70-76; Percy 1998, 140; Bendel and Krennerich. 1993, 496).

Panama (1953–55)

Start: 2/28/1953 Legislation which passed on February 28, 1953 that disadvantaged opposition parties is treated as the point at which the gradual “authoritarianization” of the elected Remón government crossed the line to dictatorship. Harassment of the opposition continued from then on, and other legal disadvantages were imposed over time (Pippin 1964, 91-93).

End: 1/2/55 Remón was assassinated. Conflict among those who had been his closest supporters led to a split in the CPN, the marginalization of those committed to the rules and policies being established by Remón, and the return to dominance by traditional political elites who had been excluded from influence while he was alive. Remón’s term was constitutionally completed by his second vice president, but we code the regime as ending with the assassination because the formal and informal rules defining who could influence policy began changing immediately, leading to a return to democracy the following year. The VP oversaw competitive elections May 1956 (Pippin 1964, 130-32; Percy 1998, 141-42).

Panama (1968–82)

Start: 10/11/1968 Coup led by the recently sacked commander of the National Guard ousted the civilian government and installed a new ruling group led by Guard officers. The regime had wide civilian support and over time incorporated civilians into newly created participatory institutions (Ropp 1982, 37; Priestley 2000, 28).

End: 3/3/1982 Coup ousted the Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard who had succeeded Torrijos when he died in July 1981. The civilian president chosen by Torrijos was forced to retire a few months later on July 31 1982. The March 3 1982 coup marks a transition from the Torrijos regime, in which both officers in the National Guard and a broad alliance of civilians influenced policy, to a regime based on one faction of the National Guard and a much narrower group of civilians (Kempe 1990, 114-24).

Panama (1982–89)

Start: 3/3/1982 Coup ousted the commander-in-chief of the National Guard. The civilian president chosen by Torrijos and the rest of the civilian government were forced to retire a few months later, completing a transition from the Torrijos regime, in which both officers in the National Guard and a broad alliance of civilians influenced policy, to a regime based on one faction of the National Guard and a much narrower group of civilians (Kempe 1990, 114-24).

End: 12/20/1989 Noriega and his allies were ousted by U.S. invading forces (Kempe 1990, 113-27).

Paraguay (1939–48) *Start:* 4/30/1939 General Estigarribia, hero of the Chaco war and candidate of the PL, was indirectly elected unopposed, initiating a new period of authoritarianism led by military officers allied with shifting factions of civilians. In February 1940, he dissolved Congress (Lewis 1993, 175-78; As They Saw It 2012).

End: 6/3/1948 Coup supported by the Colorado party ousted Moríño. Moríño had cooperated with the Colorados in overseeing a single-party election in February 1948 to choose his successor, but they did not trust him to step down when their candidate was inaugurated. He was replaced by civilian one-party Colorado government (Leon-Roesch 1993, 514; OnWar 2000a).

Paraguay (1948–54)

Start: 6/3/1948 Coup by a faction of the military allied with one faction of the Colorado party ousted Moríño and replaced him with an interim civilian Colorado government until the inauguration of González, the Colorado candidate who had won the single-party election earlier in the year (Leon-Roesch 1993, 514; OnWar 2000a).

End: 5/7/1954 A brief military conflict led by Gen Stroessner ousted the civilian president. Stroessner was elected president two months later in a single-candidate election (Roett and Sacks 1991, 53-54; Leon-Roesch 1993, 507, 514).

Paraguay (1954–93)

Start: 5/7/1954 Coup led by Gen Stroessner ousted the civilian president. Stroessner was elected president two months later in a single-candidate election (Roett and

Sacks 1991, 53-54; Leon-Roesch 1993, 514).

End: 5/9/1993 Competitive election, generally considered free, is coded as the end-point of a series of democratizing reforms carried out between 1989 and 1993 by the Rodriguez administration. The 1989 election of Rodriguez is not considered transitional because he was a Stroessner regime insider and relative by marriage who had originally achieved office via coup in what Abente Brun (1999, 93) calls “an internal adjustment made by the ruling coalition”. The formal and informal rules under which he won the election were very similar to those under which Stroessner had won elections (Abente Brun 1999, 93-94). Beginning in early 1990, however, the Rodriguez government carried out a series of democratizing reforms, e.g. the compulsory party affiliation of officers was ended, the military and police were prohibited from partisan activity, electoral rules that disadvantaged opposition parties were changed to PR, and a new constitution was written (Leon-Roesch 1993, 505; Lambert 2000, 383-85).

Peru (1948–56)

Start: 10/27/1948 Coup led by Gen Odría ousted the elected government and installed a military junta (Kantor 1969, 474; Tuesta Soldevilla 1993, 536).

End: 6/17/1956 Election won by a candidate, Manuel Prado Ugarteche, not supported by the outgoing regime (Masterson 1991, 148-49; Tuesta Soldevilla 1993, 525, 532).

Peru (1962–63)

Start: 7/18/1962 Coup led by the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, Gen Pérez Godoy, ousted the civilian government in order to prevent the incoming elected government from taking office and installed a military junta (Pike 1967, 302). In the June 1962 presidential election, no candidate had received the 1/3 of votes required to win so the choice went to Congress. Haya de la Torre, APRA’s leader, and Odría, the former president and standard bearer for UNO, agreed to a coalition in which Odra would be president and Haya de la Torre’s deputy would be vice president (because the military had let it be known that they would not allow Haya to take office). The military ousted the outgoing president in order to prevent the UNO-APRA alliance from taking office, annulled the election, and established a four man junta of the leaders of the services to rule until another election could be held (Pike 1967, 299-300; Kantor 1969, 477; Masterson 1991, 174-77 Klaren 2000, 320).

End: 6/9/1963 Competitive election returned power to civilians, completing the transition to democracy (Masterson 1991, 183).

Peru (1968–80)

Start: 10/3/1968 Coup led by the army chief of staff Gen Velasco ousted the elected president and installed a military junta (Einaudi 1974, 163, Masterson 1991, 229-30).

End: 5/18/1980 Competitive elections mark a transition to civilian democratic government (Tuesta Soldevilla 1993, 518; Orsini 2000).

Peru (1992–2000)

Start: 4/5/1992 Date of Fujimori’s autogolpe. Elected President Fujimori seized un-

constitutional powers and closed Congress and the Ministry of Justice, initiating a period of authoritarianism (Tuesta Soldevilla 1993, 518; Conaghan 2005, 41-45)

End: 11/21/2000 Fujimori announced his formal resignation on November 21, while in Japan (New York Times 2000a). Fujimori resigned in response to the publication of evidence of corruption and human rights abuses. Remaining members of Fujimori's inner circle also resigned and/or agreed to turn power over to an interim government led by the opposition until the next election. Generals allied with Fujimori were forced to retire later the same month (BBC News 2000c; Taylor 2001, 18; Conaghan 2005, 228-42).

Philippines (1972–86)

Start: 9/22/1972 Elected President Marcos declared martial law: closed Congress, arrested opposition leaders, journalists, congressmen, and student activists, and closed many media outlets. The declaration of martial law is identified as the transition to dictatorship (Grossholtz 1973, 102; Zich 1986, 119-20; Seekins 1991).

End: 2/25/1986 Marcos resigned in response to massive demonstrations protesting a stolen election. His resignation allowed the newly elected government to take office (Seekins 1991).

Poland (1944–89)

Start: 12/31/1944 Date of establishment of a provisional government, a coalition of leftist parties controlled by the PPR (communist). The provisional government announced on December 31 governed a substantial part of Poland, from which the Soviets had driven German troops. It faced no serious domestic challenges because of the defeat in October 1944 of the Warsaw uprising led by the Home Army. After the Home Army's defeat, Mikolajczyk, premier of the Polish government-in-exile in London, agreed to negotiate with the communists. When other members of the government-in-exile refused to support his compromise, he resigned from the government-in-exile. He joined the communist dominated coalition in 1945. Although non-communist leaders held some formally important positions in this and later governments, the communists never lost control. Through their control of the security forces and the Interior Ministry, they assured the repression and disorganization of more popular parties and won the 1947 election (Hiscocks 1963, 87-91, 101-6; Lukas 1982, 4-8, 20-28, 70-75).

End: 6/18/1989 The second round of parliamentary elections. In the first and second rounds, the non-communist opposition won nearly all contested seats. Although a majority of the seats had not been contested, the opposition was able to put together a non-communist coalition government (with the first non-Communist PM) by allying with some of the small parties that had historically been coopted into the communist-led front. They defected from the front to join the opposition. Consequently, we treat the second round of the election as the regime end date because it led to an elected opposition government (Pease 1992; Inter-Parliamentary Union n.d.b).

Portugal (1926–74)

Start: 5/25/1926 Military coup led by Gen Gomes da Costa, who had been selected for leadership by the young officers who organized the plot (Opello 1991, 57).

End: 4/25/1974 Coup organized by junior officers, especially those who had served in Africa, ousted the Caetano government and established a provisional government that carried out a transition to democracy. Constituent Assembly elections were held in April 1975 (Opello 1991, 84-86; Inter-Parliamentary Union n.d.c).

Romania (1945–89)

Start: 3/6/1945 The Soviets forced King Michael to appoint Groza, a communist sympathizer, as PM. He in turn appointed a communist dominated coalition government and a communist commander of the armed forces. With control over the police, military, judiciary, communication, propaganda, and public works, the communists consolidated their political control during the next three years. King Michael was forced to abdicate in December 1947 (Van Dyke 1947, 373-78; Sudetic 1993; Tismaneanu 2003, 90-95).

End: 12/22/1989 Ceaușescu and his wife fled the capital in response to a popular uprising. They were executed on December 25, 1989 by firing squad after a brief military show trial (Bachman 2006; BBC News 1999b).

Russia (1993–)

Start: 9/21/1993 “Authoritarianization” of an elected government when President Yeltsin unconstitutionally decreed the dissolution of parliament; parliament refused to dissolve and voted to impeach him. Yeltsin then ordered troops to storm the parliament and closed it on October 4, 1993. In December 1993, a new federal assembly was elected under new rules. Eight parties that had supported parliament against Yeltsin were disqualified from competing (Economic and Political Weekly 1993, 2626; Simes 1994, 67-70).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Rwanda (1962–73)

Start: 7/1/1962 Independence under single-party rule by PARMEHUTU, which had been organized to further the interests of the majority Hutu ethnic group. A pre-independence popular uprising by Hutus led to armed ethnic conflict, the deaths of tens of thousands, and the flight into exile of more than 100,000 Tutsis. Tutsis were not represented in the government elected in September 1961, before independence, which advocated Hutu supremacy and followed a policy of violent repression against Tutsis (Weinstein 1977, 55-64, U.S. Dept. of State 2011).

End: 7/5/1973 Coup led by Maj. Gen. Habyarimana ousted President Kayibana (Encyclopedia Britannica Online 2011a; U.S. Dept. of State 2011).

Rwanda (1973–94)

Start: 7/5/1973 coup led by Maj Gen Habyarimana ousted the civilian president and installed a new ruling group (U.S. Dept. of State 2011; Encyclopedia Britannica Online 2011a).

End: 7/4/1994 The RPF rebels took Kigali, ending the regime (BBC News 2011a; Kapuściński 2002; U.S. Dept. of State 2011).

Rwanda (1994–)

Start: 7/4/1994 RPF rebel forces, made up mostly of exiled Tutsi Rwandans who had served in Museveni's insurgent force or the Ugandan army and led by Maj Gen Kagame, took Kigali. They established a Tutsi-led ruling group, which has become more inclusive over time (BBC News 2000a; U.S. Dept. of State 2011).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Saudi Arabia (1927–)

Start: 5/20/1927 The Treaty of Jeddah in which Great Britain recognized the independence of the Kingdoms of Hijaz and Najd was signed on this date. They were ruled by the monarchy that had been established during the previous 25 years through conquest by Adb al Aziz al Saud, leader of the al Saud family. In September 1932, the kingdoms were formally united under the name Saudi Arabia (Smyth 1992).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Senegal (1960–2000)

Start: 8/20/1960 Independence from the Mali Federation, under single-party dominance. (The Mali Federation gained independence from France on June 20, 1960.) The BDS (later names BPS, UPS, PS) swept pre-independence elections and coopted most other parties into its organization. Harassment of the remaining opposition began shortly after independence. One opposition party was outlawed in 1960, and several opposition party leaders were arrested. Special tribunals to try political offenses were established in October 1960. The confrontation between Senghor and his PM from December 1962 to January 1963 resulted in the arrest and long prison sentence of PM Dia and consolidated Senghor's individual control over the ruling party (Foltz 1964, 16-63; Klein 1987, 326; LeVine 2004, 204).

End: 3/19/2000 The opposition won the second round of a fair presidential election, ousting the dominant-party regime (Vengroff and Magala 2001, 129-62). First round of elections held February 27, second round on March 19 (African Elections Database 2011j).

Serbia/ Yugoslavia (1991–2000)

Start: 6/25/1991 We date the beginning of Serbian dominated Yugoslavia to this day when Slovenia declared independence (Prunk 2001). The disintegration of the regime led by the Yugoslav communist party (League of Communists of Yugoslavia) in 1990, followed by the secession of Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia in 1991, left the remaining part of Yugoslavia dominated by the Serbian communist party and its leader Milosevic. This marks a change in the identity of the group that could choose policies and personnel. In the prior Yugoslavian political system, Milosevic and the Serbian party were one of several veto players in a collective leadership structure that prevented one man or region from dominating the rest. After the

secessions, leadership in the remainder of Yugoslavia narrowed to the Serbian party and especially the group around Milosevic himself. Bosnia-Herzegovina seceded in 1992, further reducing the breadth of the ruling coalition and leaving only Serbia and Montenegro in the reconstituted Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which began its formal life in April 1992 (Sekelj 2000, 63; U.S. Dept. of State 2011m).

End: 10/5/2000 Milosevic resigned in response to massive demonstrations, allowing the party that had won the election to take office (BBC News 2000b; Binnendijk and Marovic 2006; U.S. Dept. of State 2011m).

Sierra Leone (1967–68)

Start: 3/23/1967 Coup led by Maj Blake ousted Force Commander Brig Lansana, who had seized power from the civilian government two days before to prevent the opposition from taking power after it won an election. [Lansana does not appear in the data set because he was ousted before Jan 1.] Lansana was allied with the dominant faction of the incumbent party and collaborated with incumbent elites in carrying out the coup. The officers who removed Lansana opposed the incumbents. They established a seven-man military junta, the National Reformation Council, suspended the constitution, dissolved all parties, and closed parliament (Bebler 1973, 68-70; Foray 1988, 27).

End: 4/18/1968 Non-commissioned officers ousted the military government and installed the MPs who had been elected in March 1967 but were not allowed to take office. Stevens, leader of the largest party, became PM, completing the transition to civilian rule (Fisher 1969, 611; Bebler 1973, 79-80; Foray 1988, 31-32).

Sierra Leone (1968–92)

Start: 6/30/1968/ This is the date of the arrest of a few SLPP leaders to prevent them from campaigning in by-elections. The elected Stevens government began incremental steps toward single-party rule immediately after being installed. It annulled by legal petition most of the constituency elections that had been won in 1967 by the former incumbent party, the SLPP, regardless of whether there was evidence of past election rigging. This was done legally, through the courts, and the SLPP had in fact rigged elections in some constituencies in 1967, so we do not code the unseating of SLPP deputies as “authoritarianization.” The APC government then used the beneficial and coercive resources at their disposal to insure that the APC won many of the subsequent by-elections. In June 1968, the first SLPP leaders were arrested, and we identify these arrests as the event that tipped the regime from democracy to dictatorship. In November 1968, the government declared a state of emergency and sent troops into the Mende areas of strong SLPP support, where violence had broken out during by-election campaigns. A number of SLPP supporters were killed by soldiers during the ensuing repression. A few seats in SLPP-dominated districts were left vacant because the government claimed that violence precluded holding scheduled by-elections (though they were held in equally violent districts where the

APC was expected to win). The SLPP was prevented from holding political meetings and over time repression increased (Africa Confidential 1968b, 7; Cartwright 1968, 29-30; New York Times 1969; Clapham 1972, 83-85; Cox 1976, 208; Allen 1978, 192; Hayward 1984, 25-26, 30; Zack-Williams 1999, 144).

End: 4/29/1992 A junior officers' coup led by Capt Strasser ousted Momoh and the dominant party regime (Zack-Williams and Riley 1993, 91; Zack-Williams 1999, 149-50; Encyclopedia Britannica Online 2011b; U.S. Dept. of State 2011n).

Sierra Leone (1992–96)

Start: 4/29/92 A junior officers' coup led by Capt Strasser ousted Momoh and the dominant party regime and established the National Provisional Ruling Council of 18 officers and four civilians (Zack-Williams 1999, 149-50; Encyclopedia Britannica Online 2011b; U.S. Dept. of State 2011n).

End: 3/15/1996 Second round of competitive elections led to a transition to civilian rule (Kandeh 1998, 95-106; Reno 1998, 135-36; African Elections Database 2011k; U.S. Dept. of State 2011n).

Sierra Leone (1997–98)

Start: 5/25/1997 The elected government was ousted by a “sobel” force of government soldiers and RUF insurgents, which formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Kandeh 1998, 107; Zack-Williams 1999, 143, 152-53; U.S. Dept. of State 2011n).

End: 2/12/1998 The ruling junta, led by Koroma, was ousted by West African troops (Nigerian-led ECOMOG) which reinstated the elected president (Amnesty International 1998; Kandeh 1998, 107). Kabba returned to Freetown on March 10, 1998 (BBC News 1998).

Singapore (1965–)

Start: 8/9/1965 Independence when Singapore was expelled from Malaysia. Before independence, the PAP led by Lee Kuan Yew won the 1959 and 1963 assembly elections. The elections were competitive, but individuals with records of “subversive activity,” that is, pro-communists, a large group including well-known political actors, were not allowed to compete. Throughout the pre-independence period, British actions to limit the influence of the large communist movement aided Lee’s dominance over rivals in the PAP and the PAP’s dominance over other potential mass-based parties by removing some of the most popular potential political leaders from competition. Thus we do not treat the pre-independence elections as democratic. Before independence, the PAP government arrested 111 “agitators,” most from a leftist faction of the party, who had opposed Lee and split from the party prior to the 1963 election, further reducing democraticness. At independence in 1965, Lee Kuan Yew and PAP were fully in control (LePoer 1989; Means 1996, 105). The regime is considered authoritarian despite competitive pre-independence elections because parties and individuals who would have been expected to attract large numbers of votes were prevented from par-

ticipating. After independence, repression of the left and manipulation of elections continued.

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Somalia (1969–91)

Start: 10/21/1969 Coup by colonels ousted the elected government and established the Supreme Revolutionary Council of 25, including initially 4 generals, 7 lieutenant-colonels, and 7 majors to rule the country (Welch 1974, 137; Samatar 1992).

End: 1/26/1991 Rebel troops took Mogadishu (BBC News 2011b). [Since 1991 Somalia has been excluded from the dataset because no government has controlled most of the territory.]

South Africa (1910–1994)

Start: 5/31/1910 The union of South African territories and quasi-independence with Dominion status (similar to Canada or Australia) under laws that severely restricted suffrage for non-whites. Elections were competitive, but suffrage was restricted (Worger 1996).

End: 4/29/1994 The first universal suffrage competitive election won by the opposition (Sinai 1996; African Elections Database 2011k).

Soviet Union (1917–91)

Start: 11/7/1917 Seizure of the Winter Palace headquarters of the Provisional Government in Petrograd by armed military and civilian supporters of the Bolsheviks. They established themselves as the new ruling group (Skallerup 1989; Brooker 1995, 51).

End: 12/21/1991 The Soviet Union was abolished when representatives of eleven of the constituent republics signed an accord that replaced it with the Commonwealth of Independent States. Russia, Belarus and Ukraine signed an agreement among themselves on 12/8/91, which sealed the fate of the Soviet Union, and the other republics added their agreement a couple of weeks later (Roeder 1993, 244; Guardian 2006).

Spain (1939–76)

Start: 3/28/1939 The fall of Madrid marked the final victory by the nationalist armed forces over forces of the elected Popular Front government. Franco assumed power as the leader of the nationalist forces (Manchester Guardian 1939, Rinehart and Brown-ing 1988a).

End: 11/18/1976 The Cortes passed the Political Reform Law, introducing universal suffrage parliamentary elections. They were introduced by the Francoist PM and passed by the legislature elected under the Francoist corporatist system of representation. This change and others introduced at around the same time are considered the end of the Francoist regime. When Franco died in 1975, his handpicked successor, King Juan Carlos, replaced him as head of state and the PM chosen by Franco continued in office, thus continuing the regime briefly. The king, however, replaced the PM with a former Francoist reformer in June 1976, and the latter introduced

the reforms that ended the Francoist system. The first fair, direct, universal suffrage election was held in June 1977 (Rinehart and Browning 1988b; Powell 1994, 16).

Sri Lanka (1978–94)

Start: 9/7/1978 This date marks the constitutional revision that created an executive presidency with quasi-dictatorial powers, which is treated as the point when the Jayawardene government crossed the line to dictatorship, although government partisans had been assaulting opposition partisans, members of minorities, and union members opposed to government economic policies since their election victory in July 1977 (DeVotta 2002, 91; DeVotta 2004, 143-46). Under the September 1978 constitutional revision, the president was entitled to override, amend or suspend the operation of any law enacted by Parliament, to suspend Parliament, and to expel MPs (Edrisinha and Seevakkumaran 2000, 106). The government used UNP militants to harass and beat supporters of opposition parties with collusion from the police (DeVotta 2004, 143-46). In October 1980, the political rights of the main opposition leader were canceled (Blood 1988). In 1982 a rigged referendum extended the UNP's 2/3 majority in Parliament instead of holding the required election (DeVotta 2001, 91).

End: 11/9/1994 Presidential election won by opposition returned the country to a democracy (DeVotta 2002, 92; Samarsinghe and Samarsinghe 1998, 112).

Sudan (1958–64)

Start: 11/17/1958 Coup led by Lt Gen Abboud in a context of widespread anti-government demonstrations. He set up a government ruled by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces made up of 12 senior officers (Haddad 1973, 183-85; Ofcansky 1991).

End: 10/29/1964 Popular uprising caused Gen. Abboud to appoint a transitional civilian cabinet and resign (Shepherd 1964, 12; Haddad 1973, 195; Ofcansky 1991).

Sudan (1969–85)

Start: 5/25/1969 Coup by leftist junior officers led by Col Numayri, supported by socialist and communist civilians, ousted the civilian government and set up a ten-man Revolutionary Command Council that initially included one civilian to rule. They dismissed senior officers (Haddad 1973, 209-13, Ofcansky 1991).

End: 4/6/1985 Coup by conservative officers in response to riots ousted Numayri and replaced him with a Transitional Military Council allied with civilians who had been excluded during the Numayri regime (Anderson 1999, 15-26).

Sudan (1985–86)

Start: 4/6/1985 Coup by conservative officers in response to riots ousted Numayri and replaced him with a Transitional Military Council allied with civilians who had been excluded during the Numayri regime (Anderson 1999, 15-26). The period from April 1985 to the April 1986 election is coded as a regime rather than an interim period leading to a transition because, although the military rulers said they would oversee a transition, other officers exerted pressure to remain in control of the government,

and it was unclear which faction would prevail until the election occurred (Anderson 1999, 14).

End: 4/12/1986 Competitive Constituent Assembly elections held from April 1 to April 12 returned power to civilians (African Elections Database 2011).

Sudan (1989–)

Start: 6/30/1989 Coup led by Col al-Bashir and an Islamist faction of the military ousted the elected government, imposed a state of emergency, dissolved parties and unions, banned demonstrations, and established the 15 member, all military Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation to rule. The new rulers dismissed much of the officer corps (Hooglund 1991; Burr and Collins 2003, 2).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Swaziland (1968–)

Start: 9/6/1968 Independence under the traditional monarchy. Although Swaziland has a parliament and initially held multiparty elections, the royal family's policy decisions and appointments were not constrained by parliament. In 1972 the opposition won in three constituencies, and in response the king declared a state of emergency, dismissed parliament, dissolved all parties, and ruled by decree from 1973-1978. The 1978 constitution banned parties and introduced nomination and indirect election procedures to insure royal control over future parliaments. The 2005 constitution allows direct, non-partisan election of most of the Assembly, but the king still appoints ten of 65 MPs, 20 of 30 Senators, and appoints the government (Baloro 1994, 21-29; Daniel and Vilane 1986, 57; Levin and MacMillan 2003, 1094-95; African Elections Database n.d.b; U.S. Dept. of State 2011o).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Syria (1946–47)

Start: 4/17/1946 Independence transferred power to a government chosen by a parliament that had been indirectly elected under rules that limited the participation of some groups. “[V]oters at the first stage had little control over the election of the parliamentary deputies.” The regime is coded as authoritarian because of limits on suffrage and indirect elections (Torrey 1964, 65; U.S. Dept. of State 2011p).

End: 7/17/1947 The first direct, competitive parliamentary election. Regime insiders agreed to reforms that democratized the oligarchic political system, leading to the loss of control of government by the ruling party (Torrey 1964, 88-101).

Syria (1949–51)

Start: 12/19/1949 Coup ousted the army leadership that had returned power to civilians. The 12/49 coup imposed indirect military control over an elected civilian government. The March 1949 coup is not considered the beginning event of this regime because the military faction that took over in March was ousted in June 1949 by a second military coup that oversaw fair elections and a return to democratic rule in November 1949. [The military government that ruled from March to June 1949

does not appear in the data set because it did not last until Jan 1.] After December 1949, elected civilians controlled most aspects of policy, but the military exercised veto power over foreign policy and the choice of officials (Be'eri 1970, 57-64; Haddad 1971, 202-205; McGowan 1987).

End: 11/29/1951 Coup ousted the civilian government and replaced it with full military rule. The period after November 1951 is treated as a different regime because military rulers eliminated the civilian allies who had previously held high offices and exercised influence on policies (Torrey 1964, 207-12; Haddad 1971, 211; Finer 1975, 168-69).

Syria (1951–54)

Start: 11/29/1951 Coup ousted the civilian government and replaced indirect military rule with direct military rule by decree. The period after November 1951 is treated as a different regime because military rulers eliminated the civilian allies who had previously held high offices and exercised influence on policies, narrowing the ruling group to a faction of the military (Torrey 1964, 207-12; Haddad 1971, 211; Finer 1975, 168-69).

End: 2/25/1954 Coup by a faction of the military returned power to the civilians who had been ousted in November 1951 (Haddad 1971, 218; Be'eri 1982, 70-71). They then oversaw a fair and competitive elections in September-October 1954 (Torrey 1964, 244-64; Be'eri 1982, 80).

Syria (1957–58)

Start: 2/26/1957 On this date, a number of important opposition leaders, including several MPs, were found guilty of trumped up treason charges despite formal parliamentary immunity, marking the point at which the government crossed the line from democracy to autocracy. "Authoritarianization" occurred incrementally during 1956-57, as Col Sarraj gradually undermined the elected civilian government. We identify this guilty verdict as the point at which there ceases to be doubt about who exercised power. In May 1957, the government rigged by-elections, further reducing opposition representation (Torrey 1964, 329-31, 352-53). During 1957-58, Syria was ruled by an alliance of the Ba'th, a radical faction of the Nationalist party, Communists, and independents, supported by Ba'thist and Communist factions of the military. The president and PM were civilian Nationalists, and no party dominated the civilian coalition, though the Ba'th was gaining power throughout the period. The military was too factionalized to fully determine events. No single person seems to have been calling the shots during this period, but Col. Sarraj has been identified as the "power behind the throne" (Haddad 1971, 224) and seems to have been more powerful than any other single leader.

End: 2/22/1958 Syria ceased to exist as an independent country after merger with Egypt as part of the UAR (Torrey 1964, 379-80; McGowan 1987).

Syria (1962–63)

Start: 3/28/1962 Coup ousted the civilian government. A coup in September 1961 ended the UAR and returned Syria to independence; the military then oversaw competitive constituent assembly elections in December 1961. The new assembly elected a civilian president, who chose a civilian PM, initiating democratic government. The March 1962 coup was unpopular and the military factionalized, which led to conflict within the military and the establishment of a partly civilian government the month after the coup. The civilian president who had been ousted in March 1962 was returned to office, but the military controlled the make-up of the cabinet and dissolved the parliament, so this period is coded as indirect military rule and authoritarian (Be'eri 1970, 145-48, Haddad 1971, 265-73, McGowan 1987).

End: 3/8/1963 Coup by the pro-Ba'thist faction of the military ousted Gen. Zahr al-Din and his civilian allies (Be'eri 1970, 150-53; Haddad 1971, 294; Be'eri 1982, 80).

Syria (1963–)

Start: 3/8/1963 Coup led by pro-Ba'thist officers ousted Gen Zahr al-Din's government and its civilian allies (Be'eri 1970, 150-53). The March 1963 coup was led by officers sympathetic to the Ba'th but not actually members. The National Council of the Revolutionary Command set up immediately after the coup contained a minority of Ba'th members, and the first cabinet they chose was half Ba'th. Over the next few months of factional struggle within the new government and within the military, however, most non-Ba'th officers were excluded from leadership and many non-Ba'thist officers and NCOs were purged from the army, leaving the regime dominated by the Ba'thist faction of the military (Be'eri 1970, 156-65; Rabinovich 1972, 49-59; McGowan 1987).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Taiwan (1949–2000)

Start: 12/7/1949 Chiang Kai-shek declared Taipei the provisional capital of the Republic of China. Nationalist troops, supporters, and financial assets had been moving from the mainland to Taiwan, which was still under nationalist control, for some time. When Chiang's forces were defeated in the last important area they controlled on the mainland, Chiang and his closest supporters fled to Taiwan. It was intended as a temporary refuge while nationalist forces regrouped to take the mainland but quickly became a de facto independent state (Wang 1951; Government of Taiwan 2001; U.S. Dept. of State 2011q).

End: 3/18/2000 Competitive election won by the opposition (Niou and Paolino 2003, 721-40).

Tajikistan (1991–)

Start: 9/9/1991 Independence with the government controlled by communist leaders in the Supreme Soviet that had been elected in February 1990 (Library of Congress 2007; Hiro 2009, 321).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Tanzania (1964–)

Start: 4/26/1964 Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar to form Tanzania. In December 1961, Tanganyika (the continental part of what later became Tanzania) became independent under the leadership of TANU, which won the August 1960 pre-independence elections. PM Nyerere was elected president shortly after independence. Tanganyika 1961-64 is considered democratic and thus not included in the data set. Although TANU won every seat in pre-independence elections, opposition was unfettered, and observers considered the election free and fair. In January 1964, a month after Zanzibar's independence, a rebellion ousted the monarchy and brought a repressive autocratic regime led by the Afro-Shirazi Party to power (Zolberg 1968, 82; Political Handbook of the World 2012q, 1411). ASP leaders agreed to union with Tanganyika to buttress their own position in Zanzibar. The union of Zanzibar and Tanganyika consolidated ASP's control over Zanzibar. Irregularities and violence have continued to plague Zanzibari elections (U.S. Dept. of State 2011r). In 1964, TANU's tolerance of opposition also declined. It began to coerce the civil servants and police to join TANU, and citizens had to produce a TANU card to get medical care or crop selling privileges (Burton and Charton-Bigot 2010, 208). The July 1965 constitution made TANU the only legal party on the mainland and the ASP the only legal party in Zanzibar.

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Thailand (1944–47)

Start: 7/26/1944 The PM and regime leader, Supreme Commander Phibun, resigned, at least partly to try to avoid the imposition of post-war reparations because his government had supported the Japanese. Phibun and what had been the military faction of the "People's Party" – not really a party – were replaced by an unelected pro-Allied, mostly civilian faction led by Pridi Phanomyong, the Seri Thai anti-Japanese faction leader and regent, supported by a civilian pro-royalist faction and Navy officers. 1944-47 is treated as a new regime because the group from which leaders were chosen changed from high level army officers before July 1944 to a coalition of civilians and leaders of the Seri Thai, the anti-Japanese partisans. (The army supported the Japanese.) Although the 1946 constitution allowed both legislative houses to be elected, prevented officers from serving in the legislature and government, and legalized parties, all for the first time, the full period from 1944-47 is considered authoritarian because (1) control of the government did not change after the 1946 election; (2) some opposition leaders were arrested and otherwise harassed; and (3) the constitution included limitations on suffrage based on education (Vella 1955, 388-89; Cady 1974, 114; Chaloeontiarana 2007a, 16-17; Suwannathat-Pian 1995, 188).

End: 11/8/1947 Coup led by a group of mostly retired officers ousted the civilian government and returned Phibun to office (Kobkua 1995, 164-65; Thak 2007, 20-31).

Thailand (1947–57)

Start: 11/8/1947 coup led by a group of officers forced into retirement by the previous government ousted the civilian government, excluded Seri Thai from influence, and returned the army and Phibun to power. Parliament was dissolved. A new constitution formally gave the king the right to make laws when parliament was out of session, dismiss cabinet members, and appoint senators, who functioned as the legislature until new elections; these functions were really exercised by the Privy Council controlled by the army (Suwannathat-Pian 1995, 164-65; Chaloeontiarana 2007a, 20-32). In November 1951 military rule was further tightened. The 1932 constitution was brought back, the new legislature (elected in January 1948) was again dissolved, political gatherings were banned, and parties were banned from participating in politics. A national executive council of 9 officers, 3 from each service, was formed. A Senate was appointed as required by the 1932 Constitution, and it acted as the legislature until new elections for half the assembly in 1952. The other half was appointed. 106/123 members of Senate were military or police officers (Chaloeontiarana 2007a, 51-54).

End: 9/16/1957 Coup in which Phibun, his civilian allies and the military faction that supported him were ousted by Gen. Sarit, who installed a more narrowly-based military regime (Chaloeontiarana 2007b, 79-80).

Thailand (1957–73)

Start: Seizure event: 9/16/1957 Phibun ousted in a coup led by Gen Sarit, who installed a more narrowly based military regime. In October 1958, Sarit and his allies further narrowed the regime: parties and political gatherings were banned, the constitution abrogated; they created the Revolutionary Council (Khana Pattiwat) to rule. The Revolutionary Council proclaimed an Interim Constitution in 1/59 and also appointed a Constituent Assembly to write a new one and act as interim legislature. Of 220 members, 102 were army officers, 26 navy, 24 air force, 18 police, and 50 were bureaucrats. The period from September 1957 to October 1973 included multiple institutional changes, with legislatures created under different rules and later closed, and parties created and later banned (Chaloeontiarana 2007a, 79-80, 96, 186-87). We treat this period as a single regime because the inner circle of decision making was controlled throughout by “a single group of men” who came to power in the September 1957 coup (Bienen and Morell 1974, 11).

End: 10/14/1973 Demonstrations led to Thanom’s resignation and flight into exile. Army Commander-in-Chief Gen Kris refused more violent action against the demonstrators, and the king supported a transition to democracy. The King appointed an interim PM to oversee a democratic transition, and in January 1975 fair competitive elections were held, completing the transition (Bienen and Morell 1974, 11; Elliott 1978, 135).

Thailand (1976–88)

Start: 10/6/1976 Military coup established the ruling National Policy Council made

up of officers, which suspended the constitution, dissolved the assembly, banned parties, and declared martial law. They appointed a new legislature and civilian cabinet (Elliott 1978, 136; Chaloeontiarana 2007a, 234).

End: 7/24/1988 Fair and competitive election won by an opposition party, leading to the first elected civilian PM since 1976 (Niksich 1989, 167-68).

Thailand (1991–92)

Start: 2/23/1991 A bloodless coup established the six-man National Peacekeeping Council (NPKC) made up of all top military commanders to rule, dissolved parliament, suspended the constitution, declared martial law, and appointed an assembly 148 of 292 of whom were serving or retired officers (Bhuchongkul 1992, 313, 319).

End: 5/20/1992 In response to massive demonstrations, the king intervened to replace the military PM with a civilian interim PM until new elections in September 1992 (King and LoGerfo 1996, 104; Minorities at Risk Project 2004). In June 1992, the constitution was amended to require the PM to be an elected member of parliament. In September 1992 a competitive election was won by the Democrat Party, completing the transition to democracy.

Thailand (2006–07)

Start: 9/19/2006 Coup led by the Army Commander-in-Chief: the military abrogated the 1996 constitution, arrested the cabinet, dissolved parliament, banned political activities, and set up the Council for Democratic Reform as ruling body (BBC News 2006; U.S. Dept. of State 2011s).

End: 12/23/2007 Competitive elections returned the government to civilian rule (BBC News 2007).

Togo (1960–63)

Start: 4/27/1960 Independence under the control of Olympio and the CUT. Although the government at independence was elected in fair UN-supervised elections, severe repression of opposition began immediately after independence. Many pre-independence political leaders were jailed or exiled (Decalo 1976, 96).

End: 1/13/1963 Civilian government overthrown by ex-Sgt Eyadema and other veterans discharged from the French colonial army and not integrated into the new Togolese military. They turned power over to the leader of the civilian opposition but Eyadema and two other ex-sergeants held “ultimate political power” (Decalo 1976, 97-99; Global Security 2011c).

Togo (1963–)

Start: 1/13/1963 Coup led by ex-Sgt Eyadema and other NCOs and privates demobilized from the French colonial army ousted the Olympio government. They initially chose a civilian opposition leader, Grunitzky, as president leading a coalition of mostly civilian political forces, but Eyadema and two other ex-sergeants held “ultimate political power” (Decalo 1976, 99; Political Handbook of the World 2012r, 1435).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Tunisia (1956–)

Start: 3/20/1956 Independence under the control of Neo-Destour and Bourguiba. Bourguiba and other Neo-Destour party insiders chose electoral rules without consultation, effectively eliminating opposition from the government and Constituent Assembly, which was elected March 25, 1956. Although the government was nominally a constitutional monarchy, Bourguiba and Neo-Destour had full control of decision making from the beginning. The Bey was formally deposed the following year (Moore 1965, 71-75; Anderson 1986, 235).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010. [The long-ruling dictator, Ben-Ali, resigned in response to massive popular protests on January 14, 2011. He was succeeded briefly by his PM, but all members of the cabinet associated with the former ruling party resigned on February 27, 2011, ending the regime.]

Turkey (1923–50)

Start: 10/29/1923 Independence under the control of Ataturk (Mustafa Kemal) and his allies. Ataturk led the armed forces that defeated the Greek occupation army after World War I and forced the other Allied forces to accept Turkish independence. The April 1920 Grand National Assembly called by the nationalist forces elected Ataturk president and in January 1921 declared sovereignty. In November 1922, the Assembly deposed the sultan (Haddad 1965, 100-06; Brooker 1995, 243; Glazer 1995).

End: 5/14/1950 Competitive election won by the opposition (Glazer 1995).

Turkey (1957–60)

Start: 10/27/1957 The rigged October 1957 election is identified as the date when the elected government crossed the line from democracy to dictatorship. The ruling DP won fair elections in 1950 and more-or-less fair ones in 1954, but with its popularity declining, it resorted to vote rigging in 1957. During the months leading up to the 10/57 election, the government gerrymandered districts, limited opposition access to the media, banned public assemblies, outlawed coalitions, and harassed opposition leaders. There were multiple accusations of registration and vote counting fraud after the election. Ballot boxes were moved in preparation for a recount, the building to which they were moved burned before the recount could be started, and all seats in the contested area were awarded to the ruling party, lending further credence to the claims of fraud (Glazer 1995; Tursan 2004, 70-71).

End: 5/27/1960 Coup led by Chief of the General Staff Gürsel ousted the civilian government (Haddad 1965, 115-17; Finer 1975, 161-62; Glazer 1995).

Turkey (1960–61)

Start: 5/27/1960 Coup planned by mid-level officers ousted the civilian government, dissolved the Assembly, and established the Committee of National Unity of 38 officers to rule (Haddad 1965, 115-18; Brooker 1995, 253; Glazer 1995).

End: 10/15/1961 Fair and competitive election returned the country to civilian rule (Haddad 1965, 119-20; Global Security 2011a).

Turkey (1980–83)

Start: 9/12/1980 Coup led by Gen Evren and the rest of the military high command established the National Security Council composed of the service chiefs and the gendarmerie commander, to rule, imposed martial law, dissolved the Assembly, banned parties and liquidated their assets, and jailed up to 30,000 people (Brooker 1995, 253; Glazer 1995).

End: 11/6/1983 Parliamentary election on November 6 won by a party not allied with the military; National Security Council dissolved on December 13 1983 (Ahmad 1984, 3; Glazer 1995).

Turkmenistan (1991–)

Start: 10/27/1991 Independence under the control of Niyazov and the Supreme Soviet elected in January 1990 and controlled by communists (Clark et al. 1996).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Uganda (1966–71)

Start: 2/22/1966 Autogolpe with the support of the military. PM Obote suspended the constitution, arrested five ministers, and transferred all executive powers to himself after a no-confidence vote by members of his own UPC party. In March 1966, Obote relieved the president (the Kabaka, traditional leader of a different ethnic group) of his position. In April 1966, a new constitution granting the PM strong executive powers was passed by parliament, under threat from the military (Mazrui 1975, 13-14; Rowe 1990; Buganda.com 2012).

End: 1/25/1971 Coup led by Gen. Amin ousted the civilian government (Welch 1974, 133).

Uganda (1971–79)

Start: 1/25/1971 Coup led by Maj-Gen Amin ousted the civilian government, dissolved the Assembly, and suspended parts of the constitution. Hundreds of troops from Obote's region were murdered in their barracks (Welch 1974, 133; Kapuściński 2002, 141; Political Handbook of the World 2012s, 1480).

End: 4/11/1979 An invading force from Tanzania aided by Ugandan exiles captured Kampala, ending Amin's regime (Mutibwa 1992, 135; Ingham 1994, 7; Political Handbook of the World 2012s, 1480).

Uganda (1980–85)

Start: 12/11/1980 Parliamentary election marred by fraud, violence, and intimidation was won by the UPC, which brought Obote to power again as PM. The last leader of the interim government was a UPC supporter; he dismissed district commissioners – who organized elections on the ground – opposed to the UPC; some opposition candidates were prevented from running, violence and intimidation were widespread so we code the 1980 election as undemocratic (Mutibwa 1992, 141; Political Handbook of the World 2012s, 1480).

End: 7/27/1985 Coup by Brig. Okello ousted the Obote government (Rowe 1990).

[The period from July 1985 to Museveni's capture of Kampala in January 1986 excluded from the data set because no group controlled the territory.]

Uganda (1986–)

Start: 1/27/1986 The National Resistance Army, led by Museveni, captured Kampala. It established the National Resistance Council made up of the 38 leading cadres of the NRA and NRM to rule. The NRC expanded in April 1987 to include cabinet members and their deputies, most of whom were not NRM members. In April 1989, the NRC expanded further to include elected members (Mudoola 1989, 2; Kasfir 1990; Rowe 1990; Political Handbook of the World 2012s, 1480-81).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

United Arab Emirates (1971–)

Start: 12/2/1971 Formed when several sheikdoms along the Gulf united to create the independent UAE. The president is chosen by the Supreme Council of the Union, which is made up of the hereditary rulers of the initially six, now seven, emirates, from among its members. He serves as head of state, chair of the SCU, and commander of the military (Hoogland and Toth 1993; Smythe 1993; Political Handbook of the World 2012t).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Uruguay (1973–84)

Start: 6/27/1973 The president, with military support, closed the legislature, which was investigating claims of torture brought against military officers, and empowered the military and police to take whatever measures they deemed necessary, thus completing the "creeping coup" begun the previous year. In April 1972, the legislature agreed to declare a "state of internal war" in response to the Tupamaro guerrillas; this declaration restricted civil rights, allowed civilians to be tried in military courts, and allowed the military to set up detention centers for those accused of political crimes. In February 1973, under military pressure, the elected president agreed to the creation of a National Security Council (Cosená) made up of the commanders of the three branches of the military, an additional officer, and the Ministers of Defense, Interior, Economy, and Foreign Affairs as well as the president, to advise on policy (in effect to institutionalize their informal veto power); he also agreed to replace the Defense and Interior ministers and to allow officers in the dominant faction of the military to purge others insufficiently committed to the anti-subversive campaign (despite the near defeat of the Tupamaros in September 1972). The closure of the legislature completed the military's takeover of policy making, though the elected president remained formally in office until June 1976, when the military forced him to resign (Kaufman 1979, 113-15; Weinstein 1988, 44-50; Jacob and Weinstein 1990; Arceneaux 2001, 185-88). Real power was held by the Junta de Oficiales Generales, made up 18-28 top officers from the three services, which "dominated critical military and government policy decisions" and the Junta de Comandantes en Jefe, the junta

of service commanders (Gillespie 1984, 99; Weinstein 1988, 50; Arceneaux 2001, 190).
End: 11/25/1984 Competitive elections led to a democratically elected government (Weinstein 1988, 76-82; Jacob and Weinstein 1990).

Uzbekistan (1991–)

Start: 8/31/1991 Independence under the control of Karimov, the communist leader during Soviet rule, and the communist-controlled Supreme Soviet elected in February 1990 before independence (Lubin 1996; Hiro 2009, 136-42; Political Handbook of the World 2012u, 1572).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Venezuela (1948–58)

Start: 11/24/1948 Coup led by Lt Col Delgado Chalbaud and Lt Col Pérez Jiménez ousted the civilian government, suspended the constitution and Congress, and installed a military ruling group (Burggraaff 1972, 101-9, 115).

End: 1/23/1958 Pérez Jiménez resigned and fled the country in response to weeks of massive demonstrations that had caused most of the officers who were not already opposed to him to abandon him (Trinkunas 2000, 89). The military transitional government agreed to include civilian political leaders in an interim government, which oversaw fair competitive elections in December 1958, completing a transition to democracy (Taylor 1968, 52-60; Burggraaff 1972, 154-166; Coronil 1997, 65-66).

Venezuela (2005–)

Start: 12/4/2005 The legislative election on this date is coded as the last incremental step over the fine line between flawed democracy and electoral authoritarianism. Venezuela's "authoritarianization" was very gradual between August 2004 and December 2005. Although Venezuelan democracy was flawed, with a partisan National Electoral Commission and the manipulation of electoral procedures before August 2004, up until that time, observers considered elections fair. The opposition remained vibrant and was represented in the Assembly and Courts. In August 2004, Chávez won a recall election, also deemed free and fair by international election observers though not by the opposition. Leading up to the recall, the opposition had collected millions of signatures supporting it, as constitutionally required, but the Chávez-controlled National Electoral Commission had blocked the recall until the Supreme Court ruled in favor of holding it. Immediately after Chávez won the recall, the Chavista-dominated Assembly passed a law increasing the size of the Supreme Court and allowing the dismissal of judges by a simple majority Assembly vote. By the end of 2004, Chavistas had full control of the Supreme Court, and the new Supreme Court majority was rapidly dismissing anti-Chavista lower court judges and hiring Chavistas. The government also published a list of those who had signed recall petitions. Human Rights Watch has documented dismissals of tens of thousands from public employment and other jobs because their names were on this list. It also reports petition signers' loss of access to welfare benefits. Laws constraining the media

were tightened. The intimidation campaign against “anti-revolutionaries” continued through 2005. When OAS election monitors visited Venezuela shortly before the December 2005 legislative election, they noted that the fingerprint machines used to identify voters could be linked to voting machines and used to identify who voted for the opposition. Given the government’s earlier use of signatures on recall petitions to punish opponents, the five largest opposition parties boycotted the election, and only 25 percent of registered voters turned out to vote. European Union election observers criticized the boycott but noted government misuse of media and the excessive presence of troops around polling places on election day. The Chavistas won all seats in the Assembly. For the next five years no opposition voices were represented in any branch of government, and the public voice of the opposition was muted by harassment, intimidation, and occasionally arrest (Degutis 2005, 7; Marcano and Barrera 2007; Holland 2008, 10-11, 25, 36-37; Corrales and Penfold-Becerra 2011, 27, 30).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Vietnam (1954–)

Start: 7/21/1954 The Geneva Accords established North Vietnam temporarily as a separate independent state. The communist party led by Ho Chi Minh controlled the northern part of Vietnam when the peace accord ending the French-Indochinese War was signed (Pentagon Papers 1954; LePoer 1987).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Vietnam, South (1954–63)

Start: 7/21/1954 The Geneva Accords established South Vietnam temporarily as a separate independent state. At independence Vietnam was formally a constitutional monarchy, but Emperor Bao Dai was living in Paris and had little ability to influence events on the ground. He appointed Diem as PM (Pentagon Papers 1954; LePoer 1987).

End: 11/2/1963 Diem government ousted in coup, Diem and his brother were killed (Goodman 1973, 30; LePoer 1987).

Vietnam, South (1963–75)

Start: 11/2/1963 The Diem government was ousted in a coup led by Lt Gen Duong Van Minh, which set up a government led by the twelve-man Military Revolutionary Committee led by Gen Minh (Ky 1978, 31; Goodman 1973, 30; LePoer 1987).

End: 4/30/1975 Communist troops took Saigon, in effect ending the existence of South Vietnam as a separate nation. Formal reunification with the North occurred the following year (LePoer 1987).

Yemen (1918–62)

Start: 10/30/1918 Independence from the Ottoman Empire under the Hamid al-Din dynasty, the traditional imamate of the Zaidi people in what became North Yemen (Haddad 1973, 221; Burrowes 1987, 16; Time Magazine 1967).

End: 9/26/1962 Coup led by Col al-Sallal deposed Imam al-Badr a week after he

succeeded to the imamate (Burrowes 1987, 22; Clark 2010, 62-63; Haddad 1973, 244-50).

Yemen (1962–67)

Start: 9/26/1962 Coup led by Col al-Sallal deposed the imamate and created the Revolutionary Command Council to rule. The Yemeni army was small and weak and could probably have been defeated by tribesmen loyal to the royal family, but the regime was kept in power by Egyptian troops and administrators (Haddad 1973, 244-58; Burrowes 1987, 22; Clark 2010, 63).

End: 11/5/1967 Coup replaced al-Sallal with a civilian and military coalition led by a civilian (Haddad 1973, 285-88; Burrowes 1987, 28).

Yemen (1967–74)

Start: 11/5/1967 Coup replaced al-Sallal with a civilian and military coalition of anti-Egyptian republicans led by a civilian (Haddad 1973, 285-88; Burrowes 1987, 28).

End: 6/13/1974 Coup led by Col. al-Hamdi replaced the civilian-led government (Burrowes 1987, 57).

Yemen (1974–78)

Start: 6/13/1974 Coup led by Lt Col al-Hamdi replaced the civilian-led government with a Military Command Council that excluded the sheikhs and other civilians. In 1975 the MCC dissolved the partly elected Consultative Council on which tribal interests had been represented, further narrowing the regime (Burrowes 1987, 57-60; Clark 2010, 107).

End: 7/17/1978 The four-man Presidential Council that led the military regime chose Lt. Col. Salih (who had been a Major a few weeks earlier) as President and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces (Burrowes 1987, 92-93). The post October 1978 regime is considered different from the 1974-78 regime because Salih began almost immediately to change the identity of those who could influence policy. In late 1978 and 1979, he purged important officers, narrowing the faction of the military included in the regime. He brought back to influence sheikhs who had been excluded since 1974 and gave his family and tribe a privileged place in the regime (Burrowes 1987, 94-130). Beginning in 1979, Salih began developing institutions to allow some participation by ordinary citizens (Burrowes 1987, 112-31).

Yemen (1978–)

Start: In 7/17/1978 The four-man Presidential Council that led the 1974-78 regime briefly after earlier leaders' assassinations chose Lt-Col Salih as president and commander-in-chief of the armed forces (Burrowes 1987, 92-93). The post-1978 regime is considered different from the 1974-78 regime because Salih began almost immediately to change the identity of those who could influence policy, reducing the military's role and incorporating sheikhs. Beginning in late 1978, he purged important officers, narrowing the faction of the military included in the inner circle. He brought back to influences sheikhs who had been excluded since 1974 and gave his family and tribe

a privileged place in decision making, distribution, and command positions in the military (Burrowes 1987, 94-130; Clark 2010, 122). Beginning in 1979, Salih began developing institutions to allow some participation in politics by ordinary citizens (Burrowes 1987, 112-131).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

Yemen South (1967–90)

Start: 11/30/1967 Independence when Britain handed power to the National Liberation Front, one of the two groups that led the insurgency that toppled British rule (Clark 2010, 87; Time Magazine 1967).

End: 5/22/1990 Unification of South Yemen with the North ended the existence of South Yemen as a separate nation (Clark 2010, 134-40).

Yugoslavia (1945–90)

Start: 3/7/1945 A government dominated by Tito and the communists was established after the defeat of German occupation forces by communist-led Partisans and negotiations between Tito and representatives of the government-in-exile in London. Prior to that date, there were two Yugoslav governments, the Partisans with control of most of the territory and the government-in-exile with international recognition and support from part of the population, especially in Croatia (Petrovich 1947, 508-9; Van Dyke 1947, 375). The March 1945 government included five non-Partisan ministers out of 28, was led by Tito, and controlled by the communists. Constituent Assembly elections were held in November 1945 in which only People's Front candidates could run and in which "collaborators" were barred from voting. The non-communist ministers resigned in protest, and several non-communist parties boycotted the election. It resulted in a communist dominated government led by Tito as PM. The assembly ended the monarchy (Petrovich 1947, 515-18; Sudetic 1990).

End: 1/20/1990 The opening of the 14th (extraordinary) Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists, at which the Yugoslav communist party dissolved itself into its constituent republican parties, in effect ending one-party rule in Yugoslavia. In February 1990, Slovenia and Croatia legalized opposition parties. The opposition won multiparty elections in Slovenia and Croatia in April-May 1990, which ended communist rule in them; both countries stopped contributing taxes to the central government and withdrew troops from the central government's military operations in Kosovo (Lampe 2000, 352-55; Glaurdic 2011, 127-39). The Slovenian parliament declared full sovereignty in July 1990, and in the same month a constitutional reform in Serbia legalized opposition parties and defined it as defacto independent (Glaurdic 2011, 165). Although the first breakaway countries did not become formally independent until 1991, the Yugoslav League of Communists and the central government lost control of policy making in January 1990 and had lost control of most of what had been Yugoslavian territory by the end of 1990.

Zambia (1967–91)

Start: 2/28/1967 We identify February 1967 as the time when the UNIP-dominated government crossed the fine line between democracy and dictatorship: “widespread intimidation and violence by ruling party (UNIP) activists” led to victories for it in the February 1967 by-elections called to replace MPs who had split from UNIP to form a new opposition party and whose mandates had then been revoked (Tordoff and Molteno 1974, 23). Further violations of opposition political rights occurred during the following couple of years. In the first half of 1968, prior to the December 1968 general election, a number of UP supporters were beaten or stoned by UNIP youths and some houses were burned (Rasmussen 1969, 414). In August 1968, the UNIP government banned the opposition UP and arrested most of its leaders (Molteno and Scott 1974, 156, Tordoff and Molteno 1974, 27). A number of ANC (the traditional opposition) candidates were prevented from filing their nomination forms prior to the 12/68 election by UNIP roadblocks and local violence (Molteno and Scott 1974, 164). The 1968 election was thus not free and fair.

End: 10/31/1991 Election was won by the opposition (Bjornlund et al. 1992, 405-31; African Elections Database 2011n).

Zambia (1996–)

Start: 5/28/1996 We treat the date the president signed into law the constitutional amendment that prevented the most important opposition candidate (Kaunda) from running for the presidency as the point at which the MMD’s repeated small violations of democratic norms crossed the line from democracy to authoritarianism. International and domestic observers also noted a number of other irregularities in the conduct of the November 1996 election, and it was generally criticized as not free and fair (Baylies and Szeftel 1997, 122; Mba0 1998, 1-2, 6; Political Handbook of the World 2012v, 1610).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010. [MMD’s Rupiah Banda lost the September 20, 2011 election to Michael Sata of the Patriotic Front, leading to a transition to democracy.]

Zimbabwe (1980–)

Start: 4/18/1980 Independence under the rule of ZANU and Mugabe. The February 1980 pre-independence election that brought ZANU and Mugabe to power is not considered fair by most observers because of the widespread violence and intimidation of non-white voters by ZANU fighters and activists. Violence against dissidents has continued ever since (Kriger 2003, 311; Norman 2004, 84-87, 95-96).

End: Regime continued in power as of December 31, 2010.

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