Appendix C: Spatial Models of Legislative Voting in the Canadian House of Commons, 1\textsuperscript{st}-10\textsuperscript{th} Parliaments

These plots show the evolution of the division between the opposing Liberal and Conservative parties over time. We note the presence of some cross-pressured legislators, as well as an important number of Liberal MPs, who voted with the Conservative government (that is, the opposite is not true) in earlier legislative terms. In the first three parliaments (figure C-1), almost all of the dissenting Liberals were either from British Columbia or Manitoba: these MPs were elected in the two new provinces and opted to side with the governing party and support the federally funded transcontinental railway (Hamelin, 1965). As we get closer to the end of the period (figure C-2), most of these ministerial MPs have disappeared from the House, and this fact is reflected in the results found in table 3 of the main text.

Regional conflict plays an important role in the organization of the House in the first Parliament. In this legislative term, MPs from the Maritime provinces and Quebec are clustered together at the top of the spatial model (figure C-3). This is not surprising if we consider that Nova Scotia and New Brunswick sent a delegation strongly opposed to Confederation following the first election. However, the regional distribution of MPs rapidly loses a significant cohesive pattern after this term. The only clear exception is with Quebec MPs who remain mostly clustered in the positive range of the second dimension of voting, at least until the ninth Parliament (figure C-4). Hence, the second dimension does not appear to be wholly regional in nature.

A third set of plots demonstrates rather that it is the religion of the MPs that divides parties internally. The fact that most Catholics are representing the predominantly French province of Quebec explains why so many of these MPs are polarized on the second dimension. However, we also find a number of English Catholics near the top of the plots as well. The opposition between Catholics and Protestants is especially important in the fifth and sixth Parliaments (figures C-5 and C-6), which saw an increase of confessional division after the relative hiatus of the fourth Parliament when the Conservative party returned to power. Indeed, the spatial plot for this Parliament shows that MPs from Quebec were not polarized on the second dimension. The focus of this legislative term was primarily on the national economic policy. In the fourth Parliament, .72 of Quebec MPs were Conservative and thus supported the government—as opposed to .46 in the third Parliament (numbers from Beck, 1968: 35-45). Finally, the spatial analysis shows that virtually all Quebec and Catholic MPs were elected under the Liberal banner in the last two Parliaments (Figure C-6). Indeed, by the ninth Parliament, there is no evidence of internal division within the Conservative and Liberal parties. Once again, these results are confirmed by the findings presented in table 3 of the main text, which show the very small contribution of the second dimension in the model in later terms.
Figure C1: The plots are based on optimal classification scores. The location of the legislators indicate their optimal location given their voting behaviour on all votes from the first Parliament to the fifth Parliament.
Partisan Division, 6-10 Parliaments

Figure C2: The plots are based on optimal classification scores. The location of the legislators indicates their optimal location given their voting behaviour on all votes from the sixth Parliament to the tenth Parliament.
Figure C3: The plots are based on optimal classification scores. The location of the legislators indicates their optimal location given their voting behaviour on all votes from the first Parliament to the fifth Parliament.
Figure C4: The plots are based on optimal classification scores. The location of the legislators indicates their optimal location given their voting behaviour on all votes from the sixth Parliament to the tenth Parliament.
Figure C5: The plots are based on optimal classification scores. The location of the legislators indicates their optimal location given their voting behaviour on all votes from the first Parliament to the fifth Parliament.
Figure C6: The plots are based on optimal classification scores. The location of the legislators indicates their optimal location given their voting behaviour on all votes from the sixth Parliament to the tenth Parliament.