


Supplementary Information

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Figure A1: Partisanship, Race, and Restrictive Provisions
(Including Texas)



1 Scatter Plots of State Data

In Figures A1 and A2 I present the scatter plots of the state-level counts of introduced (Panel A) and passed (Panel B) provisions. Because Texas is such a large outlier, Figure A2 excludes the Lone Star State. I also superimpose the lines of best fit, with provision counts regressed on the cubic polynomial of the white share of the population.

2 Regression Tables for State-Level Models

Table A1 presents the results of the state-level regressions. Here, I re-present the robust regression results (run using `r1m` in R), as well as the OLS ones. The results are substantively quite similar, regardless of which approach is used.

Figure A2: Partisanship, Race, and Restrictive Provisions
(Excluding Texas)




Table A1: State-Level Restrictive Provisions, 2021

	Introduced		Passed	
	Robust	OLS	Robust	OLS
Nonhispanic White	22.3	29.9	3.3	6.2
	[-7.1, 51.7]	[-22.2, 82.1]	[0.3, 6.3]	[-7.6, 20.1]
Nonhispanic White ²	-26.0	-18.6	1.6	1.0
	[-46.8, -5.2]	[-55.4, 18.2]	[-0.5, 3.7]	[-8.8, 10.8]
Nonhispanic White ³	-6.3	-14.6	-0.2	-2.1
	[-24.4, 11.8]	[-46.7, 17.5]	[-2.1, 1.7]	[-10.6, 6.4]
Unified Republican Control	39.2	36.4	2.6	0.7
	[30.7, 47.7]	[21.4, 51.4]	[1.7, 3.4]	[-3.3, 4.7]
Nonhispanic White × Unified Republican Control	-645.6	-627.4	-54.6	-45.9
	[-713.2, -578.1]	[-747.2, -507.6]	[-61.5, -47.7]	[-77.7, -14.0]
Nonhispanic White ² × Unified Republican Control	667.9	663.7	48.9	46.3
	[589.4, 746.3]	[524.6, 802.9]	[40.8, 56.9]	[9.4, 83.3]
Nonhispanic White ³ × Unified Republican Control	-258.5	-246.4	-20.1	-18.6
	[-317.0, -200.0]	[-350.1, -142.7]	[-26.1, -14.1]	[-46.2, 9.0]
Competitive in 2020	3.1	10.9	-0.6	-1.8
	[-4.3, 10.5]	[-2.3, 24.0]	[-1.4, 0.1]	[-5.3, 1.7]
Unified Republican Control × Competitive	-5.8	-16.1	4.3	9.1
	[-17.4, 5.8]	[-36.7, 4.5]	[3.1, 5.5]	[3.6, 14.6]
2020 COVI	3.9	5.1	0.1	0.0
	[0.6, 7.3]	[-0.9, 11.1]	[-0.3, 0.4]	[-1.6, 1.6]
Change in Dem. Vote Share 2016–2020	-306.4	-111.1	1.1	-17.9
	[-538.4, -74.3]	[-522.5, 300.4]	[-22.7, 25.0]	[-127.3, 91.5]
Log(Median Income)	18.2	21.0	-0.8	-4.9
	[-12.7, 49.0]	[-33.7, 75.7]	[-3.9, 2.4]	[-19.5, 9.6]
Median Age	0.8	-0.3	-0.2	-0.3
	[-0.7, 2.4]	[-3.1, 2.5]	[-0.4, -0.1]	[-1.1, 0.4]
Share with Some College	-31.0	-60.0	-7.7	-2.9
	[-114.1, 52.1]	[-207.4, 87.5]	[-16.3, 0.8]	[-42.1, 36.3]
Log(Population Density)	-0.1	0.8	0.2	-0.2
	[-2.5, 2.3]	[-3.5, 5.1]	[0.0, 0.5]	[-1.3, 1.0]
Squire Index of Leg. Professionalism	15.3	40.8	-0.6	-0.8
	[-10.8, 41.5]	[-5.6, 87.1]	[-3.3, 2.1]	[-13.1, 11.6]
Intercept	-40.7	-3.9	12.9	27.0
	[-111.4, 30.0]	[-129.2, 121.5]	[5.6, 20.1]	[-6.3, 60.3]
Num.Obs.	50	50	50	50
R2		0.891		0.676
R2 Adj.		0.838		0.519
AIC	418.7	407.6	287.5	275.1
BIC	453.1	442.0	321.9	309.5
RMSE	11.11	9.94	2.99	2.64

Nonhispanic White, *Nonhispanic White*², and *Nonhispanic White*³ computed using orthogonal polynomials.
95% confidence intervals shown below estimates.

In Tables A2 and A3, I estimate the primary, robust regressions using a linear, squared, and cubic term for the share of each state that is non-white. The appropriate goodness-of-fit statistics for robust regressions are the AIC and BIC. As Table A2 indicates, the model with the cubic term is a much better fit when the dependent variable is the number of provisions introduced; all 3 models generally fit equally well when testing the count of restrictive provisions passed (Table A3). Importantly, all three functional forms for “Nonhispanic White” tell the same story: there is no real relationship between race and restrictive provisions in states where Republicans do not have unified control but where they do, the white share of the population is strongly correlated with fewer restrictive provisions being introduced and passed.

Table A2: State-Level Restrictive Provisions Introduced, 2021

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Nonhispanic White	16.5	29.7	22.3
	[-21.9, 55.0]	[-6.2, 65.6]	[-7.1, 51.7]
Nonhispanic White ²		-12.1	-26.0
		[-37.2, 12.9]	[-46.8, -5.2]
Nonhispanic White ³			-6.3
			[-24.4, 11.8]
Unified Republican Control	3.5	15.5	39.2
	[-6.7, 13.7]	[5.6, 25.4]	[30.7, 47.7]
Nonhispanic White × Unified Republican Control	-63.6	-240.5	-645.6
	[-113.8, -13.3]	[-299.9, -181.1]	[-713.2, -578.1]
Nonhispanic White ² × Unified Republican Control		210.7	667.9
		[148.8, 272.7]	[589.4, 746.3]
Nonhispanic White ³ × Unified Republican Control			-258.5
			[-317.0, -200.0]
Competitive in 2020	8.8	7.6	3.1
	[-1.2, 18.8]	[-1.7, 16.8]	[-4.3, 10.5]
Unified Republican Control × Competitive	8.3	-4.2	-5.8
	[-6.2, 22.8]	[-18.7, 10.2]	[-17.4, 5.8]
2020 COVI	1.8	4.8	3.9
	[-2.5, 6.1]	[0.7, 8.8]	[0.6, 7.3]
Change in Dem. Vote Share 2016–2020	-51.8	-272.5	-306.4
	[-344.0, 240.4]	[-560.3, 15.3]	[-538.4, -74.3]
Log(Median Income)	5.2	4.7	18.2
	[-36.1, 46.5]	[-33.7, 43.1]	[-12.7, 49.0]
Median Age	-0.9	-1.6	0.8
	[-2.4, 0.7]	[-3.2, -0.1]	[-0.7, 2.4]
Share with Some College	-8.8	27.9	-31.0
	[-119.8, 102.2]	[-75.2, 130.9]	[-114.1, 52.1]
Log(Population Density)	1.3	1.3	-0.1
	[-1.5, 4.1]	[-1.6, 4.2]	[-2.5, 2.3]
Squire Index of Leg. Professionalism	6.0	17.7	15.3
	[-29.2, 41.3]	[-14.9, 50.4]	[-10.8, 41.5]
Intercept	29.8	48.3	-40.7
	[-52.7, 112.2]	[-32.1, 128.7]	[-111.4, 30.0]
Num.Obs.	50	50	50
AIC	491.9	459.9	418.7
BIC	518.6	490.4	453.1
RMSE	25.02	17.45	11.11

Nonhispanic White, *Nonhispanic White*², and *Nonhispanic White*³ computed using orthogonal polynomials. 95% confidence intervals shown below estimates.

Table A3: State-Level Restrictive Provisions Passed, 2021

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Nonhispanic White	4.5	6.3	3.3
	[-0.1, 9.1]	[-0.3, 13.0]	[0.3, 6.3]
Nonhispanic White ²		3.3	1.6
		[-1.4, 7.9]	[-0.5, 3.7]
Nonhispanic White ³			-0.2
			[-2.1, 1.7]
Unified Republican Control	-1.1	1.1	2.6
	[-2.3, 0.1]	[-0.7, 3.0]	[1.7, 3.4]
Nonhispanic White × Unified Republican Control	-6.1	-41.8	-54.6
	[-12.1, -0.2]	[-52.8, -30.8]	[-61.5, -47.7]
Nonhispanic White ² × Unified Republican Control		29.1	48.9
		[17.6, 40.5]	[40.8, 56.9]
Nonhispanic White ³ × Unified Republican Control			-20.1
			[-26.1, -14.1]
Competitive in 2020	-1.1	-1.2	-0.6
	[-2.3, 0.0]	[-2.9, 0.5]	[-1.4, 0.1]
Unified Republican Control × Competitive	8.3	4.4	4.3
	[6.6, 10.0]	[1.7, 7.0]	[3.1, 5.5]
2020 COVI	0.3	0.5	0.1
	[-0.2, 0.8]	[-0.3, 1.2]	[-0.3, 0.4]
Change in Dem. Vote Share 2016–2020	-12.4	-5.2	1.1
	[-47.1, 22.4]	[-58.4, 48.0]	[-22.7, 25.0]
Log(Median Income)	-0.1	-2.4	-0.8
	[-5.1, 4.8]	[-9.5, 4.7]	[-3.9, 2.4]
Median Age	-0.3	-0.6	-0.2
	[-0.4, -0.1]	[-0.9, -0.3]	[-0.4, -0.1]
Share with Some College	-8.7	-2.6	-7.7
	[-21.9, 4.5]	[-21.6, 16.5]	[-16.3, 0.8]
Log(Population Density)	0.0	0.4	0.2
	[-0.3, 0.4]	[-0.2, 0.9]	[0.0, 0.5]
Squire Index of Leg. Professionalism	-0.6	-1.8	-0.6
	[-4.8, 3.5]	[-7.8, 4.2]	[-3.3, 2.1]
Intercept	15.1	28.2	12.9
	[5.3, 24.9]	[13.3, 43.1]	[5.6, 20.1]
Num.Obs.	50	50	50
AIC	288.4	285.2	287.5
BIC	315.1	315.8	321.9
RMSE	3.27	3.04	2.99

Nonhispanic White, *Nonhispanic White*², and *Nonhispanic White*³ computed using orthogonal polynomials. 95% confidence intervals shown below estimates.

3 Regression Tables for District-Level Models

In Table A4, I present the results of the models testing the interactive relationships of district and state share white with the legislators' likelihood of sponsoring a restrictive voting bill. In both the upper and lower chambers, the models including the linear and squared terms are slightly better fits. That said, the models are substantively similar: whether using a polynomial of 1 or of 2, lawmakers from white districts were the most likely to sponsor a restrictive bill, but the relationship between whiteness and sponsorship is smaller in whiter states (thus the consistently negative coefficients on *Nonhispanic White* \times *State % Nonhispanic White*).

Table A4: District-Level Sponsored Provisions, 2021

	Lower Chamber		Upper Chamber	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Nonhispanic White	1361.4*** [1016.6, 1706.1]	1326.8*** [862.6, 1790.9]	792.2*** [475.0, 1109.4]	1349.1*** [896.2, 1801.9]
Nonhispanic White ²		389.2* [79.5, 698.9]		295.0 [-9.1, 599.1]
State % Nonhispanic White	7.4 [-4.3, 19.1]	10.6 [-2.5, 23.7]	-51.0*** [-69.7, -32.3]	-64.1*** [-85.0, -43.2]
Nonhispanic White × State % Nonhispanic White	-2156.2*** [-2615.4, -1697.0]	-2052.2*** [-2675.8, -1428.7]	-878.1*** [-1285.3, -470.9]	-1748.1*** [-2338.4, -1157.8]
Nonhispanic White ² × State % Nonhispanic White		-704.1** [-1181.2, -227.0]		-129.0 [-563.0, 304.9]
Republican Representative	21.3*** [18.1, 24.5]	21.6*** [18.4, 24.9]	22.5*** [18.0, 27.1]	21.5*** [16.9, 26.2]
Female Representative	-1.9 [-4.5, 0.7]	-1.9 [-4.4, 0.7]	2.7 [-1.2, 6.7]	2.8 [-1.1, 6.7]
Black Representative	-6.7 [-20.8, 7.3]	-3.5 [-17.5, 10.6]	12.0 [-2.5, 26.4]	12.2 [-2.3, 26.8]
Latino Representative	-8.1 [-22.0, 5.9]	-6.0 [-20.0, 7.9]	10.6 [-4.8, 26.0]	11.0 [-4.6, 26.5]
Other Race Representative	-1.0 [-8.3, 6.3]	0.1 [-7.2, 7.4]	5.2 [-2.4, 12.9]	7.8 [-0.1, 15.6]
Log(Median Income)	3.9 [-1.8, 9.6]	3.4 [-2.3, 9.1]	0.0 [-9.0, 9.0]	0.1 [-8.9, 9.1]
Median Age	0.1 [-0.1, 0.4]	0.2 [-0.1, 0.5]	-0.1 [-0.5, 0.4]	-0.2 [-0.6, 0.3]
Share with Associate's Degree or Higher	-8.8 [-22.3, 4.7]	-8.6 [-22.2, 5.0]	-12.0 [-33.4, 9.4]	-6.7 [-28.2, 14.7]
Log(Population Density)	0.2 [-0.5, 1.0]	0.1 [-0.6, 0.9]	-0.5 [-1.5, 0.5]	-0.6 [-1.6, 0.4]
State Competitive in 2020	12.3*** [9.2, 15.3]	13.1*** [10.0, 16.2]	19.0*** [14.7, 23.3]	19.0*** [14.6, 23.3]
State has Unified Republican Control	9.3*** [6.6, 12.0]	9.5*** [6.8, 12.2]	5.5** [1.5, 9.5]	6.0** [2.0, 10.0]
Squire Index of Leg. Professionalism	73.4*** [59.6, 87.2]	72.4*** [58.5, 86.2]	15.8 [-4.8, 36.4]	12.1 [-8.4, 32.7]
Intercept	-29.3** [-48.0, -10.6]	-33.9*** [-53.8, -14.0]	30.5* [0.3, 60.7]	42.7** [11.2, 74.2]
Num.Obs.	4588	4588	1905	1905
R2	0.129	0.131	0.165	0.172
R2 Adj.	0.126	0.127	0.158	0.164
RMSE	39.00	38.97	36.15	36.01

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

The dependent variable ranges from 0 to 100.

Nonhispanic White and *Nonhispanic White*² computed using orthogonal polynomials.

95% confidence intervals shown below estimates and computed with robust standard errors.

4 Alternate Method for Estimating District-Level Racial Resentment

In the body of this manuscript, I calculate legislative-district level racial resentment scores by allowing ZIP code resentment scores to be split across districts where they cross district boundaries. Here, I show that my results are largely robust to a different way of approaching the problem caused by the CES not reporting legislative districts for respondents.

Rather than weight responses by the districts they *could* live in, I now assign them to the district in which a plurality of the population in their district lives. Nationally, this correctly assigns roughly 90% of Americans to the correct upper legislative district, and 80% of the population to the correct lower district.


Because this approach misassigns as many as 1-in-5 CES respondents it is not my preferred approach. However, this approach does have one key benefit over the ZIP code distribution approach: it allows me to aggregate responses all the way to the district level, rather than to the ZIP code level, and from ZIP code to district, as in the body of the manuscript.

Of course, the CES is not weighted to be representative of legislative districts. To better weight the CES respondents, I utilize the `anesrake` (Pasek, 2018) package in R. ANES rake creates raked survey weights such that survey respondents are reflective of the population they are meant to represent.

I create two weights for each CES respondent: one for the upper chamber to which they are assigned, and one for their lower chamber. I rake along 4 characteristics: age, income, education, and race. Some legislative districts have too few respondents to be raked; in these cases, respondents are all assigned a weight of 1.

In Figures A3–A6 I present the distribution of upper and lower districts along the characteristics used for raking. While the weights improve the distributions for both upper and lower districts, the improvement is especially notable in the the upper districts.


Figure A3: Age Distributions



In Table A5 I present the results of regressions estimating the relationship between estimated district levels of racial resentment among white respondents and the likelihood of being represented by a lawmaker who sponsored a restrictive bill.

The table makes clear that this alternative approach generally points in the same direction as the primary findings in the manuscript. The lower-chamber models are highly significant when using the unweighted approach ($p < 0.001$) but not significant ($p = 0.17$) in the weighted approach; given that the raking procedure worked less-well for these chambers, it is possible that the unweighted approach is better; in any event, these alternate resentment scores tell the same general story as those in the body of the manuscript.


Figure A4: Income Distributions



While I present both the weighted and unweighted upper-chamber models, the raking procedure was highly successful for these districts, as the figures above make clear. Here, the unweighted model is not significant ($p = 0.15$) but very highly significant when I implement the raking procedure ($p < 0.01$).

It is worth noting that, as discussed above, this approach surely includes the racial resentment scores for individuals who *do not live* in the district to which this approach assigns them. As such, this approach is probably biased in the direction of false negatives; that is, this set-up is conservative and is more likely to return a false negative than a false positive. That we continue to see generally significant results with magnitudes similar to

Figure A5: Education Distributions



those presented in the body of the manuscript indicates that these results are robust to different ways of estimating district-level resentment scores.

Figure A6: Racial Distributions




Table A5: District-Level Sponsored Provisions, 2021

	Lower Chamber		Upper Chamber	
	Unweighted	Rake Weighted	Unweighted	Rake Weighted
Alternate Resentment Score (Unweighted)	2.3** [0.4, 4.2]		3.4* [0.0, 6.8]	
Alternate Resentment Score (Weighted)		1.2 [-0.5, 2.9]		4.6*** [1.8, 7.5]
Republican Representative	20.5*** [17.1, 23.9]	20.8*** [17.3, 24.2]	27.8*** [23.0, 32.7]	27.6*** [22.8, 32.4]
Female Representative	-2.1 [-4.9, 0.7]	-2.1 [-4.9, 0.7]	2.1 [-2.0, 6.2]	2.1 [-2.0, 6.2]
Black Representative	10.7 [-5.9, 27.3]	11.0 [-5.6, 27.6]	11.9 [-3.3, 27.0]	12.4 [-2.8, 27.6]
Latino Representative	3.9 [-12.9, 20.7]	4.2 [-12.7, 21.0]	9.1 [-7.5, 25.6]	9.7 [-7.0, 26.3]
Other Race Representative	6.6 [-2.0, 15.1]	6.8 [-1.8, 15.3]	6.6 [-1.5, 14.8]	6.9* [-1.3, 15.1]
Nonhispanic White	9.3** [0.9, 17.8]	9.0** [0.5, 17.4]	-5.1 [-16.9, 6.6]	-4.6 [-16.3, 7.1]
Log(Median Income)	-0.6 [-6.8, 5.5]	-0.3 [-6.4, 5.9]	-2.8 [-12.3, 6.7]	-3.3 [-12.9, 6.2]
Median Age	0.1 [-0.2, 0.4]	0.1 [-0.2, 0.4]	0.1 [-0.3, 0.6]	0.1 [-0.4, 0.6]
Share with Associate's Degree or Higher	-0.6 [-15.5, 14.3]	-2.7 [-17.6, 12.2]	4.1 [-19.3, 27.5]	7.4 [-15.8, 30.6]
Log(Population Density)	1.1** [0.2, 1.9]	1.0** [0.2, 1.9]	-0.2 [-1.3, 0.9]	-0.2 [-1.3, 0.9]
State Competitive in 2020	11.7*** [8.5, 14.9]	11.6*** [8.4, 14.8]	23.6*** [18.5, 28.6]	23.8*** [18.7, 28.9]
State has Unified Republican Control	8.7*** [5.9, 11.5]	8.8*** [5.9, 11.6]	5.5** [1.1, 10.0]	5.5** [1.1, 9.9]
Squire Index of Leg. Professionalism	76.3*** [61.9, 90.8]	76.2*** [61.7, 90.7]	27.5*** [7.1, 48.0]	27.7*** [7.3, 48.2]
Intercept	-45.6*** [-63.1, -28.1]	-42.1*** [-59.3, -24.9]	-33.3*** [-57.9, -8.6]	-37.5*** [-61.2, -13.7]
Num.Obs.	4227	4227	1761	1761
R2	0.117	0.116	0.155	0.157
R2 Adj.	0.114	0.113	0.148	0.151
RMSE	39.60	39.62	36.64	36.59

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The dependent variable ranges from 0 to 100.

95% confidence intervals shown below estimates and computed with robust standard errors.

References

Pasek, Josh. 2018. "Anesrake: ANES Raking Implementation."