**Gender Norm Conflict and Marital Outcomes**

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Online Appendix 2: Additional Tables

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| **Online Appendix Table A2.1: Summary Statistics** |
| **Panel A: All Marriage Markets** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | **All** |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | Men | Women |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Mean | SD | Mean | SD |  |  |  |  |  |
| Share Ever married | 0.87 | 0.11 | 0.89 | 0.10 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Share Divorced | 0.14 | 0.07 | 0.18 | 0.07 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Share Traditional | 0.41 | 0.19 | 0.34 | 0.15 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of obs. | 752 |   | 752 |   |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Panel B: Markets by Skill Level** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | **Unskilled** |  | **Skilled** |
|  | Men | Women |  | Men | Women |
|   | Mean | SD | Mean | SD |   | Mean | SD | Mean | SD |
| Share Ever married | 0.85 | 0.12 | 0.88 | 0.12 |  | 0.90 | 0.08 | 0.90 | 0.06 |
| Share Divorced | 0.17 | 0.07 | 0.19 | 0.08 |  | 0.10 | 0.04 | 0.15 | 0.06 |
| Share Traditional | 0.48 | 0.18 | 0.42 | 0.14 |  | 0.31 | 0.15 | 0.23 | 0.10 |
| Number of obs. | 443 |   | 443 |   |   | 309 |   | 309 |   |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Panel C: Markets by Race** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | **White** |  | **Black** |
|  | Men | Women |  | Men | Women |
|   | Mean | SD | Mean | SD |   | Mean | SD | Mean | SD |
| Share Ever married | 0.89 | 0.09 | 0.91 | 0.06 |  | 0.79 | 0.14 | 0.78 | 0.14 |
| Share Divorced | 0.13 | 0.06 | 0.16 | 0.06 |  | 0.22 | 0.07 | 0.26 | 0.08 |
| Share Traditional | 0.40 | 0.18 | 0.33 | 0.15 |  | 0.46 | 0.18 | 0.39 | 0.15 |
| Number of obs. | 597 |   | 597 |   |   | 155 |   | 155 |   |
| Note: The unit of observation is a cell defined by birth cohort and marriage market, where the latter is defined by race, skill, and state. Marriage and divorce rates are calculated from ACS samples, using population weights. “% Traditional” reports the fraction of individuals across marriage market-cohorts who agree “Better for man to work, woman to tend home” based on GSS samples which vary at the regional level. Skilled is defined as having at least a college degree, whereas unskilled individuals have less than a college degree. See further sample details in Section III of the main text.  |

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| **Online Appendix Table A2.2: Distribution of Gender Norm Conflict Variable** |
|  | **Conflict top 25%** | **Conflict bottom 75%** |
|  | # of obs. | percent  | # of obs. | percent  |
| Race |  |  |  |  |
| White | 246 | 63.4 | 948 | 84.95 |
| Black | 142 | 36.6 | 168 | 15.05 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Region |  |  |  |  |
| North East | 94 | 24.23 | 144 | 12.9 |
| Midwest | 44 | 11.34 | 280 | 25.09 |
| South | 200 | 51.55 | 432 | 38.71 |
| West | 50 | 12.89 | 260 | 23.3 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Cohort |  |  |  |  |
| BY 1920-29 | 94 | 24.23 | 108 | 9.68 |
| BY 1930-49 | 178 | 45.88 | 68 | 6.09 |
| BY 1940-49 | 38 | 9.79 | 220 | 19.71 |
| BY 1950-59 | 78 | 20.1 | 224 | 20.07 |
| BY 1960-69 | 0 | 0 | 258 | 23.12 |
| BY 1970-79 | 0 | 0 | 238 | 21.33 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Skill |  |  |  |  |
| No Degree | 246 | 63.4 | 640 | 57.35 |
| Has Degree | 142 | 36.6 | 476 | 42.65 |
| Note: The unit of observation is a cell defined by birth cohort and marriage market, where the latter is defined by race, skill, and state. Conflict: (F-Mod share) x (M-Trad share) measures interaction between F-Modern and M-Traditional shares. M-Traditional measures share of men agreeing with traditional gender norms (“Better for man to work, woman to tend home”) within a cell defined by race-sex-skill-region based on GSS samples. F-Modern measures 1-share of women agreeing with traditional gender norms.  |

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| **Online Appendix Table A2.3: Main results without level effects** **(Excluding F-Mod share and M-Trad share)** |
|  | **Ever Married** | **Currently Divorced** |
|  | Men | Women | Men | Women |
|   | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|   |   |   |   |   |
| Conflict: (F-Mod share) x (M-Trad share) | -0.162\*\* | -0.209\*\* | 0.243\*\*\* | 0.282\*\*\* |
|  | (0.065) | (0.089) | (0.036) | (0.040) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Mean Dep. Var | 0.87 | 0.89 | 0.14 | 0.18 |
| Observations | 752 | 752 | 752 | 752 |
| R-squared | 0.899 | 0.806 | 0.872 | 0.820 |
| Note: The unit of observation is a cell defined by birth cohort and marriage market, where the latter is defined by race, skill, and state. Dependent variables measure marriage and divorce rates from ACS samples using population weights. Conflict: (F-Mod share) x (M-Trad share) measures interaction between F-Modern and M-Traditional shares. M-Traditional measures share of men agreeing with traditional gender norms (“Better for man to work, woman to tend home”) within a cell defined by race-sex-skill-region based on GSS samples. F-Modern measures 1-share of women agreeing with traditional gender norms. All models include cohort fixed effects as well as fixed effects for the marriage market which varies by race, skill, and state. See further sample details in Section III of the main text. Robust standard errors, clustered at state level, reported in parentheses.\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 |

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| **Online Appendix Table A2.4: Gender Norm Conflict and Marital Outcomes by Race** |
|   | **Men** | **Women** |
|  | White | Black | White | Black |
|   | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| **Panel A. Ever-married** |  |  |  |  |
| Conflict: (F-Mod share) x (M-Trad share) | -0.123\*\*\* | -0.061 | -0.098\* | 2.223 |
|  | (0.044) | (1.313) | (0.058) | (1.870) |
| Share: F-Modern | 0.043 | 0.055 | 0.026 | -1.309 |
|  | (0.034) | (0.809) | (0.044) | (1.258) |
| Share: M-Traditional | 0.174\*\*\* | 0.161 | 0.096\*\*\* | -0.986 |
|  | (0.028) | (0.703) | (0.034) | (1.072) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Mean Dep. Var | 0.89 | 0.79 | 0.91 | 0.78 |
| Observations | 597 | 155 | 597 | 155 |
| R-squared | 0.945 | 0.963 | 0.882 | 0.960 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| **Panel B. Currently Divorced** |   |   |   |   |
| Conflict: (F-Mod share) x (M-Trad share) | 0.563\*\*\* | 2.505 | 0.626\*\*\* | 1.163 |
|  | (0.038) | (2.078) | (0.051) | (1.633) |
| Share: F-Modern | -0.172\*\*\* | -1.480 | -0.199\*\*\* | -0.342 |
|  | (0.031) | (1.357) | (0.041) | (1.100) |
| Share: M-Traditional | -0.420\*\*\* | -1.264 | -0.511\*\*\* | -0.822 |
|  | (0.026) | (1.138) | (0.040) | (0.914) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Mean Dep. Var | 0.13 | 0.22 | 0.16 | 0.26 |
| Observations | 597 | 155 | 597 | 155 |
| R-squared | 0.889 | 0.817 | 0.789 | 0.884 |

Note: The unit of observation is a cell defined by birth cohort and marriage market, where the latter is defined by race, skill, and state. Dependent variables measure marriage and divorce rates from ACS samples using population weights. M-Traditional measures share of men agreeing with traditional gender norms (“Better for man to work, woman to tend home”) within a cell defined by race-sex-skill-region based on GSS samples. F-Modern measures 1-share of women agreeing with traditional gender norms. Conflict: (F-Mod share) x (M-Trad share) measures interaction between F-Modern and M-Traditional shares. All models include cohort fixed effects as well as marriage market fixed effects which vary by race, skill, and state . See further sample details in Section III of the main text.

Robust standard errors, clustered at state level, reported in parentheses.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

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| **Online Appendix Table A2.5: Gender Norm Conflict and Children in Household** |
|   | **Has Child in Household** |
|  | Men | Women |
|   | (1) | (2) |
|   |   |   |
| Conflict: (F-Mod share) x (M-Trad share) | -1.053\*\*\* | -0.580\*\*\* |
|  | (0.074) | (0.068) |
| Share: F-Modern | 0.224\* | 0.112 |
|  | (0.122) | (0.097) |
| Share: M-Traditional | 0.933\*\*\* | 0.540\*\*\* |
|  | (0.076) | (0.059) |
|  |  |  |
| Mean Dep. Var | 0.31 | 0.37 |
| Observations | 752 | 752 |
| R-squared | 0.923 | 0.963 |

Note: The unit of observation is a cell defined by birth cohort and marriage market, where the latter is defined by race, skill, and state. Dependent variable measures whether there is a child in the household from ACS samples using population weights. M-Traditional measures share of men agreeing with traditional gender norms (“Better for man to work, woman to tend home”) within a cell defined by race-sex-skill-region based on GSS samples. F-Modern measures 1-share of women agreeing with traditional gender norms. Conflict: (F-Mod share) x (M-Trad share) measures interaction between F-Modern and M-Traditional shares. All models include cohort fixed effects as well as marriage market fixed effects which vary by race, skill, and state. See further sample details in Section III of the main text.

Robust standard errors, clustered at state level, reported in parentheses.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

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