

Online Appendix:

Why Do People Use Informal Justice? Experimental Evidence from Kosovo

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May 24, 2023

Abstract

Why do some people resolve disputes through the state, while others use religious or customary justice? We address this question conducting a vignette experiment in Kosovo. We design hypothetical situations in which fictitious characters are involved in disputes regarding inheritance, debt, domestic violence, and murder. We vary information concerning i) vignette characters' resources, ii) their beliefs about the efficiency of state justice, and iii) dispute settlement customs in the characters' communities. Survey respondents assess whether a vignette character is likely to seek informal justice, given the described circumstances. We find that respondents associate informal justice with characters who believe that the state would resolve their disputes very slowly, and whose other community members would *not* use state justice. These findings generalize to respondents' own justice preferences and patterns of actual informal dispute settlement in Kosovo and beyond. Our article highlights efficiency concerns and local conventions as explanations of informal justice.


Keywords: informal justice, dispute settlement, vignette experiment, conflict, Kosovo

Online Appendix

Contents

- A.1 Formal and informal justice in Kosovo 4
 - A.1.1 Customary justice: The *Kanun* 4
 - A.1.2 Religious justice: The Sharia 7
- A.2 Sampling 8
- A.3 Ethics 8
- A.4 Main models 10
- A.5 Disaggregated justice authorities 14
- A.6 Three-way interaction of vignette treatments 15
- A.7 Respondents’ own preferences for informal justice 18
- A.8 Does vignette characters and respondents’ similarity matter? 22
- A.9 Vignettes: Information equivalence problem? 25
- A.10 Evidence in support of the resources hypothesis 27
- A.11 Informal dispute settlement cases: Data from news items 30
- A.12 Generalizability (I): The Asian Barometer data 36
- A.13 Generalizability (II): Pakistan data 38

Figure A1: Map of Kosovo and Western Balkans



Notes: The figure shows the map of Western Balkans. The area highlighted in red indicates Kosovo (different municipalities are separated by black lines).

A.1 Formal and informal justice in Kosovo

Kosovo has a single state judicial system, which is based on the country's constitution adopted after the declaration of independence from Serbia in February 2008. The constitution establishes Kosovo as "a secular state [which] is neutral in matters of religious beliefs" (Kosovo's Constitution 2008, Article 8). "Freedom of belief, conscience and religion is guaranteed" (Article 38). The highest judicial authority is the Supreme Court (Article 103[2]), while the "Constitutional Court is the final authority for the interpretation of the Constitution and the compliance of laws with the Constitution" (Article 112[1]). While "[r]eligious denominations have the right to establish religious schools and charity", the Kosovo's constitution stipulates that such activities shall be submitted to the state's constitution and laws (Article 39[3]). As such, no other court or judicial system is allowed to legally operate within Kosovo.

Kosovo's formal judicial authority extends over the territory (with varying degrees in urban and rural areas) through a system of state courts and state notary offices. Yet, despite this relatively elaborate system of state justice, Albanian citizens of Kosovo are well known for relying on informal justice and resolving disputes through customary rules and practices. The most common means of informal justice includes reliance on the Albanian traditional customary law, the *Kanun*. At times, Kosovo Albanians also resolve their disputes through the religious authority, such as local and authoritative clergy members—mainly, the imams. Below, we briefly describe these informal justice systems with some examples of how they are used in Kosovo.

A.1.1 Customary justice: The *Kanun*

The first and the most predominant form of informal justice in Kosovo is the adjudication through the community-based centuries old *Kanun*. The *Kanun* is a comprehensive

body of customary laws dating back to the 15th century or even earlier.¹ The Kanun has survived different empires and states that historically ruled over Albanians. The Ottomans tried to eradicate the Kanun between 15th and 19th century, but eventually failed—especially, in more remote areas in Northern Albania. Similarly, the Yugoslav state (1918–92), despite its many attempts to eradicate the Kanun, did not manage to eliminate this informal justice system.²

The *Kanun* has attracted public and scholarly attention due to its emphasis on honor, revenge, and blood feud (Trnavci, 2010). This is well illustrated through its prescriptions in the case when one's family member is killed by another person. The *Kanun* defines three possible courses of action in a situation like that. First, the victim's family can take revenge by killing ('taking the blood' of) the perpetrator or one of their male relatives. Second, the victim's family can forgive the perpetrator's family. Third, the victim's family can apply a sort of a 'grace period,' whereby the family of the perpetrator is assured that they will face no revenge during a defined period of time.

The second and third options are enforced through 'besa'— a word (oath) of honor. When a victim's family gives besa (to not retaliate) or offers a 'grace period,' the perpetrator's family may be assured that they will not be harmed under any circumstances. Under besa, the perpetrators of offence are free men, as if they had not committed any crime. Instead, if the besa is not given and the 'grace period' is not offered, the perpetrator's family is under 'blood condition' and they can expect revenge at any time.

The besa and the 'grace period' are mediated and enforced by the community mechanism of 'pleçsia.' The word indicates the elderly council. Pleçsia serves as a mediator in local conflicts and plays a crucial role in resolving disputes between two or more families. A member of pleçsia who mediates in a dispute is usually somebody who is

¹Castelletti, Giuseppe. 1930. "Consuetudini e vita sociale nelle montagne albanesi secondo il Kanun di Lekë Dukagjinit ["Customs and Social Life in the Albanian Mountains according to the Kanun of Lekë Dukagjini"]. Studi Albanesi, Rome.

²It is worth noting that while the Ottoman and Yugoslav states tried to eradicate the Kanun in the legal sphere, they also relied on it to secure power at the local level.

trusted by both families involved in the dispute. He (a mediator is usually a man) is a 'person of wisdom' and a respected member of the community. Families are expected to comply with any decisions reached through the mediation of pleçsia. If they do not comply with these decisions, they put their family honor at risk.

The application of the ancient *Kanun* survives to this day, albeit with convenient interpretations by present-day generations. It continues to be commonly used in disputes involving family property, marriage, debt, murder, and other civil and criminal cases. An illustrative example comes from a story of Anton Çetta, a university professor who served as a mediator of pleçsia throughout 1990s. In describing his experiences of resolving over 1,000 disputes among Albanian families, Çetta recalls:

I remember a case when a very good student of mine in the university [...] did not come to the final exams in his second and third year of his studies. [...] Eventually, I saw him come during his fourth year, after two years of 'taking a break.' When I saw him, I asked: "Why did you not come to the exams, my son?" The student replied "Professor, I could not, because I am under blood condition! We are home-confined! They [the victim's family] did not give us besa, but today I came in secretly."³

Another common application of the *Kanun* are disputes involving the rights of men and women to property. The *Kanun* stipulates that "a married woman has no right to inheritance of her parents' property—[in such a case] the *Kanun* takes the married woman as a residue of parents' property" (*Kanun* [1933], Article 20). Such a principle applies to the present day. For instance, Afërdita Statovci was denied the right to her deceased parents' property by other male relatives.⁴ It took 13 years of legal battles before she won her case. Afërdita's example is representative of the general struggle of women in Kosovo to obtain their rights to property as stipulated by the state's formal justice system. As this article is being written, only 38 percent of divorced women have been able to secure the right to any part of the divorced couple's shared property.⁵ The

³Gërguri, Festim. 2021. "Si u ndal vëllavrasja mes shqiptarëve të Kosovës nga një profesor me studentët e tij." *Gazeta Express*, January 14, 2021. [Link to the source](#).

⁴*Gazeta Express*. 2019. "Në luftë me kanunin e shtetin: Pas 13 vjetësh vajza fiton gjyqin për pronën që ia mori xhaxhai." December 15, 2019. [Link to the source](#).

⁵RTK. 2019. "Vetëm 17 Për Qind e Grave Në Kosovë Kanë Pronë." [Link to the source](#).

frequent application of the *Kanun* is one explanation of this situation.

A.1.2 Religious justice: The Sharia

Another method of informal justice in Kosovo is dispute resolution through the religious clergy according to the Islamic law, the ‘Sharia.’ A recent example of the application of religious justice comes from a murder case that took place in Kosovo’s capital, Prishtina in 2020. In a violent dispute between two neighbors who claimed the rights to a tiny property (less than one square meter large), three people were killed and two wounded.⁶ Given the gravity of the situation, the state justice was automatically involved. Yet, in parallel to the state adjudication, the families pursued informal justice by themselves. The victims’ families agreed on a ‘grace period’ of 90 days. A member of the Muslim religious clergy was involved as a mediator who guaranteed the upholding of besa.

This example illustrates how the religious clergy often takes the role of pleçsia in resolving disputes in Kosovo. This could be either because of the involved parties’ religious beliefs, the religious clergy’s perceived wisdom and respect, or both. The religious dispute resolution in Kosovo, at times, overlaps with the *Kanun*-based customary justice. However, the Sharia is also applied independently in many cases. During our field visits to Kosovo, we discovered numerous situations in which families asked for an imam’s interpretation of the Sharia to guide them in solving disputes related to inheritance and property rights.⁷ Interestingly, religious justice is commonly used not only by the religiously devout Muslims, but also by families who only nominally profess Islam.

⁶Hasani, Gentiana. 2020. “Tragjedia në Lagjen Mati 1: Familjet po i japin besë njëra—tjetrës me ndërmjetësimin e hoxhallarëve.” *Gazeta Express*, January 14, 2020. [Link to the source](#).

⁷See also, Gjinovci, Rron. 2016. “E Drejta e Grave Në Pronë.” Prishtina: Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN). [Link to the source](#).

A.2 Sampling

To collect our data, we implemented multi-stage stratified random sampling that included Albanian citizens of Kosovo older than 18 years of age.⁸ We designed the sample using the 2011 population census. Our sampling quotas were based on municipality (first-level strata) and settlement (second-level strata) data. We used probability proportional to size method. We selected our primary sampling units (PSUs) within settlements by dividing the settlements according to the multiples of six (average number of assigned interviews per PSU) in equal proportions. Our enumerators conducted interviews following a counter-clock walk procedure starting from the center of the settlement (defined by landmark, geographic datum, etc.) and interviewing every third encountered house. Enumerators continued recruiting respondents within the designated PSU until all assigned interviews are completed. All respondents were interviewed at home in their native language by co-ethnic enumerators. The average time of the interview was 15 minutes. Out of 2,405 respondents, 1,000 were recruited within the country's capital—Prishtina.

A.3 Ethics

A survey on informal justice poses some risks to subjects and enumerators. We took these risks seriously and devised four steps to mitigate them. First, before commencing the survey, we conducted qualitative interviews with local experts, including scholars, workers of international organizations, and employees of a survey firm. Following the feedback, we modified several survey items. Second, we exclusively recruited local enumerators from Kosovo who had excellent knowledge of the area and experience in conducting surveys. Our enumerators were esteemed members of their communities, and thus highly trusted by subjects. The recruited enumerators come from the Albanian

⁸Kosovo Serbs rarely use informal justice, which is why we excluded them from the sampling frame.

community and were instructed to interview members of their own ethnic group only. Third, we invested a significant amount of time in the training of the enumerators, sensitizing them in particular to the security situation, the rights of research subjects, and protocol to follow in case of unexpected problems. All enumerators obtained a certificate from the local firm authorized to conduct surveys in the area. Fourth, we put in place a number of security measures. We established a constant-response system, asking enumerators to report back on a daily basis. We also instructed enumerators to abort surveys as soon as the subject or enumerator were experiencing the slightest feeling of unease.

Overall, these security measures allowed us to obtain data on the use of informal justice, while securing the safety of all involved subjects. Besides the above measures, we informed all survey respondents about their rights. In particular, we informed the interviewees about their rights to: i) abandon the interview at any point, ii) refuse answer to any question, and iii) withdraw consent even after the conclusion of an interview. We also explained that any information collected for this survey would be published in an anonymized form so that it would be impossible to identify interviewees. Interviewees who agreed to participate in the survey were asked to sign an informed consent form using a template designed by the British Council, Kosovo (funding organization).

The project was approved by institutional review boards at the Collegio Carlo Alberto and British Council.

A.4 Main models

We analyze the predicted use of informal justice by a vignette character by estimating a linear model:

$$\text{Informal justice}_i = \alpha_i + \beta_1 \cdot \text{Resourcelessness}_i + \beta_2 \cdot \text{Inefficiency}_i + \beta_3 \cdot \text{Conventions}_i + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

whereby *Informal justice*_{*i*} takes on the value 1 if a respondent believes that a given vignette character resolved their dispute through religious clerics or through community mediation according to the *Kanun*, and 0 if the respondent believes that the vignette character resolved their dispute through the state. All independent variables are binary.⁹ The variable *Resourcelessness*_{*i*} takes on the value 1 if the respondent was exposed to a vignette describing a poor person involved in a legal dispute, and 0 if the described person was rich. The variable *Inefficiency*_{*i*} takes on the value 1 if the respondent was exposed to a vignette describing a person who believed that the state courts would solve their dispute very slowly, and 0 if the described person believed that the state courts would solve their dispute very quickly. The variable *Conventions*_{*i*} takes on the value 1 if the respondent was exposed to a vignette describing a person who believed that most people in their community would *not* use state justice to solve a similar dispute, and 0 if the described person believed that everyone in their community would use state justice. Table A1 shows the results of the model for four types of legal disputes. Tables A2 and A3 show the results of additional models that include respondent-level controls and weights, respectively.

⁹We opted for dichotomous manipulations after testing the vignettes in the field with more than dozen of respondents. More subtle manipulations were not noticeable to the respondents. Only dichotomous manipulations proved salient enough.

Table A1: Experimental primes and the expected use of informal justice by dispute type

	(1) Debt	(2) Inheritance	(3) Domestic_violence	(4) Murder
Resourcelessness (z)	0.046 (0.028)	0.021 (0.029)	0.062** (0.028)	-0.008 (0.028)
Inefficiency (z)	0.119*** (0.028)	0.067** (0.029)	0.078*** (0.028)	0.096*** (0.028)
Conventions (z)	0.058** (0.028)	0.044 (0.029)	0.060** (0.028)	0.101*** (0.028)
R-squared	0.020	0.007	0.015	0.021
N	1201	1204	1215	1190

Notes: The table reports coefficients of linear regressions of the expected choice of informal justice by a vignette character in the indicated dispute on the indicated vignette prime. All outcomes are standardized. Standard errors shown below *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Table A2: Experimental primes and the expected use of informal justice by dispute type (controls)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Debt	Inheritance	Domestic_violence	Murder
Resourcelessness (z)	0.048* (0.028)	0.012 (0.029)	0.050* (0.028)	-0.009 (0.028)
Inefficiency (z)	0.112*** (0.028)	0.066** (0.029)	0.087*** (0.028)	0.096*** (0.028)
Conventions (z)	0.061** (0.028)	0.048* (0.029)	0.058** (0.028)	0.092*** (0.028)
Female	-0.035 (0.063)	0.057 (0.067)	-0.014 (0.064)	-0.080 (0.063)
Age	0.002 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
Incomplete primary school	-0.161 (0.270)	-0.346 (0.311)	-0.233 (0.291)	-0.034 (0.270)
Complete primary school	-0.240 (0.239)	-0.202 (0.287)	-0.400 (0.263)	-0.214 (0.244)
Incomplete secondary school	-0.127 (0.259)	-0.000 (0.309)	-0.170 (0.286)	0.271 (0.262)
Complete secondary school	-0.201 (0.236)	-0.353 (0.284)	-0.574** (0.260)	-0.133 (0.241)
Incomplete religious school	0.521 (0.611)	0.012 (0.756)	1.003 (0.735)	0.057 (0.599)
Complete religious school	-0.089 (0.726)	0.141 (0.645)	-0.326 (0.730)	0.476 (0.602)
Incomplete university	-0.173 (0.251)	-0.244 (0.301)	-0.443 (0.277)	-0.138 (0.256)
Complete university	-0.280 (0.241)	-0.408 (0.290)	-0.506* (0.266)	-0.051 (0.246)
Full-time employed	0.019 (0.105)	-0.159 (0.104)	-0.004 (0.105)	-0.032 (0.100)
Part-time employed	0.094 (0.217)	0.275 (0.230)	0.074 (0.220)	0.465** (0.216)
Retired	0.150 (0.147)	0.285** (0.137)	0.285** (0.140)	0.197 (0.136)
Housewife	-0.142 (0.127)	-0.164 (0.132)	0.010 (0.128)	-0.131 (0.124)
Student	-0.248* (0.130)	-0.242* (0.136)	-0.090 (0.134)	0.053 (0.126)
Unemployed	-0.018 (0.102)	-0.059 (0.102)	0.115 (0.102)	0.000 (0.098)
Income (log)	-0.050 (0.047)	-0.010 (0.048)	-0.048 (0.046)	-0.002 (0.047)
Religiosity	0.029 (0.036)	0.059* (0.034)	0.012 (0.034)	0.072** (0.035)
R-squared	0.042	0.045	0.047	0.057
N	1195	1196	1207	1184

Notes: The table reports coefficients of linear regressions of the expected choice of informal justice by a vignette character in the indicated dispute on the indicated vignette prime. All outcomes are standardized. Self-employed is a reference category for occupation, and no schooling is a reference category for education. Standard errors shown below * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A3: Experimental primes and the expected use of informal justice by dispute type (controls & weights)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Debt	Inheritance	Domestic_violence	Murder
Resourcelessness (z)	0.062* (0.033)	0.010 (0.033)	0.058* (0.032)	-0.011 (0.031)
Inefficiency (z)	0.128*** (0.033)	0.053 (0.033)	0.125*** (0.032)	0.135*** (0.031)
Conventions (z)	0.067** (0.033)	0.060* (0.033)	0.058* (0.032)	0.076** (0.031)
Female	-0.021 (0.076)	0.051 (0.077)	-0.007 (0.074)	0.010 (0.073)
Age	-0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)
Incomplete primary school	-0.124 (0.312)	-0.261 (0.305)	-0.255 (0.411)	0.093 (0.227)
Complete primary school	-0.079 (0.284)	0.203 (0.293)	-0.372 (0.382)	0.134 (0.200)
Incomplete secondary school	-0.012 (0.311)	0.138 (0.324)	-0.236 (0.410)	0.411* (0.239)
Complete secondary school	0.024 (0.284)	0.075 (0.290)	-0.502 (0.381)	0.230 (0.201)
Incomplete religious school	0.317 (0.735)	0.392 (0.711)	1.079*** (0.401)	0.080 (0.339)
Complete religious school	0.187 (0.883)	-0.071 (0.607)	-1.010* (0.609)	0.789 (0.645)
Incomplete university	-0.138 (0.296)	0.084 (0.310)	-0.391 (0.397)	0.111 (0.220)
Complete university	-0.137 (0.291)	-0.021 (0.298)	-0.504 (0.387)	0.266 (0.210)
Full-time employed	0.038 (0.122)	-0.186 (0.122)	0.042 (0.116)	-0.039 (0.114)
Part-time employed	-0.095 (0.251)	0.058 (0.281)	-0.028 (0.234)	0.422 (0.286)
Retired	0.038 (0.180)	0.080 (0.161)	0.212 (0.159)	0.122 (0.158)
Housewife	-0.209 (0.145)	-0.178 (0.148)	0.005 (0.140)	-0.158 (0.127)
Student	-0.399*** (0.142)	-0.203 (0.157)	-0.173 (0.148)	-0.007 (0.144)
Unemployed	-0.125 (0.117)	-0.160 (0.121)	0.032 (0.110)	-0.046 (0.109)
Income (log)	-0.047 (0.057)	0.006 (0.054)	0.001 (0.055)	0.072 (0.049)
Religiosity	0.036 (0.043)	0.077** (0.038)	0.002 (0.040)	0.056 (0.038)
Weights	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.053	0.028	0.042	0.055
N	1195	1196	1207	1184

Notes: The table reports coefficients of linear regressions of the expected choice of informal justice by a vignette character in the indicated dispute on the indicated vignette prime. All outcomes are standardized. Self-employed is a reference category for occupation, and no schooling is a reference category for education. Standard errors shown below * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A.5 Disaggregated justice authorities

In a complementary exercise, we estimate a series of multinomial logistic regression models in which Y_i represents the categorical outcome of interest, including the following categories: i) dispute resolution through state authority, ii) dispute resolution through religious clerics, and iii) dispute resolution through mediation according to the *Kanun*. Table A4 shows the results of these analyses.

Table A4: Experimental primes and the expected use of informal justice by dispute type (multinomial logistic models)

	(1) Debt	(2) Inheritance	(3) Domestic_violence	(4) Murder
<i>Religious justice</i>				
Resourcelessness	0.074 (0.214)	0.228 (0.206)	0.211 (0.197)	-0.417* (0.231)
Inefficiency	0.363* (0.214)	0.309 (0.206)	0.178 (0.197)	0.582** (0.232)
Conventions	-0.229 (0.216)	0.240 (0.206)	0.345* (0.199)	0.301 (0.227)
<i>Community justice</i>				
Resourcelessness	0.247* (0.140)	0.039 (0.136)	0.303** (0.142)	0.083 (0.141)
Inefficiency	0.580*** (0.140)	0.274** (0.137)	0.423*** (0.143)	0.395*** (0.142)
Conventions	0.430*** (0.140)	0.167 (0.136)	0.230 (0.142)	0.515*** (0.143)
Controls	No	No	No	No
N	1201	1204	1215	1190

Notes: The table shows coefficients (log-odds) of multinomial logistic regression of the expected choice of informal justice by a vignette character in the indicated dispute on the indicated vignette prime. State justice is treated as the reference category. Standard errors shown below *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

A.6 Three-way interaction of vignette treatments

We theorized that the origin of legal conventions in a given community can be related to the other two factors we study: the lack of resources among its members and the widespread beliefs about the inefficiency of state justice. We further argued that the conventions effect can operate even in the absence of the original causes that put a given convention in place. The analysis that follows tries to parse this *independent* effect of conventions out. We estimate a three-way interaction model, interacting all manipulated pieces of information in the vignettes with each other:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Informal justice}_i = & \alpha_i + \beta_1 \cdot \text{Resourcelessness}_i + \beta_2 \cdot \text{Inefficiency}_i + \beta_3 \cdot \text{Conventions}_i \\ & + \beta_4 \cdot \text{Resourcelessness}_i \times \text{Inefficiency}_i \\ & + \beta_5 \cdot \text{Resourcelessness}_i \times \text{Conventions}_i \\ & + \beta_6 \cdot \text{Inefficiency}_i \times \text{Conventions}_i \\ & + \beta_7 \cdot \text{Resourcelessness}_i \times \text{Inefficiency}_i \times \text{Conventions}_i + \epsilon_i \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$


This test allows us to estimate how the effect of conventions (other people using informal justice) changes depending on the combination of the other two factors. Specifically, we can see how the information about the frequent use of informal justice in the vignette character's community affects respondents' evaluations when i) the character is either portrayed as 'resourceless' or not, and ii) when s/he is said to believe that the state justice is either efficient, or inefficient.

We use 'contour' graphs to visualize these three-way interactions (Figure A2). We find that, in the case of criminal disputes (domestic violence and murder), the effect of conventions on the expected use of informal justice by a vignette character is positive even in scenarios in which we present the character who is rich and who believes that

state justice is highly efficient. The evidence thus points to an independent effect of conventions, as posited in the theory. This pattern is not entirely replicated in the case of civil disputes (inheritance and debt). However, even in the latter cases, the conventions prime has a positive effect on the expected choice of informal justice by characters who believe that state justice is efficient, provided that these characters are not portrayed as rich. Importantly, across scenarios, we find that the conventions prime adds to the effect of the inefficiency prime by increasing expectations that a vignette character uses informal justice.

Taken together, the analysis suggests that conventions matter for the expected choice of informal justice even in the absence of state justice's inefficiency or 'resourcelessness.'

Figure A2: Experimental primes and the expected use of informal justice by dispute type: Three-way interaction



Notes: The figure plots the effect of ‘conventions’ prime on the expected choice of informal justice by a vignette character conditional on the levels of the other two primes. The shades indicate the range of estimates for the effect of conventions for each combination of other primes. The estimates indicate changes in the likelihood of choosing informal justice (vis-à-vis formal one) related to a change in the ‘conventions’ prime’s level from “nobody uses state justice” to “everybody uses state justice.” Relevant comparisons include the estimates in four corners of each graph that correspond to four possible combinations of the resources and inefficiency primes’ levels.

A.7 Respondents' own preferences for informal justice

In another exercise, we replicate our main findings using a more direct approach. In particular, we explore correlations between respondents' *own* preferences for informal justice and their *own* beliefs and circumstances.

We try to ensure a close correspondence between the measures used in this exercise and our vignette primes. First, we measure respondents' limited economic resources with an agreement with the statement that their households can barely can make ends meet. Second, we measure respondents' *own* beliefs about the inefficiency of state justice using a question about mistrust toward the Kosovo justice system. Third, we measure local community norms against the use of state justice by calculating whether the majority of respondents' neighbors (conceptualized as residents of the same municipality¹⁰) believe that people should rely on informal justice to resolve specific disputes. All independent variables are binary. The models include control variables (the same as in the previous models) and weights. Table A5 shows the results of this analysis.

There are additional dimensions of inaccessibility and inefficiency of state justice that we did not include in our vignettes (e.g. geographical proximity to a court or lengthy appeal process). We focused on the most salient issues with state justice in Kosovo based on the observations from our fieldwork. Yet, one might have a legitimate concern that by omitting certain dimensions of inaccessibility and inefficiency of state justice we could inadvertently capture the effect of these unmeasured variables by our conventions prime. Most straightforwardly, respondents could make inferences about the quality of state justice from the information that no one in a fictitious community would resolve their disputes through the state.

To address this concern, we extend the list of efficiency and accessibility proxies in the analysis of respondents' own legal preferences (such an extension is impossible in the

¹⁰The result is robust to the re-conceptualization of a local community as inhabitants of the same 250m×250m population grid.

analysis of our vignettes). In particular, we include two dummy variables that indicate whether a respondent lives in the proximity (within 10 minutes walking distance) of i) police station and ii) court/notary office. What is more, we create a dummy variable indicating whether any of respondent's neighbors (defined as persons living within the same 250m×250m population grid) described their profession as 'Law, Public Safety, Corrections and Security.' A neighboring lawyer could improve the accessibility of state justice even for 'resourceless' individuals.

To improve our measurement of inefficiency of state justice, we create a variable capturing municipal levels of trust in the Kosovo legal system. We do so by aggregating individual responses. In addition, we use the number of courts and notary offices in respondent's municipality (per 1,000 residents) as another proxy for efficiency. Given the concentration of courts in the capital, we include a dummy variable for Prishtina. Table A6 presents the results of this supplementary analysis. The results presented thus far are firmly confirmed.

Table A5: Determinants of informal justice by dispute type (respondents' own legal preferences)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Debt	Inheritance	Domestic_violence	Murder
Resourcelessness (z)	0.052 (0.037)	0.011 (0.033)	0.046 (0.035)	0.027 (0.033)
Inefficiency (z)	0.081** (0.037)	0.080** (0.035)	0.092*** (0.036)	0.082** (0.035)
Conventions (z)	0.155*** (0.033)	0.169*** (0.035)	0.185*** (0.037)	0.158*** (0.038)
Female	-0.105 (0.074)	-0.042 (0.070)	-0.016 (0.071)	-0.031 (0.072)
Age	0.001 (0.003)	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)
Incomplete primary school	0.055 (0.343)	-0.097 (0.228)	0.286 (0.276)	-0.020 (0.256)
Complete primary school	-0.060 (0.303)	0.146 (0.226)	0.009 (0.216)	-0.104 (0.229)
Incomplete secondary school	-0.079 (0.321)	0.035 (0.260)	0.142 (0.259)	0.228 (0.276)
Complete secondary school	-0.016 (0.304)	0.066 (0.226)	-0.093 (0.214)	-0.091 (0.232)
Incomplete religious school	0.788 (0.745)	0.828 (0.840)	2.001*** (0.250)	0.015 (0.486)
Complete religious school	-0.691** (0.311)	-0.329 (0.241)	2.122*** (0.209)	-0.574** (0.249)
Incomplete university	-0.288 (0.309)	0.095 (0.248)	-0.063 (0.231)	-0.230 (0.241)
Complete university	-0.271 (0.307)	-0.057 (0.233)	-0.184 (0.218)	-0.148 (0.237)
Full-time employed	-0.004 (0.123)	-0.124 (0.116)	0.138 (0.114)	-0.021 (0.124)
Part-time employed	-0.071 (0.216)	-0.257 (0.230)	-0.145 (0.154)	-0.187 (0.144)
Retired	0.138 (0.181)	0.264 (0.161)	0.164 (0.161)	0.095 (0.164)
Housewife	-0.057 (0.146)	-0.033 (0.145)	0.051 (0.133)	-0.313*** (0.121)
Student	-0.193 (0.130)	-0.299** (0.147)	-0.187 (0.130)	-0.163 (0.142)
Unemployed	0.056 (0.116)	-0.142 (0.113)	0.062 (0.108)	-0.063 (0.114)
Income (log)	0.080 (0.059)	-0.119** (0.054)	-0.031 (0.058)	0.108** (0.049)
Religiosity	0.112*** (0.040)	0.122*** (0.032)	0.063* (0.034)	0.097*** (0.033)
Weights	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.089	0.086	0.106	0.089
N	1195	1196	1207	1184

Notes: The table reports coefficients of linear regressions of the indicated outcomes on the indicated treatment. All outcome and main explanatory variables are standardized. Self-employed is a reference category for occupation, and no schooling is a reference category for education. Standard errors shown below *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Table A6: Determinants of informal justice by dispute type (respondents' *own* legal preferences & extended measures of state justice's accessibility and efficiency)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Debt	Inheritance	Domestic_violence	Murder
Resourcelessness (z)	0.062 (0.038)	0.031 (0.034)	0.060* (0.036)	0.038 (0.033)
Inefficiency (z)	0.079** (0.038)	0.064* (0.037)	0.102*** (0.037)	0.069* (0.036)
Conventions (z)	0.156*** (0.033)	0.164*** (0.035)	0.188*** (0.038)	0.159*** (0.038)
Police station	-0.031 (0.089)	0.099 (0.124)	0.141 (0.108)	-0.060 (0.095)
Court or notary office	0.023 (0.112)	-0.279** (0.121)	-0.377*** (0.094)	-0.057 (0.113)
Lawyer in neighborhood	-0.276*** (0.072)	-0.184** (0.076)	-0.125 (0.082)	-0.134* (0.081)
Trust in state justice in mun	0.036 (0.113)	-0.180 (0.110)	0.123 (0.111)	-0.054 (0.096)
Number of courts in mun	0.129 (0.260)	0.255 (0.321)	0.023 (0.191)	0.017 (0.219)
Prishtina dummy	0.220*** (0.073)	0.254*** (0.077)	0.311*** (0.073)	0.316*** (0.073)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Weights	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.097	0.104	0.124	0.102
N	1195	1196	1207	1184

Notes: The table reports coefficients of linear regressions of the indicated outcomes on the indicated treatment. All outcome and main explanatory variables are standardized. Control variables (the same as in Table A5) are not reported. Standard errors shown below *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

A.8 Does vignette characters and respondents' similarity matter?


Next, we explore treatment heterogeneity with respect to respondents' own characteristics that correspond to the characteristics of our vignette characters. Does similarity to the fictitious characters affect respondents' evaluations of the latter's use of informal justice? To address this question, we extend our model by adding interactions between characters and respondents' analogous characteristics:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Informal justice}_i = & \alpha_i + \beta_1 \cdot \text{Resourcelessness (character's)}_i + \beta_2 \cdot \text{Inefficiency (character's)}_i \\ & + \beta_3 \cdot \text{Conventions (character's)}_i + \beta_4 \cdot \text{Resourcelessness (respondent's)}_i \\ & + \beta_5 \cdot \text{Inefficiency (respondent's)}_i + \beta_6 \cdot \text{Conventions (respondent's)}_i \\ & + \beta_7 \cdot \text{Resourcelessness (character's)}_i \times \text{Resourcelessness (respondent's)}_i \\ & + \beta_8 \cdot \text{Inefficiency (character's)}_i \times \text{Inefficiency (respondent's)}_i \\ & + \beta_9 \cdot \text{Conventions (character's)}_i \times \text{Conventions (respondent's)}_i + \epsilon_i \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

To measure respondents' *own* characteristics, we rely on the proxies described in detail in Section A.7. Importantly, we try to ensure a close correspondence between these measures and our vignette primes. The models use the same controls and weights as reported in Table A3.

Figure A3 shows the coefficients for these interaction effects (β_7 — β_9 ; see also Table A7). We do not find consistent evidence that respondents' own characteristics affect their reactions to the vignette primes. Respondents' resources moderate reactions to the resources prime in two out of four scenarios, but they do so in inconsistent way, either strengthening or weakening the effect of the prime. There is little heterogeneity with respect to other dimensions, except for the negative interaction of respondents and characters' beliefs about state justice's inefficiency in the case of murder disputes.

Figure A3: The expected use of informal justice by dispute type: Interactions between experimental primes and respondent's analogous characteristics



Notes: The figure plots point-estimates (dots) and 90/95 percent confidence intervals (thick and thin lines, respectively) of interactions between vignette characters and respondents' analogous characteristics (β_7 – β_9 , equation 3) from regressions of the expected choice of informal justice by a vignette character in the indicated dispute. All outcomes are standardized. The underlying regression table is available in Table A7

Table A7: The expected use of informal justice by dispute type: Interactions between experimental primes and respondent's analogous characteristics

	(1) Debt	(2) Inheritance	(3) Domestic_violence	(4) Murder
Resourcelessness (character)	0.063* (0.032)	0.013 (0.032)	0.058* (0.032)	0.000 (0.030)
Inefficiency (character)	0.119*** (0.033)	0.062* (0.033)	0.125*** (0.031)	0.123*** (0.031)
Conventions (character)	0.065** (0.032)	0.062* (0.032)	0.050 (0.032)	0.086*** (0.030)
Resourcelessness (respondent)	0.010 (0.035)	0.094*** (0.035)	0.036 (0.034)	0.045 (0.033)
Inefficiency (respondent)	0.072** (0.036)	0.113*** (0.036)	0.083** (0.034)	0.104*** (0.034)
Conventions (respondent)	0.137*** (0.021)	0.108*** (0.031)	0.146*** (0.030)	0.122*** (0.029)
Resp. x Character.'s Resourcelessness	-0.029 (0.032)	-0.068** (0.033)	-0.005 (0.031)	0.062** (0.030)
Resp. x Character.'s Inefficiency	0.011 (0.036)	0.005 (0.035)	0.010 (0.033)	-0.065* (0.034)
Resp. x Character.'s Conventions	-0.008 (0.021)	0.026 (0.032)	0.012 (0.030)	-0.044 (0.028)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Weights	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.084	0.072	0.080	0.106
N	1195	1196	1207	1184

Notes: The table reports coefficients of linear regressions of the expected choice of informal justice by a vignette character in the indicated dispute on the indicated treatment. All effects are standardized. Standard errors shown below *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

A.9 Vignettes: Information equivalence problem?

One potential concern is that our vignettes may not only manipulate the intended information, but also alter respondents' *other* beliefs about vignette characters. In survey experiments, this issue is known as the information equivalence problem (see [Dafoe, Zhang and Caughey, 2018](#)). In our case, for example, one could argue that the wealth of a vignette character may also prime their social connections. Economic resources could thus have a double effect on legal choices by making i) state justice more accessible and ii) informal justice potentially more favorable (if a wealthy man has a privileged relationship with community elders; see [Appendix A.1](#)). We rule out the latter possibility by showing a *negative* baseline correlation between respondents' household income and their *own* preferences for informal justice ([Table A8](#); for more information about our data on respondents' justice preference, see [Appendix A.7](#)). To address the information equivalence more broadly, we personally pre-tested our vignettes and validated them through a series of manipulation checks.

A related question is how informative our primes are to permit respondents to make reasonable guesses regarding a hypothetical choice of informal justice. With regard to the resources prime, one could be concerned that, compared to the two other primes, this prime does not offer such a clear clue for respondents to predict the likely course of legal action by a vignette character. While we cannot completely rule out such a possibility, certain findings are inconsistent with the interpretation that the null effect of the resources prime can be explained by the fact that survey respondents could have been "clueless" in linking the information about vignette character's resources to their justice choices. We argue this much by focusing on respondents who were *least* likely to overlook the importance of plaintiff's resources.

One could argue that respondents who have limited resources themselves should be most likely to recognize the importance of information about vignette character's re-

sources in the context of justice choices. They should not be “clueless.” In fact, we find significant interactions between respondent’s own limited resources and the information about the ‘resourcelessness’ of the vignette characters in two out of four scenarios (inheritance and murder disputes; see Figure A3). However, these interactions go in the opposite directions. In the case of inheritance disputes, respondents with limited resources are less likely to predict the choice of informal justice by ‘resourceless’ vignette characters. But, in the case of murder disputes, respondents with limited resources are more likely to predict informal justice choices by ‘resourceless’ vignette characters.

These divergent findings are thus not in line with the interpretation that the information about vignette character’s resources might have left respondents uncertain about how this information relates to the choice of informal justice. Rather, they suggest that there are some important heterogeneities regarding the effect of resources on informal justice. We hope that future research could explore this possible heterogeneity.

Table A8: Household income and informal justice by dispute type (respondents’ *own* legal preferences)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Debt	Inheritance	Domestic_violence	Murder
Income (log)	-0.043** (0.018)	-0.070*** (0.019)	-0.040** (0.018)	-0.014 (0.017)
Controls	No	No	No	No
Weights	No	No	No	No
R-squared	0.005	0.012	0.004	0.001
N	1195	1196	1207	1184

Notes: The table reports coefficients of linear regressions of the choice of informal justice in the indicated dispute on the indicated treatment primes. Standard errors shown below *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

A.10 Evidence in support of the resources hypothesis

As indicated in the main text, the question of resources' impact on informal justice merits further discussion. On the one hand, some results are in line with the resources hypothesis. For example, the log of income correlates negatively with respondents' preferences for informal justice in Table A8. Moreover, the presence of a lawyer in the respondent's neighborhood and her proximity to a court—both allegedly increasing the accessibility of state justice—also correlate negatively with preferences for informal justice (see Table A6). These results are thus partially at odds with our vignette findings.

On the other hand, the above evidence varies with dispute types and is not robust to different model specifications. For example, the income variable is no longer significantly correlated with the respondents' preference for informal justice once demographic covariates are controlled for (see Tables A5 and A6). In two models, the direction of the estimate is even reversed (columns 1 and 4 of Table A5). Note, however, that the income variable is measured at the household level. Perhaps, larger households have more income. At the same time, larger households can be more conservative and thus endorse more traditional ways of dispute settlement. Put differently, it is unclear which channel the household income variable is most likely to capture. A similar concern could be raised about the lawyer in the neighborhood variable. A neighboring lawyer arguably increases the accessibility of state justice, but s/he can also increase general trust in the formal legal system. Thus, the variable has ambiguous interpretation vis-à-vis our proposed channels. This is why we lean toward prioritizing the vignette evidence while summarizing the main takeaways of our study.

To look more closely into the above ambiguity, we explore two additional implications of the resources channel. First, the Kosovo justice system offers free legal aid to poor individuals who are involved in criminal cases. Under the resources conjecture, we would thus expect that the effect of resources on the preference for informal justice

should be weaker in the case of criminal (*vis-à-vis* civil) disputes. This seems to be the case if we measure accessibility with the indicator of having a lawyer among neighbors (Table A6). However, the pattern does not hold true for other resources/accessibility proxies (e.g. the court variable in Table A6, or the “resourceless” and log income variables in Table A5). Likewise, the interaction does not hold true for our vignette findings whereby the outcome is the expected choice of informal justice by a fictitious character (Tables A1—A3).

Second, another peculiarity of the Kosovo justice system is that commercial and administrative cases can only be handled by a court in Prishtina. Therefore, there are no competent courts that deal with commercial and administrative cases outside the capital. As a result, under the resources conjecture, we might expect that, among respondents who live *far* away from Prishtina, resources should have a stronger effect on the preference for informal justice in the case of debt (commercial) dispute *vis-à-vis* the other three types of disputes. We test this implication by interacting our proxies for respondents’ resources with their distance to Prishtina (in degrees). We then compare these interactions between regressions of i) the preference for informal justice in debt-related disputes and ii) the preference for informal justice in other disputes. Again, the results are not consistent with the implication of the resources hypothesis. We find a significant interaction between the distance to Prishtina and respondents’ resources in debt-related cases. However, resources matter less for the preference for informal justice for respondents who live *farther* away from Prishtina (column 1 of Table A9). This pattern is thus opposite to what we expected under the resources/accessibility conjecture.

Taken together, the available evidence with respect to the resources channel is conflicting, possibly hinting at some important heterogeneities that should be explored in future studies.

Table A9: Determinants of informal justice by dispute type (respondents' *own* legal preferences & interactions with distance to Prishtina)

	(1) Debt	(2) Inheritance	(3) Domestic_violence	(4) Murder
Resourcelessness	0.085** (0.039)	0.036 (0.035)	0.021 (0.033)	0.053 (0.034)
Inefficiency	0.082** (0.037)	0.082** (0.035)	0.096*** (0.036)	0.081** (0.035)
Conventions	0.158*** (0.035)	0.167*** (0.035)	0.173*** (0.038)	0.162*** (0.039)
Distance to Prishtina	0.008 (0.036)	0.024 (0.035)	0.086** (0.038)	-0.012 (0.035)
Resour. x Dist. to Prishtina	-0.060* (0.036)	-0.045 (0.035)	0.036 (0.039)	-0.046 (0.034)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Weights	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.091	0.088	0.112	0.091
N	1195	1196	1207	1184

Notes: The table reports coefficients of linear regressions of the indicated outcomes on the indicated treatment. All outcome and main explanatory variables are standardized. Control variables are the same as in Table A5. Standard errors shown below *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

A.11 Informal dispute settlement cases: Data from news items

Data Our survey data allows us to measure people’s beliefs and preferences regarding informal justice. However, we are unable to inquire about the actual behaviors. To fill this gap, we built a complementary data source based on news articles that mention informal dispute settlement cases. To do so, we scraped over 185,000 news items from the main media outlets in Kosovo (top 15 media outlets in Kosovo according to Alexa Rankings) in the period between August and November 2021. We then conducted keyword-based text analysis to filter out news articles that describe informal dispute settlement in the cases of domestic violence, debt, murder, and property disputes. We then manually analyzed our initial (automatically generated) sample of news items, discarding duplicate and irrelevant ones and coding information about a municipality where the informal dispute settlement took place.

In sum, we identified 241 cases of informal dispute settlement related to domestic violence, 13 debt cases, 6 murder cases, and 26 property cases. The news items do not always explicitly state whether an informal dispute resolution relied on customary or religious justice. The selected news, however, indicate that the state justice was either bypassed or individuals in dispute attempted to bypass it.

Limitations Before we discuss our news data in detail, we would like to acknowledge two potential biases. First, news coverage in rural areas might be spotty. Therefore, most of the reported cases of informal dispute settlement that we capture are likely to come from urban areas. At the same time, informal justice is supposedly lower in urban areas compared to the rural ones. As a result, our news data can underestimate the extent of actual informal dispute settlement in Kosovo, thus making us less likely to observe the hypothesized correlations.

Second, and more important, cases of informal dispute settlement usually do not make it to the news if the resolution is smooth and largely satisfactory to the involved

parties. As a result, only extreme cases of informal dispute settlement, possibly entailing violence, are likely to appear in the news. This might explain why our data includes disproportionately more mentions of informal dispute settlement in criminal cases. In reality, however, informal justice is more likely to be used to solve civil disputes (see [Baldwin, 2016](#)). We address this problem by restricting our dependent variable to informal dispute settlements in criminal cases, for which our measurement is arguably more precise. The results remain substantively unchanged (see column 3 of Table [A10](#)).

Examples Below, we summarize two illustrative news stories about informal dispute resolution. We choose one story reporting an informal resolution of a criminal dispute (murder case) and one story reporting an informal resolution of a civil dispute (property case).

We begin with the murder case. Marigona Osmani, an 18-year-old woman from the municipality of Ferizaj, was dropped at the hospital lifeless by two young men in late August 2021. One of the men was Marigona’s boyfriend. It was later found that Marigona was beaten to death by her boyfriend who, with the help of one of his friends, dropped the victim’s body at the hospital and left soon after.¹¹ When Marigona’s father was interviewed about the case, he stated that “if the state does not give its verdict, we have the Kanun.”¹² He made it clear that he was ready to seek the resolution of his daughter’s murder through the Kanun if the state could not smoothly resolve this case.

Another example comes from the reporting of a property dispute case. Back in 2017, the municipality of Prishtina’s Public Housing Enterprise started to collect rental fees from the tenants of some shops in the “George Bush” boulevard in Prishtina. However, there were individuals who came forward to claim that they were the rightful owners of those shops and that they should be the ones benefiting from the rental fees. The dispute

¹¹Brezar, Aleksandar. 2021. “Is the brutal murder of Marigona Osmani a tipping point for Kosovan society?” Euronews, September 2, 2021. [Link to the source](#).

¹²Gazeta Express. 2021. “Babai i Marigona Osmanit: Po s’veproi ligji, kemi Kanunin.” Gazeta Express, September 6, 2021. [Link to the source](#).

between these individuals and the municipality of Prishtina's Public Housing Enterprise had been ongoing in state courts for over 4 years. In an interview for a local media outlet on 8 September 2021, Ilhan Domaniku, one of the individuals who claimed property ownership of one of the shops, complained about the lengthy procedures in state courts. At one point in the interview, he stated that "with their [courts'] non-actions, the state institutions oblige citizens to self-administer justice."¹³

Analysis We use news items to create our behavioral measure of informal justice in Kosovo. Due to a small number of news items mentioning informal dispute resolution in debt, murder, and property-related cases, we build a single index for informal dispute settlement cases. We first normalize the index by population (divided by 1,000). The index is available for 27 municipalities for which we have data from our survey. Second, we normalize the index by the total number of crimes in the municipality (domestic violence, theft/robbery, murder), as reported by the police. This index is only available for 17 municipalities, due to missing information in official crime statistics from some municipalities.


Next, we explore correlations between our new behavioral measures of informal justice and the average mistrust in state justice (inefficiency proxy) and the average preferences for informal justice (conventions proxy) among the municipal population, using aggregate information from our original survey for the latter two outcomes. In line with our vignette findings, Figures A4 and A5 shows that the prevalence of informal justice in a municipality (normalized by population and crime incidence, respectively) correlates with the average mistrust in state justice and the average preferences for informal justice among the municipal population.

Table A10 confirms this pattern in a regression framework. We estimate a negative binomial model using the total number of crimes in the municipality as exposure vari-

¹³Lakna, Mimoza. 2021. "Pronarët e katër lokaleve në rrugën 'Xhorxh Bush' në Prishtinë kërcënojnë me vetëgjyqësi." Bota Sot, September 8, 2021. [Link to the source](#).


able. The results are in the same magnitude and direction as the rest of our findings. The effects of inefficiency concerns and conventions are statistically significant at the 95% level once we use the arguably most reliable outcome measure, that is, informal dispute settlements in criminal cases (murder and domestic violence; column 3 of Table A10).

Figure A4: Informal dispute settlement, inefficiency concerns, and local conventions: Municipal-Level analysis (informal dispute settlements by 1,000 population)



Notes: The figure plots the correlations between the log number of informal dispute settlement cases in a municipality and the average mistrust in state justice (left panel) and the average preferences for informal justice among the municipal population (right panel). The lines represent linear fits, estimated for each panel separately. The unit of analysis are Albanian-majority municipalities in Kosovo (N=27).

Figure A5: Informal dispute settlement, inefficiency concerns, and loocal conventions: Municipal-Level analysis (informal dispute settlements by the total number of crimes)



Notes: The figure plots the correlations between the log number of informal dispute settlement of criminal cases in a municipality and the average mistrust in state justice (left panel) and the average preferences for informal justice among the municipal population (right panel). The lines represent linear fits, estimated for each panel separately. The unit of analysis are Albanian-majority municipalities in Kosovo with non-missing official crime data (N=17).

Table A10: Determinants of informal dispute settlement: Municipal-level analysis (negative binomial model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Informal dispute settlements	Informal dispute settlements	Informal dispute settlements (criminal cases)
Resourcelessness (mun.)	0.162 (0.112)	0.188 (0.133)	0.225* (0.135)
Inefficiency (mun.)	0.239* (0.125)	0.237* (0.124)	0.298** (0.127)
Conventions (mun.)	0.254** (0.123)	0.252** (0.121)	0.285** (0.125)
Population (log)		-0.067 (0.199)	-0.137 (0.197)
Exposure variable	# crimes (2020)	# crimes (2020)	# crimes (2020)
Pseudo R-squared	0.072	0.073	0.093
N	17	17	17

Notes: The table reports coefficients of negative binomial regression of informal dispute settlement cases on the indicated explanatory variables. The explanatory variables are logged and standardized. The total number of crimes in a municipality is used as an exposure variable. Standard errors shown below * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A.12 Generalizability (I): The Asian Barometer data

To probe the generalizability of our findings, we first replicate our analysis using survey data from nine Asian countries covered by the 2015-16 wave of the Asian Barometer survey (Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, China, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Myanmar). We proxy informal justice using information whether a respondent contacted traditional leaders. Importantly, the answer choices allow us to distinguish between i) people who have not contacted traditional leaders but would do it “if something important happens in the future” and ii) those who have not contacted traditional leaders but would not do it regardless of the situation. Based on this distinction, we build two informal justice proxies, capturing actual behaviors and preferences, respectively.

We operationalize our explanatory variables in a similar way to our analyses of the Kosovo data. We measure resourcelessness as an agreement with the statement: “Our income does not cover the needs, there are great difficulties.” Perceived inefficiency of the formal justice system is approximated with the extent to which a respondent mistrusts police and courts (we combine these two variables into a single index). Lastly, we measure local community norms prescribing the use of informal justice by calculating the proportion of other people in respondents’ area who contact traditional leaders or who would have done so if needed. Additionally, we control for respondents’ basic demographics, such as age, gender, education attainment, religiosity and religion as well as marital status and household size. Our models include within-country region and year fixed effects.

Consistent with our vignette results, we find that the Asian Barometer respondents are more likely to contact traditional leaders the more they mistrust the formal justice system and the more other people in their area rely on traditional leaders’ help (Table [A11](#)). Despite possible measurement and endogeneity issues, this tentative evidence builds confidence in the generalizability of our findings from Kosovo.

Table A11: Determinants of informal justice (the Asian Barometer data)

	(1) Informal justice (behaviors)	(2) Informal justice (preferences)
Resourcelessness (z)	0.017 (0.014)	0.030* (0.017)
Inefficiency (z)	0.035*** (0.013)	0.041** (0.016)
Conventions (z)	0.448*** (0.055)	0.462*** (0.065)
Age	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)
Female	-0.097*** (0.026)	-0.063** (0.032)
Married (Single=ref.cat)	0.137*** (0.037)	0.156*** (0.045)
Living-in as married	-0.114 (0.074)	-0.217** (0.096)
Widowed/Separated	0.079 (0.071)	0.050 (0.089)
Divorced	-0.112 (0.111)	-0.077 (0.127)
Protestant (Roman Catholic=ref.cat)	0.228 (0.147)	0.232 (0.167)
Islam	0.209 (0.163)	0.243 (0.196)
Hindu	-0.164 (0.237)	-0.043 (0.256)
Buddhist	0.145 (0.095)	0.117 (0.109)
Other Asian religions	-0.383* (0.231)	-0.642** (0.293)
Shinto	0.295 (0.253)	0.350 (0.274)
Other	-0.123 (0.293)	-0.096 (0.321)
None	-0.045 (0.091)	-0.017 (0.105)
Incomplete primary/elementary (No school=ref.cat)	-0.036 (0.061)	-0.084 (0.082)
Complete primary/elementary	-0.143** (0.066)	-0.161* (0.083)
Incomplete technical/vocational type	-0.227*** (0.084)	-0.260** (0.101)
Complete technical/vocational type	0.184* (0.099)	0.196* (0.119)
Incomplete secondary/high school	-0.106* (0.062)	-0.221*** (0.081)
Complete secondary/high school	-0.019 (0.067)	-0.091 (0.086)
Some university education	0.001 (0.085)	-0.089 (0.104)
University education completed	-0.001 (0.075)	-0.060 (0.093)
Post-graduate degree	0.099 (0.129)	-0.003 (0.157)
Other	-1.019** (0.512)	-0.863 (0.530)
Religiosity	0.000 (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)
Household size	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.007)
R-squared	0.219	0.196
N	4700	3390

Notes: The table reports coefficients of linear regressions of the indicated outcomes on the indicated explanatory variables. All outcomes and main explanatory variables are standardized. Standard errors shown below *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

A.13 Generalizability (II): Pakistan data

In a final exercise, we further probe the generalizability of our findings by examining data from the tribal areas in Pakistan (erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas). Unlike in Kosovo (and most other countries around the world), in tribal Pakistan, informal justice is largely a default option for people trying to solve their disputes. State justice, by contrast, is a far less common solution. In fact, [Khan et al. \(2020\)](#) find that 88% of residents of the region rely on customary or religious justice. Any commonalities between such highly diverse contexts as Kosovo and tribal Pakistan would thus provide strong evidence in support of the generalizability of our findings.

We use a representative survey collected by [Khan et al. \(2020\)](#) (to whom we are extremely grateful for making their data available). We measure informal justice using information whether a respondent resorts to tribal elders or religious leaders to solve their disputes. We measure resourcelessness as the log of income per household member. We reverse the variable so that the low levels of income indicate greater resourcelessness. Inefficiency of the formal justice system is captured by a question whether there is “*quick justice*” in a village provided by the government or the army. Lastly, we measure local community norms prescribing the use of informal justice by calculating the proportion of other people in respondents’ village who rely on tribal elders or religious leaders to resolve their disputes. Again, we control for respondents’ basic demographics, such as age, gender, education attainment, religiosity and religion as well as marital status and household size. Our model includes sub-district fixed effects.

In line with the evidence presented thus far, [Table A12](#) shows that efficiency concerns and local conventions correlate with informal dispute settlement also in tribal Pakistan. This final test thus provides another piece of evidence that reinforces our confidence in the generalizability of the Kosovo findings.

Table A12: Determinants of informal justice (Pakistan Data)

	(1)
	Informal justice (behaviors)
Resourcelessness (z)	-0.032* (0.017)
Inefficiency (z)	0.027* (0.016)
Conventions (z)	0.573*** (0.017)
Religiosity	0.029 (0.019)
Shia Muslim (Sunni Muslim=ref.cat.)	0.078 (0.062)
Primary school (No school=ref.cat.)	-0.004 (0.064)
Middle school	-0.016 (0.055)
Secondary school	-0.007 (0.056)
Higher secondary school	-0.101* (0.056)
Diploma/certificate	0.013 (0.089)
University	0.026 (0.058)
Age	0.003* (0.001)
Male	0.428*** (0.080)
Family size	-0.005 (0.004)
Married (Never married=ref.cat.)	0.030 (0.044)
Widowed	0.251 (0.153)
Divorced/Separated	0.215 (0.230)
R-squared	0.358
N	2798

Notes: The table reports coefficients of linear regression of the indicated outcome on the indicated explanatory variables. The outcome and main explanatory variables are standardized. Standard errors shown below *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

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