Populism and Candidate Support in the US: The Effects of “Thin” and “Host” Ideology

Supplementary Materials

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A Information about the Survey

We conducted the replication of Neuner and Wratil (2022) in a survey that also included two other experiments on populism. One of these experiments ran in parallel to the replication, with the second half of our sample (i.e. with respondents who are not part of our sample). The other experiment preceded these experiments and asked respondents to compare a single pair of candidates running in Congressional elections that made populist vs. non-populist statements and either shared or opposed three substantive policy positions expressed by the respondent prior to the treatment. While from the respondent’s perspective this experiment was likely similar in topic and task to our replication, Bansak et al. (2018) have shown that estimates from conjoint experiments are quite robust to the number of choice tasks respondents complete (e.g. little change up to 30 choice tasks) and survey satisficing is not a major problem. Hence, we do not expect any significant biases for our replication from this single additional choice task.

Respondents also answered questions on the following topics prior to the conjoint experiment:

- Demographics: sex, urban/rural, home ownership
- “Thin” populist attitudes scale (see section E)
- Partisanship (incl. leaners)
- Feeling close to a party
- Liberal-conservative scale
- Need-to-evaluate battery
- Binary policy preferences on tariffs, healthcare funding and border control
- “Host” ideology attitudes scale (see section E)

Descriptive statistics for sample demographics are in Table A.1. The quotas worked in generating a sample that matches the Census on age, gender, and ethnicity. Income is lower than the median US income according to the Census, but that matches Coppock and McClellan (2019), who show this difference does not skew experimental results.

Table A.1: Descriptive Demographic Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td>$30,000 to $34,999</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>High school graduate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>44.685</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.514</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>0.718</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B Reporting Standards

This section addresses the reporting standards recommended by the APSA Organized Section on Experimental Research.

Hypotheses

- The aim of this research was to replicate Neuner and Wratil (2022) in the U.S. context by examining which aspects of “thin” and “host” populist ideology drive populist voting. There were no explicit hypotheses. Additional detail is provided in the manuscript.

Subjects and Context

- The sample was recruited through Lucid as this vendor provides cost-effective samples ($1 per respondent) using quotas for gender, age, ethnicity and region. U.S. residents aged 18 and older who complete surveys through the Lucid platform were eligible to participate. There were no exclusions and the recruitment strategy was not altered during the study.

- The recruitment of participants was administered by Lucid.

- The study was fielded from July 30 to August 4, 2019.

- Data were collected online using the “Qualtrics” survey platform.

- Lucid does not provide data that would enable the calculation of a response rate.

Allocation Method

- The study consists of a fully randomized conjoint experiment. Randomization was implemented in “Qualtrics” and information on all randomized attributes is provided in Online Appendix D.

- Respondents were randomized at the individual level without restrictions or blocking.

- Given the large number of profiles drawn (roughly 15,000) it is not possible to create a balance table.

- The instructions shown to participants are provided in Online Appendix C. Respondents were blind to the randomization of conjoint attributes and were told that they were evaluating hypothetical candidates.

Treatments

- The experimental design is described in detail in Online Appendix sections C and D.

- The treatment was administered online using the “Qualtrics” survey platform.

- Participants saw five candidate pairs for a total of ten profiles.
• There was no deception. Respondents were briefed about the hypothetical nature of the presented candidates before the experiment as well as reminded of this aspect on the survey’s completion screen.

• Attention checks are described in Online Appendix section K.

Results

• Full question wordings of all relevant variables are provided in Online Appendix sections C and E.

• The analytical strategy was not pre-registered but sought to follow the paper by Neuner and Wratil (2022) as closely as possible. The manuscript and Online Appendix E provide additional details.

• As the experiment had no exclusion criteria and strong compliance, we do not include a CONSORT flow diagram. As noted in the manuscript and Online Appendix section A this experiment was embedded in a larger study (n = 3,024) and 1,505 respondents participated in the experiment discussed in this paper. Those 1,505 were randomly selected into this experiment.

• We present the results using marginal means and provide these for each attribute level. All conjoint results presented in the manuscript and this Online Appendix were estimated using the cregg R package (version 0.4.0) (Leeper, 2020).

• No weighting procedures were used.

Other Information

• The study protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences at the University of Cologne (Protocol Number: R19012JR).

• The experimental protocol was not pre-registered as the authors considered it a direct replication of Neuner and Wratil (2022). All deviations from that study are described in the manuscript and the supplementary materials.

• The experiment was funded by C-SEB (Center for Social and Economic Behavior) at the University of Cologne through the “Junior Start-up Grant” (PI: Bruno Castanho Silva; Co-PI: Christopher Wratil), project “Nevermind, I’ll find someone like me”, ref. number Rd07-2018-JSUG.

• Replication materials are available at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/5AEGPM
Experimental Design and Materials

In this section, we present details of the materials used in our conjoint design. The conjoint experiment was introduced to respondents with the following text:

Next, we will introduce you to five pairs of hypothetical candidates for the House of Representatives in your district and ask you to compare the candidates.

For each candidate, we show you her most important political priorities and her positions on four issues.

Please remember: we are interested in your personal opinion. There are no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers.

Next, respondents were presented with five choice tasks, each containing two candidate profiles (“Candidate A” and “Candidate B”) presented in form of a table. Above each table containing the candidate profiles, we provided the following instructions to respondents:

Please read the descriptions of the two candidates carefully. Then tell us which of the two candidates you would rather vote for in a Congressional election.

The profiles always showed the candidates’ “First political priority” and “Second political priority” at the top. The political positions followed below and we randomized the order in which the four positions appeared at the respondent level. Hence, to guard against any priming effects based on attribute order, our estimates are averaged across all possible orders.

Below each set of profiles, we asked respondents which of the two candidates they would rather vote for:

If you had to choose between these two candidates in a Congressional election, who would you vote for?

If neither of the two candidates appeals to you, please still indicate who you would rather vote for.

This setup is almost identical to Neuner and Wratil (2022). The only noteworthy difference being that these authors’ also included a second outcome, asking respondents to what extent they could imagine to vote for each of the candidates (but their article does not analyse this outcome). In order to address any potential ethical concerns regarding our presentation of fictitious political candidates, we debriefed respondents at the end of our survey by reminding them that the candidates were fictitious and not real people.

Figure A.1 displays a screenshot of the choice tasks as they were presented to respondents during the course of the survey.
Candidate Pair 1 / 5

Please read the descriptions of the two candidates carefully. Then tell us which of the two candidates you would rather vote for in a Congressional election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Candidate A</th>
<th>Candidate B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>First Political Priority</strong></td>
<td>Fight political corruption</td>
<td>Strengthen social justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Second Political Priority</strong></td>
<td>Prevent Islamization</td>
<td>End the abuse of power by the parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Position on legal immigration</strong></td>
<td>Is for greatly increasing the number of legal immigrants</td>
<td>Is for greatly decreasing the number of legal immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Position on military intervention in the Middle East</strong></td>
<td>Is for somewhat more military intervention</td>
<td>Is for much more military intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Position on the taxation of the rich</strong></td>
<td>Is for much lower taxes on the rich</td>
<td>Is for somewhat higher taxes on the rich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Position on free trade and globalization</strong></td>
<td>Is for much more free trade and globalization</td>
<td>Is for somewhat more free trade and globalization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If you had to choose between these two candidates in a Congressional election, who would you vote for?

If neither of the two candidates appeals to you, please still indicate who you would rather vote for.

Candidate A

Candidate B
### D Attributes of the Original and US Replication Conjoint Experiments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Levels (Germany)</th>
<th>Levels (US)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First political priority</td>
<td>Fight political corruption, Overthrow the political elite, Strengthen direct democracy, Defend citizens’ interests, Lead Germany out of the crisis, Improve environmental protection, Promote economic growth, Strengthen social justice, Stop Islamization, Fight crime, Strengthen civil rights and civil liberties, Make globalization fairer, Create a social Europe</td>
<td>Fight political corruption, Overthrow the political elite, Strengthen direct democracy, Defend citizens’ interests, End the abuse of power by the parties, Improve environmental protection, Promote economic growth, Strengthen social justice, Prevent Islamization, Fight crime, Strengthen civil rights and civil liberties, Make globalization fairer, –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second political priority</td>
<td><em>Same levels as above but constrained to be distinct from first priority</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position on immigration</td>
<td>Is for the admission of a great many new refugees, Is for the admission of some new refugees, Is for the deportation of some refugees, <strong>Is for the deportation of a great many refugees</strong></td>
<td>Is for greatly increasing the number of legal immigrants, Is for somewhat increasing the number of legal immigrants, Is for somewhat decreasing the number of legal immigrants, <strong>Is for greatly decreasing the number of legal immigrants</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position on taxes</td>
<td>Is for much lower taxes on the rich, Is for somewhat lower taxes on the rich, Is for somewhat higher taxes on the rich, <strong>Is for much higher taxes on the rich</strong></td>
<td>Is for much lower taxes on the rich, Is for somewhat lower taxes on the rich, Is for somewhat higher taxes on the rich, <strong>Is for much higher taxes on the rich</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position on free trade and globalization</td>
<td>Is for much more free trade and globalization</td>
<td>Is for much more free trade and globalization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A.2: Attributes and attribute levels in conjoint experiments compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Levels (Germany)</th>
<th>Levels (US)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is for somewhat more free trade and globalization</td>
<td>Is for somewhat more free trade and globalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is for somewhat less free trade and globalization</td>
<td>Is for somewhat less free trade and globalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Is for much less free trade and globalization</strong></td>
<td><strong>Is for much less free trade and globalization</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position on foreign affairs</td>
<td>Is for the development of the EU into a common state</td>
<td>Is for much more military intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is for stronger cooperation within the EU</td>
<td>Is for somewhat more military intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is for weaker cooperation within the EU</td>
<td>Is for somewhat less military intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Is for Germany’s withdrawal from the EU</strong></td>
<td><strong>Is for much less military intervention</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Levels operationalizing populist ideology are rendered in bold face.

Note that we follow the exact same analysis approach as Neuner and Wratil (2022). In particular, we follow them in assuming that respondents do not really differentiate between the first and the second political priority. This allows us to *ex post* redefine the design so as to render each priority an attribute with levels “Priority” versus “No priority”, depending on whether it was drawn as first or second priority or neither. For clarity, we abstain from reporting MMs for the “No priority” levels (see footnote 4 in Neuner and Wratil, 2022).
E Measurement of Populist Attitudes

In this section, we present question wordings, rationales, and results for our scales measuring thin populist and host ideology attitudes prior to the experiment. We measure thin populism with eight items, based on Akkerman et al. (2014). In particular, items Pop1, Pop2, Pop3, Pop4, Pop5 and Pop6 are directly taken from the Akkerman et al. scale. Based on the findings in Castanho Silva et al. (2020), we added Pop7 which aims to better capture the notion of the homogeneity of the people that is only marginally covered in the original items of the Akkerman scale. Pop8 adds another anti-elite item to the scale. Note that we also asked Pop9 but that this variable failed to load onto the factor (only loading at 0.32 thus well below the 0.45 cut-off for inclusion).1 It is worth noting that our measure of thin populism differs slightly from the one used by Neuner and Wratil (2022). Importantly, 6 of the 8 items in the scale appear in both studies but there is slight divergence because Pop9 did not load onto the factor and Pop5 and Pop6 were added based on the findings of a study that evaluated the properties of a number of populist attitude scales (see Castanho Silva et al., 2020).

All items were asked on 5-point “Strongly disagree” – “Strongly Agree” Likert-type scales and the full wordings of these items are as follows:

Pop1. I would rather be represented by an ordinary citizen than by a specialized politician.
Pop2. The political differences between the elite and the people are greater than the differences among the people.
Pop3. The politicians in the U.S. Congress need to follow the will of the people.
Pop4. What people call “compromise” in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles.
Pop5. The people, and not politicians, should make our most important political decisions.
Pop6. Elected officials talk too much and take too little action.
Pop7. The people are often in agreement but the politicians pursue quite different goals.
Pop8. Political parties only want peoples’ votes, they do not care about their opinions.
Pop9. The people in the U.S. agree, on principle, about what should happen politically.

Neuner and Wratil (2022) used the term “thick populism” to refer to host ideology positions which are commonly adopted by populist parties, but are not a definitional element of thin populism according to contemporary scholarship. They argue that attitudes towards such issues could be correlated in the general public (e.g. being against the European Union and against trade, but for redistribution). While they indeed find that items capturing such positions load on a common underlying dimension among German voters, we attempted to measure a similar construct in the US (i.e. attitudes towards common populist host ideology issues). Specifically, we constructed the below questions with response options on measured on a 7-point Strongly disagree – Strongly agree Likert-type scale:

1This item is really about the homogeneity of the people and given the current levels of political polarization in the US, it is perhaps unsurprising that this item did not scale with the other populism items.
Host1. Legal immigrants contribute positively to our society.

Host2. Tariffs on goods and services are necessary in a globalized world.

Host3. The U.S. should not use its military to intervene in other countries.

Host4. The rich should contribute more through higher taxes.

Unfortunately, contrary to the original German case, these items failed to load onto a single dimension in our factor analyses (see below). For this reason we do not construct a “populist host ideology” attitude scale.

To test whether both sets of items indeed represent a single factor respectively, as found in Germany by Neuner and Wratil (2022), we first report scree plots in Figure A.2. For thin populist attitudes, the elbow shapes and Eigenvalue below 1 for the second factor clearly suggest a single factor, and hence we only retain a single factor in the following factor analyses. Since we used 5-point “agree-disagree” scales for the items, we perform the actual factor analyses using the polychoric correlation matrices. The factor loadings for both scales are reported in Table A.3.

This indicates high internal consistency. For the subgroup classification in the article, we then use respondents’ factor scores, and classify those with factor scores above the mean as populists, and those with scores below the mean as non-populist. For the host ideology attitudes, however, the Eigenvalue even for the first factor is below 1. As we see in Table A.3, with results of the factor analysis, several items perform poorly, and they clearly do not load onto a single scale. Therefore, we do not group responses into a single index for this scale in the paper.

Table A.3: Factor Loadings for Individual-level Thin ideology and Host Ideology Attitudes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Thin populism Loading</th>
<th>Host ideology attitudes Item</th>
<th>Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pop1</td>
<td>0.691</td>
<td>Host1</td>
<td>0.479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop2</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>Host2</td>
<td>0.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop3</td>
<td>0.714</td>
<td>Host3</td>
<td>0.453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop4</td>
<td>0.507</td>
<td>Host4</td>
<td>0.626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop5</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop6</td>
<td>0.746</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop7</td>
<td>0.627</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop8</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SS loadings 3.57 Host ideology attitudes 0.831
Variance accounted 0.446 0.208

Notes: Full question wordings can be found at the beginning of Section E in this Online Appendix.
Figure A.2: Scree plots for thin populist (top panel) and host (bottom panel) ideology attitudes in the US.
F Evaluating Conjoint Identification Assumptions

In this section we replicate supplementary analyses conducted by Neuner and Wratil (2022), which serve the purpose of evaluating whether AMCEs (and by extension MMs) can be interpreted as causal effects based on three assumptions laid out by Hainmueller et al. (2014). Here, we focus on the evaluation of these assumptions and refer the reader to Hainmueller et al. (2014) and Neuner and Wratil (2022) for more detailed discussions of these assumptions.

First, the “stability and no carryover effects” assumption would be violated if respondents change their behavior as the experiment progresses (i.e. respondents learn from choice task to choice task). We therefore estimate the effects of the populist priorities and positions separately by choice task. The resulting MMs broken down by choice task are presented in Figure A.3. The results reveal very limited variation in the MMs across the five choice tasks. Only the MMs for strengthening direct democracy vary a little more widely across choice tasks, with the first being higher than the others. Given the large number of combinations tested, however, this slight variation is unlikely to bias the estimates. Overall then, we uncover no evidence that the “stability and no carryover effects” assumption is violated.

Second, the “no profile-order effects” assumption would be violated if the ordering of the candidate profiles affects responses within a choice task. We test for this violation by estimating MMs separately for all “Candidate A” and “Candidate B” profiles. These results are reported in Figure A.4. While there are some slight differences, there is no evidence of a systematic pattern to these differences that would suggest a violation of the assumption.

Third, the “randomization of the profiles” assumption comprises two parts. On the one hand, the randomization of the attribute levels in conjunction with the large number of profiles drawn (roughly 15,000) guarantees that the potential outcomes will be independent of the profiles. On the other hand, there are attribute level combinations that have zero probability of occurring due to the profile restrictions we imposed (i.e. the constraint that the first and second priorities have to be distinct). It is for this reason that we are not able to analyze causal quantities involving such combinations.
Figure A.3: Marginal Means of Populist Positions (top) and Priorities (bottom) by Choice Task.

Notes: Marginal means; 95% confidence intervals as horizontal bars; red line indicates Pr(Y = 1) = 0.5.
Figure A.4: Marginal Means of Populist Positions (top) and Priorities (bottom) by Candidate Profile.

Notes: Marginal means; 95% confidence intervals as horizontal bars; red line indicates Pr(Y = 1) = 0.5.
G Full Results by Partisanship

While we look at the results of populist positions and priorities by partisanship in the main paper, in Figure A.5 we plot the full results by partisanship, including all levels. Note that partisanship was measured with the standard ANES branching question and leaners are included with their respective partisan groups.

Figure A.5: Marginal Means of Attribute Levels by Party ID.

Notes: Marginal means; 95% confidence intervals as horizontal bars; red line indicates Pr(Y = 1) = 0.5.
H Results Using Alternative Operationalization of Populist Attitudes

As a robustness check, we re-estimate Figure 2 from the main paper with a different operationalization of populist subgroups. In the paper we classified respondents with factor scores above the mean as populists and those with factor scores below the mean as non-populists. Here, we break down the factor scores by quartiles to probe the robustness of the results. The results in Figure A.6, demonstrate that the substantive results hold.

Figure A.6: Marginal Means of Populist Positions (top) and Priorities (bottom) by Quartiles of Populist Attitudes.

Notes: Marginal means; 95% confidence intervals as horizontal bars; red line indicates Pr(Y = 1) = 0.5.
I Results Fixing Positions on One of the Ideological Dimensions

It is possible that the effects of certain host ideology positions are constrained by positions of the same profile/candidate on other ideological issues. This is one of the reasons that including party labels in the design would complicate the randomization as some combinations would maybe seem unbelievable to respondents. Despite not including party labels in the design, we were nonetheless interested in examining the effect of host ideology positions conditional on the level of other host ideology attributes.

Here we therefore examine treatment effects of key host ideology attributes, while keeping positions on immigration or taxation fixed. Specifically, we conduct tests restricting the analysis to races (i.e., choice tasks) where both profiles either leaned the same direction on immigration or on taxation. This means races where either both candidates leaned a) for immigration, b) against immigration, c) for taxes on the rich, or d) against taxes on the rich. This is one way of investigating if results are sensitive to whether the candidates appear to be Republican/Democratic on a major policy dimension (also see next section). Does this affect the impact of the other main issue?

We can see in Figures A.7 that Democrats react the same way to a candidates’ position on taxation regardless of their position on immigration (favoring those that defend higher taxes), and the same is true for Republicans: their estimates only marginally change from the top to the bottom panel. In Figure A.8 we observe the same phenomenon when fixing profiles’ positions on taxation: Regardless of whether both candidates are for or against higher taxes on the rich, Democrats are particularly opposed to the candidate who is in favor of greatly decreasing the number of legal immigrants. On the other hand, Republicans are against those who want to greatly increase the number of legal immigrants, regardless of whether both candidates are in favor or against taxing the rich.
Figure A.7: Marginal Means of Positions on Taxation in Scenarios where both Profiles Had Conservative (Top) or Liberal (Bottom) Positions on Immigration.

Notes: Marginal means; 95% confidence intervals as horizontal bars; red line indicates Pr(Y = 1) = 0.5.
Figure A.8: Marginal Means of Positions on Immigration in Scenarios where both Profiles Had Conservative (Top) or Liberal (Bottom) Positions on Taxation.

Notes: Marginal means; 95% confidence intervals as horizontal bars; red line indicates Pr(Y = 1) = 0.5.
J Results of Primary-Type Contests

An argument could be made that the main effect of thin populist attitudes occurs within ideological camps. For instance, Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel (2018) find that populist individuals on the left are more likely to vote for a populist left-wing party than a non-populist left-wing party, but not that they would be more likely to vote for a populist right-wing party than a left-wing one (and vice-versa for right-wing populists). Within the American context, with the strength of partisanship, this may be even more pronounced: populist attitudes may differentiate support for a populist/non-populist within Republican or Democratic contests, but not across the parties. While our experiment intentionally does not indicate what party each hypothetical candidate belongs to (in particular, to closely replicate the original study), respondents may have inferred that from their positions (e.g., a very anti-immigration candidate is assumed to be a Republican), and made their vote choices accordingly.

To test whether this could be driving the null results for populist attitudes, we rerun our analyses by looking only at choice tasks where the two profiles leaned the same way on the immigration and taxation questions: i.e., if both candidate profiles were pro-immigration and in favor of higher taxes for the rich, we treat this as akin to a “Democratic primary”, while if both candidates are for less immigration and lower taxes on the rich, we treat it as a “Republican primary”. To make this even more akin to a primary context, we estimate the marginal means for Democratic respondents for the Democratic primary tasks and Republican respondents for the Republican primary tasks (according to the ANES branching question and including leaners). \(^2\)

While this significantly reduces our sample sizes and our power to identify effects, we would expect that when policy preferences are fixed, any effect of populist priorities should be strong and evident, whereby a populist Democratic voter would be strongly inclined to support a populist-looking Democratic candidate over a non-populist Democrat, and the same for Republican-leaning voters and candidates. However, this is not what we observe. In the bottom panels of both Figures A.9 and A.10 not only do none of the populist priorities have a significant effect on voting probabilities for populist respondents, but also none of the estimates are clearly larger than that for non-populists. The lack of difference between thin-populist and non-thin-populist respondents holds even when we constrain the policy positions of the candidates to be aligned on taxation and immigration. With regard to populist positions, the results in the top panels of Figures A.9 and A.10 show some disadvantage of populist Democratic candidates who are against free trade and globalization in the Democratic primary among populist Democratic voters. But this is the exact opposite of what we would expect if respondents with populist attitudes were particularly receptive to candidates with populist positions. Therefore, partisanship does not appear to be the driving force behind the null effects of populist attitudes in the entire sample, on Congressional races.

Admittedly, these tests are underpowered, and future studies should implement this design framed as a primary race (or randomize whether party labels are included in the conjoint) to test if indeed there are no effects in those scenarios as well.

\(^2\)But note that results are substantively similar when not subsetting by respondents’ partisanship.
Figure A.9: Marginal Means of Populist Positions (top) and Priorities (bottom) in Scenarios where both Profiles Had Liberal Positions on Immigration and Taxation, among Democrat-leaning Respondents.

Notes: Marginal means; 95% confidence intervals as horizontal bars; red line indicates Pr(Y = 1) = 0.5.
Figure A.10: Marginal Means of Populist Positions (top) and Priorities (bottom) in Scenarios where both Profiles Had Conservative Positions on Immigration and Taxation, among Republican-leaning Respondents.

Notes: Marginal means; 95% confidence intervals as horizontal bars; red line indicates Pr(Y = 1) = 0.5.
K Results for Attentive Respondents Only

Our survey included an attention check. Specifically, in the middle of a grid battery with six items that had a Likert-type “Extremely uncharacteristic of me” – “Extremely characteristic of me” response scale, one of the items asked respondents: “It is very important to pay attention to this survey. To show us you’re paying attention, select ‘Uncertain’”. This came around the middle of the survey flow, immediately before the experiments. In our sample, 13% of respondents failed this attention check (which is comparable to attention check failure rates in other Lucid samples). We do not remove them from any analyses presented in the manuscript and in this Online Appendix, given concerns that dropping such respondents may bias results (see e.g., Alvarez et al., 2019). Figures A.11, A.12, and A.13 below reproduce Figures 1, 2, and 3 of the main paper removing respondents who failed that attention check. We can see how substantive results remain the same, as coefficients are almost exactly the same as those observed in the main analyses. Hence, our results are not significantly affected by inattentive respondents.
Figure A.11: Marginal Means of Attribute Levels – Removing Respondents who Failed the Attention Check.

Notes: Marginal means; 95% confidence intervals as horizontal bars; red line indicates Pr(Y = 1) = 0.5.
Figure A.12: Marginal means of populist positions (top) and priorities (bottom) by respondents’ populist attitudes – Removing respondents who failed the attention check.

Notes: Marginal means; 95% confidence intervals as horizontal bars; red line indicates $Pr(Y=1)=0.5$
Figure A.13: Marginal means of populist positions (top) and priorities (bottom) by respondents’ partisanship – Removing respondents who failed the attention check.

Notes: Marginal means; 95% confidence intervals as horizontal bars; red line indicates $\Pr(Y=1)=0.5$
References


Leeper, T. J. (2020). *cregg: Simple Conjoint Analyses and Visualization*. R package version 0.4.0.
