Tribalism in America: Behavioral Experiments on Affective Polarization in the Trump Era

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# **Report on applied experimental standards for manuscript:**

Tribalism in America: Behavioral Experiments on Affective Polarization in the Trump Era

**A. Hypotheses**

* Specific objectives or hypotheses:
The experiment was designed to investigate the impact of party partisanship on altruism, trust, and public good provision in behavioral experiments.

The specific hypotheses were:
A). *Partisans will display increased affective polarization along party lines compared to non-partisans.*

B). *Liberals and conservatives will display increased affective polarization compared to political moderates.*

C). *Contact with opposing partisans decreases affective polarization by building empathy, trust and reducing social distance with opposing partisans.*

**B. Subjects and Context**

* Eligibility and exclusion criteria for participants.

Participants below the age of 18 years at the time of participation were not eligible. There were no changes of exclusion criteria after recruitment began.

* Procedures used to recruit and select participants.

Data collection for our project was conducted by Dynata (formerly Survey Sampling International). Iyengar and Westwood (2015) also used Dynata (formerly SSI) panel surveys to conduct their research on partisanship, so our samples are methodologically comparable. Dynata recruits participants online to form a panel and then randomly invites panel members to participate in given surveys. We requested that Dynata target on several demographic characteristics to ensure the sample they invited was representative of the population of interest, but we did not impose quotas, and subjects within each demographic category were randomly selected from the panel. The resulting sample is not a strict probability sample in that not every resident of the United States has an equal probability of being sampled, but our resulting sample is representative of national level diversity in the United States on gender, education, age, race and ethnicity, as well as urban-rural demographics.

* Recruitment dates defining the periods of recruitment and when the experiments were conducted.

Recruitment took place between May 24-28, 2019. No repeat measures or follow-ups.

* Settings and locations where the data were collected.

Respondents took the survey online, but we do not have data to provide further details on location. Dynata likely has further detailed information on ip addresses. We have zipcodes.

* If there is a survey: Provide response rate and how it was calculated. 1210 respondents completed the online survey from a random sample of survey panelists by Dynata. The survey link was emailed to 13124 recipients for a response rate of 9.2%.

**C. Allocation Method**

* Details of the procedure used to generate the assignment sequence (e.g., randomization procedures).
* If random assignment used, then details of procedure (e.g., any restrictions, blocking). If random assignment used, provide evidence of random assignment.

Randomization to treatment was conducted at the individual level by computer algorithm. Kolmogorov-smirnov tests reported in the SI indicate that randomization was highly successful in balancing across demographics. No clustered randomization or blocking.

* Blinding: Were participants, those administering the interventions, and those assessing the outcomes unaware of condition assignments?

For the between-subject designs, subjects were not aware of the experimental manipulation. In the within-subject design, the treatment order was randomized. As randomization was done by computer, administrators and outcome analysts were not aware of which treatment would be assigned to specific participants in advance.

**D. Treatments**

* Description of the interventions in each treatment condition, as well as a description of the control group.

Subjects made choices involving the allocation of money among individuals with randomized party-identification treatments via an online survey.

There was no explicit control group as part of the experimental design. All subjects were randomized to either the “Democrat” or “Republican” party-id treatments.

* How and when manipulations or interventions were administered.

Manipulations took place in the course of an online survey in a section of the survey involving decision-making choices (behavioral experiments). Online surveys were administered by Qualtrics. Experimental protocols and survey items used in the Qualtrics survey are provided in the SI. The study took less than 30 minutes to complete. No deception was used in the experiment. All monetary allocations were hypothetical. Subjects were not quizzed on experimental instructions. There were no practice rounds. There was no post-experimental debriefing or interview. The experimental team did not observe the intervention. Individual party-id serves as a manipulation check on responses to partisan treatments. No incentives were given to complete the study.

**E. Results**

* 1. Outcome Measures and Covariates

The main dependent variables are DICT1\_1 through DICT9\_2 in the **US PID replication data.dta** dataset in Stata and in the Experimental protocols section in the SI. These items measure decision choices in dictator, trust, and public good games involving the allocation of money between the individual and another recipient (of random party ID), between two other recipients (of random party ID) or a group of recipients (where majority party ID is randomized). This experimental protocol was not pre-registered.

Relevant questionnaire items in exact wording:

See “Experimental Protocols” in the SI for behavioral experiment details. Below are relevant survey questions for the analysis. Demographic questions are also available in the **US PID replication data.dta** dataset.

Social Distance

|  |
| --- |
| Chose which of five pictorial representations best represents your relationship to the group:  |
| Your family |  | Democrats |
| Your community |  | Republicans |

Trust

Please tell me whether you trust or distrust the following:

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Highly Distrust | SomewhatDistrust | Somewhat Trust | Highly Trust |
| 1. Republicans
 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 1. Democrats
 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

Inter-group contact

How often do you interact with the following?

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Very Often | Sometimes | Rarely | Never |
| 1. Republicans
 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 1. Democrats
 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

2. CONSORT Participant Flow diagram ()

Please check last page for a flow diagram for the first dictator game experiment. The flow diagram is comparable for subsequent experiments. There are very few cases of missing data (<5 out of 1210).

3. Statistical Analysis

For the statistical analysis cases were only deleted where information on socioeconomic covariates was missing (i.e. the survey was not completed). There are no particular effects of assignment/treatment or missing information on outcome variables (see SI for further detail).

Attrition was not a problem due to the short-time duration for completing the study. Missing data, which is very minimal, are reported as percentages on all variables in the SI.
Due to few missing values after randomization (n=4) and no attrition, no specific ITT analysis has been conducted. No weighting procedures were applied in the survey data.

**F. Other Information**

* Was the experiment reviewed and approved by an IRB?

Yes, by the IRB at High Point University

* What was the source of funding? What was the role of the funders in the analysis of the experiment?

Funding was provided by departmental research development funds from High Point University.

* Were there any restrictions or arrangements regarding what findings could be published? Any funding sources where conflict of interest might reasonably be an issue?

There were no restrictions about publishing findings from the side of the funders. The authors do not see any potential conflict of interest.

**CONSORT Flow Diagram (Based on randomization in first dictator game)**

## Enrollment

Analysed (n= 608 )
Excluded from regression analysis because of missing covariate information (n= 0 in the bivariate model)

Allocated to intervention 2 (n= 608)

 Received allocated intervention

 Did not receive allocated intervention (give reasons) (n= 0 )

## Analysis

## Allocation

Assessed for eligibility (n ≈ 1210)

Excluded (n= 0)

  Not meeting inclusion criteria of adulthood (n= 0 )

  Declined to participate (n= 0 )

  Other reasons (n= 0)

Randomized (n= 1210)

Analysed (n= 598 )
 Excluded from regression analysis because of missing covariate information (n= 4 in the bivariate model )

Allocated to intervention 1 (n= 602)

 Received allocated intervention

 Did not receive allocated intervention (give reasons) (n= 0 )

# Theory and Hypotheses

Our ability to provide a thorough review of the literature on partisanship is limited in the short article format. While the main contribution of our manuscript is more empirical than theoretical, we devote further discussion here to our rationale for testing Hypotheses 1-3 and review the state of the literature on our topics in more detail below.

## Further Discussion on Partisanship and Ideology (H1, H2)

Partisan Polarization in the United States

As noted in the main text of this paper and by countless media accounts, partisan polarization in the United States has risen dramatically, particularly over the last several decades (e.g., Abramowitz 2011, 2012, 2018; Hetherington and Weiler 2018; Mason 2018). Whether or not this partisan division is unprecedented in the American political system (Fiorina 2017), its current causes are varied and powerful. Among them are the final demise of the New Deal Coalition, prompted in large part by the movement of social conservatives—especially southern, white men (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999)—into the Republican Party following the rise of the Religious Right. This movement, as well as others, led to the politicization of a broad range of social and moral issues previously outside the public sphere (Hare and Poole 2014). At the same time, American elections became increasingly costly and acrimonious, and, following the advent of the internet and cable news, narrowcasting became the norm in many American media outlets, reinforcing individuals’ perspectives on policy and the institutions and individuals shaping them. Collectively, these changes have both resulted in greater fervor among the most politically passionate and disengagement among the less politically engaged, who typically comprised the political “center” (Abramowitz 2011, 2018).

In the relative absence of centrist voters, elites in government—responding to the pressures of a representative system—have faced their own incentives to polarize (Abramowitz 2011). As a result, party unity in recent Congresses and many state legislatures has reached all-time recorded highs (Miller 2019). This unity, of course, has led to an absence of the bipartisan, collaborative lawmaking typical in many early and mid-20th century legislatures. Further fueling polarization, many moderate stalwarts have chosen to leave these institutions, or have been defeated in primary or general elections by more radical opposition. On her choice not to run for reelection in 2012, for example, Senator Olympia Snowe (R-ME) remarked, “...An atmosphere of polarization and ‘my way or the highway’ ideologies has become pervasive in campaigns and in our governing institutions. Unfortunately, I do not realistically expect the partisanship of recent years in the Senate to change over the short term.” (qtd. in Steinhauer 2012).

Even those who take a more minimalist view of party polarization agree that party sorting has occurred in the aftermath of these changes (Fiorina and Abrams 2008). By “party sorting” scholars refer to the increasing alignment of partisanship and ideology in the American public. The modern Republican Party is increasingly made up of conservatives, and liberals gravitate almost exclusively to the Democratic Party. These reinforcing social cues strengthen individuals’ ties to their party and transform partisanship into a social identity (Mason 2014, 2018). Even when Republicans and Democrats agree in principle on the issues, they distrust members of the other party, and sacrifice progress on policy in the name of the party (Mason 2018). Observers often point to the national government’s inability to make 21st century immigration policy as a case-in-point of this phenomenon. The great stakes of this partisan identity, however, are perhaps clearest in the context of modern American elections (Miller and Conover 2015). In no recent contest has this been clearer than in the 2016 presidential election, when many scholars attributed President Donald Trump’s victory to an us-versus-them mentality mobilized by racism, sexism, nativism, authoritarianism, and negative partisanship (e.g., Abramowitz 2018; Abramowitz and Webster 2018; MacWilliams 2016; Setzler and Yanus 2018; Barber and Pope 2019), manifest in voting not *for* one candidate, but strongly *against* the other candidate or party.

Modern partisan sorting is particularly powerful because it is not only ideological and issue-based. It is reinforced by Americans’ most basic life choices. From where they live to the food they eat to the cars they drive to the composition of their families to their entertainment choices and beyond, Republicans and Democrats truly live in different worlds—a phenomenon famously dubbed “The Big Sort” (Bishop 2009; Johnston, Manley, and Jones 2016). A Republican in 2019 is likely to live in a rural or suburban area, have two or three children, drive an American pickup or SUV, and prefer a dinner of burgers and fries while watching *Fox News*. In contrast, a Democrat is more likely to live in an urban area, have an only child (or no children), drive a Toyota Prius, and eat chicken tikka masala from Trader Joes while listening to NPR (for further illustration, see Hetherington and Weiler 2018).

Partisan sorting may also be shaped by deeper, intrinsic motivations. While political issues shape individuals’ operational ideologies, individuals’ worldviews form a sort of symbolic ideology, a precognitive response representative of fundamental physiological differences in human beings. Biopolitics scholars have studied these differences extensively, noting that, in modern American politics, they often align with individuals’ operational ideologies, and, thus, their partisanship (e.g., Gerber, et al. 2010; Kam and Estes 2016). For example, conservatives tend to be more fearful and prefer more strict rules, while liberals are more willing to take risks and are often less conscientious.

To study symbolic ideology empirically, political scientists (e.g., Sniderman and Piazza 1993; see also Hetherington and Weiler 2009) often follow a frame established in the American National Election Studies (ANES) and operationalize these concepts using a battery of four questions tapping individuals’ preferences for conformity and freethinking. Based on these studies, Hetherington and Weiler (2018, 17; see also 2009) assert that symbolic ideology is representative of broader “fixed” (Republican and conservative) and “fluid” (Democratic and liberal) worldviews polarized along partisan and operational ideological lines. Thus, they conclude that, “the American political system is being driven by an electorate that cares about politics precisely because it has become so intimately aligned with worldview. This dynamic has proven to be uniquely polarizing.” (Hetherington and Weiler 2018, 20-21).

The consequences of these reinforcing identities, both politically and socially, are significant. Republicans have different issue positions, live in different areas, and hold different worldviews than Democrats. The same can be said of conservatives and liberals and the fixed and fluid. And, because these identities often align, individuals who identify with one perspective can easily avoid contact with “others.” Lower in-group contact with members of an out-group results in higher perceived threat, as detailed elsewhere in the main text of the paper and in this Appendix. This phenomenon has been broadly observed in American politics; anecdotal and empirical evidence demonstrate that members of both parties increasingly dislike and even loathe their opponents, and are broadly willing to express their animosity openly (e.g., Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2015). In the modern age, there may truly be no greater horror for a Republican father than for his daughter to marry a Democrat (Hetherington and Weiler 2018).

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## Further Discussion on Intergroup Contact (H3)

 Research on affective polarization tends to argue in favor of building superordinate identies to alleviate partisan bias (Carlin and Love 2018, Levendusky 2018). We consider an alternative mechanism based on inter-group contact. To what extent can contact reduce prejudices and increase tolerance against out-groups? Since Allport’s (1954) pioneering work, hundreds of studies have sought to test the “contact hypothesis” across a wide range of contexts and in-group/out-group settings. Meta-analysis by Pettigrew and Tropp (2006, 2008, 2013) show a positive correlation between out-group contact and find that contact works to overcome prejudice through the mediating effects of improving information about out-groups, reducing fear, and building empathy. Contact is most effective under Allport’s (1954) ideal conditions of relatively equal group status, pursuit common goals, clear benefits of inter-group cooperation, and institutional incentives for cooperation. However, most studies have focused on race/ethnicity rather than partisanship as the principle in-group/out-group category of interest. Also, few studies have considered whether the contact hypothesis can work under instances of where groups have a history of violent in-group/out-group conflict, but early results are encouraging (Alexander and Christia 2011; Hewstone et al. 2014; Scacco and Warren 2018). Research on the effects of contact on reducing partisan prejudice is an important gap in the literature that our study aims to address.

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# Research Design

Our research design includes a number of experiments. We chose to include a succinct summary of our main findings from each experiment in the manuscript and reserve further discussion for our online appendix. We do this in part because the experimental findings are consistent, pointing to a tendency of partisan parochial bias as discussed in the manuscript. We chose to present the full range of findings in this manuscript rather than an in-depth focus on one or two experiments to show how our results are robust to different design attributes and behavioral preferences related to altruism, trust and trustworthiness, and public good contribution. We utilize modifications of classic dictator, trust, and public good experiments pioneered by Kahneman et al. (1986), Berg et al. (1995), and Ledyard (1995) respectively.

We choose to employ hypothetical allocations rather than real pay-offs due mainly for budgetary reasons. Ben-Ner (2008) shows that real vs. hypothetical allocations in dictator experiments are remarkably similar, such that we do not anticipate that our results are highly conditional on real vs. hypothetical payments.

We conducted our study with dictator games first, followed by trust, and then public goods because dictator games are the least cognitively taxing. It is possible that subjects are primed after the completion of the first dictator game and are aware that we are interested in PID treatment effects in subsequent experiments. Hence, the first dictator game is most likely the cleanest measure of partisan effects among the experiments we conducted. However, we find consistent partisan effects in subsequent experiments. Below is the question wording for each dictator, trust, and public good experiment.

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Experimental Protocols

Next you will be asked to make a series of decisions involving money. In some tasks, you will be asked to decide how much money to keep for yourself and how much to give to another person. In some tasks, you will decide how to allocate money between different people or with a group of people. Please pay attention to the decisions you make. After the survey is completed, we will select one lucky person at random, who will be paid based on their decisions. Therefore, it is very important that you read instructions very closely. Your decision could impact how much you get paid and you cannot go back and change your decision once it is made.

DG 1

In this task you have $10. You must decide how much to keep for yourself and how much to give to another person. In this task, the only information we can give you is that the other person identifies politically as a “Republican/Democrat - RANDOMIZE”. Whatever you send to the other person will be given to them if they are selected to receive a payment. Whatever you keep for yourself will be paid to you if you are selected to receive a payment. Please make your decision.

How much money do you want to send to?

↓

**REPUBLICAN/DEMOCRAT [RANDOMIZE]**

|  |
| --- |
| Amount to Send |
| $0 |
| $1 |
| $2 |
| $3 |
| $4 |
| $5 |
| $6 |
| $7 |
| $8 |
| $9 |
| $10 |

DG2

In this task, we would like you to think about how much money you would receive from another person in the tasks you just completed. In this task, the only information we can give you is that the other person identifies politically as a “Republican/Democrat - RANDOMIZE”.

How much money do you think you will receive from?

↓

**REPUBLICAN/DEMOCRAT [RANDOMIZE]**

|  |
| --- |
| Amount to Send |
| $0 |
| $1 |
| $2 |
| $3 |
| $4 |
| $5 |
| $6 |
| $7 |
| $8 |
| $9 |
| $10 |

DG3

In this task, you and the other person each start with $5. In this task, you can send any amount from 0 to $5 to the other person. Or instead of sending money, you can choose to TAKE any amount from 0 to $5 from the other person to keep for yourself.

If this task is selected for payment, you will receive $5 minus whatever you decided to send to the other person or plus whatever you decided to take from the other person. If you do not wish to send or take money from the other person, then select option “NEITHER” and you and the other person will both receive $5.

In this task, the only information we can give you is that the other people identifies politically as a “Republican/Democrat- RANDOMIZE”. Remember, you can do whatever you wish. Please make your decision.

Do you want to send or take money from?

↓

**REPUBLICAN/DEMOCRAT [RANDOMIZE]**

**SEND TAKE NEITHER**

|  |
| --- |
| Amount to Send or Take  |
| $0 |
| $1 |
| $2 |
| $3 |
| $4 |
| $5 |
| $6 |
| $7 |
| $8 |
| $9 |
| $10 |

DG 4

In this task you have $10. However, this time you may not keep any money for yourself. You must decide how to allocate money between two other people. In this task, the only information we can give you is that the other people identifies politically as a “Republican and a Democrat”. Please make your decision.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Send To Republican  | Mark Here↓ | Send To Democrat  |
| $0 |   | $10 |
| $1 |  | $9 |
| $2 |  | $8 |
| $3 |  | $7 |
| $4 |  | $6 |
| $5 |  | $5 |
| $6 |  | $4 |
| $7 |  | $3 |
| $8 |  | $2 |
| $9 |  | $1 |
| $10 |  | $0 |

DG 5

In this task, you must decide which of the follow offers are acceptable for paying two people. Circle “accept” or “reject” to decide which proposals you think other people should be paid. For example, if you think it is acceptable to pay $0 to a Republican and $10 to a Democrat, mark “Accept”. If you think that is not acceptable, then mark “Reject”. You must make a decision for each option below.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Amount to Republican | Amount toDemocrat | Decision |
| $0 | $10 | Accept | Reject |
| $1 | $9 | Accept | Reject |
| $2 | $8 | Accept | Reject |
| $3 | $7 | Accept | Reject |
| $4 | $6 | Accept | Reject |
| $5 | $5 | Accept | Reject |
| $6 | $4 | Accept | Reject |
| $7 | $3 | Accept | Reject |
| $8 | $2 | Accept | Reject |
| $9 | $1 | Accept | Reject |
| $10 | $0 | Accept | Reject |

TG1

In this task you have $5. You must decide how much to keep for yourself and how much to give to another person. In this task, the only information we can give you is that the other person identifies politically as a “Republican/Democrat”. Whatever you keep for yourself will be paid to you if you are selected to receive a payment. Whatever you send to the other person will be multiplied by 3 and then given to the other person. The other person then has the option to give money back to you. For example,

If you keep $5, then the other person receives $0.

If you send $5, then we multiply that sum by 3 ($5 x3 =$15) and the other person receives $15. The other person then decides how much (if any) of the $15 to give back to you. If the person keeps all $15, then you receive $0. If the person returns half, then you and the other person receive $7.50 each.

How much money do you want to send to?

↓

**REPUBLICAN/DEMOCRAT [RANDOMIZE]**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Amount You Send | Other Person Receives |
| $0 | $0 |
| $0.50 | $0.50 x 3 = $1.50 |
| $1.00 | $1 x 3 = $3 |
| $1.50 | $1.50 x 3 = $4.50 |
| $2.00 | $2 x 3 = $6 |
| $2.50 | $2.50 x 3 = $7.50 |
| $3.00 | $3 x 3 = $9 |
| $3.50 | $3.50 x 3 = $10.50 |
| $4.00 | $4 x 3 = $12 |
| $4.50 | $4.50 x 3 = $13.50 |
| $5 | $5 x 3 = $15 |

TG 2

Now you have to decide, if someone gave you money, how much you would keep and how much, if any, you would return. You need to make a choice for each possible offer.

How much money do you want to return to?

↓

**REPUBLICAN/DEMOCRAT [RANDOMIZE]**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Amount Sent to You  | Amount You Receive | Amount you return |
| $0 | $0 | $0 |
| $0.50 | $0.50 x 3 = $1.50 | Enter amount up to $1.50\_\_\_\_ |
| $1.00 | $1 x 3 = $3 | Enter amount up to $3.00 \_\_\_\_ |
| $1.50 | $1.50 x 3 = $4.50 | Enter amount up to $4.50 \_\_\_\_ |
| $2.00 | $2 x 3 = $6 | Enter amount up to $6.00 \_\_\_\_ |
| $2.50 | $2.50 x 3 = $7.50 | Enter amount up to $7.50 \_\_\_\_ |
| $3.00 | $3 x 3 = $9 | Enter amount up to $9.00 \_\_\_\_ |
| $3.50 | $3.50 x 3 = $10.50 | Enter amount up to $10.50 \_\_\_\_ |
| $4.00 | $4 x 3 = $12 | Enter amount up to $12.00 \_\_\_\_ |
| $4.50 | $4.50 x 3 = $13.50 | Enter amount up to $13.50 \_\_\_\_ |
| $5 | $5 x 3 = $15 | Enter amount up to $15.00 \_\_\_\_ |

PG 1

In this task you are given $5 and you must decide how much to keep and how much to contribute to a GROUP ACCOUNT. In your group there are 10 people. Whatever you and the other members of the group put into the group account is doubled (x2) and divided evenly among all of you. For example, if you put all $5 into the account, it will be doubled and become $10 to be shared evenly among all 10 people. If everyone puts all $5 into the account, then the total value of the account will be $100, and everyone will receive $10 each. Regardless of how much you keep or put into the account, you will receive your equal share of the money that remains in the account.

How much money do you want to put into a group account with

↓

**(7 REPUBLICANS, 2 DEMOCRATS and YOU)/**

**(7 DEMOCRATS, 2 REPUBLICANS, and YOU) [RANDOMIZE]**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Amount you put in | Amount is doubled |
| $0 | $0 x 2 = $0 |
| $0.50 | $0.50 x 2 = $1 |
| $1.00 | $1.00 x 2 = $2 |
| $1.50 | $1.50 x 2 = $3 |
| $2.00 | $2.00 x 2 = $4 |
| $2.50 | $2.50 x 2 = $5 |
| $3.00 | $3.00 x 2 = $6 |
| $3.50 | $3.50 x 2 = $7 |
| $4.00 | $4.00 x 2 = $8 |
| $4.50 | $4.50 x 2 = $9 |
| $5.00 | $5.00 x 2 = $10 |

PG 2

In this task you are given $2.50 and you must decide how much to keep and how much to contribute to a GROUP ACCOUNT. In your group there are 10 people. Whatever you and the other members of the group put into the group account is doubled (x2) and divided evenly among all of you. For example, if you put all $2.50 into the account, it will be doubled and become $5 to be shared evenly among all 10 people

In this task, you and everyone else already has $5 in the account. You may also take money out of the account if you wish. However, whatever you take out of the account is reduced by half. For example, if you take out all $5, then you will receive $5/2 = $2.50. You will also keep the original $2.50 you decided not to contribute AND you will still receive your share of whatever remains in the group account after everyone makes their decision. However, if everyone puts all their money into the account, then the total value of the account will be $100, and everyone will receive $10 each. Please make your decision.

Do You Want To PUT MONEY IN or TAKE MONEY OUT of the group account with?

↓

**(7 REPUBLICANS, 2 DEMOCRATS and YOU)/**

**(7 DEMOCRATS, 2 REPUBLICANS, and YOU) [RANDOMIZE]**

**PUT MONEY IN TAKE MONEY OUT NEITHER**

|  |
| --- |
| Amount  |
| $0 |
| $0.50 |
| $1.00 |
| $1.50 |
| $2.00 |
| $2.50 |
| $3.00 |
| $3.50 |
| $4.00 |
| $4.50 |
| $5 |

Contact Hypothesis Related Mechanisms

Social Distance

|  |
| --- |
| Chose which of five pictorial representations best represents your relationship to the group:  |
| Your family |  | Democrats |
| Your community |  | Republicans |

Trust

Please tell me whether you trust or distrust the following:

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Highly Distrust | SomewhatDistrust | Somewhat Trust | Highly Trust |
| 1. Republicans
 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 1. Democrats
 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

Inter-group contact

How often do you interact with the following?

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Very Often | Sometimes | Rarely | Never |
| 1. Republicans
 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 1. Democrats
 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

# Sampling Methodology

Survey research is increasingly turning to online surveys or mixed mode designs that involve combinations of random digit dialing (RDD) and online methods. Researchers generally agree that with either RDD or online samples, probability samples are more representative of the US population than non-probability samples (Malhotra and Krosnick 2007; Chang and Krosnick 2009; Yeager et al. 2011; Kennedy et al. 2016). A number of studies have been conducted involving comparisons mode effects of RDD vs. Online surveys on political attitudes and behavior. Some studies show minimal differences in terms of inference from online vs. phone surveys (Stephenson and Crête 2010; Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2014; Breton et al. 2017; Coppock 2019; Coppock and McClellan 2019). Online survey research itself is in a period of expansion. Pew Research, for example, has now moved much of its polling online: [https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/02/27/what-our-transition-to-online-polling-means-for-decades-of-phone-survey-trends/](https://mobile.highpoint.edu/owa/redir.aspx?C=I8MrCM4aZlX9__ikZTPY9MndiFoTSlG36O1kVCH9UTkPKfu0pw7XCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fwww.pewresearch.org%2ffact-tank%2f2019%2f02%2f27%2fwhat-our-transition-to-online-polling-means-for-decades-of-phone-survey-trends%2f) as well as  [https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/02/27/response-rates-in-telephone-surveys-have-resumed-their-decline/](https://mobile.highpoint.edu/owa/redir.aspx?C=NKRvH4h9owEmhJQwMVkIKOe1SbTEFBO_xlPLhIZYG5rvRvdnEg_XCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fwww.pewresearch.org%2ffact-tank%2f2019%2f02%2f27%2fresponse-rates-in-telephone-surveys-have-resumed-their-decline%2f).

 We chose online sampling for its cost-effectiveness and field tested experience at achieving valid, reliable results comparable to RDD probability sampling methods. Online sampling is especially helpful for gaining access to hard-to-reach minority groups and the elderly, and avoids some of the problems of social desirability bias due to enumerator effects in RDD and face-to-face sampling methodologies. Hence, we believed online samples would be forthcoming about their partisan preferences.

Data collection for our project was conducted by Dynata (formerly Survey Sampling International), which has provided survey data for a wide range of research in political science (ex. Kam 2012; Malhotra et al. 2013; Berinsky et al. 2014) using online panel surveys. Importantly, Iyengar and Westwood (2015) also used Dynata (formerly SSI) panel surveys to conduct their research on partisanship, so our samples are methodologically comparable. Dynata recruits participants online to form a panel and then randomly invites panel members to participate in given surveys. We requested that Dynata target on several demographic characteristics to ensure the sample they invited was representative of the population of interest, but we did not impose quotas, and subjects within each demographic category were randomly selected from the panel. The resulting sample is not a strict probability sample in that not every resident of the United States has an equal probability of being sampled, but our resulting sample is representative of national level diversity in the United States on gender, education, age, race and ethnicity, as well as urban-rural demographics. Our results are robust to the use of sampling weights. We anticipate that our results would be easily replicated using alternate sampling modes, and we encourage others to replicate our findings.

US Residents:

\*             GENDER: Male = 49%, female = 51%

\*             EDUCATION: Bachelor's Degree or Above = 30%, Less than BA = 70%

\*             AGE: 18 - 34 = 30%, 35 - 54 = 40%, 55 and older = 30%

\*             RACE: White = 73%, African-American/black = 15%, Other = 12%,

\*             ETHNICITY: Hispanic/Latinx/Spanish origin = 18%, Other = 82%

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# Results

The following tables show how subjects were randomized to the Democratic and Republican treatments in all the between subject designs.

### Table 1. Distribution of Respondents across Treatment Groups

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Democrat Treatment | Republican Treatment | Randomization |
| Dictator Game 1 | 598 (49.6%) | 608 (50.4%) | Between Subject |
| Dictator Game 2 | 613 (50.1%) | 592 (49.1%) | Between Subject |
| Dictator Game 3 | 619 (51.4%) | 586 (48.6%) | Between Subject |
| Dictator Game 4-5 | 593 (49.0%) | 617 (51.0%) | Within Subject |
| Trust Game 1 | 582 (48.3%) | 623 (51.7%) | Between Subject |
| Trust Game 2 | 593 (49.3%) | 611 (50.7%) | Between Subject |
| Public Good Game 1 | 609 (50.8%) | 589 (49.2%) | Between Subject |
| Public Good Game 2 | 588 (48.8%) | 617 (51.2%) | Between Subject |

Note: Within subject design indicates the order of randomized treatments for those receiving the Democrat Treatment first and Republican treatment first.

### Table 2. Summary Statistics on Dependent Variables

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Experiment | Recipient | Mean | SD | N | Range |
| DG1.1 | Democrat | 3.71 | 3.41 | 598 | 0 to 10 |
| DG1.2 | Republican | 3.43 | 3.44 | 608 | 0 to 10 |
| DG2.1 | Democrat | 3.42 | 3.32 | 613 | 0 to 10 |
| DG2.2 | Republican | 3.12 | 3.36 | 592 | 0 to 10 |
| DG3.1 | Democrat | 0.11 | 2.75 | 619 | -5 to 5 |
| DG3.2 | Republican | -0.15 | 2.73 | 586 | -5 to 5 |
| DG4 | Giving to Rep vs. Dem | 3.66 | 2.96 | 1202 | 0 to 10 |
| DG5.1 | Give more to Democrat | 0.47 | 0.50 | 1210 | 0 to 1 |
| DG5.2 | Give more to Republican | 0.38 | 0.49 | 1210 | 0 to 1 |
| DG5.3 | Divide 50/50 | 0.47 | 0.50 | 1210 | 0 to 1 |
| TG1.1 | Democrat | 1.92 | 1.92 | 582 | 0 to 5 |
| TG1.2 | Republican | 1.82 | 1.96 | 623 | 0 to 5 |
| TG2.1 | Democrat | 5.86 | 5.01 | 593 | 0 to 15 |
| TG2.2 | Republican | 5.47 | 5.17 | 611 | 0 to 15 |
| PG1.1 | Democrat | 2.49 | 2.05 | 609 | 0 to 5 |
| PG1.2 | Republican | 2.33 | 2.04 | 589 | 0 to 5 |
| PG2.1 | Democrat | 1.10 | 2.78 | 588 | -5 to 5 |
| PG2.2 | Republican | 1.03 | 2.68 | 617 | -5 to 5 |

### Table 3. Summary of Independent and Control Variables

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Description | Mean | SD | N |
| Female | 1 = female, 0 = male or other | 0.54 | 0.50 | 1210 |
| Age | Age in years | 44.88 | 13.93 | 1170 |
| Education | 1=incomplete high school to 5 = graduate school | 3.29 | 1.08 | 1206 |
| Income | 1 = <$25,000 to 7 =>$250,000 | 2.89 | 1.64 | 1138 |
| Race | % African American | 14.38 |  | 1210 |
|  | % Asian | 1.08 |  | 1210 |
|  | % Mixed, other | 7.27 |  | 1210 |
|  | % White | 74.21 |  | 1210 |
|  | % Unsure | 1.40 |  | 1210 |
| Latino | % Latino | 15.37 |  | 1210 |
| Ideology | 1 = strongly conservative to 5 = strongly liberal | 2.83 | 1.20 | 1117 |
| PID | % Democrat | 39.6 |  | 1120 |
|  | % Republican | 32.1 |  | 1120 |
|  | % Independent | 28.3 |  | 1120 |
| Region | % North | 17.6 |  | 1208 |
|  | % Midwest | 21.2 |  | 1208 |
|  | % South  | 42.0 |  | 1208 |
|  | % West | 19.2 |  | 1208 |
| Rural | 1 = urban to 9 = rural by Urban-Rural continuum | 2.06 | 1.66 | 1206 |
| Evangelical | 1 = identifies as Evangelical | 0.33 | 0.47 | 1210 |
| Contactdem | How often do you have contact with the Democrats? 1 = never to 4 = often | 2.86 | 0.97 | 1203 |
| Contactrep | How often do you have contact with the Republicans? 1 = never to 4 = often | 2.80 | 0.96 | 1204 |
| Closedem | How close do you feel to Democrats? 1 = not close at all to 5 = very close | 2.57 | 1.47 | 1196 |
| Closerep | How close do you feel to Republicans?1 = not close at all to 5 = very close | 2.43 | 1.45 | 1195 |
| Trustdem | How much do you trust Democrats?1 = highly distrust to 4 = highly trust | 2.36 | 1.00 | 1205 |
| Trustrep | How much do you trust Republicans?1 = highly distrust to 4 = highly trust  | 2.25 | 0.98 | 1205 |

## Balance Tables

The tables below indicate balance tests on key demographics. The results show that differences in the distribution of respondents across treatment groups by Party ID, gender, age, education, income, race/ethnicity, region, and evangelical respondents are not significant.

Table 4. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Balance Tests across Txt Groups DG1

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | D statistic combined | P-value |
| Party ID | 0.01 | 1.00 |
| Female | 0.02 | 1.00 |
| Age | 0.04 | 0.72 |
| Education | 0.03 | 0.97 |
| Income | 0.05 | 0.61 |
| Rural | 0.01 | 1.00 |
| Latino | 0.01 | 1.00 |
| Race | 0.01 | 1.00 |
| Region | 0.01 | 1.00 |
| Evangelical | 0.03 | 0.98 |

Table 5. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Balance Tests across Txt Groups DG2

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | D statistic combined | P-value |
| Party ID | 0.03 | 0.98 |
| Female | 0.02 | 1.00 |
| Age | 0.05 | 0.50 |
| Education | 0.04 | 0.79 |
| Income | 0.03 | 0.99 |
| Rural | 0.03 | 0.96 |
| Latino | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Race | 0.02 | 1.00 |
| Region | 0.03 | 0.99 |
| Evangelical | 0.02 | 1.00 |

Table 6. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Balance Tests across Txt Groups DG3

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | D statistic combined | P-value |
| Party ID | 0.02 | 1.00 |
| Female | 0.03 | 0.90 |
| Age | 0.07 | 0.16 |
| Education | 0.01 | 1.00 |
| Income | 0.03 | 0.92 |
| Rural | 0.02 | 1.00 |
| Latino | 0.01 | 1.00 |
| Race | 0.02 | 1.00 |
| Region | 0.03 | 0.93 |
| Evangelical | 0.00 | 1.00 |

Table 7. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Balance Tests across Txt Group Order DG4-5

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | D statistic combined | P-value |
| Party ID | 0.01 | 1.00 |
| Female | 0.02 | 1.00 |
| Age | 0.04 | 0.79 |
| Education | 0.02 | 1.00 |
| Income | 0.03 | 0.99 |
| Rural | 0.01 | 1.00 |
| Latino | 0.03 | 0.96 |
| Race | 0.03 | 0.92 |
| Region | 0.03 | 0.97 |
| Evangelical | 0.04 | 0.77 |

Table 8. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Balance Tests across Txt Group Order TG 1

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | D statistic combined | P-value |
| Party ID | 0.01 | 1.00 |
| Female | 0.01 | 1.00 |
| Age | 0.06 | 0.34 |
| Education | 0.04 | 0.68 |
| Income | 0.06 | 0.22 |
| Rural | 0.01 | 1.00 |
| Latino | 0.01 | 1.00 |
| Race | 0.02 | 1.00 |
| Region | 0.04 | 0.62 |
| Evangelical | 0.05 | 0.51 |

Table 9. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Balance Tests across Txt Group Order TG 2

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | D statistic combined | P-value |
| Party ID | 0.04 | 0.71 |
| Female | 0.08 | 0.04 |
| Age | 0.03 | 0.96 |
| Education | 0.02 | 1.00 |
| Income | 0.02 | 1.00 |
| Rural | 0.01 | 1.00 |
| Latino | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Race | 0.02 | 1.00 |
| Region | 0.03 | 0.99 |
| Evangelical | 0.03 | 0.90 |

Table 10. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Balance Tests across Txt Group Order PG 1

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | D statistic combined | P-value |
| Party ID | 0.01 | 1.00 |
| Female | 0.06 | 0.32 |
| Age | 0.03 | 0.90 |
| Education | 0.02 | 1.00 |
| Income | 0.04 | 0.72 |
| Rural | 0.02 | 1.00 |
| Latino | 0.01 | 1.00 |
| Race | 0.04 | 0.78 |
| Region | 0.04 | 0.68 |
| Evangelical | 0.03 | 0.98 |

Table 11. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Balance Tests across Txt Group Order PG 2

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | D statistic combined | P-value |
| Party ID | 0.02 | 1.00 |
| Female | 0.02 | 1.00 |
| Age | 0.03 | 0.92 |
| Education | 0.02 | 1.00 |
| Income | 0.04 | 0.68 |
| Rural | 0.04 | 0.76 |
| Latino | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Race | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Region | 0.03 | 0.97 |
| Evangelical | 0.03 | 0.98 |

## Manuscript Figure 1 Regressions

The tables below report full regression results on Manuscript Figure 1 with and without extended demographic controls. We note above that demographics are well balanced across our treatment groups. We included extended controls though we point to Montgomery et al. (2018) who caution against the inclusion of post-treatment controls. Our results are robust to the inclusion of post-treatment controls on observable covariates of gender, age, education, income, race and ethnicity, rural-urban continuum, controls for evangelicals and to state and regional level fixed effects. All models are estimated with OLS unless otherwise specified. Our results are robust to the use of other regression estimation to include Tobit with left-right censoring.

Montgomery, Jacob M., Brendan Nyhan, and Michelle Torres. "How conditioning on posttreatment variables can ruin your experiment and what to do about it." *American Journal of Political Science* 62, no. 3 (2018): 760-775.

### Table 12a. DG 1-3 Regression Results by PID (OLS)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| VARIABLES | DG1To Dem | DG2From Dem | DG3To Dem | DG1To Rep | DG2From Rep | DG3To Rep |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Democrat | 2.349\*\*\* | 2.071\*\*\* | 0.863\*\*\* | -0.0599 | 0.0640 | -0.953\*\*\* |
|  | (0.331) | (0.321) | (0.272) | (0.330) | (0.337) | (0.260) |
| Republican | -0.676\*\* | -0.334 | -0.697\*\* | 1.707\*\*\* | 1.704\*\*\* | 1.053\*\*\* |
|  | (0.340) | (0.325) | (0.282) | (0.347) | (0.351) | (0.271) |
| Constant | 4.025\*\*\* | 3.759\*\*\* | 6.012\*\*\* | 3.974\*\*\* | 3.603\*\*\* | 5.907\*\*\* |
|  | (0.251) | (0.228) | (0.193) | (0.244) | (0.251) | (0.177) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 557 | 565 | 571 | 560 | 552 | 545 |
| R-squared | 0.156 | 0.109 | 0.055 | 0.060 | 0.054 | 0.095 |
| adj. r2 | 0.153 | 0.106 | 0.0519 | 0.0564 | 0.0505 | 0.0920 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Table 12b. DG 1-3 Regression Results by PID (Tobit)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| VARIABLES | DG1To Dem | DG2From Dem | DG3To Dem | DG1To Rep | DG2From Rep | DG3To Rep |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Democrat | 3.932\*\*\* | 3.372\*\*\* | 1.110\*\*\* | -0.400 | -0.113 | -1.236\*\*\* |
|  | (0.576) | (0.562) | (0.356) | (0.611) | (0.673) | (0.337) |
| Republican | -1.443\*\* | -0.927 | -0.938\*\* | 2.894\*\*\* | 3.093\*\*\* | 1.369\*\*\* |
|  | (0.660) | (0.632) | (0.374) | (0.601) | (0.648) | (0.355) |
| Constant | 1.704\*\*\* | 1.294\*\*\* | 0.00262 | 1.695\*\*\* | 0.890\* | -0.145 |
|  | (0.466) | (0.443) | (0.251) | (0.458) | (0.513) | (0.221) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 557 | 565 | 571 | 560 | 552 | 545 |
| R-squared | 0.0404 | 0.0266 | 0.0121 | 0.0156 | 0.0142 | 0.0213 |
| adj. r2 | 0.153 | 0.106 | 0.0519 | 0.0564 | 0.0505 | 0.0920 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Table 13. DG1-3 Regression Results by PID, Extended Controls

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| VARIABLES | DG1To Dem | DG2From Dem | DG3To Dem | DG1To Rep | DG2From Rep | DG3To Rep |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Democrat | 2.296\*\*\* | 2.117\*\*\* | 0.680\*\* | 0.217 | 0.302 | -0.934\*\*\* |
|  | (0.362) | (0.357) | (0.311) | (0.352) | (0.361) | (0.289) |
| Republican | -0.804\*\* | -0.296 | -0.936\*\*\* | 1.928\*\*\* | 1.979\*\*\* | 0.776\*\* |
|  | (0.360) | (0.346) | (0.304) | (0.382) | (0.379) | (0.303) |
| female | 0.0763 | -0.217 | 0.853\*\*\* | 0.0536 | -0.569\* | 0.124 |
|  | (0.276) | (0.288) | (0.250) | (0.303) | (0.297) | (0.239) |
| age | -0.0916 | -0.119 | -0.00537 | -0.142\* | -0.138\* | 0.0389 |
|  | (0.0726) | (0.0762) | (0.0689) | (0.0743) | (0.0704) | (0.0575) |
| agesq | 0.000496 | 0.000801 | 6.96e-06 | 0.00104 | 0.00102 | -0.000229 |
|  | (0.000802) | (0.000857) | (0.000767) | (0.000844) | (0.000779) | (0.000635) |
| education | 0.0549 | 0.0835 | 0.0477 | -0.0233 | -0.0600 | -0.298\*\* |
|  | (0.138) | (0.143) | (0.136) | (0.147) | (0.146) | (0.127) |
| income | 0.202\*\* | -0.0291 | 0.0177 | 0.0704 | 0.161 | 0.0675 |
|  | (0.0933) | (0.101) | (0.0918) | (0.111) | (0.101) | (0.0931) |
| rural | 0.0539 | -0.0715 | 0.102 | -0.0359 | 0.0457 | 0.0288 |
|  | (0.0855) | (0.0861) | (0.0813) | (0.0832) | (0.0837) | (0.0706) |
| latino | 0.373 | -0.523 | -0.625\* | -0.296 | -0.327 | 0.226 |
|  | (0.456) | (0.432) | (0.363) | (0.412) | (0.439) | (0.377) |
| black | 1.019\* | -0.431 | 0.141 | -0.535 | 0.0775 | -0.821 |
|  | (0.591) | (0.663) | (0.521) | (0.706) | (0.648) | (0.556) |
| white | 0.410 | -0.228 | 0.0386 | -0.353 | -0.295 | -0.159 |
|  | (0.428) | (0.553) | (0.406) | (0.629) | (0.511) | (0.382) |
| evangelical | 0.690\*\* | 0.590\* | -0.0748 | 0.449 | 0.720\*\* | 0.0144 |
|  | (0.299) | (0.309) | (0.282) | (0.328) | (0.329) | (0.283) |
| Constant | 4.449\*\*\* | 6.503\*\*\* | -0.375 | 6.999\*\*\* | 6.246\*\*\* | -0.412 |
|  | (1.674) | (1.767) | (1.519) | (1.712) | (1.637) | (1.312) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 498 | 510 | 513 | 511 | 499 | 496 |
| Regional FE | 0.229 | 0.141 | 0.093 | 0.122 | 0.145 | 0.112 |
| adj. r2 | 0.210 | 0.121 | 0.0716 | 0.101 | 0.124 | 0.0900 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Table 14a. DG4-5 Regression Results by PID (OLS)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| VARIABLES | DG4Rep vs. Dem | DG4Rep vs. Dem | DG5 Dem Bias | DG5 Rep Bias | DG5 50/50 split |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Democrat | -2.170\*\*\* | -3.753\*\*\* | 1.865\*\*\* | -0.739\*\*\* | -0.831\*\*\* |
|  | (0.181) | (0.335) | (0.164) | (0.172) | (0.150) |
| Republican | 1.707\*\*\* | 3.220\*\*\* | -0.705\*\*\* | 1.602\*\*\* | -0.593\*\*\* |
|  | (0.201) | (0.369) | (0.174) | (0.167) | (0.156) |
| Constant | 3.981\*\*\* | 3.737\*\*\* | -0.577\*\*\* | -0.746\*\*\* | 0.364\*\*\* |
|  | (0.144) | (0.234) | (0.117) | (0.120) | (0.114) |
| Regression | OLS | Tobit | Logit | Logit  | Logit |
| Observations | 1,116 | 1,116 | 1,120 | 1,120 | 1,120 |
| R-squared | 0.303 |  |  |  |  |
| adj. r2 | 0.302 | 0.0838 | 0.192 | 0.158 | 0.0207 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Table 15. DG4-5 Regression Results by PID, Extended Controls

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| VARIABLES | DG4Rep vs. Dem | DG5 Dem Bias | DG5 Rep Bias | DG5 50/50 split |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Democrat | -2.078\*\*\* | 1.998\*\*\* | -0.871\*\*\* | -0.711\*\*\* |
|  | (0.204) | (0.197) | (0.195) | (0.166) |
| Republican | 1.635\*\*\* | -0.599\*\*\* | 1.818\*\*\* | -0.528\*\*\* |
|  | (0.221) | (0.193) | (0.201) | (0.172) |
| female | -0.0998 | -0.323\*\* | -0.500\*\*\* | 0.138 |
|  | (0.163) | (0.157) | (0.157) | (0.135) |
| age | 0.0773\*\* | -0.127\*\*\* | -0.0836\*\* | -0.0154 |
|  | (0.0389) | (0.0405) | (0.0401) | (0.0340) |
| agesq | -0.000749\* | 0.00109\*\* | 0.000645 | -5.22e-05 |
|  | (0.000436) | (0.000456) | (0.000446) | (0.000383) |
| education | 0.114 | 0.0357 | 0.0521 | -0.0155 |
|  | (0.0812) | (0.0776) | (0.0790) | (0.0675) |
| income | 0.0165 | -0.0284 | -0.00783 | 0.0382 |
|  | (0.0569) | (0.0537) | (0.0534) | (0.0456) |
| rural | -0.0195 | -0.0347 | -0.0893\* | 0.0117 |
|  | (0.0504) | (0.0463) | (0.0478) | (0.0412) |
| latino | -0.291 | -0.00747 | 0.401\* | -0.152 |
|  | (0.239) | (0.226) | (0.233) | (0.202) |
| black | -0.287 | 0.569\* | 0.850\*\* | -0.533\* |
|  | (0.332) | (0.343) | (0.355) | (0.297) |
| white | 0.129 | -0.253 | 0.285 | -0.142 |
|  | (0.265) | (0.257) | (0.295) | (0.233) |
| evangelical | 0.112 | 0.116 | 0.335\*\* | -0.168 |
|  | (0.178) | (0.169) | (0.168) | (0.145) |
| Constant | 1.776\*\* | 2.891\*\*\* | 1.305 | 1.189 |
|  | (0.890) | (0.919) | (0.963) | (0.797) |
| Regression | OLS | Logit | Logit | Logit |
| Observations | 1,008 | 1,011 | 1,011 | 1,011 |
| Regional FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| adj. r2/LL | 0.314 | -529.1 | -533.4 | -671.5 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Table 16a. TG Regression Results by PID (OLS)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| VARIABLES | TG1 to Dem | TG1 to Rep | TG2from Dem | TG2from Rep |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Democrat | 0.705\*\*\* | -0.246 | 3.307\*\*\* | -0.984\* |
|  | (0.204) | (0.188) | (0.480) | (0.518) |
| Republican | -0.343\* | 0.638\*\*\* | -0.702 | 2.382\*\*\* |
|  | (0.203) | (0.212) | (0.502) | (0.569) |
| Constant | 1.790\*\*\* | 1.689\*\*\* | 4.921\*\*\* | 5.168\*\*\* |
|  | (0.154) | (0.148) | (0.347) | (0.420) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 537 | 580 | 553 | 563 |
| R-squared | 0.056 | 0.038 | 0.127 | 0.080 |
| adj. r2 | 0.0524 | 0.0347 | 0.124 | 0.0767 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Table 16b. TG Regression Results by PID (Tobit)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| VARIABLES | TG1 to Dem | TG1 to Rep | TG2from Dem | TG2from Rep |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Democrat | 1.378\*\*\* | -0.425 | 5.149\*\*\* | -1.984\*\* |
|  | (0.444) | (0.475) | (0.794) | (0.997) |
| Republican | -0.952\*\* | 1.664\*\*\* | -1.518\* | 4.290\*\*\* |
|  | (0.474) | (0.515) | (0.888) | (1.029) |
| Constant | 1.166\*\*\* | 0.598 | 3.430\*\*\* | 3.293\*\*\* |
|  | (0.344) | (0.378) | (0.607) | (0.801) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 537 | 580 | 553 | 563 |
| R-squared |  |  |  |  |
| adj. r2 | 0.0163 | 0.0115 | 0.0274 | 0.0185 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Table 17. TG Regression Results by PID, Extended Controls

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| VARIABLES | TG1 to Dem | TG1 to Rep | TG2from Dem | TG2from Rep |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Democrat | 0.778\*\*\* | 3.509\*\*\* | -0.252 | -0.749 |
|  | (0.228) | (0.530) | (0.212) | (0.578) |
| Republican | -0.334 | -0.939\* | 0.403\* | 2.639\*\*\* |
|  | (0.225) | (0.544) | (0.232) | (0.632) |
| female | 0.319\* | -0.280 | 0.0678 | -0.141 |
|  | (0.174) | (0.431) | (0.181) | (0.448) |
| age | -0.0249 | -0.193 | 0.0822\* | -0.158 |
|  | (0.0410) | (0.121) | (0.0431) | (0.103) |
| agesq | 0.000197 | 0.00138 | -0.000989\*\* | 0.00110 |
|  | (0.000462) | (0.00140) | (0.000493) | (0.00114) |
| education | 0.186\*\* | 0.249 | -0.0314 | 0.382 |
|  | (0.0878) | (0.209) | (0.0938) | (0.233) |
| income | -0.0587 | 0.251\* | 0.0520 | 0.0411 |
|  | (0.0571) | (0.139) | (0.0644) | (0.163) |
| rural | 0.0760 | 0.104 | 0.0267 | -0.139 |
|  | (0.0537) | (0.130) | (0.0537) | (0.137) |
| latino | -0.0458 | -0.0554 | -0.208 | 0.492 |
|  | (0.256) | (0.638) | (0.240) | (0.668) |
| black | -0.167 | 0.351 | 0.204 | -0.256 |
|  | (0.384) | (0.865) | (0.346) | (0.876) |
| white | 0.0449 | 0.988 | 0.233 | -0.261 |
|  | (0.319) | (0.720) | (0.269) | (0.723) |
| evangelical | -0.158 | 0.252 | 0.328\* | 0.855\* |
|  | (0.184) | (0.467) | (0.197) | (0.499) |
| Constant | 1.782\* | 7.988\*\*\* | -0.159 | 8.546\*\*\* |
|  | (0.955) | (2.544) | (0.951) | (2.390) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 489 | 520 | 498 | 511 |
| Regional FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| adj. r2 | 0.0874 | 0.0474 | 0.189 | 0.128 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Table 18a. PG Regression Results by PID (OLS)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| VARIABLES | PG1To Dem majority | PG2To Dem majority | PG1To Rep majority | PG2To Rep majority |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Democrat | 0.648\*\*\* | 0.922\*\*\* | -0.381\* | -1.082\*\*\* |
|  | (0.210) | (0.276) | (0.212) | (0.269) |
| Republican | 0.00332 | -0.0229 | 0.0634 | -0.0794 |
|  | (0.219) | (0.316) | (0.233) | (0.269) |
| Constant | 2.244\*\*\* | 0.758\*\*\* | 2.493\*\*\* | 1.500\*\*\* |
|  | (0.161) | (0.208) | (0.170) | (0.190) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 566 | 540 | 546 | 576 |
| R-squared | 0.024 | 0.026 | 0.010 | 0.035 |
| adj. r2 | 0.0207 | 0.0228 | 0.00654 | 0.0320 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Table 18b. PG Regression Results by PID (Tobit)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| VARIABLES | PG1To Dem majority | PG2To Dem majority | PG1To Rep majority | PG2To Rep majority |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Democrat | 1.678\*\*\* | 1.257\*\*\* | -0.791 | -1.414\*\*\* |
|  | (0.496) | (0.366) | (0.513) | (0.350) |
| Republican | 0.150 | -0.00256 | 0.120 | -0.157 |
|  | (0.509) | (0.412) | (0.566) | (0.353) |
| Constant | 1.850\*\*\* | 0.836\*\*\* | 2.580\*\*\* | 1.853\*\*\* |
|  | (0.382) | (0.265) | (0.416) | (0.256) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 566 | 540 | 546 | 576 |
| R-squared |  |  |  |  |
| adj. r2 | 0.00812 | 0.00595 | 0.00221 | 0.00786 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Table 19. PG Regression Results by PID, Extended Controls

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| VARIABLES | PG1To Dem majority | PG2To Dem majority | PG1To Rep majority | PG2To Rep majority |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Democrat | 0.665\*\*\* | 0.873\*\*\* | -0.298 | -0.929\*\*\* |
|  | (0.229) | (0.302) | (0.232) | (0.302) |
| Republican | -0.0319 | 0.0562 | 0.0420 | -0.0746 |
|  | (0.238) | (0.345) | (0.251) | (0.299) |
| female | 0.751\*\*\* | 0.573\*\* | 0.439\*\* | -0.0197 |
|  | (0.184) | (0.268) | (0.185) | (0.239) |
| age | 0.120\*\*\* | -0.0361 | -0.0182 | 0.0485 |
|  | (0.0433) | (0.0636) | (0.0457) | (0.0612) |
| agesq | -0.00135\*\*\* | 0.000216 | 9.01e-05 | -0.000801 |
|  | (0.000501) | (0.000722) | (0.000508) | (0.000696) |
| education | -0.0198 | 0.0224 | 0.110 | -0.0988 |
|  | (0.0924) | (0.131) | (0.0969) | (0.123) |
| income | 0.0684 | -0.0306 | -0.135\*\* | -0.00739 |
|  | (0.0628) | (0.0886) | (0.0642) | (0.0820) |
| rural | -0.0146 | 0.00844 | 0.0684 | -0.0362 |
|  | (0.0526) | (0.0806) | (0.0590) | (0.0803) |
| latino | -0.128 | 0.619 | -0.474\* | -0.547 |
|  | (0.261) | (0.386) | (0.275) | (0.338) |
| black | 0.00965 | 0.0944 | -0.164 | -0.562 |
|  | (0.370) | (0.589) | (0.382) | (0.473) |
| white | 0.0943 | 0.158 | 0.274 | -0.290 |
|  | (0.320) | (0.514) | (0.312) | (0.357) |
| evangelical | -0.454\*\* | -0.557\* | -0.0397 | 0.431 |
|  | (0.188) | (0.284) | (0.199) | (0.268) |
| Constant | -0.519 | 1.610 | 2.689\*\* | 1.709 |
|  | (0.935) | (1.479) | (1.057) | (1.340) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 510 | 483 | 494 | 526 |
| Regional FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| adj. r2 | 0.0902 | 0.0623 | 0.0518 | 0.0655 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Manuscript Figure 2 Regressions

### Table 20. DG 1-3 Regression Results by Ideology

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| VARIABLES | DG1To Dem | DG2From Dem | DG3To Dem | DG1To Rep | DG2From Rep | DG3To Rep |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Very conservative | -0.662 | -0.524 | -1.108\*\*\* | 1.049\*\* | 1.344\*\*\* | 0.714\* |
|  | (0.479) | (0.457) | (0.384) | (0.439) | (0.451) | (0.373) |
| Somewhat conservative | -0.932\*\* | -0.955\*\* | -0.562\* | 0.805\*\* | 0.417 | 0.595\* |
|  | (0.364) | (0.370) | (0.287) | (0.367) | (0.360) | (0.308) |
| Somewhat liberal | 0.651 | 0.894\*\* | 0.486 | -1.083\*\* | -1.322\*\*\* | -0.518 |
|  | (0.436) | (0.413) | (0.351) | (0.428) | (0.411) | (0.339) |
| Very liberal | 1.760\*\*\* | 1.077\*\* | 1.126\*\*\* | -0.623 | -0.816\* | -0.740\* |
|  | (0.462) | (0.434) | (0.385) | (0.434) | (0.484) | (0.378) |
| Constant | 3.816\*\*\* | 3.500\*\*\* | 0.223 | 3.373\*\*\* | 3.213\*\*\* | -0.246 |
|  | (0.224) | (0.207) | (0.170) | (0.213) | (0.231) | (0.201) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 545 | 566 | 563 | 569 | 548 | 550 |
| R-squared | 0.060 | 0.043 | 0.055 | 0.045 | 0.059 | 0.035 |
| adj. r2 | 0.0533 | 0.0360 | 0.0483 | 0.0378 | 0.0521 | 0.0280 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Table 21. DG 1-3 Regression Results by Ideology, Extended Controls

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| VARIABLES | DG1To Dem | DG2From Dem | DG3To Dem | DG1To Rep | DG2From Rep | DG3To Rep |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Very conservative | -1.061\*\* | -0.850\* | -1.241\*\*\* | 0.873\* | 1.006\*\* | 0.559 |
|  | (0.440) | (0.478) | (0.398) | (0.472) | (0.465) | (0.390) |
| Somewhat  | -0.889\*\* | -0.942\*\* | -0.477 | 0.613 | 0.116 | 0.475 |
| conservative | (0.374) | (0.378) | (0.314) | (0.390) | (0.381) | (0.320) |
| Somewhat  | 0.494 | 0.599 | 0.476 | -0.888\*\* | -1.157\*\*\* | -0.818\*\* |
| liberal | (0.449) | (0.478) | (0.381) | (0.426) | (0.421) | (0.370) |
| Very liberal | 1.907\*\*\* | 1.164\*\* | 0.906\*\* | -0.330 | -0.942\* | -0.662\* |
|  | (0.495) | (0.480) | (0.417) | (0.461) | (0.491) | (0.395) |
| female | -0.0680 | -0.324 | 0.747\*\*\* | 0.0857 | -0.459 | 0.181 |
|  | (0.290) | (0.298) | (0.254) | (0.303) | (0.301) | (0.253) |
| age | -0.135\* | -0.0736 | -0.0171 | -0.118 | -0.0912 | 0.0265 |
|  | (0.0697) | (0.0782) | (0.0674) | (0.0742) | (0.0704) | (0.0574) |
| agesq | 0.00107 | 0.000396 | 0.000150 | 0.000807 | 0.000541 | -0.000131 |
|  | (0.000773) | (0.000872) | (0.000754) | (0.000843) | (0.000781) | (0.000635) |
| education | 0.0858 | 0.0959 | 0.101 | -0.138 | -0.120 | -0.218 |
|  | (0.149) | (0.149) | (0.134) | (0.149) | (0.152) | (0.139) |
| income | 0.218\*\* | -0.0682 | 0.0270 | 0.173 | 0.223\*\* | 0.0588 |
|  | (0.102) | (0.103) | (0.0896) | (0.109) | (0.101) | (0.0977) |
| rural | 0.0124 | -0.153\* | 0.0923 | -0.0111 | 0.0832 | 0.0585 |
|  | (0.0806) | (0.0815) | (0.0816) | (0.0851) | (0.0902) | (0.0733) |
| latino | 0.839\* | -0.163 | -0.608\* | -0.526 | -0.683 | -0.276 |
|  | (0.467) | (0.451) | (0.348) | (0.390) | (0.422) | (0.377) |
| black | 1.478\*\* | 0.300 | 0.107 | -0.462 | -0.863 | -1.200\*\* |
|  | (0.599) | (0.661) | (0.461) | (0.642) | (0.645) | (0.553) |
| white | 0.0625 | -0.279 | -0.242 | -0.0760 | -0.661 | 0.0812 |
|  | (0.444) | (0.528) | (0.348) | (0.554) | (0.547) | (0.402) |
| evangelical | 0.864\*\*\* | 0.861\*\*\* | 0.0794 | 0.764\*\* | 0.820\*\* | 0.0502 |
|  | (0.312) | (0.323) | (0.278) | (0.332) | (0.331) | (0.291) |
| Constant | 5.956\*\*\* | 6.277\*\*\* | -0.0702 | 6.770\*\*\* | 6.480\*\*\* | -0.636 |
|  | (1.581) | (1.823) | (1.446) | (1.696) | (1.570) | (1.301) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 494 | 514 | 513 | 522 | 502 | 503 |
| Regional FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| adj. r2 | 0.147 | 0.0904 | 0.0891 | 0.0987 | 0.129 | 0.0775 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Table 22. DG 4-5 Regression Results by Ideology

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| VARIABLES | DG4Rep vs. Dem | DG5 Dem Bias | DG5 Rep Bias | DG5 50/50 split |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Very conservative | 1.868\*\*\* | -0.863\*\*\* | 1.346\*\*\* | -0.825\*\*\* |
|  | (0.267) | (0.190) | (0.188) | (0.188) |
| Somewhat conservative | 1.457\*\*\* | -0.674\*\*\* | 0.885\*\*\* | 0.0188 |
|  | (0.225) | (0.168) | (0.166) | (0.162) |
| Somewhat liberal | -1.366\*\*\* | 1.155\*\*\* | -0.575\*\* | -0.356\* |
|  | (0.239) | (0.218) | (0.228) | (0.195) |
| Very liberal | -1.445\*\*\* | 0.909\*\*\* | -0.659\*\*\* | -0.167 |
|  | (0.244) | (0.214) | (0.239) | (0.199) |
| Constant | 3.400\*\*\* | -0.0191 | -0.718\*\*\* | 0.0479 |
|  | (0.136) | (0.0979) | (0.104) | (0.0979) |
| Regression | OLS | Logit | Logit  | Logit |
| Observations | 1,113 | 1,117 | 1,117 | 1,117 |
| R-squared | 0.163 |  |  |  |
| adj. r2 | 0.160 | 0.0792 | 0.0812 | 0.0157 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Table 23. DG 4-5 Regression Results by Ideology, Extended Controls

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| VARIABLES | DG4Rep vs. Dem | DG5 Dem Bias | DG5 Rep Bias | DG5 50/50 split |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Very conservative | 1.943\*\*\* | -1.103\*\*\* | 1.326\*\*\* | -0.861\*\*\* |
|  | (0.269) | (0.212) | (0.205) | (0.206) |
| Somewhat  | 1.336\*\*\* | -0.780\*\*\* | 0.828\*\*\* | -0.0186 |
| conservative | (0.230) | (0.189) | (0.181) | (0.174) |
| Somewhat  | -1.427\*\*\* | 1.213\*\*\* | -0.624\*\* | -0.371\* |
| liberal | (0.259) | (0.257) | (0.244) | (0.211) |
| Very liberal | -1.434\*\*\* | 0.928\*\*\* | -0.719\*\*\* | -0.265 |
|  | (0.265) | (0.246) | (0.270) | (0.219) |
| female | -0.0920 | -0.231 | -0.366\*\* | 0.0463 |
|  | (0.174) | (0.145) | (0.143) | (0.135) |
| age | 0.0642 | -0.0945\*\* | -0.0735\*\* | -0.0202 |
|  | (0.0409) | (0.0374) | (0.0371) | (0.0340) |
| agesq | -0.000660 | 0.000824\*\* | 0.000562 | -3.00e-05 |
|  | (0.000462) | (0.000420) | (0.000415) | (0.000382) |
| education | 0.0791 | 0.0361 | -0.0127 | -0.0186 |
|  | (0.0919) | (0.0760) | (0.0737) | (0.0674) |
| income | 0.0177 | -0.0213 | 0.00749 | 0.0276 |
|  | (0.0615) | (0.0492) | (0.0493) | (0.0452) |
| rural | 0.0405 | -0.0511 | -0.0220 | 0.0132 |
|  | (0.0537) | (0.0453) | (0.0454) | (0.0408) |
| latino | -0.793\*\*\* | 0.324 | 0.0247 | -0.297 |
|  | (0.259) | (0.213) | (0.213) | (0.201) |
| black | -0.958\*\*\* | 1.124\*\*\* | 0.329 | -0.800\*\*\* |
|  | (0.341) | (0.318) | (0.333) | (0.291) |
| white | 0.453 | -0.312 | 0.622\*\* | -0.274 |
|  | (0.285) | (0.236) | (0.266) | (0.228) |
| evangelical | -0.0985 | 0.290\* | 0.287\* | -0.0126 |
|  | (0.190) | (0.165) | (0.159) | (0.148) |
| Constant | 1.623\* | 2.555\*\*\* | 0.992 | 1.321\* |
|  | (0.945) | (0.857) | (0.870) | (0.792) |
| Model |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,015 | 1,018 | 1,018 | 1,018 |
| Regional FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| adj. r2/LL | 0.219 | -597.2 | -604.7 | -675.2 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Table 24. TG Regression Results by Ideology

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| VARIABLES | TG1 to Dem | TG2from Dem | TG1 to Rep | TG2from Rep |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Very conservative | -0.916\*\*\* | -1.045 | 0.0310 | 1.157 |
|  | (0.217) | (0.671) | (0.265) | (0.726) |
| Somewhat conservative | -0.457\*\* | -0.678 | -0.0978 | 0.550 |
|  | (0.210) | (0.565) | (0.225) | (0.553) |
| Somewhat liberal | 0.432 | 1.496\*\* | -0.815\*\*\* | -1.411\*\* |
|  | (0.273) | (0.626) | (0.234) | (0.699) |
| Very liberal | 0.717\*\* | 1.915\*\*\* | -0.734\*\*\* | -1.549\*\* |
|  | (0.278) | (0.663) | (0.239) | (0.626) |
| Constant | 2.025\*\*\* | 5.908\*\*\* | 2.065\*\*\* | 5.593\*\*\* |
|  | (0.133) | (0.337) | (0.133) | (0.338) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 546 | 549 | 568 | 564 |
| R-squared | 0.072 | 0.041 | 0.029 | 0.030 |
| adj. r2 | 0.0647 | 0.0342 | 0.0218 | 0.0233 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Table 25. TG Regression Results by Ideology, Extended Controls

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| VARIABLES | TG1 to Dem | TG2from Dem | TG1 to Rep | TG2from Rep |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Very conservative | -0.953\*\*\* | -1.507\*\* | -0.0805 | 0.647 |
|  | (0.245) | (0.711) | (0.276) | (0.769) |
| Somewhat  | -0.587\*\*\* | -1.109\* | -0.100 | 0.228 |
| conservative | (0.224) | (0.593) | (0.240) | (0.578) |
| Somewhat  | 0.484\* | 1.142\* | -0.863\*\*\* | -1.280\* |
| liberal | (0.293) | (0.655) | (0.255) | (0.744) |
| Very liberal | 0.782\*\*\* | 1.683\*\* | -0.660\*\* | -1.052 |
|  | (0.303) | (0.699) | (0.264) | (0.662) |
| female | 0.263 | -0.616 | 0.136 | -0.360 |
|  | (0.171) | (0.451) | (0.186) | (0.456) |
| age | -0.00608 | -0.157 | 0.0693 | -0.159 |
|  | (0.0395) | (0.125) | (0.0437) | (0.103) |
| agesq | 1.68e-05 | 0.000963 | -0.000858\* | 0.00110 |
|  | (0.000445) | (0.00145) | (0.000498) | (0.00115) |
| education | 0.143 | 0.425\* | -0.0595 | 0.0882 |
|  | (0.0918) | (0.225) | (0.0960) | (0.245) |
| income | 0.0284 | 0.223 | 0.0586 | 0.260 |
|  | (0.0595) | (0.157) | (0.0655) | (0.170) |
| rural | 0.0698 | 0.0223 | 0.0491 | -0.0945 |
|  | (0.0547) | (0.127) | (0.0563) | (0.144) |
| latino | 0.114 | 0.163 | -0.250 | 0.170 |
|  | (0.259) | (0.724) | (0.246) | (0.686) |
| black | 0.159 | 0.846 | 0.0500 | -0.868 |
|  | (0.363) | (0.904) | (0.354) | (0.841) |
| white | 0.0375 | -0.0606 | 0.303 | 0.195 |
|  | (0.306) | (0.761) | (0.282) | (0.688) |
| evangelical | 0.205 | 0.319 | 0.256 | 1.224\*\* |
|  | (0.195) | (0.506) | (0.200) | (0.524) |
| Constant | 1.348 | 9.063\*\*\* | 0.422 | 9.407\*\*\* |
|  | (0.904) | (2.654) | (0.970) | (2.358) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 502 | 502 | 514 | 514 |
| Regional FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| adj. r2 | 0.0965 | 0.115 | 0.0518 | 0.0770 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Table 27. PG Regression Results by Ideology

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| VARIABLES | PG1To Dem majority | PG2To Dem majority | PG1To Rep majority | PG2To Rep majority |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Very conservative | -0.804\*\*\* | -1.410\*\*\* | -0.314 | -0.119 |
|  | (0.254) | (0.428) | (0.260) | (0.336) |
| Somewhat conservative | -0.305 | -0.342 | 0.434\* | 0.456 |
|  | (0.216) | (0.322) | (0.233) | (0.283) |
| Somewhat liberal | 0.676\*\* | 0.695\*\* | -0.322 | -0.230 |
|  | (0.272) | (0.348) | (0.282) | (0.374) |
| Very liberal | 0.532\* | 0.145 | 0.0983 | 0.333 |
|  | (0.279) | (0.365) | (0.288) | (0.365) |
| Constant | 2.591\*\*\* | 1.364\*\*\* | 2.314\*\*\* | 0.980\*\*\* |
|  | (0.137) | (0.179) | (0.135) | (0.194) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 571 | 530 | 538 | 583 |
| R-squared | 0.053 | 0.042 | 0.018 | 0.008 |
| adj. r2 | 0.0462 | 0.0351 | 0.0103 | 0.00149 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Table 28. PG Regression Results by Ideology, Extended Controls

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| VARIABLES | TG1 to Dem | TG1 to Rep | TG2from Dem | TG2from Rep |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Very conservative | -0.684\*\* | -1.389\*\*\* | -0.198 | -0.461 |
|  | (0.280) | (0.460) | (0.271) | (0.353) |
| Somewhat  | -0.183 | -0.495 | 0.446\* | 0.227 |
| conservative | (0.231) | (0.341) | (0.244) | (0.304) |
| Somewhat  | 0.595\*\* | 0.697\* | -0.277 | -0.304 |
| liberal | (0.296) | (0.375) | (0.297) | (0.399) |
| Very liberal | 0.511\* | 0.0341 | 0.0805 | 0.364 |
|  | (0.287) | (0.387) | (0.317) | (0.370) |
| female | 0.660\*\*\* | 0.529\* | 0.428\*\* | 0.00364 |
|  | (0.184) | (0.271) | (0.186) | (0.238) |
| age | 0.120\*\*\* | -0.0194 | -0.0151 | 0.0517 |
|  | (0.0422) | (0.0623) | (0.0452) | (0.0594) |
| agesq | -0.00135\*\*\* | 1.16e-05 | 6.41e-05 | -0.000883 |
|  | (0.000487) | (0.000710) | (0.000504) | (0.000674) |
| education | -0.0136 | 0.0420 | 0.0698 | -0.204\* |
|  | (0.0923) | (0.136) | (0.102) | (0.122) |
| income | 0.0696 | -0.0214 | -0.0613 | 0.0994 |
|  | (0.0619) | (0.0881) | (0.0681) | (0.0822) |
| rural | -0.00524 | 0.0102 | 0.0635 | -0.00215 |
|  | (0.0519) | (0.0826) | (0.0614) | (0.0746) |
| latino | -0.0300 | 0.678\* | -0.410 | -0.740\*\* |
|  | (0.252) | (0.388) | (0.269) | (0.322) |
| black | 0.00732 | -0.227 | -0.113 | -0.889\*\* |
|  | (0.356) | (0.568) | (0.378) | (0.442) |
| white | -0.00736 | -0.175 | 0.338 | -0.178 |
|  | (0.302) | (0.489) | (0.308) | (0.331) |
| evangelical | -0.273 | -0.281 | 0.0767 | 0.682\*\* |
|  | (0.200) | (0.297) | (0.202) | (0.270) |
| Constant | -0.207 | 2.081 | 2.245\*\* | 1.255 |
|  | (0.923) | (1.427) | (1.028) | (1.295) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 518 | 483 | 493 | 533 |
| Regional FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| adj. r2 | 0.0933 | 0.0860 | 0.0484 | 0.0620 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Regressions for Manuscript Figure 3

### Table 29. Effect of Contact on Dictator Giving

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| VARIABLES | DG1 to Dem | DG1 to Dem  | DG1 to Dem | DG1 to Rep | DG1 to Rep | DG1 to Rep |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Contact with dem | 0.772\*\*\* | 0.419\*\*\* | 0.398\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.140) | (0.153) | (0.158) |  |  |  |
| Contact with rep |  |  |  | 0.544\*\*\* | 0.368\*\* | 0.443\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.149) | (0.167) | (0.168) |
| Democrat |  | 1.970\*\*\* | 2.034\*\*\* |  | 0.360 | 0.609 |
|  |  | (0.365) | (0.387) |  | (0.359) | (0.385) |
| Republican |  | -0.660 | -0.629 |  | 1.426\*\*\* | 1.758\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.405) | (0.423) |  | (0.390) | (0.393) |
| Very conservative |  | -0.00328 | -0.402 |  | -0.0203 | -0.245 |
|  |  | (0.461) | (0.441) |  | (0.474) | (0.477) |
| Somewhat conservative |  | -0.389 | -0.412 |  | 0.119 | -0.127 |
|  |  | (0.387) | (0.392) |  | (0.402) | (0.405) |
| Somewhat liberal |  | -0.583 | -0.752 |  | -1.063\*\* | -1.022\*\* |
|  |  | (0.479) | (0.468) |  | (0.449) | (0.436) |
| Very liberal |  | 0.705 | 0.953\* |  | -0.682 | -0.607 |
|  |  | (0.463) | (0.493) |  | (0.455) | (0.485) |
| female |  |  | -0.0847 |  |  | 0.150 |
|  |  |  | (0.279) |  |  | (0.307) |
| age |  |  | -0.117\* |  |  | -0.149\* |
|  |  |  | (0.0687) |  |  | (0.0767) |
| agesq |  |  | 0.000785 |  |  | 0.00108 |
|  |  |  | (0.000754) |  |  | (0.000871) |
| education |  |  | -0.0491 |  |  | -0.129 |
|  |  |  | (0.139) |  |  | (0.154) |
| income |  |  | 0.225\*\* |  |  | 0.116 |
|  |  |  | (0.0931) |  |  | (0.112) |
| rural |  |  | 0.0380 |  |  | -0.0557 |
|  |  |  | (0.0847) |  |  | (0.0849) |
| latino |  |  | 0.486 |  |  | -0.399 |
|  |  |  | (0.471) |  |  | (0.405) |
| black |  |  | 0.725 |  |  | -0.406 |
|  |  |  | (0.583) |  |  | (0.686) |
| white |  |  | 0.280 |  |  | -0.329 |
|  |  |  | (0.421) |  |  | (0.607) |
| evangelical |  |  | 0.782\*\* |  |  | 0.448 |
|  |  |  | (0.305) |  |  | (0.339) |
| Constant | 1.494\*\*\* | 2.092\*\*\* | 4.480\*\*\* | 1.911\*\*\* | 2.054\*\*\* | 6.346\*\*\* |
|  | (0.416) | (0.498) | (1.646) | (0.441) | (0.550) | (1.750) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 595 | 527 | 479 | 607 | 541 | 496 |
| adj. r2 | 0.0464 | 0.171 | 0.262 | 0.0232 | 0.0667 | 0.147 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Table 30. Effect of Contact on Amount Sent in Trust Game

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| VARIABLES | TG1 to Dem | TG1 to Dem  | TG1 to Dem | TG1 to Rep | TG1 to Rep | TG1 to Rep |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Contact with dem | 0.409\*\*\* | 0.314\*\*\* | 0.325\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0805) | (0.0866) | (0.0926) |  |  |  |
| Contact with rep |  |  |  | 0.321\*\*\* | 0.274\*\*\* | 0.286\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.0793) | (0.0885) | (0.0976) |
| Democrat |  | 0.610\*\*\* | 0.656\*\*\* |  | -0.0598 | -0.0583 |
|  |  | (0.214) | (0.238) |  | (0.209) | (0.233) |
| Republican |  | 0.125 | 0.138 |  | 0.486\*\* | 0.286 |
|  |  | (0.217) | (0.237) |  | (0.234) | (0.256) |
| Very conservative |  | -0.735\*\*\* | -0.733\*\*\* |  | -0.243 | -0.295 |
|  |  | (0.244) | (0.279) |  | (0.278) | (0.285) |
| Somewhat conservative |  | -0.356 | -0.484\*\* |  | -0.339 | -0.281 |
|  |  | (0.221) | (0.236) |  | (0.237) | (0.256) |
| Somewhat liberal |  | 0.0771 | 0.0936 |  | -0.700\*\*\* | -0.789\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.282) | (0.299) |  | (0.239) | (0.268) |
| Very liberal |  | 0.379 | 0.397 |  | -0.646\*\*\* | -0.643\*\* |
|  |  | (0.283) | (0.301) |  | (0.247) | (0.275) |
| female |  |  | 0.224 |  |  | 0.142 |
|  |  |  | (0.173) |  |  | (0.185) |
| age |  |  | -0.0271 |  |  | 0.0643 |
|  |  |  | (0.0397) |  |  | (0.0449) |
| agesq |  |  | 0.000225 |  |  | -0.000799 |
|  |  |  | (0.000450) |  |  | (0.000511) |
| education |  |  | 0.155\* |  |  | -0.0956 |
|  |  |  | (0.0883) |  |  | (0.0976) |
| income |  |  | -0.0122 |  |  | 0.0578 |
|  |  |  | (0.0566) |  |  | (0.0659) |
| rural |  |  | 0.0607 |  |  | 0.0302 |
|  |  |  | (0.0531) |  |  | (0.0565) |
| latino |  |  | -0.0444 |  |  | -0.217 |
|  |  |  | (0.253) |  |  | (0.241) |
| black |  |  | -0.125 |  |  | 0.346 |
|  |  |  | (0.380) |  |  | (0.353) |
| white |  |  | -0.0383 |  |  | 0.324 |
|  |  |  | (0.311) |  |  | (0.280) |
| evangelical |  |  | 0.118 |  |  | 0.202 |
|  |  |  | (0.198) |  |  | (0.203) |
| Constant | 0.752\*\*\* | 0.871\*\*\* | 0.903 | 0.954\*\*\* | 1.201\*\*\* | -0.204 |
|  | (0.234) | (0.310) | (0.930) | (0.222) | (0.301) | (1.005) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 579 | 520 | 477 | 621 | 548 | 498 |
| adj. r2 | 0.0397 | 0.104 | 0.144 | 0.0241 | 0.0526 | 0.0771 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Table 31. Effects of Contact on Social Distance, Trust

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| VARIABLES | closedem | trustdem | closerep | trustrep |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Contact with dem | 0.213\*\*\* | 0.144\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (0.0445) | (0.0335) |  |  |
| Contact with rep |  |  | 0.275\*\*\* | 0.167\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.0455) | (0.0354) |
| Democrat | 1.239\*\*\* | 0.732\*\*\* | -0.400\*\*\* | -0.189\*\* |
|  | (0.111) | (0.0753) | (0.102) | (0.0789) |
| Republican | -0.410\*\*\* | -0.270\*\*\* | 1.031\*\*\* | 0.589\*\*\* |
|  | (0.113) | (0.0807) | (0.117) | (0.0823) |
| Very conservative | -0.439\*\*\* | -0.361\*\*\* | 0.409\*\*\* | 0.179\* |
|  | (0.127) | (0.0925) | (0.135) | (0.101) |
| Somewhat conservative | -0.227\*\* | -0.254\*\*\* | 0.391\*\*\* | 0.0742 |
|  | (0.103) | (0.0775) | (0.109) | (0.0746) |
| Somewhat liberal | 0.147 | 0.0651 | -0.247\*\* | -0.208\*\* |
|  | (0.120) | (0.0875) | (0.116) | (0.0914) |
| Very liberal | 0.261\* | 0.0434 | -0.328\*\*\* | -0.343\*\*\* |
|  | (0.139) | (0.0864) | (0.126) | (0.0917) |
| female | -0.175\*\* | 0.102\* | -0.201\*\*\* | 0.0143 |
|  | (0.0771) | (0.0554) | (0.0769) | (0.0570) |
| age | -0.0390\*\* | -0.0283\*\* | -0.0158 | -0.00937 |
|  | (0.0190) | (0.0139) | (0.0188) | (0.0145) |
| agesq | 0.000380\* | 0.000280\* | 0.000188 | 9.50e-05 |
|  | (0.000210) | (0.000154) | (0.000208) | (0.000159) |
| education | -0.0714\* | -0.0491\* | -0.0315 | -0.0339 |
|  | (0.0403) | (0.0282) | (0.0430) | (0.0302) |
| income | 0.0139 | 0.00642 | 0.0127 | -0.0176 |
|  | (0.0268) | (0.0181) | (0.0265) | (0.0196) |
| rural | -0.00944 | 0.0166 | -0.00478 | 0.0336\*\* |
|  | (0.0224) | (0.0171) | (0.0248) | (0.0165) |
| latino | -0.242\*\* | -0.174\*\* | 0.0957 | -0.0724 |
|  | (0.108) | (0.0830) | (0.119) | (0.0919) |
| black | -0.0711 | 0.141 | 0.461\*\*\* | -0.118 |
|  | (0.187) | (0.118) | (0.165) | (0.120) |
| white | -0.197 | 0.0480 | 0.176 | 0.0695 |
|  | (0.145) | (0.0937) | (0.126) | (0.0940) |
| evangelical | 0.243\*\*\* | 0.0671 | 0.219\*\* | 0.0777 |
|  | (0.0850) | (0.0621) | (0.0897) | (0.0619) |
| Constant | 3.057\*\*\* | 2.519\*\*\* | 1.616\*\*\* | 1.952\*\*\* |
|  | (0.477) | (0.331) | (0.425) | (0.329) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 971 | 977 | 970 | 977 |
| adj. r2 | 0.412 | 0.357 | 0.410 | 0.304 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

# Subgroup Analysis of Partisan Bias among Independents

Iyengar and Westwood (2015) note somewhat weaker partisan bias among independent leaners compared to self-identified Republicans, Democrats, but stronger biases among independent leaners than “true” independents. Here we focus on the behavior of independents in our sample. 317 or 26% of our respondents identified as independents. We do not have a PID leaner instrument in this version of our survey to tease out the differences among this relatively small-N group (the N would be reduced further in half for a between-subject comparison). However, since ideology and PID effects are converging in our treatments, we can use the ideology measure to examine the likelihood that independents who identify as moderates vs. conservatives or liberals display the same PID biases as those who identify as Republicans or Democrats. The figure below indicates that of the 317 independents, 50% identify as ideological moderates, 35% identify as conservatives, and 22% as liberals, while 1.5% identify as “other” and 6% as “DK =don’t know”.



When we exclude other and DK respondents, we run regression analysis on dictator giving among the remaining PID independents using their ideology as a proxy for leaners. We use DG game 5 because it involves a within-subject design which allows us to compare the subsample of independents in terms of how they give to both partisan Democrats and Republicans without sacrificing the N. If ideology and PID are converging, we would expect ideological conservatives among the independents to be more biased against Democrats in the dictator games and vise-versa for ideological liberals. Consistent with manuscript Figure 2 on the effects of ideology on partisan bias, we see that independents display biases we would commonly associate with PID leaners. The figure shows that independents who are ideologically liberal are more biased toward partisan Democratics in dictator allocations, while indepedents who are ideological conservatives are more biased in favor of partisan Republicans. Moderate or “true” independents are the constant comparison group in our models. Hence, we anticipate that a leaner instrument would capture similar partisan effects in our data.



# Rationale for Data Modeling Strategy

There are other ways to model the data than the approach we use in the manuscript. However, we felt that our approach as certain advantages however in terms of clarity. Manuscript Equation 1 and Figure 1 shows the basic impact of subject PID on dictator giving, trust, and public good contributions. We analyze each treatment from between subject designs separately so as to avoid complicating figures with interaction terms. The alternative to equation 1 where we combine the Democratic and Republican treatment groups would look like this, where we have a basic treatment effect, a control for subject PID, and the interaction term between treatment and subject PID. This makes the visual presentation in Figure 1 much more complicated but conveys essentially the same information about the effects of partisanship on dictator giving.

Alternative Equation 1: *Υi* *= β0 + β1PIDTxt + β2 PIDi X i + β3(PIDTxt x PIDi ) + X i + εi*

For Figure 1, this would produce the following coefficient plot, which shows the treatment effect and interaction terms for subject PID and PID txt, where PID = 1 is the Democratic txt and PID = 0 is the Republican treatment. It conveys the same information essentially as Figure 1A and Figure 1B, but requires more time to explain the interaction terms. We favor the simplified Equation 1, but we include this alternative model in the online appendix.



We would plead a similar case for simplicity with regard to Equations 2 and 3. First, subject PID and subject Ideology are highly inter-correlated, which raises concerns about multicollinearity when combining them into the same model. Also, once you start combining all possible interaction terms between PID and Ideology (3 PID categories x 5 ideology categories with only 500 observations), the number of observations per cell gets really small (ex. only 5 people who are Republicans identify ideologically as “somewhat liberal”). However, we could focus on the most important interactions between PID and Liberal/Conservative Ideology, ignoring the other interaction terms and small-N cases like ideologically liberal Republicans mentioned earlier. Here is an example of a model that examines each txt group separately (Option A) and combined (Option B) using interaction terms between PID and Ideological Liberals and Conservatives.

Alternative Option A: *Υi* *= β0 + β1 PIDi + β2 IDEOi + β3(PIDi x IDEOi ) + X i + εi*

Alternative Option B: *Υi* *= β0 + β1PIDTxt + β2 PIDi + β3(IDEOi) + β4(PIDTxt x PIDi  x IDEOi) + X i + εi*

Consider Option A in the first Dictator game below (Option B is only more problematic). Here, the DV is Dictator giving in the Democrat Txt Group (N = 529). The model shows that compared to independents in the constant term, Democrats give more to other partisan Democrats compared to Republicans and Independents. The interaction terms between very liberal x Democrat and somewhat liberal x Democrat indicate that ideology does not have an additional additive effect on partisan giving. However, this is because the two items are highly inter-correlated. Variance inflation factor post-estimation tests basically indicate that including interaction terms between ideology and PID create serious multicollinearity problems for the model. It also is much more difficult to explain what is going on for each game in a 4000 word manuscript. The interaction term between Republicans and very conservative does show an additive effect of ideology on partisan bias, but this is also subject to multicollinearity issues. Finally, you get unreliable estimates like (Republican x somewhat liberal) as being highly significant, when we know we only have 5 cases in that category). Hence, we would like to avoid using these interaction terms when possible in models. Our Figures 1 and 2 show the effects of subject PID and ideology on partisan giving and point to convergence, which is why interaction terms lead to multicollinearity.



 Finally, we would plead a similar case with intergroup contact interactions. First, it complicates the model in ways that create issues of multicollinearity (ex. Republicans, Conservatives have more contact with other Republicans) and the number of representative cases in each cell becomes very small. However, Equation 3 shows a positive effect of contact on reducing partisan bias even when controlling for the effects of both subject partisanship and ideology, which we think is important, though we agree and acknowledge in the manuscript the endogeneity issues about contact given that contact is not experimentally manipulated in our study. We include this discussion about modeling in the online appendix, so that readers will understand our rationale for our modeling strategy.

# Discussion

### Comparison to Fowler and Kam (2007), Iyengar and Westwood (2015), Carlin and Love (2013)

Our study and Fowler and Kam (2007) and Iyengar and Westwood (2015) may not be strictly comparable for several reasons. This discussion is also relevant to trust work by Carlin and Love (2013) who utilize the Fowler and Kam (2007) design.

1. Different subject populations. F&K use student populations from a Western public university (N = 306 of which 173 identify as Democrats and only 78 as Republicans). I&W use 814 respondents from the Survey Sampling International (SSI) panel, using a nationally representative panel sample. We use the same research firm and sampling methodology as I&W, which makes a better rationale for comparison than with F&K.
2. Time variant aspects: F&K conducted research in 2004, I&W in 2012. Our study was conducted in 2019. These are very different partisan political contexts.
3. Different financial incentives. In F&K subjects are given 10 lottery tickets with an equal chance of winning $100. In I&W, subjects complete 4 dictator games with real payoffs of $10 per game. In our study, allocations are hypothetical. Early work by Forsythe et al. (1994) suggested that dictators were more altruistic in hypothetical vs. real money allocations. However, a later study by Ben Ner et al. (2008) does not find significant differences in real vs hypothetical allocations.
4. Different experimental treatments and designs. F&K randomize subjects to receive PID treatments or a control (no PID mentioned) for a within-subject design with randomized order. I&W randomize on PID (Democrat/Republican) as well as as well as gender, age (32 vs. 38), income ($39,000 vs $42,300) and race/ethnicity (White, African American) in a 2x2 within subject design with four rounds of dictator play. Our study randomizes PID for a between-subject design. Like I&W we do not have a non-partisan control group. The between-subject design may be preferable to avoid priming effects, but we include both within and between subject designs for comparison.
5. Different measurements of PID. F&K use a 7 point Likert scale to measure PID. I&W use a five point Likert scale (Republican, lean Republican, Independent, lean Democrat, Democrat). We use a 3 points scale (Democrat, Independent, Republican) with an “other” option.

While taking these factors into consideration, we observe much greater magnitude of parochial bias in mean giving between Republicans and Democrats than Fowler and Kam (2007) and Iyengar and Westwood (2015). However, differences highlighted above should be taken into consideration in comparing dictator giving between these two studies.

Fowler and Kam (2007) did not include trust games for comparison. Figure 2 compares mean giving in the trust games of Iyengar and Westwood (2015) to our own data. As in the dictator game, we find a wider parochial gap between in-group vs. out-group giving. Results are comparable to comparisons to trust games run by Carlin and Love (2013), who find stronger bias in Republican than Democratic PID treatments, using the Fowler and Kam (2007) design.

Next, we provide a comparison of our trust game findings with cross-national work by Carlin and Love (2018). However, we would point out that the comparisons involve very different subject groups. Carlin and Love (2013, 2018) reply primarily on student samples for the Chile, Mexico, South Africa, and El Salvador (with the exception of Spain and Portugal) rather than nationally representative samples. In the US, Carlin and Love’s US data were collected in 2009 and 2011, which relied on student samples in 2009 and student + M-Turk samples in 2011. Figure 3 reports average partisan bias (ex. averaging Republican and Democrat respondent biases in the amount sent to co-partisan recipient compared to an opposing partisan recipient) for the US in 2009 and 2011 (using Carlin and Love’s data) as well as our data from 2019 and the cross-national comparisons reported in Carlin and Love (2018) collected primarily between 2009-2012. Hence, our data were collected nearly 7 years later than the CL studies. The figure shows increased bias in the US from 2009-2011 relative to our study in 2019, and is comparable to partisan biases observed in Latin America.

Finally, we note recent work by Gidron et al. (2018, 2019) who use feeling thermometers to investigate cross-national affective polarization in 20 Western polities between 1996 and 2015 using existing survey data. While we do not have comparable feeling thermometers to compare, and their study predates ours, they find US partisan polarization in the middle range among western democracies. In a 2018 conference paper, they report that increased polarization is associated with higher unemployment and higher income inequality cross-nationally and tends to be higher in majoritarian democracies. We anticipate that feeling thermometers would detect elevated affective polarization if conducted today, consist with our comparative behavioral results.

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Carlin, Ryan E., and Gregory J. Love. "The politics of interpersonal trust and reciprocity: An experimental approach." *Political Behavior* 35, no. 1 (2013): 43-63.

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Forsythe, Robert, Joel L. Horowitz, Nathan E. Savin, and Martin Sefton. "Fairness in simple bargaining experiments." *Games and Economic behavior* 6, no. 3 (1994): 347-369.

Fowler, James H., and Cindy D. Kam. "Beyond the self: Social identity, altruism, and political participation." *The Journal of politics* 69, no. 3 (2007): 813-827.

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Gidron, Noam, James Adams, and Will Horne. "Toward a comparative research agenda on affective polarization in mass publics." *APSA Comparative Politics Newsletter* 29 (2019): 30-36.

Iyengar, Shanto, and Sean J. Westwood. "Fear and loathing across party lines: New evidence on group polarization." *American Journal of Political Science* 59, no. 3 (2015): 690-707.

# Experimental Protocols for Bosnia, Kosovo, and Syria Comparisons

In this section we detail the experimental protocols used in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Syria. The protocols for Kosovo (2011), Bosnia- Herzegovina (2013), and Syria (2013) are nearly identical. In all cases, subjects were given a privacy screen when making their decisions and no personal information was included on the forms/envelopes that could be used to identify the subject in each case. All experiments were conducted by a local administrator who read from a standard script. In Syria, the experiments were conducted by a reputable journalist, who also administered protocols from the same standard script as in Kosovo and Bosnia.

Subject recruitment in Bosnia and Kosovo were conducted by a public opinion research firm using random sampling methods with stratification by ethnicity. Primary sampling units were selected based on probability proportion to size methods, random route interviewing, and random selection of household members with the most recent birthday serving as the final selection key. Due to financial incentives to participate in the study, refusal rates were typically below 20-30%.

In Syria, probability sampling was not possible due to uncertain population parameters and security concerns. We selected on the two most populous urban environments in Northern Syria – Aleppo, which was Syria’s second largest city before the war, and a smaller comparison city of Idlib. We restricted sampling to regions that were under the control of Free Syrian Army rebels. Within rebel territory, we relied on cluster sampling methods. Our interviewer selected neighborhoods and streets which were deemed sufficiently safe to conduct interviews. The interviewer would identify clusters of individuals and randomly select from within those clusters with the restriction of no more than 5 people for a given cluster and only 1 person per household.

**Experimental Instructions from Kosovo (2011)**

***Note: Bosnia (2013) uses the same script, only that subjects are randomized to recipients who are ethnic Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs instead of Albanians/Serbs from Kosovo.***

**BEFORE THE SESSION**

1. *Local Administrator and Assistant rehearse the script, and prepare the session room. There must be sufficient space to accommodate participants and to assure that each participant has enough space to work in comfort and relative privacy. One person per table or desk. Do not crowd subjects!*
2. *The Administrator prepares the forms.*

**CHECK-IN**

1. *As participants arrive, they are greeted at the entrance to the session room. They are asked to show their letter of invitation [FORM “LETTER OF INVITATION”] to participate in the session. Because this letter will have been hand delivered by either the administrator him/herself or one of the other local interviewers, someone will be able to guarantee that the person with the letter is, in fact, the person who received the letter.*
2. *The administrator will then give each respondent a consent form to read. [FORM “LETTER OF CONSENT”] The respondent may then choose to leave, indicating lack of consent. Respondents who stay have consented to participate by agreeing to stay.*
3. *The administrator assigns each respondent who has agreed to stay a unique ID number printed on an index card, and assigns them to a seat. Each person should have their own separate table to work.*

**INTRODUCTION**

Welcome. Thank you for coming today. My name is \*\*\*. Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. Your participation in this study is voluntary. As you know you will receive a payment today for your participation based on the tasks involved in today’s activity. Please understand that we will be providing all money and at no time will we ask you for money so do not worry.

Now, let me tell you a little about this research project. This is an international social science research project, and the questions that you will answer and the tasks you will perform have been asked of people all over the world. The purpose of the project is to understand how people of different ethnicity, cultures, and backgrounds make decisions, interact with other people, and how their decisions are affected by the conditions where they live. We are going to ask you to make decisions about money. These decisions will involve not only you but also other people in Kosovo.

In this project, I will serve not only as the administrator of this session, but also as your local contact, in case you ever have questions about the progress of the study or your involvement. Standing over there is my assistant. He/she will pass out the forms and materials that you will use.

You will participate in two main types of tasks today. You will receive different forms for each task. In one task, you will be asked to make several decisions about how to allocate money. In each of these tasks, you will have to decide how to allocate a sum of money between yourself and someone else or a group of people. These other people will not be in this room, but they will be future participants in this study, and they will all be from Kosovo.

The other task will be to complete a survey, which asks questions from general international social surveys on public opinion, attitudes, and basic social data. Rest assured that we will not ask you to provide any information that could be used to identify you as a participant in this study.

Before we begin there are several rules we would like you to keep in mind:

1. First, you should not talk with one another or look at anyone else’s work.
2. Second, please listen to all instructions that I give you. This is very important. If you follow the instructions carefully you might make a considerable sum of money.
3. Third, we will be handing out many different forms to you. Please do not begin filling out or looking at those forms until I ask you to do so.
4. Finally, you just received a card with an ID number on it. Please turn it upside down. Do not show that number to anyone else except myself or one of my assistants.

Do you have any questions? If not, let’s begin!

**Decision-Making Tasks**

First, we will do a series of decision-making tasks. Please pay attention because you can earn money if you listen closely and follow instructions. The assistant will come around to each of you and hand you a survey booklet and a pen. The first thing you will need to do is to copy the ID number on the card you were given on the front of the survey booklet. Do not open the booklet until I instruct you to do so. We will go through each question together as a group. I will read each question aloud and you will circle the appropriate answer.

In the following tasks you will be asked to make decisions involving money. In a typical task, you will have a specific amount of money and then you must decide how much to keep for yourself and how much to give to another person or group of people. These people are not physically present in this room today, but they will be participating in a future session somewhere in Kosovo. Like you, they will be randomly selected to participate in the study. For every decision you make today, the other person or persons will either be [Albanians or Serbs from Kosovo].

For each task you will make a series of decisions. Then at the end, we will role a die to see for which task you will be paid. Because you do not know which task is the one for which you are paid, it is extremely important to pay attention to the instructions for every decision.

**Task 1A**

Your first task is to decide how to allocate 5 euros between yourself and someone else. You have to decide how much to keep for yourself and how much to send to another person.

First, look at the information below to see whether the other person is an [Albanian or Serb from Kosovo]. This person is not physically present in this room today, but they will be participating in a future session somewhere in Kosovo.

Then look at the column below to decide how much to send. You can send any amount from 0 to up to 5 euros. Whatever you decide to keep for yourself we will pay you if this is the task that is selected for payment. Whatever you send to another person, we will give them at a future session. Remember, you can do whatever you wish.

For example:

1. You could keep [4,00 euros and give 1,00 to the other person].
2. You could keep [2,50 euro and give 2,50 euro to the other person] or you could keep [all 5 euros and give 0 euros to the other person].
3. You can do anything you wish. (Repeat using other examples).

Do you understand? Just remember to pay attention to whom you are sending money. Please make your decision by circling the amount of money you want to send. Please make your decision now.

----------------------------------------------Sample Form---------------------------------------------

TASK 1A

How much money do you want to send to?

↓

**Albanian from Kosovo**

|  |
| --- |
| Amount to Send |
| €0 |
| €0,50 |
| €1,00 |
| €1,50 |
| €2,00 |
| €2,50 |
| €3,00 |
| €3,50 |
| €4,00 |
| €4,50 |
| €5,00 |

**Task 2A**

*Repeat Instructions for Task 1A. Either SAME ETHNICITY or OTHER ETHNICITY (Randomized)*

*Subjects then complete other tasks.*

**Selection Tasks for Payment**

 We will now select one of the 6 tasks for payment by rolling a six-sided die. Once the task is selected, we will come around and collect your booklets and calculate your payments. While we are calculating your payment, you will complete a survey. We will call you one at a time to receive your payment once the survey is completed.

**Survey Task**

Now we would like you to answer a few questions about your background and opinions on a wide range of issues. The assistant will come around to each of you and hand you a survey booklet. The first thing you will need to do is to copy the ID number on the card you were given on the front of the survey booklet. Do not open the booklet until I instruct you to do so. We will go through each question together as a group. I will read each question aloud and you will circle the appropriate answer. Please do not read ahead. Answer only the question that I am reading to you, and be patient if others take more time. If you have questions, please raise your hand, and I will come to you. Please do not say your answers to questions aloud, because it will influence what others think. And you may all disagree about the answers to some of the questions. When everyone is finished, the assistant will collect the survey booklets and we will call you one at a time to receive your payment for participating in this project.

**CONCLUSION**

 This concludes our study. I want to thank everyone for your participation. The tasks that you engaged in here are valuable for our research. You are now free to leave. Please leave all materials here including all pens and paper. We thank you for participating in our study, and please feel free to contact us in the future if you have any questions. Our contact information is provided on your invitation letter and consent form. However, please feel free to stay if you have any further questions. Thank you again and have a good day.

**Syria Experimental Protocols (2013)**

***Note: Our location treatments serve as a proxy for Alawite/Sunni Arabs since most rebel controlled locations were populated by Sunni Arabs, while Assad controlled territory was predominately populated by Alawites at the time of our study. This was common knowledge in Syria.***

**BEFORE THE EXPERIMENT**

1. *Local administrator: identify areas of the city (Aleppo, Idlib region) where civilians are congregated in public and where you can safely travel. These clusters are the initial sampling point. Conduct no more than five respondents per cluster and no more than two clusters for a given street or neighborhood. Limit interviews to 1 person per household or extended family. If multiple family members are able and willing to participate, select one family member at random (most recent birthday). For your safety, avoid random routes. Conduct interviews in a public location for safety concerns (or a private location that you consider safe if available). If in a public location, keep a distance from crowds to ensure privacy and do not permit others to listen in on the interview once in progress.*

**CHECK-IN**

1. *Participants are approached by the administrator and asked to complete a series of decision tasks and a survey.*
2. *The administrator will then give each respondent a consent form to read. [FORM “LETTER OF CONSENT”] The respondent may then choose to leave, indicating lack of consent. Respondents who stay have consented to participate by agreeing to stay. Subjects may sign the consent form by making a simple mark if they prefer not to sign by name.*
3. *The administrator assigns each respondent a unique ID number. Subjects should not write their names, addresses, or any other identifying information on any forms.*

**INTRODUCTION**

Welcome. Thank you for coming today. My name is \*\*\*. Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. Your participation in this study is voluntary. As you know you will receive a payment today for your participation based on the tasks involved in today’s activity. Please understand that we will be providing all money and at no time will we ask you for money so do not worry.

Now, let me tell you a little about this research project. This is an international social science research project, and the questions that you will answer and the tasks you will perform have been asked of people all over the world. The purpose of the project is to understand how people of different ethnicity, cultures, and backgrounds make decisions, interact with other people, and how their decisions are affected by the conditions where they live. We are going to ask you to make decisions about money. These decisions will involve not only you but also other people in Syria.

In this project, I will serve not only as the administrator of this session, but also as your local contact, in case you ever have questions about the progress of the study or your involvement.

You will participate in two main types of tasks today. You will receive different forms for each task. In one task, you will be asked to make several decisions about how to allocate money. In each of these tasks, you will have to decide how to allocate a sum of money between yourself and someone else or a group of people. These other people will not be in this room, but they will be future participants in this study, and they will all be from Syria.

The other task will be to complete a survey, which asks questions from general international social surveys on public opinion, attitudes, and basic social data. Rest assured that I will not ask you to provide any information that could be used to identify you as a participant in this study.

Before I begin there are several rules I would like you to keep in mind:

1. First, [*if in a group or if others are present*] you should not talk with other people or let others observe what you are doing. [*Administrator should also enforce this rule*]
2. Second, please listen to all instructions that I give you. This is very important. If you follow the instructions carefully you might make a considerable sum of money.
3. Third, I will be handing out many different forms to you. Please do not begin filling out or looking at those forms until I ask you to do so.
4. Finally, you just received a card with an ID number on it. Please do not write your name or any other identifying information on any forms. We will only use this number from now on.

Do you have any questions? If not, let’s begin!

**Decision-Making Tasks**

First, we will do a series of decision-making tasks. Please pay attention because you can earn money if you listen closely and follow instructions. Here is a booklet and a pen. The first thing you will need to do is to copy the ID number on the front of the booklet. Do not open the booklet until I instruct you to do so. We will go through each question together. I will read each question aloud and you will circle the appropriate answer.

In the following tasks you will be asked to make decisions involving money. In a typical task, you will have a specific amount of money and then you must decide how much to keep for yourself and how much to give to another person or group of people. These people are not physically present in this room today, but they will be participating in a future session somewhere in Syria. Like you, they will be randomly selected to participate in the study. For every decision you make today, the other person or persons will either be [Syrians from this general location or Syrians from another location in Syria].

For each task you will make a series of decisions. Then at the end, I will randomly select 1 task for which you will be paid. Because you do not know which task is the one for which you are paid, it is extremely important to pay attention to the instructions for every decision.

**Task 1**

Your first task is to decide how to allocate 500 Syrian Pounds (SP) between yourself and someone else. You have to decide how much to keep for yourself and how much to send to another person.

First, look at the information below to find out more about the other person [ex. local Syrian from rebel controlled territory]. This person is not physically present in this room today, but they will be participating in a future session somewhere in Syria.

Then look at the column below to decide how much to send. You can send any amount from 0 to up to 500 SP. Whatever you decide to keep for yourself we will pay you if this is the task that is selected for payment. Whatever you send to another person, we will give them at a future session. Remember, you can do whatever you wish.

For example:

1. You could keep [500 SP and give 100 SP to the other person].
2. You could keep [250 SP and give 250 SP to the other person] or you could keep [all 500 SP and give 0 SP to the other person].
3. You can do anything you wish. (Repeat using other examples).

Do you understand? Just remember to pay attention to whom you are sending money. Please make your decision by circling the amount of money you want to send. Please make your decision now.

------------------------------------------------Sample Form-------------------------------------------

TASK 1

How much money do you want to send to?

↓

**Someone living in (rebel controlled Aleppo, Idlib region)**

|  |
| --- |
| Amount to Send |
| 0 |
| 50 |
| 100 |
| 150 |
| 200 |
| 250 |
| 300 |
| 350 |
| 400 |
| 450 |
| 500 |

**Task 2**

*Repeat Instructions for Task 1.*

------------------------------------------------Sample Form-------------------------------------------

TASK 2

How much money do you want to send to?

↓

**Someone fighting with the Free Syrian Army in Syria**

|  |
| --- |
| Amount to Send |
| 0 |
| 50 |
| 100 |
| 150 |
| 200 |
| 250 |
| 300 |
| 350 |
| 400 |
| 450 |
| 500 |

**Task 3**

*Repeat Instructions for Task 1. Subjects then complete three other tasks.*

TASK 3

How much money do you want to send to?

↓

**Someone living in territory still under Assad control**

|  |
| --- |
| Amount to Send |
| 0 |
| 50 |
| 100 |
| 150 |
| 200 |
| 250 |
| 300 |
| 350 |
| 400 |
| 450 |
| 500 |

**Survey Task**

Now I would like you to answer a few questions about your background and opinions on a wide range of issues. I will read each question aloud and you will circle the appropriate answer. Please do not read ahead. Answer only the question that I am reading to you. Please do not say your answers to questions aloud, so that others will not hear what you think. When you are finished, I will collect the survey booklet and you will receive your payment for participating in this project.

**Selection Tasks for Payment**

 I will now select one of the 6 tasks for payment. Once the task is selected, you will be paid based on your decision in that task. [*The administrator picks one task for payment and then pays the subject for that task, reminding the subject how much they chose to keep/send for that task.]*

**CONCLUSION**

 This concludes our study. I want to thank you for your participation. The tasks that you engaged in here are valuable for our research. You are now free to leave. Please feel free to contact us in the future if you have any questions. Our contact information is provided on your consent form. However, please feel free to stay if you have any further questions. Thank you again and have a good day.

### Table 32. Amount Sent to In-groups and Out-groups (0-10 Monetary Units)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | In-group Amount | Out-group Amount | In/Out-groupDifference (paired t-tests) |
| Syria (2013) | 9.30(2.37)[133] | 0.86(2.70)[133] | t=27.91\*\*\*p<.001 |
| Kosovo (2011) | 5.77(2.57)[466] | 3.48(2.88)[466] | t=17.66\*\*\*p<.001 |
| Bosnia (2013) | 6.03(3.14)[449] | 3.91(3.08)[449] | t=14.92\*\*\*p<.001 |
| US (2019) | 5.06(3.28)[404] | 2.66(3.02)[397] | t=10.48\*\*\*p<0.001 |

Note: Standard deviation in parentheses. N in brackets. US data excludes non-partisans

 \*\*\* p<0.01

Note: US (2019) uses an unpaired t-test for the between subject design. The other tests are paired t-tests for a within-subject design.

# Further Discussion of External Validity

It is certainly a valid empirical question as to whether the intensity of bias we observe in these behavior experiments with race/ethnicity/partisanship are no more or less externally valid than what we might observe with a sports rivalry treatment. Would people who have ethnic/racial or partisan biases would act on those biases in real life in ways that are different from those with sports loyalty or what might otherwise seem like trivial biases? Are the stakes in these experiments trivial or do they capture something meaningful about real-world behavior?

We would argue that they are likely predictive of real-world behavior but more work on external validity is clearly needed to demonstrate this. First, consider the behavior in our own experiments of people in conflict-affected areas of Syria, Bosnia, and Kosovo where there are real life & death stakes for the choices one makes in terms of who to trust and who to interact with. In an environment where people have real security concerns, conflict reinforces parochial/tribalism as a survival mechanism (Choi and Bowles 2007, Bauer et al. 2016). In the language of social capital, people turn to in-group bonding over inter-group bridging (Putnam 2000; Siisiainen 2003). While partisan bias in the US is not as strong as what we observe in other conflict-ridden societies, it is concerning that bias approaches that of environments where people have recently been killing one another. Still, we do not have evidence to show that partisan bias in our experiments is likely to manifest into greater high stakes, life & death behavioral choices, so we point out in the manuscript that readers should be cautious about inferring too much from conflict comparisons with the US and we note in the conclusion that while some see partisan polarization as part of a process that erodes democratic norms and institutions (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018), that there are also cycles in partisanship that may recalibrate over time (Stimson 2018). But future research should do more to examine the external validity of experimental behavior such as what we observe with more high stakes outcomes, provided this can be done in ways that are ethical in the conduct of research. We note this discussion in the online appendix and in the manuscript where possible.

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Choi, Jung-Kyoo, and Samuel Bowles. 2007. "The Coevolution of Parochial Altruism and War." *science* 318(5850): 636-640.

Putnam, Robert D. *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. Simon and schuster, 2000.

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Finally, as somewhat of a defense of the non-triviality of certain sports loyalties, these sport identity rivalries can be quite emotional, intense, partisan, and violent. In some cases, wars have been triggered by or at least predicted by intense sports rivalries (Durham 1979; Sack and Suster 2000) and violent conflict often manifests into sports behavior (Miguel et al. 2011). In some countries, sports also map onto ethnic/partisan divisions, so that sports become a form of symbolic contestation over salient social and political issues (Foer 2004; Markovits and Rensmann 2013; Giulianotti 2015). Earlier studies of US public opinion suggest that Americans seek to avoid the politicization of sports (Thorson and Serazio 2018), but it’s hard to see this continuing in the current climate of BLM-related protests (Martin and McHendry 2016) and Trump’s rhetoric (Curry 2017; Falcous et al. 2019). Hence, we take your suggestion very seriously about comparing our treatment effects to what one might observe in a sports rivalry context. This is something that should be more closely examined.

Curry, M.T., 2017. Get that Son of a\*\*\*\*\* off the Field: Regulating Student-Athlete Protest Speech in Public University Sports Facilities. *Howard LJ*, *61*, p.669.

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Sack, Allen L., and Zeljan Suster. "Soccer and Croatian nationalism: A prelude to war." *Journal of Sport and Social Issues* 24, no. 3 (2000): 305-320.

Thorson, Emily A., and Michael Serazio. "Sports fandom and political attitudes." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 82, no. 2 (2018): 391-403.