**Appendices for “Think Ahead: Cost Discounting and External Validity in Foreign Policy Opinion Experiments”**

**Appendix A:**

It might be argued that the effect of the prime is independent of the content of the prime, that any prime could produce this effect. To account for this possibility, and to show that casualties constitute a particular concern for these experiments, I also examine the subjects’ responses to priming of concern for international reputation. The second design was similar. As an abstract rather than a concrete idea, reputation is likely to be construed at the high-level. Construal level theory instructs us that “high-level construals are more likely than low-level construals to remain unchanged as one gets closer.”[[1]](#footnote-2) That is, people do not vary as much when assessing abstract implications between the proximal and the distal as they do assessing concrete details. As such, whatever negative effects on reputation people expect should be accounted for in their formation of their opinion, so a prime of reputation should alter the experimental effect very little.

In December 2016 and March 2017, I recruited 1323 more Mturkers, ensuring both times that I would have no repeat respondents. The experimental design was the same as that reported in the main text, except that I did not include the “Follow Through” group. For this comparative test, in place of costs, I inserted a prime about the US’ reputation, a key mechanism in ACT.[[2]](#footnote-3) The “open reputation” group received the following question:

What effect, if any, would the President’s actions in the prior scenario have on the international reputation of the US?

* It would harm the US’ reputation
* It would not affect the US’ reputation
* It would improve the US’ reputation

The order of the choices was randomized. I followed up with a question about whether they believed it would harm/improve US reputation “somewhat” or “a great deal”, yielding a five-point estimate.




Figure 4  
**Difference in approval from reputation prime**

Figure 4 displays differences in approval caused by that intervention. In both groups, the difference caused by the reputation prime is minimal. Unlike the casualties prime, the reputation prime caused no movement in the treatment effect in either direction. It appears respondents already account for reputation without being primed. This is consistent with ACT, and with Brutger and Kertzer’s finding that varying the richness of the vignette does not much affect audience costs via concern over national reputation.[[3]](#footnote-4)

**Appendix B:**

Table 2  
**Mean approval level for each cost comparison group (ordinal measure 1 – 7)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Cost Category*:** | *Tomz Default* | *Open Cost Prompt* |
| ***Vignette*:** |  |  |
| *Empty threat* | 3.11 | **3.51\*** |
| *Stay out* | 4.03 | 4.1 |
| *Follow through* | 4.94 | 4.66 |

Results of independent two group t-tests. Asterisks indicate significance level (\*.05, \*\*.01) of difference from the “Tomz Default” category. The ordinal measure ranges from 1 (strongly disapprove) to 7 (strongly approve).

Table 3  
**Mean approval level for each reputation comparison group (ordinal measure 1 – 7)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Reputation Category*:** | *Tomz Default* | *Open Reputation Prompt* |
| ***Vignette*:** |  |  |
| *Empty threat* | 3.11 | 2.98 |
| *Stay out* | 4.06 | 4.19 |

Results of independent two group t-tests. Asterisks indicate significance level (\*.05, \*\*.01) of difference from the “Tomz Default” category. The ordinal measure ranges from 1 (strongly disapprove) to 7 (strongly approve).

Table 4a  
**Ordered logit coefficients for three comparison groups**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **Empty Threat** | | **Stay Out** | | **Follow Through** |
| Costfirst | .36\* (.16) | .05 (.16) | | -.32\* (.16) | |
|  |  |  | |  | |
| Cutpoint 1 | -.88 (.15) | -1.5 (.14) | | -2.2 (.16) | |
| Cutpoint 2 | .13 (.12) | -.5 (.12) | | -1.45 (.14) | |
| Cutpoint 3 | .53 (.12) | -.22 (.12) | | -1.11 (.13) | |
| Cutpoint 4 | .92 (.13) | .09 (.12) | | -.8 (.13) | |
| Cutpoint 5 | 1.39 (.14) | .48 (.12) | | -.34 (.12) | |
| Cutpoint 6 | 2.58 (.18) | 1.58 (.14) | | 1.09 (.12) | |
| N | 500 | 502 | | 510 | |

Note: Cell entries are ordered logit coefficients, with associated standard errors in parentheses. \* p , .05, \*\* p , .01

Table 4b  
**Ordered logit coefficients for two comparison groups with all demographic controls**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **Empty Threat** | **Follow Through** |
| **Age** |  |  |
| 25-34 | 0.45 (0.27) | -0.34 (0.28) |
| 35-44 | 0.31 (0.29) | 0.06 (0.31) |
| 45-54 | -0.35 (0.35) | -0.25 (0.37) |
| 55-64 | -0.27 (0.45) | 0.77 (0.41) |
| >64 | -1.14 (0.75) | 0.16 (0.63) |
| **Female** | 0.44\* (0.18) | -0.17 (0.17) |
| **Party** |  |  |
| strong dem | -0.1 (0.29) | 0.16 (0.28) |
| dem | -0.16 (0.28) | 0.37 (0.28) |
| lean dem | -0.1 (0.33) | 0.45 (0.3) |
| lean repub | -0.89 (0.39) | 0.82 (0.39) |
| repub | -1.46\* (0.35) | 1.47\* (0.34) |
| strong repub | -2.01\* (0.45) | 1.68\* (0.43) |
| **Education** |  |  |
| HSgrad | -0.35 (1.28) |  |
| some college | 0.12 (1.27) | -0.08 (0.31) |
| associate | -0.05 (1.28) | -0.01 (0.34) |
| bachelors | -0.4 (1.27) | -0.06 (0.29) |
| phd | 1.46 (1.57) | 0.37 (0.71) |
| grad/prof degree | -0.61 (1.31) | 0.15 (0.38) |
| **Race** |  |  |
| black | 0.51 (0.31) | 0.38 (0.32) |
| native-amer | -0.05 (0.84) | -1.68 (0.94) |
| asian | 0.15 (0.36) | 0.45 (0.31) |
| other | -0.72 (0.71) | -1.82 (1.18) |
| **Costfirst** | 0.41\* (0.17) | -0.32\* (0.17) |
| Cutpoint 1 | -1.26 (1.31) | -2.1 (0.42) |
| Cutpoint 2 | -0.05 (1.3) | -1.3 (0.41) |
| Cutpoint 3 | 0.39 (1.3) | -0.91 (0.4) |
| Cutpoint 4 | 0.83 (1.31) | -0.57 (0.4) |
| Cutpoint 5 | 1.33 (1.31) | -0.07 (0.4) |
| Cutpoint 6 | 2.62 (1.31) | 1.52 (0.41) |

Note: Cell entries are ordered logit coefficients, with associated standard errors in parentheses. \* p , .05, \*\* p , .01

Table 5a  
**Tests of the parallel regression assumption: Empty Threat**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Test** | **χ2** | **Degrees of Freedom** | ***p* > χ2** |
| Wolfe Gould | 6.495 | 5 | .261 |
| Brant | 6.524 | 5 | .258 |
| score | 6.797 | 5 | .236 |
| likelihood ratio | 6.485 | 5 | .262 |
| Wald | 6.524 | 5 | .258 |

Table 5b  
**Tests of the parallel regression assumption: Follow Through**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Test** | **χ2** | **Degrees of Freedom** | ***p* > χ2** |
| Wolfe Gould | 5.498 | 5 | .358 |
| Brant | 5.254 | 5 | .386 |
| score | 5.417 | 5 | .367 |
| likelihood ratio | 5.231 | 5 | .388 |
| Wald | 5.254 | 5 | .386 |

Note: These tests are designed to test the assumption that the relationship between each pair of outcome groups is the same. Thus, the desired statistic for these tests would be *insignificant*, failing to reject the null hypothesis of a difference between groups.

Table 6  
**Demographics for each round**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Total | 10/15 | 12/16 | 3/17 |
| **Party** |  |  |  |  |
| strong dem | 22.46% | 22.79% | 21.39% | 25.21% |
| dem | 21.93% | 23.13% | 20.66% | 21.85% |
| lean dem | 14.21% | 14.36% | 14.38% | 12.89% |
| ind/no pref | 13.71% | 14.90% | 13.37% | 10.08% |
| lean repub | 7.41% | 6.54% | 8.24% | 7.84% |
| repub | 12.31% | 11.40% | 13.01% | 13.45% |
| strong repub | 7.97% | 6.88% | 8.96% | 8.68% |
| **Race** |  |  |  |  |
| white | 82.40% | 83.90% | 81.51% | 79.67% |
| black | 7.53% | 6.96% | 7.97% | 8.24% |
| native-amer | 0.61% | 0.66% | 0.43% | 1.10% |
| asian | 7.20% | 6.83% | 7.18% | 8.79% |
| pacific islander | 0.09% | 0.07% | 0.07% | 0.27% |
| other | 2.17% | 1.59% | 2.84% | 1.92% |
| latino (any) | 6.60% | 5.98% | 7.40% | 6.06% |
| **Sex** |  |  |  |  |
| male | 53.88% | 57.85% | 50.00% | 52.34% |
| female | 45.82% | 41.75% | 49.79% | 47.38% |
| other | 0.31% | 0.40% | 0.21% | 0.28% |
| **Marital** **Status** | |  |  |  |
| single | 49.41% | 50.03% | 47.94% | 52.47% |
| married | 40.68% | 40.89% | 41.39% | 37.09% |
| separated | 1.37% | 1.52% | 1.35% | 0.82% |
| widowed | 1.25% | 1.13% | 1.28% | 1.65% |
| divorced | 7.29% | 6.43% | 8.04% | 7.97% |
| **Age** |  |  |  |  |
| 18-24 | 12.24% | 11.81% | 12.54% | 12.91% |
| 25-34 | 43.33% | 44.66% | 41.67% | 44.23% |
| 35-44 | 23.73% | 24.29% | 23.79% | 21.15% |
| 45-54 | 11.57% | 10.68% | 11.97% | 13.74% |
| 55-64 | 6.93% | 6.50% | 7.62% | 6.04% |
| >64 | 2.20% | 2.06% | 2.42% | 1.92% |
| **Education** |  |  |  |  |
| <HS | 0.31% | 27.00% | 0.29% | 0.55% |
| HSgrad | 10.90% | 12.83% | 9.27% | 9.32% |
| some college | 25.24% | 24.58% | 26.16% | 24.38% |
| associate | 11.91% | 12.96% | 11.33% | 9.86% |
| bachelors | 39.75% | 39.75% | 39.77% | 39.73% |
| phd | 1.26% | 1.20% | 1.28% | 1.37% |
| grad/prof degree | 10.63% | 8.42% | 11.90% | 14.79% |
| **Income** |  |  |  |  |
| <25k | 18.25% | 18.32% | 17.98% | 19.01% |
| 25k-35k | 15.48% | 16.14% | 14.36% | 17.08% |
| 35k-50k | 18.53% | 19.25% | 18.69% | 14.88% |
| 50k-75k | 22.30% | 22.35% | 22.74% | 20.39% |
| 75k-100k | 13.74% | 12.96% | 14.71% | 13.22% |
| 100k-150k | 9.14% | 8.60% | 9.03% | 11.85% |
| >150k | 2.56% | 2.38% | 2.49% | 3.58% |

Table 7  
**N for each comparison group across rounds**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Cost Category:*** | *Tomz Default* | | | *Open Cost Prompt* | | | *Open Reputation Prompt* | | |
|  | 10/15 | 12/16 | 3/17 | 10/15 | 12/16 | 3/17 | 10/15 | 12/16 | 3/17 |
| ***Vignette:*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| *Empty Threat* | 256 | 219 |  | 244 |  |  |  | 257 | 198 |
| *Stay Out* | 239 | 205 |  | 263 |  |  |  | 244 | 200 |
| *Follow Through* | 247 |  |  | 263 |  |  |  |  |  |

October 2015 subjects saw only cost, not reputation.   
December 2016 subjects saw both cost and reputation prompts together in random order.   
March 2017 subjects saw only the reputation prompt.

**Appendix C:**

Here, I consider the conditional average treatment effect by partisan identification. The primary tests in the paper came from the October 2015 experimental round, so I consider only that round. This also avoids the potential confounding problems associated with the newly inaugurated president in January 2017.

I use the initial party ID question, which gave three values: Republican, Democrat, and Independent. Although a follow-up question was asked of Independents to ascertain whether they “lean” towards one party or another, I include them in the same category for this test (the results are consistent, as can be seen in the Stata replication file). Table 8a shows the variation in the effects of treatment by party and vignette.

Because the sample is now split 18 ways, most of the standard errors are too large to maintain statistical significance in the reported effects, but effect directions are consistent those reported in the main body of the text. Respondents in the Empty Threat groups show an increase in approval when primed to consider casualties, regardless of partisan affiliation. Respondents in the Follow Through groups show a decrease in approval with treatment, regardless of partisan affiliation. It is also interesting to note that Republicans and Independents cancel each other out in the Stay Out group: Republicans respond to the cost prime with a 1.2 point decrease in approval, and Independents respond with a 1 point increase in approval.

Table 8a  
**Separate Cost tests by partisanship**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Tomz Prompt* | *Open Cost Prompt* | *Effect of Treatment* | *p* | *N* |
| **Republicans** |  |  |  |  |  |
| Empty Threat | 2.07 | 2.5 | .42 | .12 | 109 |
| Stay Out | 4.02 | 2.78 | **-1.24**\*\* | **.01** | 96 |
| Follow Through | 5.78 | 5.14 | **-.64**\* | **.05** | 95 |
| **Democrats** |  |  |  |  |  |
| Empty Threat | 3.5 | 3.79 | .29 | .13 | 226 |
| Stay Out | 4.47 | 4.4 | -.07 | .6 | 224 |
| Follow Through | 4.62 | 4.57 | -.05 | .6 | 231 |
| **Independents (including “lean”)** |  |  |  |  |  |
| Empty Threat | 3.19 | 3.88 | **.7**\* | **.02** | 165 |
| Stay Out | 3.58 | 4.51 | **.93**\*\* | **.00** | 182 |
| Follow Through | 4.84 | 4.57 | -.27 | .19 | 184 |
|  |  |  |  | Total: | 1512 |

Note: \* p , .05, \*\* p , .01

As an additional check, table 8b shows the base ordered logit model with control for party ID (with party=“lean neither way” as the reference category). Though Republicans are more bellicose overall, the estimates for the effect of the cost prime are consistent with those reported in Table 4 in Appendix B and displayed in Figure 3 in the main text.

Table 8b  
**Ordered logit coefficients for two comparison groups with party control**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **Empty Threat** | **Follow Through** |
|  |  |  | |
| **Party** |  |  | |
| strong dem | -0.05 (0.29) | 0.04 (0.26) | |
| dem | -0.12 (0.27) | 0.29 (0.26) | |
| lean dem | -0.06 (0.32) | 0.34 (0.29) | |
| lean repub | -1.08\*\* (0.38) | 0.68 (0.38) | |
| repub | -1.45\*\* (0.33) | 1.33\*\* (0.33) | |
| strong repub | -2.28\*\* (0.43) | 1.26\*\* (0.41) | |
|  |  |  | |
| **Costfirst** | 0.41\*\* (0.16) | -0.31\* (0.16) | |
| Cutpoint 1 | -1.40 (0.25) | -1.92 (0.25) | |
| Cutpoint 2 | -0.26 (0.25) | -1.13 (0.24) | |
| Cutpoint 3 | 0.17 (0.25) | -0.78 (0.23) | |
| Cutpoint 4 | 0.60 (0.25) | -0.44 (0.23) | |
| Cutpoint 5 | 1.08 (0.25) | 0.02 (0.23) | |
| Cutpoint 6 | 2.36 (0.28) | 1.53 (0.24) | |
| N | 489 | 497 | |

Note: Cell entries are ordered logit coefficients, with associated standard errors in parentheses. \* p , .05, \*\* p , .01

**Appendix D: Experimental Prompt**

Respondents in all three treatment groups read the following:

*Initial Prompt*

This survey will ask you some questions about US relations with other countries around the world. It will take 5-8 minutes to complete.  
  
You will read about a situation our country has faced many times in the past and will probably face again. Different leaders have handled the situation in different ways. We will describe one approach US leaders have taken, ask you a few questions to make sure you understood the situation, and then ask your opinion of the leader's actions.

Then the respondents are randomly placed in one of the following three treatment groups.

*Vignette 1: Follow Through with Intervention*

A country sent its military to **take over** a neighboring country.  The attacking country was led by a **dictator**, who invaded **to get more power and resources**. The attacking country had a **strong** military, so it would take a major effort for the United States to help push them out.  A victory by the attacking country would **hurt** the safety and economy of the United States.

The US president said that if the attack continued, the US military would **push out** the invaders.  He **sent troops** to the region and **prepared them for war**. The attacking country continued to invade.

The president then ordered US troops to destroy one of the invader’s military bases. US troops **destroyed the base**, but the invasion still continued. So the president sent in more US military forces, which **fought the aggressive government** until it halted its invasion.

*Vignette 2: Threaten and Back Down*

A country sent its military to **take over** a neighboring country.  The attacking country was led by a **dictator**, who invaded **to get more power and resources**. The attacking country had a **strong** military, so it would take a major effort for the United States to help push them out.  A victory by the attacking country would **hurt** the safety and economy of the United States.

The US president said that if the attack continued, the US military would **push out** the invaders. The attacking country continued to invade. In the end, the US president **did not send troops**, and the attacking country **took over** its neighbor.

*Vignette 3: No Threat or Intervention*

A country sent its military to **take over** a neighboring country.  The attacking country was led by a **dictator**, who invaded **to get more power and resources**. The attacking country had a **strong** military, so it would take a major effort for the United States to help push them out.  A victory by the attacking country would **hurt** the safety and economy of the United States.

The US president said the United States would **stay out** of the conflict. The attacking country continued to invade. In the end, the US president **did not send troops**, and the attacking country **took over** its neighbor.

The respondents then take an attention check. They are allowed to go back and reread the scenario if they need to. If they fail to answer any of these questions correctly, they are excused from the experiment and not allowed to complete it.

*Attention Check*

In order to make sure you understood the situation, we will ask you three questions about the scenario. If you answer any of them incorrectly, the survey will end and you will not be allowed to complete the survey. You may go back to reread the scenario if necessary.

What kind of government does the country have?

* Communist
* Dictator
* Democratic Government
* I don't know

What does the country aim to do?

* Incite civil war in a neighboring country
* Take over a neighboring country
* Buy nuclear weapons from a neighboring country
* I don't know

What did the US president do in the end?

* Sent troops to stop the country
* Stayed out of the conflict
* Enacted economic sanctions
* I don't know

The respondents are then asked the following two sets of questions to establish the primary treatment and control groups of concern for this study.

**Questions After the Vignette**

*Casualties Prime Question*(randomly assigned to be before or after approval question)

How many US troops would you expect were [to be] killed when [if] the president [had] decided to stop the invasion with military force?

* Fewer than 50
* 50-99
* 100-499
* 500-1999
* 2000-4999
* 5000-10000
* More than 10000

*Reputation Prime Questions*

What effect, if any, would the President’s actions in the prior scenario have on the international reputation of the US?

* It would harm the US' reputation.
* It would not affect the US' reputation.
* It would improve the US' reputation.

If the subject chooses harm:

* Would it harm the US' reputation a lot or only a little?
  + It would harm the US' reputation a lot.
  + It would only harm the US' reputation a little.

If the subject chooses improve:

* Would it harm the US' reputation a lot or only a little?
  + It would improve the US' reputation a lot.
  + It would only improve the US' reputation a little.

*Self-Report of Presidential Approval*

Do you approve, disapprove, or neither approve nor disapprove of the way the US president handled the situation?

* Approve
* Neither Approve nor Disapprove
* Disapprove

If subject chooses Approve:

* Do you approve very strongly, or only somewhat?
  + Very strongly
  + Somewhat

If subject chooses Disapprove:

* Do you disapprove very strongly, or only somewhat?
  + Very Strongly
  + Somewhat

If subject chooses: Neither Approve nor Disapprove

## Do you lean toward approving of the way the US president handled the situation, lean toward disapproving, or don't you lean either way?

* + Lean toward Disapproving
  + Lean toward approving
  + Don’t lean either way

Then a number of demographic questions are asked, they are thanked, and their participation is complete.

*Demographic Questions*

Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a...

* Republican (1)
* Democrat (2)
* Independent (3)
* No preference (4)
* Other - please specify (5) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

If Republican is Selected

* Would you call yourself...
* A strong republican (1)
* Not a very strong republican (2)

If Democrat is Selected

* Would you call yourself...
* A strong democrat (1)
* Not a very strong democrat (2)

If no preference is Selected

* Do you think of yourself as closer to the...
* Republican party (1)
* Democratic party (2)
* Neither (3)

If Independent is Selected

* As an independent, do you think of yourself as closer to the...
* Republican party (1)
* Democratic party (2)
* Neither (3)

Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with this statement: The use of military force only makes problems worse.

* Agree strongly (1)
* Agree somewhat (2)
* Neither agree nor disagree (3)
* Disagree somewhat (4)
* Disagree strongly (5)

Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with this statement: The United States needs to play an active role in solving conflicts around the world.

* Agree strongly (1)
* Agree somewhat (2)
* Neither agree nor disagree (3)
* Disagree somewhat (4)
* Disagree strongly (5)

Did you vote in the 2012 election?

* Yes (1)
* No (2)
* I'm not sure or I don't remember (3)

Which region of the country do you live in?

* Midwest - IA, IL, IN, KS, MI, MN, MO, ND, NE, OH, SD, WI (1)
* Northeast - CT, DC, DE, MA, MD, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT (2)
* Southeast - AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, WV (3)
* Southwest - AZ, NM, OK, TX (4)
* West - AK, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NV, OR, UT, WA, WY (5)

What was your total household income before taxes during the past 12 months?

* Less than $24,999 (1)
* $25,000 to $34,999 (2)
* $35,000 to $49,999 (3)
* $50,000 to $74,999 (4)
* $75,000 to $99,999 (5)
* $100,000 to $149,999 (6)
* $150,000 or more (7)

Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin?

* Yes (1)
* No (2)

What is your race? For purposes of this question, persons of Spanish/Hispanic/Latino origin may be of any race.

* White (1)
* Black or African American (2)
* American Indian and Alaska Native (3)
* Asian (4)
* Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander (5)
* Other (6) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

What is your age?

* 18 to 24 years (1)
* 25 to 34 years (2)
* 35 to 44 years (3)
* 45 to 54 years (4)
* 55 to 64 years (5)
* Age 65 or older (6)

What is the highest degree or level of education you have completed?

* Less than high school (1)
* High school graduate (includes equivalency) (2)
* Some college, no degree (3)
* Associate's degree (4)
* Bachelor's degree (5)
* Ph.D. (6)
* Graduate or professional degree (7)

What is your marital status?

* Single (never married) (1)
* Married (2)
* Separated (3)
* Widowed (4)
* Divorced (5)

What is your gender?

* Male (1)
* Female (2)
* Other (3) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Is there anything else you would like us to know?

* Yes (1) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
* No (2)

**Appendix E: Supplemental Information for *Journal of Experimental Political Science* reporting standards**

1. **Hypotheses**

* Specific objectives and hypotheses
  + Addressed in manuscript

1. **Subjects and Context**

* Eligibility and exclusion criteria for participants
  + I recruited only MTurk users in the United States. This is because the experimental prompt in question concerns the US president, and the theory concerns domestic support. All American MTurk “Master Workers” were eligible to participate in the study; these are workers who have been deemed by MTurk Employers to consistently have success in there tasks.
  + All subjects were only allowed to participate in a single round.
* I used Qualtrics to administer the surveys through USC’s subscription.
* Dates of survey deployment are addressed in the manuscript and other appendices.
* In addition to the 1512 subjects who completed the survey, there were 132 subjects who opened the survey and let it expire without reading or answering any of the content.

1. **Allocation Method**

* Qualtrics has all the randomization tools needed for this design. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the three vignettes outlined in the manuscript, and then they were randomly assigned to have the casualties question come either before or after the self-reported approval question.
  + Evidence of successful random assignment is shown in the following table of mean, standard deviations, and n’s of several demographic variables (analyzed continuously) across treatment groups:

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Vignette** | Party | Ethn | Marry | Age | Edu | Gender | Income |  |
| Empty | 3.3  (1.9) 489 | 1.3  (.9)  499 | 1.7  (1)  499 | 2.6  (1.1)  498 | 4.1  (1.3)  494 | 1.4  (.5)  499 | 3.3  (1.6)  500 | Mean  SD n |
| Stay | 3.2  (1.9)  497 | 1.4  (1.1)  501 | 1.7  (1)  502 | 2.6  (1.2)  502 | 4.2  (1.5)  501 | 1.4  (.5)  502 | 3.4  (1.7)  502 | Mean  SD n |
| Follow | 3.1  (1.9)  497 | 1.4  (.92)  509 | 1.7  (1)  508 | 2.6  (1.2)  507 | 4.2  (1.4)  502 | 1.4  (.5)  508 | 3.2  (1.7)  510 | Mean  SD n |

* All subjects were blind to the fact that this was an experiment, not a simple survey. This was accomplished in that they each saw only one vignette.

1. **Treatments**

* This is addressed in the manuscript and other appendices.

1. **Results**
2. **Outcome Measures and Covariates**
   * Addressed in manuscript.
3. **CONSORT Participant Flow Diagram**
   * All information relevant to a flow diagram has been heretofore addressed.
4. **Statistical Analysis**
   * Addressed in the manuscript.
5. **Other Information**

* The design was reviewed and approved by the IRB of USC
* The experimental design was registered as with all relevant hypotheses at Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP). <http://egap.org/registration/1497>
* Funding was provided by USC’s Center for International Studies after I submitted a detailed plan for experimental design and analysis.
* Access to replication data is provided in manuscript.

1. Yaacov Trope and Nira Liberman, “Construal-Level Theory of Psychological Distance,” *Psychological Review* 117, no. 2 (April 2010): 440–63, http://dx.doi.org.libproxy1.usc.edu/10.1037/a0018963. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 3 (1994): 577–92; Kenneth A. Schultz, “Why We Needed Audience Costs and What We Need Now,” *Security Studies* 21, no. 3 (July 1, 2012): 369–75, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2012.706475. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. Ryan Brutger and Joshua D. Kertzer, “A Dispositional Theory of Reputation Costs,” *International Organization*, 2018. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)