

Appendices: Are There Long-Term Effects of the  
Vietnam Draft on Political Attitudes or Behavior?  
Apparently Not

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# 1 Further References

## 1.1 Prior Studies of Vietnam Draft and Political Behavior / Attitudes

Table 1: Summary of Study Findings

Authors	Lottery	Sample	N	Findings
Longino 1973 (Bergan 2009)	1969	U. Virginia Students	141	Men with high draft numbers were more likely to change their attitudes about war to favor immediate and total troop withdrawal, but differences not statistically significant.
Notz et al. 1971	1969	Northeastern U. students who signed a petition	232 (1) 655 (2) 588 (3)	1) Draft classification or risk had no effect on likelihood of signing petition. 2) Men facing lower draft risk were more likely to favor faster or total withdrawal from Vietnam.
Staw et al. 1974	1971	Students at Loyola U., Northwestern U., and U. Illinois, Chicago	493	Men facing highest risk of draft favored rapid troop withdrawal.
Apsler 1972	1970	Students from Boston U., Harvard U., Northwestern U., and Boston area	54	Men facing the highest (and lowest) risk of being drafted were more anxious about being inducted, were less likely to agree that the U.S. needs a powerful armed forces, and more likely to agree that the U.S. should abolish the draft.
Erikson and Stoker 2011	1969	High school students	255	Among college-bound students, recipients of safe numbers were more hawkish in 1973 survey, more likely to maintain their partisan affiliation before and after the lottery. Recipients of low lottery numbers were more likely to report voting for McGovern and hold liberal political attitudes.

## 1.2 Non-Political Studies

Because the draft lotteries randomized induction priority, they serve as an exogenous source of variation in the conscription risk and present a remarkable opportunity to assess the causal effects of risk and service on outcomes. Dozens of studies outside of political science have exploited this randomized "natural experiment" to measure the causal effects of draft risk on phenomena related to the physical and mental health, education, employment, and mortality of people more and less affected by the draft. Economists have analyzed the effects of military service on education (Angrist and Chen 2011) and employment (Angrist 1990; Douglas 2012). Scholars from many fields have studied the effects of military service on health outcomes (Angrist et al. 2010; Dobkin and Shabani 2009; Hearst et al. 1991) and mortality (Conley and Heerwig 2012; Hearst et al. 1986). Still others have used the lottery to study a broad range of phenomena including violence (Rholfs 2005), smoking (Eisenberg and Rowe 2009, Schmitz and Conley 2016), family structure (Heerwig and Conley 2013), and self-esteem (Rubin and Paplau 1973).

Angrist, Joshua D. "Lifetime earnings and the Vietnam era draft lottery: evidence from social security administrative records." *The American Economic Review* 80, no. 3 (1990): 313-336.

Angrist, Joshua D., and Stacey H. Chen. "Schooling and the Vietnam-era GI Bill: Evidence from the draft lottery." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 3, no. 2 (2011): 96-118.

Angrist, Joshua D., Stacey H. Chen, and Brigham R. Frandsen. "Did Vietnam veterans get sicker in the 1990s? The complicated effects of military service on self-reported health." *Journal of Public Economics* 94, no. 1 (2010): 824-837.

Dobkin, Carlos, and Reza Shabani. "The health effects of military service: Evidence from the Vietnam draft." *Economic Inquiry* 47, no. 1 (2009): 69-80.

Eisenberg, Daniel, and Brian Rowe. "The effect of smoking in young adulthood on smoking later in life: evidence based on the Vietnam era draft lottery." In *Forum for Health Economics & Policy* 12, no. 2 (2009).

Hearst, Norman, James W. Buehler, Thomas B. Newman, and George W. Rutherford. "The draft lottery and AIDS: evidence against increased intravenous drug use by Vietnam-era veterans." *American Journal of Epidemiology* 134, no. 5 (1991): 522-525.

Hearst, Norman, Thomas B. Newman, and Stephen B. Hulley. "Delayed effects of the military draft on mortality." *New England Journal of Medicine* 314, no. 10 (1986): 620-624.

Heerwig, Jennifer A., and Dalton Conley. "The causal effects of Vietnam-era military service on post-war family dynamics." *Social science research* 42, no. 2 (2013): 299-310.

Rubin, Zick, and Letitia Anne Peplau. "Belief in a just world and reactions to another's

lot: A study of participants in the national draft lottery.” *Journal of Social Issues* 29 (1973): 73-93.

Schmitz, Lauren, and Dalton Conley. “The Long-Term Consequences of Vietnam-Era Conscription and Genotype on Smoking Behavior and Health.” *Behavior Genetics* 46, no. 1 (2016): 43-58.

## 2 Additional Survey Results

### 2.1 Life Trajectory Outcomes

The survey included a variety of questions tracking the life trajectory of draft eligible men, particularly economic and family situation. Like Tables 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 from the main paper, the following are the draft effects on each outcome (i.e. the difference between high-risk and low-risk surveyees). The most important result here is the first row, which is the effect of draft status on military service. Roughly 40% of high-risk surveyees served, while only 18% of low-risk surveyees served.

Table 2: Draft Effect on Life Trajectory Outcomes

	N	ATE	Cluster.SE	Cluster.P
Served in Armed Services	901	22.5	2.5	0
Gov’t Employee	912	1.6	1.4	0.244
Personal Finances Good	912	1.8	2	0.36
Weekly Church Attendance	905	-3.5	2.2	0.111
Evangelical Christian	903	0	1.9	0.98
Live out of State	905	-0.6	3.1	0.835
Live in Rural ZIP	675	-3.7	2.7	0.175

*Each row is a separate OLS regression that includes birth-year and state fixed effects. The ITT compares men with high-risk birthdates (numbers 1-50) to those with low-risk birthdates (numbers 317-366). The estimates are expressed in terms of percentage points. SEs are clustered at birthdate level.*

### 2.2 Miscellaneous Outcomes

Below are all other survey outcomes that we hypothesized might be affected by draft status. The effects are generally consistent with random noise.

Table 3: Draft Effect on Miscellaneous Outcomes

	N	ATE	Cluster.SE	Cluster.P
Divorced / Separated	912	-0.2	5	0.971
No Children	907	-0.7	2.7	0.807
Currently Working	909	-2.1	3.7	0.576
Satisfied with Life	912	2.7	2.7	0.324
Confident in Retirement	912	3.2	2.5	0.205
Religion Important	902	-4.3	3.2	0.178
Live <25 mi from Home Town	912	0.5	2.7	0.85
Gov't Should Guarantee Retirement Income	887	0.3	3.3	0.925
Hard Work No Guarantee of Success	904	-1.1	2.9	0.698
Too Little Spending on Poor	896	-1.1	2.9	0.719
Too Little Spending on Vets	900	0.4	3.4	0.904
Different Rules for Well Connected	899	-0.1	2	0.977
Hard Workers have hard time	901	-4.1	3.5	0.247
Trust People Sometimes / Never	912	-4.6	2.3	0.04
Disapprove of Congress	904	-1.3	1.2	0.308
Pay Attention to Politics	906	-6.3	2.9	0.033
Vote '12: Romney	899	-3.7	3.4	0.272
Primary '16: Clinton	648	-4	3.7	0.279
Primary '16: Trump	648	-3	3.1	0.328
Primary '16: Any GOP	648	1	3.9	0.793
Registered DEM	676	-1.8	3.9	0.657
Registered GOP	676	0.8	3.4	0.805
Party ID: Republican	897	-0.2	2.7	0.953
Party ID: Independent	897	3.7	2.9	0.206
Very Conservative	903	-2.2	1.5	0.141
Conservative	903	1.9	2.5	0.432
Moderate	903	0.5	2.7	0.847
Liberal	903	1.6	2.6	0.537
Very Liberal	903	-2.2	1.8	0.222

*Each row is a separate OLS regression that includes birth-year and state fixed effects. The ITT compares men with high-risk birthdates (numbers 1-50) to those with low-risk birthdates (numbers 317-366). The estimates are expressed in terms of percentage points. SEs are clustered at birthdate level.*

### 3 Voter File Results with Draft Number as Treatment Variable

As a robustness check on the voter file analysis in Tables 9-10, we also ran the same analysis substituting draft number as the treatment variable. Given the uncertain nature of draft risk, it is possible that the effects of draft risk were closer to linear than binary. All of these effects should be interpreted as the effect of a draft number increasing by one

on the number of votes / registered voters per birthdate. (The largest possible increase in the treatment, then, is from 1 to 366.) The results here are generally consistent with the results from the paper. In Table A4, there is no detectable effect of draft number on votes on a given birthdate. In Table A5, the results possibly show a very slight increase in the number of registered voters at higher birthdates (about a 1% increase in the number of men moving from the lowest to the highest numbers) but no difference in the partisanship of those registered.

### 3.1 Voting Rate Analysis (Replicating Table 9)

Table 4: Effect of Draft Number on Voting Rate (in Votes per Birthdate)

	Birthdates	Mean	ATE	SE	P-Value
2008	1093	2864.2	0.064	0.048	0.184
2010	1093	2445.9	0.036	0.042	0.387
2012	1093	2956.7	0.058	0.050	0.248
2014	1093	2371.8	0.019	0.041	0.641
Total	1093	10638.5	0.177	0.179	0.324

*Each row is a single OLS regression on birthdate-level with birth year fixed effects and linear time trend. Treatment is draft number, with higher numbers corresponding to lower draft risk. The SE of the “Total” line is large because the number of votes associated with each birthdate is highly correlated across elections.*

### 3.2 Party Registration Analysis (Replicating Table 10)

Table 5: Effect of Draft Number on Party Registration (in Registrees per Birthdate)

	Birthdates	Mean	ATE	SE	P-Value
Registered Voters	1093	3773.2	0.088	0.062	0.160
Registered Voters (Party States)	1093	2408.7	0.090	0.041	0.026
Registered Dems	1093	951.4	0.033	0.017	0.055
Registered Reps	1093	830.8	0.036	0.017	0.036
Scored Dems	1093	1575.7	0.045	0.026	0.081
Scored Reps	1093	1483.3	0.028	0.028	0.321

*Each row is a single OLS regression on birthdate-level with birth year fixed effects and linear time trend. Treatment is draft number, with higher numbers corresponding to lower draft risk. See table 4 for states with party registration.*

## 4 Voter File Results on Individual Level

As a second robustness check on the voter file analysis, we also replicated the analysis on the individual level rather than the birthdate level. This analysis takes as given the individuals who have registered to vote, which introduces some selection bias into the results.

This mostly affects Table A6, where voting probability is conditional on registration. As previously stated, drafted birthdates have slightly fewer male registrees, but those registrees were slightly more likely to vote in the four recorded elections (by just under one tenth of a percentage point per election on average). These two effects are both on the edge of statistical significance and cancel out in the aggregate (hence there is no substantial result in Table 9). In Table A7, the results are consistent with the previous analysis, showing no significant effect on the probability of registering with one party over the other.

## 4.1 Voting Rate Analysis (Replicating Table 9)

Table 6: Draft Effect on Voting Rate (in Pct Points)

	N	Drafted	SE	P-Value
2008	4126573	0.023	0.053	0.664
2010	4126573	0.092	0.060	0.126
2012	4126573	0.055	0.050	0.275
2014	4126573	0.185	0.062	0.003
Average	4126573	0.089	0.048	0.063

*Each row is a single OLS regression on individual level with birth year fixed effects and linear time trend. Treatment “drafted status:” whether the individual’s draft number was below the draft cutoff for the given year. The SE of the “Average” line is large because the number of votes associated with each birthdate is highly correlated across elections.*

## 4.2 Party Registration Analysis (Replicating Table 10)

Table 7: Draft Effect on Party Registration (in Pct Points)

	N	Drafted	SE	P-Value
Registered Dem	2632751.0	0.033	0.074	0.655
Registered Rep	2632751.0	-0.072	0.074	0.326
Scored Dem	4124123.0	-0.001	0.061	0.983
Scored Rep	4124123.0	0.045	0.061	0.459

*Each row is a single OLS regression on individual level with birth year fixed effects and linear time trend. Treatment “drafted status:” whether the individual’s draft number was below the draft cutoff for the given year. See table 4 for states with party registration.*

## 5 Flow Chart: Selection and Attrition

