## Appendix A Online Appendix

## Appendix A. 1 Response Distributions

Question wording and distributions of key co-variates and coding decisions:

1. Economic Optimism: How does the financial situation of your household now compare with what it was 12 months ago? Has it:

| Response | US | GB |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Gotten a lot better | $5.1 \%$ | $1.9 \%$ |
| Gotten a little better | 19.1 | 10.1 |
| Stayed the same | 35.9 | 36.5 |
| Gotten a little worse | 23.5 | 36.4 |
| Gotten a lot worse | 15.0 | 13.3 |
| Don't know | 1.5 | 1.8 |

5pt Note: Those responding 'Gotten a lot better' or 'Gotten a little better' coded ' 1 ' for the multivariate estimations and ' 0 ' otherwise.
2. Redistribution: Distribution of respondents on a 7 -point scale where 1 equals "Government should get out of the business of promoting income equality" and 7 equals "Government should do more to reduce income equality"

| Response | US | GB |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Government Should Get Out | $33.1 \%$ | $10.1 \%$ |
| 2 | 7.9 | 7.6 |
| 3 | 5.8 | 11.2 |
| 4 | 17.2 | 24.6 |
| 5 | 10.4 | 13.1 |
| 6 | 9.2 | 11.9 |
| Government Should Do More | 16.4 | 21.5 |

5pt Note: For the dichotomous variable used in the multivariate analyses, a respondent's score is ' 1 ' on the Redistribution variable if they provide a response to this question that is above the sample median, which in both countries is " 4 ", and ' 0 ' otherwise.
3. Instrumentalism: Two questions combine to determine whether a respondent holds instrumentalist views concerning providing aid. The two questions are a) US/UK aid to developing countries strengthens our political influence in the world; and b) US/UK aid to developing countries helps to prevent international terrorism. Response distributions are as follows:

| Response | US | GB |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Question: | Strengthens <br> Influence | Prevents <br> Terrorism | Strengthens <br> Influence | Prevents <br> Terrorism |
| Strongly Agree | $7.0 \%$ | $2.9 \%$ | $5.5 \%$ | $2.5 \%$ |
| Agree | 31.1 | 24.2 | 20.4 | 17.7 |
| Neither or Don't Know | 32.5 | 34.5 | 33.2 | 33.3 |
| Disagree | 17.2 | 24.8 | 22.0 | 28.2 |
| Strongly Disagree | 12.2 | 13.6 | 18.9 | 18.3 |

5pt Note: In both nations, the two items scale together well (US: $\alpha=$ 0.82 ; GB: $\alpha=0.81$ ), and an additive index of responses to the two variables yields a scale ranging from 2-10. In the multivariate analyses, "Instrumentalists" are those who score above the combined median index score of 6 , and receive a score of ' 1 '. Non-instrumentalists receive a score of ' 0 '.
4. Ideology and Partisanship: In the multivariate analyses, an 11-point ideology scale captures respondents' left to right self placement (with higher scores indicating a more rightward self-placement). The mean and median ideology value in the US is 5.6 and 5 , respectively. In GB, it is 5.0 and $5.33 .2 \%$ and $28.1 \%$ of the US sample thinks of themselves as Democrats and Republicans, respectively. In Britain, the distribution of partisan identification is as follows: $31.4 \%$ Labour, $25.4 \%$ Conservative; $8.0 \%$ Liberal Democrat; 5.6\% UKIP; 4.2\% Green; $2.7 \%$ Nationalist (SNP/Plaid Cyrmu).
5. Other Demographics: For GB, $52.9 \%$ of the sample is female and the mean age is 52.7 (median (54)). For GB, $53.5 \%$ of the sample is female and the mean age is 53.0 (median (54)). In Britain, $47.6 \%$ of those sampled identifies with a religious denomination. The comparable number in the US is $71.7 \%$.

## Appendix A. 2 Full Probit Analyses

Table A1: Probit Coefficients

| Predictor | US A | US B | GB A | GB B |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Money Treatment | 0.05 | -0.01 | ${ }_{-0.25}{ }^{+}$ | -0.25 |
|  | (0.09) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.21) |
| Percent Treatment | $\begin{aligned} & 0.74 * * \\ & (0.09) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.52^{* * *} \\ & (0.13) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.38^{* *} \\ & (0.13) \end{aligned}$ | $0.41^{*}$ $(0.19)$ |
| Money \& Pct. Treat | 0.31*** | ${ }_{0.24+}$ | (0.13) | (0.19) |
|  | $(0.09)$ | $(0.13)$ | $(0.13)$ | $(0.19)$ |
| Economic Optimism | 0.21** | 0.12 | 0.03 | -0.26 |
|  | (0.08) | (0.15) | (0.14) | (0.31) |
| Favour Redistribution | $0.28^{* * *}$ | 0.07 | 0.12 | 0.15 |
|  | (0.08) | (0.14) | (0.10) | (0.19) |
| Instrumentalism | $0.79^{* * *}$ | 0.87*** | $1.18{ }^{* * *}$ | 1.30*** |
|  | (0.07) | (0.14) | (0.11) | (0.22) |
| Ideology | $-0.08^{* * *}$ | $-0.08^{* * *}$ | $-0.17^{* * *}$ | $-0.17^{* * *}$ |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Female | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.11 | 0.12 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| Religious | 0.08 | -0.11 | 0.10 | 0.07 |
|  | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.10) |
| Age | $-0.01^{* * *}$ | $-0.01{ }^{* * *}$ | $-0.02^{* * *}$ | $-0.02^{* * *}$ |
|  | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Democrat | 0.30 *** | 0.31 *** |  |  |
|  | (0.08) | (0.08) |  |  |
| Republican | $-0.08$ | $-0.09$ |  |  |
|  | (0.09) |  |  |  |
| Labour |  |  | $0.04$ (0.13) | $0.04$ |
| Conservative |  |  | -0.24 | -0.24 |
|  |  |  | (0.15) | (0.15) |
| Lib. Dem. |  |  | 0.18 | 0.22 |
|  |  |  | (0.15) | (0.15) |
| Green |  |  | 0.04 | 0.03 |
|  |  |  | (0.25) | (0.25) |
| Nationalist |  |  | -0.44 | -0.43 |
|  |  |  | (0.28) | (0.28) |
| UKIP |  |  | $-0.80^{* *}$ | -0.80 ** |
|  |  |  | (0.27) | (0.27) |
| Interaction Effects |  |  |  |  |
| Economic Optimism with Money |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.12 \\ & (0.22) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.12 \\ & (0.43) \end{aligned}$ |
| with Percent |  | $0.38{ }^{+}$ |  | 0.25 |
|  |  | (0.22) |  | (0.39) |
| with Money \& Pct. |  | 0.15 |  | $0.80^{+}$ |
|  |  | 0.20 |  | (0.43) |
| Redistribution with Money |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.31 \\ & (0.20) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.02 \\ & (0.27) \end{aligned}$ |
| with Percent |  | 0.52* |  | -0.05 |
|  |  | (0.20) |  | (0.26) |
| with Money \& Pct. |  | 0.15 |  | -0.20 |
|  |  | (0.19) |  | (0.26) |
| Instrumentalism with Money |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.06 \\ & (0.20) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.07 \\ & (0.31) \end{aligned}$ |
| with Percent |  | -0.12 |  | -0.31 |
|  |  | (0.20) |  | (0.30) |
| with Money \& Pct. |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.08 \\ & (0.18) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.11 \\ & (0.30) \end{aligned}$ |
| Fit Statistics |  |  |  |  |
| $\chi^{2}$ | $540.6(\mathrm{df}=13)$ | $544.2(\mathrm{df}=22)$ | 283.6 ( $\mathrm{df}=16$ ) | $303.0(\mathrm{df}=25)$ |
| McFadden $R^{2}$ | 0.238 | 0.242 | 0.269 | 0.274 |

## Appendix A. 3 Robustness Checks for Multivariate Analyses

Table A2: Marginal Effects-No Control for Instrumentalism

| Predictor | US A | US B | UK A | UK B |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Money Treatment | 0.02 | -0.02 | -0.05 | -0.05 |
| Percent Treatment | $0.27^{* * *}$ | $0.17^{* * *}$ | $0.15^{* *}$ | $0.15^{*}$ |
| Money \& Pct. Treat | $0.13^{* * *}$ | $0.10^{*}$ | 0.04 | 0.04 |
| Economic Optimism | $0.12^{* *}$ | 0.08 | -0.08 | -0.08 |
| Favour Redistribution | $0.16^{* * *}$ | $0.10^{+}$ | $0.09^{*}$ | $0.12^{+}$ |
| Ideology | $-0.04^{* * *}$ | $-0.03^{* * *}$ | $-0.07^{* * *}$ | $-0.08^{* * *}$ |
| Female | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Religious | $-0.03^{+}$ | -0.03 | 0.04 | 0.03 |
| Age | $-0.01^{* * *}$ | $-0.01^{* * *}$ | $-0.01^{* * *}$ | $-0.01^{* * *}$ |
| Democrat | $0.17^{* * *}$ | $0.17^{* * *}$ |  |  |
| Republican | -0.03 | -0.03 |  |  |
| Labour |  |  | 0.05 | 0.05 |
| Conservative |  |  | -0.04 | -0.04 |
| Lib. Dem. |  |  | $0.13^{+}$ | $0.14^{*}$ |
| Green |  |  | 0.03 | 0.01 |
| Nationalist |  | -0.11 | -0.11 |  |
| UKIP |  | $-0.26^{* * *}$ | $-0.26^{* * *}$ |  |
| Interaction Effects |  | -0.03 |  |  |
| Economic Optimism |  | $0.15^{+}$ |  | 0.12 |
| with Money |  | -0.03 |  | 0.11 |
| with Percent |  |  |  |  |
| with Money \& Pct. |  | 0.10 |  |  |
| Redistribution |  | $0.17^{*}$ |  | -0.04 |
| with Money |  |  |  | -0.01 |
| with Percent |  |  |  |  |
| with Money \& Pct. |  |  |  |  |

$* * *=p<0.001 ; * *=p<0.01 ; *=p<0.05 ;+=p<0.10$

