# Classified or Coverup? The effect of redactions on conspiracy theory beliefs

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# Appendix

## Stimulus materials and question wording

## Conspiracy predispositions

To what degree do you agree with the following statement? Politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil.

- Strongly disagree [1]
- Moderately disagree [2]
- Slightly disagree [3]
- Slightly agree [4]
- Moderately agree [5]
- Strongly agree [6]

To what degree do you agree with the following statement? Much of what happens in the world today is decided by a small and secretive group of individuals.

- Strongly disagree [1]
- Moderately disagree [2]
- Slightly disagree [3]
- Slightly agree [4]
- Moderately agree [5]
- Strongly agree [6]

### Introductory article

In 1996, TWA Flight 800 exploded minutes after takeoff from New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport on a flight bound for Paris, falling to the water and killing all 230 passengers on board. Some have suggested that the explosion was the result of the plane being hit by a surface-to-air missile accidentally fired by the U.S. Navy during a missile test. Both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Transportation Safety Board conducted separate investigations and found that the plane exploded due to an electrical malfunction. Government officials argue that official documents from their investigation provide thorough evidence in support of this explanation, but others still claim that radar analysis and eyewitness testimony suggest a government coverup.



The remains of TWA Flight 800 inside a hangar in 1996.

## Experimental stimuli

### **Control condition**

We would now like you to read three excerpts from a vintage cookbook from the 1930s that show how food tastes and preparation have changed over the years. The first is a series of three recipes for pastries and pastry dishes. Please read the document carefully.



The second document consists of three more recipes for pastries and pastry dishes. The recipe book was published in England. Please read the document carefully.



The final document consists of recipes for cakes, ginger snaps, and icing. The recipe book was published in England. Please read the document carefully.



#### Unredacted/redacted manipulation

#### [Shown in both conditions in Study 1 and Study 2]

We would now like you to read three excerpts from the documents released by the government during its investigation of TWA Flight 800. The first is a transcript of a conversation between an air traffic controller, the Flight 800 pilot, and another pilot in the crash vicinity. Please read the document carefully.

#### [Shown in Study 2 redaction condition only]

(Note: The documents you are going to read were redacted by the government, which stated that the redactions were necessary to avoid revealing details of airline procedures and military operations that would threaten aviation safety and national security.)

[all stimuli below are identical in Study 1 and Study 2]

#### [Unredacted]

8:30:14 p.m., Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center: TWA eight hundred, climb and maintain one five thousand [15,000 feet].

8:30:17, TWA Flight 800: TWA's eight hundred heavy, climb and maintain one five thousand, leaving one three thousand 8:31:12; [TWA Flight 800 explodes at an altitude of 13,800 feet, based on post-crash analysis.]

8:31:50, Eastwind Airlines Flight 507: We just saw an explosion out here on Stinger Bee five on seven. 8:31:51: [Infrared sensor aboard US satellite detects large heat source in the vicinity of Flight 800 crash.]

8:31:57, Boston: Stinger Bee five oh seven, I'm sorry. I missed it. Ah, you're on eighteen. Did you say something else? 8:32:00: [TWA Flight 800 hits water, based on post-crash analysis.]

8:32:01, Eastwind 507: We just saw an explosion up ahead of us here something [like] about sixteen thousand feet or something like that. It just went down-to the wat 8:32:56, Boston: TWA eight hundred, [call] Center

- 8:33:04, Boston: TWA eight hundred, if you hear Center ident[ify].
- 8:33:17, Boston: Stinger Bee, ah, five zero seven, you reported an explosion, is that correct, sir? 8:33:21, Eastwind 507: Yes sir, about, ah, five miles at my eleven o'clock here.

8:33:48, Eastwind 507: [unintelligible] Stinger Bee, ah [unintelligible] Boston, we are directly over the site where that airplane or whatever it was just exploded and went into the water. [Then, from a second operator...] [unintelligible] eighteen, ah, nineteen miles on the two thirty-six radial [unintelligible] Hampton

8:34:01, Boston: Roger that. Thank you very much, sir, we're investigating that right now. TWA eight hundred, Center. TWA eight zero zero, if you hear Center, ident.

- 8:35:36. Boston: TWA eight hundred, Center
- 8:35:43, Eastwind 507: I think that was him.
- 8:35:45. Boston: I think so. 8:35:48, Eastwind 507: God bless him.

8:36:57, Boston: Stinger Bee five oh seven, thanks for that report, ah, New York on one three three point zero five [133.05 MHz]. Good day, sir.

8:37:05, Eastwind 507: Thirty-three oh five, so long Stinger five oh seven. Anything we can do for you before we go? 8:37:11, Boston: Well, I just want to confirm that, ah, that you saw the, ah, splash in the water approximately, ah, twenty [20 miles] southwest of

Hampton, is that right? 8:37:20, Eastwind 507: Ah, yes sir. It, it blew up in the air, and then we saw two fireballs go down to the, to the water and there was a big 8:37:20, Eastwind 507: Ah, yes sir. It, it blew up in the air, and then we saw two fireballs go down to the, to the water and there was a big

[unintelligible] smoke form, ah, coming up from that. Also, ah, there seemed to be a light. I, I thought it was a landing light [unintelligible] it was coming right at us at, about, I don't know, about fifteen thousand feet or something like that, and I pushed my landing lights, ah, you know, so I saw him, and then it blew.

8:37:40, Boston: Roger that, sir, ah, that was a seven forty-seven out there you had a visual on that. Anything else in the area when it happened? 8:37:47, Eastwind 507: I didn't see anything. He seemed to be alone. I thought he had a landing light on. Maybe it was a fire, I don't know. 8:37:52, Boston: Stinger Bee five oh seven, ah, roger that. Anything else comes to your mind, ah, you can use your other radio, come back to this frequency and tell me about it.

8:37:59, Eastwind 507: That's all I can think of at this time.

#### [Redacted]



8:37:59, Eastwind 507: That's all I can think of at this time.

The second document is an excerpt from the radar evidence summarized in the official aircraft accident report regarding the inflight breakup of TWA Flight 800 over the Atlantic Ocean. The report was conducted by the National Transportation Survey Board. Please read the document carefully.

Factual Information Aircraft Accident Report 89 Factual Information 89 Aircraft Accident Report Examination of the radar data showed the following vehicle and/or within 10 nm of TWA flight 800 just before the accident (see figure 25): Examination of the radar data showed the following vehicle and/or object tracks within 10 nm of TWA flight 800 just before the accident (see figure 25): A U.S. Navy P-3 antisubmarine airplane was less than 3 nm south-southwest of flight 800 at an altitude of about 20,000 feet msl, moving to the southwest at more than 250 knots ground speed) A U.S. Navy P-3 antisubmarine airplane was less than 3 nm south-southwest of TMA flight 800 at an altitude of ebout 20,000 feet msl, moving to the southwest at more than 250 knots ground speed) USAir (now USAirways) flight 217 was about 3 nm south-southwest of TwA flight 800, descending through an altit of about 21,700 feet msl and moving northward. USAir (now USAirways) flight 217 was about 3 nm south-southwest of TMA flight 800, descending through an altitude of about 21,700 feet msl and moving northward. TuA flight 900 was about 9 nm vest of TuA flight 800
 at an altitude of about 19,000 f
 mal, moving Lo the east-northeast. TWA flight 900 was about 9 nm west of TWA flight 800 at an altitude of about 19,000 feet msl, moving to the east northeast. An unidentified (primary radar) track was recorded less than 3 nm south-southeast of TwA flight 800, moving southwest about 30 knots ground speed, consistent with the spe of a boat An unidentified (primary radar) track was recorded less than 3 nm south-southeast of TWA flight BB0, moving southwest about 30 knots ground speed, consistent with the speed of a boat. An unidentified (primary radar) track was recorded about 5 m west of TMA flight 806 moving cast-southcast about 15 knots ground speed, consistent with the speed of a boat. An unidentified (primary radar) track was recorded about 5 nn west of TMA flight 800 noving east-southeast about 15 knots ground speed, consistent with the speed of a boat. An unidentified (primary radar) track was recorded about 5 nm west-nor of TwA flight 800, moving to the south-southwest about 12 knots ground speed, consistent with the speed of a heat. An unidentified (primary radar) track was recorded about 5 nm west-northwest of TMA flight 800, moving to the south-southwest about 12 knots ground speed, consistent with the speed of a boat.

An unicentified (primary radar) track was recorded about 6 nm northwest of TWA flight 800, moving to the southeast about 20 knots ground speed consistent with the speed of a boat.

The radar data also showed several isolated primary returns not associated with any track. (As previously noted, primary radar returns are often recorded from surfaces other than airplane surfaces.)

The Safety bond's examination of all of the available radar data revealed no sequence of primary or secondary radar returns that intersected TMA filght 800s position at any time, nor did it reveal any radar returns consistent with a missile or other projectile traveling toward the accident airplane. No secondary radar returns were received from TMA filght 800 after 2051:12; however, after 2051:12; numerous new primary radar returns appeared near the accident airplane's last recorded radar position, some of which were visible for up to 20 minutes after the last secondary radar return was received from the accident airplane. The primary radar returns that appeared near the accident airplane after 2051:12 were recorded largely in two areas of dense concentration, located about 1 to 1/2 alles east-northeast and 1/2 to 2 1/2 miles northeast of the last secondary radar return, respectively

An unidentified (primary radar) track was recorded about 6 mm northwest of TiGA flight 800, moving to the southwast about 28 knots ground speed, consistent with the speed of a boat.

The radam data also shound several isolated primary returns not associated with any track. (As previously noted, primary radam returns are often recorded from surfaces other than airplane surfaces.)

The Safety Board's examination of all of the available radar data revealed no sequence of primary or accondary radar returns south at interacted TWA Hight BMS position at any time, did it reveals any radar returns consistent with a missile or other projectile traveling toward the accident airplane secondary radar returns were received from TWA flight BMS after 2011;21; however, after to secondary radar returns were received from TWA flight BMS after 2011;22; however, after the secondary radar returns were received from TWA flight BMS after 2011;22; however, after the secondary radar returns were received from TWA flight BMS after 2011;22; however, after the secondary radar returns were received from TWA flight BMS after 2011;22; however, after the secondary radar returns were received from TWA flight BMS after 2011;22; however, after the secondary radar returns were received from TWA flight BMS after 2011;22; however, after the secondary radar returns were received from TWA flight BMS after 2011;22; however, after the secondary radar returns were received from TWA flight BMS after 2011;22; however, after the secondary radar returns were received from TWA flight BMS after 2011;22; however, after the secondary radar returns were received from TWA flight BMS after 2011;22; however, after the secondary radar returns were received from TWA flight BMS after 2011;22; however, after the secondary radar returns were received from TWA flight BMS after 2011;22; however, after the secondary radar returns were received from TWA flight BMS after the second returns were received from TWA flight BMS after the second returns were received from TWA flight BMS after the second returns were received from TWA flight BMS after the second returns were received from TWA flight BMS after the second returns were received from TWA flight BMS after the second returns were received from TWA flight BMS after the second returns were received from the second returns were received from twere the second returns were re

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The final document is an excerpt from the conclusions of the official aircraft accident report regarding the inflight breakup of TWA Flight 800 over the Atlantic Ocean. The report was conducted by the National Transportation Survey Board. Please read the document carefully.

Conclusions	306	Aircraft Accident Report	Conclusions	396	Aircraft Accident Report
3.1 Findings			3.1 Findings		
and off-duty time prescribe	ed by Federal regulation wioral conditions that	ualified and had received the trainin, s. No evidence indicated any might have adversely affected the ht.	g and off-duty time prescribed by preexisting medical or behavior flight crew's performance duri	by Federal regulations. bral conditions that mig ing the accident flight.	th have adversely affected the
2. The airplane was certifi regulations and approved TM		spatched in accordance with Federal	but there were no significant	, there were light wind	is and scattered clouds in the area, ons that might have disrupted the
		inds and scattered clouds in the area tions that might have disrupted the			nitiated by a preexisting condition
<ol> <li>The in flight breakup of resulting in a structural f</li> </ol>		initiated by a preexisting condition	5. by a bomb or a missile strike.		of TWA flight 800 was not initiated
		initiated by a bomb or a missile	<ol><li>The fuel/air vapor in the u flammable at the time of the a</li></ol>		's center wing fuel tank was
<ol><li>The fuel/air vapor in th flammable at the time of th</li></ol>		800's center wing fuel tank was	<ol> <li>A fuel/air explosion ****** been capable of generating suf</li> </ol>		el tank of TWA flight 800 would have are to break apart the tank.
capable of generating suffi 8. The witness observations	cient internal pressure	ere not related to a missile, and the	from the accident airplane in	light reported by most o crippled flight during ne witnesses' observatio	of these witnesses was burning fuel some portion of the postexplosion ons of one or more fireballs were of
airplane in crippled flight	during some portion of servations of one or mo	s was burning fuel from the accident the postexplosion preimpact breakup re fireballs were of the airplane's	9. The TWA flight 800 in-fligh center wing fuel tank.	nt breakup was initiated	I by a fuel/air explosion in the
9. The TWA flight 800 in-fl center wing fuel tank.	ight breakup was initia	ted by a fuel/air explosion in the	to be electrically unbonded ma ignition hazards created by st	y not provide adequate	
to be electrically unbonded	l may not provide adequa static electricity gen	ss than 3 inches long in any direction te protection against potential erated by lightning or other ccident Report	high-energy discharges.		
			Conclusions	308	Aircraft Accident Report
			3.2 Probable Cause		
Conclusions	308	Aircraft Accident Report	The National Transportation Saf		
3.2 Probable Cause					WA flight 800 accident was an ng from ignition of the flammable
flight 800 accident was an e	explosion of the center w	that the probable cause of the TWA wing fuel tank (CWT), resulting from ank. The source of ignition energy for	investigation, the most likely	ed with certainty, but, was a short circuit out	ource of ignition energy for the , of the sources evaluated by the tside of the CWT that allowed as according with the fuel quantity

indication system.
, Contributing factors to the accident
were the design and certification concept that fuel tank explosions could be prevented
solely by precluding all ignition sources and the design and certification of the Boeing
74 with host sources located beneath the CNT with no nemis to reduce the heat
transferred into the CNT or to render the fuel vapor in the tank nonflammable

flight 800 accident was an explosion of the center wing fuel tank (OUT), resulting from ignition of the flammable fuel/air mixture in the tank. The source of ignition energy for the explosion could not be determined with certainty, but, of the sources evaluated by the investigation, the most likely was a short circuit outside of the CUT that allowed excessive voltage to enter it through electrical wiring associated with the fuel quantity indication system. Contributing factors to the accident were the design and certification concept that fuel tank explosions could be prevented solely by precluding all ignition sources and the design and certification of the Event the design rate certification of the Event the CWT or to render the fuel vapor in the tank norflammable.

## Dependent variables

We would now like to ask you for your beliefs about TWA Flight 800. For each of the statements below and on the following pages, please indicate how likely or unlikely you think it is that the statement is true.

A mechanical failure caused the explosion of TWA Flight 800.

- Very unlikely [6]
- Somewhat unlikely [5]
- Slightly unlikely [4]
- Slightly likely [3]
- Somewhat likely [2]
- Very likely [1]

The U.S. government was involved in the explosion of TWA Flight 800.

- Very unlikely [1]
- Somewhat unlikely [2]
- Slightly unlikely [3]
- Slightly likely [4]
- Somewhat likely [5]
- Very likely [6]

TWA Flight 800 was shot down by a missile fired by the U.S. military.

- Very unlikely [1]
- Somewhat unlikely [2]

- Slightly unlikely [3]
- Slightly likely [4]
- Somewhat likely [5]
- Very likely [6]

The government thoroughly investigated the crash of Flight 800 and determined its true cause.

- Very unlikely [6]
- Somewhat unlikely [5]
- Slightly unlikely [4]
- Slightly likely [3]
- Somewhat likely [2]
- Very likely [1]

The government is covering up the true cause of the explosion of TWA Flight 800 from the public.

- Very unlikely [1]
- Somewhat unlikely [2]
- Slightly unlikely [3]
- Slightly likely [4]
- Somewhat likely [5]
- Very likely [6]

## Testing H2 as a difference-in-differences estimate

As noted in the main text, our second hypothesis predicted that the difference in conspiracy beliefs between the redacted and unredacted conditions would be greater among individuals with high conspiracy predispositions than those with low predispositions.

Tables 2 and A2 estimate the following model:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \text{redacted} + \beta_2 * \text{unredacted} + \beta_3 * \text{highconspiracy} + \beta_4 * \text{redactedXhighconspiracy} + \beta_5 * \text{unredactedXhighconspiracy}$$
(1)

We wish to calculate the following difference-in-differences estimate, which represents the difference in redaction effects (relative to the baseline condition, which is the excluded category in the model above) between low- and high-predisposition participants:

(Effect of redacted text on high-conspiracy subjects - effect of unredacted text on high-conspiracy subjects) - (Effect of redacted text on low-conspiracy subjects - effect of unredacted text on lowconspiracy subjects)

This quantity of interest can be reduced to what is reported in the auxiliary row in the tables as follows:

$$= \left(\underbrace{(\beta_1 + \beta_4)}_{\text{Redacted/HC}} - \underbrace{(\beta_2 + \beta_5)}_{\text{Unredacted/HC}}\right) - (\underbrace{\beta_1}_{\text{Redacted/LC}} - \underbrace{\beta_2}_{\text{Unredacted/LC}})$$

$$= (\beta_1 - \beta_2) + (\beta_4 - \beta_5) - (\beta_1 - \beta_2)$$

$$= \beta_4 - \beta_5$$
(2)

## Table A1: Respondent characteristics

## (a) Study 1

	Control	Unredacted	Redacted	Total
Age				
18-29	48%	46%	45%	46%
30-39	27%	28%	26%	27%
40-59	21%	22%	26%	23%
60+	4%	3%	3%	3%
Gender				
Female	49%	50%	56%	52%
Male	51%	50%	44%	48%
Education				
High school or less	10%	10%	9%	10%
Some college/associate degree	41%	40%	41%	41%
Bachelor's degree	37%	36%	36%	36%
Graduate degree	12%	14%	14%	14%
Race				
Nonwhite	21%	19%	21%	20%
White	79%	81%	79%	80%
Party				
Democrat	39%	38%	45%	41%
Republican	19%	19%	14%	18%
Independent/something else	42%	43%	41%	42%
Ν	835	852	837	2524

## (b) Study 2

	Control	Unredacted	Redacted	Total
Age				
18-29	46%	44%	44%	44%
30-39	30%	30%	32%	31%
40-59	21%	23%	20%	21%
60+	4%	3%	4%	4%
Gender				
Female	52%	50%	55%	52%
Male	48%	50%	45%	48%
Education				
High school or less	9%	9%	11%	10%
Some college/associate degree	38%	38%	39%	39%
Bachelor's degree	39%	39%	37%	38%
Graduate degree	14%	13%	13%	14%
Race				
Nonwhite	16%	22%	20%	20%
White	84%	78%	80%	80%
Party				
Democrat	43%	42%	44%	43%
Republican	18%	19%	18%	18%
Independent/something else	39%	39%	37%	38%
N	835	839	841	2515

Table A2: Response timing by condition

(a) Stu	dv 1	

	Stimulus (seconds)	Mech. failure	Govt. involved	Shot down	Thorough investigation	Govt. coverup	Average beliefs
Redacted	$105.15^{**}$ (8.16)	$-2.37^{**}$ (0.59)	-0.06 (0.23)	$0.27 \\ (0.24)$	-0.07 (0.25)	-0.04 (0.22)	$-0.40^{*}$ (0.20)
Unredacted	$107.28^{**}$ (8.31)	$-2.07^{**}$ (0.61)	-0.31 (0.21)	-0.25 (0.21)	$0.04 \\ (0.25)$	-0.13 (0.21)	$-0.52^{*}$ (0.20)
Control mean	$179.68^{**}$ (4.97)	$15.39^{**}$ (0.43)	$6.19^{**}$ (0.16)	$5.28^{**}$ (0.15)	$7.12^{**}$ (0.17)	$5.58^{**}$ (0.15)	$7.87^{**}$ (0.14)
Redacted – unredacted	-2.14 (9.29)	-0.31 (0.58)	$0.26 \\ (0.22)$	$0.52^{*}$ (0.24)	-0.11 (0.26)	$0.10 \\ (0.21)$	0.11 (0.20)
Ν	2493	2512	2512	2509	2501	2500	2478

## (b) Study 2

	Stimulus (seconds)	Mech. failure	Govt. involved	Shot down	Thorough investigation	Govt. coverup	Average beliefs
Redacted	$112.82^{**}$ (7.72)	-1.15+ (0.66)	-0.21 (0.19)	-0.26 (0.17)	-0.31+ (0.18)	-0.18 (0.20)	$-0.46^{*}$ (0.19)
Unredacted	$104.53^{**}$ (7.65)	$-1.87^{**}$ (0.59)	-0.27 (0.19)	-0.23 (0.17)	-0.07 (0.23)	-0.32 (0.19)	$-0.55^{**}$ (0.18)
Control mean	$179.66^{**}$ (4.68)	$14.35^{**}$ (0.42)	$5.78^{**}$ (0.14)	$4.88^{**}$ (0.13)	$6.59^{**}$ (0.13)	$5.26^{**}$ (0.15)	$7.39^{**}$ (0.13)
Redacted – unredacted	8.29 (8.62)	$0.72 \\ (0.66)$	$0.05 \\ (0.18)$	-0.03 (0.24)	-0.24 (0.22)	$0.14 \\ (0.18)$	$0.10 \\ (0.19)$
Ν	2493	2511	2507	2511	2507	2502	2486

+ p < 0.10, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01. OLS estimates with robust standard errors. Response times trimmed to the 99<sup>th</sup> percentile of the distribution by question due to extreme outliers. Timing for outcome variables only considered for non-missing responses.

### Study 2: Participants, design, and procedure

To address the concern that no reason was given for the redactions in Study 1, the instructions provided to respondents in the redaction condition in Study 2 were modified to include a realistic rationale (e.g., Landay and Doyle 2014; Jansen 2015):

(Note: The documents you are going to read were redacted by the government, which stated that the redactions were necessary to avoid revealing details of airline procedures and military operations that would threaten aviation safety and national security.)

This rationale is substantively plausible given the content of the stimulus documents, which include, for instance, information on correspondence between commercial aircraft and air traffic control (which could be thought to contain sensitive information on airline procedures) and radar data that describes the position of an antisubmarine airplane (further details on its status or procedures could be thought to be classified).

After completing the survey, respondents were debriefed that the redactions and the provided rationale were fictitious, though the documents they read were genuine. All other materials and procedures in Study 2 were identical to Study 1, including the content of the stimuli and the wording and construction of the dependent variables.

A new set of Amazon Mechanical Turk participants were recruited to complete Study 2 on the Qualtrics online survey platform.<sup>1</sup> The study was conducted from August 20–21, 2015.<sup>2</sup> By construction, the sample size was equivalent to Study 1 (n = 2515). The demographic characteristics (48% male, 80% white, median age group 30–39, 52% bachelor's degree or higher) and political leanings of the sample (43% identify as Democrats, 18% as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Those who had previously taken part in Study 1 were excluded by a script that checked their Mechanical Turk ID against a list of past participants.

 $<sup>^{2}</sup>$ A piece of debris was identified as part of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 several weeks before the study was conducted. In this sense, the context of the studies was similar (Study 1 was conducted during the initial search for wreckage from the flight).

Republicans, 38% as independents or something else) were also virtually identical (see Table A1 above for further details).

## Study 2: Results

As in Study 1, we again find strong support for our first hypothesis. Even when a rationale was provided for the presence of redactions, respondents exposed to redacted documents reported higher conspiracy beliefs (mean=2.50, 95% CI: 2.41–2.59) than those exposed to unredacted documents (mean=2.35, 95% CI: 2.27–2.44; t = 2.29, p < .05). Our research question about the effect of exposure to the documents relative to controls yields somewhat different results, however. Unlike in Study 1, average conspiracy beliefs decreased relative to controls (mean=2.64, 95% CI: 2.55–2.73) in both the unredacted and redacted conditions (t = 4.62, p < .01 and t = 2.29, p < .05, respectively).<sup>3</sup> In other words, the presence of redactions partially offset but did not eliminate the misperception-reducing effect of exposure to the information in the documents.<sup>4</sup> The treatment effects for Study 2 are analyzed more systematically in Table A3, which follows the structure of Table 1 above. The key quantity for each dependent variable is the difference in effects between the redacted and unredacted conditions, which is presented in a row at the bottom at the table. This quantity is positive and significant at the p < .05 level for the average belief measure as well as three of the five dependent variables in the scale, indicating that conspiracy beliefs were higher overall on average and for a majority of the individual outcome measures when redactions were present.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, a preregistered timing analysis mirroring the exploratory findings from Study 1 above again provides no evidence that respondents in the redaction condition differed in how long they spent longer reading the

 $<sup>^{3}</sup>$ As described above, the comparison between the redacted condition and the controls estimates the the *joint* effect of exposure to corrective information *and* redactions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Note: We again find no difference in redaction effects by conspiracy predispositions and thus omit discussion of those results here to conserve space (see Table A4 below).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>The differences we observe in conspiracy adherence mirror Figure 1 above. Overall, 29% of respondents in the control condition had an average response above the outcome measures' midpoint (95% CI: 26–32%) compared with 24% of those in the redacted condition (95% CI: 21–26%) and 20% in the unredacted condition (95% CI: 17–23%).

	Mech. failure	Govt. involved	Shot down	Thorough investigation	Govt. coverup	Average beliefs
Redacted documents	$-0.19^{**}$ (0.07)	$-0.15^{*}$ (0.07)	$-0.24^{**}$ (0.07)	$0.00 \\ (0.07)$	-0.13+ (0.08)	$-0.15^{*}$ (0.06)
Unredacted documents	$-0.28^{**}$ (0.07)	$-0.32^{**}$ (0.07)	$-0.39^{**}$ (0.07)	-0.10 (0.07)	$-0.31^{**}$ (0.08)	$-0.29^{**}$ (0.06)
Control mean	$2.63^{**}$ (0.05)	$2.70^{**}$ (0.05)	$2.59^{**}$ (0.05)	$2.50^{**}$ (0.05)	$2.78^{**}$ (0.05)	$2.64^{**}$ (0.05)
Redaction effect (H1):						
Redacted – unredacted	$0.09 \\ (0.07)$	$0.16^{*}$ (0.07)	$0.15^{*}$ (0.07)	$0.10 \\ (0.07)$	$0.18^{*}$ (0.07)	$0.14^{*}$ (0.06)
N	2513	2509	2513	2509	2504	2488

Table A3: Redaction effects on TWA Flight 800 conspiracy beliefs

+  $p < 0.10, \ ^* p < 0.05, \ ^{**} p < 0.01.$  OLS estimates with robust standard errors.

stimuli or answering outcome measures (see Table A2 above).<sup>6</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Unlike in Study 1, respondents made fewer relevant comments in the redacted versus the unredacted condition. However, the difference was substantively very small (1.2% versus 2.5%; t = 2.00, p < .05). Given that only 31 respondents in either condition made such comments, the weight of the evidence based on response time data from the full sample is still consistent with the interpretation that respondent attention and engagement was equivalent between the redacted and unredacted conditions.

	Mech. failure	Govt. involved	Shot down	Thorough investigation	Govt. coverup	Average beliefs
Redacted documents	$-0.25^{**}$ (0.09)	$-0.22^{**}$ (0.09)	$-0.26^{**}$ (0.09)	-0.11 (0.09)	$-0.21^{*}$ (0.09)	$-0.22^{**}$ (0.08)
Unredacted documents	$-0.29^{**}$ (0.09)	$-0.31^{**}$ (0.09)	$-0.38^{**}$ (0.09)	-0.09 (0.08)	$-0.30^{**}$ (0.09)	$-0.28^{**}$ (0.08)
High conspiracy predisp.	$0.57^{**}$ (0.10)	$0.97^{**}$ (0.10)	$0.91^{**}$ (0.10)	$0.65^{**}$ (0.10)	$0.94^{**}$ (0.11)	$0.80^{**}$ (0.09)
Redacted $\times$ high consp.	$0.08 \\ (0.14)$	$0.08 \\ (0.14)$	-0.02 (0.14)	$0.20 \\ (0.13)$	$0.10 \\ (0.15)$	$0.09 \\ (0.12)$
Unredacted $\times$ high consp.	$0.03 \\ (0.14)$	-0.03 (0.14)	-0.02 (0.14)	-0.03 (0.13)	-0.02 (0.15)	-0.02 (0.12)
Control mean	$2.37^{**}$ (0.07)	$2.25^{**}$ (0.06)	$2.18^{**}$ (0.06)	$2.20^{**}$ (0.06)	$2.35^{**}$ (0.07)	$2.27^{**}$ (0.06)
Difference in redaction effec	ts (H2):					
Redacted $\times$ high consp. – unredacted $\times$ high consp.	0.06 (0.13)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.11 \ (0.13) \end{array}$	$0.01 \\ (0.13)$	0.23+ (0.13)	$0.12 \\ (0.14)$	0.11 (0.12)
N	2510	2506	2510	2506	2501	2485

Table A4: Redaction effects by conspiracy predispositions (Study 2)  $\,$ 

+  $p < 0.10, \ ^* p < 0.05, \ ^{**} p < 0.01.$  OLS estimates with robust standard errors.

Item	Location
A. Hypotheses	
State specific objectives or hypotheses.	Page 3
B. Subjects and context	
Report eligibility and exclusion criteria for partici- pants.	Pages 2–3. Mechanical Turk worker were ineligible for Study 1 if they ha participated in a pretest of the study of for Study 2 if they had participated i the pretest or Study 1.
How were participants contacted for recruitment? Were incentives offered?	Page 5, appendix (respondents from Mechanical Turk were offered incentive to participate)
Report recruitment dates defining the periods of recruitment and when the experiments were con- ducted.	Page 5, appendix
Describe settings and locations where the data were collected.	Page 5, appendix
If there is a survey: Provide response rate and how it was calculated.	N/A; studies conducted on Mechanica Turk.
C. Allocation method	
Report details of the procedure used to generate the assignment sequence (e.g., randomization proce- dures).	Random assignment was generated by the Qualtrics software platform.
If random assignment used, report details of proce- dure (e.g., any restrictions, blocking).	N/A (simple random assignment)
If random assignment used, to help detect errors such as problems in the procedure used for random as- signment or failure to properly account for blocking, provide a table (in text or appendix) showing base- line means and standard deviations for demographic characteristics and other pretreatment measures (if collected) by experimental group.	See Table A1 above. There is some evidence of imbalance by gender and part in Study 1 and race in Study 2, but a we note in footnote 11, our results ar unchanged if we control for these fact tors and the other respondent charac- teristics listed in the table.

Table A5: Compliance with JEPS reporting standards

(continued on next page)

Item	Location
Describe blinding.	Subjects were blind to which condition they were in.
D. Treatments	
Provide a detailed description of the interventions in each treatment condition as well as a description of	Pages 5–6, appendix
the control group. State how and when manipulations or interventions were administered.	See page 6, appendix; manipulation was random assignment by Qualtrics into experimental condition
Report the number of repetitions of the experimental task and the group rotation protocol. Report the or- dering of treatments for within-subject designs. Any piggybacking of other protocols should be reported. Report any use of experienced subjects or subjects used in more than one session or treatment.	N/A
Report time span: How long did each experiment last? How many sessions were subjects expected to attend? If there were multiple sessions, how much time passed between them?	Single online session
Report total number of sessions conducted and num- ber of subjects used in each session. Report whether deception was used.	One individual session for each respon- dent (online) No
Report treatment fidelity: Evidence on whether the treatment was delivered as intended.	Yes (online platform; no known techni- cal errors)
Were incentives given? If so, what were they and how were they administered?	Payments to participants via Mechani- cal Turk platform
E. Results	
1. Outcome measures and covariates Provide precise definitions of all primary and sec- ondary measures and covariates.	Appendix
Clearly state which of the outcomes and subgroup analyses were specified prior to the experiment and which were the result of exploratory analysis.	All specified prior to study except as noted in the text

(continued on next page)

Item	Location
2. CONSORT participant flow diagram	
Number of subjects initially assessed for eligibility for the study.	3,003 (Study 1), 2,816 (Study 2)
Exclusions prior to random assignment and reasons for the exclusions.	479 participants dropped out of Study 1 prior to beginning the survey (i.e., a the consent form) or were excluded du to participation in a pretest; 301 participants dropped out of Study 2 on the consent page or were excluded due to participating in Study 1 or the pretest
Number of subjects initially assigned to each exper- imental group.	Study 1: 835 control, 852 unredacted 837 redacted; Study 2: 835 control, 837 unredacted, 841 redacted
The proportion of each group that received its allo- cated intervention and the reasons why subjects did not receive the intended intervention.	N/A (all participants received allocated interventions as far as we know)
The number of subjects in each group that dropped out or for other reasons do not have outcome data.	See discussion of missing outcome data below
The number of subjects in each group that are in- cluded in the statistical analysis, and the reasons for any exclusions. 3. Statistical analysis	No other exclusions
Researchers will conduct statistical analysis and re- port their results in the manner they deem appropri- ate. We recommend that this reporting include the following:	
Note whether the level of analysis differs from level of randomization and estimate appropriate standard errors.	N/A (individual-level randomization and analysis)
If there is attrition, discuss reasons for attrition and examine whether attrition is related to pretreatment variables.	No known attrition (short, single session studies)
Report other missing data (not outcome variables):	

(continued on next page)

Item	Location
-Frequency or percentages of missing data by group.	N/A (see below for outcome data; treatment assignment observed for all respondents; no other control variables used in analysis)
-Methods for addressing missing data (e.g., listwise deletion, imputation methods).	Listwise deletion
-For each primary and secondary outcome and for each subgroup, provide summary of the number of cases deleted from each analysis and rationale for dropping the cases.	Cases dropped due to missing data by outcome measure and study: mechan- ical failure (S1: 3, S2: 2), government involved (S1: 3, S2: 6), shot down (S1: 5, S2: 2), thorough investigation (S1: 13, S2: 6), government coverup (S1: 15, S2: 11), average beliefs (S1: 34, S2: 27).
For survey experiments: Describe in detail any weighting procedures that are used. F. Other information	No weights used
Was the experiment reviewed and approved by an IRB?	Yes
If the experimental protocol was registered, where and how can the filing be accessed?	Pages 3, 10
What was the source of funding? What was the role of the funders in the analysis of the experiment? Were there any restrictions or arrangements regard- ing what findings could be published? Are there any funding sources where conflict of interest might be an issue?	Acknowledgments (Dartmouth College Office of Undergraduate Research) No
If a replication data set is available, provide the URL.	Replication data will be made available at the <i>Journal of Experimental Political</i> <i>Science</i> website after publication.

(Note: All page numbers above correspond to the non-typeset text that will be made available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/redactions-conspiracy.pdf.)

# References

- Jansen, Bart. 2015. "Watchdog: TSA gave expedited screening to convicted felon." USA Today, March 19, 2015. Downloaded September 1, 2015 from http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/03/19/ tsa-pre-check-felon/25034075/.
- Landay, Jonathan S., and Michael Doyle. 2014. "Obama officials, Senate intelligence panel spar over deletions from torture report." McClatchyDC, August 4, 2014. Downloaded September 1, 2015 from http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/ national/national-security/article24771430.html.