

Online Appendix

1 Data Construction

The manuscript details the process through which we collected, cleaned, and combined the various datasets used in the analyses. Here we note some additional details on cleaning and manually checking merged data. When merging in the OPM employment data to the lobbying disclosure data acquired from Legistorm, we followed a tiered process.

First, we identified lobbyists with agency backgrounds through examining individual lobbying disclosure reports. The ‘covered’ field in these reports contains lobbyist-submitted professional background data if they were a ‘covered’ employee, as delineated in the Lobbying Disclosure Act. This field is unstructured text, so we first ran a string extraction algorithm to detect common agencies. For instance, the field might contain “Assistant Sec. of Education W. Bush” or “Assist. Sec. Dep. of Ed. W Bush”. We would assign this person to the Department of Education, appointed under George W. Bush. We also relied on Legistorm’s identification of previous employment of lobbyists, checking it against the covered field. For individuals with a non-empty covered field but with no agency identified information, we manually checked all covered fields to ensure our algorithm did not miss individuals with agency backgrounds.

One of our priorities was to generate as large a possible universe of potential matches, to mitigate the risk of false positives and negatives. This means that in the lobbying data we wanted to be overly-generous in finding individuals who possibly worked in a bureaucratic agency. Thus, our merge process first used additional biographical information acquired by Legistorm, which identifies some lobbyists who previously worked in the federal government. This subset is nonrandom and Legistorm was more likely to have found very prominent individuals. Our next step was to use the raw LDA reports to identify additional executive branch revolvers. These LDA reports mandate that covered employees enter their covered position/agency into this field as plain text. We then did a variety of string extraction and matching algorithms on the covered status field in the reports, searching for strings related

to executive branch experience.²⁵ We manually examined an additional 52,000 fields of this raw text to capture as many possible lobbyists who *might* have previously been bureaucrats as possible.

We then merged individuals from this universe of potential revolving door lobbyists to the OPM data based on first name, last name and two-letter OPM code. We manually checked any duplicate matches. We then merged unmatched lobbyists by agency and last name, again manually checking matches. We manually looked for the remaining lobbyists with agency backgrounds in the OPM data, including looking up previous work experience on the internet to inform matches. We also manually checked roughly 20% of these matches to verify they were correct. We also manually looked up lobbyists identified by Legistorm as having agency experience but were not yet matched to the OPM data to ensure as little missingness as possible. Through this process we are confident to have excluded any false positive matches and, as much as possible, false negatives.

2 Additional Descriptives

This section lists additional descriptives of the underlying lobbying data. Figure A1 plots the total number of lobbyists by agency (limited to the top 25 agencies by lobbyists) and Figure A2 presents a similar plot by issue area.

3 Additional Results

In Table A1 we report results from the same cross-sectional specification as Table 1 but as a linear probability model instead of a logistic regression. Substantive conclusions from this specification choice do not meaningfully change when compared to the results from the logistic regression. Coefficients are naturally smaller since they can be interpreted as raw increases in probability rather than log-odds.

In Table A2 we report results using the disaggregated version of the *Agency Lobbying*

²⁵For example, a field could contain “Assistant to Deputy Sec of Agriculture USDA.” However, many fields are less structured than this. Examples and more details on this process are in the appendix.




Figure A1: Lobbyists by Agency

Note: This figure plots the top 25 agencies by numbers of employees who become lobbyists in our dataset. The text at the end of each bar is how many lobbyists as a percentage of the agency's possible covered employees register as lobbyists during our period of study.




Figure A2: Lobbyists by Issue Area

Note: This figure plots the number of total lobbyists in our dataset by issue area.

Table A1: Probability of Becoming Lobbyist – OLS

	Pr(Become Lobbyist)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Professional Position	0.0499*** (0.0129)	0.0565*** (0.0136)	0.0499*** (0.0129)	0.0565*** (0.0136)
Administrative Position	0.0410*** (0.0085)	0.0449*** (0.0090)	0.0410*** (0.0085)	0.0449*** (0.0090)
Agency Tenure	0.0005 (0.0004)	0.0005 (0.0005)	0.0005 (0.0004)	0.0005 (0.0005)
log Pay	0.0180*** (0.0057)	0.0150*** (0.0057)	0.0180*** (0.0057)	0.0150*** (0.0057)
Career SES	-0.0275 (0.0251)	-0.0295 (0.0249)	-0.0275 (0.0251)	-0.0295 (0.0249)
Non-Career SES	0.1799*** (0.0461)	0.1852*** (0.0459)	0.1799*** (0.0461)	0.1852*** (0.0459)
Party Difference	0.0191*** (0.0070)	0.0171** (0.0071)	0.0191*** (0.0070)	0.0171** (0.0071)
DC, VA, MD	0.0679*** (0.0155)	0.0813*** (0.0158)	0.0679*** (0.0155)	0.0813*** (0.0158)
Executive Office of the President	0.0822*** (0.0177)		0.0822*** (0.0177)	
PAS Appointee	0.0838*** (0.0173)	0.0919*** (0.0184)	0.0838*** (0.0173)	0.0919*** (0.0184)
Schedule C Appointment	0.0204 (0.0131)	0.0212 (0.0140)	0.0204 (0.0131)	0.0212 (0.0140)
log Econ. Significant Rules (Agency)	0.0258*** (0.0064)	0.0182** (0.0087)	0.0258*** (0.0064)	0.0182** (0.0087)
log Econ. Significant Rules (Issue Area)	-0.0043 (0.0072)	-0.0018 (0.0065)	-0.0043 (0.0072)	-0.0018 (0.0065)
log Lobby Revenue by Agency	-0.0003 (0.0008)	0.0007 (0.0010)	-0.0003 (0.0008)	0.0007 (0.0010)
Agency Firm Lobbyists	0.0023 (0.0027)	-0.0060* (0.0034)	0.0023 (0.0027)	-0.0060* (0.0034)
Total Agency Lobbyists	-0.0004 (0.0013)	0.0005 (0.0015)	-0.0004 (0.0013)	0.0005 (0.0015)
Grants / Outlays	-0.0395** (0.0201)	-0.0727*** (0.0228)	-0.0395** (0.0201)	-0.0727*** (0.0228)
Observations	6,598	6,598	6,598	6,598
Year fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Agency fixed effects		✓		✓

The unit of analysis is the individual federal employee in their last year in government. The outcome is a 0 or 1 indicator for whether the individual becomes a lobbyist.

Activity factor score variable. This measure is comprised of three variables – how many lobbyists from an agency are currently registered, how many are firm lobbyists, and how much lobbying revenue they generate. Including these as separate variables, rather than a factor score, does not produce any meaningful relationships. This aligns with the noisy relationship associated with the factor score in the main results.

In Table A3 we assess the sensitivity to the agency activity models to lagged independent variables. Ex ante, it is not obvious which time period of agency activity should produce variation in the propensity for individuals to enter lobbying. By using lagged indicators of agency activity there is little overall change to the interpretation of the results. However, the agency activity factor score is now consistently positive slightly more precisely estimated. This may suggest that the previous year’s (or two years’) lobbying activity is a stronger signal to potential revolvers than the contemporary trends in the industry. In the final two models, we create an average for the amount of rulemaking activity within the agency or issue area the individual worked over the last three years of their careers. We find similar results to the other specifications, with the economically significant rulemaking positive and statistically significant in the agency fixed effects models. This table also includes, in models 7 and 8, an alternative measurement of agency activity – the **Total Budget** spent on grants.

Table A4 displays the full models used to create Figure ???. These models interact the political variables with a dummy variable for a) different party in power or b) different administration in power. The former is coded based on the party of the president when the bureaucrat began their government service – i.e., if they began under George W. Bush and continued to service under Obama, this would take the value of 1. In the latter, the same construction is used but only accounts for different administrations, not the party of the administration in power. The results show that party differences increase the probability of lobbying for Schedule C appointees, and there is no change based on administration difference.

In Table A5 we re-run the main results from the manuscript but with different clustering for standard errors, either by year or by agency. These results show little difference from the

Table A2: Probability of Becoming Lobbyist

	Pr(Become Lobbyist)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Professional Position	1.535** (0.6331)	1.633** (0.6556)	1.242** (0.6147)	1.245** (0.6242)
Administrative Position	1.398** (0.6029)	1.492** (0.6171)	1.175** (0.5901)	1.247** (0.5970)
Agency Tenure	0.0028 (0.0078)	0.0043 (0.0083)	-0.0075 (0.0073)	-0.0039 (0.0076)
log Pay	0.7649** (0.3773)	0.7148* (0.3991)	0.7796** (0.3874)	0.7416* (0.4023)
Career SES	-0.4730 (0.4062)	-0.5588 (0.4125)	-0.6589* (0.3812)	-0.7215* (0.3814)
Non-Career SES	1.360*** (0.3057)	1.423*** (0.3178)	1.939*** (0.2718)	2.004*** (0.2761)
Party Difference	0.2634** (0.1081)	0.2479** (0.1099)	0.2996*** (0.1024)	0.2719*** (0.1031)
DC, VA, MD	1.836*** (0.6352)	2.155*** (0.6472)	2.295*** (0.6639)	2.706*** (0.6378)
Executive Office of the President	1.258*** (0.2929)		0.7061** (0.2813)	
PAS Appointee	0.9776*** (0.2176)	1.052*** (0.2290)	0.9145*** (0.1935)	0.9815*** (0.2002)
Schedule C Appointment	0.5039** (0.2249)	0.5188** (0.2346)	1.006*** (0.2197)	1.004*** (0.2254)
log Econ. Significant Rules (Agency)	0.3632*** (0.0893)	0.2052** (0.1033)	0.2987*** (0.0813)	0.1890** (0.0934)
log Econ. Significant Rules (Issue Area)	-0.0306 (0.1261)	0.0115 (0.0906)	-0.0429 (0.1212)	0.0101 (0.0825)
log Lobby Revenue by Agency	0.0003 (0.0120)	0.0092 (0.0122)	0.0028 (0.0108)	0.0031 (0.0114)
Agency Firm Lobbyists	0.0318 (0.0410)	-0.0148 (0.0407)	0.0520 (0.0400)	0.0194 (0.0391)
Total Agency Lobbyists	0.0032 (0.0227)	-0.0075 (0.0227)	-0.0145 (0.0219)	-0.0262 (0.0213)
Grants / Outlays	-0.6018* (0.3605)	-0.8309*** (0.3138)	-0.6030* (0.3264)	-0.7444*** (0.2733)
Observations	6,598	5,957	27,842	24,755
Year fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Agency fixed effects		✓		✓
Issue Area fixed effects	✓		✓	

The unit of analysis is the individual federal employee in a given year. The outcome is a 0 or 1 indicator for whether the individual becomes a lobbyist. Agency Lobbying Activity is a factor score of a combination of variables, described in detail in the text. Executive Office of the President dummy variable is absorbed by agency fixed effects.

Table A3: Probability of Becoming Lobbyist – Agency Activity

	Pr(Become Lobbyist)										
	Lag (t-1)	Lag (t-1)	Lag (t-2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	Last 3	(6)	(7)	Total Budget	(8)
Professional Position	1.642*** (0.6313)	1.732*** (0.6559)	1.552** (0.6372)	1.628** (0.6591)	1.525** (0.6340)	1.630** (0.6547)	1.321** (0.5456)	1.435*** (0.5539)			
Administrative Position	1.469** (0.5981)	1.506** (0.6150)	1.429** (0.6042)	1.431** (0.6194)	1.393** (0.6046)	1.489** (0.6166)	1.303** (0.5213)	1.306** (0.5229)			
Agency Tenure	0.0033 (0.0080)	0.0041 (0.0084)	0.0050 (0.0078)	0.0063 (0.0083)	0.0031 (0.0078)	0.0047 (0.0083)	0.0031 (0.0067)	0.0042 (0.0073)			
log Pay	0.7075* (0.3822)	0.7016* (0.4066)	0.7576** (0.3851)	0.7524* (0.4091)	0.7648** (0.3773)	0.7118* (0.3985)	0.9734*** (0.3104)	0.9166*** (0.3277)			
Career SES	-0.4329 (0.4065)	-0.5276 (0.4105)	-0.4148 (0.4053)	-0.5531 (0.4093)	-0.4886 (0.4052)	-0.5654 (0.4115)	-0.4687 (0.4038)	-0.6319 (0.4061)			
Non-Career SES	1.389*** (0.3038)	1.390*** (0.3170)	1.394*** (0.3019)	1.364*** (0.3147)	1.353*** (0.3066)	1.413*** (0.3178)	1.390*** (0.3007)	1.331*** (0.3057)			
Party Difference	0.2706** (0.1093)	0.2477** (0.1119)	0.2406** (0.1091)	0.2288** (0.1112)	0.2571** (0.1083)	0.2419** (0.1100)	0.2286** (0.0957)	0.2095** (0.0978)			
DC, VA, MD	1.665*** (0.6092)	2.008*** (0.6282)	1.694*** (0.6023)	1.943*** (0.6194)	1.801*** (0.6287)	2.108*** (0.6383)	1.620*** (0.3821)	1.829*** (0.4039)			
Executive Office of the President	1.024*** (0.2588)		0.9577*** (0.2574)			1.247*** (0.2864)		0.8676*** (0.2582)			
PAS Appointee	1.027*** (0.2239)	1.085*** (0.2367)	1.002*** (0.2235)	1.078*** (0.2370)	0.9884*** (0.2198)	1.056*** (0.2294)	0.9771*** (0.1969)	0.9451*** (0.2018)			
Schedule C Appointment	0.4751** (0.2298)	0.4703* (0.2418)	0.4306* (0.2302)	0.4681* (0.2406)	0.4995** (0.2247)	0.5241** (0.2352)	0.5658*** (0.2025)	0.4964** (0.2084)			
log Econ. Significant Rules (Agency)	0.2490*** (0.0706)	0.2114*** (0.0795)	0.1025 (0.0712)	0.0252 (0.0760)	0.1083 (0.0708)		0.2748*** (0.0767)	0.3053*** (0.0818)			
log Econ. Significant Rules (Issue Area)	0.0537 (0.0722)	0.0054 (0.0736)	0.1081 (0.0673)	0.0649 (0.0708)	0.0649 (0.0708)		0.0217 (0.0955)	-0.1529** (0.0658)			
Agency Lobbying Activity	0.3667*** (0.0792)	0.1775* (0.0954)	0.3004*** (0.0772)	0.1083 (0.0888)	0.1083 (0.0888)		0.4169*** (0.0865)	0.0293 (0.1246)			
Grants / Outlays	0.0130 (0.2872)	-0.1500 (0.2755)	-0.6031* (0.3149)	-0.7228** (0.3041)	-0.6456* (0.3552)	-0.8049*** (0.3032)					
log Econ. Sign. Rules Last 3 Yrs.					0.3850*** (0.0861)	0.2421** (0.1080)					
log Econ. Sign. Rules Last 3 Yrs. (Issue Area)					-0.1136 (0.1191)	-0.1058 (0.1052)					
log Total Budget							-0.0004 (0.0122)	-0.0234* (0.0122)			
Observations	6,583	5,962	6,582	5,946	6,597	5,956	9,404	8,640			
Year fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			
Agency fixed effects		✓		✓		✓		✓			

The unit of analysis is the individual federal employee in their last year in government. The outcome is a 0 or 1 indicator for whether the individual becomes a lobbyist.




Figure A3: Robustness to Different Lags

Note: This figure plots regressions of the form in Table A3, reporting the coefficients from these models. This specification leaves out the agency lobbying activity variable since it is truncated to begin in 2001 and would limit the sample when dealing with longer lags.

Table A4: Probability of Becoming Lobbyist – Political Indicators Robustness

	Pr(Become Lobbyist)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Party Difference	-0.1348 (0.2152)	-0.2534 (0.2276)				
Appointee	0.2110 (0.2250)	0.6958*** (0.2334)	0.4867*** (0.1795)	1.019*** (0.1987)	0.2340 (0.3171)	0.6550** (0.3297)
Professional Position	1.228** (0.6249)	1.559** (0.6414)	1.238** (0.6263)	1.569** (0.6439)	1.268** (0.6293)	1.601** (0.6458)
Administrative Position	1.192** (0.5907)	1.354** (0.5988)	1.161** (0.5906)	1.323** (0.5993)	1.195** (0.5930)	1.359** (0.6000)
Agency Tenure	0.0075 (0.0082)	0.0078 (0.0088)	-0.0107 (0.0084)	-0.0103 (0.0089)	-0.0100 (0.0085)	-0.0092 (0.0091)
log Pay	1.007*** (0.3297)	0.9812*** (0.3494)	0.8486** (0.3472)	0.8346** (0.3670)	0.8409** (0.3480)	0.8257** (0.3678)
Career SES	-0.5481 (0.4052)	-0.6142 (0.4019)	-0.4288 (0.4053)	-0.4998 (0.4038)	-0.3938 (0.4074)	-0.4523 (0.4062)
DC, VA, MD	1.972*** (0.6261)	2.255*** (0.6452)	1.987*** (0.6258)	2.252*** (0.6438)	1.987*** (0.6270)	2.258*** (0.6448)
log Econ. Significant Rules (Agency)	0.1599** (0.0804)	0.1953* (0.1008)	0.1665** (0.0799)	0.2022** (0.1020)	0.1702** (0.0802)	0.2025** (0.1023)
log Econ. Significant Rules (Issue Area)	-0.0843 (0.1255)	0.0177 (0.0883)	-0.0838 (0.1253)	0.0125 (0.0884)	-0.0796 (0.1253)	0.0149 (0.0885)
Agency Lobbying Activity	0.6066*** (0.0854)	-0.1809 (0.1377)	0.6074*** (0.0858)	-0.1587 (0.1382)	0.6036*** (0.0856)	-0.1693 (0.1384)
Grants / Outlays	-0.5801* (0.3504)	-0.8345*** (0.3082)	-0.5622 (0.3510)	-0.8454*** (0.3112)	-0.5615 (0.3522)	-0.8528*** (0.3124)
Party Difference × Appointee	0.4894** (0.2435)	0.6046** (0.2556)				
Administration Difference			0.7927*** (0.1513)	0.7601*** (0.1539)	0.5261* (0.3150)	0.3738 (0.3312)
Administration Difference × Appointee					0.3070 (0.3247)	0.4407 (0.3391)
Observations	6,599	5,958	6,599	5,958	6,599	5,958
Year fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Agency fixed effects		✓		✓		✓

The unit of analysis is the individual federal employee in their last year in government. The outcome is a 0 or 1 indicator for whether the individual becomes a lobbyist. The Executive Office of the President dummy variable is removed from model 2 since it is absorbed by the agency fixed effects.

main results, which include robust standard errors but no clustering. Table A6 also runs the same specifications as the primary results, but includes a squared term for agency tenure. Holding other variables fixed, the predicted values generated by agency tenure and its square remain noisy and centered around zero, mirroring the results without the quadratic term.

In Table A7 we omit the salary variable from the specification included in the main results. It is possible to imagine that salary is post treatment to other features of an individuals' career that drive them to enter into lobbying in the first place. The results do not change when this variable is omitted, alleviating concerns surrounding potential post-treatment bias.

Table A8 examines whether policy changes that affected the ability for certain officials' post-government lobbying activity ("cooling off" laws) also affected their propensity to become lobbyists. The main policy, the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA)²⁶, took effect late in 2007. Thus, we include a dummy variable for post-2007 and interact it with two different variables: **Very Senior Official** and **Senior Official**, coded in accordance with the law's guidelines. Similarly, the Obama Administration restricted the kinds of lobbying activity its officials could partake in after leaving the administration (essentially limiting some senior officials' ability to contact current White House staff). This variable, **Obama Exec. Order**, captures whether an individual is subject to this executive order. The results show no heterogeneity based on these policy changes.

²⁶<https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/house-bill/2316>

Table A5: Probability of Becoming Lobbyist – SE Clustering

	Pr(Become Lobbyist)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Professional Position	1.535*** (0.5917)	1.633*** (0.6246)	1.535* (0.8525)	1.633* (0.8699)
Administrative Position	1.398*** (0.5018)	1.492*** (0.5303)	1.398* (0.7281)	1.492** (0.7496)
Agency Tenure	0.0028 (0.0089)	0.0043 (0.0084)	0.0028 (0.0108)	0.0043 (0.0124)
log Pay	0.7649** (0.3166)	0.7148** (0.3490)	0.7649 (0.5079)	0.7148 (0.5498)
Career SES	-0.4730 (0.4140)	-0.5588 (0.4396)	-0.4730* (0.2773)	-0.5588* (0.3031)
Non-Career SES	1.360*** (0.3231)	1.423*** (0.3490)	1.360*** (0.2364)	1.423*** (0.2290)
Party Difference	0.2634*** (0.0899)	0.2479*** (0.0814)	0.2634*** (0.0996)	0.2479** (0.1022)
DC, VA, MD	1.836*** (0.4606)	2.155*** (0.4732)	1.836*** (0.5239)	2.155*** (0.5924)
Executive Office of the President	1.258*** (0.3684)		1.258*** (0.4186)	
PAS Appointee	0.9776*** (0.1940)	1.052*** (0.1923)	0.9776*** (0.3556)	1.052*** (0.3917)
Schedule C Appointment	0.5039*** (0.1921)	0.5188*** (0.1844)	0.5039 (0.4178)	0.5188 (0.4474)
log Econ. Significant Rules (Agency)	0.3632*** (0.0917)	0.2052* (0.1105)	0.3632*** (0.0823)	0.2052* (0.1174)
log Econ. Significant Rules (Issue Area)	-0.0306 (0.1275)	0.0115 (0.0759)	-0.0306 (0.1140)	0.0115 (0.0623)
log Lobby Revenue by Agency	0.0003 (0.0100)	0.0092 (0.0143)	0.0003 (0.0125)	0.0092 (0.0108)
Agency Firm Lobbyists	0.0318 (0.0411)	-0.0148 (0.0330)	0.0318 (0.0432)	-0.0148 (0.0296)
Total Agency Lobbyists	0.0032 (0.0185)	-0.0075 (0.0157)	0.0032 (0.0254)	-0.0075 (0.0214)
Grants / Outlays	-0.6018* (0.3544)	-0.8309*** (0.2747)	-0.6018** (0.2831)	-0.8309*** (0.2074)
Standard-Errors		Year	Agency	
Observations	6,598	5,957	6,598	5,957
Year fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Agency fixed effects		✓		✓

The unit of analysis is the individual federal employee in their last year in government. The outcome is a 0 or 1 indicator for whether the individual becomes a lobbyist.

Table A6: Probability of Becoming Lobbyist – Tenure Robustness

	Pr(Become Lobbyist)	
	(1)	(2)
Professional Position	1.489** (0.6295)	1.572** (0.6538)
Administrative Position	1.301** (0.5981)	1.354** (0.6128)
Agency Tenure	0.1731*** (0.0294)	0.1737*** (0.0303)
Agency Tenure Sqrd.	-0.0067*** (0.0011)	-0.0067*** (0.0011)
log Pay	0.4626 (0.3957)	0.4213 (0.4209)
Career SES	-0.1572 (0.4165)	-0.2177 (0.4200)
Non-Career SES	1.279*** (0.3059)	1.338*** (0.3181)
Party Difference	0.1315 (0.1038)	0.1155 (0.1061)
DC, VA, MD	1.831*** (0.6480)	2.114*** (0.6548)
Executive Office of the President	1.159*** (0.2969)	
PAS Appointee	0.9540*** (0.2243)	1.027*** (0.2369)
Schedule C Appointment	0.4792** (0.2259)	0.4911** (0.2369)
log Econ. Significant Rules (Agency)	0.3615*** (0.0901)	0.2020* (0.1056)
log Econ. Significant Rules (Issue Area)	-0.0274 (0.1265)	0.0034 (0.0903)
log Lobby Revenue by Agency	0.0005 (0.0121)	0.0084 (0.0123)
Agency Firm Lobbyists	0.0370 (0.0410)	-0.0045 (0.0410)
Total Agency Lobbyists	-0.0001 (0.0227)	-0.0130 (0.0229)
Grants / Outlays	-0.5955 (0.3643)	-0.8383*** (0.3167)
Observations	6,598	5,957
Year fixed effects	✓	✓
Agency fixed effects		✓

The unit of analysis is the individual federal employee in their last year in government. The outcome is a 0 or 1 indicator for whether the individual becomes a lobbyist. Executive Office of the President dummy variable is absorbed by agency fixed effects.

Table A7: Probability of Becoming Lobbyist – Human Capital without Pay

	Pr(Become Lobbyist)	
	(1)	(2)
Professional Position	2.007*** (0.5367)	2.273*** (0.5412)
Administrative Position	1.879*** (0.5258)	2.041*** (0.5322)
Agency Tenure	0.0139** (0.0063)	0.0141** (0.0067)
Career SES	-0.2564 (0.4037)	-0.3794 (0.4084)
Non-Career SES	1.663*** (0.2818)	1.707*** (0.2879)
Party Difference	0.3300*** (0.1068)	0.3092*** (0.1082)
DC, VA, MD	1.808*** (0.6272)	2.105*** (0.6442)
PAS Appointee	0.6538*** (0.1921)	1.198*** (0.2325)
Schedule C Appointment	-0.1078 (0.1834)	0.3907* (0.2179)
log Econ. Significant Rules (Agency)	0.2609*** (0.0786)	0.2395** (0.1003)
log Econ. Significant Rules (Issue Area)	-0.0560 (0.1255)	0.0230 (0.0881)
Agency Lobbying Activity	0.4823*** (0.0879)	-0.1708 (0.1395)
Grants / Outlays	-0.5464 (0.3509)	-0.8266*** (0.3079)
Observations	6,626	6,013
Year fixed effects	✓	✓
Agency fixed effects		✓

The unit of analysis is the individual federal employee in their last year in government. The outcome is a 0 or 1 indicator for whether the individual becomes a lobbyist.

Table A8: Probability of Becoming Lobbyist – Lobbying Restrictions

	Pr(Become Lobbyist)	
	(1)	(2)
Professional Position	1.582** (0.6354)	1.695*** (0.6538)
Administrative Position	1.427** (0.6018)	1.529** (0.6136)
Agency Tenure	0.0042 (0.0080)	0.0061 (0.0085)
log Pay	0.7025* (0.3884)	0.6335 (0.4062)
Career SES	-0.4305 (0.4046)	-0.4976 (0.4078)
Non-Career SES	1.448*** (0.3189)	1.513*** (0.3284)
Party Difference	0.2602** (0.1084)	0.2408** (0.1104)
DC, VA, MD	1.838*** (0.6290)	2.172*** (0.6443)
Executive Office of the President	1.394*** (0.2995)	
PAS Appointee	0.7537*** (0.2311)	0.7355*** (0.2482)
Schedule C Appointment	0.7131*** (0.2487)	0.7764*** (0.2604)
log Econ. Significant Rules (Agency)	0.3704*** (0.0895)	0.2174** (0.1022)
log Econ. Significant Rules (Issue Area)	-0.0363 (0.1262)	0.0182 (0.0892)
Agency Lobbying Activity	0.2772*** (0.0987)	-0.1744 (0.1402)
Grants / Outlays	-0.5840 (0.3589)	-0.8538*** (0.3104)
Very Senior Official	0.1671 (0.6342)	0.1335 (0.6336)
Senior Official	0.4673 (0.3261)	0.7245** (0.3443)
Obam Exec. Order	-0.0069 (0.3474)	0.0234 (0.3560)
Very Senior Official × Cooling Off Laws	-0.2669 (0.8105)	-0.0966 (0.8038)
Senior Official × Cooling Off Laws	0.0219 (0.3094)	-0.2240 (0.3222)
Observations	6,598	5,957
Year fixed effects	✓	✓
Agency fixed effects		✓

The unit of analysis is the individual federal employee in a given year. The outcome is a 0 or 1 indicator for whether the individual becomes a lobbyist. Agency Lobbying Activity is a factor score of a combination of variables, described in detail in the text. Executive Office of the President dummy variable is absorbed by agency fixed effects.

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