

Appendix A. Additional Tables.

A.1 Summary Statistics

Table A.1: Summary statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.
Treatment	1598	0.175	0.380
Turnout June 2016	1598	0.859	0.349
Turnout April	1598	0.891	0.312
Turnout May	1598	0.822	0.382
Turnout November	1302	0.840	0.367
Female	1598	0.476	0.500
Age	1598	41.77	12.48
Low Education	1598	0.088	0.283
Medium Education	1598	0.563	0.496
High Education	1598	0.349	0.477
Employed	1598	0.671	0.470
Retired	1598	0.069	0.253
Unemployed	1598	0.135	0.341
student	1598	0.101	0.301
Housechores	1598	0.025	0.156
Ideology	1405	4.32	2.036

A.2 T-tests

Table A.2: T-tests

	Turnout 2016	Turnout April 2019	Turnout May 2019	Turnout Nov. 2019
Control	0.853	0.876	0.809	0.839
Treatment	0.874	0.961	0.882	0.848
t-test	0.932	4.119***	2.864***	0.346

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A.3 Balance

We regress the treatment variable on a series of covariates. In Table A.3 we find no significant differences between those individuals that are part of the treatment group and those in the control group in terms of their pre-treatment attitudes, ideology, education and turnout in the past election.

Table A.3: Balance: OLS regression

	(1) treatment
Turnout in 2016	0.0939 (0.232)
Ideology	-0.0136 (0.0369)
Low education	-0.470 (0.325)
High education	0.247 (0.151)
Attitudes	
Voting is important	0.0448 (0.0317)
Voting is duty	-0.0276 (0.0315)
Elections are clean	0.0430 (0.0271)
Trust in political parties	0.0107 (0.0333)
Voting does not change anything	0.0133 (0.0266)
Citizens are important	-0.0103 (0.0257)
Free expression ideas	0.0385 (0.0279)
Corruption is extended	-0.0484 (0.0311)
Do not understand political issues	0.0394 (0.0267)
Democracy is not working well	-0.0231 (0.0269)
Political system does not care about people like me	0.0288 (0.0319)
Constant	-2.294*** (0.509)
Observations	1481

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A.4 Attrition

In Table [A.4](#) we regress the attrition between waves on all the covariates (income was only asked in wave 2, so it is not included). Almost all covariates are insignificant. Only age and education predict negatively the attrition in the May survey, and age the attrition in the November survey.

Table A.4: Attrition: OLS regression

	(1)	(2)
	Attrition May	Attrition November
Female	-0.000790 (0.0143)	-0.0156 (0.0183)
Age	-0.00208** (0.000683)	-0.00283** (0.000877)
Low Education	0.0303 (0.0258)	0.0539 (0.0334)
High education	-0.0140 (0.0146)	0.0123 (0.0187)
Retired	-0.0340 (0.0300)	-0.0192 (0.0373)
Unemployed	-0.0177 (0.0206)	-0.0380 (0.0262)
Student	-0.00358 (0.0259)	0.0323 (0.0339)
Housechores	0.0259 (0.0494)	0.0422 (0.0640)
Turnout 2016	0.00137 (0.0201)	-0.0356 (0.0258)
Ideology	-0.00476 (0.00333)	0.00251 (0.00422)
Aragon	-0.0584 (0.0407)	0.00489 (0.0513)
Asturias	-0.0409 (0.0455)	0.115* (0.0578)
Balearic Isl.	0.0275 (0.0470)	0.0925 (0.0617)
Canary Isl.	-0.0630 (0.0391)	0.113* (0.0491)
Cantabria	-0.0319 (0.0573)	-0.0968 (0.0727)
Castille-Leon	-0.0000618 (0.0301)	-0.00313 (0.0390)
Castille-Mancha	0.0131 (0.0362)	0.0273 (0.0470)
Catalonia	-0.0226 (0.0240)	0.0645* (0.0309)
Com. Valenciana	-0.0375 (0.0262)	0.0546 (0.0336)
Extremadura	-0.0585 (0.0457)	0.0350 (0.0576)
Galicia	0.00914 (0.0314)	-0.0148 (0.0409)
Madrid	-0.0211 (0.0237)	0.0570 (0.0304)
Murcia	-0.00866 (0.0420)	0.0782 (0.0541)
Navarre	-0.0750 (0.0580)	-0.0182 (0.0726)
Basque Country	-0.0454 (0.0352)	0.00547 (0.0448)
La Rioja	-0.0661 (0.0856)	-0.0657 (0.107)
Constant	0.243*** (0.0396)	0.281*** (0.0518)
Observations	2246	1996

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A.5 Design Validation

Our final treatment group is formed by 279 individuals from the 1,068 people that declared that had been drafted either as officers or substitutes for the April 2019 election. This means that 28% of the respondents that took part in the second survey were part of the electoral administration. This is, although slightly below, close to the expected 33% of respondents that having been elected as possible officers were in the end serving in the election

In addition, we made a total of 31,504 initial contacts. This means that the 279 treated individuals are 0.89% of all of them. According to the official statistics there were 25,893,248 citizens with the right to vote residing in Spain. In the April 2019 general election there were 60,038 ballot boxes. As each ballot box is supervised by three officers, this means that 180,114 citizens were recruited through lottery to be part of the electoral administration - equivalent to 0.7% of the voting population below 65 years old. Although our incidence may look higher, this may be a result of the people with a medical leave that have an exemption not to be an electoral officer and the around 60,000 convicted people (which are equivalent to 0.2% of the electoral census). Both groups are exempted from being officers and, at the same time, they are less likely to be part of the Netquest panel. This means that our overall incidence is very close to the real one. See the official statistics on the electoral census [here](#) and the convicted population in 2016, which is the latest available official data [here](#).

A.6 Main Results: Full Tables

Table A.5: ATE on Voting

Treatment	0.244 (0.198)	1.255*** (0.323)	0.615** (0.203)	0.104 (0.209)
Female	0.170 (0.145)	0.0400 (0.174)	0.00278 (0.142)	0.0587 (0.168)
Age	0.0167* (0.00682)	0.0357*** (0.00839)	0.0343*** (0.00688)	0.0255** (0.00786)
Low education	-0.504* (0.225)	-0.503 (0.264)	-0.562* (0.222)	-0.806** (0.251)
High education	-0.167 (0.150)	0.198 (0.186)	0.207 (0.151)	0.213 (0.178)
Retired	0.590 (0.390)	-0.466 (0.350)	0.0477 (0.327)	0.475 (0.424)
Unemployed	-0.247 (0.193)	-0.239 (0.233)	-0.104 (0.197)	-0.490* (0.213)
Student	0.402 (0.260)	0.368 (0.295)	0.266 (0.240)	-0.253 (0.279)
Housechores	-0.330 (0.416)	-0.394 (0.514)	-0.859* (0.377)	-1.169** (0.395)
Constant	1.087*** (0.305)	0.522 (0.365)	0.0456 (0.303)	0.700* (0.355)
Observations	1792	1598	1598	1302

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A.7 Main Results: Full Tables

Table A.6: ATE on Voting

Treatment	0.0548 (0.214)	1.278*** (0.377)	0.407 (0.217)	0.104 (0.209)
Female	0.227 (0.175)	0.0578 (0.203)	0.00313 (0.163)	0.0587 (0.168)
Age	0.00844 (0.00803)	0.0334*** (0.00960)	0.0348*** (0.00773)	0.0255** (0.00786)
Low education	-0.449 (0.280)	-0.700* (0.301)	-0.678** (0.253)	-0.806** (0.251)
High education	-0.182 (0.179)	0.136 (0.216)	0.249 (0.172)	0.213 (0.178)
Retired	0.554 (0.422)	-0.271 (0.400)	0.0447 (0.357)	0.475 (0.424)
Unemployed	-0.343 (0.224)	-0.0303 (0.276)	-0.0327 (0.224)	-0.490* (0.213)
Student	0.315 (0.336)	0.571 (0.379)	0.194 (0.281)	-0.253 (0.279)
Housechores	-0.248 (0.477)	-0.366 (0.573)	-0.842* (0.411)	-1.169** (0.395)
Constant	1.474*** (0.372)	0.684 (0.425)	0.0954 (0.344)	0.700* (0.355)
Observations	1302	1302	1302	1302

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A.8 Treatment Effects on Officer Replacements




Figure A.1: ATEs Soft Treated: Officer Replacements

A.9 Matching Analysis

As a further robustness, we run a matching analysis. Although we have a very good balance between the treated and control sample (see Table A.3), we found that for one occupational category there was no perfect balance. To account for this, we run four types of matching analyses: nearest-neighbor-matching (1:1), nearest-neighbor-matching (2:1), inverse probability weighting, and augmented inverse probability weighting. To match individuals, we use age, gender, educational level, occupational status (*employed*, *retired*, *unemployed with previous employment*, *unemployed with no previous employment*, *student*, and *housechores*, and income levels). The matchings are implemented with replacements.

The results are displayed in Figures A.2 and A.3. It can be observed that matching treated and untreated individuals does not yield any significant difference in the likelihood to vote in May 2016, our placebo behavior. We do find, again, relevant treatment effects on the likelihood of voting in the April 2019 elections, when the treatment happened, and the subsequent May 2019 election. The effect is somewhat smaller than in the previous estimations. Finally, we see again that the effect vanishes by November 2019, when the general election was repeated.




Figure A.2: Matching Estimates (I)




Figure A.3: Matching Estimates (II)

A.10 Analyses including 2016 Turnout as a Covariate

In Figure A.4 we replicate the main models including turnout in 2016 as a covariate. This captures which voters already had a higher likelihood to vote. When including this covariate, the effect of civic duty remains unchanged. Similar to the previous analysis, the probability of voting in an election for someone that is selected as an electoral officer increases in around 11%. This higher likelihood to vote is extended to a month later, then the probability to vote increases in 7.5% if someone had their civic duty activated in the previous election. Finally, seven months later the positive impact on voting had vanished.




Figure A.4: ATEs of Compulsory Civic Duty (2016 turnout included as covariate)

A.11 Treatment Effect on Declared Probability to Vote in Repeated Election

In the May survey we asked respondents what was the probability they would vote in a 0-10 scale if there was a repetition of the election in case no party or coalition gained the confidence of the Parliament in an investiture vote. We did not find significant differences between treated and untreated individuals in their declared probability to vote. In Figure A.5 we show the ATE of three models: one without covariates, a second one with the covariates used in the paper, and a third one with those covariates and including declared turnout in 2016 as well.




Figure A.5: ATEs of Probability to Vote in Repeated Election (May survey)

A.12 ATEs on Attitudes in November 2019

As a robustness, we replicate the analysis of Figure 3 and explore the treatment effects on the long-term attitudinal change in November 2019 compared to April 2019. The dependent variable is the change in attitudes between the third and the first wave of our data and we include again as covariates age, gender, education, and the occupational variables. We find again that there is no consistent or systematic change in attitudes as a result of serving as an officer in the April 2019 election.




Figure A.6: ATEs on Attitudes in November 2019

A.13 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

In Figure A.7 we show some heterogeneous effects of the treatment conditional on pre-treatment attitudes. For those attitudes that do not tap into the importance of voting, the heterogeneous effects are not significant. However, for those attitudes, such as the belief that “*voting is important*”, “*voting is a duty*” or “*citizens are important in Spanish politics*” we find that the turnout is mostly activated for those that already have positive attitudes before serving as electoral officers. Their civic duty reminds them of the importance that they already allocate to voting. We thank a reviewer for suggesting us to explore this.




Figure A.7: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

A.14 Mediation Analysis

We explore a mediation analysis in Table A.7. Using [Imai, Keele, and Tingley \(2010\)](#); [Imai, Keele, and Yamamoto \(2010\)](#) procedures¹⁶, we account for the proportion of the treatment effect that impacts directly on the likelihood of voting in the May and November elections, and the extent to which is mediated by the vote in the April general election. We argue that if most of the effect is mediated, this means that the treatment activates the vote in April and that the effect carries over to the next elections.

Table A.7: Mediation Analysis

	(1)	(2)
	Turnout May	Turnout November
Average Mediation Effect	0.058	0.045
	[0.036 , 0.079]	[0.0244 , 0.065]
Average Direct Effect	0.015	-0.036
	[-0.032 , 0.051]	[-0.092 , 0.001]
% of Total Effect mediated	0.777	1.330
	[0.508 , 2.660]	[-21.807 , 24.254]
Observations	1,598	1,302

95% confidence intervals in brackets. 500 simulations

The mediation analysis confirms this. 77% of the effect in May is mediated and the direct effect is much smaller. The mediated effect is significant and so is the proportion of the effect that is mediated. Consistent with previous results, the effects of the April election disappear by November.

¹⁶We implement these procedures using [Hicks and Tingley \(2011\)](#)

A.15 Survey Details and Ethical Considerations

The survey was administered by Netquest to a sample drawn from their online panel. The sample meets gender, age, and regional quotas (using the Spanish *Comunidades Autónomas*). The firm is certified with ISO Standard specific to AccessPanels. The study and the questionnaire was reviewed by the Ethics Committee of one of the authors' university and fulfills all their requirements with regards to ethical practices and preservation of anonymity. Netquest recruits a panel of survey respondents who consent to being included in a variety of market and social research surveys and experiments. Previously to the survey, participants were additionally informed that the survey was part of a research study, as well as who are the authors of the study. An email address was also provided in case they wanted to raise any issue with regards to the questionnaire. After being briefed, respondents could voluntarily decide to take part or not in the survey. All participants may opt out of their relationship with Netquest at any time, including while they are taking part in the survey. Following the standard practice in these online panels in Spain, all participants received as a compensation for completing the survey points that they could use to participate in a lottery. The specific compensation that each respondent received cannot be calculated as it depends on a draw.

A.16 Statements on Political Attitudes in the Surveys

Table A.8: Statements

Variable	Statement
Voting is important	Voting is important so that politicians can take the right decisions
Voting is a duty	Voting is a duty that all citizens have
Elections are clean	Elections are clean in Spain
Voting does not change anything	It does not matter whom to vote for, voting does not change anything
Trust in political parties	I trust in political parties
Citizens are important in Spanish politics	We, the citizens, are important in Spanish politics
All ideas should be freely expressed	In a democracy everyone should be able to express their political ideas, even if they are extreme
Corruption is extended	Political corruption is generalized in Spain
I don't understand most political issues	Most political issues discussed in Spain are incomprehensible to me
Democracy is not working well	Democracy in Spain is not working well
System does not care about people like me	The political system does not care about people like me

All variables range from 0 (I fully disagree) to 10 (I fully agree)

Appendix Bibliography

- Hicks, R., & Tingley, D. (2011). Causal mediation analysis. *The Stata Journal*, 11(4), 605-619.
- Imai, K., Keele, L., & Tingley, D. (2010). A general approach to causal mediation analysis. *Psychological Methods*, 15(4).
- Imai, K., Keele, L., & Yamamoto, T. (2010). Identification, inference and sensitivity analysis for causal mediation effects. *Statistical Science*, 51-71.