**Appendix: Online Supporting Information**

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11. **Summary of how Loewen et al.’s data and analysis differ from ours**
12. **Numbers of eligible MPs in each session:** Small discrepancies are described below. We have slightly larger numbers of subjects in each of the first two sessions, and the results are similar, as shown in A2.2.
13. **Coding treatment:** Loewen et al. use two very similar coding rules that vary according to whether the last proposer is included or excluded. We follow their coding rule in the first session, but A12 shows that this coding decision is inconsequential.
14. **Estimation:** We control for (pre-registered) covariates not used by Loewen et al. However, the inclusion of these covariates has little effect on the estimates or standard errors. See Tables A9 and A10.
15. **Variance estimation:** Loewen et al. use clustered standard errors, but we use robust standard errors. A2 shows that the two standard error estimators produce similar results.
16. **Graphics**: The descriptive statistics depicted in Figure 1 control for session, in keeping with the experimental design, which is blocked by session. Loewen et al.’s Figure 1 presented means from the two sessions pooled.
17. **Modeling**: Our paper presents instrumental variables (IV) estimates of the average effect (among compliers) of making a proposal that passes. IV estimation was not part of the Loewen et al. article. As pointed out in the text, the statistical significance of the IV estimates is similar to the statistical significance ITT estimates, as they are approximately equivalent to ITT estimates rescaled by the share of compliers.
18. **Comparisons between Loewen et al.’s data and ours**

A2.1: Discrepancies between the two datasets

2004-2006 Session

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Year | Candidate Name | Our dataset:  Place on list | Loewen et al.:  Place on paper | Our dataset:  Passed | Loewen et al.:  Passed |
| 2006 | Roger Gaudet | 3 | 3 | 1 | 0 |
| 2006 | Wajid Khan | 9 | 9 | 0 | 1 |
| 2006 | Marcel Proulx | 75 | Missing | 0 | Missing |

We have 133 in the control group.

Loewen et al. have 127 in the control group. The order number for MPs at 88 and above are all 88 in Loewen et al.’s data.

All MPs who have an order number that is 87 or smaller have the power to propose for both our data and Loewen et al.’s.

2006-2008 Session

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Year | Candidate Name | Our dataset:  Place on list | Loewen et al.:  Place on paper | Our dataset:  Passed | Loewen et al.:  Passed |
| 2008 | Gerry Ritz | 14 | Missing | 0 | Missing |
| 2008 | Bill Casey | 38 | Missing | 1 | Missing |
| 2008 | Andrew Scheer | 50 | Missing | 1 | Missing |
| 2008 | André Arthur | 51 | Missing | 0 | Missing |
| 2008 | Mike Lake | 58 | Missing | 1 | Missing |
| 2008 | Chris Warkentin | 62 | 62 | 1 | 0 |
| 2008 | Pierre Lemieux | 65 | Missing | 0 | Missing |
| 2008 | Guy Lauzon | 82 | Missing | 0 | Missing |
| 2008 | Kevin Sorenson | 105 | 105 | 0 | 1 |
| 2008 | Blair Wilson | 109 | Missing | 0 | Missing |
| 2008 | Maurice Vellacott | 115 | 115 | 0 | 1 |

For Loewen et al., only MPs who have a smaller order number than 117 have the power to propose. Our data includes 117.

We have 120 in the control group.

Loewen et al. have 112 in the control group. MPs who do not have the power to propose have their respective order numbers in the Loewen et al. data, unlike in the first session, and the order numbers otherwise match.

**A2.2: Replication of Loewen et al. 2014**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Current vote share | Loewen et al.  Without Interaction | Our data  Without Interaction | Loewen et al.  With Interaction | Our data  With Interaction |
| Government | 1.39 | 1.77 | -0.02 | -0.05 |
|  | (0.74) (0.73) | (0.71) (0.69) | (0.99) (0.97) | (0.91) (0.89) |
| Treatment | -0.07 | -0.13 | -0.98 | -1.40 |
|  | (0.63) (0.63) | (0.66) (0.67) | (0.73) (0.73) | (0.80) (0.81) |
| Government × Treatment |  |  | 3.70 | 4.72 |
|  |  |  | (1.46) (1.44) | (1.43) (1.45) |
| Previous vote share | 0.83 | 0.86 | 0.82 | 0.85 |
|  | (0.04) (0.04) | (0.04) (0.04) | (0.04) (0.04) | (0.04) (0.04) |
| 2004-2006 | 0.04 | -0.26 | 0.07 | -0.209 |
|  | (0.64) (0.58) | (0.66) (0.60) | (0.64) (0.58) | (0.66) (0.60) |
| Constant | 7.25 | 5.64 | 7.89 | 6.56 |
|  | (1.80) (1.93) | (1.85) (1.93) | (1.80) (1.92) | (1.85) (1.91) |
| Observations | 404 | 429 | 404 | 429 |
| R2 | 0.61 | 0.581 | 0.61 | 0.590 |
| Root MSE | 6.35 | 6.819 | 6.30 | 6.748 |

We used Loewen et al.’s data to rerun their models with and without interactions.

Robust standard errors in first parentheses. Clustered standard errors by ID in the second parentheses.

1. **Balance checks**

**A3.1: Breakdown of proposals made and passed by session**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Session | Treatment | Proposed | Passed |
| 2004-2006 | 80 | 69 | 10 |
| 2006-2008 | 96 | 91 | 38 |
| 2008-2011 | 98 | 97 | 40 |
| 2011-2015 | 150 | 146 | 54 |
| 2015-2019 | 119 | 114 | 54 |
| 2019-2021 | 56 | 56 | 14 |
| Total | 599 | 573 | 210 |

**A3.2: Vote shares grouped by treatment and membership in the governing party, by session**

Diagram

Description automatically generated

**Balance Check Regressions:**The F statistic compares the null of no covariate effects on treatment assignment to the alternative in which the covariates predict treatment assignment. To control for different treatment assignment probabilities over time, the pooled regression includes indicator variables for each session, but the F-test focuses on the joint significance the covariates.

**A3.3: Balance checks including retirees**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Treatment | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|  | Pooled | 2004-2006 | 2006-2008 | 2008-2011 | 2011-2015 | 2015-2019 | 2019-2021 |
| Previous vote share | 0.001 | 0.003 | 0.005 | 0.000 | 0.005 | -0.000 | 0.001 |
|  | (0.001) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.003) |
| # of Elections won | -0.002 | -0.005 | 0.001 | -0.011 | -0.022 | 0.008 | 0.006 |
|  | (0.007) | (0.022) | (0.023) | (0.022) | (0.018) | (0.019) | (0.016) |
| Female | 0.042 | 0.023 | 0.113 | 0.097 | 0.007 | 0.054 | -0.020 |
|  | (0.029) | (0.080) | (0.084) | (0.080) | (0.060) | (0.074) | (0.063) |
| Alberta | -0.005 | 0.028 | -0.110 | -0.094 | 0.024 | 0.011 | 0.036 |
|  | (0.053) | (0.143) | (0.158) | (0.155) | (0.112) | (0.131) | (0.125) |
| British Columbia | 0.031 | 0.179 | 0.088 | 0.027 | -0.010 | 0.016 | -0.081 |
|  | (0.042) | (0.119) | (0.116) | (0.116) | (0.083) | (0.104) | (0.092) |
| Manitoba | -0.005 | -0.054 | -0.036 | 0.150 | -0.034 | -0.247 | 0.162 |
|  | (0.063) | (0.159) | (0.171) | (0.166) | (0.124) | (0.166) | (0.145) |
| New Brunswick | -0.054 | 0.432 | -0.130 | -0.275 | -0.129 | -0.138 | -0.057 |
|  | (0.072) | (0.190) | (0.188) | (0.195) | (0.146) | (0.184) | (0.161) |
| Newfoundland and Labrador | -0.006 | -0.084 | 0.077 | 0.070 | 0.072 | -0.373 | 0.018 |
|  | (0.085) | (0.222) | (0.214) | (0.219) | (0.171) | (0.256) | (0.222) |
| Northwest Territories | -0.275 |  | -0.236 | 0.605 | -0.791 | -0.618 | -0.212 |
|  | (0.208) |  | (0.517) | (0.506) | (0.371) | (0.495) | (0.433) |
| Nova Scotia | 0.111 | 0.434 | 0.108 | -0.028 | 0.060 | 0.117 | 0.130 |
|  | (0.070) | (0.192) | (0.169) | (0.193) | (0.132) | (0.188) | (0.184) |
| Nunavut | 0.327 | 0.699 | 0.505 |  |  |  | -0.208 |
|  | (0.269) | (0.486) | (0.512) |  |  |  | (0.443) |
| Prince Edward Island | -0.141 | -0.273 | 0.058 | 0.055 | -0.210 | -0.645 | -0.229 |
|  | (0.119) | (0.485) | (0.262) | (0.298) | (0.225) | (0.356) | (0.258) |
| Quebec | 0.010 | -0.183 | 0.010 | 0.228 | 0.039 | -0.146 | 0.040 |
|  | (0.041) | (0.167) | (0.138) | (0.135) | (0.077) | (0.090) | (0.098) |
| Saskatchewan | 0.007 | -0.072 | 0.249 | -0.234 | 0.073 | -0.122 | 0.164 |
|  | (0.063) | (0.156) | (0.182) | (0.189) | (0.133) | (0.153) | (0.145) |
| Yukon | 0.201 |  | 0.579 | -0.295 | 0.238 | 0.350 |  |
|  | (0.232) |  | (0.508) | (0.502) | (0.373) | (0.498) |  |
| Bloc | 0.132 | 0.328 | 0.077 | -0.028 | 0.101 | 0.305 | 0.158 |
|  | (0.052) | (0.166) | (0.149) | (0.139) | (0.202) | (0.181) | (0.119) |
| NDP | 0.006 | -0.003 | -0.152 | 0.080 | -0.147 | 0.051 | 0.020 |
|  | (0.040) | (0.137) | (0.122) | (0.113) | (0.104) | (0.107) | (0.114) |
| Conservative | 0.023 | 0.035 | -0.012 | 0.189 | -0.161 | -0.003 | -0.038 |
|  | (0.034) | (0.102) | (0.097) | (0.109) | (0.112) | (0.087) | (0.074) |
| Third Party | -0.207 | -0.438 | 0.612 | -0.397 | 0.019 | -0.694 | -0.120 |
|  | (0.150) | (0.494) | (0.523) | (0.370) | (0.391) | (0.506) | (0.234) |
| 2006-2008 | 0.106 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.042) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2008-2011 | 0.093 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.043) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2011-2015 | 0.510 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.045) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2015-2019 | 0.267 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.042) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2019-2021 | -0.113 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.042) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 0.239 | 0.161 | 0.190 | 0.317 | 0.781 | 0.624 | 0.167 |
|  | (0.078) | (0.201) | (0.215) | (0.214) | (0.160) | (0.209) | (0.164) |
| Observations | 1507 | 240 | 255 | 242 | 240 | 270 | 260 |
| F balance | 1.497 | 1.256 | 0.756 | 1.075 | 0.767 | 1.014 | 0.829 |
| P balance | 0.077 | 0.224 | 0.750 | 0.379 | 0.738 | 0.444 | 0.659 |
| R2 | 0.163 | 0.088 | 0.059 | 0.080 | 0.059 | 0.068 | 0.056 |
| R2 Adj. | 0.149 | 0.018 | -0.017 | 0.006 | -0.018 | 0.001 | -0.014 |

Standard errors in parentheses

**A3.4: Checks for covariate balance: predicting treatment assignment based on MPs’ pre-treatment characteristics using the main covariates**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Treatment | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|  | Pooled | 2004-2006 | 2006-2008 | 2008-2011 | 2011-2015 | 2015-2019 | 2019-2021 |
| Previous vote share | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.006 | -0.001 | 0.002 | -0.005 | 0.002 |
|  | (0.001) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.002) |
| # of Elections won | -0.004 | 0.013 | -0.008 | -0.012 | -0.003 | -0.012 | 0.007 |
|  | (0.008) | (0.026) | (0.024) | (0.022) | (0.016) | (0.022) | (0.017) |
| Female | 0.048 | 0.011 | 0.117 | 0.097 | -0.010 | 0.092 | 0.005 |
|  | (0.032) | (0.084) | (0.086) | (0.084) | (0.069) | (0.080) | (0.065) |
| Government | -0.022 | -0.073 | -0.039 | 0.096 | -0.040 | -0.053 | -0.023 |
|  | (0.029) | (0.077) | (0.080) | (0.084) | (0.065) | (0.072) | (0.064) |
| 2006-2008 | 0.073 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.046) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2008-2011 | 0.081 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.046) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2011-2015 | 0.456 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.048) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2015-2019 | 0.195 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.046) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2019-2021 | -0.133 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.045) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 0.327 | 0.274 | 0.154 | 0.492 | 0.766 | 0.810 | 0.154 |
|  | (0.074) | (0.177) | (0.201) | (0.194) | (0.159) | (0.166) | (0.127) |
| Observations | 1266 | 213 | 216 | 217 | 181 | 210 | 229 |
| F balance | 0.910 | 0.422 | 0.987 | 0.897 | 0.124 | 1.145 | 0.248 |
| P balance | 0.457 | 0.793 | 0.416 | 0.467 | 0.974 | 0.336 | 0.910 |
| R2 | 0.126 | 0.008 | 0.018 | 0.017 | 0.003 | 0.022 | 0.004 |
| R2 Adj. | 0.120 | -0.011 | -0.000 | -0.002 | -0.020 | 0.003 | -0.013 |

Standard errors in parentheses.

**A3.5: Additional balance checks with all covariates**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Treatment | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|  | Pooled | 2004-2006 | 2006-2008 | 2008-2011 | 2011-2015 | 2015-2019 | 2019-2021 |
| Previous vote share | 0.001 | 0.005 | 0.006 | -0.001 | 0.009 | -0.007 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.004) |
| # of Elections won | -0.004 | 0.003 | -0.022 | -0.009 | -0.037 | -0.004 | 0.018 |
|  | (0.009) | (0.027) | (0.026) | (0.025) | (0.025) | (0.025) | (0.018) |
| Female | 0.047 | 0.006 | 0.144 | 0.081 | -0.014 | 0.109 | -0.015 |
|  | (0.032) | (0.086) | (0.091) | (0.087) | (0.070) | (0.084) | (0.068) |
| Alberta | -0.005 | -0.069 | -0.019 | -0.076 | -0.197 | 0.166 | 0.068 |
|  | (0.060) | (0.155) | (0.173) | (0.162) | (0.163) | (0.165) | (0.131) |
| British Columbia | 0.017 | 0.216 | 0.051 | 0.050 | -0.088 | 0.008 | -0.084 |
|  | (0.046) | (0.133) | (0.120) | (0.126) | (0.100) | (0.119) | (0.097) |
| Manitoba | -0.004 | -0.088 | -0.087 | 0.064 | 0.010 | -0.105 | 0.212 |
|  | (0.068) | (0.162) | (0.178) | (0.182) | (0.152) | (0.181) | (0.158) |
| New Brunswick | -0.064 | 0.397 | -0.226 | -0.289 | -0.064 | -0.185 | -0.052 |
|  | (0.078) | (0.193) | (0.200) | (0.197) | (0.178) | (0.201) | (0.176) |
| Newfoundland and Labrador | -0.035 | -0.059 | 0.067 | 0.097 | -0.004 | -0.241 | -0.265 |
|  | (0.096) | (0.249) | (0.260) | (0.224) | (0.217) | (0.264) | (0.260) |
| Northwest Territories | -0.259 |  | -0.261 | 0.603 | -0.747 | -0.572 | -0.246 |
|  | (0.212) |  | (0.514) | (0.510) | (0.387) | (0.504) | (0.439) |
| Nova Scotia | 0.124 | 0.405 | 0.191 | -0.049 | 0.027 | 0.052 | 0.183 |
|  | (0.077) | (0.195) | (0.178) | (0.201) | (0.149) | (0.236) | (0.205) |
| Nunavut | 0.639 | 0.670 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.470) | (0.492) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Prince Edward Island | -0.085 | -0.341 | 0.263 | 0.223 | -0.288 | -0.503 | -0.253 |
|  | (0.134) | (0.492) | (0.300) | (0.368) | (0.240) | (0.366) | (0.314) |
| Quebec | 0.012 | -0.218 | -0.026 | 0.207 | 0.039 | -0.117 | 0.020 |
|  | (0.046) | (0.171) | (0.152) | (0.142) | (0.094) | (0.104) | (0.108) |
| Saskatchewan | 0.018 | -0.096 | 0.296 | -0.258 | 0.179 | -0.014 | 0.241 |
|  | (0.071) | (0.159) | (0.221) | (0.192) | (0.179) | (0.188) | (0.158) |
| Yukon | 0.211 |  | 0.583 | -0.303 | 0.282 | 0.485 |  |
|  | (0.236) |  | (0.506) | (0.506) | (0.390) | (0.510) |  |
| Bloc | 0.127 | 0.314 | 0.098 | -0.002 | 0.049 | 0.226 | 0.140 |
|  | (0.057) | (0.169) | (0.162) | (0.150) | (0.244) | (0.191) | (0.130) |
| NDP | -0.015 | -0.010 | -0.160 | 0.071 | -0.312 | -0.046 | -0.052 |
|  | (0.045) | (0.147) | (0.126) | (0.116) | (0.131) | (0.126) | (0.125) |
| Conservative | 0.030 | 0.039 | -0.056 | 0.224 | -0.308 | -0.019 | -0.051 |
|  | (0.038) | (0.109) | (0.102) | (0.113) | (0.145) | (0.103) | (0.082) |
| Third Party | -0.134 | 0.000 | 0.619 | -0.543 | -0.035 | -0.641 | -0.164 |
|  | (0.181) | (.) | (0.523) | (0.520) | (0.415) | (0.518) | (0.270) |
| 2006-2008 | 0.084 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.046) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2008-2011 | 0.094 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.046) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2011-2015 | 0.490 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.051) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2015-2019 | 0.223 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.047) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2019-2021 | -0.114 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.045) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 0.282 | 0.080 | 0.187 | 0.394 | 0.764 | 0.929 | 0.243 |
|  | (0.087) | (0.225) | (0.234) | (0.229) | (0.194) | (0.247) | (0.178) |
| Observations | 1266 | 213 | 216 | 217 | 181 | 210 | 229 |
| F balance | 1.241 | 1.265 | 0.900 | 0.938 | 0.928 | 0.913 | 0.848 |
| P balance | 0.215 | 0.223 | 0.579 | 0.533 | 0.546 | 0.564 | 0.636 |
| R2 | 0.140 | 0.094 | 0.076 | 0.079 | 0.093 | 0.079 | 0.064 |
| R2 Adj. | 0.123 | 0.020 | -0.008 | -0.005 | -0.007 | -0.008 | -0.011 |

Standard errors in parentheses

1. **Attrition**

**A4.1: Assessing whether retirement is affected by assigned treatment**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Retired | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|  | Pooled | 2004-2006 | 2006-2008 | 2008-2011 | 2011-2015 | 2015-2019 | 2019-2021 |
| Treatment | 0.024 | -0.043 | 0.036 | -0.012 | 0.104 | 0.099 | -0.042 |
|  | (0.018) | (0.037) | (0.043) | (0.038) | (0.060) | (0.049) | (0.043) |
| Government | 0.029 | 0.030 | 0.031 | -0.001 | 0.002 | -0.017 | 0.043 |
|  | (0.019) | (0.043) | (0.044) | (0.045) | (0.057) | (0.049) | (0.048) |
| Previous vote share | -0.001 | -0.004 | -0.001 | -0.001 | 0.007 | -0.001 | -0.003 |
|  | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| # of Elections won | 0.061 | 0.083 | 0.082 | 0.042 | 0.056 | 0.068 | 0.031 |
|  | (0.007) | (0.017) | (0.016) | (0.015) | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.014) |
| Female | 0.017 | 0.021 | 0.029 | 0.069 | 0.012 | -0.038 | 0.016 |
|  | (0.022) | (0.047) | (0.056) | (0.053) | (0.062) | (0.057) | (0.046) |
| 2006-2008 | 0.002 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.029) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2008-2011 | -0.053 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.028) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2011-2015 | 0.104 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.034) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2015-2019 | 0.111 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.031) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2019-2021 | 0.010 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.028) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -0.008 | 0.112 | -0.097 | 0.008 | -0.353 | 0.054 | 0.202 |
|  | (0.049) | (0.100) | (0.125) | (0.111) | (0.141) | (0.125) | (0.082) |
| Observations | 1507 | 240 | 255 | 242 | 240 | 270 | 260 |
| R2 | 0.103 | 0.164 | 0.139 | 0.064 | 0.115 | 0.111 | 0.046 |
| R2 Adj. | 0.097 | 0.146 | 0.122 | 0.044 | 0.096 | 0.094 | 0.027 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

1. **Alternative Model Specifications**

**A5.1: Average treatment effects by session, without additional covariates**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Current vote share | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | 2004-2006 | 2006-2008 | 2008-2011 | 2011-2015 | 2015-2019 | 2019-2021 |
| Treatment | -0.537 | 0.158 | -0.357 | 2.149 | 0.842 | 0.738 |
|  | (0.906) | (0.859) | (1.140) | (2.340) | (1.253) | (0.945) |
| Government | -4.513 | 7.362 | 13.047 | 1.446 | -9.059 | 2.064 |
|  | (0.899) | (0.827) | (0.999) | (1.863) | (1.183) | (0.903) |
| Previous vote share | 0.806 | 0.857 | 0.761 | 0.441 | 0.981 | 0.625 |
|  | (0.049) | (0.039) | (0.065) | (0.135) | (0.071) | (0.027) |
| Constant | 9.895 | 3.973 | 3.494 | 15.693 | 4.578 | 16.342 |
|  | (2.647) | (1.948) | (3.280) | (6.503) | (3.777) | (1.627) |
| Observations | 213 | 216 | 217 | 181 | 210 | 229 |
| R2 | 0.631 | 0.656 | 0.642 | 0.090 | 0.578 | 0.591 |
| R2 Adj. | 0.626 | 0.651 | 0.637 | 0.074 | 0.572 | 0.586 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

**A5.2: Interaction of treatments with membership in governing party by session, without additional covariates**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Current vote share | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | 2004-2006 | 2006-2008 | 2008-2011 | 2011-2015 | 2015-2019 | 2019-2021 |
| Treatment | -1.542 | -0.807 | 0.099 | 1.692 | 1.440 | 1.972 |
|  | (1.099) | (1.093) | (1.659) | (3.550) | (1.928) | (1.011) |
| Government | -5.899 | 5.974 | 13.707 | 0.547 | -8.349 | 3.103 |
|  | (1.090) | (1.076) | (1.217) | (3.674) | (1.792) | (0.989) |
| P2P × Government | 4.089 | 3.319 | -1.339 | 1.113 | -1.267 | -4.479 |
|  | (1.788) | (1.614) | (1.881) | (4.409) | (2.468) | (2.241) |
| Previous vote share | 0.806 | 0.844 | 0.758 | 0.439 | 0.983 | 0.625 |
|  | (0.048) | (0.039) | (0.066) | (0.137) | (0.072) | (0.027) |
| Constant | 10.263 | 5.008 | 3.427 | 16.181 | 4.159 | 16.029 |
|  | (2.624) | (1.966) | (3.304) | (7.119) | (4.020) | (1.675) |
| Observations | 213 | 216 | 217 | 181 | 210 | 229 |
| R2 | 0.638 | 0.661 | 0.642 | 0.090 | 0.579 | 0.598 |
| R2 Adj. | 0.631 | 0.655 | 0.635 | 0.069 | 0.570 | 0.591 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

**A5.3: Average treatment effects by effective number of re-election bids, with fixed effects for candidate ID**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Current vote share | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Pooled | 6 Bids | 5 Bids | 4 Bids | 3 Bids | 2 Bids |
| Treatment | 0.978 | -0.216 | 1.006 | 0.453 | 1.232 | 1.669 |
|  | (0.693) | (2.063) | (5.437) | (1.629) | (1.165) | (1.153) |
| Government | 3.579 | -1.908 | 3.519 | 3.886 | 4.173 | 4.028 |
|  | (0.937) | (2.469) | (3.792) | (1.801) | (1.725) | (1.883) |
| Previous vote share | 0.051 | 0.182 | -0.266 | 0.016 | 0.107 | 0.006 |
|  | (0.058) | (0.148) | (0.275) | (0.140) | (0.125) | (0.099) |
| 2006-2008 | -0.872 | 5.655 | 0.141 | 0.388 | -1.264 | -1.077 |
|  | (0.946) | (3.123) | (11.842) | (2.361) | (1.443) | (1.754) |
| 2008-2011 | -5.092 | 0.540 | 1.583 | 0.852 | -8.460 | -4.735 |
|  | (1.009) | (3.243) | (11.577) | (2.344) | (1.442) | (2.443) |
| 2011-2015 | -6.124 | 2.237 | 5.142 | -3.657 | -3.761 | -13.818 |
|  | (1.302) | (3.283) | (12.125) | (2.642) | (2.321) | (3.079) |
| 2015-2019 | -2.405 | -0.106 | 6.431 | 3.194 | 0.781 | -13.068 |
|  | (1.407) | (3.263) | (11.886) | (2.953) | (3.196) | (3.637) |
| 2019-2021 | -4.459 | -1.104 | 1.152 | 2.343 | -1.222 | -15.131 |
|  | (1.475) | (3.117) | (10.695) | (3.499) | (3.223) | (3.799) |
| Constant | 47.777 | 40.417 | 88.036 | 37.728 | 53.604 | 65.320 |
|  | (4.294) | (7.524) | (18.923) | (6.101) | (9.230) | (8.388) |
| Observations | 899 | 66 | 25 | 136 | 294 | 378 |
| ID FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R2 | 0.720 | 0.362 | 0.840 | 0.698 | 0.655 | 0.812 |
| R2 Adj. | 0.546 | 0.118 | 0.681 | 0.566 | 0.462 | 0.608 |

Standard errors in parentheses

Note: These within-subjects regression models estimate treatment effects on MPs who ran at least twice and include fixed effects for each individual to examine how vote share chances as MPs move in and out of treatment.

**A5.4: Regression Estimates of Average Treatment Effects by Session Including Fixed Effects**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Current vote share | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | 2004-2006 | 2006-2008 | 2008-2011 | 2011-2015 | 2015-2019 | 2019-2021 |
| Treatment | -0.027 | 0.738 | 0.403 | -0.029 | -1.051 | 0.549 |
|  | (0.558) | (0.782) | (0.634) | (1.605) | (0.976) | (0.880) |
| Government | -6.424 | 8.893 | 13.134 | 3.314 | -5.836 | 0.505 |
|  | (0.749) | (1.462) | (1.005) | (1.763) | (1.551) | (1.186) |
| Previous vote share | 0.975 | 0.845 | 0.735 | 0.573 | 0.831 | 0.799 |
|  | (0.045) | (0.042) | (0.050) | (0.109) | (0.073) | (0.043) |
| # of Elections won | -0.486 | 0.317 | -0.360 | 0.851 | -0.700 | -0.171 |
|  | (0.207) | (0.270) | (0.202) | (0.533) | (0.273) | (0.173) |
| Female | -0.090 | -0.784 | -0.598 | -0.532 | 1.402 | 0.014 |
|  | (0.833) | (1.131) | (0.724) | (1.684) | (0.960) | (0.843) |
| Constant | 6.333 | 1.546 | 4.507 | 5.909 | 12.643 | 9.052 |
|  | (1.933) | (2.142) | (2.470) | (4.634) | (3.474) | (2.456) |
| Observations | 213 | 216 | 217 | 181 | 210 | 229 |
| Province FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Party FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R2 | 0.847 | 0.723 | 0.911 | 0.682 | 0.803 | 0.679 |
| R2 Adj. | 0.833 | 0.696 | 0.902 | 0.645 | 0.784 | 0.651 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

**A5.5: Interaction of Treatment Assignment with Membership in the Governing Party by Session Including Fixed Effects**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Current vote share | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | 2004-2006 | 2006-2008 | 2008-2011 | 2011-2015 | 2015-2019 | 2019-2021 |
| Treatment | -0.630 | -0.143 | 0.969 | -1.294 | -0.859 | 1.921 |
|  | (0.639) | (0.898) | (0.865) | (2.330) | (1.323) | (0.941) |
| Government | -7.369 | 7.708 | 13.972 | 1.058 | -5.606 | 1.533 |
|  | (0.831) | (1.707) | (1.041) | (3.067) | (1.831) | (1.192) |
| Treatment × Government | 2.632 | 2.898 | -1.676 | 2.934 | -0.412 | -4.953 |
|  | (1.318) | (1.522) | (1.198) | (2.992) | (1.908) | (2.066) |
| Previous vote share | 0.974 | 0.831 | 0.731 | 0.572 | 0.832 | 0.806 |
|  | (0.044) | (0.042) | (0.050) | (0.109) | (0.074) | (0.044) |
| # of Elections won | -0.471 | 0.315 | -0.343 | 0.822 | -0.699 | -0.197 |
|  | (0.202) | (0.268) | (0.202) | (0.539) | (0.275) | (0.168) |
| Female | -0.000 | -0.779 | -0.618 | -0.535 | 1.400 | 0.017 |
|  | (0.839) | (1.120) | (0.725) | (1.671) | (0.964) | (0.833) |
| Constant | 6.557 | 2.602 | 4.438 | 6.921 | 12.516 | 8.623 |
|  | (1.895) | (2.166) | (2.458) | (5.030) | (3.633) | (2.484) |
| Observations | 213 | 216 | 217 | 181 | 210 | 229 |
| Province FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Party FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R2 | 0.849 | 0.727 | 0.911 | 0.684 | 0.803 | 0.687 |
| R2 Adj. | 0.835 | 0.699 | 0.902 | 0.644 | 0.783 | 0.659 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

**A5.6: Regression Estimates of Average Treatment Effects by Session with Winning as the Dependent Variable**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Elected | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | 2004-2006 | 2006-2008 | 2008-2011 | 2011-2015 | 2015-2019 | 2019-2021 |
| Treatment | 0.013 | -0.022 | 0.050 | -0.003 | -0.124 | 0.032 |
|  | (0.052) | (0.054) | (0.056) | (0.084) | (0.057) | (0.053) |
| Government | -0.085 | 0.019 | 0.409 | -0.134 | -0.037 | -0.013 |
|  | (0.060) | (0.059) | (0.065) | (0.066) | (0.058) | (0.054) |
| Previous vote share | 0.009 | 0.011 | 0.009 | 0.005 | 0.011 | 0.006 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.002) |
| # of Elections won | -0.069 | -0.081 | -0.035 | 0.048 | -0.062 | -0.026 |
|  | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.017) | (0.018) | (0.015) |
| Female | 0.051 | -0.068 | -0.078 | -0.044 | -0.018 | -0.067 |
|  | (0.056) | (0.072) | (0.072) | (0.072) | (0.067) | (0.055) |
| Constant | 0.513 | 0.474 | 0.107 | 0.043 | 0.362 | 0.592 |
|  | (0.126) | (0.168) | (0.146) | (0.169) | (0.148) | (0.097) |
| Observations | 240 | 255 | 242 | 240 | 270 | 260 |
| R2 | 0.119 | 0.106 | 0.272 | 0.063 | 0.096 | 0.052 |
| R2 Adj. | 0.100 | 0.088 | 0.257 | 0.043 | 0.079 | 0.033 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

**A5.7: Interaction of Treatment Assignment with Membership in the Governing Party by Session with Winning as the Dependent Variable**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Elected | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | 2004-2006 | 2006-2008 | 2008-2011 | 2011-2015 | 2015-2019 | 2019-2021 |
| Treatment | -0.031 | -0.038 | 0.040 | -0.174 | -0.099 | 0.064 |
|  | (0.058) | (0.066) | (0.077) | (0.121) | (0.077) | (0.059) |
| Government | -0.141 | -0.005 | 0.395 | -0.450 | -0.004 | 0.012 |
|  | (0.073) | (0.080) | (0.082) | (0.138) | (0.083) | (0.061) |
| Treatment × Government | 0.173 | 0.057 | 0.029 | 0.381 | -0.057 | -0.110 |
|  | (0.123) | (0.114) | (0.098) | (0.155) | (0.113) | (0.128) |
| Previous vote share | 0.009 | 0.010 | 0.009 | 0.005 | 0.011 | 0.006 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.002) |
| # of Elections won | -0.069 | -0.080 | -0.036 | 0.045 | -0.062 | -0.026 |
|  | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.015) |
| Female | 0.057 | -0.069 | -0.078 | -0.042 | -0.018 | -0.067 |
|  | (0.056) | (0.072) | (0.072) | (0.071) | (0.067) | (0.055) |
| Constant | 0.533 | 0.489 | 0.108 | 0.212 | 0.343 | 0.584 |
|  | (0.123) | (0.173) | (0.147) | (0.194) | (0.154) | (0.098) |
| Observations | 240 | 255 | 242 | 240 | 270 | 260 |
| R2 | 0.127 | 0.107 | 0.273 | 0.083 | 0.097 | 0.055 |
| R2 Adj. | 0.105 | 0.085 | 0.254 | 0.059 | 0.076 | 0.033 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

1. **Effects of Treatment Assignment on Whether a Proposal was Made**

**A6.1: First stage effects of treatment assignment on whether MPs propose a bill or motion**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Proposed | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|  | Pooled | 2004-2006 | 2006-2008 | 2008-2011 | 2011-2015 | 2015-2019 | 2019-2021 |
| Treatment | 0.952 | 0.858 | 0.945 | 0.989 | 0.974 | 0.954 | 1.000 |
|  | (0.009) | (0.039) | (0.024) | (0.011) | (0.014) | (0.020) | (0.000) |
| Government | -0.020 | -0.085 | 0.016 | 0.008 | -0.019 | -0.035 | 0.000 |
|  | (0.009) | (0.043) | (0.021) | (0.008) | (0.025) | (0.021) | (0.000) |
| Previous vote share | -0.000 | -0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | -0.001 | -0.000 | 0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.000) |
| # of Elections won | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | -0.002 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.011) | (0.008) | (0.000) | (0.004) | (0.006) | (0.000) |
| Female | 0.007 | -0.021 | 0.040 | 0.009 | 0.019 | 0.008 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.008) | (0.041) | (0.019) | (0.009) | (0.014) | (0.024) | (0.000) |
| 2006-2008 | 0.033 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.018) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2008-2011 | 0.053 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.017) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2011-2015 | 0.053 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.021) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2015-2019 | 0.040 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.019) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2019-2021 | 0.046 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.014) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -0.021 | 0.037 | -0.023 | -0.013 | 0.071 | 0.033 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.025) | (0.079) | (0.040) | (0.014) | (0.112) | (0.044) | (0.000) |
| Observations | 1266 | 213 | 216 | 217 | 181 | 210 | 229 |
| R2 | 0.922 | 0.803 | 0.911 | 0.982 | 0.865 | 0.909 | 1.000 |
| R2 Adj. | 0.922 | 0.799 | 0.909 | 0.981 | 0.862 | 0.907 | 1.000 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

1. **Alternative Coding Procedures for Delineating the Treatment Group**

**A7.1: Average treatment effects of treatment excluding the last treated MP, by session**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Current vote share | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | 2004-2006 | 2006-2008 | 2008-2011 | 2011-2015 | 2015-2019 | 2019-2021 |
| Treatment’ | -0.485 | 0.163 | -0.430 | 2.400 | 0.709 | 0.778 |
|  | (0.912) | (0.857) | (1.118) | (1.896) | (1.238) | (0.954) |
| Government | -4.415 | 7.259 | 11.088 | 2.781 | -10.039 | 1.986 |
|  | (0.892) | (0.906) | (1.183) | (1.806) | (1.170) | (0.902) |
| Previous vote share | 0.816 | 0.854 | 0.850 | 0.296 | 1.025 | 0.620 |
|  | (0.050) | (0.043) | (0.064) | (0.122) | (0.068) | (0.027) |
| # of Elections won | -0.181 | 0.042 | -1.313 | 4.649 | -1.148 | 0.116 |
|  | (0.318) | (0.280) | (0.323) | (0.591) | (0.477) | (0.179) |
| Female | -1.599 | -0.853 | -1.029 | -1.210 | -0.071 | 0.494 |
|  | (1.166) | (1.220) | (1.491) | (2.162) | (1.390) | (0.859) |
| Constant | 10.064 | 4.197 | 4.027 | 11.281 | 5.293 | 16.222 |
|  | (2.633) | (2.005) | (3.318) | (5.681) | (3.737) | (1.752) |
| Observations | 212 | 215 | 216 | 180 | 210 | 228 |
| R2 | 0.634 | 0.658 | 0.663 | 0.384 | 0.594 | 0.590 |
| R2 Adj. | 0.625 | 0.650 | 0.655 | 0.367 | 0.584 | 0.580 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note that in the 2015-2019 the last treated MP did not rerun which is why the observations are unchanged in this session from the main analysis.

**A7.2: Interactive effects of treatment modified to exclude the last treated MP, by session**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Current vote share | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | 2004-2006 | 2006-2008 | 2008-2011 | 2011-2015 | 2015-2019 | 2019-2021 |
| Treatment’ | -1.445 | -0.835 | -0.138 | 2.696 | 1.237 | 2.054 |
|  | (1.116) | (1.091) | (1.632) | (2.408) | (1.920) | (1.017) |
| Government | -5.738 | 5.807 | 11.516 | 3.363 | -9.408 | 3.039 |
|  | (1.103) | (1.141) | (1.420) | (3.419) | (1.777) | (0.982) |
| Treatment’ × Government | 3.875 | 3.429 | -0.847 | -0.720 | -1.120 | -4.563 |
|  | (1.818) | (1.635) | (1.858) | (3.973) | (2.441) | (2.246) |
| Previous vote share | 0.815 | 0.841 | 0.847 | 0.297 | 1.026 | 0.620 |
|  | (0.050) | (0.044) | (0.064) | (0.122) | (0.069) | (0.027) |
| # of Elections won | -0.159 | 0.034 | -1.304 | 4.651 | -1.145 | 0.099 |
|  | (0.314) | (0.277) | (0.327) | (0.597) | (0.483) | (0.179) |
| Female | -1.501 | -0.918 | -1.028 | -1.213 | -0.055 | 0.510 |
|  | (1.174) | (1.211) | (1.495) | (2.173) | (1.396) | (0.845) |
| Constant | 10.418 | 5.279 | 3.984 | 10.964 | 4.916 | 15.938 |
|  | (2.610) | (2.046) | (3.349) | (5.971) | (3.985) | (1.793) |
| Observations | 212 | 215 | 216 | 180 | 210 | 228 |
| R2 | 0.640 | 0.663 | 0.664 | 0.385 | 0.595 | 0.597 |
| R2 Adj. | 0.630 | 0.654 | 0.654 | 0.363 | 0.583 | 0.586 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

1. **Instrumental Variable Analyses**

Going beyond the analysis of Loewen et al., another estimand discussed in our pre-analysis plan is the average causal effect of introducing a successful bill or motion. This causal parameter is pertinent because one reason MPs in the governing party might benefit from proposal power is that they are better positioned to have their proposals adopted. However, this causal effect can only be identified for a subgroup of legislators known as compliers (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996); in this context, compliers are legislators whose proposals would pass if and only if the legislator has a favorable lottery number. In the six legislative sessions, compliers appear to comprise approximately 34% of all legislators.[[1]](#footnote-1) As Angrist et al. (1996) show formally, our ability to identify the complier average causal effect (CACE) hinges on the strong substantive assumption that the sole pathway through which random assignment affects outcomes is by affecting whether proposals actually pass. This assumption implies that failing to make a proposal at all or making a proposal that fails to pass has no electoral consequences. Under this strong assumption, the CACE is estimated consistently by instrumental variables regression, which essentially rescales the estimated intent-to-treat effect by dividing it by the apparent share of compliers. If the intent-to-treat estimates are statistically insignificant, so too will be the estimates of the CACE.

Among compliers, proposing a bill or motion that is passed generates an electoral boost of 1.560 (SE = 1.685), on average (see column 1). This estimate essentially rescales both the estimated ITT and its standard error by dividing by 0.34, which is roughly the passage rate for lottery-induced proposals. This estimate is noisy but, taken at face value, represents a potentially meaningful increase in vote share. Time will tell whether this interpretation remains sustainable as more legislative sessions are observed.

**A8.1: First stage for instrumental variables regressions, using assigned treatment to predict passage of a proposed bill or motion**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Passed | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|  | Pooled | 2004-2006 | 2006-2008 | 2008-2011 | 2011-2015 | 2015-2019 | 2019-2021 |
| Treatment | 0.338 | 0.128 | 0.397 | 0.398 | 0.381 | 0.476 | 0.252 |
|  | (0.020) | (0.038) | (0.051) | (0.049) | (0.052) | (0.045) | (0.058) |
| Government | 0.157 | 0.041 | 0.083 | 0.164 | 0.452 | 0.194 | 0.050 |
|  | (0.020) | (0.038) | (0.052) | (0.061) | (0.066) | (0.052) | (0.034) |
| Previous vote share | 0.001 | -0.000 | -0.003 | -0.000 | -0.003 | 0.007 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.002) | (0.001) |
| # of Elections won | 0.004 | 0.001 | 0.017 | 0.002 | 0.036 | -0.014 | 0.001 |
|  | (0.006) | (0.012) | (0.015) | (0.014) | (0.018) | (0.015) | (0.008) |
| Female | 0.007 | -0.001 | 0.058 | -0.027 | 0.095 | 0.019 | -0.042 |
|  | (0.022) | (0.033) | (0.062) | (0.056) | (0.070) | (0.058) | (0.028) |
| 2006-2008 | 0.100 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.028) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2008-2011 | 0.099 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.028) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2011-2015 | 0.080 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.035) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2015-2019 | 0.118 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.030) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2019-2021 | 0.053 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.022) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -0.184 | 0.005 | 0.049 | -0.037 | -0.181 | -0.394 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.047) | (0.087) | (0.122) | (0.132) | (0.171) | (0.116) | (0.053) |
| Observations | 1266 | 213 | 216 | 217 | 181 | 210 | 229 |
| R2 | 0.277 | 0.090 | 0.280 | 0.315 | 0.300 | 0.349 | 0.215 |
| R2 Adj. | 0.272 | 0.068 | 0.262 | 0.299 | 0.280 | 0.333 | 0.198 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

**A8.2: Instrumental variables estimates of the effect of proposing a bill or motion that passes on incumbents’ subsequent vote share, using treatment as an instrumental variable**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Current vote share | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|  | Pooled | 2004-2006 | 2006-2008 | 2008-2011 | 2011-2015 | 2015-2019 | 2019-2021 |
| Passed | 1.560 | -4.199 | 0.395 | -0.901 | 5.690 | 1.757 | 2.933 |
|  | (1.685) | (7.262) | (2.083) | (2.804) | (7.545) | (2.613) | (3.928) |
| Government | 1.273 | -4.337 | 7.339 | 13.194 | -0.951 | -9.420 | 1.926 |
|  | (0.622) | (1.051) | (0.911) | (1.375) | (3.896) | (1.334) | (0.960) |
| Previous vote share | 0.766 | 0.805 | 0.858 | 0.761 | 0.452 | 0.971 | 0.626 |
|  | (0.027) | (0.046) | (0.049) | (0.065) | (0.125) | (0.062) | (0.035) |
| 2006-2008 | -0.124 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.940) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2008-2011 | -3.321 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.940) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2011-2015 | -8.667 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (1.040) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2015-2019 | -0.006 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.981) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2019-2021 | -0.483 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.901) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 10.071 | 9.912 | 3.945 | 3.449 | 16.208 | 5.277 | 16.368 |
|  | (1.483) | (2.378) | (2.411) | (3.098) | (5.996) | (2.952) | (1.857) |
| Observations | 1266 | 213 | 216 | 217 | 181 | 210 | 229 |
| R2 | 0.441 | 0.615 | 0.656 | 0.641 | 0.094 | 0.576 | 0.587 |
| R2 Adj. | 0.438 | 0.610 | 0.651 | 0.636 | 0.079 | 0.570 | 0.582 |

Standard errors in parentheses

**A8.3: First stage for instrumental variables regressions, using place on list to predict passage of a proposed bill or motion**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Passed | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|  | Pooled | 2004-2006 | 2006-2008 | 2008-2011 | 2011-2015 | 2015-2019 | 2019-2021 |
| Place on list | -0.002 | -0.001 | -0.003 | -0.003 | -0.002 | -0.002 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Government | 0.154 | 0.043 | 0.058 | 0.193 | 0.414 | 0.184 | 0.063 |
|  | (0.021) | (0.038) | (0.052) | (0.062) | (0.065) | (0.056) | (0.037) |
| Previous vote share | 0.001 | -0.000 | -0.003 | -0.002 | -0.002 | 0.005 | 0.001 |
|  | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.001) |
| # of Elections won | 0.002 | 0.005 | 0.015 | 0.001 | 0.028 | -0.013 | -0.002 |
|  | (0.006) | (0.012) | (0.016) | (0.014) | (0.018) | (0.016) | (0.008) |
| Female | 0.014 | 0.015 | 0.057 | -0.033 | 0.099 | 0.028 | -0.047 |
|  | (0.022) | (0.034) | (0.064) | (0.055) | (0.072) | (0.062) | (0.029) |
| 2006-2008 | 0.148 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.028) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2008-2011 | 0.136 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.028) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2011-2015 | 0.250 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.033) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2015-2019 | 0.226 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.032) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2019-2021 | 0.032 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.022) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 0.186 | 0.158 | 0.574 | 0.559 | 0.443 | 0.277 | 0.185 |
|  | (0.051) | (0.098) | (0.146) | (0.146) | (0.175) | (0.132) | (0.069) |
| Observations | 1266 | 213 | 216 | 217 | 181 | 210 | 229 |
| R2 | 0.257 | 0.102 | 0.258 | 0.306 | 0.318 | 0.240 | 0.158 |
| R2 Adj. | 0.251 | 0.080 | 0.240 | 0.290 | 0.298 | 0.221 | 0.139 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

**A8.4: Instrumental variables estimates of the effect of proposing a motion that passes on an incumbent’s subsequent vote share with place on list as an instrumental variable**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Current vote share | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|  | Pooled | 2004-2006 | 2006-2008 | 2008-2011 | 2011-2015 | 2015-2019 | 2019-2021 |
| Passed | 1.846 | -1.561 | 0.454 | -1.814 | 7.048 | 3.034 | 0.357 |
|  | (1.789) | (6.757) | (2.168) | (2.862) | (6.759) | (3.327) | (4.650) |
| Government | 1.232 | -4.424 | 7.337 | 13.381 | -1.504 | -9.655 | 2.034 |
|  | (0.628) | (1.032) | (0.911) | (1.383) | (3.653) | (1.393) | (0.963) |
| Previous vote share | 0.766 | 0.805 | 0.858 | 0.760 | 0.453 | 0.966 | 0.626 |
|  | (0.027) | (0.045) | (0.049) | (0.065) | (0.125) | (0.063) | (0.035) |
| 2006-2008 | -0.160 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.943) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2008-2011 | -3.358 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.943) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2011-2015 | -8.735 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (1.049) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2015-2019 | -0.059 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.988) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2019-2021 | -0.486 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.901) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 10.090 | 9.810 | 3.936 | 3.600 | 15.942 | 5.277 | 16.450 |
|  | (1.484) | (2.341) | (2.413) | (3.106) | (5.977) | (2.969) | (1.852) |
| Observations | 1266 | 213 | 216 | 217 | 181 | 210 | 229 |
| R2 | 0.441 | 0.627 | 0.656 | 0.639 | 0.089 | 0.571 | 0.590 |
| R2 Adj. | 0.437 | 0.621 | 0.651 | 0.634 | 0.073 | 0.565 | 0.585 |

Standard errors in parentheses

1. Pre-Analysis Plan [Redacted for Review]
2. References

Angrist, Joshua D., Guido W. Imbens, and Donald B. Rubin. "Identification of causal effects using instrumental variables." *Journal of the American statistical Association* 91.434 (1996): 444-455.

1. As shown in Table A8.1, this estimate is obtained from a first-stage regression in which passage is regressed on treatment assignment, session indicators, and the covariates listed in equation (1). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)