ONLINE APPENDIX

Political Exclusion and Support for Democratic Innovations:

Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment on Participatory Budgeting

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Study background and sample-population comparison

The experiment we report on in the paper formed part of a study we conducted for a large Dutch municipality (report available upon request). A key goal of the study was to examine support for participatory budgeting (PB) across various groups of citizens. More specifically, the study sought to understand what kind of PB processes citizens prefer in order to be able to design processes that citizens would be willing to support and take part in (especially those citizens that usually do not manage to get their voices heard). For comparative purposes, the study also sought to understand to what degree the identified patterns were specific to the respective municipality. To that end, we embedded the experiment not only in a survey administered in this single municipality but also in a survey administered among citizens living in the ten most populous Dutch municipalities. In a similar vein, to assess to what extent the findings depended on municipal size, we also embedded the experiment in surveys administered in smaller municipalities. Table A1 shows that the pooled sample is roughly representative of the Dutch population at large in terms of sex, ethnicity, and education (i.e. the three objective criteria we used for our operationalization of political exclusion).

Table A1. Comparison of pooled sample with the entire Dutch population

Characteristic	Sample	Population	Sample - Population
Female	0.510	0.507	-0.003
Ethnic minority	0.115	0.122	0.007
Education (low)	0.575	0.696	0.121
Female + Ethnic minority	0.061	0.061	0.000
Female + Education (low)	0.281	0.356	0.075
Education (low) + Ethnic minority	0.063	0.089	0.026
Female + Education (low) + Ethnic minority	0.031	0.044	0.013

Note. Cell entries are proportions. Population statistics (January 1, 2019 or first quarter of 2019) retrieved from https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/ Population statistics apply to citizens aged 18 years and older, except for (combinations with) "Education (low)" for which statistics were only available for the age category of 15 years and older. "Ethnic minority" compares the proportion of citizens who have a least one parent that was born in a non-Western country (population) to respondents reporting that they belong to an ethnic minority (sample). "Education (low)" refers to citizens/respondents whose highest completed level of education was not a higher vocational or university degree.

Experimental materials[1]

Toestemmingsformulier

Deze studie gaat over de lokale politiek en leefbaarheid in de wijk. De studie wordt uitgevoerd door onderzoekers van de Universiteit Leiden, TU Delft en Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam.

Wij vragen u nu eerst de tekst hieronder aandachtig te lezen:

Hierbij stem ik in met mijn deelname aan deze studie. Dit houdt in dat ik een aantal keuzes zal maken tussen beleidsopties en een enquête zal beantwoorden.

Mijn persoonlijke gegevens zullen strikt vertrouwelijk behandeld worden en nooit gedeeld worden met derden. Op elk moment kan ik mijn deelname aan de studie stoppen zonder daartoe enige reden te geven.

Ik stem in met de publicatie van de studieresultaten zolang de informatie anoniem is, zodat participanten niet kunnen worden geïdentificeerd.

Kiest u nu alstublieft een van de opties hieronder. Klik dan op de knop "Verder".

Ik heb de uitleg gelezen en begrepen en ik stem vrijwillig in met mijn deelname aan deze studie.

Ik wil niet deelnemen aan deze studie.

Figure A1. Consent form

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[1] The experiment received ethical approval from the relevant committee at the Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs of Leiden University (decision number 2019-0001-Kantorowicz).

Wij vragen u nu om de volgende tekst aandachtig te lezen. Dit is belangrijk voor het beantwoorden van de andere vragen in de enquête.

De laatste jaren hebben gemeenten in Nederland geëxperimenteerd met **wijkbudgetten**. Wijkbudgetten worden op verschillende manieren georganiseerd en kunnen tot verschillende uitkomsten leiden.

In het algemeen werkt een wijkbudget als volgt. Bewoners worden gevraagd ideeën in te sturen voor projecten om de leefbaarheid van hun wijk te verbeteren. Daarbij wordt er vastgesteld welke bewoners een project mogen insturen en wat voor projecten zijn toegestaan. Nadat de projecten zijn ingestuurd, werken de bewoners ze verder uit. De gemeente kan ervoor kiezen om daarbij steun te bieden. Uit al de projecten wordt dan een winnaar gekozen. Dit winnende project ontvangt een deel van het gemeentebudget (€50.000,-) en wordt vervolgens uitgevoerd door de gemeente. Hoe een wijkbudget er in de praktijk precies uitziet, kan verschillen.

Stelt u zich voor dat uw gemeente heeft besloten om volgend jaar in uw wijk met een wijkbudget te gaan werken en moet bepalen hoe dit georganiseerd moet worden.

U krijgt zo twee scenario's te zien van mogelijke wijkbudgetten, elk met een eigen organisatiestructuur en uitkomst. Geef alstublieft aan naar welk scenario uw voorkeur uitgaat voor **uw wijk**, zelfs als u het niet helemaal zeker weet.

U zult 6 keer worden gevraagd zo'n keuze te maken.

Figure A2. Original introduction to the experiment

The last years municipalities in the Netherlands have experimented with **neighborhood budgets**. Neighborhood budgets are organized in different ways and can lead to different outcomes.

In general, a neighborhood budget works as follows. Residents are asked to submit ideas for projects to improve the quality of life in their neighborhood. It is determined which residents are allowed to submit a project and what kind of projects are allowed. After the projects have been submitted, residents further develop them. The municipality can choose to offer support for that. In each neighborhood, a winner is then chosen out of all of the projects. This winning project receives a share of the municipal budget (€50,000.-) and is subsequently implemented by the municipality. What a neighborhood budget exactly looks like in practice can differ.

Imagine that your municipality has decided that a neighborhood budget would be implemented in your neighborhood next year and needs to determine how this should be organized.

You will shortly see two scenarios of possible neighborhood budgets, each with its own organizational structure and outcome. Please indicate which scenario you prefer for **your neighborhood**, even if you are not entirely sure.

You will be asked to make such a choice 6 times.

Figure A3. Introduction to the experiment (English translation)

Keuze 1

	Wijkbudget A	**Wijkbudget B**
Winnend project	Opnieuw bestraten van fietspaden	Installeren van meer verlichting
Bewoners die een project mogen indienen	Wijkbewoners die gekozen worden door andere wijkbewoners	Alle wijkbewoners
Toegestane projecten	Projecten die passen bij thema's geselecteerd door de gemeente	Elk project dat als doel heeft de leefbaarheid van de wijk te verbeteren
Steun van de gemeente	De gemeente organiseert een bijeenkomst onder wijkbewoners om de projecten te bespreken	De gemeente biedt geen extra steun
Keuze van het winnende project	Alle wijkbewoners mogen stemmen voor het winnende project	Alle wijkbewoners mogen stemmen voor het winnende project

Naar welke van deze twee wijkbudgetten gaat uw voorkeur uit **voor uw wijk**?

Wijkbudget A	Wijkbudget B

Als het dus zou gaan om **uw wijk**, wat voor cijfer zou u dan geven aan de wijkbudgetten op een schaal van 1 tot en met 7, waarbij de 1 'keur ik helemaal af' betekent en de 7 'keur ik helemaal goed'?

Keur ik helemaal af   Keur ik helemaal goed
1   2   3   4   5   6   7

Wat voor cijfer zou u geven aan **Wijkbudget A**?

Wat voor cijfer zou u geven aan **Wijkbudget B**?

Figure A4. Example of a choice task (Dutch original)

Attributes and their possible levels

Respondents across the three surveys all viewed the same conjoint tables in the sense that they each time viewed a table consisting of a random set of attribute-levels drawn from the same pool of attributes and levels. Table A2 displays the possible levels each attribute could take.

Table A2. Attributes and their possible levels

English translation		Dutch original	
Attribute	Levels	Attribute	Levels
Residents who are allowed to submit a project	• All neighborhood residents • Neighborhood residents who are randomly chosen by the municipality • Neighborhood residents who are chosen by other neighborhood residents • Neighborhood residents who are chosen by the municipality	Bewoners die een project mogen indienen	• Alle wijkbewoners • Wijkbewoners die willekeurig gekozen worden door de gemeente • Wijkbewoners die gekozen worden door andere wijkbewoners • Wijkbewoners die gekozen worden door de gemeente
Allowed projects	• Any project that seeks to improve the quality of life of the neighborhood • Projects that fit themes selected by the municipality	Toegestane projecten	• Elk project dat als doel heeft de leefbaarheid van de wijk te verbeteren • Projecten die passen bij thema's geselecteerd door de gemeente
Support from the municipality	• The municipality offers no extra support • The municipality organizes a meeting among neighborhood residents to discuss the projects • The municipality organizes a meeting in which civil servants help neighborhood residents to develop their projects	Steun van de gemeente	• De gemeente biedt geen extra steun • De gemeente organiseert een bijeenkomst onder wijkbewoners om de projecten te bespreken • De gemeente organiseert een bijeenkomst waarin ambtenaren wijkbewoners helpen hun projecten te ontwikkelen

Table A2. (Continued)

English Translation		Dutch original	
Attribute	Levels	Attribute	Levels
Choice of the winning project	- All neighborhood residents are allowed to vote for the winning project - Neighborhood residents that submit a project are allowed to vote for the winning project - Independent experts choose the winning project - Civil servants of the municipality choose the winning project	Keuze van het winnende project	- Alle wijkbewoners mogen stemmen voor het winnende project - Wijkbewoners die een project indienen, mogen stemmen voor het winnende project - Onafhankelijke experts kiezen het winnende project - Ambtenaren van de gemeente kiezen het winnende project
Winning project	- Repave sidewalks - Repave bicycle track - Renovate playgrounds - Renovate squares - Install more lights - Install more speed bumps - Plant more trees and bushes - Install more garbage bins	Winnend project	- Opnieuw bestraten van voetpaden - Opnieuw bestraten van fietspaden - Opknappen van speeltuinen - Opknappen van pleinen - Installeren van meer verlichting - Aanleggen van meer verkeersdrempels - Planten van meer bomen en bosjes - Plaatsen van meer vuilnisbakken

Relevant survey questions

Table A3. Relevant survey questions

Variable	Question (English translation)	Question (Dutch original)
Sex	What is your sex? [male/female/other/prefer not to say]	Wat is uw geslacht? [man/vrouw/anders/zeg ik liever niet]
Education	What is the highest level of education you have successfully completed? a. Primary education b. Secondary education: lower vocational c. Secondary education: vocational d. Secondary education: pre-university e. Lower vocational f. Higher vocational / University Bachelor g. Master's degree h. PhD i. None j. Other	Wat is het hoogste onderwijsniveau dat u succesvol heeft afgerond? a. Basisonderwijs b. VMBO c. HAVO d. VWO e. MBO f. HBO / WO Bachelor g. WO Master / Doctoraal h. PhD / Doctoraat i. Geen j. Anders
Ethnic minority	Do you belong to an ethnic minority group in the Netherlands? By this we mean ethnic groups such as Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, and Antillean people who originally do not come from the Netherlands. [Yes/No]	Behoort u tot een etnische minderheid in Nederland? Daaronder verstaan we etnische groepen zoals Turken, Marrokkanen, Surinamers en Antillianen die oorspronkelijk niet afkomstig zijn uit Nederland. [Ja/Nee]

Table A3. (Continued)

Variable	Question (English translation)	Question (Dutch original)
Policy preferences	Residents have different ideas about what could improve the quality of life in their neighborhood. What would you think about the following plans to improve the quality of life in your neighborhood? Indicate for each of the plans on a scale from 1 to 7 to what extent you would like to see them realized in your neighborhood, where 1 means "not at all" and 7 "very much."	Bewoners hebben verschillende ideeën over wat de leefbaarheid van hun wijk zou kunnen verbeteren. Wat zou u vinden van de volgende plannen om de leefbaarheid van uw wijk te verbeteren? Geef voor elk van de plannen aan op een schaal van 1 tot en met 7 in hoeverre u ze gerealiseerd zou willen zien worden in uw wijk, waarbij de 1 "helemaal niet" betekent en de 7 "heel erg graag'.

<table>
<tr><td></td><td>
a. Repave sidewalks
b. Repave bicycle track
c. Renovate playgrounds
d. Renovate squares
e. Install more lights
f. Install more speed bumps
g. Plant more trees and bushes
h. Install more garbage bins
</td><td>
a. Opnieuw bestraten van voetpaden
b. Opnieuw bestraten van fietspaden
c. Opknappen van speeltuinen
d. Opknappen van pleinen
e. Installeren van meer verlichting
f. Aanleggen van meer verkeersdrempels
g. Planten van meer bomen en bosjes
h. Plaatsen van meer vuilnisbakken
</td></tr>
</table>

Table A3. (Continued)

Variable	Question (English translation)	Question (Dutch original)
Political exclusion	Citizens have diverse ideas about local politics. Please indicate below to what extent you agree with these statements about local politics on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means 'completely disagree' and 7 'completely agree.' a. Local politicians share my norms and values b. An ordinary citizens like me cannot influence local politics	Burgers hebben uiteenlopende ideeën over de lokale politiek. Geef alstublieft hieronder aan in hoeverre u het eens bent met deze stellingen over de lokale politiek op een schaal van 1 tot en met 7, waarbij de 1 'helemaal mee oneens' betekent en de 7 'helemaal mee eens'. a. Lokale politici delen mijn normen en waarden b. Een normale burger als ik kan de lokale politiek niet beïnvloeden

Note. The question for "Education" was adopted from the European Social Survey 8 (2016), Item F15. Response options f – g coded as "high level of education," all others as "low level of education." "Ethnic minority" question adopted from European Social Survey 8 (2016), Item C26. Political exclusion items adopted from Fisher, Van Heerde, and Tucker (2010) and Grönlund, Setälä, and Herne (2010). We used the "Policy preferences" question to construct outcome favorability.

Assumption Checks

The subgroup comparisons assume that all respondents were equally exposed to the various attribute levels. Figure A5 provides a randomization check for the frequencies of the attribute levels across relevant background characteristics. It shows that the randomization worked well, with only a slight exception for strong and weak outcome favorability in the case of the minority-majority comparison.


Figure A5. Randomization checks. Frequencies of displayed attribute levels across background characteristics (sex, ethnic minority, low/high level of education).

Figure A5. (continued).

Figure A5. (continued).

Two key assumptions of conjoint analyses consisting of several choice tasks are that (1) a respondent's choices and ratings across the tasks are independent from one another (absence of a carryover effect), and (2) respondents do not systematically choose or give a higher rating to the profile displayed on the left or right side of the screen (absence of profile-order effect) (Hainmueller, Hopkins, & Yamamoto, 2014). Figures A6-A9 report the results of the assumption

checks. For the analyses using the ratings as the dependent variable, we observe a small carry-over effect for some of the levels, but none of these is very pronounced (Figure A6). The profile-order effect is much clearer: respondents tended to give significantly higher scores to neighborhood budgets displayed on the left of the screen than to the ones displayed on the right (Figure A7). We control for this in the analyses reported in Figure A10. For the analyses using the forced choice as the dependent variable, we also observe a significant profile effect (Figure A9) and therefore control for that in the analyses reported in Figure 3. Again, we do not find a very pronounced carry-over effect (Figure A8).

Figure A6. Carry-over assumption check (approval ratings). Shows marginal means of approval ratings for each of the six choice tasks with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A7. Profile-order assumption check (approval ratings). Shows marginal means of approval ratings across neighborhood budgets displayed on the left (1) and right (2).

Figure A8. Carry-over assumption check (forced choice). Shows marginal means of the probability of choosing a neighborhood budget for each of the six choice tasks with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A9. Profile-order assumption check (forced choice). Shows marginal means of the probability of choosing a neighborhood budget displayed on the left (1) and right (2) with 95% confidence intervals.

Dependent Variable

In the paper, we use the forced choice because we think it better captures the trade-offs that respondents make between the two juxtaposed neighborhood budgets (NBs) and allows us to detect more subtle effects than the approval ratings (cf. Bansak, Hainmueller, Hopkins, & Yamamoto, 2021, p. 26; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2015; Hainmueller et al., 2014). That is because the ratings rely on respondents' assessment of each NB separately. This does not require them to make any explicit trade-offs and can result in identical ratings for two juxtaposed NBs even when the respondent's preference might be tilted slightly towards one of the two. We think its ability to detect smaller effects is key for the practical reason that the between-group differences in average support for NBs are relatively small (Figure 2).

Still, we anticipate two potential objections to our use of the forced choice. First, in our experimental design, the number of possible levels differs across attributes (see Table A2). This makes it difficult to compare effect sizes across attributes. This is because in such analyses the possible bounds of the average marginal component effects depend on the number of possible levels each attribute can take (Leeper, Hobolt, & Tilley, 2019). For instance, outcome favorability is forced to vary between -0.5 and 0.5, and the choice of the winning project between -0.875 and 0.875. Yet, given that we are interested here in differences *between groups* rather than *between attributes*, this has no direct bearing on the expectations we verify in the paper.

Second, the forced choice analyses might downplay the effect of outcome favorability. That is, when respondents give equal ratings to the two displayed projects in a choice task, we cannot observe the effect of outcome favorability when using the forced choice as the dependent variable. Consider the case that a respondent gives a score above four to all projects, qualifying all projects as 'strongly favored.' Whereas such a strong preference for improvement could show up in higher

average ratings for neighborhood budgets, one might argue that it makes little sense to expect that it would affect her/his choices. Yet, if anything, then, the true effect is likely to be larger rather than smaller than observed in the forced choice analyses.

To verify our reasoning, we also ran the main analyses with the ratings as the dependent variable. Figure A10 reports the results. The fact that we observe mostly null results where we do observe significant effects for the forced choice (Figure 3 and Figure A16) seems to fit our line of reasoning set out above: when we rely on the ratings, it becomes more difficult to observe the relatively small difference in marginal means we do observe in the forced choice analyses (ranging between $\Delta 1.3$pp and $\Delta 7.2$pp). Note also that according to the second objection we should observe a larger rather than smaller effect of outcome favorability than in the analyses using the forced choice. Instead, most of the significant outcome favorability effects observed in the forced choice analyses fail to reach significance in the analyses using the ratings. Finally, the one significant effect of a procedural design attribute is qualitatively similar to the effect observed in the analyses using the forced choice (Figure 3): compared to other citizens, the average approval rating is, on average, 0.28 points higher on the seven-point scale for minority citizens when civil servants make the final decision. The only anomaly we find is the significant difference in marginal means for the majority-minority comparison in terms of weak outcome favorability.

Figure A10. Results of subgroup analyses for objective measures of political exclusion (approval ratings). Shows the *difference* in marginal means with 95% confidence intervals. 'Excluded' (female, lower educated, minority) and 'not excluded' (male, higher educated, majority) refer to intersections of the three characteristics.

Alternative Operationalization of Outcome Favorability

Outcome favorability in the reported analyses consists of two categories (weak/strong). As this operationalization could potentially affect the results, we also performed the subgroup analyses with an alternative operationalization (1-2: weak; 3-5: moderate; 6-7: strong). Figure A11 displays the results. In line with the main results, we find no significant cross-group differences for the comparisons based on intersectionality. In addition, we find the same significant difference for strong outcome favorability in the minority-majority comparison (i.e. respondents identifying with an ethnic minority cared significantly less about getting a strongly favored outcome). However, we do also observe some slight deviations from the main results. For the comparison based on education, the analyses using the three-category operationalization suggest that lower-educated citizens were significantly less likely to choose NBs that returned unfavorable outcomes (Δ-2pp) (see 'weak favorability' in Figure A11). Moreover, some of the effects we observed in the main analyses fail to reach conventional levels of significance when using the three-category operationalization. This pertains to the significant difference we observed for weak outcome favorability in the minority-majority comparison and to the difference for strong favorability in the female-male comparison. Yet, the loss of significance is likely to be simply due to a loss of statistical power through the addition of the third category.

Figure A11. Results for alternative specification of outcome favorability (forced choice for objective measures of exclusion). Shows the difference in marginal means with 95% confidence intervals. 'Excluded' (female, lower educated, minority) and 'not excluded' (male, higher educated, majority) refer to intersections of the three characteristics.

Power Analysis

Figure A12 shows a power analysis conducted with *cjpowR* (Freitag & Schuessler, 2020). Depending on the subsample we use and assuming the detection of AMCEs at a level of 0.05, the power to detect a main effect varies from close to 100% to roughly 23% (the subsample of respondents who are lower educated, female, *and* identify with an ethnic minority). Table A4 provides a summary. Recall that the number of observations is a multiplication of the number of respondents, the six choice tasks, and the two neighborhood budgets rated in each choice task (e.g. for 'male' in Table A4: 1,609*6*2 = 19,308).

Table A4 Statistical power per group

Measure	Group	Observations	Power
Objective	Male	1,609*12=19,308	~100%
	Female	1,618*12=19,416	~100%
	Higher educated	1,377*12=16,524	~100%
	Lower educated	1,790*12=21,480	~100%
	Majority	2,824*12=33,888	~100%
	Minority	422*12=5,064	~70%
	Male + higher edu. + majority	599*12=7,188	~85%
	Female + lower edu. + minority	100*12=1,200	~23%
Subjective	Lack of voice: weak	2,054*12=24,624	~100%
	Lack of voice: strong	1,194*12=14,328	~99%
	Lack of influence: weak	1,761*12=21,132	~100%
	Lack of influence: strong	1,485*12=17,820	~100%

*Note:* Reports power for detecting AMCEs at a level of 0.05.

Figure A12. Power analysis. Shows the achieved power for detecting average marginal component effects (AMCEs) of 0.03, 0.04, and 0.05 by sample size.

Feelings of Political Exclusion

Figure A13 displays the averages of respondents' answers to the subjective measures of political exclusion for each of the ascribed categories of exclusion. Figures A14 and A15 show the results of the subgroup analyses for the two subjective measures. In both comparisons, we observe that at least two of the attributes matter significantly for the marginal difference in the probability of choosing one of the NBs over the other, with effect sizes ranging between Δ1.4pp and Δ2.5pp. We discuss each subjective measure in turn.

Lack of voice. Both citizens that felt they lacked voice in local politics and those that did not were significantly more likely to select NBs that offered an open rather than restricted agenda. However, this effect was significantly larger for those with a strong rather than weak sense of

lacking voice (Δ1.4pp for both effects). We observe similar significant effects for the support offered by the municipality. Both groups were significantly less likely to choose NBs that offered no extra support and were more likely to choose those that organized discussions or provided project assistance. Yet, the negative effect of no extra support (Δ1.6pp) as well as the positive effect of project assistance (Δ2.2pp) was significantly larger for citizens with a stronger sense of not having a voice. Similarly, both groups were less likely to select NBs that let civil servants make the final call, but this effect was significantly larger for those with a stronger feeling of lacking voice (Δ2.3pp). Finally, just like other citizens, they were also more likely to pick NBs that led to a favored outcome but this effect was significantly larger for them (Δ2.1pp). These findings provide support for the instrumental logic.

Lack of influence. We find two significant between-group differences for this subjective measure of exclusion. First, both groups prefer NBs that allow all residents to choose the winning project, but this effect is significantly larger for those that have a weaker sense of lacking influence (Δ2.0pp). Second, we similarly find that both groups prefer NBs that offer favorable outcomes, but this effect is larger for those who do not think that they lack influence on local politics (Δ2.5pp). These findings contradict the instrumental logic: those that felt they lacked political influence were relatively less likely to choose NBs that allowed all citizens to decide and/or returned favorable outcomes.

Figure A13. Subjective by objective measures of political exclusion. Shows mean agreement with political exclusion statements for each group with 95% confidence intervals (1: completely disagree; 7: completely agree).

Figure A14. Results subgroup analyses for subjective measures of political exclusion (forced choice). Shows marginal means with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A15. Results subgroup analyses for subjective measures of political exclusion (forced choice). Shows the *difference* in marginal means with 95% confidence intervals.

Forced Choice Results

Figure A16. Results subgroup analyses for objective measures of political exclusion (forced choice). Shows the *difference* in marginal means with 95% confidence intervals. 'Excluded' (female, lower educated, minority) and 'not excluded' (male, higher educated, majority) refer to intersections of the three characteristics.

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