

Supporting Appendix
to the paper
External Threat Environments and
Individual Bias against Female Leaders
(not for publication)

This document presents the results of statistical models that we conducted but, due to space constraints, were not able to report in the paper.

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Table A1. Summary statistics

| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max | P50 |
|--|--------|-------|-----------|------|-------|------|
| <i>Dependent variables</i> | | | | | | |
| Unfavorable attitude toward female leaders (binary) | 220322 | .47 | .5 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Unfavorable attitude toward female leaders (4-level) | 220322 | 2.49 | .97 | 1 | 4 | 2 |
| Unfavorable attitude toward female leaders (3-level) | 220322 | .94 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| <i>Key explanatory variables</i> | | | | | | |
| External threat | 220322 | .37 | .28 | .03 | 1.1 | .28 |
| Geopolitical competition | 181598 | .3 | .22 | .12 | .64 | .16 |
| MID past 3 years | 187706 | .65 | .48 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| MID past 3 years (incl. use of force) | 187706 | .57 | .49 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| MID past 3 years (incl. fatality) | 187706 | .31 | .46 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| <i>Country-level control variables</i> | | | | | | |
| GDP per capita (log) | 220322 | 8.43 | 1.45 | 5.27 | 11.21 | 8.37 |
| Polity score | 220322 | 5.39 | 5.42 | -10 | 10 | 7 |
| Muslim (\%) | 220322 | .22 | .35 | 0 | .99 | .02 |
| Catholic (\%) | 220322 | .27 | .33 | 0 | .97 | .09 |
| Female employment (\%) | 220322 | .41 | .09 | .12 | .52 | .43 |
| Female legislators (\%) | 220322 | .17 | .11 | 0 | .56 | .13 |
| <i>Individual-level control variables</i> | | | | | | |
| Female | 220322 | .51 | .5 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Age | 220322 | 40.56 | 16.16 | 15 | 99 | 38 |
| Married | 220322 | .63 | .48 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Highest education | 220322 | 4.75 | 2.21 | 1 | 8 | 5 |
| Muslim | 220322 | .21 | .4 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Catholic | 220322 | .24 | .43 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Religiosity | 220322 | 7.7 | 3.01 | 1 | 10 | 9 |
| Female legislators (\%) | 220322 | .17 | .11 | 0 | .56 | .13 |

| Variables | Definition/operationalization | Data Source |
|-----------------------------------|---|---|
| Included in Table 1 | | |
| Level of democracy | the Polity IV index | Polity IV (Marshall, 2015) |
| Interstate conflict | dummy variable for ongoing interstate conflict | Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset (Palmer et al., 2015) |
| Civil conflict | dummy variable for ongoing civil conflict | the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002) |
| Terrorism attacks | Log-terrorist attack events | Global Terrorism Database (LaFree and Dugan, 2007) |
| Terrorism casualties | Log-terrorist attack casualties | Global Terrorism Database (LaFree and Dugan, 2007) |
| GDP per capita | Log-real GDP per capita | the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2019) |
| Muslim | Muslim fraction of each country's population | The World Religion Data (Maoz and Henderson, 2013) |
| Female legislative representation | Percentage of seats held by women in the lower or single house of each country's national legislature | the Varieties of Democracies (V-Dem) dataset (Coppedge et al., 2018) |
| Female labor force participation | the fraction of the formal labor force that is made up of female citizens | the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2019) |
| Democracy duration | Democracy duration | Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013) |
| Oil income per capita | Log-oil income per capita | Ross and Mahdavi (2015). |
| Modernization | Index of economic modernization from principal component analysis | Chatagnier and Castelli (2019) and updated by the authors to cover the period until 2010. |
| Material culture | Index of material culture from principal component analysis | Chatagnier and Castelli (2019) and updated by the authors to cover the period until 2010. |

Table A2. Summary of country-level control variables.




Figure A1. External threat scale (only countries above the median). A higher value indicates more hostile security environment. The scale is averaged for each country during the period 1991-2012.




Figure A2. External threat scale (only countries below the median). A higher value indicates more hostile security environment. The scale is averaged for each country during the period 1991-2012.




Figure A3. Trend of external threat scale




Figure A4. Distribution of country-level variables by the level of external threats

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|----------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| <i>Country-level controls</i> | | | | | | |
| MID | 0.002 (0.006) | | | | | |
| MID (incl. fatality) | | -0.012* (0.006) | | | | |
| Intrastate conflict | | | 0.031** (0.007) | | | |
| Intrastate war | | | | 0.052** (0.007) | | |
| Terrorism events | | | | | 0.016** (0.002) | |
| Terrorism deaths | | | | | | 0.011** (0.001) |
| GDP per capita (log) | -0.003 (0.006) | -0.003 (0.006) | 0.000 (0.006) | 0.006 (0.006) | -0.001 (0.005) | -0.004 (0.005) |
| Polity score | -0.005** (0.001) | -0.005** (0.001) | -0.003** (0.001) | -0.004** (0.001) | -0.004** (0.001) | -0.004** (0.001) |
| Muslim (%) | 0.302** (0.061) | 0.286** (0.062) | 0.516** (0.065) | 0.477** (0.066) | 0.506** (0.063) | 0.494** (0.062) |
| Catholic (%) | 0.307** (0.045) | 0.311** (0.044) | 0.506** (0.043) | 0.528** (0.043) | 0.437** (0.043) | 0.417** (0.043) |
| Female employment (%) | 0.166 (0.121) | 0.116 (0.121) | 0.907** (0.109) | 0.700** (0.109) | 1.029** (0.109) | 0.948** (0.107) |
| <i>Individual-level controls</i> | | | | | | |
| Female | -0.133** (0.002) | -0.133** (0.002) | -0.131** (0.002) | -0.131** (0.002) | -0.131** (0.002) | -0.131** (0.002) |
| Age | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) |
| Married | 0.003 (0.002) | 0.003 (0.002) | 0.004+ (0.002) | 0.004+ (0.002) | 0.003 (0.002) | 0.003 (0.002) |
| Highest education | -0.020** (0.001) | -0.020** (0.001) | -0.020** (0.000) | -0.020** (0.000) | -0.020** (0.000) | -0.020** (0.000) |
| Muslim | 0.057** (0.005) | 0.057** (0.005) | 0.060** (0.005) | 0.059** (0.005) | 0.060** (0.005) | 0.060** (0.005) |
| Catholic | 0.000 (0.003) | 0.000 (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) |
| Religiosity | 0.004** (0.000) | 0.004** (0.000) | 0.003** (0.000) | 0.003** (0.000) | 0.003** (0.000) | 0.003** (0.000) |
| Constant | 0.373** (0.081) | 0.403** (0.082) | -0.056 (0.080) | -0.011 (0.080) | -0.082 (0.077) | -0.022 (0.075) |
| Year intercept | 0.051** (0.010) | 0.051** (0.010) | 0.050** (0.009) | 0.051** (0.009) | 0.049** (0.009) | 0.047** (0.009) |
| Country intercept | 0.197** (0.018) | 0.197** (0.018) | 0.241** (0.021) | 0.246** (0.022) | 0.227** (0.020) | 0.223** (0.020) |
| Residuals | 0.449** (0.001) | 0.449** (0.001) | 0.451** (0.001) | 0.451** (0.001) | 0.449** (0.001) | 0.449** (0.001) |
| # of countries | 82 | 82 | 84 | 84 | 86 | 86 |
| # of respondents | 193434 | 193434 | 220378 | 220378 | 226050 | 226050 |
| Log likelihood | -119830 | -119828 | -137539 | -137521 | -140129 | -140128 |

Table A3. Examining the effect of other immediate security threats. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

| | Female respondents | | | Male respondents | | |
|----------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| <i>Country-level controls</i> | | | | | | |
| External threat | 0.116** (0.019) | 0.101** (0.026) | 0.071** (0.026) | 0.122** (0.021) | 0.165** (0.028) | 0.127** (0.028) |
| GDP per capita (log) | | 0.003 (0.007) | -0.007 (0.007) | | -0.010 (0.007) | -0.016* (0.007) |
| Polity score | | -0.003** (0.001) | -0.008** (0.001) | | -0.002** (0.001) | -0.008** (0.001) |
| Muslim (%) | | 0.512** (0.066) | 0.359** (0.061) | | 0.421** (0.067) | 0.263** (0.064) |
| Catholic (%) | | 0.384** (0.051) | 0.273** (0.048) | | 0.395** (0.053) | 0.283** (0.051) |
| Female employment (%) | | 0.973** (0.138) | 0.873** (0.138) | | 0.365** (0.138) | 0.201 (0.141) |
| Female legislators (%) | | | -0.151** (0.051) | | | -0.163** (0.053) |
| <i>Individual-level controls</i> | | | | | | |
| Age | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.002** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) |
| Married | 0.023** (0.003) | 0.022** (0.003) | 0.023** (0.003) | -0.012** (0.003) | -0.013** (0.003) | -0.015** (0.003) |
| Highest education | -0.023** (0.001) | -0.023** (0.001) | -0.023** (0.001) | -0.015** (0.001) | -0.015** (0.001) | -0.015** (0.001) |
| Muslim | 0.066** (0.007) | 0.064** (0.007) | 0.064** (0.007) | 0.060** (0.006) | 0.060** (0.006) | 0.065** (0.007) |
| Catholic | 0.002 (0.004) | 0.001 (0.004) | 0.001 (0.004) | 0.010* (0.004) | 0.006 (0.004) | 0.007 (0.004) |
| Religiosity | 0.004** (0.001) | 0.004** (0.001) | 0.004** (0.001) | 0.003** (0.001) | 0.002** (0.001) | 0.002** (0.001) |
| Constant | 0.356** (0.025) | -0.269** (0.098) | -0.022 (0.100) | 0.509** (0.025) | 0.240* (0.096) | 0.490** (0.100) |
| Year intercept | 0.055** (0.010) | 0.050** (0.010) | 0.056** (0.011) | 0.035** (0.007) | 0.028** (0.007) | 0.038** (0.008) |
| Country intercept | 0.178** (0.013) | 0.204** (0.019) | 0.174** (0.018) | 0.196** (0.015) | 0.209** (0.020) | 0.181** (0.019) |
| Residuals | 0.445** (0.001) | 0.447** (0.001) | 0.446** (0.001) | 0.448** (0.001) | 0.450** (0.001) | 0.451** (0.001) |
| # of countries | 91 | 86 | 85 | 91 | 86 | 85 |
| # of respondents | 121649 | 115885 | 113105 | 116247 | 110165 | 107217 |
| Log likelihood | -74459 | -71347 | -69478 | -71956 | -68547 | -67000 |

Table A4. Splitting the sample between female and male respondents. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

| Dependent var. | Obedience | Men better leader |
|----------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) |
| <i>Country-level controls</i> | | |
| External threat | -0.342** (0.019) | |
| GDP per capita (log) | -0.039** (0.005) | -0.012* (0.005) |
| Polity score | 0.001 (0.001) | -0.003** (0.001) |
| Muslim (%) | -0.266** (0.062) | 0.523** (0.061) |
| Catholic (%) | -0.542** (0.040) | 0.513** (0.041) |
| Female employment (%) | -1.013** (0.104) | 0.626** (0.097) |
| <i>Individual-level controls</i> | | |
| Female | -0.004+ (0.002) | -0.129** (0.002) |
| Age | -0.000** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) |
| Married | 0.005* (0.002) | 0.003 (0.002) |
| Highest education | -0.023** (0.000) | -0.019** (0.000) |
| Muslim | 0.010* (0.005) | 0.061** (0.005) |
| Catholic | -0.009** (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) |
| Religiosity | 0.010** (0.000) | 0.003** (0.000) |
| obedience | | 0.018** (0.002) |
| Constant | 1.525** (0.075) | 0.152* (0.072) |
| Year intercept | 0.053** (0.009) | 0.041** (0.007) |
| Country intercept | 0.227** (0.021) | 0.232** (0.020) |
| Residuals | 0.456** (0.001) | 0.449** (0.001) |
| # of countries | 87 | 89 |
| # of respondents | 242743 | 234533 |
| Log likelihood | -154051 | -145263 |

Table A5. Using *Obedience* variable. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

| Dependent var. | Military conscription | | Military size | | Military spending/GDP | |
|----------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) Pooled | (2) FE | (3) Pooled | (4) FE | (5) Pooled | (6) FE |
| External threat | 1.424 ⁺ (0.743) | 10.144** (2.236) | 0.028* (0.011) | 0.067** (0.025) | 0.036* (0.018) | 0.126** (0.040) |
| GDP per capita (log) | 0.100 (0.118) | -0.523 (0.515) | 0.007** (0.003) | -0.013 ⁺ (0.007) | 0.009** (0.003) | 0.013 (0.012) |
| Polity score | 0.016 (0.024) | -0.045 (0.098) | -0.001 ⁺ (0.000) | -0.001 (0.001) | -0.003** (0.001) | -0.001 (0.002) |
| Intrastate conflict | -0.210 (0.278) | -0.039 (0.440) | 0.007 (0.007) | -0.015 (0.014) | 0.023* (0.012) | 0.016 (0.017) |
| Interstate conflict | -1.402* (0.624) | 15.008 (876.424) | 0.022 (0.021) | 0.025 (0.022) | -0.016 (0.028) | 0.002 (0.020) |
| Population (log) | 0.265 ⁺ (0.138) | -2.935 (1.948) | 0.001 (0.002) | -0.136** (0.034) | 0.006* (0.003) | 0.025 (0.055) |
| Lagged Y | | | 0.967** (0.007) | 0.778** (0.033) | | |
| Lagged Y | | | | | 0.945** (0.009) | 0.774** (0.038) |
| Constant | -5.708 ⁺ (2.914) | | -0.055 (0.039) | 2.588** (0.550) | -1.188** (0.196) | -4.619** (1.027) |
| # of countries | 158 | 24 | 159 | 159 | 152 | 152 |
| Observations | 2372 | 358 | 2949 | 2949 | 2596 | 2596 |

Table A6. Testing the relationship between external threats and militarization. The first two columns estimate binary logit regression, and the last four columns estimate OLS regression. Since Model 2 estimates a conditional fixed-effects logit model, all countries having no change in military conscription are dropped from the sample. $+p < 0.1$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$.

| | Only country FE | | | Two-way FE | | |
|----------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| <i>Country-level controls</i> | | | | | | |
| External threat | 0.182** (0.052) | 0.148* (0.058) | 0.134* (0.056) | 0.119* (0.045) | 0.132* (0.052) | 0.100* (0.050) |
| GDP per capita (log) | | -0.019 (0.014) | -0.018 (0.013) | | 0.012 (0.018) | 0.006 (0.017) |
| Polity score | | -0.002 (0.003) | -0.006* (0.003) | | -0.004 (0.002) | -0.010** (0.002) |
| Muslim (%) | | 0.420 (0.314) | 0.067 (0.355) | | 0.045 (0.402) | -0.396 (0.429) |
| Catholic (%) | | 0.817** (0.180) | 0.771** (0.182) | | 0.711** (0.203) | 0.649** (0.214) |
| Female employment (%) | | 1.015* (0.471) | 0.956* (0.449) | | 1.125* (0.492) | 1.037** (0.389) |
| Female legislators (%) | | | -0.008 (0.109) | | | -0.102 (0.127) |
| <i>Individual-level controls</i> | | | | | | |
| Female | -0.129** (0.005) | -0.131** (0.005) | -0.130** (0.005) | -0.129** (0.005) | -0.131** (0.005) | -0.130** (0.005) |
| Age | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) |
| Married | 0.006 (0.004) | 0.003 (0.004) | 0.003 (0.003) | 0.004 (0.004) | 0.003 (0.003) | 0.002 (0.003) |
| Highest education | -0.020** (0.001) | -0.020** (0.002) | -0.020** (0.002) | -0.020** (0.002) | -0.020** (0.002) | -0.020** (0.002) |
| Muslim | 0.060** (0.011) | 0.061** (0.012) | 0.063** (0.013) | 0.059** (0.011) | 0.060** (0.011) | 0.062** (0.012) |
| Catholic | 0.009+ (0.005) | 0.005 (0.004) | 0.005 (0.004) | 0.006 (0.005) | 0.003 (0.004) | 0.004 (0.004) |
| Religiosity | 0.003+ (0.001) | 0.003* (0.001) | 0.003+ (0.001) | 0.003* (0.001) | 0.003* (0.001) | 0.003* (0.001) |
| Constant | 0.494** (0.029) | -0.044 (0.224) | 0.083 (0.216) | 0.509** (0.026) | -0.222 (0.261) | 0.023 (0.227) |
| # of countries | 91 | 86 | 85 | 91 | 86 | 85 |
| # of respondents | 237896 | 226050 | 220322 | 237896 | 226050 | 220322 |
| R ² | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0.20 | 0.19 | 0.19 |

Table A7. Fixed-effects estimators: Including country and/or year fixed-effects instead of country and year random-effects. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

| | Country-year random effects | | | All three levels | | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| <i>Country-level controls</i> | | | | | | |
| External threat | 0.255** (0.040) | 0.141** (0.035) | 0.103** (0.034) | 0.202** (0.042) | 0.184** (0.044) | 0.160** (0.043) |
| GDP per capita (log) | | -0.045** (0.007) | -0.036** (0.007) | | -0.031** (0.008) | -0.023** (0.008) |
| Polity score | | -0.007** (0.002) | -0.008** (0.002) | | -0.004* (0.002) | -0.007** (0.002) |
| Muslim (%) | | 0.008 (0.046) | -0.002 (0.043) | | 0.105+ (0.059) | 0.091 (0.057) |
| Catholic (%) | | -0.167** (0.034) | -0.161** (0.032) | | -0.093+ (0.050) | -0.095* (0.047) |
| Female employment (%) | | -0.270+ (0.144) | -0.146 (0.145) | | -0.154 (0.175) | -0.024 (0.179) |
| Female legislators (%) | | | -0.429** (0.093) | | | -0.266** (0.094) |
| <i>Individual-level controls</i> | | | | | | |
| Female | -0.129** (0.002) | -0.131** (0.002) | -0.130** (0.002) | -0.129** (0.002) | -0.131** (0.002) | -0.130** (0.002) |
| Age | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) |
| Married | 0.004+ (0.002) | 0.003 (0.002) | 0.002 (0.002) | 0.004+ (0.002) | 0.003 (0.002) | 0.002 (0.002) |
| Highest education | -0.020** (0.000) | -0.020** (0.000) | -0.020** (0.000) | -0.020** (0.000) | -0.020** (0.000) | -0.020** (0.000) |
| Muslim | 0.061** (0.005) | 0.058** (0.005) | 0.065** (0.005) | 0.059** (0.005) | 0.058** (0.005) | 0.065** (0.005) |
| Catholic | 0.005+ (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.006+ (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) |
| Religiosity | 0.004** (0.000) | 0.004** (0.000) | 0.004** (0.000) | 0.004** (0.000) | 0.004** (0.000) | 0.004** (0.000) |
| Constant | 0.427** (0.022) | 1.053** (0.105) | 1.024** (0.101) | 0.459** (0.027) | 0.818** (0.123) | 0.773** (0.123) |
| Country-year intercept | 0.176** (0.009) | 0.123** (0.007) | 0.115** (0.006) | 0.016** (0.008) | 0.010** (0.009) | 0.009** (0.012) |
| Country intercept | | | | 0.170** (0.014) | 0.117** (0.011) | 0.110** (0.011) |
| Year intercept | | | | 0.057** (0.005) | 0.057** (0.005) | 0.055** (0.005) |
| Residuals | 0.446** (0.001) | 0.448** (0.001) | 0.449** (0.001) | 0.446** (0.001) | 0.448** (0.001) | 0.449** (0.001) |
| # of countries | 91 | 86 | 85 | 91 | 86 | 85 |
| # of respondents | 237896 | 226050 | 220322 | 237896 | 226050 | 220322 |
| Log likelihood | -146170 | -139692 | -136363 | -146091 | -139650 | -136326 |

Table A8. Alternative multilevel models. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|----------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| <i>Country-level controls</i> | | | | | | |
| External threat (CINC excluded) | 0.248** (0.026) | 0.216** (0.034) | 0.139** (0.035) | | | |
| Geopolitical competition | | | | 0.156** (0.012) | 0.168** (0.014) | 0.108** (0.015) |
| GDP per capita (log) | 0.004 (0.006) | -0.018** (0.006) | | 0.006 (0.007) | 0.004 (0.007) | |
| Polity score | -0.003** (0.001) | -0.009** (0.001) | | -0.000 (0.001) | -0.008** (0.001) | |
| Muslim (%) | 0.485** (0.062) | 0.296** (0.061) | | 0.758** (0.073) | 0.633** (0.069) | |
| Female employment (%) | 0.583** (0.100) | 0.472** (0.104) | | 0.951** (0.108) | 0.936** (0.111) | |
| Female legislators (%) | | -0.185** (0.040) | | | -0.234** (0.046) | |
| <i>Individual-level controls</i> | | | | | | |
| Female | -0.129** (0.002) | -0.129** (0.002) | -0.129** (0.002) | -0.128** (0.002) | -0.130** (0.002) | -0.129** (0.002) |
| Age | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) |
| Married | 0.005* (0.002) | 0.004+ (0.002) | 0.003 (0.002) | 0.006** (0.002) | 0.005* (0.002) | 0.004+ (0.002) |
| Highest education | -0.019** (0.000) | -0.019** (0.000) | -0.019** (0.000) | -0.020** (0.000) | -0.020** (0.000) | -0.020** (0.001) |
| Muslim | 0.053** (0.005) | 0.053** (0.005) | 0.055** (0.005) | 0.059** (0.005) | 0.058** (0.005) | 0.061** (0.005) |
| Catholic | 0.007* (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.003 (0.003) | 0.002 (0.003) | 0.002 (0.003) |
| Religiosity | 0.003** (0.000) | 0.003** (0.000) | 0.003** (0.000) | 0.003** (0.000) | 0.002** (0.000) | 0.002** (0.000) |
| Catholic (%) | | 0.543** (0.042) | 0.462** (0.043) | | 0.451** (0.047) | 0.366** (0.046) |
| Constant | 0.458** (0.025) | -0.049 (0.080) | 0.334** (0.086) | 0.515** (0.025) | -0.236** (0.089) | -0.058 (0.091) |
| Year intercept | 0.036** (0.006) | 0.043** (0.008) | 0.052** (0.009) | 0.042** (0.007) | 0.036** (0.007) | 0.033** (0.006) |
| Country intercept | 0.179** (0.014) | 0.233** (0.021) | 0.211** (0.021) | 0.185** (0.016) | 0.226** (0.022) | 0.199** (0.020) |
| Residuals | 0.449** (0.001) | 0.450** (0.001) | 0.450** (0.001) | 0.448** (0.001) | 0.447** (0.001) | 0.448** (0.001) |
| # of countries | 86 | 83 | 82 | 70 | 69 | 68 |
| # of respondents | 229360 | 221468 | 215740 | 199714 | 195823 | 190095 |
| Log likelihood | -141855 | -137678 | -134277 | -123354 | -120516 | -117122 |

Table A9. Using the alternative measure of external threats: external threats (excluding CINC ratio) and geopolitical competition. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|----------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| <i>Country-level controls</i> | | | | | |
| External threat | 0.118** (0.014) | 0.121** (0.020) | 0.125** (0.020) | 0.137** (0.022) | 0.148** (0.022) |
| GDP per capita (log) | | 0.009+ (0.006) | -0.002 (0.005) | 0.011 (0.009) | 0.022** (0.008) |
| Polity score | | -0.002** (0.001) | -0.003** (0.001) | -0.006** (0.001) | -0.007** (0.001) |
| Muslim (%) | | 0.587** (0.066) | 0.476** (0.066) | 0.736** (0.076) | 0.713** (0.077) |
| Catholic (%) | | 0.439** (0.042) | 0.554** (0.043) | 0.512** (0.043) | 0.517** (0.043) |
| Female employment (%) | | 1.050** (0.107) | 0.840** (0.107) | 0.937** (0.118) | 1.013** (0.117) |
| <i>Individual-level controls</i> | | | | | |
| Female | | -0.131** (0.002) | -0.131** (0.002) | -0.130** (0.002) | -0.130** (0.002) |
| Age | | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) |
| Married | | 0.003 (0.002) | 0.003 (0.002) | 0.005* (0.002) | 0.005* (0.002) |
| Highest education | | -0.020** (0.000) | -0.020** (0.000) | -0.020** (0.001) | -0.020** (0.001) |
| Muslim | | 0.061** (0.005) | 0.061** (0.005) | 0.056** (0.005) | 0.055** (0.005) |
| Catholic | | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.003 (0.003) | 0.003 (0.003) |
| Religiosity | | 0.003** (0.000) | 0.003** (0.000) | 0.003** (0.000) | 0.003** (0.000) |
| Democracy duration (log) | | -0.033** (0.004) | | | |
| Oil dependence | | | 0.001 (0.003) | | |
| Modernization | | | | 0.001** (0.000) | |
| Materialist culture | | | | | 0.001** (0.000) |
| Constant | 0.431** (0.025) | -0.178* (0.082) | -0.074 (0.077) | -0.290** (0.103) | -0.365** (0.100) |
| Year intercept | 0.053** (0.009) | 0.045** (0.008) | 0.043** (0.008) | 0.054** (0.010) | 0.054** (0.010) |
| Country intercept | 0.198** (0.015) | 0.209** (0.018) | 0.242** (0.022) | 0.223** (0.021) | 0.231** (0.022) |
| Residuals | 0.455** (0.001) | 0.448** (0.001) | 0.449** (0.001) | 0.452** (0.001) | 0.452** (0.001) |
| # of countries | 92 | 84 | 86 | 73 | 73 |
| # of respondents | 266319 | 221656 | 226050 | 196111 | 196111 |
| Log likelihood | -168241 | -136933 | -140139 | -122784 | -122785 |

Table A10. Including additional controls. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

| Dependent var. | men should have more right to a job than women | | | university education is more important for a boy than for a girl | | |
|----------------------------------|--|----------|----------|--|----------|----------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| <i>Country-level controls</i> | | | | | | |
| External threat | 0.051* | | | 0.225** | | |
| | (0.021) | | | (0.037) | | |
| Military conscription | | -0.017 | | | 0.087** | |
| | | (0.011) | | | (0.020) | |
| Military size (log) | | | -0.036** | | | 0.044** |
| | | | (0.007) | | | (0.015) |
| Military spending/GDP (log) | | | -0.094** | | | -0.102** |
| | | | (0.008) | | | (0.015) |
| GDP per capita (log) | 0.041** | 0.010 | 0.067** | -0.079** | -0.052** | -0.069** |
| | (0.006) | (0.009) | (0.008) | (0.010) | (0.015) | (0.014) |
| Polity score | -0.000 | -0.003** | -0.003** | -0.002+ | 0.000 | -0.004** |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.001) |
| Muslim (%) | 0.574** | 0.141+ | 0.882** | 1.384** | 0.997** | 1.947** |
| | (0.076) | (0.073) | (0.098) | (0.121) | (0.123) | (0.162) |
| Female employment (%) | -0.501** | -1.293** | -0.407** | 2.739** | 2.399** | 2.050** |
| | (0.111) | (0.151) | (0.126) | (0.198) | (0.271) | (0.227) |
| <i>Individual-level controls</i> | | | | | | |
| Strong defense | | 0.042** | 0.040** | | 0.104** | 0.115** |
| | | (0.004) | (0.003) | | (0.007) | (0.006) |
| Female | -0.130** | -0.130** | -0.131** | -0.219** | -0.228** | -0.219** |
| | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| Age | 0.002** | 0.002** | 0.002** | 0.002** | 0.003** | 0.002** |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Married | 0.027** | 0.027** | 0.029** | 0.003 | 0.001 | 0.004 |
| | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.002) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.004) |
| Highest education | -0.028** | -0.030** | -0.028** | -0.049** | -0.052** | -0.048** |
| | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Muslim | 0.072** | 0.072** | 0.075** | 0.107** | 0.085** | 0.086** |
| | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.005) | (0.009) | (0.011) | (0.009) |
| Catholic | 0.001 | -0.001 | 0.000 | 0.015** | 0.017* | 0.019** |
| | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.006) |
| Religiosity | 0.009** | 0.010** | 0.008** | 0.002* | 0.005** | 0.001 |
| | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Catholic (%) | 0.841** | 0.357** | 0.821** | 1.163** | 0.622** | 1.382** |
| | (0.046) | (0.055) | (0.054) | (0.078) | (0.093) | (0.090) |
| Constant | -0.047 | 0.802** | -0.672** | 1.004** | 1.207** | 0.642** |
| | (0.084) | (0.110) | (0.119) | (0.146) | (0.194) | (0.212) |
| Year intercept | 0.058** | 0.059** | 0.102** | 0.132** | 0.105** | 0.187** |
| | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.018) | (0.023) | (0.021) | (0.032) |
| Country intercept | 0.310** | 0.219** | 0.348** | 0.449** | 0.349** | 0.552** |
| | (0.027) | (0.022) | (0.030) | (0.040) | (0.033) | (0.059) |
| Residuals | 0.430** | 0.430** | 0.428** | 0.842** | 0.844** | 0.838** |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| # of countries | 86 | 78 | 82 | 86 | 78 | 82 |
| # of respondents | 193071 | 140137 | 170743 | 230715 | 161666 | 203092 |
| Log likelihood | -111537 | -80952 | -97797 | -288086 | -202156 | -252625 |

Table A11. Alternative dependent variables. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

We investigate the relationship between the external security environment and gender attitudes on education and employment. We conduct these supplementary analyses because previous studies show that attitudes about political leadership, education, and employment constitute gender norms and individual beliefs about gender equality (e.g., Alexander and Welzel, 2011; Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn, 2013; Seguino, 2011). This implies that these three attitudes correlate with one another. The first dependent variable for patriarchal attitudes is a binary indicator marking whether a respondent agrees with the statement that “[w]hen jobs are

scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.” The second dependent variable is a four-level ordinal indicator reporting the level of agreement with “[a] university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.” As presented in Table A11, we find that hostile security environments significantly correlate with negative attitudes about female employment and female education. At the same time, we find that the effect of militarization, one of our key mechanisms, differs across attitudes. In particular, militarization is not associated with negative attitudes about female employment, while it is with negative attitudes about female leadership and education. More research is necessary to find how external threats influence various gender attitudes and what the relationship among these gender attitudes is.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|----------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| <i>Country-level controls</i> | | | |
| External threat | 0.113** (0.014) | 0.125** (0.020) | 0.092** (0.020) |
| GDP per capita (log) | | -0.000 (0.006) | -0.010+ (0.006) |
| Polity score | | -0.003** (0.001) | -0.008** (0.001) |
| Muslim (%) | | 0.477** (0.065) | 0.299** (0.065) |
| Female employment (%) | | 0.854** (0.107) | 0.717** (0.109) |
| Female legislators (%) | | | -0.119** (0.039) |
| Yearly trend | -0.004* (0.002) | -0.002 (0.002) | 0.000 (0.002) |
| <i>Individual-level controls</i> | | | |
| Female | -0.129** (0.002) | -0.131** (0.002) | -0.130** (0.002) |
| Age | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) |
| Married | 0.004* (0.002) | 0.003 (0.002) | 0.002 (0.002) |
| Highest education | -0.020** (0.000) | -0.020** (0.000) | -0.020** (0.000) |
| Muslim | 0.061** (0.005) | 0.061** (0.005) | 0.064** (0.005) |
| Catholic | 0.006* (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) |
| Religiosity | 0.004** (0.000) | 0.003** (0.000) | 0.003** (0.000) |
| Catholic (%) | | 0.554** (0.042) | 0.479** (0.043) |
| Constant | 7.872* (3.341) | 2.975 (3.674) | -0.191 (4.314) |
| Year intercept | 0.042** (0.008) | 0.042** (0.008) | 0.050** (0.009) |
| Country intercept | 0.186** (0.014) | 0.243** (0.022) | 0.224** (0.022) |
| Residuals | 0.448** (0.001) | 0.449** (0.001) | 0.449** (0.001) |
| # of countries | 91 | 86 | 85 |
| # of respondents | 237896 | 226050 | 220322 |
| Log likelihood | -146714 | -140139 | -136745 |

Table A12. Adding yearly trend to the models of Table 1 in the main text. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

| | Three-level | | | Four-level | | |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| <i>Country-level controls</i> | | | | | | |
| External threat | 0.228** (0.028) | 0.207** (0.038) | 0.123** (0.038) | 0.215** (0.028) | 0.244** (0.038) | 0.174** (0.038) |
| GDP per capita (log) | | -0.066** (0.011) | -0.089** (0.011) | | 0.008 (0.010) | -0.012 (0.011) |
| Polity score | | -0.004** (0.001) | -0.016** (0.001) | | -0.006** (0.001) | -0.016** (0.001) |
| Muslim (%) | | 1.356** (0.133) | 0.862** (0.129) | | 0.885** (0.126) | 0.515** (0.126) |
| Catholic (%) | | 1.305** (0.082) | 1.096** (0.082) | | 1.086** (0.081) | 0.936** (0.082) |
| Female employment (%) | | 1.165** (0.205) | 0.872** (0.209) | | 1.585** (0.203) | 1.324** (0.208) |
| Female legislators (%) | | | -0.283** (0.073) | | | -0.226** (0.073) |
| <i>Individual-level controls</i> | | | | | | |
| Female | -0.283** (0.004) | -0.287** (0.004) | -0.284** (0.004) | -0.249** (0.004) | -0.252** (0.004) | -0.251** (0.004) |
| Age | 0.002** (0.000) | 0.002** (0.000) | 0.002** (0.000) | 0.002** (0.000) | 0.002** (0.000) | 0.002** (0.000) |
| Married | 0.012** (0.004) | 0.008* (0.004) | 0.007 ⁺ (0.004) | 0.008* (0.004) | 0.006 (0.004) | 0.004 (0.004) |
| Highest education | -0.038** (0.001) | -0.039** (0.001) | -0.038** (0.001) | -0.038** (0.001) | -0.038** (0.001) | -0.038** (0.001) |
| Muslim | 0.122** (0.009) | 0.117** (0.009) | 0.119** (0.009) | 0.117** (0.009) | 0.117** (0.009) | 0.122** (0.009) |
| Catholic | 0.010 ⁺ (0.006) | 0.003 (0.006) | 0.005 (0.006) | 0.010 ⁺ (0.006) | 0.004 (0.006) | 0.004 (0.006) |
| Religiosity | 0.009** (0.001) | 0.009** (0.001) | 0.009** (0.001) | 0.007** (0.001) | 0.006** (0.001) | 0.006** (0.001) |
| Constant | 2.561** (0.052) | 1.990** (0.152) | 2.603** (0.156) | 1.020** (0.046) | -0.167 (0.148) | 0.338* (0.154) |
| Year intercept | 0.118** (0.020) | 0.108** (0.019) | 0.128** (0.022) | 0.092** (0.016) | 0.084** (0.016) | 0.097** (0.018) |
| Country intercept | 0.404** (0.030) | 0.518** (0.044) | 0.459** (0.041) | 0.358** (0.027) | 0.476** (0.043) | 0.444** (0.046) |
| Residuals | 0.850** (0.001) | 0.854** (0.001) | 0.851** (0.001) | 0.877** (0.001) | 0.880** (0.001) | 0.880** (0.001) |
| # of countries | 91 | 86 | 85 | 91 | 86 | 85 |
| # of respondents | 237896 | 226050 | 220322 | 250099 | 237899 | 231979 |
| Log likelihood | -299352 | -285285 | -277359 | -322424 | -307342 | -299791 |

Table A13. Using the three-level or four-level ordinal dependent variables treating both “No answer” and/or “Don’t know” as an intermediate position. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

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