

## **Appendix: Divided Government, Delegation, and Civil Service Reform \***

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### DATES OF ADOPTION OF MERIT SYSTEMS

Table A1 below shows the dates of the adoption of the merit systems across US states. We rely on two main secondary sources, namely Ujhelyi 2014 and Ting et al. 2013. Where the dates are the same in these two sources, no further research is carried out. Where these two dates differ, we look for further secondary and primary sources. In some cases, no sources were available and hence we relied on Ujhelyi 2014 ‘as default’. In those cases where we find that primary sources contradict his findings, we specify it in the Notes column.

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State	Introduction Merit System			Notes
	Ujhelyi 2014	Ting et al. 2013	This Paper	
AK	1960	1960	1960	Same
AL	1939	1939	1939	Same
AR	1969	1968	1969	Ujhelyi (2014) as default
AZ	1968	1968	1968	Same
CA	1913	1913	1913	Same
CO	1919	1918	1918	Colorado Constitution amended in 1918
CT	1937	1937	1937	Same
DE	1968	1966	1966	Law enacting merit system passed in 1966
FL	1967	1968	1967	Florida statute enacted in 1967
GA	1945	1953	1945	Georgia constitution amended in 1945
HI	1955	1955	1955	Same
IA	1967	1966	1966	Iowa Code enacted in 1966
ID	1967	1969	1967	Ujhelyi (2014) as default
IL	1905	1905	1905	Same
IN	1941	1941	1941	Same
KS	1941	1941	1941	Same
KY	1960	1954	1960	Law passed in 1960
LA	1952	1940	1952	Ujhelyi (2014) as default
MA	1885	1885	1885	Same
MD	1921	1921	1921	Same
ME	1937	1937	1937	Same
MI	1941	1937	1940	Ujhelyi (2014) as default
MN	1939	1939	1939	Same
MO	1945	1946	1945	Constitution amended in 1945
MS	1977	1976	1976	Code enacting merit system adopted in 1976
MT	1976	1976	1976	Same
NC	1949	1949	1949	Same
ND	1975	1974	1975	Ujhelyi (2014) as default
NE	1975	1974	1975	Ujhelyi (2014) as default
NH	1950	1954	1950	Ujhelyi (2014) as default
NJ	1908	1908	1908	Same
NM	1961	1962	1961	Ujhelyi (2014) as default
NV	1953	1953	1953	Same
NY	1883	1883	1883	Same
OH	1913	1913	1913	Same
OK	1959	1958	1959	Merit system adopted in 1959
OR	1945	1945	1945	Same
PA	1963	1968	1963	Ujhelyi (2014) as default
RI	1939	1939	1939	Same
SC	1969	1973	1969	Ujhelyi (2014) as default
SD	1973	1968	1973	Ujhelyi (2014) as default
TN	1937	1937	1937	Same
UT	1963	1962	1963	Ujhelyi (2014) as default
VA	1943	1942	1943	Ujhelyi (2014) as default
VT	1950	1950	1950	Same
WA	1961	1961	1961	Same
WI	1905	1905	1905	Same
WV	1989	1989	1989	Same
WY	1957	1956	1957	Personnel Act adopted in 1957

## ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE

Before discussing the statistical analysis, we provide some anecdotal evidence that the push for civil service reform was mainly bipartisan and the main reforms across the U.S. states were enacted when a single party did not have full control over the government. This is different from what the contemporary political economy literature normally assumes.

The semi-annual *Book of the States* (BoS) provides detailed discussions of the process of state government reorganization. The BoS documents that reorganization is often overseen by bi-partisan commissions and supported by the use of study groups and public opinion polls (BoS 1954 Section IV). The introduction of the merit system across U.S. states was no different. In the 1940s and 1950s, a series of Little Hoover Commissions, modeled after the Hoover Commission at the federal level, were central in making proposals for strengthening central personnel agencies in several states, such as Montana, Nevada, Illinois, Louisiana, and New Mexico (BoS 1954 Section IV).

An interesting example of this process was Louisiana's 1940 law enacting a comprehensive civil service. The law was drafted by a group of citizens with the help of public interest attorneys, rather than by lobbyists or legislators themselves (Hyneman 1940). The legislation set up a state civil service commission, composed of individuals appointed by state universities and confirmed by the governor, to oversee the implementation of the merit system. The drafters realized that the merit system would need strong public support to survive (Hyneman 1940).

The reform in Michigan, around the same time, also demonstrates the importance of a bipartisan commission. According to Litchfield (1941, p.80), "The amendment seeks to set up a system in which the actual administration is conducted by a competent personnel director, who is to be advised by, and in the last analysis checked by, a non-salaried, bi-partisan commission".

Similarly, bipartisan commissions and civil society groups were central in the first wave of civil service reform at the end of the 19th century. The New York Civil Service Reform Association is the exemplary case, which inspired the Civil Service Commission created by the Pendleton Act at the federal level.

Comprehensive civil service reforms were introduced at times when no single party had a stronghold over the government. As pointed out by Dresang (1982, p. 44):

the cluster of states where reforms have been most frequent and far-reaching are states where there is meaningful two-party conflict in gubernatorial races and where there have indeed been changes in governors and in party control of that office during the period being examined.

This was true also at the federal level, where the discussion about the introduction of a merit system started between the Democrat President Johnson and the Republican-controlled Congress (Ruhil and Camões 2003). In the process of extending the merit

system at the federal level, the Congress decided to adopt a strong commitment device (enshrined in the Pendleton Act), which envisaged the automatic expansion of the merit system as the federal civil service grew (Johnson and Libecap 1994). This was done to avoid potential conflicts (and Presidential vetoes) on periodic votes on the expansion of the civil service (Johnson and Libecap 1994).

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

TABLE A1 *Descriptive Statistics*

VARIABLES	N	mean	sd	min	max
Civil Service Reform	950	0.889	0.314	0	1
Citizen Ideology	912	0.432	0.175	0.00963	0.869
Income	912	10.68	1.889	5.297	15.80
IPE	849	0.455	0.498	0	1
Percent Urban	912	0.659	0.143	0.321	0.917
Full-time Employment	912	10.47	0.846	8.434	12.40
Simple Divided Government	931	0.300	0.458	0	1
Divided Veto	931	0.345	0.476	0	1
Divided Tax and Budget	931	0.361	0.481	0	1
Civil Service Reform IPE	849	1.331	0.685	0	2
Divided Governor	931	0.300	0.458	0	1
Divided Chambers	950	0.155	0.362	0	1
Divided Any	931	0.458	0.498	0	1
Share Governor Party in Senate	931	57.27	23.62	0	100
Share Governor Party in House	931	57.13	22.69	3	100
Share Dem Governor	950	6.431	29.73	-100	100

## ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

TABLE A2 *Divided Government Veto and Civil Service Reform*

VARIABLES	(1) Merit IPE	(2) Merit IPE	(3) Merit IPE	(4) Merit IPE (O. Logit)	(5) Merit
Divided Veto	0.145** (0.0519)	0.149** (0.0520)	0.0816+ (0.0453)	0.818** (0.300)	0.0321+ (0.0163)
Citizen Ideology			0.620* (0.257)	8.392** (2.834)	0.0201 (0.139)
Percent Urban			3.899 (8.214)	45.45 (28.63)	3.082 (3.700)
Income			0.0422 (0.0849)	-0.0828 (0.435)	0.0250 (0.0432)
Full-time Employment			0.241 (0.382)	-2.731 (4.128)	-0.00196 (0.138)
Observations	830	830	830	830	893
State FE	X	X	X	X	X
Time FE		X	X	X	X
State-Specific Trends			X		X

Notes: Column 1 shows the results for the OLS regression model with state fixed effects. Column 2 adds year fixed effects and Column 3 time-varying controls (citizen ideology, urban population, (logged) number of state employees and (squared) income) and state-specific time trends. Column 4 uses ordered logistic regression and includes state and time fixed effects and controls. Column 5 uses the same specification of Column 3, but uses the introduction of a comprehensive merit system as (dichotomous) dependent variable, without taking into consideration the appointment rules for the personnel executive. In all models standard errors are clustered by state. \*\*p<.01; \*p<.05; +p<.1.

TABLE A3 *Simple Divided Government and Civil Service Reform*

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Merit IPE	Merit IPE	Merit IPE	Merit IPE (O. Logit)	Merit
Simple Divided Government	0.0862 (0.0522)	0.0815 (0.0606)	0.0254 (0.0431)	0.243 (0.373)	-0.00127 (0.0150)
Citizen Ideology			0.630* (0.254)	8.075** (2.899)	0.0229 (0.139)
Percent Urban			4.326 (8.209)	46.64 (29.84)	3.382 (3.694)
Income			0.0374 (0.0861)	-0.155 (0.425)	0.0240 (0.0434)
Full-time Employment			0.235 (0.385)	-2.781 (4.220)	-0.00740 (0.138)
Observations	830	830	830	830	893
State FE	X	X	X	X	X
Time FE		X	X	X	X
State-Specific Trends			X		X

Notes: Column 1 shows the results for the OLS regression model with state fixed effects. Column 2 adds year fixed effects and Column 3 time-varying controls (citizen ideology, urban population, (logged) number of state employees and (squared) income) and state-specific time trends. Column 4 uses ordered logistic regression and includes state and time fixed effects and controls. Column 5 uses the same specification of Column 3, but uses the introduction of a comprehensive merit system as (dichotomous) dependent variable, without taking into consideration the appointment rules for the personnel executive. In all models standard errors are clustered by state. \*\*p<.01; \*p<.05; +p<.1.

TABLE A4 *Divided Government Tax and Budget and Civil Service Reform*

VARIABLES	(1) Merit IPE	(2) Merit IPE	(3) Merit IPE	(4) Merit IPE (O. Logit)	(5) Merit
Divided Tax and Budget	0.147** (0.0521)	0.153** (0.0525)	0.0807+ (0.0462)	0.841** (0.305)	0.0334+ (0.0166)
Citizen Ideology			0.615* (0.257)	8.347** (2.827)	0.0182 (0.140)
Percent Urban			3.820 (8.191)	45.72 (28.69)	3.041 (3.690)
Income			0.0411 (0.0850)	-0.0979 (0.433)	0.0245 (0.0432)
Full-time Employment			0.225 (0.385)	-2.834 (4.138)	-0.00864 (0.137)
Observations	830	830	830	830	893
State FE	X	X	X	X	X
Time FE		X	X	X	X
State-Specific Trends			X		X

Notes: Column 1 shows the results for the OLS regression model with state fixed effects. Column 2 adds year fixed effects and Column 3 time-varying controls (citizen ideology, urban population, (logged) number of state employees and (squared) income) and state-specific time trends. Column 4 uses ordered logistic regression and includes state and time fixed effects and controls. Column 5 uses the same specification of Column 3, but uses the introduction of a comprehensive merit system as (dichotomous) dependent variable, without taking into consideration the appointment rules for the personnel executive. In all models standard errors are clustered by state. \*\*p<.01; \*p<.05; +p<.1.



TABLE A5 *Divided Governor, Divided Chamber, Divided Any, Divided Veto and Civil Service Reform - Shares*

VARIABLES	(1) Merit IPE	(2) Merit IPE	(3) Merit IPE	(4) Merit IPE	(5) Merit IPE
Divided Any	0.175** (0.0635)		0.0767 (0.0521)		
Divided Veto		0.148** (0.0519)			
Divided Governor				0.205* (0.0988)	0.0661 (0.0790)
Divided Chambers				0.158* (0.0642)	0.0817+ (0.0472)
Citizen Ideology			0.616* (0.248)		0.616* (0.248)
Percent Urban			3.660 (7.758)		3.696 (7.713)
Income			0.0432 (0.0829)		0.0440 (0.0841)
Full-time Employment			0.243 (0.373)		0.238 (0.378)
Constant	1.164** (0.121)	1.318** (0.0746)	-4.399 (6.429)	1.127** (0.149)	-4.370 (6.465)
Observations	830	830	830	830	830
State FE	X	X	X	X	X
Time FE	X	X	X	X	X
Shares	X	X	X	X	X
State-Specific Trends			X		X

SE clustered by state

\*\*p<.01; \*p<.05; +p<.1

Notes: The columns add the shares of the governor party in both chambers and the share of votes for democratic governor, replicating respectively: Column 2, 3 and 5 in Table 1 and Column 2 and 4 in Table 2. In all models standard errors are clustered by state. \*\*p<.01; \*p<.05; +p<.1.

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