

# Supporting Information

This appendix contains information that is supplemental to “Islam, Gender Segregation, and Political Engagement: Evidence from an Experiment in Tunisia”

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# 1 Summary Statistics and Balance Tests

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>Min.</b>	<b>Max.</b>	<b>N</b>
Contact, Wave 2	0.860	0.348	0	1	1,089
Woman Enumerator	0.529	0.499	0	1	1,084
Woman Respondent	0.529	0.499	0	1	1,084
Political Islam Supporter	0.246	0.431	0	1	1,066
National Security Priority	0.238	0.426	0	1	1,107
Nidaa Tounes Supporter	0.412	0.492	0	1	1,084
Age	40.144	16.277	18	87	1,084
Education	3.073	1.354	1	6	1,084
Employed	0.366	0.482	0	1	1,084
Rural Resident	0.321	0.467	0	1	1,084

Table 1: **Summary statistics**

Variable	Mean & Standard Deviation				P-Value for test that: Wom=Mixed	N N
	Mean (Woman)	SD (Woman)	Mean (Mixed)	SD (Mixed)		
Woman Enumerator	0.536	0.499	0.521	0.5	0.639	1,084
Woman Respondent	0.517	0.5	0.54	0.499	0.455	1,084
National Security Priority	0.227	0.419	0.249	0.433	0.394	1,107
Nidaa Tounes Supporter	0.439	0.497	0.385	0.487	0.075	1,084
Age	40.558	16.286	39.723	16.273	0.399	1,084
Education	3.018	1.353	3.128	1.354	0.180	1,084
Employed	0.382	0.486	0.35	0.477	0.275	1,084
Rural Resident	0.316	0.465	0.326	0.469	0.735	1,084
Political Knowledge	2.010	0.836	2.026	0.825	0.739	1,107
Marital Status	0.641	0.480	0.639	0.481	0.934	1,026
Household Income	2.324	1.033	2.362	1.048	0.555	1,031
Religiosity	1.509	1.003	1.476	0.980	0.597	993
Voted for Parliament	0.642	0.480	0.613	0.488	0.324	1,082

Note: Averages and standard deviations for each treatment condition of key variables. P-Value based on OLS regressions of variable on treatments.

Table 2: **Balance Table**

## 2 Perceived Effectiveness and Qualifications

	<b>Nidaa Tounes</b>	<b>Ennahda</b>	<b>Small Parties</b>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Across Both Treatments</i>	3.00	2.99	2.92
<i>Women Representatives</i>	2.98	3.14	2.94
<i>Mixed Representatives</i>	3.02	2.82	2.91
<i>Difference</i>	-0.04	0.30	0.03
<i>95% confidence interval</i>	(-0.20 to 0.11)	(0.10 to 0.51)	(-0.22 to 0.28)
<i>N</i>	355	197	181

Table 3: **The effects of women officeholders and individuals' party identification on perceived effectiveness.** Perceived effectiveness is measured on a four-point scale. Data are from Wave 2.

	<b>Nidaa Tounes</b>	<b>Ennahda</b>	<b>Small Parties</b>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Across Both Treatments</i>	3.04	3.05	3.01
<i>Women Representatives</i>	3.05	3.15	3.01
<i>Mixed Representatives</i>	3.03	2.93	3.00
<i>Difference</i>	0.03	0.22	0.01
<i>95% confidence interval</i>	(-0.12 to 0.17)	(0.02 to 0.41)	(-0.21 to 0.23)
<i>N</i>	361	189	182

Table 4: **The effects of women officeholders and individuals' party identification on perceived qualifications.** Perceived qualifications are measured on a four-point scale. Data are from Wave 2.

### 3 Robustness Checks

#### 3.1 Effects Conditional on Enumerator Gender

	<b>Overall</b>	<b>Men</b>	<b>Women</b>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Women Representatives</i>	0.58** (0.251)	0.52 (0.326)	0.67* (0.398)
<i>Woman Enumerator</i>	0.44* (0.238)	0.29 (0.346)	0.54 (0.333)
<i>Women Representatives x Woman Enumerator</i>	-0.45 (0.356)	-0.44 (0.503)	-0.51 (0.521)
<i>Constant</i>	1.42*** (0.159)	1.41*** (0.215)	1.43*** (0.237)
<i>N</i>	1,067	503	564

Table 5: **The Effects of Women Officeholders and Enumerators' Gender on Willingness to Communicate.** This table gives the results from a logistic regression (\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , and \*  $p < 0.1$ ).

### 3.2 Results with Electoral District Fixed Effects

	<b>Overall</b>	<b>Men</b>	<b>Women</b>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Women Representatives</i>	0.36** (0.183)	0.36 (0.258)	0.44* (0.268)
<i>Electoral District Fixed Effects?</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Constant</i>	1.46*** (0.275)	1.33*** (0.385)	1.57*** (0.394)
<i>N</i>	1,052	478	471

Table 6: **The Effects of Women Officeholders on Willingness to Communicate with District Fixed Effects.** Fixed effects for the 27 electoral districts in Tunisia are omitted from this table in the interest of space. This table gives the results from a logistic regression (\*\*\*)  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , and \*  $p < 0.1$ ).

### 3.3 Tests for Spillover

	Overall	Men	Women
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Women Representatives</i>	0.66*	0.88	0.35
	(0.381)	(0.537)	(0.558)
<i>EOs 1</i>	0.90**	1.10*	0.63
	(0.418)	(0.590)	(0.608)
<i>EOs 2</i>	0.47	0.79	0.04
	(0.413)	(0.598)	(0.589)
<i>EOs 3</i>	0.21	0.18	0.28
	(0.349)	(0.483)	(0.541)
<i>EOs 4</i>	0.16	0.73	-0.43
	(0.382)	(0.566)	(0.542)
<i>EOs 5</i>	0.45	0.83	0.03
	(0.413)	(0.644)	(0.565)
<i>Women Representatives x EOs 1</i>	-0.77	1.52*	0.09
	(0.617)	(0.848)	(0.942)
<i>Women Representatives x EOs 2</i>	-0.57	-0.75	-0.35
	(0.584)	(0.828)	(0.841)
<i>Women Representatives x EOs 3</i>	-0.01	-0.06	0.04
	(0.572)	(0.790)	(0.855)
<i>Women Representatives x EOs 4</i>	0.02	-0.56	0.62
	(0.583)	(0.843)	(0.824)
<i>Women Representatives x EOs 5</i>	-0.46	-0.92	-0.02
	(0.605)	(0.901)	(0.842)
<i>Constant</i>	1.29***	1.00***	1.63***
	(0.252)	(0.352)	(0.387)
<i>N</i>	1,089	503	564

Table 7: **The Effects of Women Officeholders on Willingness to Communicate, Controlling for Previous Experimental Treatments.** The survey contained an earlier experiment on the effects of election observers (EOs). Treatment assignment to that experiment was independent of treatment assignment to this experiment. The experiment had five experimental conditions and one control group, which is the omitted category in the regressions above. This table gives the results from a logistic regression (\*\*\*)  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , and \*  $p < 0.1$ ).



### 3.4 Effects Conditional on Respondent Gender

	(1)
<i>Women Representatives</i>	0.33 (0.248)
<i>Woman Respondent</i>	0.20 (0.236)
<i>Women Representatives x Woman Respondent</i>	0.06 (0.355)
<i>Constant</i>	1.53*** (0.168)
<i>N</i>	1,067

Table 8: **The Effects of Women Officeholders and Respondents' Gender on Willingness to Communicate.** This table gives the results from a logistic regression (\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , and \*  $p < 0.1$ ).

### 3.5 Effects Conditional on Prioritization of National Security (NS)

	Overall (1)	Men (2)	Women (3)	Nidaa (4)	Nahda (5)	Small Parties (6)
<i>Women Reps.</i>	0.28 (0.199)	0.22 (0.278)	0.28 (0.289)	-0.15 (0.341)	0.65 (0.454)	0.20 (0.374)
<i>NS</i>	-0.11 (0.267)	-0.38 (0.393)	0.05 (0.368)	-0.12 (0.480)	-0.75 (0.532)	0.20 (0.554)
<i>Women Reps. x NS</i>	0.52 (0.438)	0.53 (0.620)	0.52 (0.630)	0.64 (0.706)	0.25 (0.889)	0.92 (1.206)
<i>Constant</i>	1.66*** (0.135)	1.62*** (0.194)	1.71*** (0.195)	2.04*** (0.258)	1.69*** (0.291)	1.32*** (0.252)
<i>N</i>	1,089	503	564	440	240	227

Table 9: **The Effects of Women Officeholders and Prioritization of National Security Issues on Willingness to Communicate.** *NS* (National security) is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent viewed the most important issue as national security and 0 otherwise. This table gives the results from a logistic regression (\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , and \*  $p < 0.1$ ).

### 3.6 Effects Conditional on Prioritization of the Economy

	Overall	Men	Women	Nidaa	Nahda	Small Parties
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Women Reps.</i>	0.39 (0.308)	0.15 (0.420)	0.62 (0.463)	0.28 (0.531)	0.60 (0.662)	0.12 (0.644)
<i>Economy</i>	-0.05 (0.244)	0.07 (0.348)	-0.10 (0.347)	-0.07 (0.449)	0.13 (0.499)	-0.17 (0.496)
<i>Women Reps. x Econ.</i>	-0.01 (0.376)	0.26 (0.520)	-0.32 (0.555)	-0.39 (0.643)	0.20 (0.818)	0.21 (0.765)
<i>Constant</i>	1.66*** (0.196)	1.49*** (0.277)	1.79*** (0.279)	2.05*** (0.354)	1.42*** (0.394)	1.49*** (0.418)
<i>N</i>	1,089	503	564	440	240	227

Table 10: **The Effects of Women Officeholders and Prioritization of the Economy on Willingness to Communicate.** *Economy* is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent viewed the most important issue as the economy and 0 otherwise. This table gives the results from a logistic regression (\*\*\*)  $p < 0.01$ , (\*\*)  $p < 0.05$ , and (\*)  $p < 0.1$ ).

### 3.7 Effects Conditional on Partisan Support

	Baseline (1)	With Controls (2)
<i>Women Representatives</i>	0.27 (0.347)	0.26 (0.352)
<i>Party: Ennahda</i>	0.13 (0.329)	0.00 (0.338)
<i>Party: Nidaa</i>	0.64** (0.312)	0.49 (0.321)
<i>Ennahda*Women</i>	0.48 (0.521)	0.49 (0.527)
<i>Nidaa*Women</i>	-0.27 (0.456)	-0.27 (0.462)
<i>Age</i>		0.02*** (0.008)
<i>Women Respondent</i>		0.17 (0.209)
<i>Education Level</i>		0.01 (0.084)
<i>Employed</i>		-0.21 (0.212)
<i>Rural Resident</i>		0.29 (0.221)
<i>Constant</i>	1.37*** (0.224)	0.49 (0.532)
<i>N</i>	907	907

Table 11: **The Effects of Women Officeholders and Respondents’ Partisan Support on Willingness to Communicate.** *Party* is a variable that measures respondents’ partisan support. Each category of party is entered as a binary indicator. The baseline category for *Party* is “small parties.” This table gives the results from a logistic regression (\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , and \*  $p < 0.1$ ).




Figure 1: **The Effect of Women Officeholders on Contact, Conditional on the Respondents’ Support for Certain Parties.** Probabilities based on Model 2 in Table 11.

Recall that our argument is that some conservative Islamist respondents in our survey had a negative reaction to seeing gender mixing in what we had intended to be a control condition. Within this context, it is interesting to note that the treatment effect for supporters of small parties is similar to that of Ennahda supporters, though it does not reach conventional levels of significance. This pattern makes sense when we consider that supporters of political Islam are significantly more likely to support the smaller parties than they are to support Nidaa Tounes (24 percent of small parties’ supporters are Islamists vs. 15 percent of Nidaa Tounes’ supporters). As noted in the main text, support for political Islam and support for Ennahda are not perfectly correlated since citizens’ voting decisions are also shaped by more programmatic considerations (Berman and Nugent, 2015). Consequently, not all Islamists support Ennahda, and not all Ennahda supporters are Islamists. Thus, the fact that supporters of small parties reacted somewhat more negatively to the mixed-gender condition is consistent with the argument about gender mixing that we develop in the main text. If relatively more supporters of these small parties are Islamists, then we would expect them to have relatively more discomfort with gender mixing.

### 3.8 Effects Conditional on Respondent Support for Political Islam

	Baseline (1)	With Controls (2)
<i>Women Representatives</i>	0.10 (0.206)	0.10 (0.209)
<i>Supports Political Islam</i>	-0.52** (0.251)	-0.47* (0.256)
<i>Women Representatives x Supports Political Islam</i>	1.01** (0.440)	0.99** (0.444)
<i>Age</i>		0.02*** (0.007)
<i>Woman Respondent</i>		0.16 (0.194)
<i>Education Level</i>		-0.00 (0.076)
<i>Employed</i>		-0.12 (0.197)
<i>Rural Resident</i>		0.35* (0.205)
<i>Constant</i>	1.79*** (0.147)	0.81 (0.478)
<i>N</i>	1,050	1,050

Table 12: **The Effects of Women Officeholders and Respondents’ Support for Political Islam on Willingness to Communicate.** *Supports Political Islam* is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondents “disagrees” or “strongly disagrees” with the following statement: “Religious practices are private and should be separated from social and political life”. This table gives the results from a logistic regression (\*\*\*)  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , and \*  $p < 0.1$ ).

## 4 Survey Questions

Below, we provide the text in English for the questions that are referenced in our paper. The questions in Arabic are available from the authors upon request. Please note that these questions were embedded in a larger survey of political attitudes in Tunisia.

### 4.1 Wave 1 Questions

1. At the last election, we noticed that a lot of people weren't able to vote for various reasons.

Did you vote in the recent (parliamentary) election?

(a) No

(b) Yes

2. (If the previous response was yes:) Which party did you vote for in the election?

(a) Al Mahaba

(b) CPR

(c) Ennahda

(d) Ettakatol

(e) Nidaa Tunis

(f) Popular Front

(g) Republican Party

(h) Other

3. (If the response to question 1 was no:) Although you did not vote, which party would you have voted for in the election?

(a) Al Mahaba

- (b) CPR
- (c) Ennahda
- (d) Ettakatol
- (e) Nidaa Tunis
- (f) Popular Front
- (g) Republican Party
- (h) Other

4. Now we are going to read you a series of statements. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with each statement...“Religion is a private matter, and we need to separate religious beliefs from politics.”

- (a) Disagree strongly
- (b) Disagree
- (c) Agree
- (d) Agree strongly

5. We would like to send information to the new representatives about the issues their constituents are facing. Would you like to tell your representatives your opinion about the main problems facing Tunisia?

- (a) No
- (b) Yes

6. (If the response to question 5 was yes:) What do you think is the main priority for Tunisia today? (Read the options.)

- (a) Economic situation



- (b) National security
- (c) Quality of democracy
- (d) Rights of women
- (e) Religion's role in politics
- (f) Administrative reform
- (g) Other (fill in)

7. Now, I am going to ask you three factual questions about politics in Tunisia.<sup>1</sup> Even if you aren't sure, please give me your best guess. First, do you know what was the name of the Prime Minister going into the recent election?

- (a) Ali Laarayedh
- (b) Mehdi Jomaa
- (c) Hamadi Jebali

8. Second, do you know for how many years will the Chamber of the Peoples Deputies elected?

- (a) Three
- (b) Four
- (c) Five

9. Third, do you know what percent of parties lists are reserved for women?

- (a) 50
- (b) 33
- (c) 25

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<sup>1</sup>Responses to these questions were combined to create the political knowledge variable. Each accurate response was coded as 1, whereas each inaccurate response was coded as 0. Accordingly, the political knowledge variable ranges from 0 to 3.

10. Finally, I'd like to ask you some background questions. How old are you?

11. (Fill in sex of the respondent.)

(a) Male

(b) Female

12. What is the highest level of education that you have received?

(a) Illiterate

(b) Elementary

(c) Primary

(d) Secondary

(e) Undergraduate (B.A.)

(f) M.A. or higher

13. Are you currently employed?

(a) No

(b) Yes

14. How often do you read the Quran?

(a) Everyday or almost everyday

(b) Several times a week

(c) Sometimes

(d) Rarely

(e) I don't read

15. What is your marital status?

- (a) Single
- (b) Married
- (c) Other

16. What is your monthly family income in Tunisian dinars?

- (a) Under 200 dinars
- (b) Between 201 and 500 dinars
- (c) Between 501 and 1,000 dinars
- (d) Between 1,001 and 1,500 dinars
- (e) Between 1,501 and 2,500 dinars
- (f) More than 2,501 dinars

## **4.2 Wave 2 Questions**

1. Did you vote in the runoff presidential election?

- (a) No
- (b) Yes

2. (If the answer to question 1 was yes:) Which candidate did you vote for in the election?

- (a) Beji Caid Essebsi
- (b) Moncef Marzouki
- (c) Spoiled ballot
- (d) Other (fill in)

3. (If the answer to question 1 was no:) Although you did not vote, which candidate would you have voted for in the election?
- (a) Beji Caid Essebsi
  - (b) Moncef Marzouki
  - (c) Spoiled ballot
  - (d) Other (fill in)
4. (Experiment on election observation:) Now we would like to ask you some questions about the electoral process and the results of the recent election. (Continue if in treatment group:) As you know, voters took to the polls on December 21st to cast their vote for the president. You may not be aware, however, that election observers from (country) monitored the election after receiving an invitation from the Tunisian government.<sup>2</sup> The (country) observers monitored the political situation before and during the election, and they stationed themselves throughout the country to monitor voting and vote counting on Election Day. The (country) observers planned to evaluate the elections for compliance with standards for free and fair elections and report on incidences of manipulation, undue partisan interference, voter intimidation, and voter fraud.
5. What do you think is the main issue for Tunisia today? (Read the options.)
- (a) Economic situation
  - (b) National security
  - (c) Quality of democracy
  - (d) Rights of women
  - (e) Religion's role in politics

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<sup>2</sup>The countries and organizations in this experiment on election observers were the African Union, Arab League, European Union, Tunisia, and the United States.

(f) Administrative reform

(g) Other (fill in)

6. This is a picture of some of the recently elected (women or women and men) in the Tunisian Parliament. (See below for photographs.)

As a part of the efforts to educate new (women or women and men) in Parliament about the issues their constituents are facing, we will send information to the (women or women and men) representatives from your district if you give us permission right now. Do you want us to tell your (women or women and men) representatives your answer about the main problem facing Tunisia today?

(a) No

(b) Yes

7. How effective do you think that the representatives from your district that I just told you about will be in parliament at making policies that benefit Tunisia?

(a) Very ineffective

(b) Ineffective

(c) Effective

(d) Very effective

8. How effective do you think that the representatives from your district that I just told you about will be in parliament at providing benefits to people in your district?

(a) Very ineffective

(b) Ineffective

(c) Effective

(d) Very effective

9. How qualified for serving in parliament do you think that the representatives from your district that I just told you about from your district are?

(a) Very unqualified

(b) Unqualified

(c) Qualified

(d) Very qualified

## 5 Sample Composition

We worked closely with ELKA Consulting to construct a nationally-representative sample. In Wave 1, 1,400 adult Tunisians participated, with a response rate of 71 percent.<sup>3</sup> 1,084 respondents returned for Wave 2. Despite the drop-offs, the sample remained broadly representative; for example, 59 percent of those in our sample who reported voting said they had cast their vote for Beji Caid Essebsi, closely matching the official result of 57 percent.

We further compare the population in our survey to the overall Tunisian population on several key dimensions using the closest available annual data from the *CIA World Factbook*.<sup>4</sup> These comparisons focus on the sample in the second wave of the survey.

- Median age: Survey = 37; Country = 32
- Unemployment rate: Survey = 17; Country = 15
- Proportion urban: Survey = 68; Country = 67
- Sex ratio: Survey = 0.89; Country = 0.99

Though of course there are some small differences between our survey sample and the Tunisian population, we conclude from these comparisons that our survey enumerators successfully sampled the country as a whole.

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<sup>3</sup>AAPOR Category 1. See American Association for Public Opinion Research (2011, 9).

<sup>4</sup>Central Intelligence Agency, “Tunisia,” *CIA World Factbook*, 2015, available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ts.html>.

## 6 Photos

In the Wave 2 experiment, respondents were shown a picture of members of parliament before being asked about their willingness to communicate with their representatives. To underscore the design, respondents were not asked about communicating with the respondents in the photos but were instead asked about communicating with their (“your”) representatives. We used these images to reinforce the main treatment, which involved a verbal cue about the gender of individuals’ own representatives.

The images shown in our experiment were selected from photos of some of the new men and women elected to the Tunisian parliament. The photos were taken on one of the first days of the legislative session: December 4, 2014. As can be seen in the images below, the same women appeared in both photos, so that only the presence of men varied.

Pre-tests indicated that the respondents did not know the representatives. The fact that the representatives were not recognizable is to be expected since the first democratic parliament had just been elected, giving Tunisians little time with which to become familiar with the faces of the members of parliament. To ensure that the results were not being driven by some politically-engaged respondents in our sample recognizing the individuals in the photos, we dropped people in the highest category of political knowledge (i.e., answered all three political knowledge questions correctly) as a robustness check.

### 6.1 Photos as cues of religiosity?

One facet of the photos that deserves special attention is the dress of the people in the images, which could provide cues about the individuals’ religiosity or religious practices. 60 percent of the women in the women representatives image (Figure 2) were wearing headscarves, as compared to 50 percent of the women in the mixed-gender representatives image (Figure 3). Arguably, Figure 2 thus implies a slightly more “Islamic” or “Islamist” group of members of parliament than Figure



3. However, we believe that it is unlikely that this small difference in religious dress accounts for the significant treatment effect we identify in the paper, in which Ennahda supporters were less likely to contact the mixed-gender representatives than the women-only officeholders. Crucially, if headscarves implied something about the representatives' religious beliefs, then we would also expect Nidaa Tounes supporters (i.e., secularists) to have penalized the women-only group. As shown in the main text, this pattern did not obtain. Put differently, a symbol of religiosity seems as likely to have a positive effect on Islamist respondents and it does to have a negative effect on secularist respondents. Yet the effects we identify are only present among Islamists according to two different measures of Islamism.

We note that none of the men in Figure 3 are wearing religious dress. Since wearing religious dress (e.g., caps) is much less common among men officeholders in Tunisia, even within the Ennahda party, the photo was unlikely to convey much information either way among the religion or Islamism of the men. For example, as of May 2018, there were 41 male members of parliament in Tunisia who belong to the Ennahda party. Of those people, only one wore a cap and four had beards, which are another potential symbol of religious piety in Islam.<sup>5</sup> As such, the absence of a cap or beard does not send a particularly strong cue of a male representative's religiosity or religious practice.

## **6.2 Photos as cues of party?**

Although the specific individuals in the photos were not generally known to respondents, one might worry about whether some aspect of their images conveyed information about their parties to respondents. One possibility is that the dress of the representatives cued party to respondents, with respondents inferring that the representatives in Figure 2 are more likely to be Islamists than the representatives in Figure 3 because of the slightly different patterns in the photos in terms of religious dress already noted. As discussed earlier, we think this explanation does not square

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<sup>5</sup>See <https://majles.marsad.tn/2014/fr/assemblee> (accessed May 19, 2018).

with our findings. Again, the treatment effect we identify was concentrated only among Islamist respondents. If Islamist respondents were more attracted to communicating with women because Figure 2 made them think of a slightly more Islamist set of representatives, then we would also expect secularist respondents to be less attracted to communicating with women for the same reason. That was not the case.

A second possibility is that the gender of the representatives cued party to respondents. As discussed in the main text, the two main political parties at the time of our study were Nidaa Tounes, a secular party, and Ennahda, an Islamist party. 37 out of 86 Nidaa Tounes seats were captured by women (43 percent), while 27 out of 69 Ennahda seats were captured by women (39 percent). Given these roughly similar levels of women’s representation, gender should not have conveyed information to respondents about party. But again, even if it did, we would not expect such a cue to generate effects that were so concentrated among a single party.



Figure 2: **Women-only officeholders.**



Figure 3: **Mixed-gender officeholders.**

## 7 Key Events Between the Surveys

Using LexisNexis, we searched a database of major world newspapers to identify key political and social events that occurred between the parliamentary and presidential elections in Tunisia—and thus between our two surveys.<sup>6</sup> Searches using the terms “gender” and “women” revealed no major events pertaining gender mixing or women’s inclusion in politics. A summary of key events that did occur is provided below.

- Oct. 26: Parliamentary election
- Oct. 27: Ennahda concedes victory to Nidaa Tounes
- Oct. 28: ISIE decided to sanction Nidaa Tounes for irregularities with removal of one parliamentary seat in Kasserine district
- Oct. 30: The Tunisian central bank announced the benchmark interest rate would remain

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<sup>6</sup>We thank Caroline Wallace for providing excellent research assistance for these searches.

unchanged and warned of a continually deteriorating external economic position, but commended the stabilizing political situation brought by the election

- Nov. 1: Campaigning for the presidential election officially opened; leader of Ennahda called for formation of coalition government with Nidaa Tounes
- Nov. 2: Nidaa Tounes candidate Beji Caid El-Sebsi officially announced candidacy
- Nov. 7: Nidaa Tounes successful regained Kasserine seat in appeal of ISIE decision, removing the only seat held by the Democratic Forum for Labour and Liberties
- Nov. 7: Takfiri terrorists attacked army bus near the Algerian border, killing five Tunisian soldiers
- Nov. 8: Ennahda announced decision not to endorse any presidential candidate
- Nov. 11: Six parties (Congress for the Republic, the National Construction, the Democratic Trend, the Reform and Development, the National Movement of Justice and Development and the Maghreb Construction) together announced an endorsement of presidential candidate Moncef Marzouki
- Nov. 17: Two candidates, a former central bank governor (Mustapha Kamal Nabli) and a diplomat and labour minister during the rule of Zine Abidine Ben Ali (Nourredine Hachad), pulled out of the presidential race on the same day
- Nov. 21: Tunisia closed borders with Libya due to fears that ISIS would launch a terrorist attack on the elections
- Nov. 23: Presidential election
- Dec. 21: Presidential election (second round)

## 8 Within-Subjects Analysis

In the interest of space, the main text presents the results from the between-subjects analysis, and we present the results from the within-subjects analysis here. One point to note when considering the within-subjects analysis is that overall rates of contact declined between Waves 1 and 2. There are several reasons why interest in communicating might have declined in Wave 2, including that people had more enthusiasm about politics immediately following the parliamentary election and that explicitly mentioning officeholders' gender or showing a picture (as we did in Wave 2) depressed interest.<sup>7</sup> Regardless, people remained very interested in contacting their representatives in Wave 2, as noted in the text.

Table 13 confirms the results given in the main text in Table 2 by comparing contact in Waves 1 and 2. To estimate the effect of women representatives, we use a difference-in-differences estimator. Our outcome variable remains contact, but it is measured now at two points in time. We regress contact on indicators for the second wave and the treatment as well as their interaction. Adding together the coefficient estimates for the interaction term (0.055) and the *Women Representatives* (-0.012) gives us the average treatment effect (0.043 or 4.3 percentage points as also shown in Table 15). *Women Representatives* is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a respondent was assigned to the treatment in Wave 2. As column 1 in Table 13 shows, people were significantly more interested in contacting women, contrary to the conventional wisdom but consistent with the between-subjects analysis. Tables 14 and 15 provide the estimated rates of contact from the OLS regression models. Table 16 confirms the between-subjects finding about partisanship by comparing willingness to communicate in the two waves by party.

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<sup>7</sup>A further possibility is that the plural masculine form of “representatives” primed respondents to think of men. If that was the case, then respondents were more likely to communicate with representatives when thinking of men. Such a dynamic would strengthen the main finding we highlight below, which is that respondents are least likely to contact their representatives when thinking of a mixed-gender group of representatives.

	<b>Overall</b>	<b>Men</b>	<b>Women</b>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Women Representatives</i>	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
<i>Second Wave</i>	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.02)
<i>Second Wave x Women Representatives</i>	0.05** (0.03)	0.07* (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)
<i>Constant</i>	0.95*** (0.01)	0.96*** (0.01)	0.94*** (0.01)
<i>N</i>	1,067	503	564

Table 13: **The Effects of Women Officeholders and Respondents' Gender on Willingness to Communicate, Within-Subjects Analysis.** Column 2 includes only male respondents and column 3 includes only female respondents. Results are from OLS regression models with standard errors clustered on respondent (\*\*\*)  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ ).

	<b>Overall</b>	<b>Men respondents</b>	<b>Women respondents</b>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Women Representatives</i>	94.1	93.5	94.6
<i>Mixed Representatives</i>	95.3	96.3	94.4
<i>Difference</i>	-1.2	-2.8	0.2
<i>95% confidence interval</i>	(-3.9 to 1.5)	(-6.6 to 1.1)	(-3.5 to 4.0)
<i>N</i>	1,067	503	564

Table 14: **The predicted effects of women officeholders and individuals' gender on willingness to communicate**, between-subjects Wave 1 by treatment group in Wave 2.

	<b>Overall</b>	<b>Men respondents</b>	<b>Women respondents</b>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Women Representatives</i>	88.0	86.6	89.2
<i>Mixed Representatives</i>	83.7	82.2	84.9
<i>Difference</i>	4.3	4.4	4.3
<i>95% confidence interval</i>	(0.1 to 8.5)	(-2.0 to 10.7)	(-1.2 to 9.9)
<i>N</i>	1,067	503	564

Table 15: **The predicted effects of women officeholders and individuals' gender on willingness to communicate**, between-subjects Wave 2.

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	<b>Nidaa Tounes</b>	<b>Ennahda</b>	<b>Small Parties</b>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Women Representatives</i>	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
<i>Second Wave</i>	-0.07*** (0.03)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.04)
<i>Second Wave x Women Representatives</i>	0.00 (0.04)	0.12** (0.05)	0.06 (0.06)
<i>Constant</i>	0.96*** (0.01)	0.96*** (0.02)	0.97*** (0.02)
<i>N</i>	440	240	227

Table 16: **The Effects of Women Officeholders and Individuals' Partisanship on Willingness to Communicate, Within-Subjects Analysis.** Results are from OLS regressions with standard errors clustered on respondent (\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ ).



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