Online Appendix: Justice For Sale

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A Information omitted from main text

A.1 Translation, summary statistics

Figure A1: Pleas in Buckinghamshire, 1189

De Plac Foreste de Bukingehsr . p Galfr fit Petri.

- Alewi de Tiringehā deb .xiiii. s. 7.1111. d. de mia. Godwin⁹ Brun⁹ deb .xx. d. p fuga Willi. Rič de Templ deb .1. m. p def.
- Johs de Bekenesfeld redd Comp de .x. s. p def. In thro Et deb .v. s.
- Iđ vič deb .xxIIII. š. 7 .vi. đ. p Wastis 7 Essart 7 plač . 7

 Ppstris . Foreste de Bukingehšr.
- Id vic redd Comp de .xxxIIII. s. 7.1x. d. de Wast 7 Essartis.

 7 Plac 7 Ppst is in Bedefordsr. In Pdon p libtate
 Carte & Frib3 Hospit.xxxIIII. s. 7.1x. d. Et Quiet est.
- Vxor Ansgoti redd Comp de .ix. li. 7.1. m. p Custod filii sui c tra sua. In thro .v. m. Et deb .vi. li. 7.vi. s. 7.vii. d.

The Pleas of the Forest of Bukinghamshire by Geoffrey Fitz-Peter [appointed as an associate Justice on the Royal Court in 1189]. Alew of Tiringham owes 14 shillings and fourpence for mercy. Godwin Brun owes 20 pence for the flight of William. Richard of the Templars owes 1 mark for default. John of Bekenesfeld renders account of 10 shillings for default. In the treasury 4 shillings. And he owes 6 shillings. The same Sheriff [of Buckinghamshire and Bedfordshire] owes 24 shillings and sixpence [in individual payments due] for wastes and assarts and pleas and purprestures in Buckinghamshire Forest. The same Sheriff renders account of 34 shillings and ninepence [of individual payments due] for wastes and assarts and pleas and purprestures in Bedfordshire. In pardon 34 shillings and ninepence by the free charter of the King for the Friars (Knights?) Hospitaller. And he is quit. The wife of Ansgot renders account of 9 pounds and 1 mark for custody of her sons with her land. In the treasury 5 marks. And she owes 6 pounds and 6 shillings and eightpence.

Table A1: Pipe Roll Revenue Records 1184-1203, by Category

Category	Count
County farms and other crown lands	4,716
Land forfeited to the crown	5,759
Feudal taxes and quasi-taxes	8,118
Debts owed Jews at their deaths	659
Court business	16,577

Table A2: Summary Statistics, Major Categories of Revenue on New Debts

		Nev	v Feudal Ta	xes	Fa	Farms, Escheats			ew Pleas, et	c.
	Year	Count	Total (\pounds)	Mean	Count	Total (£)	Mean	Count	Total (£)	Mean
New Debts	1184	10	102	10	533	22670	43	177	620	4
Paid	1184	10	3	<1	533	12616	24	177	283	2
New Debts	1185	18	255	14	660	25659	39	1260	6548	5
Paid	1185	18	168	9	660	13009	20	1260	2541	2
New Debts	1186	12	184	15	546	23573	43	437	1682	4
Paid	1186	12	5	<1	546	12154	22	437	580	1
New Debts	1187	707	6740	10	623	22761	37	346	2011	6
Paid	1187	707	3565	5	623	12857	21	346	782	2
New Debts	1188	85	600	7	527	24255	46	1348	4761	4
Paid	1188	85	141	2	527	13658	26	1348	2866	2
New Debts	1189	20	66	3	419	20640	49	688	1052	2
Paid	1189	20	7	<1	419	9925	24	688	543	1
New Debts	1190	250	1984	8	274	16065	59	566	49189	87
Paid	1190	250	544	2	274	4087	15	566	17348	31
New Debts	1191	16	154	10	202	11620	58	824	5483	7
Paid	1191	16	43	3	202	2957	15	824	538	1
New Debts	1192	30	217	7	213	11345	53	126	915	7
Paid	1192	30	1	<1	213	4255	20	126	179	1
New Debts	1193	21	111	5	212	11899	56	1003	1734	2
Paid	1193	21	2	<1	212	2928	14	1003	512	1
New Debts	1194	484	6674	14	964	18891	20	312	13917	45
Paid	1194	484	3255	7	964	8851	9	312	4911	16
New Debts	1195	143	3194	22	937	19626	21	1921	9256	5
Paid	1195	143	1118	8	937	10480	11	1921	3594	2
New Debts	1196	1278	12399	10	750	25513	34	417	4053	10
Paid	1196	1278	3923	3	750	11899	16	417	699	2
New Debts	1197	451	3132	7	585	19475	33	341	4672	14
Paid	1197	451	1407	3	585	9506	16	341	421	1
New Debts	1198	383	4757	12	494	20901	42	691	12792	19
Paid	1198	383	2080	5	494	7978	16	691	4412	6
New Debts	1199	870	8711	10	507	17201	34	1880	15873	8
Paid	1199	870	4069	5	507	4943	10	1880	4568	2
New Debts	1200	459	5644	12	545	20038	37	1339	22282	17
Paid	1200	459	1792	4	545	6706	12	1339	4959	4
New Debts	1201	777	8485	11	497	18912	38	562	17913	32
Paid	1201	777	3502	5	497	6587	13	562	3002	5
New Debts	1202	1058	7211	7	489	21369	44	1020	8139	8
Paid	1202	1058	2985	3	489	5550	11	1020	2420	2
New Debts	1203	932	8667	9	456	20534	45	1288	15236	12
Paid	1203	932	4147	4	456	6061	13	1288	4189	3

Payments of "0" included in counts.

Table A3: Summary Statistics, Major Categories of Revenue on All Debts

Debts 1184 70			F	eudal Taxe	S	Fa	rms, Esche	ats		Pleas, etc.	
Paid 1184 70 14 <1 615 12928 21 1279 2761 2 Debts 1185 78 1451 19 740 30468 41 2403 27828 12 Debts 1186 68 1193 18 635 28769 45 2119 25688 12 Paid 1186 68 21 <1		Year	Count	Total (£)	Mean	Count	Total (£)	Mean	Count		Mean
Debts	Debts	1184	70		19	615		44	1279		16
Paid 1185 78 193 2 740 13720 19 2403 5392 2 Debts 1186 68 1193 18 635 28769 45 2119 25688 12 Paid 1186 68 21 <1 635 12711 20 2119 3515 2 Debts 1187 761 3576 5 710 13571 19 1872 23194 13 Debts 1188 535 3623 7 613 28104 46 2506 26060 10 Paid 1188 535 204 <1 613 13858 23 2506 4948 2 Debts 1189 485 64 <1 494 10167 21 2308 1934 1 Debts 1190 614 4174 7 339 19766 58 2308 69618 30 <th< td=""><td>Paid</td><td>1184</td><td>70</td><td>14</td><td><1</td><td>615</td><td>12928</td><td>21</td><td>1279</td><td>2761</td><td>2</td></th<>	Paid	1184	70	14	<1	615	12928	21	1279	2761	2
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	Paid	1203	1677	4965	3	852	6462	8	2971	8771	3

Payments of "0" included in counts.

Notes

Tables A2 and A3 both show substantial fluctuation over time in debts owed on farms/escheats. This was due largely to variation in the amount of land in the King's hands. High farms/escheats revenue in the 1180s was due to King Henry's practice of keeping valuable holdings vacant in order to collect their rents. The decrease in such revenue in 1190 was due to Richard's sale of many holdings, and the fact that his brother John held six counties with their rents and profits for fiscal years 1190-1193. The difference between the amounts owed and paid on farms/escheats is largely because the sheriffs responsible for these payments spent a substantial portion of their revenue running their counties. In other categories, it is due to the fact that many individuals paid off their debts in installments.

A.2 Omitted results

Table A4: Kidnap effect on criminal fines for crimes against individuals, crimes against the state, and fees for entitlements, by threat level

	1-year	2-year	3-year	1-year	2-year	3-year		
	Fir	nes for cri	mes against	t individua	ls, in ln(pe	nce)		
Threatened	-0.20	-0.20	-0.19*	-0.19	-0.19	-0.21*		
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.06)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.07)		
N	113	113	238	113	113	238		
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02		
Safe	-0.22	-0.21	-0.12	-0.28	-0.28	-0.09		
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.12)		
N	160	170	330	160	170	330		
\mathbb{R}^2	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.00		
	Fines for crimes against the state, in ln(pence)							
Threatened	-0.52**	-0.56*	-0.60**	-0.56**	-0.52**	-0.21		
	(0.13)	(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.15)		
N	107	115	236	107	115	236		
R^2	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.16	0.04		
Wild cluster p-value	0	0	.13	0	0	.24		
Safe	0.28	0.35	0.09	0.16	0.13	0.11		
	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.15)		
N	260	306	564	260	306	564		
R^2	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00		
Wild cluster p-value	.25	.17	.55	.20	.42	.55		
		1	Entitlements	s, in ln(pen	ce)			
Threatened	-0.71	0.72	-1.05*	-1.42**	-0.84	-0.71		
	(0.71)	(0.96)	(0.42)	(0.38)	(0.70)	(0.73)		
N	14	23	73	14	23	73		
\mathbb{R}^2	0.05	0.04	0.07	0.23	0.12	0.14		
Safe	-1.22*	-0.22	-1.28***	-1.69	-0.89*	-0.99***		
	(0.59)	(0.25)	(0.21)	(1.01)	(0.44)	(0.17)		
N	36	108	279	36	108	279		
R^2	0.12	0.00	0.13	0.18	0.04	0.15		
Even Year					√	✓		
County FE				\checkmark	\checkmark	✓		

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. There are four clusters in the high-threat analysis, and between 14 and 21 in the one-, two- and three-year safe analyses.

Table A5: Kidnap effect on proportion paid immediately, by threat level

		All court fees and fines								
	1-year	2-year	3-year	1-year	2-year	3-year				
Threatened	0.00	-0.01	-0.08**	-0.02	-0.04	-0.06**				
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.01)				
N	682	708	1,641	682	708	1,641				
\mathbb{R}^2	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.04				
Safe	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	0.01	0.01				
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)				
N	1,041	1,285	2,443	1,041	1,285	2,443				
\mathbb{R}^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01				
County FE				\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark				
Even Year					\checkmark	\checkmark				

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. There are four clusters in the high-threat analysis, and 19, 20, and 21 in the one-, two- and three-year safe analyses.

Table A6: Kidnap effect on proportion paid immediately for criminal fines, together and disaggregated, by threat level

	1-year	2-year	3-year	1-year	2-year	3-year				
		All crim	inal fines:	paid/total	charged					
Threatened	-0.03	-0.03	-0.09*	-0.03	-0.04	-0.07				
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)				
N	220	228	474	220	228	474				
\mathbb{R}^2	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.04				
Safe	-0.16**	-0.12	-0.11**	-0.14**	-0.06	-0.05				
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)				
N	420	476	894	420	476	894				
\mathbb{R}^2	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02				
	Fines for	Fines for crimes against individuals: paid/total charged								
Threatened	-0.00	-0.00	0.04	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01				
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)				
N	113	113	238	113	113	238				
\mathbb{R}^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00				
Safe	-0.08	-0.06	0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00				
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)				
N	160	170	330	160	170	330				
\mathbb{R}^2	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00				
	Fines f	or crimes	against th	e state: pai	id/total ch	narged				
Threatened	-0.02	-0.01	-0.08	-0.02	-0.03	-0.10				
	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)				
N	107	115	236	107	115	236				
\mathbb{R}^2	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.03				
Safe	-0.14	-0.09	-0.09*	-0.15*	-0.06	-0.04				
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)				
N	260	306	564	260	306	564				
\mathbb{R}^2	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.02				
County FE				✓	✓	✓				
Even Year					\checkmark	\checkmark				

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. There are four clusters in the high-threat analysis, and between 18 and 21 in the safe analyses.

Table A7: Kidnap effect on proportion paid immediately for court fines, court services, and entitlements, by threat level

	1-year	2-year	3-year	1-year	2-year	3-year	
		Court	fines: pai	d/total ch	narged		
Threatened	0.05	0.05	0.05	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	
Timeatened	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	
N	370	371	820	370	371	820	
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Safe	0.01	-0.01	0.07	-0.02	-0.02	0.08	
Suic	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	
N	405	441	815	405	441	815	
R^2	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	
	Court services: paid/total charged						
Threatened	-0.08	-0.09	-0.13	-0.04	-0.04	-0.09	
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.07)	
N	75	83	258	75	83	258	
\mathbb{R}^2	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.04	
Safe	0.07	0.04	0.02	0.17*	0.11*	0.00	
	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.04)	
N	172	246	435	172	246	435	
\mathbb{R}^2	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.03	0.00	
		Entitle	ments: pa	id/total c	harged		
Threatened	0.22	-0.02	-0.17	0.42	0.24	-0.06	
	(0.23)	(0.17)	(0.10)	(0.23)	(0.29)	(0.13)	
N	14	23	73	14	23	73	
\mathbb{R}^2	0.11	0.00	0.04	0.45	0.24	0.07	
Safe	0.28	0.19**	-0.04	-0.01	0.05	-0.03	
N	36	108	279	36	108	279	
\mathbb{R}^2	0.11	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.03	
County FE				√	√	√	
Even Year					\checkmark	\checkmark	

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. There are four clusters in the high-threat analysis, and between 14 and 21 in the safe analyses.

B Robustness to different specifications

B.1 Removal of highest charges

In this section I re-estimate Tables 3, 4, and A3, excluding the highest amounts charged in the data. This is in order to exclude outliers, especially in 1190, that might give the impression of a negative result. To do so I simply exclude all amounts charged that exceeded 100 pounds. In practice this approximates to excluding the top 5% of charges. I show that my results are robust to this additional restriction. The (null) results in A4-A6 are similarly robust and are omitted here for space.

Table A8: Kidnap's effect on all fees and fines, by threat level, highest amounts excluded

	All fees and fines, in ln(pence)								
	1-year	2-year	3-year	1-year	2-year	3-year			
Threatened	-0.24*	-0.29***	-0.79***	-0.22**	-0.23*	-0.20			
	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)			
N	676	700	1,608	676	700	1,608			
R^2	0.01	0.02	0.08	0.01	0.19	0.19			
Safe	-0.15	0.24**	-0.56***	-0.23**	0.12	0.01			
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.11)			
N	1,033	1,257	2,342	1,033	1,257	2,342			
\mathbb{R}^2	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.13	0.22			
County FE				√	✓	\checkmark			
Even Year					✓	✓			

One-year comparisons compare 1191 to 1193. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. There are four clusters in the high-threat analysis, and 19, 20, and 21 in the 1-, 2- and 3-year safe analyses.

Table A9: Kidnap effect on all criminal fines, court services, and court fines, by threat level, highest amounts excluded

	1-year	2-year	3-year	1-year	2-year	3-year				
		All	Criminal fin	nes, in ln(p	ence)					
Threatened	-0.23**	-0.28	-0.44***	-0.23**	-0.23***	-0.13				
	(0.05)	(0.14)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.13)				
N	218	226	468	218	226	468				
R^2	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.20	0.06				
Safe	0.00	0.07	-0.08	-0.17	-0.09	-0.05				
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.13)				
N	420	476	892	420	476	892				
\mathbb{R}^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01				
		Court services, in ln(pence)								
Threatened	-0.64**	-0.46	-1.65**	-0.57*	-0.55**	-0.49*				
	(0.17)	(0.40)	(0.30)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.20)				
N	74	82	256	74	82	256				
\mathbb{R}^2	0.07	0.03	0.23	0.04	0.13	0.31				
Safe	-0.10	0.38	-0.61**	-0.33	0.13	-0.20				
	(0.34)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.18)	(0.19)				
N	171	243	422	171	243	422				
\mathbb{R}^2	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.06	0.18				
		•	Court fines,	in ln(penc	e)					
Threatened	0.03	0.03	-0.18***	0.01	0.01	-0.02				
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)				
N	370	371	820	370	371	820				
\mathbb{R}^2	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.04				
Safe	-0.05	-0.06	-0.08	-0.01	-0.01	-0.04				
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)				
N	405	441	814	405	441	814				
\mathbb{R}^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00				
County FE		<u> </u>		√	√	<u>√</u>				
Even Year					\checkmark	\checkmark				

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. There are four clusters in the high-threat analysis, and between 18 and 21 in the safe analyses.


Table A10: Kidnap effect on criminal fines disaggregated by type, and entitlements, by threat level, highest amounts excluded


	1-year	2-year	3-year	1-year	2-year	3-year			
		Fine	s for crimes	against indi	ividuals				
Threatened	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.02			
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.11)			
N	112	112	237	112	112	237			
R^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01			
Safe	-0.22	-0.21	-0.12	-0.28	-0.28	-0.09			
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.12)			
N	160	170	330	160	170	330			
\mathbb{R}^2	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.00			
	Fines for crimes against the state								
Threatened	-0.34*	-0.40	-0.39	-0.39*	-0.35**	-0.05			
	(0.13)	(0.28)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.24)			
N	106	114	231	106	114	231			
\mathbb{R}^2	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.19	0.03			
Safe	0.28	0.35	0.13	0.16	0.13	0.11			
	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.15)			
N	260	306	562	260	306	562			
\mathbb{R}^2	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00			
			Entit	lements					
Threatened	-2.13**	-0.92	-1.39**	-1.84***	-1.40*	-1.65**			
	(0.39)	(0.79)	(0.28)	(0.08)	(0.46)	(0.34)			
N	11	18	49	11	18	49			
\mathbb{R}^2	0.66	0.05	0.13	0.67	0.24	0.14			
Safe	-0.98*	-0.09	-0.94***	-2.23**	-0.80*	-0.65***			
	(0.53)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.78)	(0.45)	(0.16)			
N	29	85	198	29	85	198			
R^2	0.15	0.00	0.13	0.35	0.09	0.20			
County FE				✓	√	√			
Even Year					\checkmark	\checkmark			

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. There are four clusters in the high-threat analysis, and between 14 and 21 in the one-, two- and three-year safe analyses.

B.2 Berkshire as threatened

The county of Berkshire contained land held by John on which stood two militarily important castles, Windsor and Wallingford. It is coded as "safe" in the main text because these castles were confiscated from John and manned by Crown men almost immediately after Richard's kidnap. Moreover, even when John held them, unlike his castles at Nottingham and Tickhill, they were never manned by his own men-at-arms. Instead, they were manned by mercenaries (Gillingham, 1999; Turner and Heiser, 2000). Both facts suggest that the Crown would be less concerned with building support in Berkshire in the years after the kidnap. Nevertheless, I replicate the main results set forth in Figures 6-7 and Tables 3, 4, and A3 to show that they are generally robust to treating Berkshire as threatened, although some results are slightly attenuated. Given the above, this is unsurprising.





Panels show average numbers of new accounts opened for three time intervals around the kidnap, disaggregated by threat level and case type. N = 5 (1-year), 10 (2-year), 15 (3-year) in threatened counties; N = 20 (1-year), 40 (2-year), 60 (3-year) in safe counties. Numbers above graph bars show means, rounded to the nearest integer, error bars represent 95% confidence intervals, and t-tests assume unequal variance.

Table A11: Kidnap effect on all fees and fines, by threat level, Berkshire as threatened

	All fees and fines, in ln(pence)								
	1-year	2-year	3-year	1-year	2-year	3-year			
Threatened	-0.35**	-0.34***	-1.02***	-0.34**	-0.22	-0.25**			
	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.08)			
N	691	736	1,704	691	736	1,704			
R-squared	0.02	0.02	0.10	0.02	0.13	0.19			
hline Safe	-0.19	0.31**	-0.91***	-0.27**	0.12	-0.08			
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.21)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.13)			
N	1,032	1,257	2,380	1,032	1,257	2,380			
R-squared	0.01	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.17	0.31			
County FE				\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark			
Even Year					\checkmark	\checkmark			

One-year comparisons compare 1191 to 1193. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. There are five clusters in the high-threat analysis, and 18, 19, and 20 in the 1-, 2- and 3-year safe analyses.

Table A12: Kidnap effect on criminal fines, court services, and court fines, by threat level, Berkshire as threatened

	1-year	2-year	3-year	1-year	2-year	3-year
		All	criminal fine	es, in ln(pen	ice)	
Threatened	-0.40***	-0.38*	-0.54**	-0.42***	-0.25	-0.21
	(0.07)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.17)	(0.13)
N	225	245	512	225	245	512
R-squared	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.10	0.06
Safe	-0.00	0.05	-0.13	-0.17	-0.12	-0.08
	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.13)
N	415	459	856	415	459	856
R-squared	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
		Co	ourt services	, in ln(penc	e)	
Threatened	-0.90**	-0.55	-1.67***	-0.78***	-0.47	-0.67**
	(0.29)	(0.34)	(0.26)	(0.03)	(0.35)	(0.18)
N	76	88	269	76	88	269
R-squared	0.10	0.03	0.21	0.05	0.05	0.24
Safe	-0.16	0.31	-0.82***	-0.39	0.03	-0.34
	(0.35)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.20)	(0.22)
N	171	241	424	171	241	424
R-squared	0.00	0.01	0.06	0.02	0.07	0.22
		(Court fines, i	in ln(pence)		
Threatened	0.02	0.02	-0.18***	0.01	0.00	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
N	372	375	827	372	375	827
R-squared	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.04
Safe	-0.04	-0.05	-0.10	-0.01	-0.01	-0.05
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)
N	403	437	808	403	437	808
R-squared	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
County FE				√	√	\checkmark
Even Year					\checkmark	\checkmark

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. There are five clusters in the high-threat analysis, and between 17 and 20 in the safe analyses.

Table A13: Kidnap effect on fines for crimes against individuals and the state and on entitlements, by threat level, Berkshire as threatened


	1-year	2-year	3-year	1-year	2-year	3-year		
Fines for crimes against individuals, in ln(pence)								
Threatened	-0.20	-0.17	-0.17**	-0.19	-0.19	-0.21**		
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.05)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.07)		
N	115	120	248	115	120	248		
R-squared	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01		
Safe	-0.23	-0.22	-0.12	-0.28	-0.28	-0.09		
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.12)		
N	158	163	320	158	163	320		
R-squared	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.00		
	Fi	nes for cr	imes agains	t the state,	in ln(pen	ce)		
Threatened	-0.50**	-0.46*	-0.42	-0.56**	-0.34	-0.06		
	(0.12)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.13)	(0.22)	(0.20)		
N	110	125	264	110	125	264		
R-squared	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.12	0.02		
Safe	0.28	0.33	0.06	0.16	0.10	0.07		
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)		
N	257	296	536	257	296	536		
R-squared	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00		
		E	Entitlements	, in ln(pen	ce)			
Threatened	-0.93	0.32	-1.19**	-1.42**	-1.14	-1.07		
	(0.66)	(0.98)	(0.42)	(0.36)	(0.55)	(0.68)		
N	15	25	79	15	25	79		
R-squared	0.08	0.01	0.08	0.23	0.23	0.14		
Safe	-1.11*	-0.12	-1.25***	-1.69	-0.79*	-0.94***		
	(0.59)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(1.01)	(0.42)	(0.17)		
N	35	106	273	35	106	273		
R-squared	0.11	0.00	0.12	0.18	0.04	0.15		
County FE				✓	✓	✓		
Even Year					\checkmark	\checkmark		

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. There are five clusters in the high-threat analysis, and between 13 and 20 in the safe analyses.


B.3 Safe counties as low-threat and safe counties


In this section, I show that the (largely null) results presented in the text for safe counties are robust to a disaggregation of "safe" counties into "low-threat" counties that adjoined less militarily important land held by john, and "safe" counties that did not adjoin any land held by john. These regions are shown in Figure A3.

Figure A3: Counties of England, low-threat and safe as separate categories



John's six full counties are in black. Counties neighboring John's strongholds at Tickhill and in Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire (Lincolnshire, Leicestershire and Warwickshire, Staffordshire, and Yorkshire) are labeled "High Threat" and colored dark grey. Counties adjoining other land held by John (Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Bedfordshire, Cumberland, Gloucestershire, Hampshire, Norfolk and Suffolk, Westmoreland, and Wiltshire) are labeled "Low Threat" and colored light grey. All other crown counties are labeled "Safe" and colored light grey. The two white English counties are the semi-autonomous palatinates of Durham and Cheshire. Data from the Historic County Borders Project, http://www.county-borders.co.uk/.





Panels show average numbers of new accounts opened for three time intervals around the kidnap in "low threat" and "safe" counties, disaggregated by case type. N=8 (1-year), 16 (2-year), 24 (3-year) in low-threat counties; N=11 (1-year), 24 (2-year), 39 (3-year) in safe counties. Numbers above graph bars show means, rounded to the nearest integer, error bars represent 95% confidence intervals, and t-tests assume unequal variance.

Table A14: Kidnap effect on all fees and fines in low threat and safe counties, in ln(pence)

	1-year	2-year	3-year	1-year	2-year	3-year
Low threat	-0.09	0.37**	-0.68**	-0.22	0.18	-0.08
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.25)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.15)
N	652	782	1,298	652	782	1,298
R^2	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.18	0.33
No threat	-0.44***	0.21	-1.14***	-0.44***	0.10	-0.08
	(0.12)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.09)	(0.27)	(0.22)
N	389	503	1,145	389	503	1,145
\mathbb{R}^2	0.03	0.00	0.09	0.03	0.13	0.26
Even Year					✓	✓
County FE				✓	✓	✓

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. There are eight clusters in the low-threat analysis, and 11, 12, and 13 in the one-, two- and three-year safe analyses.

Table A15: Kidnap effect on all criminal fines, court services, and court fines, low threat and no threat disaggregated

	1-year	2-year	3-year	1-year	2-year	3-year		
		All criminal fines						
Low threat	0.15	0.21	0.01	-0.07	0.01	-0.00		
	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.26)	(0.21)		
N	245	284	456	245	284	456		
\mathbb{R}^2	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01		
No threat	-0.31	-0.22	-0.29**	-0.32	-0.24	-0.11		
	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.10)	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.16)		
N	175	192	438	175	192	438		
R^2	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02		
			Court se	ervices				
Low threat	-0.20	0.36	-0.88**	-0.26	0.14	-0.33		
	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.23)	(0.19)		
N	86	121	219	86	121	219		
\mathbb{R}^2	0.01	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.12	0.30		
No threat	-0.17	0.35	-0.77	-0.56	0.04	-0.36		
	(0.60)	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.38)	(0.35)	(0.39)		
N	86	125	216	86	125	216		
R^2	0.00	0.01	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.14		
			Court	fines				
Low threat	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.03		
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)		
N	297	306	472	297	306	472		
\mathbb{R}^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		
No threat	-0.27	-0.26*	-0.33*	-0.11	-0.11	-0.25		
	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.22)		
N	108	135	343	108	135	343		
R^2	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.00	0.01	0.06		
Even Year					✓	✓		
County FE				✓	✓	✓		

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. There are eight clusters in the low-threat analysis and between 10 and 13 in the no threat analysis, depending on specification and category.

Table A16: Kidnap effect on fines for crimes against individuals and the state, and fees for entitlements, low threat and no threat disaggregated


	1-year	2-year	3-year	1-year	2-year	3-year
		Fine	es, crimes ag	gainst indiv	viduals	
Low threat	-0.19	-0.17	-0.09	-0.34	-0.34	-0.14
	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.14)
N	95	101	162	95	101	162
\mathbb{R}^2	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.07	0.07	0.01
No threat	-0.27	-0.27*	-0.16*	-0.07	-0.07	0.02
	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.12)
N	65	69	168	65	69	168
R^2	0.05	0.06	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01
		Fi	nes, crimes	against the	state	
Low threat	0.47	0.50	0.14	0.32	0.25	0.10
	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.22)
N	150	183	294	150	183	294
\mathbb{R}^2	0.05	0.05	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.00
No threat	-0.07	0.05	0.01	-0.06	-0.03	0.15
	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.15)
N	110	123	270	110	123	270
\mathbb{R}^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
			Entitl	ements		
Low threat	-2.07**	-0.65*	-1.26***	-2.35**	-1.17**	-1.16***
	(0.65)	(0.33)	(0.26)	(0.89)	(0.46)	(0.22)
N	21	67	145	21	67	145
\mathbb{R}^2	0.30	0.03	0.12	0.42	0.07	0.17
No threat	0.01	0.38	-1.28***	2.05	-0.08	-0.76***
	(0.95)	(0.34)	(0.38)		(0.86)	(0.23)
N	15	41	134	15	41	134
R^2	0.00	0.02	0.13		0.00	0.14
Even Year					✓	√
County FE				\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. There are 7 or 8 clusters in the low-threat analysis and between 7 and 13 in the no threat analysis, depending on specification and category.

C The kidnap in context

In this section, I first investigate the effect of the kidnap over the entirety of Richard's reign, in order to determine whether the effect dissipated—i.e., the Court ceased to prioritize support-building in high-threat counties—after the immediate threat to those areas was removed. The results are shown in Figure A5 and Table A17. I next investigate the effect of the kidnap in the context of the entire 20-year period of the sample. The results are shown in Figure A6 and Table A18.

Figure A5: Average per-county new court cases, overall and by group: between 1190-1192 and 1193-1198




Panels show average number of new court accounts opened, per county, in threatened and safe counties. In safe counties, pre-kidnap N=12; post-kidnap N=24. In threatened counties, pre-kidnap N=63; post-kidnap N=126. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals; t-tests assume unequal variance.

Table A17: Pre/post kidnap difference in fee and fine amounts, in threatened and safe counties, over King Richard's reign 1190-1198

			lnap change			
	Thre	eatened cou	nties	\$	S	
All fees, fines	-0.89**	-0.89**	-0.48***	-0.79***	-0.81***	-0.45**
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.08)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.17)
N	1,991	1,991	1,991	3,338	3,338	3,338
\mathbb{R}^2	0.06	0.06	0.13	0.04	0.04	0.19
Criminal fines	-0.53**	-0.51**	-0.41**	-0.09	-0.13	-0.07
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.12)
N	607	607	607	1,463	1,463	1,463
\mathbb{R}^2	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.03
Court services	-1.53**	-1.32**	-0.77*	-0.77***	-0.75***	-0.40*
	(0.28)	(0.36)	(0.29)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.20)
N	354	354	354	569	569	569
\mathbb{R}^2	0.15	0.10	0.16	0.05	0.05	0.18
Court fines	-0.19***	-0.16***	-0.09**	-0.10	-0.08	-0.04
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.10)
N	912	912	912	913	913	913
\mathbb{R}^2	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.01
Fines, crimes against state	-0.46	-0.41	-0.41	-0.00	-0.03	0.01
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.33)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.15)
N	300	300	300	1,010	1,010	1,010
\mathbb{R}^2	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01
Fines, crimes against individuals	-0.09	-0.04	-0.04	-0.11	-0.09	-0.08
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)
N	307	307	307	453	453	453
\mathbb{R}^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Entitlements	-0.62***	-0.76***	-0.13	-1.16***	-1.12***	-0.94**
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.17)
N	102	102	102	373	373	373
\mathbb{R}^2	0.03	0.04	0.10	0.11	0.10	0.13
County FEs		✓	✓		√	✓
Even Year			1.5 2			\checkmark

Errors are cluster-robust. I do not account for inflation, which ranged from 2.7% to 4.7% between 1190 and 1203 (Barratt, 2001); therefore, negative results are likely underestimated. Number of clusters is four for threatened counties and 21 for safe counties.

Figure A6: Average per-county new court cases, overall and by group: between 1184-1192, and 1193-1203



Panels show average number of new court accounts opened, per county, in threatened and safe counties. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals; t-tests assume unequal variance. In threatened counties, pre-kidnap N=36; post-kidnap N=44. In safe counties, pre-kidnap N=189; post-kidnap N=231.

Table A18: Pre/post kidnap difference in fee and fine amounts, in threatened and safe counties, 1184-1203

		Post-kio	lnap char	nge in logge	ed amounts		
	Threa	tened cou	nties	Safe counties			
All fees, fines	-0.09	-0.09	-0.01	-0.18	-0.15	-0.03	
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	
N	5,214	5,214	5,214	8,921	8,921	8,921	
\mathbb{R}^2	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.03	
Criminal fines	-0.32	-0.32	-0.29	-0.29**	-0.32***	-0.30**	
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.11)	
N	1,901	1,901	1,901	3,932	3,932	3,932	
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.02	
Court services	-0.01	-0.08	-0.00	-0.33	-0.28	-0.13	
	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.17)	
N	844	844	844	1,599	1,599	1,599	
R^2	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.04	
Court fines	-0.16*	-0.14	-0.07	-0.29***	-0.23***	-0.24***	
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	
N	2,143	2,143	2,143	2,531	2,531	2,531	
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	
Fines, crimes against state	-0.26	-0.32	-0.31	-0.12	-0.18	-0.17	
	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.15)	
N	1,147	1,147	1,147	2,673	2,673	2,673	
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	
Fines, crimes against individuals	-0.32**	-0.26**	-0.20*	-0.26***	-0.25***	-0.28***	
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	
N	754	754	754	1,260	1,260	1,260	
R^2	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	
Entitlements	-0.01	0.02	0.01	-0.39***	-0.34**	-0.23*	
	(0.20)	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.13)	
N	301	301	301	828	828	828	
R^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.03	
County FEs		√	√		√	✓	
Even Year			\checkmark			\checkmark	

Errors are cluster-robust. I do not account for inflation, which ranged from 2.7% to 4.7% between 1190 and 1203 (Barratt, 2001); therefore, negative results are likely underestimated. Number of clusters is four for threatened counties and 21 for safe counties.

D Robustness to pre-kidnap trends

D.1 Time trends

Table A19: Two-year and three-year time windows in threatened and safe counties, with time trends, for all specifications, on total amounts charged discussed in main text

		Threa	itened			Sa	ıfe	
	2-year	3-year	2-year	3-year	2-year	3-year	2-year	3-year
All fees, fines	-5.53**	-0.68**	-5.58**	-0.35**	-2.59***	0.59**	-3.15***	0.64
	(1.10)	(0.17)	(1.08)	(0.08)	(0.84)	(0.23)	(0.68)	(0.38)
N	708	1,641	708	1,641	1,285	2,443	1,285	2,443
\mathbb{R}^2	0.18	0.10	0.18	0.21	0.15	0.10	0.16	0.30
Criminal fines	-4.89***	-0.61	-4.99***	-0.48	-0.07	0.14	-0.00	0.08
	(0.46)	(0.34)	(0.45)	(0.31)	(0.36)	(0.27)	(0.45)	(0.28)
N	228	474	228	474	476	894	476	894
\mathbb{R}^2	0.15	0.05	0.15	0.07	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
Court services	-4.58***	-1.28	-3.26***	-0.87**	-1.33	0.98*	-1.57*	0.84
	(0.40)	(0.62)	(0.03)	(0.26)	(0.83)	(0.55)	(0.75)	(0.52)
N	83	258	83	258	246	435	246	435
\mathbb{R}^2	0.21	0.23	0.09	0.25	0.07	0.12	0.07	0.24
Court fines	0.42**	0.06	0.38*	0.12	-0.16	-0.03	0.20	0.01
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.05)	(0.24)	(0.10)	(0.35)	(0.09)
N	371	820	371	820	441	815	441	815
\mathbb{R}^2	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
Crimes vs. state	-4.41***	-0.97	-4.33***	-0.95	0.44	0.59*	0.40	0.37
	(0.34)	(0.54)	(0.20)	(0.57)	(0.62)	(0.33)	(0.71)	(0.24)
N	115	236	115	236	306	564	306	564
\mathbb{R}^2	0.17	0.04	0.16	0.05	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01
Crimes vs. indivs.	_	-0.08	-0.19	-0.10	-0.04	-0.34	0.46	-0.29
	-	(0.37)	(0.19)	(0.39)	(0.15)	(0.20)	(0.30)	(0.26)
N	113	238	113	238	170	330	170	330
\mathbb{R}^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.01
Entitlements	0.15	1.92	1.18	1.99	-2.42**	0.51	-2.03	-0.79
	(1.37)	(1.19)	(0.63)	(0.87)	(1.10)	(0.66)	(1.47)	(0.79)
N	23	73	23	73	108	279	108	279
\mathbb{R}^2	0.04	0.14	0.12	0.21	0.06	0.15	0.04	0.15
Trend	✓	√	✓	✓	√	✓	✓	√
Even year				\checkmark				\checkmark
County FEs			\checkmark	\checkmark	d 21 in the t		\checkmark	\checkmark

All errors cluster-robust. Four clusters in threatened areas, 20 and 21 in the two-year and three-year specifications, respectively, for safe areas. 3-year effects on criminal fines just skirt conventional levels in threatened counties.

D.2 Placebo treatment




Figure A7: Placebo categories

Panels show average numbers of new accounts opened around placebo year of treatment 1190, disaggregated by threat level and case category. N = 4 (1-year), 8 (2-year), 12 (3-year) in threatened counties; N = 21 (1-year), 42 (2-year), 63 (3-year) in safe counties. Numbers above graph bars show means, rounded to the nearest integer, and error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Table A20: Effect of "placebo" treatment in 1190 on all fees and fines

	All fees and fines						
	1-year	2-year	3-year	1-year	2-year	3-year	
Threatened	0.48**	0.85***	0.80**	0.41*	0.97**	0.85**	
	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.25)	(0.21)	
N	549	1,110	1,198	549	1,110	1,198	
\mathbb{R}^2	0.04	0.07	0.06	0.03	0.16	0.12	
Safe	-0.02	0.91***	0.80***	0.32**	1.59***	1.06***	
	(0.17)	(0.25)	(0.20)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.16)	
N	778	1,796	2,120	778	1,796	2,120	
\mathbb{R}^2	0.00	0.06	0.05	0.01	0.22	0.13	
Even year					\checkmark	\checkmark	
FEs				\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	

One-year compares 1189 to 1191. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of clusters is four for threatened counties and 20 or 21 for safe counties. Replacing 1190 with 1188 in the two-year regressions does not affect their sign.

Table A21: Effect of "placebo" treatment in 1190 on all criminal fines, court services, and court fines in threatened and safe counties.

	1-year	2-year	3-year	1-year	2-year	3-year
			All crim	inal fines		
Threatened	0.75	0.44	0.43	0.48	0.59**	0.47
	(0.50)	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.48)	(0.17)	(0.21)
N	170	339	382	170	339	382
\mathbb{R}^2	0.06	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.08	0.05
Safe	-0.45**	-0.45**	-0.38**	-0.30	-0.12	-0.26**
	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.16)	(0.10)
N	317	745	936	317	745	936
\mathbb{R}^2	0.05	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01
			Court	services		
Threatened	1.09*	1.73*	1.58*	1.13*	1.46*	1.15
	(0.45)	(0.57)	(0.58)	(0.38)	(0.58)	(0.60)
N	78	140	153	78	140	153
\mathbb{R}^2	0.18	0.32	0.25	0.17	0.44	0.32
Safe	0.46	1.72***	1.43***	1.01***	2.32***	1.63***
	(0.28)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.19)
N	133	304	352	133	304	352
\mathbb{R}^2	0.03	0.22	0.16	0.08	0.45	0.25
			Cour	t fines		
Threatened	-0.05	-0.18**	-0.17**	-0.06	-0.11*	-0.12*
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.05)
N	289	578	590	289	578	590
\mathbb{R}^2	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.08	0.07
Safe	-0.04	-0.10	-0.09	0.01	0.21	0.11
	-0.0-	-0.10	-0.09	0.01	0.21	0.11
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.21)	(0.14)
N						
$rac{N}{R^2}$	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.21)	(0.14)
	(0.12) 290	(0.10) 549	(0.09) 620	(0.12) 290	(0.21) 549	(0.14) 620
\mathbb{R}^2	(0.12) 290	(0.10) 549	(0.09) 620	(0.12) 290	(0.21) 549 0.01	(0.14) 620 0.01

One-year compares 1189 to 1191. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of clusters is four for threatened counties and between 17 and 21 in safe counties. Replacing 1190 with 1188 in the two-year regressions does not affect their sign.

Table A22: Effect of "placebo" treatment in 1190 on crimes against individuals, crimes against the state, and entitlements, in threatened and safe counties

	1-year	2-year	3-year	1-year	2-year	3-year
	-	Fines,	crimes aga	ainst indiv	viduals	
Threatened	0.03	-0.34**	-0.36**	0.09	-0.15**	-0.15**
	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.04)
N	68	128	131	68	128	131
\mathbb{R}^2	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.04	0.04
Safe	-0.24	-0.18	-0.28	-0.36	-0.03	-0.22
	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.29)	(0.19)
N	95	172	193	95	172	193
\mathbb{R}^2	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.01
		Fir	nes, crimes	against s	tate	
Threatened	1.26	0.81	0.78	0.32	0.79	0.63
	(0.80)	(0.61)	(0.59)	(0.62)	(0.34)	(0.37)
N	102	211	251	102	211	251
\mathbb{R}^2	0.12	0.05	0.04	0.01	0.11	0.06
Safe	-0.55**	-0.52**	-0.38**	-0.42*	-0.26	-0.27*
	(0.24)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.13)
N	222	573	743	222	573	743
\mathbb{R}^2	0.06	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02
			Entitle	ments		
Threatened	3.25**	3.97***	2.36***	2.93	3.70***	2.48**
	(0.34)	(0.12)	(0.19)		(0.48)	(0.74)
N	12	45	65	12	45	65
R^2	0.74	0.41	0.30	0.74	0.45	0.31
Safe	1.72**	1.69***	1.73***	1.29*	1.55***	1.51***
	(0.78)	(0.40)	(0.38)	(0.69)	(0.47)	(0.46)
N	31	185	199	31	185	199
\mathbb{R}^2	0.17	0.11	0.12	0.10	0.14	0.16
Even					√	√
FEs				✓	✓	✓

One-year compares 1189 to 1191. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of clusters is four in threatened counties and between 14 and 21 in safe counties. Replacing 1190 with 1188 in the two-year regressions does not affect their sign.

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