**Appendix A: Descriptive statistics**

Table A1: Descriptive statistics

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **Mean** | **Std. Dev.** | **Min** | **Max** | **Observations** |
| Turnout | 67.24 | 14.86 | 23.56 | 107.56 | 415 |
| Log of GDP per capita | 8.99 | 1.44 | 4.95 | 11.28 | 415 |
| Proportional electoral system | 0.76 | 0.43 | 0 | 1 | 415 |
| Compulsory voting | 0.22 | 0.42 | 0 | 1 | 415 |
| Log of population | 15.97 | 1.90 | 11.15 | 20.87 | 415 |
| General government gross debt | 53.68 | 33.11 | 3.65 | 236.76 | 415 |
| Expenditure rule | 0.07 | 0.26 | 0 | 1 | 415 |
| Revenue rule | 0.02 | 0.15 | 0 | 1 | 415 |
| Balanced budget rule | 0.16 | 0.36 | 0 | 1 | 415 |
| Debt rule | 0.07 | 0.26 | 0 | 1 | 415 |
| Expenditure rule strenght | 0.51 | 1.08 | 0 | 5.6 | 415 |
| Revenue rule strenght | 0.27 | 0.68 | 0 | 3.4 | 415 |
| Balanced budget rule strenght | 0.62 | 1.09 | 0 | 4.6 | 415 |
| Debt rule strenght | 0.46 | 0.96 | 0 | 4.6 | 415 |
| Strenght of fiscal rules index | 0.34 | 0.61 | 0 | 2.80 | 415 |

**Appendix B: Aggregate turnout analysis without controls**

Table B1: Fiscal rules dummies

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Expenditure rule | -0.67  (2.14) | - | - | - | -0.48  (2.14) |
| Revenue rule | - | -0.54  (3.55) | - | - | 0.31  (4.08) |
| Balanced budget rule | - | - | -0.87  (1.77) | - | -0.59  (1.95) |
| Debt rule | - | - | - | -1.00  (1.66) | -0.68  (2.05) |
| Country-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Number of countries | 131 | 131 | 131 | 131 | 131 |
| Number of observations | 742 | 742 | 742 | 742 | 742 |
| F-test p-value | - | - | - | - | 1.00 |
| Within R-squared | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.10 |
| Note: Dependent variable is turnout as percent of voting age population. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.  \*: p<0.10, \*\*: p<0.05, \*\*\*: p<0.01. | | | | | |

Table B2: Strength of fiscal rules

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
| Expenditure rule strenght | -1.03  (0.40)\*\* | - | - | - | - | |
| Revenue rule strenght | - | -1.11  0.81 | - | - | - | |
| Balanced budget rule strenght | - | - | -0.79  (0.50) | - | - | |
| Debt rule strenght | - | - | - | -1.13  (0.50)\*\* | - | |
| Strength of fiscal rules index | - | - | - | - | -1.74  ( 0.80)\*\* | |
| Country-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Year-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Number of countries | 131 | 131 | 131 | 131 | 131 | |
| Number of observations | 742 | 742 | 742 | 742 | 742 | |
| Within R-squared | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.11 | |
| Note: Dependent variable is turnout as percent of voting age population. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.  \*: p<0.10, \*\*: p<0.05, \*\*\*: p<0.01. | | | | | |

Table B3: Fiscal rules dummies, only OECD countries

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Expenditure rule | -1.64  (2.21) | - | - | - | -1.74  (1.66) |
| Revenue rule | - | -1.46  (5.39) | - | - | -1.96  (4.71) |
| Balanced budget rule | - | - | 1.43  (1.94) | - | 1.58  (2.37) |
| Debt rule | - | - | - | 1.39  (1.86) | 1.10  (3.07) |
| Country-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Number of countries | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 |
| Number of observations | 236 | 236 | 236 | 236 | 236 |
| F-test p-value | - | - | - | - | 0.61 |
| Within R-squared | 0.40 | 0.39 | 0.40 | 0.40 | 0.40 |
| Note: Dependent variable is turnout as percent of voting age population. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.  \*: p<0.10, \*\*: p<0.05, \*\*\*: p<0.01. | | | | | |

Table B4: Strength of fiscal rules, only OECD countries

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
| Expenditure rule strenght | -0.84  (0.38)\*\* | - | - | - | - | |
| Revenue rule strenght | - | -0.61  (0.79) | - | - | - | |
| Balanced budget rule strenght | - | - | -0.22  (0.61) | - | - | |
| Debt rule strenght | - | - | - | -0.64  (0.59) | - | |
| Strength of fiscal rules index | - | - | - | - | -0.98  (0.90) | |
| Country-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Year-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Number of countries | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 | |
| Number of observations | 236 | 236 | 236 | 236 | 236 | |
| Within R-squared | 0.41 | 0.40 | 0.39 | 0.40 | 0.40 | |
| Note: Dependent variable is turnout as percent of voting age population. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.  \*: p<0.10, \*\*: p<0.05, \*\*\*: p<0.01. | | | | | |

**Appendix C: Turnout before and after the introduction of a fiscal rule**

Table C1: Introduction of a fiscal rule and turnout

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | (1) |
| -3 years from introduction of fiscal rule | 1.27  (2.23) |
| -2 years from introduction of fiscal rule | -3.86  (2.46) |
| -1 years from introduction of fiscal rule | 1.53  (2.11) |
| 0 years from introduction of fiscal rule | 1.58  (2.04) |
| +1 years from introduction of fiscal rule | -1.16  (3.51) |
| +2 years from introduction of fiscal rule | -3.70  (2.41) |
| +3 years from introduction of fiscal rule | -3.41  (2.93) |
| Log of GDP per capita | -2.89  (5.37) |
| Proportional electoral system | -6.84  (4.16) |
| Compulsory voting | -1.49  (3.64) |
| Log of population | -7.74  (8.97) |
| General government gross debt | -0.03  (0.02) |
| Country-fixed effects | Yes |
| Year-fixed effects | Yes |
| Number of countries | 103 |
| Number of observations | 415 |
| Within R-squared | 0.20 |
| Note: Dependent variable is turnout as percent of voting age population. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*: p<0.10, \*\*: p<0.05, \*\*\*: p<0.01. | |

**Appendix D: Strength of the fiscal rules**

*Constructing the fiscal rules strength indexes*

For this part of the analysis, indexes for the strength of each types of fiscal rule, expenditure, revenue, balanced budget and debt rules are constructed. Stricter fiscal rules should - everything else being equal - act as greater constraint on government fiscal policy. Each index takes on a greater value the larger the legal commitment of the fiscal rule is,[[1]](#footnote-1) and if the rules cover a larger part of the public sector.[[2]](#footnote-2) It also takes a greater value if there exists formal enforcement procedures, and if there are auxiliary rules such as multi-year expenditure ceilings and a so-called Fiscal Responsibility Law. Scores are also higher if an independent body, such as a fiscal council, sets budget assumptions and monitors the implementation of the rules. These indexes thus not only measure the existence of a given fiscal rule but also the rule’s scope and the institutional framework of the rule, which might help determine whether the fiscal rule is actually enforced. The indexes for the strength of each fiscal rules are also aggregated to an overall fiscal rules index, which measure the strength of the total fiscal rules’ framework. The precise construction of the indexes is described in detail in Aaskoven (2018) and is inspired by the proposed methods of Schaechter et al. (2012, 29-31) and Bergman and Hutchison (2015, 84-85).

*Strength for fiscal rules, main results.*

When looking at fiscal rules in a purely dummy format in table 1 of the main analysis, there seems to be little robust evidence that the introduction of these types of rules on average has a negative effect on voter turnout. However, the effect of fiscal rules on turnout might be contingent on not just the existence of fiscal rules but also on their ability to actually be an effective constraint on national fiscal policy. Consequently, the effect of fiscal rules might in- or decrease with the general strictness of the fiscal rules and the existence of auxiliary institutions and the overall national fiscal legal framework, which at least theoretically could make the fiscal rules de-facto stricter and compliance with the rules more likely. To test this argument, in table D1, the dummies for the different types of fiscal rules from table 1 in the main analysis are replaced by the indexes for the strength of each type of fiscal rules as well as the aggregate index for the strength of the overall fiscal rules’ framework constructed as previously described.

However, while the index for expenditure rules seems to have a negative and statistically significant effect on turnout, neither of the other types of fiscal rules indexes seem to have any statistically significant effect on voter turnout, although all indexes exhibit the expected negative sign.

The strength of the overall fiscal rules’ framework in column 5 of table D1 seem to be a statistically significant predictor of lower turnout rates. The effect here is also non-trivial as one unit increase in the fiscal rules strength index translates into a more than one percentage point decrease in the aggregate turnout rate.[[3]](#footnote-3)

However, this effect on turnout in a the wider sample of democracies seems driven entirely by the expenditure rule index, which does seem to have a depressing effect on aggregate turnout. The effect of expenditure rule strength is of a limited but not trivial size given that one standard deviation change on the expenditure rule strength index translate into about a one percentage point lower turnout rate. The question is why this type of fiscal rules seems to have, in accordance with the constraints argument, a negative effect on aggregate turnout, while other fiscal rules do not. One could argue that, compared to other fiscal rules, strict expenditure rules are a more direct constraint on one of the most fundamental aspect of government fiscal policy, public expenditures. Furthermore, voters might be better able to understand how expenditure rules, with often takes the form of direct expenditure ceilings in nominal national currency (Bova et al. 2015, 63), constrain government fiscal policy.

However, there is reason to caution, as the theoretical arguments for why fiscal rules should lower electoral turnout would apply to all fiscal rules and not just an expenditure rule. Both revenue, balanced budget and debt rules should, if complied with, also narrow the scope for government fiscal policy and, at least indirectly, act as brake on expansion of government expenditures. Furthermore, both debt rules and balanced budget rules should also be easy for voters to - at least superficially - understand (Schaechter et al. 2012, 8). Thus, in light of the lack of a statistically significant effect of the other types of fiscal rules, the apparent statistically significant effect of expenditure rule strength might instead reflect a coincidence or a spurious effect rather than a true effect of expenditure rule strength on electoral turnout. Taking the results from the main analysis and table D1 into account, there seems to be little evidence in favor of an effect of fiscal rules on electoral from a conservative statistical viewpoint, especially with regards to fiscal rules such as balanced budget rules, the most common type of national fiscal rules, confer figure 1 in the main analysis.

Table D1: Strength of fiscal rules and turnout

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
| Log of GDP per capita | -2.60  (5.45) | -2.59  (5.48) | -2.76  (5.58) | -2.32  (5.51) | -2.62  (5.52) | |
| Proportional electoral system | -6.36  (4.27) | -6.68  (4.20) | -6.66  (4.23) | -6.21  (4.39) | -6.37  (4.33) | |
| Compulsory voting | -1.35  (3.48) | -1.27  (3.49) | -1.30  (3.50) | -1.14  (3.50) | -1.13  (3.47) | |
| Log of population | -6.79  (9.04) | -6.55  (9.02) | -6.90  (9.02) | -6.97  (9.06) | -6.88  (9.03) | |
| General government gross debt | -0.03  (0.02) | -0.03  (0.02) | -0.03  (0.02) | -0.03  (0.02) | -0.03  (0.02) | |
| Expenditure rule strenght | -1.00  (0.33)\*\*\* | - | - | - | - | |
| Revenue rule strenght | - | -1.15  (0.76) | - | - | - | |
| Balanced budget rule strenght | - | - | -0.41  (0.45) | - | - | |
| Debt rule strenght | - | - | - | -0.77  (0.49) | - | |
| Strength of fiscal rules index | - | - | - | - | -1.33  (0.69)\* | |
| Country-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Year-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Number of countries | 103 | 103 | 103 | 103 | 103 | |
| Number of observations | 415 | 415 | 415 | 415 | 415 | |
| Within R-squared | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0.18 | 0.19 | 0.19 | |
| Note: Dependent variable is turnout as percent of voting age population. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.  \*: p<0.10, \*\*: p<0.05, \*\*\*: p<0.01. | | | | | |

*Robustness checks: Controlling for the influence international organizations*

The baseline results from the regressions with both the dummy and strength measures of fiscal rules did not seem to yield any statistically significant effect of fiscal rules on turnout with the potential exception of expenditure rule. However, it could be argued that even though the regression estimates employ a number of controls, potential confounding factors could be left of the estimations. In order to address this issue, I conduct a robustness test where I redo the results in table 3 controlling for different international sources which could simultaneously affect both the propensity to enact and strengthen national fiscal rules and their auxiliary framework. These control is whether the country is a member of a currency union and whether the country is under an IMF program.[[4]](#footnote-4)

Even though currency unions often comes with supranational fiscal rules of their own, such as the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact and later the Fiscal Compact, it could be argued that these supranational rules might spill over in the national fiscal rules’ framework. Furthermore, currency unions could in themselves be a constraint on national policy, especially with regards to monetary policy. Being under an IMF program could also be endogenous to the existence and strength of the fiscal framework since IMF programs might come with conditions of changing the national fiscal framework. Furthermore, the IMF program might in itself serve as a constraint on national fiscal policy, in line with previous findings (Hyde and O'Mahoney 2010), and might thus also lower turnout. The results from this robustness test are reported in table D2.

Including controls for currency union membership and IMF program does not change the results. Still, only expenditure rule strength seems to exhibit a statistically significant negative effect on turnout. While both currency union membership and being under an IMF program has the expected negative sign on turnout rates, neither of the effects are statistically significant.

Table D2: The effect of international organizations

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Log of GDP per capita | -2.74  (5.53) | -2.77  (5.56) | -2.95  (5.66) | -2.50  (5.62) | -2.85  (5.61) |
| Proportional electoral system | -6.32  (4.24) | -6.65  (4.15) | -6.62  (4.18) | -6.17  (4.34) | -6.33  (4.29) |
| Compulsory voting | -1.29  (3.50) | -1.19  (3.50) | -1.22  (3.51) | -1.06  (3.52) | -1.06  (3.48) |
| Log of population | -6.91  (9.10) | -6.65  (9.08) | -6.99  (9.09) | -7.06  (9.12) | -7.00  (9.10) |
| General government gross debt | -0.02  (0.02) | -0.03  (0.02) | -0.03  (0.02) | -0.03  (0.02) | -0.03  (0.02) |
| Under IMF program | -0.25  (1.48) | -0.33  (1.45) | -0.35  (1.46) | -0.33  (1.46) | -0.31  (1.46) |
| Currency union membership | -1.33  (1.78) | -1.04  (1.69) | -0.78  (1.84) | -0.93  (1.76) | -1.18  (1.79) |
| Expenditure rule strenght | -1.01  (0.34)\*\*\* | - | - | - | - |
| Revenue rule strenght | - | -1.17  (0.76) | - | - | - |
| Balanced budget rule strenght | - | - | -0.42  (0.46) | - | - |
| Debt rule strenght | - | - | - | -0.78  (0.51) | - |
| Strength of fiscal rules index | - | - | - | - | -1.35  (0.71)\* |
| Country-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Number of countries | 103 | 103 | 103 | 103 | 103 |
| Number of observations | 415 | 415 | 415 | 415 | 415 |
| Within R-squared | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0.18 | 0.19 | 0.19 |
| Note: Dependent variable is turnout as percent of voting age population. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*: p<0.10, \*\*: p<0.05, \*\*\*: p<0.01. | | | | | |

**Appendix E: Results from OECD countries**

In this appendix, the aggregate analysis is limited to the countries of the OECD. OECD countries generally have more stable and robust government institutions, higher government efficiency as well as a stronger tradition for the rule of law, so, as argued in the main analysis, in these countries we should actually expect fiscal rules to have a larger de-facto effect on government fiscal policy (Bergman and Hutchison 2015) and consequently on electoral turnout.

In table E1, turnout is regressed on the different types of fiscal rules with statutory and/or constitutional basis. When adding the fiscal rule dummy variables one by one, none of these variables has a statistically significant negative effect on turnout rates. Surprisingly, a balanced budget rule seems to increase electoral turnout, while the expenditure rule dummy becomes statistically significant at a p<0.10-level with a negative effect when analyzed together with the other fiscal rules dummies in column 5, where an F test is also done to test whether the expenditure rule effect is equal to the other fiscal rules’ effects.

Table E1: Fiscal rules dummies and turnout

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Log of GDP per capita | 0.50  (7.11) | -0.02  (6.76) | 2.97  (6.24) | 0.29  (6.75) | 3.90  (6.29) |
| Proportional electoral system | 1.44  (3.33) | 1.18  (3.30) | 0.51  (3.32) | 0.76  (3.74) | 1.23  (4.10) |
| Compulsory voting | -1.09  (3.45) | -0.87  (3.42) | -2.54  (4.38) | -1.24  (3.60) | -2.75  (4.09) |
| Log of population | -3.90  (16.05) | -1.68  (15.50) | -7.77  (16.29) | -3.33  (15.84) | -9.32  (16.12) |
| General government gross debt | -0.04  (0.03) | -0.04  (0.03) | -0.03  (0.04) | -0.04  (0.03) | -0.03  (0.03) |
| Expenditure rule | -2.81  (2.52) | - | - | - | -3.82  (2.22)\* |
| Revenue rule | - | -1.81  (5.11) | - | - | -0.55  (3.92) |
| Balanced budget rule | - | - | 3.95  (1.90)\*\* | - | 5.05  (1.83)\*\*\* |
| Debt rule | - | - | - | 1.11  (2.27) | -1.76  (3.17) |
| Country-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Number of countries | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 |
| Number of observations | 189 | 189 | 189 | 189 | 189 |
| F-test p-value | - | - | - | - | 0.06 |
| Within R-squared | 0.39 | 0.38 | 0.41 | 0.38 | 0.42 |
| Note: Dependent variable is turnout as percent of voting age population. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.  \*: p<0.10, \*\*: p<0.05, \*\*\*: p<0.01. | | | | | |

In table E2, the dummies are replaced with the indexes measuring the strength of the fiscal rules’ framework. In this estimation, neither each individual fiscal rule index nor the aggregate fiscal rules index have any statistically significant effect on electoral turnout. The results suggest no robust negative effect of fiscal rules’ strength on electoral turnout in parliamentary elections within the OECD countries.

Table E2: Strength of fiscal rules and turnout

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
| Log of GDP per capita | 0.34  (7.12) | 0.11  (6.72) | 1.20  (6.40) | 0.31  (6.95) | 0.26  (6.80) | |
| Proportional electoral system | 2.19  (3.56) | 1.54  (3.41) | 0.72  (3.63) | 1.90  (3.97) | 1.60  (3.76) | |
| Compulsory voting | -0.56  (3.22) | -0.62  (3.34) | -1.55  (3.87) | -0.54  (3.29) | -0.70  (3.38) | |
| Log of population | -2.93  (15.44) | -2.74  (15.28) | -4.43  (15.71) | -3.23  (15.88) | -3.09  (15.44) | |
| General government gross debt | -0.04  (0.03) | -0.04  (0.03) | -0.04  (0.03) | -0.04  (0.03) | -0.04  (0.03) | |
| Expenditure rule strenght | -0.58  (0.44) | - | - | - | - | |
| Revenue rule strenght | - | -0.30  (0.84) | - | - | - | |
| Balanced budget rule strenght | - | - | 0.54  (0.55) | - | - | |
| Debt rule strenght | - | - | - | -0.18  (0.51) | - | |
| Strength of fiscal rules index | - | - | - | - | -0.13  (0.89) | |
| Country-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Year-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Number of countries | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | |
| Number of observations | 189 | 189 | 189 | 189 | 189 | |
| Within R-squared | 0.38 | 0.38 | 0.38 | 0.38 | 0.38 | |
| Note: Dependent variable is turnout as percent of voting age population. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.  \*: p<0.10, \*\*: p<0.05, \*\*\*: p<0.01. | | | | | |

In table E3, controls are added for currency union membership and whether the country is under an IMF program. This does not change the results from table 2. Neither of the indexes of fiscal rules’ strength are statistically significant predictors of the level of electoral turnout. In accordance with the constraining argument, being under an IMF program does seem to reduce electoral turnout. An effect which is substantial both in terms of effect size and level of statistical significance.

Table E3: The effect of international organizations

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Log of GDP per capita | 1.14  (7.13) | 0.922  (6.78) | 1.93  (6.58) | 1.09  (6.99) | 1.05  (6.87) |
| Proportional electoral system | 2.18  (3.80) | 1.50  (3.64) | 0.60  (3.92) | 1.77  (4.26) | 1.52  (4.04) |
| Compulsory voting | -0.60  (3.23) | -0.70  (3.37) | -1.64  (3.94) | -0.66  (3.39) | -0.79  (3.45) |
| Log of population | 1.20  (16.97) | 1.55  (16.82) | 0.30  (17.48) | 1.17  (17.45) | 1.30  (17.08) |
| General government gross debt | -0.03  (0.03) | -0.03  (0.03) | -0.02  (0.04) | -0.03  (0.03) | -0.03  (0.03) |
| Under IMF program | -4.44  (2.08)\*\* | -4.44  (2.06)\*\* | -4.40  (2.07)\*\* | -4.45  (2.07)\*\* | -4.45  (2.07)\*\* |
| Currency union membership | 1.05  (2.21) | 1.45  (2.18) | 2.13  (2.44) | 1.47  (2.26) | 1.53  (2.32) |
| Expenditure rule strenght | -0.56  (0.47) | - | - | - | - |
| Revenue rule strenght | - | -0.24  (0.87) | - | - | - |
| Balanced budget rule strenght | - | - | 0.55  (0.59) | - | - |
| Debt rule strenght | - | - | - | -0.13  (0.58) | - |
| Strength of fiscal rules index | - | - | - | - | -0.08  (0.95) |
| Country-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Number of countries | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 |
| Number of observations | 189 | 189 | 189 | 189 | 189 |
| Within R-squared | 0.41 | 0.41 | 0.41 | 0.41 | 0.41 |
| Note: Dependent variable is turnout as percent of voting age population. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*: p<0.10, \*\*: p<0.05, \*\*\*: p<0.01. | | | | | |

**Appendix F: Fiscal rules strength and inequality in turnout**

Table F1: Fiscal rules strength and inequality in turnout

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Income decile | 0.0098  (0.0020)\*\*\* | 0.0098  (0.0019)\*\*\* | 0.0088  (0.0019)\*\*\* | 0.0093  (0.0022)\*\*\* | 0.0094  (0.0021)\*\*\* |
| Expenditure rule strenght | 0.0026  (0.0044) | - | - | - | - |
| Expenditure rule strength X Income decile | -0.0001  (0.0008) | - | - | - | - |
| Revenue rule strenght | - | 0.0055  (0.0072) | - | - | - |
| Revenue rule strength X income decile | - | -0.0003  (0.0010) | - | - | - |
| Balanced budget rule strenght | - | - | -0.0008  (0.0057) | - | - |
| Balanced budget rule strength X income decile | - | - | 0.0005  (0.0007) | - | - |
| Debt rule strenght | - | - | - | 0.0036  (0.0067) | - |
| Debt rule strength X income decile | - | - | - | 0.0003  (0.0012) | - |
| Strength of fiscal rules index | - | - | - | - | 0.0044  (0.0079) |
| Strength of fiscal rules index X income decile | - | - | - | - | 0.0003  (0.0014) |
| Married | 0.0440  (0.0059)\*\*\* | 0.0439  (0.0058)\*\*\* | 0.0439  (0.0058)\*\*\* | 0.0439  (0.0058)\*\*\* | 0.0439  (0.0058)\*\*\* |
| Unemployed | -0.0571  (0.0092)\*\*\* | -0.0570  (0.0091)\*\*\* | -0.0571  (0.0092)\*\*\* | -0.0570  (0.0092)\*\*\* | -0.0571  (0.0092)\*\*\* |
| Age | 0.0274  (0.0011)\*\*\* | 0.0274  (0.0011)\*\*\* | 0.0274  (0.0011)\*\*\* | 0.0274  (0.0011)\*\*\* | 0.0274  (0.0011)\*\*\* |
| Age squared | -0.0002  (0.0000)\*\*\* | -0.00020  (0.0000)\*\*\* | -0.0002  (0.0000)\*\*\* | -0.0002  (0.0000)\*\*\* | -0.0002  (0.0000)\*\*\* |
| Education level dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Country-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| ESS round-fixed effecs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Number of observations | 240,600 | 240,600 | 240,600 | 240,600 | 240,600 |
| R-squared | 0.1926 | 0.1926 | 0.1926 | 0.1926 | 0.1926 |

Note: Dependent variable is whether the respondent voted in the last national election. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.

\*: p<0.10, \*\*: p<0.05, \*\*\*: p<0.01.

**Appendix G: Difference-in-discontinuity with outlaying municipality**

Table G1: Difference-in-discontinuity estimations

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Effect of relaxing fiscal rules | -0.01  (0.03) | -0.03  (0.03) | -0.01  (0.02) | -0.00  (0.02) |
| Bandwidth | 564 | 400 | 800 | 1000 |
| Observations | 422 | 309 | 591 | 777 |

Note: Dependent variable is turnout in municipal elections. Column one reports bandwidths based on the algorithm of

Calonico et al. (2017). Municipal-clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*: p<0.10, \*\*: p<0.05, \*\*\*: p<0.01.

Figure G1: Difference-in-discontinuity estimation

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Note: The inner line represents a third-order polynomial fit. Outer lines represent 90 percent confidence intervals.

**References**

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1. From political commitment to constitutional level. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. From central to general government. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. A 90 percent confidence interval suggest an effect size between -2.47 and -0.18 percentage points. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Data for currency union membership is from the IMF’s Fiscal Rules Database, while the IMF’s own website is the source for whether the country is under some sort of IMF program. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)