

An Intra-party Account of Electoral System Choice

Valentin Schröder/ Philip Manow (University of Bremen)

Appendices A to E

Appendix A

Variables in the model have been set up in the following way. We first identified, in each district, the non-SPD candidate with the highest vote-share. We then assessed whether he was also endorsed by several parties rather than only by his own party. This is our dependent variable in a logistic regression. As for independent variables, we include the vote-share of the SPD candidate in the previous election as our indicator for the intensity of a Socialist threat. As controls, we include a dummy variable on the main non-SPD candidate being the incumbent MP, and three sets of dummies, on his party, the election, and the administrative region


Table A-1: Model summary for logistic regression on alliance formation

Previous SPD vote-share		0.02***	(0.005)
Incumbent		-0.37***	(0.129)
Party dummies	DFP	1.81**	(0.571)
	FVg	4.54***	(0.937)
	Other Liberal	-	
	NLP	3.14***	(0.555)
	DRP	4.63***	(0.637)
	DKP	3.74***	(0.574)
	BdL	3.31***	(0.720)
	Christian-social	4.32***	(1.219)
	Zentrum	0.45	(0.543)
	Guelf	4.02***	(0.754)
	Other Conservative	3.91**	(1.237)
	Peasant	3.46**	(1.054)
	Middle class	-	
	DS	3.75***	(0.847)
	DRefp	1.35	(0.692)
	Ethnic	-1.52	(0.868)
Election dummies	1893	0.52*	(0.240)
	1898	0.48*	(0.240)
	1903	0.35	(0.244)
	1907	0.92***	(0.254)
	1912	0.58*	(0.242)
Region dummies	Hesse (Grand duchy)	0.40	(0.454)
	Mecklenburg-Schwerin	0.60	(0.571)
	Saxony (Kingdom)	1.20**	(0.444)
	Wurttemberg	1.99***	(0.448)
	Prussian province of Brandenburg	-0.24	(0.403)
	Prussian province of Hannover	0.03	(0.390)
	Prussian province of Hesse	1.25**	(0.448)
	Prussian province of Eastern Prussia	-0.18	(0.422)
	Prussian province of Pommerania	-0.70	(0.434)
	Prussian province of Posen	1.40	(0.786)
	Prussian Rhine province	0.23	(0.381)
	Prussian province of Saxony	1.01*	(0.420)
	Prussian province of Silesia	1.04**	(0.371)
	Prussian province of Schleswig-Holstein	0.39	(0.474)
	Prussian province of Westphalia	0.40	(0.417)
	Prussian province of Western Prussia	0.32	(0.529)
	City of Berlin	1.03	(0.531)
	Bavarian province of Middle Franconia	0.30	(0.507)
	Bavarian province of Lower Bavaria	-1.32	(1.011)
	Bavarian province of Upper Bavaria	-0.59	(0.646)
	Bavarian province of Upper Franconia	-0.24	(0.561)
	Bavarian province of the Upper Palatinate	-0.83	(1.073)

	Bavarian province of the Palatinate	-0.04 (0.488)
	Bavarian province of Swabia	-
	Bavarian province of Lower Franconia	-
	Alsace-Lorraine	0.92 (0.810)
Constant		-3.39*** (0.641)
Observations		1879
Pseudo R2		0.384
Log Likelihood		1001
LR chi2 (46)		-1299.00***

Main Non-SPD candidate running for “Middle class party” or other Liberal party predicts running as joint candidate perfectly. Main Non-SPD candidate running in Bavarian provinces of Swabia and Lower Franconia predicts not running as a joint candidate perfectly (all Zentrum candidates). *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Figure A-1: Predicted probabilities of alliance in support of strongest Non-SPD candidate (non-incumbent)



Appendix B

In the main text, we argue that bourgeois candidates profited from being supported by other bourgeois parties in terms of maximizing their chances at runoff participation against the SPD candidate. We demonstrate that this is the case in this appendix, with a beta regression on the vote-share received, in each of the 397 districts in each of the six elections of 1890, 1893, 1898, 1903, 1907 and 1912, by the candidate of the bourgeois party in each district that received the highest vote-share of all Non-SPD candidates. This vote-share is our dependent variable here.

We employ a dummy on an alliance in support of this candidate existing, a continuous variable on the SPD vote-share (percent) in the recent election, and an interaction of these two variables as our independent variables of interest. We also include the candidate party's vote share (percent) in the previous election, a dummy on incumbency, and an interaction of previous vote-share and incumbency. We control for all variables from model A-1. Results are summarized below in table B-1.

Figure B-1: Predicted vote-share of strongest Non-SPD incumbent as a function of SPD vote-share in recent election and alliance support, by previous vote-share of incumbent 1890–1912




Table B-1: Model summary for beta regression of vote-share of main Non-SPD candidate

In Alliance		0.03	(0.041)
Recent SPD vote-share (percent)		-0.02***	(0.001)
Interaction In Alliance*Recent SPD vote-share		0.01***	(0.001)
Incumbent		-0.14*	(0.060)
Own previous vote-share (percent)		0.02***	(0.001)
Interaction Incumbent*Own previous vote-share		0.003***	(0.001)
Candidate party dummies	DFP	0.02	(0.110)
	FVg	-0.11	(0.145)
	Other Liberal	-0.11	(0.209)
	NLP	-0.13	(0.106)
	DRP	-0.22	(0.114)
	DKP	-0.19	(0.109)
	BdL	0.10	(0.144)
	Christian-social	-0.13	(0.195)
	Zentrum	0.43***	(0.106)
	Guelf	-0.26	(0.140)
	Other Conservative	-0.22	(0.232)
	Peasant	0.24	(0.185)
	Middle class	-0.11	(0.472)
	DS	-0.00	(0.151)
	DRefp	-0.16	(0.161)
	Ethnic	0.01	(0.122)
Election dummies	1893	0.16***	(0.036)
	1898	0.13***	(0.036)
	1903	0.09**	(0.036)
	1907	0.25***	(0.037)
	1912	-0.00	(0.036)
Region dummies	Hesse (Grand duchy)	0.17*	(0.084)
	Mecklenburg-Schwerin	0.35***	(0.096)
	Saxony (Kingdom)	0.39***	(0.076)
	Wurttemberg	0.17*	(0.079)
	Prussian province of Brandenburg	0.44***	(0.073)
	Prussian province of Hannover	0.30***	(0.074)
	Prussian province of Hesse	0.12	(0.079)
	Prussian province of Eastern Prussia	0.51***	(0.076)
	Prussian province of Pommerania	0.45***	(0.080)
	Prussian province of Posen	0.24**	(0.091)
	Prussian Rhine province	0.30***	(0.061)
	Prussian province of Saxony	0.35***	(0.071)
	Prussian province of Silesia	0.29***	(0.063)
	Prussian province of Schleswig-Holstein	0.27**	(0.088)
	Prussian province of Westphalia	0.35***	(0.069)
	Prussian province of Western Prussia	0.17*	(0.083)
	City of Berlin	0.28**	(0.105)
	Bavarian province of Middle Franconia	0.17	(0.098)
	Bavarian province of Lower Bavaria	0.05	(0.098)
	Bavarian province of Upper Bavaria	0.17	(0.086)
	Bavarian province of Upper Franconia	0.10	(0.095)
	Bavarian province of the Upper Palatinate	0.10	(0.099)
	Bavarian province of the Palatinate	0.13	(0.091)
	Bavarian province of Swabia	-0.12	(0.088)
	Bavarian province of Lower Franconia	-0.14	(0.088)
	Alsace-Lorraine	0.48***	(0.097)
	Other	0.38***	(0.067)
Constant		-1.12***	(0.124)
Scale (Constant)		3.11***	(0.031)
Observations		1985	
LR(chi2)		2943.95	
Log likelihood		1887.50	

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

We then calculated predicted vote-shares for candidates within and without alliances as a function of the SPD vote-share (percent) in the recent election, for four scenarios: incumbents that had attained 25, 35, 45 and 55 percent of the vote in first round of the previous election (figure B-1).

Predictions show an incumbency bonus on vote-share that is the higher, the lower an MP's previous vote-share is. His vote-share is also in decline in increasing SPD vote-shares. This is however offset for incumbents running within an alliance the more decisively the higher the SPD share is. Crucially, whenever the SPD share was below 50 percent in the first round (meaning no outright win for the SPD), the non-SPD candidate secured runoff participation – if he was running within an alliance. This is indicated by predicted shares exceeding 33 percent, the value that guarantees runoff participation, for alliance candidates even as the SPD vote-share approaches 50.

Runoffs have however been identified as the main reason why the SPD, despite being the strongest party in many districts, often failed to also secure the respective mandates and suffered from a ratio of vote-shares and seat-shares below one Matthias and Pikart 1966, Fairbairn 1997, Anderson 2000, Ritter 2002.

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Appendix C

In the main text of this article, we interpret Rice scores as an aggregate measure of party cohesion, at the level of parliamentary party groups (figure 2). We find these scores to be a) generally lower for bourgeois party groups as elite parties as compared to scores for the SPD as a mass party, and b) to vary strongly across RCVs for bourgeois party groups. We also present predicted probabilities of MPs to defect from their party line along the number of committees in their electoral support whose parties held a party line differing from the one of the MP in question (figure 3), and on how this reverberates into breakdown of party cohesion, via predictions on Rice scores along the average number of dissenting committees per MP of a party group (figure 4). In this appendix, we demonstrate that individual voting behavior of bourgeois backbench MPs, as opposed to individual voting behavior of their party leaders, is the cause of lower Rice scores. We also provide detail on our regressions on the role alliance played for legislative cohesion, and on the RCV data we employ.

We start with describing the RCV data we employ. We then turn to the variables used in the related regressions. We then present summaries of all RCV-related models (models C-1 – C-7) and comment on those models that we do not mention in the main text (models C-2 – C-4, and C-6).

In the Reichstag, RCV were never held automatically. They always had to be requested by at least 50 MPs (ca. 12.5 percent of all MPs). Until 1902, they were conducted by the Reichstag president asking MPs one after another in alphabetical order, whether they voted Yes, No or Abstention. MP Spahn, in the 215th session of the 10th LP on 13 November 1902 estimated this procedure taking around 45 minutes per RCV, depending on how many MPs were present and on how quickly they would answer the president's question. In the 1898 elections (10th LP), the SPD gained 56 mandates, thereby getting in a position to request RCVs on its own for the first time. It then tried to employ RCV requests as a means of embarrassing the bourgeois parties in 1900, with respect to the so-called Lex Heinze bill (that, if adopted as law would have endangered the freedom of expression), in 1902 with respect to the law on the Imperial Foreign Tariff on grain, and again 1909 with respect to several laws an taxation of agricultural produce, tobacco, alcohol and train tickets. In order to avoid bias from this and possible attempts of other parties to employ bundles of RCV requests for placating their legislative opponents, we only employed each first RCV held in a plenary session for the following analyses. However, results of these analyses do not differ substantially as concerns the findings of our interest. They are often even stronger, especially so for models C-6 and C-7.

Also, by-elections affected between five and ten percent of MPs within LPs. At times, electoral alliances for by-elections are not documented well or are not documented at all in Reibel (2007). So we also did not include observations on MPs having entered the Reichstag due to winning their mandate in a by-election.

Finally, since we focus on the six major parties, we also do not include observations on MPs from the smaller parties in the following.

These three steps (multiple RCVs, by-elections, small-party MPs) lead to a reduction in numbers of observations from an overall total of 211,384 to a total of observation analyzed in the following of 79,856, as depicted in table C-1.

Table C-1: Observations from RCV data, by number of RCV within session and MP belonging to small or major party and being elected in general election or by-election

Nth RCV per session	Small + by-election	Small + general	Major 6 + by-election	Major 6 + general	Total
1	17857	1724	5699	79856	105136
2	7737	783	2769	34374	45663
3	3575	328	133	15249	20482
4	2178	205	885	8930	12198
5	1298	118	510	5155	7081
6	1003	94	402	4013	5512
7	585	54	239	2264	3142
8	512	46	201	1988	2747
9	295	24	108	1142	1569
10	295	24	108	1142	1569
11	223	16	70	867	1176
12	72	8	38	275	393
13	72	8	38	275	393
14	72	8	38	275	393
15	72	8	38	275	393
16	72	8	38	275	393
17	72	8	38	275	393
18	72	8	38	275	393
19	72	8	38	275	393
20	72	8	38	275	393
21	72	8	38	275	393
22	72	8	38	275	393
23	72	8	38	275	393
24	72	8	38	275	393
Total	36494	3520	12815	158555	211384

As for dependent variables in models C-1 – C-5, we defined the “party line” of each party group in each RCV as being Yes, No or Abstention, according to how the majority of its MPs voted. If an MP’s voting behavior differed from the party line, we coded his vote as a defection (0) in a dummy variable. Else we coded the observation as 1. The dependent variables in models C-6 – C-7 are Rice scores, calculated at the level of party groups.

As for independent variables, we defined an MP as a “party leader” if he was the chairman of his party and/or parliamentary party group at the time the respective RCV was held, using information from Huber 1991 and Fricke et al. 1983. We also defined a variable indicating

whether an MP was elected within an alliance, using data from Reibel 2007, and a variable on the share of the vote he received in his district in the previous election, as documented in official statistics Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt 1890, 1893, 1903, 1913. In order to account for the possible transformation of elite parties into mass parties on the long run, we defined a variable on the legislative period (LP), running from 8 (for the 8th legislative period, 1890–93) to 13, and a squared term on this given our suspicion that this was not a linear process.

Finally, we included a series of dummy variables on party groups of MPs. We retrieved data on party group membership from the lists of members published in the annexes to the Reichstag protocols at the beginning of each LP. In order to account for changes in membership during LPs, we consulted the Addenda to the official Reichstag handbooks that were published towards the end of each LP.¹ In the following, membership in the DFP party group serves as our reference category.

We then first calculated three logistic regressions. Model C-1 covers MPs of all major parliamentary party groups. Models C-2 and C-3 treat the Non-SPD and SPD MPs in isolation. We addressed possible idiosyncrasies in voting behavior of individual MPs by estimating standard errors clustered along each MP. Results are summarized in table C-1.

They show a strong effect of elite party leadership against proneness to defect. Predicted probabilities of defection for ideal-types of party leaders without district-level alliances and for backbenchers within alliances are close to zero for leaders of all parties (see figure C-1). For backbenchers of elite parties, however probabilities vary considerably, and are at much higher levels. Only for the SPD do probabilities remain close to zero, irrespective of whether or not MPs are party leaders.

Models C-2 and C-3, where the SPD and elite party MPs are treated as separate populations, corroborate this.

¹ These sources are available online, at Reichstagsprotokolle.de. Lists of members are always contained in the first annex to each legislative session within each LP. We cross-checked our data with the BIORAB-Kaiserreich dataset on MP demographics, available at zhsf.gesis.org/ParlamentarierPortal/datenbanken.htm.

Figure C-1: Predicted probabilities of defection for ideal-types of party leaders without and backbenchers within alliances for six major parliamentary groups, 1890–1914




Table C-2: Summary of results for logistic regressions on MP RCV behavior along being a party leader

	C-1 - All MP	C-2 - Non-SPD only	C-3 - SPD only
Party leader	-0.47** (0.175)	-0.38* (0.148)	1.43* (0.638)
SPD party leader	1.66* (0.788)		
Alliance	-0.08 (0.060)	0.18** (0.067)	0.78 (0.648)
Vote-share in district	-0.00 (0.002)	-0.01*** (0.002)	-0.03 (0.054)
Legislative term	-0.40 (0.225)	-0.77*** (0.224)	-0.30 (3.827)
Legislative term squared	0.01 (0.011)	0.03** (0.011)	0.01 (0.179)
Party dummies			
DRP		0.65*** (0.123)	
DKP		0.07 (0.113)	
NLP		0.71*** (0.111)	
Z		0.96*** (0.108)	
SPD	-4.37*** (0.348)		
Constant	-0.17 (1.142)	1.26 (1.147)	-3.70 (19.155)
Observations	79,856	65,869	13,987
Pseudo R2	0.0462	0.0174	0.0175
Chi2	242.0	226.0	26.93
Log likelihood	-12419	-11824	-75.14
Clusters	1065	897	168

Standard errors (clustered at level of MPs) in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

We then inquired into the effect of committees in support of an MP-turned-candidate being split across their party lines (“split alliances”) in Reichstag votes. In the main text, we report findings on a model including only Non-SPD MPs (model C-5). In the following we add a summary of a model covering MPs of all six major parties (model C-4). This is accompanied by a summary of model C-5.

Table C-3: Summary of results for logistic regressions on MP RCV behavior along split alliances

	C-4 - All parties	C-5 - Bourgeois parties
Party leader	-0.51** (0.171)	-0.43** (0.167)
SPD party leader	1.68* (0.806)	
Count of dissenting committees	0.49*** (0.051)	0.48*** (0.047)
Alliance	-0.27*** (0.068)	0.00 (0.077)
Vote-share in district	-0.00 (0.002)	-0.01*** (0.002)
Legislative term	-0.35 (0.232)	-0.74** (0.231)
Legislative term squared	0.01 (0.011)	0.03** (0.011)
Party dummies		0.61*** (0.132)
	DRP	0.15 (0.117)
	DKP	0.68*** (0.116)
	NLP	1.02*** (0.115)
	Z	
	SPD	-4.33*** (0.349)
Constant	-0.43 (1.177)	1.14 (1.181)
Observations	79,856	65,869
Pseudo R2	0.0545	0.0256
Chi2	341.6	343.6
Log likelihood	-12419	-11824
Clusters	1065	897

Standard errors (clustered at level of MPs) in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Finally, we assessed the degree to which split alliances of individual MPs reverberated into party cohesion, as assessed by Rice scores, with two models at the level of the six major party groups. In order to include variables mimicking those of the previous models, we calculated the average number of split alliances per party group, as well as average vote-shares and averages of alliances in place (i.e. the share of MPs of a party group being supported by at least one committee beyond their own party). Rice scores as the dependent variable take values in the interval [0,1]. In order to be able to conduct the appropriate beta regressions, we changed values of 0 to 0.0000001 and values of 1 to 0.9999999. We again set up a model on all six major parties (model C-6) and another one on the five major bourgeois parties (model C-7). Predictions of Rice scores as a function of average numbers of split alliances are depicted in figure 3 in the main text. Model summaries are given in table C-4.

Table C-4: Summary of results for beta regressions on Rice scores of party groups along split alliances

	C-6 - All party groups	C-7 - Bourgeois party groups
Average number of split alliances	-0.88*** (0.192)	-0.87*** (0.195)
Average number of alliances in support of MPs	0.09 (0.231)	0.12 (0.282)
Average vote-share in districts	-0.01 (0.008)	-0.01 (0.008)
Legislative term	-0.19 (0.197)	-0.25 (0.253)
Legislative term squared	0.01 (0.010)	0.01 (0.013)
Party dummies		-0.10*** (0.025)
	DRP	-0.19*** (0.036)
	DKP	-0.39*** (0.008)
	NLP	-0.41* (0.192)
	Z	
	SPD	0.01 (0.148)
Constant	4.29*** (1.051)	4.50*** (1.293)
Scale	0.06 (0.131)	-0.02 (0.091)
Observations	1,474	1,236
r2_p	.	.
chi2	11824	42013
ll_0	11802	9007
N_clust	6	5

Standard errors (clustered at level of party groups) in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

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Appendix D

In the main text, we make several claims on the effects of the 1917/8 electoral reform on party mandate totals and the repartition of mandates by party across districts. In the following, we provide results of a simulation along data provided by the government to parliament (Reichsleitung 1918) during the legislative process leading to this reform.

Table D-1: Vote shares and mandate shares in the 1912 elections, and mandate shares, mandates gained, and districts with two or more mandates according to simulation of 1917/8 reform

	SPD	DFP	NLP	DRP	DKP	Z
1912 results						
Vote-share	34.8	11.9	13.5	3.3	8.2	16.3
Seat-share	27.7	10.3	11.3	3.5	10.3	22.7
Simulation						
Seat-share post-reform	30.2	10.7	12.2	3.2	9.3	21.8
Seats net gain from reform	23	6	9	0	0	6
Seats gained in multi-member districts	52	8	9	0	0	9
Districts with >1 seat gained	13	1	0	0	0	1

DFP, Z: districts with >1 mandate: Teltow (DFP) and Cologne (Z)) held two mandates each for these parties.

This reform implied increases in the share of mandates of 2.5 percent for the SPD, 0.9 percent for the NLP and 0.4 percent for the DFP, as well as a loss worth one percent each for the DKP and Zentrum (see table D-1). We infer this from a simulation that we conducted using a detailed account of 1903-1912 electoral results according to the new districts. This account was presented to MPs as part of the parliamentary process StBA XIII/2 No. 1288 1918. This is why we assume that MPs were aware of the consequences of the reform in question.

Table D-2: Simulation of distribution of mandates under electoral reform, for 26 MMD districts in elections 1903, 1907 and 1921

	Districts where no mandates gained			Districts where one mandate gained per party			Districts with more than one mandate gained			Mandates gained in districts where more than one mandate gained		
	1903	1907	1912	1903	1907	1912	1903	1907	1912	1903	1907	1912
DKP	22	25	26	3	-	-	1	1	-	2	2	-
DRP	25	24	26	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
NLP	19	16	17	7	9	9	-	1	-	-	2	-
Z	16	18	18	7	6	7	3	2	1	6	4	2
DFP	25	21	19	-	4	6	1	1	1	2	2	2
SPD	3	3	2	8	12	11	15	11	13	41	31	41
Ethnic Minorities	25	24	24	1	-	2	-	2	-	-	4	-
Other	25	26	26	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	-	-	-	8	11	12	18	15	14	53	49	45

Total: Number of districts only where applicable to all parties; may be lower or higher than totals of districts/mandates given in table. Source: Reichsleitung 1918.

We then took a look at the 26 districts affected by the reform from an intra-party perspective. So, given the reform having been implemented in 1903 already: how many mandates did individual

parties gain? This is depicted in table D-2. First of all, the Conservatives were practically unaffected by the reform. The DRP only gained at most one mandate per MMD, and none at all in 1912. Similarly, the DKP did not gain any mandates in 1912, but a total of five and two in 1903 and 1907, respectively. Of these, three were gained in as many districts in 1903 – so the DKP list also only required a single name there. Only in one district did the DKP gain two mandates: the Teltow county. Hence, DKP MPs were bound to be only very mildly affected (if at all) from reform – as were their NLP, Zentrum and DFP colleagues.

The SPD gains predominantly hailed from districts it already held: large cities. These were just the areas under-represented in parliament. This reinforces our claim that the whole reform implied a certain moderation of rural over-representation rather than an attempt at PR introduction.

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Appendix E

Table E-1: Country-level data on population, electoral system, procedure applicable to electoral reform and post-switch district magnitudes

Country	Procedure	Electoral System	Year of reform [of observation]	Population (Mill.)	Seats before	Seats after	District total post-switch	District magnitude				Population per district (1 000)		
								Average	Median	Minimum	Maximum	A	N	
Australia	no Switch	SMD-preferential	1919	5.4	75	-	75	1.0	1.0	1	1	1	72	72
New Zealand	no Switch	SMD-plurality	[1922]	1.2	80	-	80	1.0	1.0	1	1	1	15	15
Canada	no Switch	SMD-plurality	[1921]	8.8	235	-	235	1.0	1.0	1	1	1	37	37
United Kingdom	no Switch	SMD/MMD-plurality	[1922]	42.8	615	-	615	1.0	1.0	1	1	2	70	70
Japan	no Switch	SMD/MMD-plurality	[1919]	55.9	494	-	494	1.3	1.3	1	1	3	113	113
United States	no Switch	SMD-plurality	[1920]	106.5	435	-	435	1.0	1.0	1	1	1	245	245
Estonia	decree	PR, upper tier (N)	1919	1.1	-	120	120	1.0	1.0	120	120	120	110	110
Latvia	decree	PR, upper tier (N)	1925	1.8	-	150	150	30.0	30.0	35	15	35	360	360
Lithuania	decree	PR	1919	2	-	112	112	18.7	18.7	20	12	20	200	333
Greece	decree	PR, upper tier (N)	1926	6.2	397	286	286	7.5	7.5	7	2	22	620	163
Austria	decree	PR	1919	6.5	-	150	150	6.0	6.0	7	4	12	260	260
Hungary	decree	PR, SMD-plurality	1922	8	-	245	245	1.2	1.2	1	1	10	38	38
Czechoslovakia	decree	PR, upper tier (N)	1920	13	-	309	309	14.0	12.9	12	6	24	591	542
Spain	decree	PR	1931	23.6	-	470	470	7.5	7.5	7	1	18	375	375
Poland	decree	PR	1918	31.9	-	525	525	8.2	7.6	7	3	16	498	462
Finland	parliamentary	PR	1907	2.7	-	200	200	12.5	12.5	12	1	23	169	169
Iceland	parliamentary	SMD-plurality, PR for upper tier (N)	1920	0.1	27	42	42	1.5	1.5	1	1	6	4	4
Luxembourg	parliamentary	PR	1920	0.3	12	48	48	12.0	12.0	12	7	16	75	75
Norway	parliamentary	PR	1920	2.6	126	150	150	5.2	5.2	5	3	8	90	90
Ireland	parliamentary	PR	1921	3.1	105	180	180	4.6	4.6	4	1	8	79	79
Denmark	parliamentary	PR, upper tier (D)	1915	3.3	114	140	140	1.4	1.5	1	1	24	34	34
Switzerland	parliamentary	PR	1920	3.9	200	189	189	7.6	7.6	6	1	32	156	156
Sweden	parliamentary	PR	1909	5.5	214	230	230	4.1	4.1	4	3	7	98	98
Belgium	parliamentary	PR	1900	6.1	41	152	152	5.1	5.1	4	2	18	203	203
Netherlands	parliamentary	PR	1919	6.9	100	100	100	9.1	9.1	6	3	26	690	627
Romania	parliamentary	PR, SMD-plurality	1918	17.1	183	568	568	2.3	2.3	1	1	25	68	68

Italy	parliamentary	PR	1919	34.2	508	508	54	54	9.4	9.4	8	5	20	633	633
France	parliamentary	PR, MMD-majority	1919	39.3	601	646	98	98	6.6	6.6	5	1	56	401	401
Germany	parliamentary	PR, SMD-majority	1918	62.8	397	441	$\frac{38}{7}$	$\frac{38}{7}$	1.1	1.1	1	1	10	162	162

A: Level or districts relevant for appropriation of mandates to parties, i.e. for party-wise seat totals; N: Level or districts relevant for assignment of mandates to candidates, i.e. for nomination.

Data on districts post-switch refers to districts at time of observation for no-switch countries. Australia introduced SMD-majority preferential voting in 1919.

Electoral system: PR: proportional system applied to at least one appropriation district; SMD: single-member districts, MMD: multi-member districts; Upper tier: fixed number of mandates allotted at national level in addition to mandates allotted in sub-national districts, or number of mandates allotted at national level in addition to mandates allotted in sub-national districts contingent on party votes totals (Greece) or party votes not translated into mandates in sub-national districts (all other), where (N) indicates separate nation-wide list for upper tier and (D) indicates upper-tier mandates being assigned to candidates nominated and running at sub-national district level only. United Kingdom: two mandates for universities-district distributed under d'Hondt formula.

Procedure: Legislation in all no-switch countries continuously required parliamentary assent at least in the period 1890-1935; Finland: law on electoral system adopted with assent also of the Russian Czar; Ireland: law on electoral system adopted by UK House of Commons; Romania: law on electoral reform implemented by government decree of 14 November 1918; Dates and sponsors of laws on electoral reform in decree countries: Estonia: order of Provisional government of February 1919; Latvia: Law on election of Constitutional Assembly issued by People's Council of 19 August 1919; Lithuania: Decision on Fundamental Principles of the Provisional Constitution of 4 April 1919 issued by National Council; Greece: Law No. 3353, Calling for the Election of Deputies of 2 September 1926 and Decree on the Setup of Electoral Districts of 21 September 1926, both issued by acting head of government General Kondylis; Austria: Decree on the Conduct of Elections to the Constituent National Assembly, issued by German-Austrian National Council on 18 December 1918; Hungary: Government decree No. 2200/1922 of April (?) 1922; Czechoslovakia: Constitution as agreed between Czech National Committee and Slovak National Council of 29 February 1920; Spain: Decrees of 8 May 1931, 3 June 1931 and 5 June 1931 issued by Provisional Government; Poland: Presidential Decree of 28 November 1918.

Appendix F

Excerpts from parliamentary protocols, annexes to parliamentary protocols, official Reichstag handbooks and official statistics have been employed for preparation of the article, as listed below.

These documents are available at Reichstagsprotokolle.de under their respective legislative term and session or running number (*Anlage Nummer*), with the exception of the below two publications issued by the Imperial Statistical Office (*Statistisches Reichsamt*). Reprints of the latter from the 1970s are however still widely available.

Electoral reform 1918:

StB XIII/2 (Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstags: Stenographische Berichte). 1917. Vol. 310: XIII. Legislaturperiode, 2. Session, 112. Sitzung (9 July 1917). p. 3507-3523.

StB XIII/2 (Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstags: Stenographische Berichte). 1918. Vol. 310: XIII. Legislaturperiode, 2. Session, 186. Sitzung (8 July 1918). p. 5909-5964.

StBA XIII/2 No. 1288 (Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstags: Anlagen zu den Stenographischen Berichten). 1918. Vol. 315: XIII. Legislaturperiode, 2. Session (1918). Anlage 1288.

Weimar electoral system:

StB NV 1920a (Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstags: Stenographische Berichte). Vol. 330: Nationalversammlung, 168. Sitzung (22 April 1920). p. 5327 - 5363.

StB NV 1920b (Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstags: Stenographische Berichte). Vol. 330: Nationalversammlung, 169. Sitzung (23 April 1920). p. 5365 - 5389.

Reichstag party group membership 1890-1920:

Bureau des Reichstags (Ed.) 1891: *Amtliches Reichstags-Handbuch. Achte Legislaturperiode 1890/95*. Berlin: Verlag von Trowitzsch und Sohn.

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Deutscher Reichstag 1890: Verzeichnis der Bevollmächtigten zum Bundesrat und der Mitglieder des Reichstags mit angehängter Fraktionsliste; in: *Anlagen zu den Stenografischen Berichten 8/1.* Session: 1. p. 1-47.

Deutscher Reichstag 1893: Verzeichnis der Bevollmächtigten zum Bundesrat und der Mitglieder des Reichstags mit angehängter Fraktionsliste; in: *Anlagen zu den Stenografischen Berichten 9/1.* Session: 1 (1. Aufl.). p. 1-48.

Deutscher Reichstag 1894: Verzeichnis der Bevollmächtigten zum Bundesrat und der Mitglieder des Reichstags mit angehängter Fraktionsliste; in: *Anlagen zu den Stenografischen Berichten 9/2.* Session: 2 (3. Aufl.). p. 1-48.

Deutscher Reichstag 1895: Verzeichnis der Bevollmächtigten zum Bundesrat und der Mitglieder des Reichstags mit angehängter Fraktionsliste; in: *Anlagen zu den Stenografischen Berichten 9/3.* Session: 3 (3. Aufl.). p. 1-47.

Deutscher Reichstag 1896: Verzeichnis der Bevollmächtigten zum Bundesrat und der Mitglieder des Reichstags; in: *Anlagen zu den Stenografischen Berichten 9/4.* Session: 4 (3. Aufl.). p. 1-47.

Deutscher Reichstag 1898: Verzeichnis der Bevollmächtigten zum Bundesrat und der Mitglieder des Reichstags; in: *Anlagen zu den Stenografischen Berichten 9/5.* Session: 5 (3. Aufl.). p. 1-47.

Deutscher Reichstag 1899: Verzeichnis der Bevollmächtigten zum Bundesrat und der Mitglieder des Reichstags mit angehängter Fraktionsliste; in: *Anlagen zu den Stenografischen Berichten 10/1.* Session: 1 (3. Aufl.). p. 1-49.

Deutscher Reichstag 1901: Verzeichnis der Bevollmächtigten zum Bundesrat und der Mitglieder des Reichstags; in: *Anlagen zu den Stenografischen Berichten 10/2.* Session: 2 (3. Aufl.). p. 1-50.

Deutscher Reichstag 1904: Verzeichnis der Bevollmächtigten zum Bundesrat und der Mitglieder des Reichstags; in: *Anlagen zu den Stenografischen Berichten 11/ 1.* Session: 1 (4. Aufl.). p. 1-54.

Deutscher Reichstag 1905: Verzeichnis der Bevollmächtigten zum Bundesrat und der Mitglieder des Reichstags mit angehängter Fraktionsliste; in: *Anlagen zu den Stenografischen Berichten* 11/1. Session: 1 (7. Aufl.). p. 1-54.

Deutscher Reichstag 1906a: Verzeichnis der Bevollmächtigten zum Bundesrat und der Mitglieder des Reichstags mit angehängter Fraktionsliste; in: *Anlagen zu den Stenografischen Berichten* 11/2. Session: 2 (4. Aufl.). p. 1-54.

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Deutscher Reichstag 1911: Verzeichnis der Bevollmächtigten zum Bundesrat und der Mitglieder des Reichstags mit angehängter Fraktionsliste; in: *Anlagen zu den Stenografischen Berichten* 12/2. Session: 2 (5. Aufl.). p. 1-62.

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Statistisches Reichsamt 1919: Die Wahlen zur Verfassunggebenden Deutschen Nationalversammlung am 19. Januar 1919; in: *Vierteljahreshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen Reiches* 28: 1. Ergänzungsheft. p. 1-88.

Statistisches Reichsamt 1920: Die Wahlen zum Reichstag am 6. Juni 1920; in: *Statistik des Deutschen Reiches* 291: 1. p. 1-98.

Verfassunggebende Deutsche Nationalversammlung 1919: Alphabetisches Verzeichnis der Mitglieder der verfassunggebenden deutschen Nationalversammlung; in: *Anlagen zu den Stenografischen Berichten* 335: 1. p. 1-25.

Verfassunggebende Deutsche Nationalversammlung 1920: Während der Session eingetretene Änderung im Alphabetischen Verzeichnis der Mitglieder der verfassunggebenden deutschen Nationalversammlung; in: *Anlagen zu den Stenografischen Berichten* 335: Zu Nr. 1. p. 3505-3512.