

International Migration and Military Intervention in Civil War – Online Appendix

In this appendix, we report a variety of additional model specifications in order to increase the confidence in our arguments and to show that the findings do not depend on specific decisions in the research design. We also give additional information about the data on civil wars and third party intervention and discuss a number of issues pertaining to the data on migration. Finally, we discuss the differences between our work and those studies suggesting that shared ethnic kin or refugees motivate intervention.

The set of additional analyses and robustness checks includes:

- **Major powers and contiguous states only:** we restrict the sample to major powers and contiguous states only as these are usually most likely (“politically relevant” dyads) to intervene.
- We estimate a series of **lagged-migration models**, which allow us to consider the temporal effects of the migration items in more detail. We consider **five, ten, and fifteen years** as lags.
- We **dropped all linearly interpolated values** of the two migration variables and then re-estimated our model **with actually observed** migration cases only.
- We **disaggregate** the dependent variable into **government-biased interventions** and **opposition-biased interventions** to show that our results are not driven by a particular intervention type.
- **Binary variables for the US and the USSR/Russia**, respectively, are included as controls in our models to address **geostrategic, military, and political concerns** primarily during the Cold War.
- We present “**reduced-form**” models, which are **only based on the dependent variable and the migration items** as explanatory variables.
- Given the rareness of interventions in civil wars, we also make use of **rare-events logistic regression** models.
- We replaced **the third party’s democracy variable** by a **dichotomous variable** and interacted it with the migration items.
- We additionally include variables that capture **refugee flows** and **relocation costs**.
- Two additional tables consider a series of **additional control variables** at the **monadic and dyadic levels** and **fixed effects** for the countries in our dyads.
- To examine the issue of **reverse causality**, we summarize a **simultaneous equation model**.

- In a final set of models, we seek to proxy the **age of the migrant population**.

A.1 Major Powers or Contiguous States Only

Major powers and contiguous states might have a different propensity for intervention than other countries (e.g., Koga, 2011; Kathman, 2011; Mitchell, 1970; Finnemore, 2004; Weiss, 2012; Regan, 1998; Lemke and Regan, 2004; Aydin, 2008; Findley and Marineau, 2015). We constrained the sample by only using politically relevant dyads, i.e., pairs of contiguous states or pairs of states where the potential intervener is a major power. These country-pairs are arguably those with more opportunities and a higher willingness for military intervention (Lemke and Reed, 2001). On one hand, major powers are more likely than other states to actually have the means for intervention if the willingness is given. On the other hand, contiguous states are usually the most affected ones by civil war in neighboring countries and the first ones that experience “negative externalities” (e.g., Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008). This then increases the willingness to intervene. Whereas we control for major powers in the main text’s models, we go beyond merely controlling for this by one important change in the research design: we restrict the sample to major power states *and* contiguous states as defined by the Correlates of War project (Stinnett et al., 2002). When restricting the sample to these two types of states, we keep the item *Major Power*, though, as not all contiguous states are major powers.

Table 1 in this appendix summarizes our findings when re-estimating our main models with the constrained sample. The core results pertaining to *Third-Party Immigrants* and *Third-Party Emigrants* remain robust to this change in the research design: both items are positively signed and statistically significant. Our results thus provide encouraging empirical support to our priors. Note, however, when only cases of contiguous states and regional/global powers are chosen, there is a strong bias toward interveners who may intervene for other reasons than those we argued for in the article.

A.2 Different Temporal Lags for the Migration Variables

Our data on migrants are only available for each decade and we addressed this problem by linearly interpolating missing values. This approach is based on the assumption that migrant stocks increased or decreased linearly over time, which may not necessarily be the case. Moreover, there might be an endogeneity problem stemming from reverse causality, i.e., intervention may affect the migration flow towards a third-party state. Although the latter point might be of little concern as, according to Özden et al. (2011), most census have been conducted at the beginning of the decade, we estimated alternative models where we lagged the migration variables by 5, 10, and 15 years.

Our findings remain virtually unchanged. Also note that by lagging the migrant variables in such

Table A.1: Third-Party Military Intervention in Civil Wars – Major Powers or Contiguous States Only

	Model A.1	Model A.2	Model A.3
Alliance Ties	-0.022 (0.151)	0.156 (0.155)	0.028 (0.145)
Third-Party Polity	0.005 (0.012)	0.027*** (0.009)	0.011 (0.012)
Target-State Polity	-0.025** (0.010)	-0.028*** (0.010)	-0.029*** (0.010)
Capability Ratio	0.215*** (0.046)	0.206*** (0.040)	0.213*** (0.042)
Major Power	-0.221 (0.250)	-0.339 (0.219)	-0.218 (0.236)
Rebel Strength	0.058 (0.108)	0.138 (0.100)	0.098 (0.109)
Colonial History	0.207 (0.251)	0.227 (0.246)	0.170 (0.264)
Ethnic Ties	0.696*** (0.169)	0.591*** (0.168)	0.627*** (0.167)
Distance	-0.084 (0.093)	-0.054 (0.093)	-0.039 (0.095)
Cold War	0.349*** (0.130)	0.297** (0.127)	0.309** (0.132)
Previous Intervention	0.574*** (0.114)	0.649*** (0.105)	0.644*** (0.110)
t	-0.169*** (0.031)	-0.170*** (0.029)	-0.166*** (0.030)
t2	0.007*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)
t3	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Third-Party Immigrants	0.112*** (0.028)		0.078** (0.032)
Third-Party Emigrants		0.120*** (0.028)	0.078** (0.032)
Constant	-2.683*** (0.758)	-3.253*** (0.782)	-3.463*** (0.815)
Observations	4,779	4,779	4,779

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses

a way, we can, in fact, rule out the possibility that our data include refugees fleeing the (potential) target of intervention. Hence, we can tease out the effect of the first mechanism leading to our first hypothesis. In other words, this robustness check suggests that potential interveners are less likely to be concerned about refugee flows into their country, but are more likely to be affected by lobbying efforts of the diaspora living in their territory.

Table A.2: Third-Party Military Intervention in Civil Wars – Lagged Migration (t-5)

	Model A.4	Model A.5	Model A.6
Alliance Ties	-0.098 (0.137)	0.125 (0.151)	-0.093 (0.133)
Third-Party Polity	-0.014 (0.009)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.013 (0.009)
Target-State Polity	-0.038*** (0.012)	-0.039*** (0.011)	-0.039*** (0.012)
Capability Ratio	0.179*** (0.031)	0.162*** (0.032)	0.175*** (0.033)
Major Power	0.452*** (0.160)	0.508*** (0.149)	0.435*** (0.155)
Rebel Strength	-0.043 (0.097)	0.062 (0.090)	-0.032 (0.095)
Colonial History	0.063 (0.224)	0.143 (0.196)	0.044 (0.232)
Ethnic Ties	0.419*** (0.157)	0.231 (0.160)	0.395*** (0.147)
Distance	-0.215** (0.085)	-0.309*** (0.079)	-0.196** (0.088)
Cold War	0.092 (0.135)	0.028 (0.139)	0.088 (0.135)
Previous Intervention	0.442*** (0.132)	0.410*** (0.125)	0.450*** (0.136)
t	-0.274*** (0.030)	-0.286*** (0.029)	-0.272*** (0.030)
t2	0.012*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)
t3	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Third-Party Immigrants(t-5)	0.120*** (0.026)		0.114*** (0.024)
Third-Party Emigrants(t-5)		0.074*** (0.028)	0.016 (0.023)
Constant	-0.748 (0.697)	0.043 (0.738)	-0.954 (0.776)
Observations	48,225	48,225	48,225

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses

Table A.3: Third-Party Military Intervention in Civil Wars – Lagged Migration (t-10)

	Model A.7	Model A.8	Model A.9
Alliance Ties	-0.091 (0.216)	0.170 (0.179)	-0.083 (0.213)
Third-Party Polity	-0.007 (0.013)	0.010 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.014)
Target-State Polity	-0.031** (0.015)	-0.031** (0.015)	-0.033** (0.015)
Capability Ratio	0.148*** (0.048)	0.133*** (0.050)	0.146*** (0.050)
Major Power	0.596*** (0.187)	0.606*** (0.199)	0.574*** (0.199)
Rebel Strength	-0.159 (0.145)	0.012 (0.143)	-0.142 (0.137)
Colonial History	0.095 (0.322)	0.236 (0.285)	0.080 (0.334)
Ethnic Ties	0.262 (0.249)	-0.007 (0.257)	0.228 (0.253)
Distance	-0.229** (0.114)	-0.307*** (0.106)	-0.208* (0.118)
Cold War	0.256 (0.165)	0.213 (0.179)	0.245 (0.169)
Previous Intervention	1.130*** (0.140)	1.154*** (0.148)	1.150*** (0.137)
t	-0.249*** (0.043)	-0.268*** (0.043)	-0.248*** (0.044)
t2	0.009*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)
t3	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Third-Party Immigrants(t-10)	0.135*** (0.039)		0.127*** (0.037)
Third-Party Emigrants(t-10)		0.100** (0.041)	0.020 (0.033)
Constant	-0.801 (0.866)	-0.350 (0.892)	-1.055 (0.917)
Observations	30,927	30,927	30,927

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses

Table A.4: Third-Party Military Intervention in Civil Wars – Lagged Migration (t-15)

	Model A.10	Model A.11	Model A.12
Alliance Ties	0.162 (0.345)	0.563* (0.331)	0.291 (0.339)
Third-Party Polity	0.017 (0.016)	0.027 (0.018)	0.017 (0.016)
Target-State Polity	-0.049 (0.030)	-0.036 (0.030)	-0.047 (0.030)
Capability Ratio	0.266*** (0.076)	0.258*** (0.077)	0.275*** (0.080)
Major Power	0.519* (0.305)	0.540* (0.297)	0.477 (0.294)
Rebel Strength	0.007 (0.218)	-0.026 (0.241)	-0.019 (0.226)
Colonial History	0.686** (0.300)	0.798*** (0.264)	0.696** (0.283)
Ethnic Ties	1.638*** (0.426)	1.193*** (0.361)	1.405*** (0.433)
Distance	-0.190* (0.109)	-0.259** (0.101)	-0.190* (0.108)
Cold War	-0.067 (0.235)	-0.255 (0.251)	-0.164 (0.234)
Previous Intervention	1.043*** (0.290)	1.001*** (0.290)	1.062*** (0.298)
t	-0.378*** (0.070)	-0.365*** (0.068)	-0.368*** (0.067)
t2	0.016*** (0.004)	0.015*** (0.004)	0.015*** (0.004)
t3	-0.0002*** (0.000)	-0.0002*** (0.000)	-0.0002*** (0.000)
Third-Party Immigrants(t-15)	0.132*** (0.048)		0.092** (0.045)
Third-Party Emigrants(t-15)		0.116** (0.051)	0.072 (0.050)
Constant	-2.168** (0.973)	-1.673** (0.777)	-2.355** (0.916)
Observations	20,449	20,449	20,449

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses

A.3 Re-Estimation without Linearly Interpolated Values

Similar to the rationale behind the robustness check in the previous section, we also re-estimated our core models without linearly interpolated values. The findings generally hold as summarized in this appendix's Table A.5.

Table A.5: Third-Party Military Intervention in Civil Wars – Core Models without Linear Interpolation

	Model A.13	Model A.14	Model A.15
Alliance Ties	-0.694 (0.431)	-0.356 (0.451)	-0.683* (0.405)
Third-Party Polity	0.016 (0.021)	0.044** (0.020)	0.019 (0.020)
Target-State Polity	-0.031 (0.024)	-0.023 (0.020)	-0.035 (0.023)
Capability Ratio	0.373*** (0.076)	0.310*** (0.061)	0.353*** (0.074)
Major Power	0.462 (0.400)	0.536 (0.326)	0.384 (0.384)
Rebel Strength	0.018 (0.175)	0.109 (0.163)	0.001 (0.174)
Colonial History	0.292 (0.474)	0.370 (0.387)	0.199 (0.439)
Ethnic Ties	1.776*** (0.448)	1.356*** (0.457)	1.680*** (0.437)
Distance	-0.395** (0.168)	-0.492*** (0.169)	-0.309* (0.179)
Cold War	-0.036 (0.341)	-0.007 (0.347)	-0.047 (0.349)
Previous Intervention	0.680* (0.385)	0.580 (0.417)	0.766* (0.440)
t	-0.185** (0.091)	-0.141 (0.095)	-0.186** (0.092)
t2	0.004 (0.007)	0.001 (0.008)	0.003 (0.007)
t3	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Third-Party Immigrants	0.181*** (0.055)		0.169*** (0.058)
Third-Party Emigrants		0.122** (0.058)	0.058 (0.057)
Constant	-1.459 (1.424)	-0.733 (1.428)	-2.283 (1.619)
Observations	5,356	5,356	5,356

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses

A.4 Disaggregation of the Dependent Variable

Note that our sample is balanced in terms of intervention-years in support of the opposition or backing the government: in the period considered by our study, about 45 percent of the intervention-years were

in support of the opposition, while the remaining 55 percent backed the government. We argue that, ultimately, who is involved in a war, the interveners' connection to them, or the interveners' bias toward who ought to win a conflict, is of minor importance for our work. It only matters that intervention takes place – regardless of the side of intervention. Still, we re-estimated our baseline models by considering interventions supporting either the government or the opposition, respectively (Regan, 2002). Our main findings are unaffected by this disaggregation of the dependent variable, however.

Table A.6: Third-Party Military Intervention in Civil Wars – Government-Biased Interventions

	Model A.16	Model A.17	Model A.18
Government-Biased Intervention			
Alliance Ties	0.386*** (0.148)	0.513*** (0.162)	0.406*** (0.146)
Third-Party Polity	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.009)	-0.011 (0.010)
Target-State Polity	-0.030*** (0.010)	-0.027*** (0.009)	-0.030*** (0.010)
Capability Ratio	0.167*** (0.034)	0.161*** (0.031)	0.164*** (0.033)
Major Power	0.623*** (0.163)	0.594*** (0.129)	0.549*** (0.141)
Rebel Strength	0.027 (0.114)	0.046 (0.108)	0.035 (0.114)
Colonial History	0.581*** (0.215)	0.596*** (0.203)	0.529** (0.221)
Ethnic Ties	0.315* (0.183)	0.208 (0.197)	0.242 (0.188)
Distance	-0.134 (0.116)	-0.136 (0.096)	-0.079 (0.113)
Cold War	0.102 (0.145)	0.050 (0.156)	0.057 (0.152)
Previous Intervention	0.550*** (0.115)	0.604*** (0.125)	0.590*** (0.126)
t	-0.193*** (0.038)	-0.194*** (0.037)	-0.193*** (0.038)
t2	0.010*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)
t3	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Third-Party Immigrants	0.080*** (0.027)		0.058** (0.026)
Third-Party Emigrants		0.084*** (0.028)	0.054** (0.027)
Constant	-2.417*** (0.869)	-2.522*** (0.773)	-2.969*** (0.884)
Observations	74,039	74,039	74,039

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses

Table A.7: Third-Party Military Intervention in Civil Wars – Opposition-Biased Interventions

	Model A.19	Model A.20	Model A.21
Opposition-Biased Intervention			
Alliance Ties	-0.566*** (0.214)	-0.353* (0.213)	-0.519** (0.205)
Third-Party Polity	-0.011 (0.008)	0.010 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.008)
Target-State Polity	-0.020 (0.013)	-0.020* (0.011)	-0.023* (0.012)
Capability Ratio	0.175*** (0.043)	0.158*** (0.039)	0.166*** (0.042)
Major Power	0.249 (0.219)	0.306 (0.230)	0.192 (0.223)
Rebel Strength	0.072 (0.107)	0.169 (0.103)	0.105 (0.103)
Ethnic Ties	0.857*** (0.214)	0.701*** (0.203)	0.796*** (0.208)
Distance	-0.252*** (0.071)	-0.327*** (0.072)	-0.195*** (0.071)
Cold War	0.516*** (0.178)	0.472*** (0.181)	0.485*** (0.180)
Previous Intervention	0.374*** (0.105)	0.402*** (0.098)	0.405*** (0.106)
t	-0.153*** (0.029)	-0.153*** (0.029)	-0.149*** (0.028)
t2	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)
t3	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Third-Party Immigrants	0.149*** (0.025)		0.127*** (0.026)
Third-Party Emigrants		0.110*** (0.032)	0.047 (0.031)
Constant	-2.288*** (0.657)	-1.755*** (0.646)	-2.872*** (0.674)
Observations	74,039	74,039	74,039

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses

Colonial History not included as it perfectly predicts no pro-opposition intervention

A.5 Binary Variables for the US and the USSR/Russia

Given that the time period of our study is dominated by the Cold War, the US and the USSR may figure prominently as intervening states. Against this background, we also check the results after including dummies for these two countries. It is arguably less likely that either of these states were strongly motivated by the emigrant/immigrant issues we argue for in the paper during the Cold War, relative to other geostrategic, military, or political concerns.

Appendix Table A.8 summarizes our findings. Two results are particularly interesting here. First, our core findings on the migration variables are qualitatively identical to those discussed in the main text. This may not come across surprising, however, as both the US and the USSR/Russia are already part of the *Major Power* item. Second, while the US was much more likely to intervene, the results are statistically insignificant for the USSR/Russia.

A.6 Reduced Form Models

The full models in the main text suffer from a comparatively large amount of missing values. However, this is not driven by an individual variable, e.g., the polity item. The reason for the missing values simply is that there are not many “overlapping variables” (in terms of observations covered), although each individual variable’s coverage seems sufficient (see Table 1 in the main text).

However, given the drop in observations more generally, we also re-estimated models that included only the variables of interest, i.e., the migration items (next to the variables for temporal dependencies). This gives us more confidence that the results are indeed supportive of what we hypothesize and not some product of model specification. Table A.9 presents these “reduced-form” models, which are only based on the dependent variable and the migration items as explanatory variables (next to the variables for temporal dependencies). Again, the results for the two migration variables are virtually identical to those presented in the main article.

A.7 Rare Events Logistic Regression Models

Military intervention is a rare event – not only in our sample, but more generally as well. In fact, out of 127,676 observations in our data, only 281 have seen the intervention of a third party with military means. This equals 0.22 percent of all data points. For addressing any potential concerns in light of this rare-events problem, we re-estimated our core models with the rare-events logistic regression estimator by King and Zeng (2001*b*) and King and Zeng (2001*a*). Table A.10 in this appendix summarizes our results when using this particular estimator that directly corrects for the potential bias due to a rare-

Table A.8: Third-Party Military Intervention in Civil Wars – US and USSR/Russia Controls

	Model A.22	Model A.23	Model A.24
US Dummy	0.392* (0.229)	0.831*** (0.209)	0.510** (0.220)
USSR Dummy	0.003 (0.409)	0.178 (0.370)	-0.053 (0.432)
Alliance Ties	-0.127 (0.150)	-0.045 (0.155)	-0.114 (0.144)
Third-Party Polity	-0.015** (0.007)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.013* (0.008)
Target-State Polity	-0.030*** (0.009)	-0.030*** (0.008)	-0.033*** (0.009)
Capability Ratio	0.174*** (0.032)	0.153*** (0.028)	0.163*** (0.029)
Major Power	0.430** (0.190)	0.272 (0.181)	0.312* (0.178)
Rebel Strength	0.046 (0.087)	0.098 (0.083)	0.071 (0.087)
Colonial History	0.399* (0.236)	0.553** (0.220)	0.365 (0.241)
Ethnic Ties	0.647*** (0.156)	0.520*** (0.156)	0.570*** (0.149)
Distance	-0.253*** (0.070)	-0.286*** (0.066)	-0.186*** (0.071)
Cold War	0.294** (0.125)	0.226* (0.131)	0.235* (0.126)
Previous Intervention	0.500*** (0.087)	0.558*** (0.086)	0.549*** (0.090)
t	-0.186*** (0.025)	-0.183*** (0.024)	-0.184*** (0.025)
t2	0.008*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)
t3	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Third-Party Immigrants	0.116*** (0.025)		0.083*** (0.023)
Third-Party Emigrants		0.111*** (0.025)	0.070*** (0.021)
Constant	-1.515*** (0.588)	-1.339** (0.588)	-2.188*** (0.639)
Observations	74,039	74,039	74,039

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses

Table A.9: Third-Party Military Intervention in Civil Wars – Reduced Form Model

	Model A.25	Model A.26	Model 27
t	-0.199*** (0.020)	-0.194*** (0.019)	-0.198*** (0.020)
t2	0.009*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)
t3	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Third-Party Immigrants	0.124*** (0.013)		0.058*** (0.020)
Third-Party Emigrants		0.146*** (0.012)	0.104*** (0.020)
Constant	-2.874*** (0.110)	-2.923*** (0.093)	-3.000*** (0.102)
Observations	126,701	126,701	126,701

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses

events data-generating process. As demonstrated in this table, though, our results closely mirror the findings we discuss in the main text.

A.8 Binary Variable for *Third-Party Democracy*

Finally, we considered the possibility that the interactive term might yield more consistently significant results when the polity-based third-party variable is dichotomized. This might also be more in line with our theoretical argument. Moving linearly from 0 to 20 on the interval of *Third-Party Democracy* may not necessarily be reflective of linearly moving from no responsiveness to the public to responsiveness. In light of this, we dichotomized the original *Third-Party Democracy* by coding all countries with a value of +16 or higher as democratic (0 otherwise). We omit the regression tables for this robustness check and move straight to the graphical interpretation in this appendix's Figure 1.

On one hand, the probability of military intervention increases with more immigrants or emigrants, regardless of whether we focus on democratic or non-democratic third parties. However, the probability of democratic interventions is higher, which we argued for in the main article. On the other hand, the difference between democratic and non-democratic forms of government is not statistically significant in either panel: the confidence intervals (which we omit in the graph to facilitate reading) of the two panels overlap, while the multiplicative term in the underlying regression models is statistically insignificant. Eventually, the results for our conditional hypothesis seem to be inconclusive, although it may also well be the case that dichotomizing the original variable *Third-Party Democracy* simply aggregates too much information, thereby losing precision and accuracy.


Table A.10: Third-Party Military Intervention in Civil Wars – Rare-Events Logit

	Model A.28	Model A.29	Model A.30
Alliance Ties	-0.070 (0.334)	0.399 (0.334)	0.037 (0.304)
Third-Party Polity	-0.025 (0.018)	0.019 (0.018)	-0.019 (0.019)
Target-State Polity	-0.067*** (0.022)	-0.064*** (0.019)	-0.074*** (0.021)
Capability Ratio	0.442*** (0.080)	0.416*** (0.067)	0.419*** (0.072)
Major Power	1.214*** (0.405)	1.206*** (0.348)	1.070*** (0.357)
Rebel Strength	0.096 (0.219)	0.271 (0.206)	0.164 (0.219)
Colonial History	0.559 (0.509)	0.638 (0.459)	0.397 (0.531)
Ethnic Ties	1.218*** (0.373)	0.916** (0.374)	1.019*** (0.355)
Distance	-0.544*** (0.159)	-0.601*** (0.139)	-0.374** (0.163)
Cold War	0.769*** (0.297)	0.645** (0.307)	0.663** (0.303)
Previous Intervention	1.234*** (0.226)	1.347*** (0.208)	1.353*** (0.225)
t	-0.413*** (0.070)	-0.426*** (0.066)	-0.408*** (0.068)
t2	0.016*** (0.005)	0.016*** (0.005)	0.015*** (0.005)
t3	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)
Third-Party Immigrants	0.312*** (0.058)		0.237*** (0.058)
Third-Party Emigrants		0.292*** (0.058)	0.163*** (0.056)
Constant	-3.690*** (1.391)	-3.743*** (1.296)	-5.468*** (1.518)
Observations	74,039	74,039	74,039

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses

Figure 1: Probability of Military Intervention: Migrants Variables Conditional on Third-Party Polity



A.9 The Role of Refugees and Relocation Costs

As elaborated in the main text, our variables on migration do omit refugees. We follow Özden et al. (2011, p.14) and subtract the number of refugees from total migrant numbers for the cases that are based on the Trends in International Migrant Stock Database. Note, however, when re-estimating the models while controlling for refugees (see Milton, Spencer and Findley, 2013; Moore and Shellman, 2006), the results presented in the main article are unchanged in both direction and substance. Moreover, for re-estimating our models while including a variable on refugees, we also considered a measure capturing the ease of refugees moving from the civil war country to the host country. Building on the literature on forced migration, Table A.11 additionally incorporates the item *Relocation Costs*, as discussed Moore and Shellman (2006), which is calculated as the Correlates of War's distance between capitals weighted by GNP per capita.

While the item on refugee flows is positively signed and significant, both *Third-Party Immigrants* as well as *Third-Party Emigrants* largely retain their positive and significant effects on military intervention. *Third-Party Emigrants* in Model A.33 is an exception, however, although this is likely to be driven by the drop in the number of observations. This indicates that an independent effect of voluntary and permanent *migration* on third-party military intervention does exist.

Table A.11: Third-Party Military Intervention in Civil Wars – The Role of Refugees

	Model A.31	Model A.32	Model A.33
Alliance Ties	0.010 (0.213)	0.204 (0.228)	0.031 (0.206)
Third-Party Polity	-0.013 (0.008)	0.000 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.008)
Target-State Polity	-0.027* (0.015)	-0.028** (0.014)	-0.028* (0.015)
Capability Ratio	0.161*** (0.033)	0.171*** (0.031)	0.168*** (0.031)
Major Power	0.656*** (0.195)	0.643*** (0.189)	0.593*** (0.186)
Rebel Strength	0.171 (0.129)	0.223* (0.124)	0.189 (0.127)
Colonial History	0.406* (0.244)	0.437* (0.258)	0.337 (0.258)
Ethnic Ties	0.575** (0.280)	0.464* (0.266)	0.521** (0.260)
Cold War	0.654*** (0.183)	0.640*** (0.204)	0.629*** (0.192)
Previous Intervention	0.282** (0.134)	0.319** (0.134)	0.302** (0.138)
t	-0.324*** (0.083)	-0.316*** (0.081)	-0.322*** (0.083)
t2	0.042** (0.019)	0.041** (0.018)	0.043** (0.019)
t3	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)
Relocation Costs	-0.020 (0.074)	-0.064 (0.090)	-0.005 (0.076)
Refugee Flows	0.089*** (0.020)	0.101*** (0.021)	0.081*** (0.020)
Third-Party Immigrants	0.112*** (0.034)		0.087*** (0.030)
Third-Party Emigrants		0.100** (0.043)	0.054 (0.039)
Constant	-3.748*** (0.424)	-3.874*** (0.476)	-3.951*** (0.473)
Observations	26,168	26,168	26,168

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses

A.10 Fixed Effects and Additional Control Variables at the Monadic and Dyadic Levels

Dyads with high levels of migration are likely quite different from dyads with lower levels of migration in ways that also affect the likelihood of third-party intervention in civil war. In the main models, the most obvious excluded control is likely to be GDP per capita: richer countries may attract more migrants as well as often have a greater capability to intervene. The empirical models presented in the main text are based on the specifications in Koga (2011), one of the most recent and comprehensive articles on third-party interventions in civil war. We do realize, however, that important determinants of military interventions may have been neglected by this approach, while several factors influencing the size of the migrant population have been discarded as well. In order to address this issue and engage more with the “selection on observables,” Table A.12 summarizes an additional model that does incorporate alternative determinants of migration and military intervention. In particular, we consider a control for trade flows between the external state and the country at war to capture economic interdependence. Migration flows could, in fact, be a proxy for economic ties between societies. Rather than intervention being driven by migrant lobbies, it may be the case that economic interdependence in general – of which migrant flows could be one aspect – make countries more likely to intervene. However, the migration variables are unaffected when including the trade-flow (sum of imports and exports) variable (see below). We also added several dyadic variables to further control for potential ties between countries, e.g., linguistic, religious, and genetic distances.

The variables on population, trade, and GDP per capita are based on the Correlates of War Project and taken from Hegre, Oneal and Russett (2010). Moreover, we use data on (weighted) linguistic, religious, and genetic similarities between two countries in a dyad from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2015) to capture cultural proximity. Linguistic distances are computed using language trees (Fearon, 2003), where languages are grouped into families based on their similarities. Religious distances are computed using the number of “common nodes” between the religions of each country in a pair using the World Christian Database. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2015) weigh these distances using the share of each religious or linguistic sub-group within each country to take into account the presence of heterogenous sub-populations. Genetic distance captures differences in allele frequencies across a range of neutral genes and Spolaore and Wacziarg (2015) convincingly show that genetic distance provides a useful summary of a wide array of cultural traits transmitted intergenerationally. We use the genetic distance weighted by the share of population belonging to each distinct ancestral group in each country. By measuring the time since two populations shared common ancestors, genetic distance summarizes differences in slowly changing genealogically transmitted characteristics, including habits and customs, which should

effectively capture the cultural proximity between two countries (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2015).

Finally, in the article we do not consider a fixed effects specification as this would induce selection bias (Kathman, 2011; Regan, 2002). Specifically, including fixed effects would lead to the omission of all those third-party states that ultimately decide not to intervene. Hence, the constrained sample would only include those countries that did intervene at some point. However, we now allow for the presence of unobservable time-invariant factors by controlling for third-party and target-state fixed effects (Table A.13). Our core results in either Table A.12 or Table A.13 are very similar to the models in the main text, although most of the additional control covariates are not significant at conventional levels. Note that although we jointly consider these distances as they account for distinct elements of culture, and the correlation among them is moderate, results are the same when introducing them separately to the models.

A.11 Reverse Causality: Simultaneous Equation Model

The issue of reverse causality has been raised, i.e., not only is the probability of intervention potentially dependent on the number of emigrants in the host country, but the number of emigrants is dependent on the probability of intervention.

To this end, we estimated a simultaneous equation model using 3SLS, for which we needed to specify equations for (a) military intervention and (b) emigrants, i.e., the endogenous variables. In 3SLS, instruments for endogenous variables are generated by regressing each such variable on exogenous items. This method depends on the variables treated as exogenous jointly being powerful predictors of the endogenous variables. We explored possible specifications by running models similar to those in the main text, based on the same theoretical rationale.

Eventually, we present the specification in Table A.14, which basically sees all dyadic items as factors that directly influence emigration and influence military intervention only indirectly through their influence on *Third-Party Emigrants*. The core results pertaining to *Third-Party Immigrants* and *Third-Party Emigrants* are robust, though.

A.12 Age of the Migrant Community in the Third-Party State

An additional influence we have not yet considered pertains to the immigrant mechanism we posit: the “age of the migrant community.” Older “diasporas” will have been able to invest in institutions that may sway governments and politics alike. New migrant communities, however, may be unable to mobilize as effectively.

The information from the World Bank we use is the most comprehensive publicly available data

Table A.12: Third-Party Military Intervention in Civil Wars – Additional Control Variables

	Model A.34	Model A.35	Model A.36
Alliance Ties	-0.012 (0.152)	0.076 (0.158)	-0.028 (0.145)
Third-Party Polity	-0.012 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.014 (0.012)
Target-State Polity	-0.024** (0.009)	-0.024*** (0.009)	-0.026*** (0.009)
Capability Ratio	0.187* (0.112)	0.218** (0.106)	0.194* (0.111)
Major Power	0.549*** (0.193)	0.481*** (0.174)	0.480** (0.187)
Rebel Strength	0.015 (0.094)	0.078 (0.086)	0.040 (0.094)
Colonial History	0.225 (0.209)	0.239 (0.205)	0.143 (0.215)
Ethnic Ties	0.606*** (0.179)	0.485*** (0.179)	0.512*** (0.171)
Distance	-0.216** (0.094)	-0.224*** (0.085)	-0.126 (0.087)
Cold War	0.337*** (0.128)	0.285** (0.129)	0.303** (0.130)
Previous Intervention	0.510*** (0.089)	0.550*** (0.084)	0.538*** (0.089)
t	-0.194*** (0.028)	-0.188*** (0.027)	-0.190*** (0.028)
t2	0.009*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)
t3	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)
Target-State GDP p.c.	-0.146 (0.102)	-0.144 (0.101)	-0.125 (0.103)
Third-Party GDP p.c.	0.026 (0.112)	0.143 (0.106)	0.081 (0.110)
Target-State Population	-0.029 (0.139)	0.018 (0.130)	-0.050 (0.136)
Third-Party Population	-0.024 (0.116)	-0.042 (0.111)	-0.050 (0.118)
Bilateral Trade	-0.013 (0.044)	-0.006 (0.045)	-0.018 (0.045)
Linguistic Distance	-0.067 (0.321)	-0.040 (0.309)	-0.066 (0.316)
Religious distance	0.086 (0.337)	-0.097 (0.351)	-0.005 (0.348)
Genetic Distance	0.433 (0.766)	-1.769** (0.881)	-0.171 (0.772)
Third-Party Immigrants	0.138*** (0.028)		0.108*** (0.027)
Third-Party Emigrants		0.123*** (0.028)	0.074*** (0.026)
Constant	-1.449* (0.809)	-1.554** (0.769)	-1.852** (0.816)
Observations	64,972	64,972	64,972

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses

Table A.13: Third-Party Military Intervention in Civil Wars – Third-Party and Target-State Fixed Effects

	Model A.37	Model A.38	Model A.39
Alliance Ties	0.274*	0.411**	0.257*
	(0.151)	(0.170)	(0.156)
Third-Party Polity	0.013	0.018	0.014
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Target-State Polity	-0.026	-0.027	-0.026
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Capability Ratio	-0.023	-0.063	-0.014
	(0.163)	(0.173)	(0.164)
Major Power	1.908***	2.535***	1.801***
	(0.628)	(0.649)	(0.622)
Rebel Strength	-0.107	-0.155	-0.111
	(0.129)	(0.131)	(0.129)
Colonial History	0.350	0.561**	0.341
	(0.248)	(0.258)	(0.257)
Ethnic Ties	0.771***	0.848***	0.705***
	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.205)
Distance	-0.616***	-0.657***	-0.511***
	(0.123)	(0.143)	(0.145)
Cold War	0.200	0.118	0.195
	(0.162)	(0.159)	(0.164)
Previous Intervention	0.501***	0.494***	0.503***
	(0.115)	(0.112)	(0.114)
t	-0.167***	-0.178***	-0.168***
	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.038)
t2	0.008**	0.008***	0.008**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
t3	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Third-Party Immigrants	0.160***		0.144***
	(0.034)		(0.038)
Third-Party Emigrants		0.105***	0.047
		(0.032)	(0.037)
Constant	-0.324	0.769	-1.222
	(1.200)	(1.267)	(1.383)
Observations	11,620	11,620	11,620

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses

Third-party and target-state fixed effects included, but omitted from presentation.

Table A.14: Third-Party Military Intervention in Civil Wars – Simultaneous Equation Model

	Model A.40 – I Emigrants Equation	Model A.40 – II Intervention Equation
Alliance Ties	1.131 (0.046)***	
Third-Party Polity	0.042 (0.001)***	
Target-State Polity	0.113 (0.001)***	
Capability Ratio		0.000 (0.000)***
Major Power		0.020 (0.001)***
Rebel Strength		0.001 (0.000)***
Colonial History	4.276 (0.107)***	
Ethnic Ties	1.024 (0.061)***	
Distance	-1.653 (0.014)***	
Cold War		0.001 (0.000)***
Previous Intervention		0.004 (0.000)***
t		-0.001 (0.000)***
t2		0.000 (0.000)***
t3		-0.000 (0.000)***
Third-Party Immigrants		0.001 (0.000)***
Third-Party Emigrants		0.001 (0.000)***
Constant	14.825 (0.114)***	-0.001 (0.001)
Observations	74,039	74,039

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Robust standard errors in parentheses

set for migration flows for a large number of years and countries. However, these data do not include information on the “age of the diaspora” and, to the best of our knowledge, there are no available data on this. Having said that, as a proxy, we constructed a variable that counts the years in our data set since more than 597 migrants from a civil-war country (75th percentile in order to capture a “critical mass”) have existed in the potentially intervening country (if any). When including this item as an additional control, our core results remain unchanged.

Table A.15: Third-Party Military Intervention in Civil Wars – Age of Diaspora

	Model A.41
Alliance Ties	-0.019 (0.127)
Third-Party Polity	-0.012* (0.007)
Target-State Polity	-0.030*** (0.008)
Capability Ratio	0.180*** (0.029)
Major Power	0.461*** (0.139)
Rebel Strength	0.066 (0.081)
Colonial History	0.195 (0.236)
Ethnic Ties	0.533*** (0.146)
Distance	-0.163** (0.074)
Cold War	0.320*** (0.117)
Previous Intervention	0.529*** (0.092)
t	-0.187*** (0.024)
t2	0.008*** (0.002)
t3	-0.000*** (0.000)
Third-Party Immigrants	0.119*** (0.024)
Third-Party Emigrants	0.052*** (0.020)
Age of Third-Party Immigrant Community	0.018** (0.008)
Constant	-2.649*** (0.604)
Observations	74,039

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses

A.13 Data on civil wars and military intervention

The civil wars in Koga (2011) are those identified by Fearon and Laitin (2003, p.76) who rely on the following criteria to identify their cases: “(1) they involved fighting between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized, nonstate groups who sought either to take control of a government, to take power in a region, or to use violence to change government policies; (2) the conflict killed at least 1,000 over its course, with a yearly average of at least 100. (3) at least 100 were killed on both sides (including civilians attacked by rebels). The last condition is intended to rule out massacres where there is no organized or effective opposition.”¹

Recall that, for our dependent variable, we rely on the definition in Regan (1998, p.756), i.e., military interventions are defined as “convention-breaking military [...] activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and opposition forces.” As Mumford (2013) points out, this definition assumes that military interventions indeed have to be *overt*, while *covert* interventions (direct or proxy ones) are excluded. As a result, however, Regan (1998) does include *overt proxy* interventions.

The reason for the combination of the civil wars in Fearon and Laitin (2003) with the intervention data from Regan (2002) is threefold. First, our time period under study is limited until 2000 as the migration data only go until that point in time. Hence, combining the migration data with a more updated data set is not required. Second, Regan’s (2002) intervention data are arguably the most detailed on interventions. Third, Regan (2002) only codes a rather “limited” sample of civil wars, which induces that we would miss many intervention events in civil wars that Fearon and Laitin (2003) actually do code. And this becomes particularly important when considering that military intervention in civil war is a rare event. In turn, as a supplement to the data from Regan (2002), we also use data on military interventions from Pearson and Baumann (1993) and Pickering and Kisangani (2009) for those civil conflicts that are not covered by Regan (2002), but are coded in Fearon and Laitin (2003). To make this consistent with Regan’s (2002) definition of military intervention in civil conflict, Koga (2011) included only those military interventions that are coded as the ones that take sides in a domestic dispute in Pearson and Baumann (1993) and Pickering and Kisangani (2009).

A.14 Data on bilateral migrations

As discussed in the article, data on migrants are taken from the World Bank. We define international migrant numbers as the number of people born in a country other than that in which they live. As this

¹The complete list of civil wars included in these data is available here: <https://web.stanford.edu/group/fearon-research/cgi-bin/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/addtabs.pdf>.

may also include refugees, we follow Özden et al. (2011) who subtracted the number of refugees from total migrant numbers for the cases that are based on the *Trends in International Migrant Stock Database*. Yet, four issues pertaining to these data may merit discussion. First, to what extent are our data on bilateral migration between countries able to account for a “changing identity” over time? Note that we use migrants’ country of origin as the identifying characteristic. In the words of Özden et al. (2011, p.17), “while nationality can change, place of birth cannot.” In more detail, “[f]ollowing the end of the cold war, many countries redrew their political boundaries. Some fragmented into smaller nation states, such as the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, and others reunified following an extended period of separation, such as Germany and Yemen. A single standard set of countries is specified for the entire timeframe of the database, for both origin and destination locations, so that migration numbers for pairs of countries can be compared over time. Since many new origin and destination countries emerged during the study period, the most current set of countries and regions was chosen” (Özden et al., 2011, p.20). Second, to what extent are the data on migration able to account for “ethnically similar diasporas with different ties” over time? As indicated above, we use migrants’ country of origin as the identifying characteristic. For example, there are least two kinds of Tamil diasporas: those from Sri Lanka and those from India. In this case, we do identify two types of diasporas: one from India and one from Sri Lanka. As a result, and to stress this point again, the ethnicity of migrant groups does not matter, and our data do also not have information on that; only the country of origin is provided in the World Bank’s migration data and this is the identifying characteristic we focus on. Third, and related to the last point, note that in the present study we make the assumption that immigrants from a specific country of origin are ethnically homogeneous, and therefore we identify divides only across countries. In other words, we do not allow for within country-pairs ethnic diversity. We are aware that in some instances this is a simplistic categorization, and immigrants stemming from the same country can be fragmented into a multitude of ethnic groups. Distinguishing between migrants of different ethnicities could help us to clarify some of the underlying theoretical mechanisms and this is one issue to explore in future research. Fourth, since the two migration variables capture the size of migrant populations, they are also likely to incorporate the element of “importance:” larger migrant communities should be politically more relevant and, hence, influential.

A.15 Shared ethnic kin and refugee flows as determinants of intervention.

To complement the development of our theory, it is worth noting that there are important differences between our work and those studies suggesting that shared ethnic kin or refugees motivate intervention.

Although we do make use of existing arguments that link identity with foreign policy decisions, there are at least three key aspects that distinguish this research from earlier studies on ethnic ties. First, as outlined in the introduction, migration is a global phenomenon involving all countries in the world. Hence, data on migration flows allow us to map political and cultural connections between all states over time, and we also distinguish between *immigrants* and *emigrants*. Ties via ethnic kin are more limited – in space and time as well as theoretically and empirically. Second, studies on transnational ethnic ties (e.g., Nome, 2013) largely employ dichotomous variables. This reduces the dimensionality of the problem significantly and masks a great deal of variation across states and over time. Migrants' roles in global politics fit more accurately along a continuum rather than within “distinct boxes,” and we thus use the size of bilateral migration stocks to capture the inherent strength of this role.

Third, ethnic groups clearly span across state borders (e.g., the Ewe are found in Ghana, Benin, and Togo), but this usually occurs within regions. Hence, ethnic groups are found in regional clusters, which potentially overlap with many underlying, domestic-level determinants of military intervention. This, in turn, makes it more difficult to separate the individual effect of ethnic ties from the domestic-level influences (see, e.g., Gleditsch, 2007; Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008). Conversely, examining migration allows use to track ethnic, cultural, and generally any social relations across both short and long distances beyond individual regional clusters. Studying the link between migration and military intervention will thus shed new light on whether more refined markers of identity and transnational linkages can influence military intervention, and whether this leads to different policy implications than in previous studies focusing on ethnic ties only.

Note also that migration and refugee flows are two distinct phenomena. Whereas migrants leave their country to settle in another – our data set defines migrants as any person that changes his or her country of usual residence – refugees move out of their country due to restriction or danger to their lives. In fact, refugee movements occur only under coercion or pressure, often due to war and persecution, whereas migrants are usually driven voluntarily (e.g., by economic factors). Moreover, migration is a global phenomenon involving all countries in the world, whereas refugee flows are more localized events as refugees usually flee to neighboring countries and remain in a region. Finally, and most importantly, migrants usually find a home in their new country, whereas refugees pertain to a temporary movement of people who generally return to their country of origin. Our theoretical argument applies to “durable” forms of linkages between two countries, where migrants influence foreign policies due to their permanent residence in the host country.

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