

Supplemental Appendices

Fatality Thresholds, Causal Heterogeneity, and Civil War Research: Reconsidering the Link Between Narcotics and Conflict

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A List of Publications Surveyed

Table A.1.

Journal	Year	Issue	Author(s)	Title	Threshold Used			If Both, Results Change?
					Only High	Only Low	Both	
APSR	2000	V.94 N.4	Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis	International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis	1	0	0	NA
APSR	2001	V.95 N. 1	Havard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch	Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992	1	0	0	NA
APSR	2003	V.97 N. 1	James Fearon and David Laitin	Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War	1	0	0	NA
APSR	2007	V.101 N. 1	Lars-Erik Cederman and Luc Girardin	Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto Nationalist Insurgencies	1	0	0	NA
APSR	2007	V.101 N. 1	James Fearon, Kimuli Kasara, and David Laitin	Ethnic Minority Rule and Civil War Onset	1	0	0	NA
APSR	2007	V.101 N. 4	Thomas Chapman and Philip Roeder	Partition as a Solution to Wars of Nationalism: The Importance of Institutions	1	0	0	NA
APSR	2010	V.104 N. 3	Stathis Kalyvas and Laia Balcells	International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict	1	0	0	NA
APSR	2011	V.105 N. 2	Kathleen Cunningham	Divide and Conquer or Divide and Concede: How Do States Respond to Internally Divided Separatists?	0	1	0	NA
APSR	2011	V.105 N. 3	Lars-Erik Cederman, Nils Weidmann, and Kristian Gleditsch	Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison	0	1	0	NA
APSR	2013	V.107 N. 2	Jan Pierskalla and Florian Hollenbach	Technology and Collective Action: The Effect of Cell Phone Coverage on Political Violence in Africa	0	1	0	NA
APSR	2013	V.107 N. 3	Dara Kay Cohen	Explaining Rape During Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980-2009)	1	0	0	NA

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Journal	Year	Issue	Author(s)	Title	Threshold Used			If Both, Results Change?
					Only High	Only Low	Both	
JCR	2000	V.44 N.1	Patrick Regan	Substituting Policies During U.S. Interventions in Internal Conflicts: A Little of This, a Little of That	0	1	0	NA
JCR	2000	V.44 N.2	Tanja Ellingsen	Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches' Brew?: Multiethnicity and Domestic Conflict During and After the Cold War	0	0	1	0
JCR	2001	V.45 N. 3	Nicholas Sambanis	Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?: A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1)	1	0	0	NA
JCR	2002	V.46 N. 1	Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler	On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa	1	0	0	NA
JCR	2002	V.46 N. 1	Marta Reynal-Querol	Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars	1	0	0	NA
JCR	2002	V.46 N. 1	Patrick Regan	Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts	0	1	0	NA
JCR	2002	V.46 N. 1	S. Brock Blomberg and Gregory Hess	The Temporal Links Between Conflict and Economic Activity	0	1	0	NA
JCR	2002	V.46 N. 3	Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis	How Much War Will We See?: Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War	1	0	0	NA
JCR	2002	V.46 N. 6	Sean P. O'Brien	Anticipating the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: An Early Warning Approach to Conflict and Instability Analysis	0	1	0	NA
JCR	2003	V.47 N. 1	Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Dan Reiter, and Christopher Zorn	Nonproportional Hazards and Event History Analysis in International Relations	1	0	0	NA
JCR	2003	V.47 N. 4	Hilde Ravlo, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Han Dorussen	Colonial War and the Democratic Peace	1	0	0	NA
JCR	2004	V.48 N. 6	Nicholas Sambanis	What Is Civil War?: Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition	0	0	1	1

Table A.1 – Continued from previous page

Journal	Year	Issue	Author(s)	Title	Threshold Used			If Both, Results Change?
					Only High	Only Low	Both	
JCR	2005	V.49 N. 1	Mirjam E. Sørli, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Håvard Strand	Why Is There So Much Conflict in the Middle East?	0	1	0	NA
JCR	2005	V.49 N. 3	Patrick M. Regan and Daniel Norton	Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars	0	1	0	NA
JCR	2005	V.49 N. 4	Macartan Humphreys	Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms	1	0	0	NA
JCR	2005	V.49 N. 4	Päivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Elisabeth Gilmore	A Diamond Curse?: Civil War and a Lootable Resource	0	0	1	0
JCR	2005	V.49 N. 4	James D. Fearon	Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War	1	0	0	NA
JCR	2006	V.50 N. 2	Bethany Lacina	Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars	0	1	0	NA
JCR	2006	V.50 N. 4	Randall J. Blimes	The Indirect Effect of Ethnic Heterogeneity on the Likelihood of Civil War Onset	1	0	0	NA
JCR	2006	V.50 N. 4	Håvard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis	Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset	0	0	1	1
JCR	2006	V.50 N. 5	Patrick M. Regan and Aysegul Aydin	Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention in Civil Wars	0	1	0	NA
JCR	2006	V.50 N. 6	Clayton L. Thyne	Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences: The Effect of Interstate Relations on Civil War	0	0	1	0
JCR	2007	V.51 N. 5	Dawn Brancati	Political aftershocks: The Impact of Earthquakes on Intrastate Conflict	0	0	1	0
JCR	2007	V.51 N. 6	Isak Svensson	Fighting With Faith: Religion and Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars	0	1	0	NA
JCR	2008	V.52 N. 3	James Raymond Vreeland	The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War: Unpacking Anocracy	1	0	0	NA
JCR	2008	V.52 N. 3	Zaryab Iqbal and Christopher Zorn	The Political Consequences of Assassination	0	1	0	NA

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Journal	Year	Issue	Author(s)	Title	Threshold Used			If Both, Results Change?
					Only High	Only Low	Both	
JCR	2008	V.52 N. 5	Jaroslav Tir and Michael Jasinski	Domestic-Level Diversionary Theory of War: Targeting Ethnic Minorities	0	1	0	NA
JCR	2008	V.52 N. 6	Andrew J. Enterline and J. Michael Greig	Perfect Storms?: Political Instability in Imposed Polities and the Futures of Iraq and Afghanistan	0	0	1	0
JCR	2009	V.53 N. 1	Päivi Lujala	Deadly Combat Over Natural Resources: Gems, Petroleum, Drugs, and the Severity of Armed Civil Conflict	0	1	0	NA
JCR	2009	V.53 N. 1	Thomas Edward Flores and Irfan Nooruddin	Democracy Under the Gun Understanding Postconflict Economic Recovery	0	1	0	NA
JCR	2009	V.53 N. 3	Isak Svensson	Who Brings Which Peace?: Neutral Versus Biased Mediation and Institutional Peace Arrangements in Civil Wars	0	1	0	NA
JCR	2009	V.53 N. 4	Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gates, and Päivi Lujala	Geography, Rebel Capability, and the Duration of Civil Conflict	0	0	1	1
JCR	2009	V.53 N. 4	Lars-Erik Cederman, Halvard Buhaug, and Jan Ketil Rød	Ethno-Nationalist Dyads and Civil War: A GIS-Based Analysis	0	1	0	NA
JCR	2009	V.53 N. 4	Nils B. Weidmann	Geography as Motivation and Opportunity: Group Concentration and Ethnic Conflict	0	1	0	NA
JCR	2009	V.53 N. 4	David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan	It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome	0	1	0	NA
JCR	2010	V.54 N. 5	Shanna A. Kirschner	Knowing Your Enemy: Information and Commitment Problems in Civil Wars	1	0	0	NA
JCR	2011	V.55 N. 1	Susan Olzak	Does Globalization Breed Ethnic Discontent?	0	1	0	NA

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Journal	Year	Issue	Author(s)	Title	Threshold Used			If Both, Results Change?
					Only High	Only Low	Both	
JCR	2011	V.55 N. 3	Dawn Brancati and Jack L. Snyder	Rushing to the Polls: The Causes of Premature Postconflict Elections	1	0	0	NA
JCR	2011	V.55 N. 5	Halvard Buhaug, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Helge Holtermann, Gudrun Østby, and Andreas Forø Tollefsen	It's the Local Economy, Stupid! Geographic Wealth Dispersion and Conflict Outbreak Location	0	1	0	NA
JCR	2011	V.55 N. 5	Marco Pinfari	Time to Agree: Is Time Pressure Good for Peace Negotiations?	0	1	0	NA
JCR	2011	V.55 N. 6	Jacob D. Kathman	Civil War Diffusion and Regional Motivations for Intervention	0	0	1	0
JCR	2011	V.55 N. 6	Nils W. Metternich	Expecting Elections: Interventions, Ethnic Support, and the Duration of Civil Wars	0	1	0	NA
JCR	2012	V.56 N. 1	Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, Kristin M. Bakke, and Lee J. M. Seymo	Shirts Today, Skins Tomorrow: Dual Contests and the Effects of Fragmentation in Self-Determination Disputes	0	1	0	NA
JCR	2012	V.56 N. 2	Joshua R. Gubler and Joel Sawat Selway	Horizontal Inequality, Crosscutting Cleavages, and Civil War	0	0	1	1
JCR	2012	V.56 N. 4	Hanne Fjelde and Desirée Nilsson	Rebels Against Rebels: Explaining Violence Between Rebel Groups	0	1	0	NA
JCR	2012	V.56 N. 4	Luis de la Calle and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca	Rebels without a Territory: An Analysis of Nonterritorial Conflicts in the World, 1970-1997	0	0	1	1
JCR	2012	V.56 N. 5	Seden Akcinaroglu	Rebel Interdependencies and Civil War Outcomes	0	1	0	NA
JCR	2012	V.56 N. 6	Melani Cammett and Edmund Malesky	Power Sharing in Postconflict Societies: Implications for Peace and Governance	1	0	0	NA
JCR	2013	V.57 N. 4	Anna Getmansky	You Can't Win If You Don't Fight: The Role of Regime Type in Counterinsurgency Outbreaks and Outcomes	0	1	0	NA

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Journal	Year	Issue	Author(s)	Title	Threshold Used			If Both, Results Change?
					Only High	Only Low	Both	
JCR	2013	V.57 N. 5	Seden Akcinaroglu and Elizabeth Radziszewski	Private Military Companies, Opportunities, and Termination of Civil Wars in Africa	0	0	1	1
JCR	2013	V.57 N. 5	Dawn Brancati and Jack L. Snyder	Time to Kill: The Impact of Election Timing on Postconflict Stability	1	0	0	NA
JCR	2013	V.57 N. 5	Michael G. Findley	Bargaining and the Interdependent Stages of Civil War Resolution	1	0	0	NA
JPR	2000	V.37 N.3	Errol A. Henderson and J. David Singer	Civil War in the Post-Colonial World, 1946-92	1	0	0	NA
JPR	2000	V.37 N.4	Noël Bonneuil and Nadia Auriat	Fifty Years of Ethnic Conflict and Cohesion: 1945-94	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2001	V.38 N.4	Jonathan Fox	Two Civilizations and Ethnic Conflict: Islam and the West	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2001	V.38 N.4	Robert Blanton, T. David Mason, and Brian Athow	Colonial Style and Post-Colonial Ethnic Conflict in Africa	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2001	V.38 N.5	Demet Yalcin Mousseau	Democratizing with Ethnic Divisions: A Source of Conflict?	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2002	V.39 N.1	Stephen Saideman	Discrimination in International Relations: Analyzing External Support for Ethnic Groups	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2002	V.39 N.4	Indra de Soysa	Paradise is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil War, 1989-99	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2002	V.39 N.4	Halvard Buhaug and Scott Gates	The Geography of Civil War	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2002	V.39 N.4	Jean-Paul Azam and Anke Hoeffler	Violence Against Civilians in Civil Wars: Looting or Terror?	1	0	0	NA
JPR	2002	V.39 N.6	Cassady Craft and Joseph P. Smaldone	The Arms Trade and the Incidence of Political Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1967-97	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2003	V.40 N.3	Matthew Hoddie and Caroline Hartzell	Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements	1	0	0	NA

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Journal	Year	Issue	Author(s)	Title	Threshold Used			If Both, Results Change?
					Only High	Only Low	Both	
JPR	2004	V.41 N.2	Seonjou Kang and James Meernik	Determinants of Post-Conflict Economic Assistance	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2004	V.41 N.3	Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom	On the Duration of Civil War	1	0	0	NA
JPR	2004	V.41 N.3	James Fearon	Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?	1	0	0	NA
JPR	2004	V.41 N.3	Karl R. de Rouen Jr and David Sobek	The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome	1	0	0	NA
JPR	2004	V.41 N.3	Barbara F. Walter	Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War	1	0	0	NA
JPR	2004	V.41 N.4	Andrej Tuscicisny	Civilizational Conflicts: More Frequent, Longer, and Bloodier?	1	0	0	NA
JPR	2004	V.41 N.6	Resat Bayer and Matthew C. Rupert	Effects of Civil Wars on International Trade, 1950-92	1	0	0	NA
JPR	2004	V.41 N.6	Jonathan Fox	The Rise of Religious Nationalism and Conflict: Ethnic Conflict and Revolutionary Wars, 1945-2001	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2005	V.42 N.1	Vally Koubi	War and Economic Performance	1	0	0	NA
JPR	2005	V.42 N.3	Christina Schatzman	Political Challenge in Latin America: Rebellion and Collective Protest in an Era of Democratization	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2005	V.42 N.4	Marie L. Besançon	Relative Resources: Inequality in Ethnic Wars, Revolutions, and Genocides	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2005	V.42 N.4	Henrik Urdal	People Vs. Malthus: Population Pressure, Environmental Degradation, and Armed Conflict Revisited	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2005	V.42 N.4	Quan Li and Ming Wen	The Immediate and Lingering Effects of Armed Conflict on adult Mortality: A Time-Series Cross-National Analysis	0	1	0	NA

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Journal	Year	Issue	Author(s)	Title	Threshold Used			If Both, Results Change?
					Only High	Only Low	Both	
JPR	2005	V.42 N.5	Jaroslav Tir	Dividing Countries to Promote Peace: Prospects for Long-Term Success of Partitions	0	0	1	1
JPR	2005	V.42 N.6	Navin A. Bapat	Insurgency and the Opening of Peace Processes	1	0	0	NA
JPR	2006	V.43 N.1	Jorge A. Restrepo, Michael Spagat, and Juan F. Vargas	The Severity of the Colombian Conflict: Cross-Country Datasets Versus New Micro-Data	0	0	1	1
JPR	2006	V.43 N.6	Halvard Buhaug	Relative Capability and Rebel Objective in Civil War	0	0	1	1
JPR	2007	V.44 N.2	Isak Svensson	Bargaining, Bias and Peace Brokers: How Rebels Commit to Peace	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2007	V.44 N.3	Brian Lai and Clayton Thyne	The Effect of Civil War on Education, 1980-97	0	0	1	1
JPR	2007	V.44 N.3	Kristian Skrede Gleditsch	Transnational Dimensions of Civil War	0	0	1	0
JPR	2007	V.44 N.5	Erin K. Jenne, Stephen M. Saideman, and Will Lowe	Separatism as a Bargaining Posture: The Role of Leverage in Minority Radicalization	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2008	V.45 N.1	Karl R. Derouen Jr and Jacob Bercovitch	Enduring Internal Rivalries: A New Framework for the Study of Civil War	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2008	V.45 N.2	Gudrun Østby	Polarization, Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Civil Conflict	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2008	V.45 N.2	Gerald Schneider and Nina Wiesehomeier	Rules That Matter: Political Institutions and the Diversity-Conflict Nexus	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2008	V.45 N.2	Erika Forsberg	Polarization and Ethnic Conflict in a Widened Strategic Setting	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2008	V.45 N.3	Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Andrew J. Enterline, and Kyle A. Joyce	Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process	1	0	0	NA
JPR	2008	V.45 N.3	Katherine Glassmyer and Nicholas Sambanis	Rebel-Military Integration and Civil War Termination	1	0	0	NA

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Journal	Year	Issue	Author(s)	Title	Threshold Used			If Both, Results Change?
					Only High	Only Low	Both	
JPR	2008	V.45 N.4	Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom	Post-Conflict Risks	1	0	0	NA
JPR	2008	V.45 N.4	Desirée Nilsson	Partial Peace: Rebel Groups Inside and Outside of Civil War Settlements	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2008	V.45 N.4	Victor A.B. Davies	Postwar Capital Flight and Inflation	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2008	V.45 N.5	Benjamin E. Goldsmith and Baogang He	Letting Go Without a Fight: Decolonization, Democracy and War, 1900-94	1	0	0	NA
JPR	2008	V.45 N.6	Ole Magnus Theisen	Blood and Soil? Resource Scarcity and Internal Armed Conflict Revisited	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2009	V.46 N.1	Patrick M. Regan, Richard W. Frank, and Aysegul Aydin	Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War: A New Dataset	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2009	V.46 N.2	Hanne Fjelde	Buying Peace? Oil Wealth, Corruption and Civil War, 1985-99	0	0	1	0
JPR	2009	V.46 N.6	Matthias Basedau and Jann Lay	Resource Curse or Rentier Peace? The Ambiguous Effects of Oil Wealth and Oil Dependence on Violent Conflict	0	0	1	0
JPR	2010	V.47 N.1	Päivi Lujala	The Spoils of Nature: Armed Civil Conflict and Rebel Access to Natural Resources	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2010	V.47 N.2	David E. Cunningham	Blocking Resolution: How External States Can Prolong Civil Wars	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2010	V.47 N.2	Abel Escribà-Folch	Economic Sanctions and the Duration of Civil Conflicts	1	0	0	NA
JPR	2010	V.47 N.2	Joakim Kreutz	How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset	0	0	1	1
JPR	2010	V.47 N.3	Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Andrea Ruggeri	Political Opportunity Structures, Democracy, and Civil War	0	1	0	NA

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Journal	Year	Issue	Author(s)	Title	Threshold Used			If Both, Results Change?
					Only High	Only Low	Both	
JPR	2010	V.47 N.3	Alex Braithwaite	Resisting Infection: How State Capacity Conditions Conflict Contagion	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2010	V.47 N.3	Cameron G. Thies	Of Rulers, Rebels, and Revenue: State Capacity, Civil War Onset, and Primary Commodities	1	0	0	NA
JPR	2010	V.47 N.3	Karl DeRouen Jr, Mark J Ferguson, Samuel Norton, Young Hwan Park, Jenna Lea, and Ashley Streat-Bartlett	Civil War Peace Agreement Implementation and State Capacity	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2010	V.47 N.4	Lars-Erik Cederman, Simon Hug, and Lutz F. Krebs	Democratization and Civil War: Empirical Evidence	0	0	1	1
JPR	2010	V.47 N.4	Nils B. Weidmann, Jan Ketil Rød, and Lars-Erik Cederman	Representing Ethnic Groups in Space: A New Dataset	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2010	V.47 N.5	Reed M. Wood	Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence Against Civilians	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2011	V.48 N.1	Christopher S P Magee and Tansa George Massoud	Openness and Internal Conflict	0	0	1	1
JPR	2011	V.48 N.1	Marie Olson Lounsbury and Alethia H Cook	Rebellion, Mediation, and Group Change: An Empirical Investigation of Competing Hypotheses	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2011	V.48 N.2	Michael Bleaney and Arcangelo Dimico	How Different Are the Correlates of Onset and Continuation of Civil Wars?	0	0	1	0
JPR	2011	V.48 N.2	Nicolas Rost and J Michael Greig	Taking Matters into Their Own Hands: An Analysis of the Determinants of State-Conducted Peacekeeping in Civil Wars	1	0	0	NA
JPR	2011	V.48 N.4	Cullen S Hendrix and Sarah M Glaser	Civil Conflict and World Fisheries, 1952-2004	0	0	1	1
JPR	2011	V.48 N.5	Jason Sorens	Mineral Production, Territory, and Ethnic Rebellion: The Role of Rebel Constituencies	0	1	0	NA

Table A.1 – Continued from previous page

Journal	Year	Issue	Author(s)	Title	Threshold Used			If Both, Results Change?
					Only High	Only Low	Both	
JPR	2011	V.48 N.5	Karl DeRouen Jr, Jacob Bercovitch, and Paulina Pospieszna	Introducing the Civil Wars Mediation (CWM) Dataset	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2012	V.49 N.1	Cullen S Hendrix and Idean Salehyan	Climate Change, Rainfall, and Social Conflict in Africa	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2012	V.49 N.1	Clionadh Raleigh and Dominic Kniveton	Come Rain or Shine: An Analysis of Conflict and Climate Variability in East Africa	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2012	V.49 N.1	Rune T Slettebak	Don't Blame the Weather! Climate-Related Natural Disasters and Civil Conflict	0	0	1	0
JPR	2012	V.49 N.1	Drago Bergholt and Päivi Lujala	Climate-Related Natural Disasters, Economic Growth, and Armed Civil Conflict	0	0	1	1
JPR	2012	V.49 N.1	Vally Koubi, Thomas Bernauer, Anna Kalbhenn, and Gabriele Spilker	Climate Variability, Economic Growth, and Civil Conflict	0	0	1	0
JPR	2012	V.49 N.2	Zeynep Taydas and Dursun Peksen	Can States Buy Peace? Social Welfare Spending and Civil Conflicts	0	0	1	0
JPR	2012	V.49 N.2	Christa Deiwiks, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch	Inequality and Conflict in Federations	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2012	V.49 N.3	Marianne Dahl and Bjørn Høyland	Peace on Quicksand? Challenging the Conventional Wisdom About Economic Growth and Post-Conflict Risks	0	0	1	1
JPR	2012	V.49 N.4	Siri Aas Rustad and Helga Malmin Binningsbø	A Price Worth Fighting For? Natural Resources and Conflict Recurrence	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2012	V.49 N.5	Reed M Wood, Jacob D Kathman, and Stephen E Gent	Armed Intervention and Civilian Victimization in Intrastate Conflicts	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2013	V.50 N.1	Lisa Hultman	UN Peace Operations and Protection of Civilians: Cheap Talk or Norm Implementation?	0	1	0	NA

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Journal	Year	Issue	Author(s)	Title	Threshold Used			If Both, Results Change?
					Only High	Only Low	Both	
JPR	2013	V.50 N.2	Sabine C Carey, Neil J Mitchell, and Will Lowe	States, the Security Sector, and the Monopoly of Violence: A New Database on Pro-Government Militias	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2013	V.50 N.3	Erica Chenoweth and Orion A Lewis	Unpacking Nonviolent Campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0 Dataset	0	0	1	1
JPR	2013	V.50 N.3	Victor Asal, Richard Legault, Ora Szekely, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld	Gender Ideologies and Forms of Contentious Mobilization in the Middle East	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2013	V.50 N.3	Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham	Understanding Strategic Choice: The Determinants of Civil War and Nonviolent Campaign in Self-Determination Disputes	0	0	1	0
JPR	2013	V.50 N.5	Govinda Clayton	Relative Rebel Strength and the Onset and Outcome of Civil War Mediation	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2013	V.50 N.5	Philip Hultquist	Power Parity and Peace? The Role of Relative Power in Civil War Settlement	0	1	0	NA
JPR	2013	V.50 N.6	Nynke Salverda	Blue Helmets as Targets: A Quantitative Analysis of Rebel Violence against Peacekeepers, 1989-2003	0	1	0	NA
IO	2001	V.55 N.1	Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild	Stabilizing the Peace after Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables	1	0	0	NA
IO	2002	V.56 N.3	Rupen Cetinyan	Ethnic Bargaining in the Shadow of Third-Party Intervention	0	1	0	NA
IO	2004	V.58 N.1	Michael Ross	How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence From Thirteen Cases	1	0	0	NA
IO	2004	V.58 N.2	Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay	Draining the Sea: Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare	1	0	0	NA
IO	2006	V.60 N.1	Barbara F. Walter	Information, Uncertainty, and the Decision to Secede	0	1	0	NA

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Journal	Year	Issue	Author(s)	Title	Threshold Used			If Both, Results Change?
					Only High	Only Low	Both	
IO	2006	V.60 N.2	Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch	Refugees and the Spread of Civil War	0	0	1	0
IO	2008	V.62 N.3	Halvard Buhaug, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Jan Ketil Rød	Disaggregating Ethno-Nationalist Civil Wars: A Dyadic Test of Exclusion Theory	0	0	1	0
IO	2009	V.63 N.1	Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III	Rage against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars	1	0	0	NA
IO	2011	V.65 N.4	Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and David E. Cunningham	Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups	0	1	0	NA
IO	2012	V.66 N.3	Burcu Savun and Daniel C. Tirone	Exogenous Shocks, Foreign Aid, and Civil War	0	0	1	0
IO	2013	V.67 N.2	Paul K. MacDonald	“Retribution Must Succeed Rebellion”: The Colonial Origins of Counterinsurgency Failure	1	0	0	NA
IO	2013	V.67 N.2	Lars-Erik Cederman, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan, and Julian Wucherpfennig	Transborder Ethnic Kin and Civil War	0	1	0	NA
IO	2013	V.67 N.3	David E. Cunningham and Douglas Lemke	Combining Civil and Interstate Wars	0	0	1	0

B Variables, Operationalization, and Data Sources

Table A.2

Variable	Operationalization	Data Source
Total combat deaths	All soldiers and civilians killed in combat; log transformed to adjust for skewedness	Lujala (2009); raw data from Lacina and Gleditsch (2005)
Conflict duration	Measured in days; the start of a duration is coded as the date when a given conflict met or exceeded the 25 battle-related deaths per year criterion; the end of the duration is coded as the date in which the conflict no longer meets the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset criteria	Lujala (2009); raw data from Gates and Strand (2004)
Conflict intensity	Total battle deaths/conflict duration; log transformed to adjust for skewedness	Lujala (2009)
Drug cultivation in the conflict zone	Dummy; '1' = drug cultivation in the conflict zone; '0' otherwise	Lujala (2009); raw data from DRUGDATA (Lujala 2003)
Gem production in the conflict zone	Dummy; '1' = gem production in the conflict zone; '0' otherwise	Lujala (2009); raw data on secondary diamonds from DIADATA (Gilmore et al. 2005) and GEMDATA (Lujala, Flöter, and Rød 2005). Raw location and timing data from Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Harbom and Wallensteen 2005)
Hydrocarbon production in the conflict zone	Dummy; '1' = hydrocarbon production in the conflict zone; '0' otherwise	Lujala (2009); raw data on crude oil and/or natural gas from PETRODATA (Lujala, Rød, and Thieme 2007). Raw location and timing data from Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Harbom and Wallensteen 2005)
Hydrocarbon production outside the conflict zone	Dummy; '1' = hydrocarbon production outside the conflict zone; '0' otherwise	Lujala (2009); raw data on crude oil and/or natural gas from PETRODATA (Lujala, Rød, and Thieme 2007). Raw location and timing data from Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Harbom and Wallensteen 2005)
Mountainous terrain	Share of state's terrain covered by mountains; log transformed to adjust for skewedness	Lujala (2009); raw data from Blyth et al. (2002)
Border conflict	Dummy; '1' = conflict abuts an international border; '0' otherwise	Lujala (2009)
Territorial conflict	Dummy; '1' = territorial conflict; '0' otherwise	Lujala (2009); raw data from Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Harbom and Wallensteen 2005)
Rebel strength	Dummy; '1' = rebel movement is weaker than governmental forces; '0' otherwise	Lujala (2009); raw data from Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009)
Cold War	Dummy; '1' = years 1946-1989; '0' = years 1990-2002	Lujala (2009)
Internationalized civil war	Dummy; '1' = internationalized; '0' otherwise	Lujala (2009); raw data from Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Harbom and Wallensteen 2005)
Population size	State population size; log transformed to adjust for skewedness	Lujala (2009); raw data from Fearon and Laitin (2003), updated with World Bank Development Indicators (Bank 2002)
Democracy	Dummy; '1' = country was democratic the year before the conflict started (polity score > 5); '0' otherwise	Lujala (2009); raw data from Polity IV (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2002)
GDP per capita	Real per capita income; log transformed to adjust for skewedness; lagged one year	Lujala (2009); raw data from Fearon and Laitin (2003), updated with Penn World Tables 6.0 (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2002) and World Bank Development Indicators (Bank 2002)
Ethnic fractionalization	Probability that two randomly chosen individuals belong to different linguistic groups, operationalized as $ELF = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^n s_i^2$ where s_i is the share of group i ($i = 1, \dots, n$)	Lujala (2009); raw data from Fearon and Laitin (2003)
Ethnic polarization	Dummy; '1' = country has 50% or greater ethnic /religious majority and at least an 8% ethnic/religious minority; '0' otherwise	Lujala (2009); raw data from Fearon and Laitin (2003)

C Regression Results when Excluding Conflicts with Drug Production and Fewer than 50 Battle Deaths

Table A.3. Regression results for total battle deaths when including all observations versus excluding the four conflicts with drug production and fewer than 50 battle deaths. Results correspond to Figure 3 in the main text.

	Including All Observations	Excluding the Four Conflicts with Drug Cultivation and Fewer than 50 Battle Deaths
Drug Cultivation	0.39**	0.68
(In zone)	(2.39)	(1.17)
Gem Production	2.72**	2.24**
(In zone)	(2.51)	(2.27)
Hydrocarbon Prod.	2.56***	2.32***
(In zone)	(3.41)	(2.99)
Hydrocarbon Prod.	0.48**	0.50**
(Out zone)	(2.55)	(2.31)
Mountainous terrain (log)	1.06***	1.06***
	(2.98)	(2.99)
Conflict at border	2.47***	2.43***
	(2.75)	(2.68)
Weak rebel group	1.26	1.29
	(0.37)	(0.42)
Equal strength	4.41**	4.95**
	(2.11)	(2.38)
Cold War	3.88***	4.16***
	(4.08)	(4.44)
Internationalized conflict	10.70***	12.41***
	(5.72)	(6.43)
Population size (log)	1.59***	1.57***
	5.46	(5.38)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.26**	0.30**
	(2.43)	(2.23)
Ethnic polarization	0.45**	0.48*
	(2.00)	(1.87)
Democracy	0.48 **	0.46**
	(2.07)	(2.34)
Observations	244	240
R ²	0.39	0.40

Coefficients are exponentiated and absolute t-statistics, clustered by country, are shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is log-transformed. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D Regression Results Across Varying Battle Death Thresholds

This appendix reports the regression results for each of the figures presented in the main text. The results are presented for each of the battle death thresholds that resulted in observations being removed from the analysis.

D.1 Regression Results for Total Combat Deaths Across Varying Battle Death Thresholds.

Table A.4. Results corresponding to Figure 2 in the main text.

	Battle Death Threshold													
	25	50	75	100	125	150	175	200	225	250	275	300	325	350
Drug Cultivation	0.39**	0.63	0.87	0.81	0.77	0.74	0.71	0.69	0.67	0.66	0.67	0.87	0.92	1.06
(In zone)	(2.39)	(1.27)	(0.46)	(0.68)	(0.76)	(0.84)	(0.93)	(1.00)	(1.08)	(1.10)	(1.09)	(0.41)	(0.28)	(0.16)
Gem Production	2.72**	2.12**	1.79	1.75	2.01**	2.33**	2.10**	2.10**	1.79*	1.78*	1.71*	1.49	1.42	1.28
(In zone)	(2.51)	(2.06)	(1.65)	(1.56)	(2.02)	(2.55)	(2.32)	(2.30)	(1.87)	(1.86)	(1.76)	(1.23)	(1.09)	(0.75)
Hydrocarbon Prod.	2.56***	2.17***	2.38***	2.48***	2.42***	2.49***	2.40***	2.38***	2.17**	2.22**	2.02**	2.13***	1.83**	2.15**
(In Zone)	(3.41)	(2.69)	(2.88)	(2.99)	(3.05)	(3.06)	(2.91)	(2.87)	(2.49)	(2.59)	(2.31)	(2.69)	(2.01)	(2.27)
Hydrocarbon Prod.	0.48**	0.53**	0.50**	0.51**	0.53**	0.58*	0.59*	0.62	0.66	0.66	0.64	0.53**	0.52**	0.49**
(Out Zone)	(2.55)	(2.05)	(2.31)	(2.17)	(2.15)	(1.73)	(1.67)	(1.46)	(1.40)	(1.38)	(1.46)	(2.18)	(2.10)	(2.53)
Mountainous terrain (log)	1.06***	1.03**	1.04**	1.04**	1.04***	1.04**	1.03**	1.04**	1.03**	1.03**	1.04**	1.04**	1.04***	1.04**
(2.98)	(2.02)	(2.43)	(2.57)	(2.61)	(1.99)	(2.08)	(1.99)	(2.05)	(2.18)	(2.44)	(2.30)	(2.65)	(2.44)	
Conflict at border	2.47***	2.23**	2.57***	2.62***	2.46***	2.34***	2.61***	2.61***	2.89***	2.80***	2.97***	2.63***	2.37***	2.71***
(2.75)	(2.52)	(2.92)	(3.00)	(2.84)	(2.62)	(2.95)	(2.96)	(3.33)	(3.19)	(3.39)	(3.21)	(2.98)	(3.01)	
Weak rebel group	1.26	0.86	0.57	0.55	0.63	0.72	0.69	0.71	0.74	0.75	0.82	1.03	1.15	0.79
(0.37)	(0.26)	(1.10)	(1.16)	(0.89)	(0.62)	(0.68)	(0.63)	(0.56)	(0.54)	(0.35)	(0.05)	(0.28)	(0.64)	
Equal strength	4.41**	2.88*	1.53	1.31	1.34	1.43	1.31	1.44	1.50	1.49	1.79	2.08	2.01	1.42
(2.11)	(1.84)	(0.82)	(0.51)	(0.55)	(0.64)	(0.49)	(0.64)	(0.72)	(0.71)	(1.03)	(1.39)	(1.23)	(0.77)	
Cold War	3.88***	4.78***	4.23***	3.91***	3.48***	3.56***	3.34***	3.19***	3.06***	2.99***	2.68***	2.89***	3.30***	3.12***
(4.08)	(5.18)	(5.12)	(5.12)	(5.17)	(5.45)	(5.12)	(4.69)	(4.49)	(4.42)	(4.14)	(4.53)	(5.21)	(4.75)	
Internationalized conflict	10.70***	10.67***	7.51***	6.59***	6.76***	6.39***	6.06***	5.83***	6.12***	6.09***	5.34***	7.07***	5.75***	5.21***
(5.72)	(5.75)	(4.96)	(4.64)	(4.40)	(4.17)	(4.06)	(3.92)	(3.97)	(3.96)	(3.64)	(4.99)	(4.54)	(4.34)	
Population size (log)	1.59***	1.49***	1.42***	1.37***	1.35***	1.34***	1.34***	1.33***	1.32***	1.32***	1.31***	1.34***	1.27***	1.28***
(5.46)	(4.64)	(4.24)	(3.78)	(3.89)	(3.65)	(3.74)	(3.49)	(3.76)	(3.76)	(3.64)	(4.06)	(3.34)	(3.64)	
Ethnic fractionalization	0.26**	0.39*	0.46	0.51	0.47	0.38*	0.45	0.43	0.55	0.56	0.47	0.37**	0.44*	0.46*
(2.43)	(1.70)	(1.51)	(1.27)	(1.45)	(1.83)	(1.52)	(1.60)	(1.12)	(1.10)	(1.42)	(2.03)	(1.86)	(1.80)	
Ethnic polarization	0.45**	0.58	0.45**	0.43**	0.44**	0.48**	0.49**	0.50**	0.44**	0.45**	0.44**	0.52**	0.48***	0.43***
(2.00)	(1.32)	(2.28)	(2.44)	(2.47)	(2.17)	(2.16)	(2.09)	(2.44)	(2.44)	(2.50)	(2.06)	(3.26)	(3.32)	
Democracy	0.48**	0.41***	0.42***	0.40***	0.42***	0.38***	0.41***	0.43***	0.52**	0.52**	0.54**	0.63*	0.59**	0.57**
(2.07)	(2.75)	(3.25)	(3.30)	(3.24)	(3.68)	(3.30)	(3.08)	(2.47)	(2.52)	(2.39)	(1.83)	(2.28)	(2.35)	
Observations	244	222	205	199	191	187	181	178	171	170	165	162	152	149
R ²	0.39	0.38	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.42	0.40	0.39	0.40	0.39	0.40	0.43	0.44	0.47

Coefficients are exponentiated and absolute t-statistics, clustered by country, are shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is log-transformed. Results presented for battle death thresholds which resulted in observations being removed. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.4. Results corresponding to Figure 2 in the main text (continued).

	Battle Death Threshold														
	375	425	525	575	600	625	675	725	750	775	800	825	925	950	975
Drug Cultivation (In zone)	1.05 (0.14)	0.95 (0.13)	0.97 (0.08)	0.97 (0.09)	0.91 (0.27)	0.91 (0.26)	0.88 (0.36)	0.87 (0.36)	0.88 (0.33)	1.05 (0.12)	0.98 (0.04)	1.08 (0.19)	1.06 (0.15)	1.05 (0.13)	0.93 (0.19)
Gem Production (In zone)	1.25 (0.68)	1.31 (0.82)	1.27 (0.74)	1.26 (0.70)	1.38 (0.95)	1.38 (0.90)	1.35 (0.87)	1.29 (0.74)	1.28 (0.73)	1.14 (0.35)	1.24 (0.54)	1.29 (0.69)	1.25 (0.59)	1.23 (0.56)	1.31 (0.75)
Hydrocarbon Prod. (In Zone)	2.09** (2.14)	2.23** (2.39)	2.19** (2.32)	2.25** (2.37)	2.22** (2.31)	2.19** (2.21)	2.09** (2.02)	2.06* (1.95)	2.03* (1.88)	1.95* (1.74)	1.89 (1.64)	1.88 (1.57)	1.84 (1.47)	1.87 (1.54)	1.95* (1.68)
Hydrocarbon Prod. (Out Zone)	0.48** (2.57)	0.51** (2.45)	0.51** (2.37)	0.52** (2.31)	0.51** (2.37)	0.52** (2.12)	0.48** (2.43)	0.45** (2.61)	0.45** (2.60)	0.41*** (2.67)	0.40*** (2.69)	0.42** (2.51)	0.44** (2.32)	0.45** (2.32)	0.48** (2.07)
Mountainous terrain (log)	1.04** (2.48)	1.04*** (2.67)	1.03** (2.37)	1.04** (2.41)	1.04** (2.36)	1.04** (2.39)	1.03* (1.93)	1.03* (1.97)	1.03 (1.46)	1.03 (1.48)	1.03 (1.51)	1.03* (1.70)	1.04* (1.98)	1.04** (2.07)	1.04** (2.29)
Conflict at border	2.78*** (3.11)	2.80*** (3.22)	2.69*** (3.02)	2.65*** (2.99)	2.78*** (3.15)	2.72*** (2.94)	2.57*** (2.68)	2.66*** (2.82)	2.60*** (2.74)	2.65*** (2.83)	2.71*** (2.91)	2.64*** (2.89)	2.72*** (3.01)	2.63*** (2.80)	2.77*** (2.93)
Weak rebel group	0.77 (0.70)	0.81 (0.55)	0.79 (0.58)	0.80 (0.53)	0.75 (0.70)	0.76 (0.65)	0.83 (0.42)	0.83 (0.42)	0.83 (0.40)	0.84 (0.40)	0.82 (0.43)	0.81 (0.46)	0.72 (0.68)	0.72 (0.69)	0.78 (0.51)
Equal strength	1.39 (0.73)	1.41 (0.74)	1.64 (0.94)	1.66 (0.95)	1.96 (1.17)	1.96 (1.17)	2.12 (1.18)	2.08 (1.16)	2.09 (1.17)	2.08 (1.17)	1.98 (1.10)	2.15 (1.19)	1.83 (0.90)	1.80 (0.89)	1.80 (0.88)
Cold War	3.01*** (4.36)	2.83*** (4.03)	2.86*** (4.00)	2.75*** (3.92)	2.87*** (4.30)	2.91*** (4.26)	2.66*** (3.42)	2.52*** (3.52)	2.55*** (3.56)	2.40*** (3.58)	2.49*** (3.88)	2.27*** (3.39)	2.19*** (3.22)	2.12*** (3.09)	1.95*** (2.72)
Internationalized conflict	5.24*** (4.37)	4.94*** (4.18)	4.52*** (3.80)	4.44*** (3.76)	3.99*** (3.87)	3.95*** (3.81)	3.73*** (3.57)	3.67*** (3.53)	3.70*** (3.54)	3.67*** (3.56)	3.47*** (3.53)	3.31*** (3.39)	3.02*** (3.13)	3.03*** (3.13)	3.28*** (3.49)
Population size (log)	1.30*** (3.84)	1.28*** (3.62)	1.25*** (3.23)	1.24*** (3.02)	1.24*** (2.96)	1.23*** (2.72)	1.25*** (2.65)	1.27*** (2.80)	1.28*** (2.81)	1.30*** (2.89)	1.30*** (2.84)	1.31*** (2.82)	1.29*** (2.69)	1.30*** (2.84)	1.27** (2.45)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.48* (1.74)	0.46* (1.87)	0.44* (1.88)	0.47* (1.71)	0.51 (1.62)	0.52 (1.60)	0.50* (1.69)	0.51 (1.63)	0.51 (1.62)	0.55 (1.42)	0.61 (1.24)	0.58 (1.37)	0.66 (1.03)	0.67 (1.01)	0.58 (1.39)
Ethnic polarization	0.44*** (3.30)	0.45*** (3.28)	0.47*** (2.92)	0.43*** (2.95)	0.43*** (2.91)	0.43*** (2.93)	0.47*** (2.62)	0.48** (2.52)	0.49** (2.46)	0.50** (2.38)	0.50** (2.35)	0.51** (2.38)	0.52** (2.36)	0.52** (2.34)	0.55** (2.24)
Democracy	0.60** (2.13)	0.62** (1.99)	0.62** (2.05)	0.67* (1.76)	0.65* (1.91)	0.64* (1.92)	0.63* (1.83)	0.63* (1.83)	0.62* (1.83)	0.62* (1.83)	0.58** (2.00)	0.56** (2.08)	0.53** (2.13)	0.52** (2.17)	0.57* (1.82)
Observations	148	145	141	140	139	137	130	129	128	127	126	124	121	120	117
R ²	0.47	0.47	0.45	0.44	0.47	0.45	0.41	0.41	0.40	0.40	0.41	0.41	0.39	0.39	0.39

Coefficients are exponentiated and absolute t-statistics, clustered by country, are shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is log-transformed. Results presented for battle death thresholds which resulted in observations being removed. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D.2 Regression Results for Conflict Duration Across Varying Battle Death Thresholds.

Table A.5. Results corresponding to Figure 5 in the main text.

	Battle Death Threshold													
	25	50	75	100	125	150	175	200	225	250	275	300	325	350
Drug Cultivation (In zone)	-0.19 (0.22)	-0.33 (0.24)	-0.46 (0.26)	-0.46 (0.26)	-0.48 (0.27)	-0.52 (0.27)	-0.51 (0.28)	-0.48 (0.28)	-0.45 (0.28)	-0.44 (0.28)	-0.49 (0.29)	-0.65* (0.30)	-0.73* (0.31)	-0.76* (0.32)
Other Natural Resources	-0.12 (0.20)	-0.12 (0.22)	-0.01 (0.23)	0.02 (0.24)	0.01 (0.25)	-0.001 (0.25)	0.06 (0.25)	0.06 (0.26)	0.14 (0.26)	0.13 (0.26)	0.16 (0.27)	0.22 (0.27)	0.37 (0.29)	0.35 (0.29)
Mountainous terrain (log)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
GDP/capita (log)	0.10 (0.09)	0.11 (0.09)	0.05 (0.10)	0.05 (0.10)	0.03 (0.10)	0.01 (0.10)	0.01 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.06 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.11)	-0.06 (0.11)
Weak rebel group	-0.69** (0.28)	-0.63** (0.31)	-0.55* (0.34)	-0.62* (0.35)	-0.64* (0.36)	-0.67* (0.36)	-0.65* (0.36)	-0.69* (0.36)	-0.72* (0.36)	-0.72* (0.36)	-0.76** (0.37)	-0.83** (0.37)	-0.94** (0.39)	-0.84** (0.41)
Equal strength	-0.53* (0.33)	-0.43 (0.36)	-0.28 (0.37)	-0.29 (0.39)	-0.33 (0.39)	-0.34 (0.39)	-0.29 (0.39)	-0.37 (0.40)	-0.42 (0.40)	-0.41 (0.40)	-0.49 (0.41)	-0.51 (0.41)	-0.50 (0.42)	-0.42 (0.44)
Internationalized conflict	-0.73** (0.25)	-0.70** (0.27)	-0.65** (0.27)	-0.64** (0.27)	-0.67** (0.28)	-0.67** (0.28)	-0.65** (0.28)	-0.65** (0.29)	-0.70** (0.29)	-0.70** (0.29)	-0.70** (0.30)	-0.77** (0.30)	-0.75** (0.31)	-0.73** (0.31)
Cold War	-0.20 (0.16)	-0.27 (0.16)	-0.23 (0.18)	-0.18 (0.18)	-0.14 (0.19)	-0.14 (0.19)	-0.08 (0.20)	-0.03 (0.20)	0.005 (0.21)	0.01 (0.21)	0.05 (0.22)	0.01 (0.22)	-0.12 (0.23)	-0.08 (0.23)
Population size (log)	-0.14* (0.06)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.12 (0.30)	-0.34 (0.32)	-0.43 (0.33)	-0.42 (0.33)	-0.38 (0.35)	-0.36 (0.35)	-0.48 (0.35)	-0.44 (0.36)	-0.53 (0.36)	-0.53 (0.36)	-0.49 (0.37)	-0.49 (0.38)	-0.67 (0.40)	-0.66 (0.40)
Democracy	-0.40* (0.20)	-0.41* (0.20)	-0.48* (0.22)	-0.45 (0.23)	-0.52* (0.24)	-0.49 (0.24)	-0.58* (0.25)	-0.65** (0.26)	-0.79** (0.28)	-0.78** (0.28)	-0.81** (0.28)	-0.92** (0.29)	-1.00** (0.31)	-1.03** (0.33)
Territorial Conflict	-0.24 (0.17)	-0.25 (0.17)	-0.34* (0.18)	-0.35* (0.19)	-0.37* (0.19)	-0.39* (0.19)	-0.43** (0.20)	-0.38* (0.20)	-0.35 (0.21)	-0.35 (0.21)	-0.39* (0.21)	-0.45** (0.22)	-0.39* (0.22)	-0.39* (0.23)
Conflict at border	-0.61** (0.16)	-0.54** (0.17)	-0.58** (0.18)	-0.56** (0.18)	-0.56** (0.18)	-0.54** (0.19)	-0.59** (0.19)	-0.59** (0.19)	-0.63** (0.20)	-0.62** (0.20)	-0.62** (0.20)	-0.59** (0.21)	-0.52* (0.22)	-0.55* (0.22)
Observations	238	216	199	193	185	181	175	172	165	164	160	157	147	144
R ²	0.27	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.26	0.27	0.26	0.27	0.30	0.30	0.30

Standard errors, clustered by country, are shown in parentheses. Results presented for battle death thresholds which resulted in observations being removed.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.5. Results corresponding to Figure 5 in the main text (continued).

	Battle Death Threshold														
	375	425	525	575	600	625	675	725	750	775	800	825	925	950	975
Drug Cultivation (In zone)	-0.77* (0.32)	-0.75* (0.32)	-0.79* (0.32)	-0.80* (0.32)	-0.79* (0.32)	-0.79* (0.32)	-0.89** (0.32)	-0.88** (0.32)	-0.89** (0.32)	-0.87** (0.33)	-0.85** (0.33)	-0.90** (0.34)	-0.83** (0.34)	-0.82** (0.34)	-0.80* (0.34)
Other Natural Resources	0.35 (0.29)	0.36 (0.30)	0.42 (0.31)	0.42 (0.31)	0.39 (0.31)	0.36 (0.31)	0.53 (0.33)	0.49 (0.33)	0.50 (0.34)	0.49 (0.34)	0.45 (0.34)	0.45 (0.34)	0.33 (0.34)	0.33 (0.34)	0.30 (0.34)
Mountainous terrain (log GDP/capita (log))	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Weak rebel group	-0.85** (0.41)	-0.89** (0.41)	-1.04** (0.44)	-1.04** (0.44)	-1.00** (0.44)	-1.02** (0.44)	-1.18** (0.45)	-1.16** (0.45)	-1.15** (0.45)	-1.14** (0.45)	-1.13** (0.45)	-1.11** (0.45)	-0.93* (0.47)	-0.93* (0.47)	-0.93* (0.48)
Equal strength	-0.42 (0.44)	-0.45 (0.44)	-0.65 (0.46)	-0.64 (0.46)	-0.65 (0.47)	-0.66 (0.47)	-0.80 (0.48)	-0.79 (0.48)	-0.79 (0.48)	-0.78 (0.48)	-0.75 (0.48)	-0.78 (0.49)	-0.62 (0.50)	-0.61 (0.50)	-0.61 (0.51)
Internationalized conflict	-0.72** (0.31)	-0.72** (0.32)	-0.72** (0.33)	-0.72** (0.33)	-0.68** (0.33)	-0.66** (0.33)	-0.62* (0.34)	-0.61* (0.34)	-0.62* (0.34)	-0.61* (0.34)	-0.57* (0.34)	-0.56 (0.34)	-0.47 (0.35)	-0.45 (0.35)	-0.42 (0.35)
Cold War	-0.09 (0.23)	-0.08 (0.24)	-0.10 (0.25)	-0.10 (0.25)	-0.11 (0.25)	-0.14 (0.25)	-0.17 (0.26)	-0.20 (0.26)	-0.21 (0.26)	-0.22 (0.26)	-0.25 (0.26)	-0.18 (0.27)	-0.17 (0.28)	-0.21 (0.28)	-0.15 (0.28)
Population size (log)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.09)	0.01 (0.09)	0.08 (0.10)	0.08 (0.10)	0.08 (0.10)	0.08 (0.10)	0.09 (0.10)	0.08 (0.10)	0.09 (0.10)	0.10 (0.10)	0.11 (0.10)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.65 (0.40)	-0.67 (0.40)	-0.71 (0.41)	-0.69 (0.41)	-0.72 (0.41)	-0.75 (0.41)	-0.91** (0.42)	-0.90** (0.42)	-0.90** (0.42)	-0.89** (0.42)	-0.96** (0.42)	-0.94** (0.42)	-0.95** (0.43)	-0.95** (0.43)	-0.95** (0.43)
Democracy	-1.01** (0.33)	-1.10** (0.34)	-1.13** (0.34)	-1.10** (0.34)	-1.09** (0.34)	-1.09** (0.34)	-1.21*** (0.35)	-1.22*** (0.35)	-1.21*** (0.35)	-1.22*** (0.35)	-1.21*** (0.35)	-1.18*** (0.35)	-1.15** (0.35)	-1.16** (0.35)	-1.18** (0.36)
Territorial Conflict	-0.39* (0.23)	-0.37 (0.23)	-0.37 (0.24)	-0.38 (0.24)	-0.40 (0.24)	-0.39 (0.24)	-0.38 (0.24)	-0.36 (0.24)	-0.37 (0.24)	-0.36 (0.24)	-0.33 (0.24)	-0.38 (0.25)	-0.34 (0.25)	-0.32 (0.25)	-0.36 (0.25)
Conflict at border	-0.54* (0.22)	-0.52* (0.22)	-0.47 (0.23)	-0.48* (0.23)	-0.49* (0.23)	-0.46 (0.23)	-0.37 (0.24)	-0.36 (0.24)	-0.34 (0.24)	-0.34 (0.24)	-0.37 (0.24)	-0.36 (0.24)	-0.36 (0.25)	-0.38 (0.25)	-0.41 (0.25)
Observations	143	140	136	135	134	132	125	124	123	122	121	119	117	116	114
R ²	0.29	0.30	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.26	0.26	0.27

Standard errors, clustered by country, are shown in parentheses. Results presented for battle death thresholds which resulted in observations being removed.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D.3 Regression Results for Analysis of Conflict Intensity Across Varying Battle Death Thresholds.

Table A.6. Results corresponding to Figure 6a in the main text—No duration control

	Battle Death Threshold													
	25	50	75	100	125	150	175	200	225	250	275	300	325	350
Drug Cultivation (In Zone)	0.41** (2.03)	0.41* (1.93)	0.55 (1.27)	0.51 (1.44)	0.44** (1.97)	0.44* (1.81)	0.42* (1.91)	0.42* (1.81)	0.41* (1.81)	0.40* (1.83)	0.42* (1.70)	0.41 (1.62)	0.39** (1.99)	0.41* (1.73)
Gem Production (In Zone)	1.16 (0.33)	1.18 (0.34)	1.12 (0.23)	1.19 (0.35)	1.29 (0.63)	1.49 (0.98)	1.40 (0.82)	1.38 (0.77)	1.24 (0.51)	1.22 (0.49)	1.19 (0.42)	1.14 (0.32)	1.44 (0.84)	1.46 (0.84)
Hydrocarbon Prod. (In Zone)	1.35 (0.92)	1.22 (0.59)	1.38 (0.99)	1.36 (0.98)	1.27 (0.76)	1.22 (0.61)	1.21 (0.57)	1.29 (0.72)	1.16 (0.43)	1.20 (0.52)	1.19 (0.50)	1.31 (0.82)	1.29 (0.73)	1.23 (0.57)
Hydrocarbon Prod. (Out Zone)	0.65 (1.18)	0.75 (0.77)	0.74 (0.84)	0.76 (0.73)	0.74 (0.85)	0.79 (0.69)	0.84 (0.49)	0.82 (0.54)	0.93 (0.19)	0.94 (0.17)	0.90 (0.31)	0.82 (0.55)	1.04 (0.10)	1.08 (0.21)
Mountainous terrain (log)	1.05* (1.82)	1.05* (1.77)	1.05* (1.70)	1.04 (1.45)	1.03 (1.23)	1.02 (0.86)	1.02 (0.88)	1.04 (1.21)	1.05* (1.71)	1.05* (1.79)	1.05* (1.77)	1.05* (1.74)	1.06* (1.80)	1.06* (1.70)
Conflict at border	0.42** (2.55)	0.52* (1.84)	0.48* (1.97)	0.54* (1.70)	0.53* (1.80)	0.48** (2.08)	0.53* (1.80)	0.53* (1.70)	0.51* (1.76)	0.49* (1.82)	0.51* (1.76)	0.45** (2.15)	0.52* (1.75)	0.49* (1.79)
Weak rebel group	0.15*** (3.84)	0.15*** (3.17)	0.17*** (2.76)	0.12*** (3.43)	0.13*** (3.23)	0.15*** (3.00)	0.15*** (3.05)	0.15*** (3.08)	0.15*** (3.08)	0.15*** (3.06)	0.15*** (3.01)	0.17*** (2.82)	0.17*** (2.82)	0.21** (2.28)
Equal strength	0.66 (0.70)	0.66 (0.62)	0.65 (0.62)	0.46 (1.17)	0.44 (1.19)	0.48 (1.05)	0.45 (1.15)	0.45 (1.14)	0.38 (1.39)	0.38 (1.39)	0.30* (1.73)	0.32 (1.63)	0.43 (1.20)	0.52 (0.88)
Cold War	3.21*** (3.40)	3.30*** (3.48)	3.21*** (3.53)	3.25*** (3.63)	3.19*** (3.51)	3.53*** (4.02)	3.43*** (3.78)	3.64*** (4.34)	3.84*** (4.61)	3.71*** (4.51)	3.86*** (4.52)	4.00*** (4.68)	3.36*** (4.45)	3.28*** (4.16)
Internationalized conflict	1.64 (1.43)	1.60 (1.29)	1.41 (0.91)	1.31 (0.71)	1.25 (0.55)	1.23 (0.49)	1.17 (0.38)	1.17 (0.36)	1.33 (0.65)	1.32 (0.63)	1.36 (0.71)	1.72 (1.37)	1.51 (1.07)	1.55 (1.13)
Population size (log)	1.05 (0.37)	1.09 (0.63)	1.05 (0.33)	1.05 (0.34)	1.03 (0.22)	1.00 (0.03)	1.00 (0.01)	0.99 (0.06)	0.99 (0.04)	0.99 (0.04)	1.00 (0.02)	1.02 (0.13)	0.99 (0.07)	0.99 (0.09)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.18** (2.51)	0.14*** (2.78)	0.17** (2.30)	0.21** (1.99)	0.24* (1.86)	0.20** (2.11)	0.23* (1.88)	0.24* (1.79)	0.29 (1.48)	0.29 (1.45)	0.32 (1.29)	0.26 (1.61)	0.23* (1.77)	0.22* (1.80)
Ethnic polarization	0.34* (1.96)	0.36* (1.92)	0.31* (1.97)	0.32* (1.84)	0.29** (1.98)	0.30* (1.86)	0.30* (1.83)	0.34* (1.78)	0.38 (1.48)	0.39 (1.45)	0.44 (1.26)	0.49 (1.11)	0.32* (1.75)	0.30* (1.69)
Democracy	0.34*** (3.15)	0.28*** (3.55)	0.26*** (3.79)	0.27*** (3.53)	0.29*** (3.09)	0.28*** (3.21)	0.29*** (3.00)	0.27*** (3.06)	0.29*** (2.70)	0.29*** (2.76)	0.24*** (3.21)	0.24*** (3.14)	0.31** (2.57)	0.32** (2.43)
Observations	244	222	205	199	191	187	181	178	171	170	165	162	152	149
R ²	0.37	0.36	0.36	0.37	0.38	0.40	0.37	0.38	0.36	0.36	0.37	0.38	0.40	0.39

Coefficients are exponentiated and absolute t-statistics, clustered by country, are shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is log-transformed. Results presented for battle death thresholds which resulted in observations being removed. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.6. Results corresponding to Figure 6a in the main text—No duration control (continued).

	Battle Death Threshold														
	375	425	525	575	600	625	675	725	750	775	800	825	925	950	975
Drug Cultivation (In Zone)	0.41* (1.75)	0.45 (1.62)	0.43* (1.72)	0.43* (1.76)	0.40* (1.83)	0.40* (1.87)	0.33** (2.40)	0.33** (2.43)	0.33** (2.38)	0.35** (2.12)	0.35** (2.09)	0.38* (1.86)	0.40* (1.80)	0.39* (1.81)	0.35** (2.11)
Gem Production (In Zone)	1.42 (0.80)	1.17 (0.36)	1.18 (0.38)	1.16 (0.34)	1.26 (0.48)	1.22 (0.40)	1.42 (0.77)	1.35 (0.66)	1.34 (0.65)	1.29 (0.54)	1.29 (0.52)	1.32 (0.62)	1.27 (0.52)	1.25 (0.49)	1.35 (0.71)
Hydrocarbon Prod. (In Zone)	1.20 (0.50)	1.16 (0.41)	1.19 (0.49)	1.24 (0.61)	1.22 (0.58)	1.33 (0.84)	1.38 (1.02)	1.35 (0.97)	1.33 (0.94)	1.32 (0.91)	1.32 (0.91)	1.28 (0.85)	1.23 (0.71)	1.26 (0.79)	1.33 (0.99)
Hydrocarbon Prod. (Out Zone)	1.07 (0.20)	0.95 (0.14)	0.99 (0.03)	1.01 (0.04)	0.99 (0.02)	0.82 (0.62)	0.84 (0.56)	0.77 (0.82)	0.77 (0.82)	0.74 (0.87)	0.74 (0.87)	0.78 (0.75)	0.74 (0.83)	0.75 (0.84)	0.74 (0.88)
Mountainous terrain (log)	1.06* (1.70)	1.05 (1.63)	1.05* (1.72)	1.06* (1.80)	1.06* (1.80)	1.05 (1.57)	1.07** (2.28)	1.06** (2.28)	1.06* (1.96)	1.06* (1.95)	1.06* (1.95)	1.06** (2.03)	1.06* (1.97)	1.06** (2.02)	1.06** (2.00)
Conflict at border	0.50* (1.72)	0.58 (1.33)	0.70 (0.87)	0.68 (0.95)	0.71 (0.85)	0.82 (0.47)	0.98 (0.05)	1.02 (0.05)	1.00 (0.01)	1.01 (0.03)	1.01 (0.02)	0.95 (0.12)	0.98 (0.04)	0.93 (0.17)	0.96 (0.09)
Weak rebel group	0.20** (2.30)	0.18** (2.40)	0.12*** (2.97)	0.12*** (2.97)	0.12*** (3.04)	0.11*** (3.11)	0.08*** (3.42)	0.08*** (3.38)	0.08*** (3.37)	0.08*** (3.35)	0.08*** (3.35)	0.08*** (3.38)	0.10*** (2.84)	0.10*** (2.84)	0.11*** (2.79)
Equal strength	0.51 (0.90)	0.45 (1.06)	0.29* (1.67)	0.30 (1.66)	0.34 (1.45)	0.34 (1.45)	0.27 (1.65)	0.27 (1.65)	0.27 (1.65)	0.27 (1.64)	0.27 (1.64)	0.31 (1.48)	0.37 (1.17)	0.36 (1.20)	0.37 (1.17)
Cold War	3.19*** (4.05)	2.92*** (3.59)	2.62*** (3.18)	2.46*** (2.95)	2.56*** (3.07)	2.41*** (2.87)	1.96** (2.36)	1.84** (2.16)	1.86** (2.20)	1.82** (2.07)	1.82** (2.05)	1.64 (1.54)	1.68 (1.53)	1.60 (1.42)	1.57 (1.33)
Internationalized conflict	1.56 (1.14)	1.48 (1.03)	1.38 (0.85)	1.35 (0.79)	1.23 (0.57)	1.32 (0.79)	1.44 (1.05)	1.41 (1.00)	1.42 (1.02)	1.42 (1.02)	1.42 (1.02)	1.42 (0.86)	1.34 (0.84)	1.34 (0.85)	1.49 (1.17)
Population size (log)	1.00 (0.01)	1.02 (0.14)	1.02 (0.10)	1.00 (0.03)	1.01 (0.04)	1.07 (0.41)	1.22 (1.50)	1.24* (1.66)	1.25* (1.74)	1.26* (1.76)	1.26* (1.76)	1.28* (1.91)	1.27* (1.79)	1.28* (1.87)	1.28* (1.87)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.23* (1.78)	0.30 (1.45)	0.34 (1.24)	0.37 (1.15)	0.40 (1.05)	0.35 (1.24)	0.24* (1.92)	0.24* (1.91)	0.24* (1.92)	0.25* (1.88)	0.25* (1.88)	0.24* (1.96)	0.26* (1.78)	0.26* (1.75)	0.22* (1.98)
Ethnic polarization	0.30* (1.68)	0.30* (1.73)	0.28* (1.82)	0.25** (2.04)	0.25** (2.01)	0.25** (2.11)	0.26** (2.31)	0.26** (2.28)	0.27** (2.25)	0.27** (2.24)	0.27** (2.24)	0.28** (2.22)	0.28** (2.25)	0.28** (2.18)	0.30** (2.14)
Democracy	0.33** (2.32)	0.30** (2.54)	0.30** (2.49)	0.33** (2.23)	0.32** (2.26)	0.34** (2.12)	0.27*** (3.10)	0.27*** (3.10)	0.26*** (3.12)	0.26*** (3.11)	0.26*** (3.11)	0.25*** (3.10)	0.26*** (3.00)	0.25*** (3.04)	0.28*** (2.86)
Observations	148	145	141	140	139	137	130	129	128	127	126	124	121	120	117
R ²	0.37	0.37	0.38	0.39	0.40	0.41	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.43	0.43	0.44	0.42	0.42	0.42

Coefficients are exponentiated and absolute t-statistics, clustered by country, are shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is log-transformed. Results presented for battle death thresholds which resulted in observations being removed. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.7. Results corresponding to Figure 6b in the main text—Including duration control

	Battle Death Threshold													
	25	50	75	100	125	150	175	200	225	250	275	300	325	350
Drug Cultivation	0.40**	0.52*	0.72	0.67	0.61*	0.60*	0.57*	0.56*	0.55*	0.54**	0.56*	0.66	0.66	0.77
(In Zone)	(2.50)	(1.85)	(1.07)	(1.32)	(1.72)	(1.75)	(1.87)	(1.89)	(1.96)	(2.00)	(1.93)	(1.28)	(1.43)	(0.72)
Gem Production	1.76	1.62	1.47	1.49	1.67	1.94**	1.78*	1.77*	1.54	1.53	1.48	1.35	1.43	1.34
(In Zone)	(1.46)	(1.27)	(1.07)	(1.09)	(1.63)	(2.18)	(1.96)	(1.89)	(1.50)	(1.48)	(1.44)	(1.01)	(1.15)	(0.89)
Hydrocarbon Prod.	1.84**	1.67**	1.90**	1.94***	1.86***	1.86**	1.81**	1.85**	1.69**	1.73**	1.64**	1.78**	1.61**	1.78**
(In Zone)	(2.53)	(1.98)	(2.60)	(2.72)	(2.72)	(2.52)	(2.41)	(2.44)	(2.04)	(2.18)	(1.98)	(2.57)	(2.01)	(1.98)
Hydrocarbon Prod.	0.56**	0.62	0.59*	0.60*	0.61*	0.66	0.68	0.69	0.76	0.76	0.73	0.62*	0.67	0.64*
(Out Zone)	(2.06)	(1.62)	(1.95)	(1.80)	(1.94)	(1.58)	(1.43)	(1.30)	(1.10)	(1.08)	(1.19)	(1.91)	(1.56)	(1.79)
Mountainous	1.05***	1.04**	1.04**	1.04**	1.04**	1.03*	1.03*	1.04**	1.04**	1.04**	1.04***	1.04***	1.05***	1.05***
terrain (log)	(2.85)	(2.28)	(2.55)	(2.50)	(2.47)	(1.84)	(1.91)	(2.16)	(2.39)	(2.54)	(2.76)	(2.75)	(2.93)	(2.68)
Conflict at border	1.00	1.15	1.29	1.36	1.30	1.23	1.36	1.35	1.45	1.40	1.48	1.36	1.34	1.53
	(0.01)	(0.52)	(0.90)	(1.14)	(1.00)	(0.79)	(1.17)	(1.13)	(1.32)	(1.15)	(1.31)	(1.11)	(1.04)	(1.26)
Weak rebel group	0.42**	0.39**	0.35**	0.29***	0.33***	0.38**	0.37**	0.37**	0.39**	0.39**	0.42**	0.53*	0.56	0.51*
	(2.05)	(2.13)	(2.54)	(3.07)	(2.76)	(2.35)	(2.41)	(2.39)	(2.32)	(2.29)	(2.10)	(1.78)	(1.51)	(1.92)
Equal strength	1.67	1.48	1.07	0.85	0.85	0.92	0.85	0.89	0.86	0.86	0.88	1.04	1.13	1.02
	(1.07)	(0.85)	(0.17)	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.21)	(0.38)	(0.26)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.28)	(0.09)	(0.27)	(0.04)
Cold War	3.52***	4.04***	3.77***	3.62***	3.35***	3.54***	3.38***	3.37***	3.35***	3.26***	3.10***	3.27***	3.33***	3.17***
	(4.31)	(5.05)	(5.24)	(5.47)	(5.64)	(5.86)	(5.53)	(5.54)	(5.59)	(5.50)	(5.18)	(5.63)	(5.98)	(5.24)
Internationalized	4.10***	4.49***	3.77***	3.38***	3.37***	3.26***	3.10***	3.00***	3.33***	3.30***	3.12***	4.17***	3.48***	3.48***
conflict	(3.98)	(4.07)	(3.57)	(3.30)	(3.00)	(2.82)	(2.74)	(2.63)	(2.85)	(2.83)	(2.68)	(3.96)	(3.54)	(3.57)
Population	1.29**	1.29***	1.25**	1.23**	1.21**	1.19**	1.19*	1.18*	1.18*	1.18*	1.18*	1.21**	1.16*	1.18**
size (log)	(2.57)	(2.63)	(2.45)	(2.12)	(2.09)	(2.00)	(1.96)	(1.75)	(1.83)	(1.81)	(1.86)	(2.24)	(1.90)	(2.29)
Ethnic	0.21***	0.25***	0.30**	0.35**	0.36**	0.29**	0.35**	0.34**	0.42*	0.43*	0.41*	0.32**	0.34**	0.36**
fractionalization	(3.07)	(2.73)	(2.36)	(1.98)	(2.10)	(2.55)	(2.20)	(2.19)	(1.70)	(1.67)	(1.75)	(2.48)	(2.49)	(2.41)
Ethnic	0.39***	0.47**	0.39***	0.38***	0.37***	0.40***	0.40***	0.43***	0.42**	0.42**	0.44**	0.51**	0.41***	0.38***
polarization	(2.72)	(2.21)	(2.96)	(2.87)	(3.10)	(2.86)	(2.84)	(2.73)	(2.60)	(2.56)	(2.39)	(2.16)	(3.45)	(3.23)
Democracy	0.40***	0.34***	0.34***	0.34***	0.36***	0.33***	0.36***	0.36***	0.42***	0.41***	0.40***	0.44***	0.46***	0.46***
	(3.17)	(3.61)	(4.21)	(4.08)	(3.87)	(4.42)	(4.04)	(3.92)	(3.38)	(3.47)	(3.31)	(3.10)	(3.10)	(3.05)
Duration (log)	0.61***	0.58***	0.56***	0.56***	0.56***	0.55***	0.55***	0.56***	0.55***	0.55***	0.55***	0.54***	0.54***	0.51***
	(10.28)	(11.38)	(13.07)	(12.84)	(12.53)	(11.81)	(11.93)	(11.96)	(12.27)	(12.19)	(11.46)	(10.94)	(9.54)	(9.29)
Observations	244	222	205	199	191	187	181	178	171	170	165	162	152	149
R ²	0.55	0.58	0.61	0.62	0.64	0.65	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.67	0.67	0.67

Coefficients are exponentiated and absolute t-statistics, clustered by country, are shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is log-transformed. Results presented for battle death thresholds which resulted in observations being removed. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.7. Results corresponding to Figure 6b in the main text—Including duration control (continued).

	Battle Death Threshold														
	375	425	525	575	600	625	675	725	750	775	800	825	925	950	975
Drug Cultivation (In Zone)	0.77 (0.74)	0.75 (0.82)	0.74 (0.86)	0.73 (0.90)	0.69 (1.05)	0.68 (1.06)	0.60 (1.45)	0.60 (1.45)	0.60 (1.40)	0.69 (1.04)	0.67 (1.07)	0.73 (0.86)	0.74 (0.83)	0.74 (0.86)	0.65 (1.19)
Gem Production (In Zone)	1.30 (0.83)	1.26 (0.70)	1.24 (0.64)	1.22 (0.60)	1.34 (0.81)	1.32 (0.73)	1.38 (0.88)	1.31 (0.75)	1.31 (0.74)	1.20 (0.47)	1.25 (0.57)	1.31 (0.71)	1.25 (0.60)	1.24 (0.57)	1.32 (0.81)
Hydrocarbon Prod. (In Zone)	1.74* (1.86)	1.80** (1.99)	1.78* (1.93)	1.83** (2.03)	1.81* (1.96)	1.84** (1.99)	1.78* (1.91)	1.75* (1.83)	1.72* (1.78)	1.68* (1.68)	1.65 (1.60)	1.63 (1.52)	1.59 (1.38)	1.62 (1.47)	1.70* (1.68)
Hydrocarbon Prod. (Out Zone)	0.63* (1.83)	0.63* (1.89)	0.64* (1.77)	0.66* (1.72)	0.64* (1.85)	0.61* (1.92)	0.60** (2.10)	0.55** (2.43)	0.55** (2.42)	0.51** (2.53)	0.51** (2.55)	0.53** (2.40)	0.54** (2.27)	0.54** (2.27)	0.56** (2.10)
Mountainous terrain (log)	1.05*** (2.71)	1.05*** (2.85)	1.04** (2.48)	1.04** (2.59)	1.04** (2.57)	1.04** (2.42)	1.05** (2.45)	1.05** (2.49)	1.04* (1.94)	1.04* (1.95)	1.04* (1.96)	1.04** (2.15)	1.04** (2.27)	1.05** (2.34)	1.05** (2.49)
Conflict at border	1.57 (1.34)	1.68 (1.54)	1.70 (1.54)	1.66 (1.49)	1.75 (1.65)	1.79* (1.67)	1.76* (1.67)	1.83* (1.81)	1.79* (1.75)	1.83* (1.82)	1.89* (1.90)	1.81* (1.85)	1.88* (1.94)	1.80* (1.71)	1.89* (1.80)
Weak rebel group	0.50* (1.97)	0.50* (1.91)	0.42** (2.33)	0.42** (2.28)	0.40** (2.39)	0.38** (2.45)	0.34*** (2.70)	0.34*** (2.67)	0.34*** (2.65)	0.35** (2.61)	0.36** (2.58)	0.35** (2.61)	0.36** (2.35)	0.35** (2.37)	0.38** (2.23)
Equal strength	1.00 (0.00)	0.97 (0.06)	0.91 (0.20)	0.92 (0.18)	1.08 (0.16)	1.06 (0.12)	0.95 (0.10)	0.93 (0.14)	0.94 (0.13)	0.94 (0.11)	0.95 (0.10)	1.05 (0.10)	1.03 (0.05)	1.01 (0.01)	1.02 (0.03)
Cold War	3.07*** (4.89)	2.86*** (4.43)	2.78*** (4.23)	2.65*** (4.07)	2.76*** (4.43)	2.72*** (4.26)	2.36*** (3.48)	2.23*** (3.53)	2.25*** (3.60)	2.16*** (3.53)	2.22*** (3.72)	2.02*** (3.03)	1.99*** (2.85)	1.91*** (2.69)	1.80** (2.43)
Internationalized conflict	3.50*** (3.60)	3.34*** (3.46)	3.01*** (3.19)	2.95*** (3.14)	2.67*** (3.19)	2.69*** (3.24)	2.57*** (3.16)	2.52*** (3.11)	2.54*** (3.15)	2.54*** (3.19)	2.50*** (3.15)	2.37*** (2.99)	2.25*** (2.83)	2.25*** (2.81)	2.46*** (3.41)
Population size (log)	1.19** (2.52)	1.19** (2.40)	1.17** (2.10)	1.15* (1.96)	1.16* (1.98)	1.17** (2.03)	1.24*** (3.02)	1.26*** (3.28)	1.27*** (3.42)	1.28*** (3.44)	1.28*** (3.44)	1.30*** (3.46)	1.28*** (3.25)	1.29*** (3.45)	1.27*** (3.07)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.37** (2.35)	0.40** (2.15)	0.40** (2.04)	0.43* (1.91)	0.47* (1.78)	0.46* (1.86)	0.38** (2.43)	0.38** (2.38)	0.38** (2.39)	0.40** (2.19)	0.44** (2.04)	0.42** (2.20)	0.47* (1.79)	0.47* (1.75)	0.41** (2.17)
Ethnic polarization	0.39*** (3.21)	0.39*** (3.19)	0.39*** (2.99)	0.36*** (3.46)	0.36*** (3.35)	0.36*** (3.38)	0.37*** (3.29)	0.38*** (3.25)	0.39*** (3.20)	0.40*** (3.22)	0.40*** (3.19)	0.41*** (3.25)	0.41*** (3.19)	0.42*** (3.10)	0.44*** (3.07)
Democracy	0.49*** (2.84)	0.49*** (2.76)	0.49*** (2.81)	0.53** (2.48)	0.51** (2.56)	0.52** (2.47)	0.45*** (3.09)	0.45*** (3.05)	0.44*** (3.05)	0.44*** (3.02)	0.44*** (3.07)	0.42*** (3.07)	0.41*** (3.06)	0.40*** (3.08)	0.44*** (2.76)
Duration (log)	0.51*** (9.36)	0.51*** (9.04)	0.52*** (8.11)	0.52*** (8.13)	0.52*** (8.03)	0.52*** (7.72)	0.54*** (7.30)	0.55*** (7.18)	0.55*** (7.21)	0.54*** (7.50)	0.53*** (7.55)	0.53*** (7.60)	0.53*** (7.25)	0.53*** (7.02)	0.53*** (6.99)
Observations	148	145	141	140	139	137	130	129	128	127	126	124	121	120	117
R ²	0.66	0.65	0.64	0.64	0.66	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.66	0.65	0.65	0.66

Coefficients are exponentiated and absolute t-statistics, clustered by country, are shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is log-transformed. Results presented for battle death thresholds which resulted in observations being removed. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

E Random Drop Tests for the Intensity and Duration Analyses

Using the same procedure as in Figure 4 in the main text, we simulate the statistical effect of dropping observations for the conflict intensity and conflict duration analyses by randomly deleting the equivalent number of observations excluded by each battle death threshold 1,000 times.¹

E.1 Conflict Duration

Figure A.1 presents the results for the conflict duration analysis (this corresponds to Figure 5 in the main text). The pattern in Figure A.1 differs significantly from systemically changing the battle death threshold indicating that the results are not driven by a loss of statistical efficiency. Indeed, the confidence intervals remain on opposite sides of zero while the point estimates remain stable at around -11 percent rather than decreasing dramatically as they do in Figure 5 in the main text.

1. Note that we randomly simulate 1,000 datasets for each unique number of remaining observations. As such, if the shift to a higher battle death threshold does not exclude additional observations, we only simulate that number of missing observations once. The list of unique numbers of remaining observations is in the second column of the table accompanying Figure 2 in the main text.





Figure A.1. Simulated percent change in hazard of conflict termination (from no drug cultivation to drug cultivation) when randomly deleting observations to accord with the number of observations excluded by each battle death threshold. Each point estimate represents the mean of 1,000 randomly simulated datasets


E.2 Conflict Intensity

Figure A.2a presents the results for the conflict intensity model without a duration control (this corresponds to the analysis in Figure 6a in the main text). The pattern in Figure A.2a differs significantly from the battle death threshold analysis indicating that the results are not driven by a loss of statistical efficiency. While the confidence intervals cross zero after 80 observations have been removed randomly, systematically dropping observations according to battle death thresholds does not result in a similar change in the precision of the estimates in Figure 6a in the main text. This illustrates that there is a systematic pattern linking drug cultivation and conflict intensity across a range of battle death thresholds unrelated to simply dropping observations.

Figure A.2b presents the results for the conflict intensity model including a duration control (this corresponds to Figure 6b in the main text). Once again, the pattern in Figure A.2b differs significantly from systematically changing the battle death threshold indicating that the results are not driven by a loss of statistical efficiency. Indeed, while the confidence intervals quickly cross zero in the battle death threshold analysis, the 90 percent confidence intervals only cross zero after randomly dropping nearly 120 observations. Moreover, unlike in Figure 6b in the main text, the point estimates remain quite stable at approximately -60 percent.



(a) Excluding Duration Control



(b) Including Duration Control

Figure A.2. Simulated percent change in conflict intensity (from no drug cultivation to drug cultivation) when randomly deleting observations to accord with the number of observations excluded by each battle death threshold. Each point estimate represents the mean of 1,000 randomly simulated datasets

F Matching Analysis

Matching is an important data pre-processing technique that can help to ameliorate unit heterogeneity, namely by “pruning” (i.e. dropping) or weighting observations that fall outside of common support. Note, however, that this technique cannot overcome the problem of causal heterogeneity. To see this, take a hypothetical example where we are interested in the effect of some treatment, T , on some dependent variable of interest. Let us assume we have a sample of intrastate conflicts that includes both coups and major civil wars, and that we choose to pre-process the data to maximize balance on observed covariates for our treated cases and control cases. For convenience, let us assume that after running our matching procedure, we are left with 100 coups and 100 major civil wars. Of the coups, 50 are treated with T and 50 are not. Likewise, of the civil wars, 50 are treated with T and 50 are not. Assume further that the 50 treated and 50 control coups can be perfectly matched with one another on all observed covariates X , and that the 50 treated and 50 control civil wars can likewise be perfectly matched with one another. Assume also that there are no unobservables. Let the true treatment effect of T on coups be “0”, and the true treatment effect of T on civil wars be “1”.


If we were to run a least squares regression to estimate the treatment effect of T using only the matched sub-sample of coups, we would find no effect (“0”).² If we were to do the same to estimate the treatment effect for only the matched sub-sample of civil wars, we would find an effect of “1”. But if we were to estimate the treatment effect for our full sample of all matched intrastate conflicts (i.e. both coups and civil wars), we would find an effect of “0.5.” Here, despite the fact that matching helped balance covariates across treated and control cases for both coups and civil wars, the true treatment effect of T for both sub-populations was obscured when they were estimated in the same linear model.

To demonstrate that matching cannot ameliorate the problem we highlight in Section


2. Of course, assuming perfect balance, running an least squares regression would not be necessary—one could simply take the difference in means of the treated and control groups. In practice, however, perfect balance is often impossible, and so scholars generally adjust with regression after pre-processing the data with matching.

3 in the main text, we have employed matching techniques and re-run our analysis at the 25 battle-related death threshold level with multiple matching techniques: nearest neighbor, optimal, and full.³ We plot our results in Figure A.3. For total battle deaths, across all matching methods, the substantive effect of drugs on total battle deaths in the matched sample is estimated to be virtually unchanged from a naive (non-matched) estimate, hovering around the -60 percent mark. Moreover, these estimates are statistically significant at the 95% level, and some of these routines (such as full matching) even return more precise estimates. Similarly, for duration, pre-processing the data by matching does not have a notable effect on the substantive results or the precision of the estimates. In other words, matching across the set of covariates included in the analysis is not enough to solve the problem that drugs play very different roles in coups versus civil wars. Even when we maximize balance on observed covariates using matching techniques, causal heterogeneity is having a pernicious effect on our estimates of the relationships between drugs and total battle deaths and conflict duration.

3. We use the `MatchIt` software package for R to conduct this analysis (Ho et al. 2007, 2011). Table A.8 reports the balance statistics for all three specifications.



(a) Total Battle Deaths



(b) Conflict Duration

Figure A.3. The effect of drug cultivation on total battle death and conflict duration when employing various matching methods

Table A.8. Balance Statistics

Total Battle Deaths

	Un-Matched			Nearest Matching			Optimal Matching			Full Matching		
	Mean Treated	Mean Control	Mean Difference	Mean Treated	Mean Control	Mean Difference	Mean Treated	Mean Control	Mean Difference	Mean Treated	Mean Control	Mean Difference
Gem Prod.	0.65	0.17	0.48	0.65	0.59	0.06	0.65	0.59	0.06	0.65	0.65	0.00
Hydrocarbons (In)	0.38	0.29	0.09	0.38	0.29	0.09	0.38	0.26	0.12	0.38	0.35	0.04
Hydrocarbons (Out)	0.53	0.50	0.03	0.53	0.41	0.12	0.53	0.38	0.15	0.53	0.37	0.16
Mountains (log)	-1.35	-4.20	2.85	-1.35	-1.52	0.18	-1.35	-1.56	0.21	-1.35	-1.58	0.23
Border Conflict	0.85	0.60	0.25	0.85	0.82	0.03	0.85	0.85	0.00	0.85	0.90	0.04
Weak Rebel Group	0.91	0.80	0.12	0.91	0.91	0.00	0.91	0.88	0.03	0.91	0.92	0.01
Equal Strength	0.06	0.11	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.09	0.03	0.06	0.05	0.01
Cold War	0.62	0.60	0.02	0.62	0.74	0.12	0.62	0.74	0.12	0.62	0.72	0.10
Internationalized	0.09	0.12	0.04	0.09	0.09	0.00	0.09	0.15	0.06	0.09	0.08	0.01
Population Size (log)	10.36	9.79	0.57	10.36	10.15	0.21	10.36	10.07	0.29	10.36	10.74	0.38
Eth. Frac.	0.52	0.54	0.02	0.52	0.52	0.00	0.52	0.51	0.01	0.52	0.49	0.02
Eth. Pol.	0.91	0.82	0.09	0.91	0.85	0.06	0.91	0.85	0.06	0.91	0.78	0.13
Democracy	0.24	0.21	0.02	0.24	0.18	0.06	0.24	0.18	0.06	0.24	0.28	0.05

Duration

	Un-Matched			Nearest Matching			Optimal Matching			Full Matching		
	Mean Treated	Mean Control	Mean Difference	Mean Treated	Mean Control	Mean Difference	Mean Treated	Mean Control	Mean Difference	Mean Treated	Mean Control	Mean Difference
Mountains (log)	-1.35	-4.30	2.95	-1.35	-1.78	0.43	-1.35	-1.91	0.56	-1.35	-1.74	0.39
Other Resources	0.85	0.69	0.16	0.85	0.91	0.06	0.85	0.82	0.03	0.85	0.88	0.03
GDP/capita (log)	0.03	0.24	0.21	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.03	-0.04	0.07	0.03	-0.22	0.25
Weak Rebel Group	0.91	0.80	0.11	0.91	0.85	0.06	0.91	0.88	0.03	0.91	0.89	0.02
Equal Strength	0.06	0.11	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.08	0.02
Internationalized	0.09	0.11	0.02	0.09	0.12	0.03	0.09	0.09	0.00	0.09	0.11	0.02
Cold War	0.62	0.62	0.00	0.62	0.62	0.00	0.62	0.71	0.09	0.62	0.73	0.11
Population Size (log)	10.36	9.82	0.54	10.36	9.99	0.37	10.36	10.17	0.19	10.36	10.55	0.19
Eth. Frac	0.52	0.54	0.02	0.52	0.56	0.05	0.52	0.54	0.02	0.52	0.56	0.04
Democracy	0.24	0.22	0.01	0.24	0.18	0.06	0.24	0.18	0.06	0.24	0.14	0.10
Territorial	0.50	0.40	0.10	0.50	0.38	0.12	0.50	0.44	0.06	0.50	0.33	0.17
Border Conflict	0.85	0.59	0.26	0.85	0.82	0.03	0.85	0.88	0.03	0.85	0.84	0.01

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