## Supplementary Appendix

Table A.1: Supermajoritarian Override Requirements and Gubernatorial Success (Alternative Dependent Variable)

				Gov. Pr	oposal≤	Enacted Budg.
Independent Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Supermajority Requirement	-0.90	-0.79	-1.42	-1.33	-1.12	-1.37
	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.63)	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.59)
Gubernatorial success $_{t-1}$	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.14	0.14	0.12
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Itom voto	0.10	0.07	0.05	0.53	0.36	1.06
Item veto	(0.10)	(0.41)	(0.03)	(0.33)	(0.30)	(1.00)
	(0.00)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(1.01)
Governor's proposal (billions of \$, logged)	-0.51	-0.39	-0.43	-1.29	-0.87	-1.48
	(0.65)	(0.35)	(0.75)	(0.83)	(0.38)	(0.94)
Divided government	-0.35	-0.40	-0.33	-0.77	-0.61	-0.68
	(0.71)	(0.62)	(0.66)	(0.94)	(0.84)	(0.88)
Lower chamber copartisans	-1.18	-0.93	-1.22	-3.25	-2.16	-2.89
	(2.72)	(1.88)	(2.69)	(3.13)	(2.32)	(3.11)
I	F 10	۲.00	F F 1	2.0	ົ້າຄະ	4.00
Legislative professionalism	5.10	5.09	0.01 (5.62)	5.02	3.80	(6.58)
	(0.92)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(1.10)	(1.01)	(0.58)
GSP (per capita)	65.09	40.93	58.47	111.54	79.71	100.45
	(40.11)	(32.97)	(42.93)	(40.03)	(29.95)	(44.47)
ln(Unemployment)	-0.30	-0.38	-1.38	0.80	0.37	-0.23
	(1.02)	(0.80)	(1.20)	(0.95)	(0.78)	(0.94)
State Population (in millions)	0.08	0.05	0.06	0.26	0.13	0.24
state i optimition (in minione)	(0.25)	(0.12)	(0.25)	(0.33)	(0.16)	(0.34)
Complexity and the second seco	()	(- )	0.97	()	()	1.00
Gov. budget preparation authority			-0.87			-1.09
			(0.47)			(0.50)
Gov. discretion over federal funds			0.36			0.78
			(0.52)			(0.72)
Governor can reorganize budget depts.			-0.62			-0.35
			(0.50)			(0.51)
Governor can reduce budget			-0.23			0.20
			(0.38)			(0.44)
Commentation lineite			0.20			0.49
Governor term limits			-0.39			-0.48
			(0.23)			(0.20)
Legislative term limits			-0.23			-0.67
			(0.42)			(0.67)
Tax and expenditure limits			1.39			1.59
			(0.64)			(0.83)
Initiative process			0.16			-0.62
			(0.62)			(0.61)
$(\mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{r}}, \mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{r}}, \mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{r}}, \mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{r}})$	1410	19.07	15 54	07.07	90.10	24.10
(Constant)	(12.22)	12.07	10.04 (13.86)	(17.02)	20.19	(10.24)
	(12.00)	(0.00)	(10.00)	(11.02)	(0.42)	(13.24)
N	853	1035	853	577	696	577
MSE	5.97	5.56	5.93	6.27	5.81	6.24
Ulusters Veen fixed effects	182 V	218 Vez	182 V	164 V	199 Vez	164 Var
rear fixed-effects	res	res	res	res	res	res

Entries are linear regression coefficient estimates and standard errors, clustered by governor. The dependent variable is the absolute value of the difference between the governor's proposed budget (as a percentage change of the previous budget) and the legislature's enacted budget (as a percentage change of the previous budget). The supermajority variable in models (1) and (3) indicates states with a veto override threshold of 3/5 or 2/3, excluding states with supermajority budgetary passage requirements. In model (2) the supermajority variable indicates states with 3/5 or 2/3 veto override requirements or states that require legislative supermajorities to approve the state budget. Year fixed effects are included in all models but not reported. Alaska, Nebraska, Maryland and Wyoming are excluded from all models.

				Gov. Pr	roposal≤	Enacted Budg.
Independent Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Supermajority Requirement	-0.77	-0.75	-1.28	-1.23	-1.22	-1.30
	(0.46)	(0.43)	(0.52)	(0.53)	(0.48)	(0.54)
Gubernatorial $success_{t-1}$	0.05	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.07	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Item veto	-0.06	0.03	-0.32	0.25	0.28	0.45
	(0.46)	(0.37)	(0.56)	(0.57)	(0.43)	(0.62)
Governor's proposal (billions of \$ logged)	-0.37	-0.43	-0.19	-1.03	-0.93	-1.07
coverner 5 proposar (simons or \$, logged)	(0.46)	(0.30)	(0.51)	(0.52)	(0.31)	(0.54)
Divided government	0.44	0.49	0.41		0.69	0.70
Divided government	-0.44 (0.46)	-0.42 (0.42)	-0.41 (0.43)	(0.59)	-0.08 (0.52)	-0.79
- · · ·	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.55)
Lower chamber copartisans	-1.84	-1.24	-1.71	-4.02	-2.73	-3.53
	(2.21)	(1.51)	(2.10)	(2.00)	(1.80)	(2.04)
Legislative professionalism	4.94	4.89	5.03	3.79	4.10	4.97
	(4.30)	(4.10)	(4.10)	(4.46)	(4.40)	(4.26)
GSP (per capita)	53.49	38.48	41.65	103.85	81.36	89.08
	(36.01)	(31.24)	(37.20)	(35.46)	(28.90)	(38.93)
ln(Unemployment)	0.01	0.08	-0.98	1.32	0.86	0.44
	(0.83)	(0.69)	(0.91)	(0.85)	(0.71)	(0.77)
State Population (in millions)	0.01	0.03	-0.02	0.13	0.10	0.09
( )	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.09)	(0.18)
Gov budget preparation authority			-0.77			-1.01
Gov. Budget preparation authority			(0.38)			(0.45)
Con digonation over federal funda			0.02			0.94
Gov. discretion over lederal funds			-0.03 (0.36)			(0.24)
~			(0.50)			(0.40)
Governor can reorganize budget depts.			-0.65			-0.34
			(0.41)			(0.30)
Governor can reduce budget			-0.28			0.20
			(0.38)			(0.43)
Governor term limits			-0.31			-0.31
			(0.19)			(0.19)
Legislative term limits			-0.10			-0.33
-			(0.35)			(0.45)
Tax and expenditure limits			1 13			1 14
			(0.44)			(0.48)
Initiativo process			0.25			-0.41
initiative process			(0.23)			(0.48)
	10.10	10.07	(0.00)	05.00	00.00	00.01
(Constant)	12.12 (0.71)	13.07 (6.35)	11.(0)	(11.66)	23.33 (7.20)	(11.00)
	(3.11)	(0.55)	(10.47)	(11.00)	(1.20)	(11.90)
N	892	1081	892	604	728	604
MSE	4.53 187	4.29 222	4.49	4.12	3.87 204	4.08
Vear fixed-effects	Yes	220 Yes	Yes	Yes	204 Yes	Yes
	100	- 00	- 00		- 00	2.00

Table A.2: Supermajoritarian Override Requirements and Gubernatorial Success (Alternative Dependent Variable)

Entries are linear regression coefficient estimates and standard errors, clustered by governor. The dependent variable is the absolute value of the difference between the governor's proposed budget and the legislature's enacted budget, as a percentage of the final enacted budget (multipled by 100). The supermajority variable in models (1) and (3) indicates states with a veto override threshold of 3/5 or 2/3, excluding states with supermajority budgetary passage requirements. In model (2) the supermajority variable indicates states with 3/5 or 2/3 veto override requirements or states that require legislative supermajorities to approve the state budget. Year fixed effects are included in all models but not reported. Alaska, Nebraska, Maryland and Wyoming are excluded from all models.

Independent Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
Second year of term	-0.00	0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Third year of term	-0.01	0.00	-0.00
Denutlance of terms	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Fourth year of term	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.02)
First term governor	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
log(Population)	0.98	0.92	0.97
Supermajority Requirement	-0.18	_0.16	-0.07
Supermajority requirement	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.01)
Gubernatorial $\operatorname{success}_{t-1}$	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Item veto	0.24	0.13	0.31
Divided government	0.01	-0.04	0.00
Divided government	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.00)
Lower chamber copartisans	-0.01	-0.19	-0.03
	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.16)
Legislative professionalism	0.41 (0.33)	0.60 (0.29)	0.48 (0.24)
GSP (per capita)	28 27	31.68	26.07
Goi (per capita)	(3.69)	(3.97)	(3.23)
$\ln(\text{Unemployment})$	-0.06	0.03	0.03
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.07)
Gov. budget preparation authority			(0.03)
Gov. discretion over federal funds			0.08
			(0.03)
Governor can reorganize budget depts.			0.04
Courses on aduce hudget			(0.03)
Governor can reduce budget			(0.00)
Governor term limits			-0.01
			(0.02)
Legislative term limits			-0.11
Tay and expenditure limits			-0.05
Tax and expenditure mines			(0.03)
Initiative process			-0.12
			(0.05)
(Constant)	6.28 (0.53)	7.10	6.28
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.11)
N MSE	$854 \\ 0.24$	$1035 \\ 0.25$	$854 \\ 0.21$
Clusters	167	198	167
Year fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
F-test, endogeneity of gov's proposal	5.15	6.81	6.45
<i>p</i>	0.02	0.01	0.01
Partial R-squared	0.89	0.86	0.88
Joint F-test of instruments	271.44	224.65	341.09
p	0.00	0.00	0.00

Table B.1: First-stage results

Entries are first stage coefficients and standard errors, clustered by governor, from instrumental variables estimation. The dependent variable is the governor's per capita budget proposal. The supermajority variable in models (1) and (3) indicates states with a veto override threshold of 3/5 or 2/3, excluding states with supermajority budgetary passage requirements. In model (2) the supermajority variable indicates states with 3/5 or 2/3 veto override requirements or states that require legislative supermajorities to approve the state budget. Year fixed effects are included in all models but not reported. Alaska, Nebraska, Maryland and Wyoming are excluded from all models.