A Supplementary Material for "Unequal We Fight: The Impact of Economic Inequality Within Ethnic Groups on Conflict Initiation"

Validating GeoEPR group shape files with DHS survey data

The map below shows the ethnic group settlement regions of Sierra Leone according to the GeoEPR dataset (green: Kono, yellow: Mende, blue: Limba, red: Temne). The small dots show the self-reported ethnicity of DHS respondents. Since we only know the location of survey clusters, the respondents of each cluster are arranged as circles around the cluster location. We can see that to a large extent, the self-reported ethnicity of respondents corresponds to the ethnicity predicted by the GeoEPR dataset. However, urban regions (see e.g. Freetown in the West of the country) typically feature a very diverse population, which is difficult to measure using GeoEPRs regional group representation.


Figure A.1: Validating GeoEPR group locations with DHS survey data.

Controlling for Regional Fixed Effects

Models A1 and A2 in Table A.1 control for regional fixed effects. Model A1 and A2 re-run Models 3 and 7 from Table 1 adding regional fixed effects.

	(A1) Logit b/se	(A2) Logit b/se
Intra-group inequality	2.428*** (0.602)	1.711 (1.550)
Horizontal inequality	0.531*** (0.132)	1.134*** (0.297)
Excluded	1.472*** (0.355)	0.042 (1.324)
IGI * Excluded		1.740 (1.787)
IGI * Rel. Ineq.		-0.815* (0.431)
N	7263	7263
Log-Likelihood	-334.847	-333.171

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Standard controls from Table 1 and temporal controls (calendar year/peace years) not shown.
Standard errors are clustered at the country-level.

Table A.1: Appendix: Controlling for Regional Fixed Effects

The figure below displays the simulated marginal effect plot based on Model A2.

Figure A.2: Average simulated marginal effect plot based on Model A2

Controlling for Group-Level Wealth

Models A3 and A4 in Table A.2 control for group wealth. Model A3 and A4 re-run Models 3 and 7 from Table 1 adding group-level GDP per capita.

	(A3) Logit b/se	(A4) Logit b/se
Intra-group inequality	2.143*** (0.528)	0.911 (1.496)
Horizontal inequality	0.481*** (0.147)	0.775*** (0.234)
Excluded	1.343*** (0.339)	-0.103 (1.189)
IGI * Excluded		1.801 (1.590)
IGI * Rel. Ineq.		-0.400 (0.325)
Group Wealth	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
N	7279	7279
Log-Likelihood	-341.424	-340.655

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Standard controls from Table 1 and temporal controls (calendar year/peace years) not shown.
Standard errors are clustered at the country-level.

Table A.2: Appendix: Controlling for group-level wealth

The figure below displays the simulated marginal effect plot based on Model A4.


Figure A.3: Average simulated marginal effect plot based on Model A4

Controlling for Oil Exporters

Models A5 and A6 in Table A.3 control for oil exporters based on Ross (2013). Model A5 and A6 re-run Models 3 and 7 from Table 1 adding an oil exporter dummy.

	(A5) Logit b/se	(A6) Logit b/se
Intra-group inequality	2.082*** (0.520)	0.915 (1.474)
Horizontal inequality	0.488*** (0.153)	0.812*** (0.215)
Excluded	1.345*** (0.343)	-0.100 (1.149)
IGI * Excluded		1.787 (1.569)
IGI * Rel. Ineq.		-0.448 (0.293)
Oil Exporter	-0.138 (0.527)	-0.069 (0.524)
N	7279	7279
Log-Likelihood	-341.699	-340.844

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Standard controls from Table 1 and temporal controls (calendar year/peace years) not shown.
Standard errors are clustered at the country-level.

Table A.3: Appendix: Controlling for oil exporters

The figure below displays the simulated marginal effect plot based on Model A6.

Figure A.4: Average simulated marginal effect plot based on Model A6

Controlling for State Strength

Models A7 and A8 in Table A.4 control for state strength. Model A7 and A8 re-run Models 3 and 7 from Table 1 controlling for the number of coup attempts in the previous two years.

	(A7) Logit b/se	(A8) Logit b/se
Intra-group inequality	2.528*** (0.635)	1.770 (1.543)
Horizontal inequality	0.517*** (0.147)	0.901*** (0.239)
Excluded	1.271*** (0.385)	0.049 (1.340)
IGI * Excluded		1.466 (1.720)
IGI * Rel. Ineq.		-0.537* (0.323)
# of Coup Attempts in previous 2 years	0.187 (0.548)	0.157 (0.552)
N	6770	6770
Log-Likelihood	-328.674	-327.827

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Standard controls from Table 1 and temporal controls (calendar year/peace years) not shown.
Standard errors are clustered at the country-level.

Table A.4: Appendix: Controlling for state strength

The figure below displays the simulated marginal effect plot based on Model A8.

Figure A.5: Average simulated marginal effect plot based on Model A8