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\title{Supplementary Materials}

%\author{Hanna Bäck and Johannes Lindvall, Lund University}

%\thanks{We are grateful to Holger Döring for generously sharing his data on parties and governments and helping us to convert them into country-year format. We are also grateful to Carl Gahnberg for excellent research assistance. We received helpful comments and advice from Despina Alexiadou, Robert Franzese, Peter Santesson-Wilson, and many others. Johannes Lindvall received generous financial support from the European Research Council (Starting Grant 284313).}

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%\begin{abstract}
%Many political scientists and economists have argued that coalition governments tend to accumulate more debt than single-party governments do, but the evidence for this proposition is mixed. We argue that only some coalition governments are more likely to increase public debt than single-party governments:\ coalitions where parties are unable to make credible promises to their partners about future policy. We introduce the concept of ``commitment potential'' within coalitions and propose a way of measuring it. We evaluate our theoretical claims using data on twenty advanced democracies observed over a period of almost fifty years. We find that multi-party governments with high commitment potential do not, on average, accumulate more debt than single-party governments; but governments with low commitment potential do.
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\maketitle

Table 1 contains two models with interactive specifications (making the effect of the coalition variable and the commitment potential variable conditional on the level of debt). In the first model, the positive coefficient for Coalition $\times$ Debt$_{t-1}$ suggests that coalition governments are associated with larger increases (or smaller decreases) in debt when debt is already high. In the second model, the negative coefficient for Commitment Potential $\times$ Debt$_{t-1}$ suggests that this result is largely driven by coalition governments with low commitment potential.

Table 2 re-estimates models (3) and (4) in table 1 in the paper using three different raw debt measures:\ the Reinhart and Rogoff data, the OECD data compiled by Armingeon et al. and the IMF Historical Debt Database. The coefficient for commitment potential remains significantly negative in all these models.

 \begin{sidewaystable}
    \begin{small}
    \begin{centering}
    \caption{Interactive Models of Changes in Debt, 1961--2008}
    \label{tab:int}
    \begin{tabularx}{\textwidth}{Xdd}
        \toprule
        \input{results_interactive_raw}
        \bottomrule
    \end{tabularx}
    \end{centering}
    \end{small}
\end{sidewaystable}

 \begin{sidewaystable}
    \begin{small}
    \begin{centering}
    \caption{Models With Alternative Measures of Debt, 1961--2008}
    \label{tab:alt}
    \begin{tabularx}{\textwidth}{Xdddddd}
        \toprule
        \input{results_altdebt_raw}
        \bottomrule
    \end{tabularx}
    \end{centering}
    \end{small}
\end{sidewaystable}

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